



Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning


Executive Overview Brief

February 2016





We traditionally see ourselves at either peace or war, with war being an undesirable exception.




In response, we're pre-disposed to seek a rapid, conclusive "end" and return to normalcy – even though that is not our historical experience.

At times, the DoD exhibits an incomplete understanding of war/conflict (Ex. our "first battles"). Moreover, we've created and maintained a framework to our liking – one in a manner of how we would prefer conflict to unfold, but not one reflecting reality.

Within the defense community, this has led to a narrow and inelastic interpretation of operational art and a flawed philosophy and model of campaigning.




Is this a fair model of the universe of competitive Int'l Relations and Differing Styles of Warfare and Conflict?



Do we have adequate theories, concepts, tools, practices, and elements of design to campaign effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict and competition?



Is the current “Notional Plan Phasing Construct” the tool that seeks to account for that universe?




Elements of Operational Design

- Termination
- Military end state
- Objective
- Effects
- Center of gravity
- Decisive point
- Lines of operation and lines of effort
- Direct and indirect approach
- Anticipation
- Operational reach
- Culmination
- Arranging operations
- Forces and functions

Whether we meant it to be or not, this illustration has become a substitute campaign model across DoD.



When do we ‘think’ we actually campaign?




Phase 0 – Shaping
JP 1, JP 3-0, & JP 5-0
describe CCMDRs’
actions in this space
as “routine and
normal activities”

...the model suggests that either DoD is either at peace or waging warfare – but accounts for very little in-between.
JP 1.0’s Chapter IV characterizes CCDRs’ duties as:

“CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders. During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required. During a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions.” -JP 1.0



Where do we focus our institutional attention?



“Steady-State”??


“Sustained Conflict”?

Post-Conflict?



What comes after military success?

What do we tell ourselves we do after achieving military success?



At times, DoD sees this space as discretionary. Alternatively, history demonstrates that it's a very demanding and essential part of the campaign/conflict.

At issue is - this is where we create conditions to achieve or enable desirable and sustainable outcomes.

Assessing this space as "optional" doesn't alleviate the risks resonant and posed by these conditions; nor that we won't have to conduct missions required in this space.

CCDRs consistently execute tasks normally associated with phases IV and V throughout Phase Zero.


"Steady-State"??

"Sustained Conflict"?

Re-characterization



Thoughts on Termination and Military Endstate




In one area of our joint doctrinal prose, we say the military endstate is used to define termination criteria; in another area, we say termination criteria defines the military endstate. Moreover, we say POTUS/SECDEF “give” us the termination criteria; however, analysis of our model suggests these terms are fairly synonymous, but not centered on or tied to achieving a sustainable political outcome.



An Incongruent Trinity

The Relationship of Military End State, Termination, and Realizing the Aim-




Military End State ● ?
Termination ● ?
Realize Aim* ★ ?

- There is an intellectual gap in how DoD theorizes the translation of military success/advantage into enduring and favorable outcomes. *Where in the model would you plot Termination?,... Military End State?,... Realizing the Aim?*
- We need to recognize that we have adopted a poor and ahistorical model to describe that translation, selected bad terms to describe that model, and defined those terms with even worse descriptions.
- We don't account for achieving a sustainable outcome in our philosophy of campaigning and joint design methodology. Joint doctrine explains that in planning - we'll be "told" what to do after we've rapidly and decisively defeated the adversary – Really?? Are there adversarial approaches that avoid or are immune to rapid, decisive operations? What are examples of relevant elements of design that would be useful in crafting campaigns to counter those styles of warfare? How would we translate Mil success in those conditions into outcomes?*How should we begin to re-think our philosophy of campaigning*

*Aim or Outcome is not a current element of Joint Operational Design




How has the US effectively turned military victory into achievement of the aim and favorable, sustainable success?




First of all, a sustainable outcome(s) is the aim of every campaign, not simply the destruction of the adversaries' war-making capability, or merely to attain a Military Endstate and then seek Termination. Successful US-led campaigns account for the deep understanding required, amount of force needed, and time necessary to deliver/enable sustainable outcomes as we move from sustained conflict through a re-characterization period; to creating favorable conditions(when we do it right); then to acceptable security situations; and later to a partnership and an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains/realized advantage. Furthermore, successful campaigns seek to consolidate gains as they materialize. Consolidation isn't elective or discretionary, its required and perpetual. Joint leaders can't wait for an imaginary time/space where conflict and risk are absent in order to consolidate. Finally, Joint Forces execute tasks from all phases, all the time throughout the campaign. Our current joint campaign construct doesn't account for the level of effort, time, and forces required to turn military victory into successful and sustainable outcomes.

Trend of U.S. Consolidation/Commitment Beyond Armed Conflict 1898-2015





Where do we think we see risk across the model?




“Steady-State”??

“Sustained Conflict”?

