Assignment 4


1. 12.3:

2.

- 1. For $c = e_k(x \parallel h(x))$, if an attacker knows the whole plaintext x then they know the entire input into the encryption. With knowledge of both the input and ciphertext output of the encryption function, the key to the encryption function could be brute forced if the key space is small enough. With knowledge of the key k, an attacker could potentially verify any message x^l . This would only work in a situation where the key k does not change, i.e. this attack would not work with a one-time pad.
- 2. For $c = e_{kl}(x \parallel MAC_{k2}(x))$, the above attack would not work. Assuming the length of k_2 is long enough that the attacker cannot reasonable brute force it, the attacker will not be able to crack the key k_2 to get the correct output of the MAC. Without knowledge of the key to the MAC the attacker cannot get the key k_l and thus will not be able to verify any message x^l .
- (a) Draw the block diagram for both constructions

Matyas-Mever-Oseas

Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (modified)



(b) Show why the modified construction is not secure by using the decryption function of the block cipher to obtain a (second) preimage. Assume H_0 is all zeroes.

If we use the decryption function on the modified Matyas-Meyer-Oseas block, we get the message directly as an output: $Dec(Enc_{Ho}(m_1)) = m_1$ for the first block of the block chain H_0 . If we move to the next block, we know the input to the block will be some message m_2 and the hash result from the previous block, H_1 . We can easily use the decryption function on this block to obtain a second preimage: $Dec(Enc_{H1}(m_2) = m_2)$.

(c) Given the above method for finding preimages, describe how to find collisions.

We can do $Enc_{Hi-1}(m_i) = H_i$ to find an m such that $m_i != m_i^1$ and compute whether $H(m_i) = H(m_i^1)$.

3. Below is the code for my implementation of an AES CBC-MAC:

```
### This is a template file for a simple CBCMAC for Python 3
    Please implement the provided functions and assure that your code
    works correctly for the example given below
    Name: Thomas Mackintosh
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import binascii
out = b''
m1 = b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
m2 = b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy doh'
c1 = b'\x94maSb\x14\x08\x15\xef<\x8c:\xbe\xb9LF'
   = b'|K\x8b\x06\x96K#\x1d\x87\xdd\x1e\xca\xa9o\xad\x83'
def padding(m):
       "Append padding to message in order to
        become multiple of 16 in order to fit in
        AES input
    # single-1 padding (a single 1 followed by zeroes)
# combined with length strengthening where the length in
    # bits is appended as a 64-bit number.
    m hex = binascii.hexlifv(m)
    m_hex += b'80' #single-1 padding appended first
    while len(m_hex) < 120:
    m_hex += b'0'
    m_hex += b'00000158'
    # print ("Message as hex: ", m_hex, "\n")
    return m_hex
def CBCMACbasedOnAES(message, key, init_vec):
      BUMALDaseaunats(message, key, thickey).
""This function computes the MAC of message using key.

The MAC function is CBC-MAC with AES and both single-1
        padding and length strengthening provided by the
        padding function.
        key must be convertible to bytes of length 16 message must be convertible to bytes type"""
    cbc = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, init_vec)
    out = cbc.encrypt(message)[-16:]
    return out
def main():
    #For M1
print("Message: ",m1)
    prad_m = bytes.fromhex(hex(int(padding(m1),16))[2:])
print("Need: ", c1)
CBC = CBCMACbasedOnAES(pad_m, key, iv)
    print("Have: ", CBC, "\n")
    print("Message: ",m2)
pad_m = bytes.fromhex(hex(int(padding(m2),16))[2:])
print("Need: ", c2)
    CBC = CBCMACbasedOnAES(pad_m, key, iv)
    print("Have: ", CBC)
    """ Two testvectors are given below:
    m1 = b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog'
CBC-MAC1 = b'\x94maSb\x14\x08\x15\xef<\x8c:\xbe\xb9LF'
                     b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy doh'
    CBC-MAC2 = b'|K\x8b\x06\x96K\#\x1d\x87\xdd\x1e\xca\xa9o\xad\x83'
    __name__ == '__main__':
main()
```

This code provides the following output:

Message: b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog' Need: b'\x94maSb\x14\x08\x15\xef<\x8c:\xbe\xb9LF' Have: b'\x94maSb\x14\x08\x15\xef<\x8c:\xbe\xb9LF'