Re-Characterization




Where do we see risk?







Are our potential adversaries' approaches unfolding within a gap of our Joint Campaigning philosophy and construct? (2 of 2)



State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int'l community charter (such as an UNSCR or NATO Defense Treaty Article) or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn't recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous force without sustained conflict



The Frustration of Alternative Styles of Warfare



- “Hybrid warfare is a term that sought to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categories of conflict. It uses a blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals.”
- “ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has referred to these hybrid threats as an [“inflection point”](#) in modern war. Indeed, in the disordered post-Cold War world, hybrid warfare remains an excellent framework for understanding the changing character of war(fare).”
- “The concept,... allows NATO to avoid action because a range of activities – from the aggressive use of disinformation by Moscow, to economic pressure, to bribery and threats, to use of “locals” to stir up protests – become conveniently categorized as being under the threshold of war. Indeed as one expert, James Sherr, has observed,...Russia(n) hybrid warfare could [“cripple a state](#) before that state even realizes the conflict had begun,” and yet it manages to “slip under NATO’s threshold of perception and reaction.” Sherr is right.”
- Hybrid threats provide the “perfect” conundrum: the injection of so much uncertainty that NATO collapses under its own principle of allied consensus. At what point does the alliance decide if the Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaite, is correct when she remarked that [Lithuania was “already under attack,”](#) with the first stage of confrontation taking place – informational war, propaganda and cyber attack?



Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict

According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

| Traditional Military Methods | New Military Methods |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">-Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War)-Frontal Clashed between large units consisting mostly of ground units-Defeat of Manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control-Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation-Combat operations on land, sea, and air-Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance | <ul style="list-style-type: none">-Military action starts by groups during peacetime (War is not declared at all)-Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable inter-specific fighting groups-Annihilation of the enemy's military power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure-Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)-Use of armed civilians (4 civilians; 1 military)- Simultaneous strike on the enemies units and facilities in all of the territory-Use of Asymmetric and indirect methods <p>Management of troops in a unified informational sphere Sphere.</p> |



Main Guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020...

1. From direct destruction to direct influence
2. From direct annihilation of the opponent to its “inner decay” (and will)
3. From a war with weapons and technology to a culture of war
4. From a war with conventional forces to specifically prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings
5. From the traditional (3D) battle ground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions.
6. From direct clash to “contactless war”
7. From a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s side and base
8. From war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace
9. From symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns
10. From a war in defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.



Modern Russian Approach

Compared to DoD's JOPES Phasing Construct (Bins vs. Phases)

Invisible

Visible

Bin #4

Destabilize thru propaganda to increase discontent, boosted by the arrival of "bands" of militaries, escalating subversion.

Bin #8

Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations

Bin #3

Coercion & Undermining

Bribe, Intimidate,
Deceive government
and military officials

Bin #7

Combined targeted information, electronic warfare & aerospace ops
continuous air force harassment,
with the use of high-tech weapons

Bin #2

Info/Diplomatic Deception

Confuse/Stymie/Mislead
Adversary's understanding
and decision making

Bin #6

Commence military action w/ all types, forms, methods, and forces.

Preceded by large scale recon
and subversive missions.

Bin #1

Non-military asymmetric

warfare - "Favorable
POL/MIL & economic setup"


Bin #5

Establish of no-fly zones over the adversary's country, impose blockades,
Extensive use of private military
companies in close cooperation with
armed opposition units.

In the context of employment, these groupings of activities seem more like bins of tool boxes or capabilities the Russians apply based on local/area METT-TC as opposed to sequential and mechanical phases.



Does the current campaign framework “substitute” help us think through the military’s role and contribution in countering our potential adversaries’ modern styles of warfare?




The Russian “New Gen” Approach compared to how we prefer conflict to unfold

What the Russians are willing to pursue against our partners’ interests in the space that we want to consider “peacetime” is dramatic.

Many nations, including our possible adversaries don’t have the same bi-furcated view that they are either at peace or war. They see their actions “...as a natural part of the ebb and flow of international relations “



Are we seeing other similar approaches unfolding?



It's not too hard to intellectually place the Chinese, nK, ISIL, and Iranian unfolding activities in the same space.



What are the Joint Forces' capabilities and range of activities within in the theater campaign's current description?





| | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Public Affairs | MISO | Precision Strike |
| Civil Affairs | IO | |
| Coop w/ NGOs | Missile Defense | UW |
| HA/DR | IAD | R&S |
| SSA | Detect Threat Networks | Personnel Recovery |
| FID | CT | |
| FMO | 1206 | Raids |
| NEO | MIL Deception | EW |
| MIL Engagement | COIN/SFA | ISR |
| MN Exercises | Counter WMD | |
| | Intel Sharing | Strategic Deploy |

What do our bins of capabilities look like? What should the bins look like? Are these “tools” really integrated or synchronized within a coherent model for campaigning beyond traditional armed conflict? Are these just functional activities employed wherever they can be “squeezed in”, toward loosely or ill-defined objectives? Can we organize, authorize, and arrange these capabilities to counter the adversaries approaches we see currently unfolding?