Message: b'The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy doh'
Need: b'|K\x8b\x06\x96K#\x1d\x87\xdd\x1e\xca\xa9o\xad\x83'
Have: b'|K\x8b\x06\x96K#\x1d\x87\xdd\x1e\xca\xa9o\xad\x83'

4. Below is the code for cracking hashed passwords using SHA512:

```
from Crypto.Hash import SHA512
from timeit import default_timer as timer
def crack_passwords(passwords_from_file):
    with open('dictionary.txt', 'r') as fh:
         dictionary = [line.rstrip('\r\n') for line in fh.readlines()]
         dictl = len(dictionary) - 1
         for i in range (0,len(passwords_from_file),1):
             #start = timer() can be used to measure how long it takes to crack each password
vec = passwords_from_file[i].split('$') #Separates each line into its individual parts
                   for j in range(0, dictl, 1):
    Hash = SHA512.new(vec[2].encode('utf-8') + dictionary[j].encode('utf-8'))
                       for k in range(0,4999,1): #All are SHA512 and default to 5000 rounds
Hash = SHA512.new(Hash.hexdigest().encode('utf-8'))
                       if (Hash.hexdigest() == vec[3]):
    pt.append(dictionary[j])
                            end = timer()
                            print(dictionary[j]) #Print dictionary word on successful crack
                   for j in range(0, dictl,1):
                       Hash = SHA512.new(vec[3].encode('utf-8')+dictionary[j].encode('utf-8'))
                       for k in range(0,24999,1):
                            Hash =SHA512.new(Hash.hexdigest().encode('utf-8'))
                       if (Hash.hexdigest() == vec[4]):
                            pt.append(dictionary[j])
                            print(dictionary[j]) #Print dictionary word on successful crack
    return pt # return list of plaintexts
with open('passwords.txt', 'r') as fh:
    plaintexts = crack_passwords([line.rstrip('\r\n') for line in fh.readlines()])
    # for i in fh:
    # print i
# Can use this notation to print the final list of plaintexts after all calculations finish
    # Instead I print the words as they are found withing the crack_passwords function
```

The above code provides the following output:

Airmont Ansonia Anguilla Apple Grove Altus Algonquin Algerita Annandale Alvwood Allenhurst Ambler Alamance Allen City Anselma Ambridge Agency Adgateville Accord Abeytas Advance

If we output the code with the time taken to crack each password, we get the following output:

```
PASSWORD: Airmont Time taken: 5.550299001018196 seconds PASSWORD: Ansonia Time taken: 20.517417489987565 seconds PASSWORD: Anguila Time taken: 8.958472188998712 seconds PASSWORD: Algorida Time taken: 23.13965288698091 seconds PASSWORD: Algorida Time taken: 9.997414041991578 seconds PASSWORD: Algorida Time taken: 9.50819558015792 seconds PASSWORD: Annolade Time taken: 19.62534457989084 seconds PASSWORD: Almolard Time taken: 19.62534457989084 seconds PASSWORD: Almolard Time taken: 22.17496778027103 seconds PASSWORD: Almolard Time taken: 6.359459736995632 seconds PASSWORD: Almolard Time taken: 10.89969251700677 seconds Time taken: 20.171272645995487 seconds PASSWORD: Angulard Time taken: 12.6873442449898 seconds PASSWORD: Aggerty Time taken: 12.6873442449898 seconds PASSWORD: Adgateville Time taken: 16.702048188017216 seconds PASSWORD: Abeytas Time taken: 6.616238359012641 seconds Time taken: 2.9110286129871383 seconds
```

PASSWORD: Advance Time taken: 18.245870003011078 seconds

From the above results, we see that it takes \$1.04014845800702 seconds to get through the first 5 passwords which are preceded with a salt at 5000 rounds (average 16.2080296916 seconds per password.) We also see it takes 130.680724372 seconds to get through the next 10 passwords without a hash at 5000 rounds (average 13.068072437 seconds per password.) Lastly, it takes 44.840311862 seconds to get through the last 5 passwords which are hashed at 25000 rounds without a salt (average 8.9680623724 seconds.) From this data we can see the most secure form of SHA512 is with a salt at 5000 rounds. SHA512 hashed at 25000 rounds is the least secure as it can be broken the quickest.