Don't we need to actually campaign in all spaces?, Do we continue campaigning after sustained hostilities subside?



- ***Have we properly defined this space we currently refer to as Phase 0? How about Phases IV/V and beyond.***
- ***Do we have a clear understanding and framework of how to campaign in these spaces? What is our Theory of Shaping? What is the Joint Force's Theory of Consolidation?***
- ***Do we currently recognize and appreciate the requirements and demands beyond "just" military victory to actually translate that success into real outcomes?***




Are we really accounting for the universe of competitive International Relations and Conflict in our model?



Are we effectively preparing future joint leaders?



Emerging Examples of Alternative Campaigning Models will seek to describe, illustrate, and account for:



- 1. An expanded & relevant array of Factors of Campaign Design**
 - 2. A methodology/description for the idea of shaping**
 - 3. A methodology for translating military success into sustainable outcomes.**
 - 4. The interdependence needed to achieve sustainable outcomes.**
 - 5. Ideas for embedded assessment**
 - 6. That political aims will continually evolve.**
 - 7. The NMS' expanded view of the continuum of conflict.**
 - 8. Hybrid relationships. (Flexible command relationships)**
 - 9. Multiple aspects of risks of non action, risk of strategic failure, risk of changed environment after operations, risks missed opportunities.**
 - 10. The relationship between actions at the strategic level and operational campaigning.**
- * And up to 5-10 more aspects**



Factors of Joint Campaign Design

- Joint operational planning and execution has thirteen elements of operational design.
- Overly simplistic and focused on assisting Joint Commanders and staffs to craft operations to defeat adversaries' war-making capability in armed conflict.
- Don't reflect our historical experiences in translating military success into sustainable outcomes.
- Don't assist and guide joint leaders and staffs toward informed and effective applications of the joint force in conditions beyond or outside of sustained armed conflict.

Elements of Operational Design

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| •Termination | •Direct and indirect approach |
| •Military end state | •Anticipation |
| •Objective | •Operational reach |
| •Effects | •Culmination |
| •Center of gravity | •Arranging operations |
| •Decisive point | •Forces and functions |
| •Lines of operation and lines of effort | |

- Insufficient in scope, irrelevant in many operational contexts, and lacks the necessary precision and depth to effectively guide the development and execution of joint campaigns across the universe of known, emerging, and anticipated patterns of warfare.
- Several of the current elements even inhibit the design of effective campaigns and operations.



Factors of Joint Campaign Design

- An alternative campaign framework must have a much broader, relevant, and precise set of factors of design that:
 1. Expands our understanding of operational art
 2. Provides to model to coherently develop successful campaigns
 3. Orients on outcomes not simply military success.
- Examples of new and logical considerations or factors of actual campaign design. Although discrete, each factor wouldn't be considered in isolation. Moreover, as these are all mutually supportive, they couldn't be considered sequentially, but collectively as a function toward an informed application of the joint force aligned with other forms of power. This array includes, but is not limited to:

- 1) Deep and relevant understanding of the environment, the adversary and its behavior, and the contested political issue(s) at stake within the context of international relations.***
- 2) Living estimate/forecast of the range and time interval of the possible political consequences of the circumstance, in terms of both acceptable & unacceptable futures.***
- 3) Comprehension of the conditions and behaviors the joint force must produce to achieve and enable an outcome within the range of acceptability.***
- 4) Methodology of long-term consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes.***
- 5) Recommendation, selection, legitimization of the initial aim of the associated policy shift – followed by continual maintenance and refinement. (Effective Civ/Mil dialogue)***



Factors of Joint Campaign Design

- 6) Principle and cascading narratives that military actions and activities promote, reinforce, and enable; which in turn empowers the campaign***
- 7) Coherent groupings of authorizations and permissions that enable multiple forms of national power to employ and work in unison.***
- 8) Interagency alignment of simultaneous and inter-related efforts orchestrated toward the outcome.***
- 9) Synchronization, prioritization, and de-confliction of funding over extended periods.***
- 10.) Logic of why the military campaign will work. Methodology of linking and arranging military actions and activities that produce the necessary condition, forces the required adversarial behavior, and leads to a sustainable situation with range of outcomes. This may include concepts for achieving surprise, denial, and deception. Requires continual assessment.***
- 11.) Description of the intricate, simultaneous application and command and control of relevant forces, resources, and capabilities, including the alignment of efforts of all participating combatant commands and specific description of how their contributions enable the campaign and deliver outcomes. (Some of the existing elements of operational design may be informative within this factor)***



Factors of Joint Campaign Design

- In terms of being grouped together and characterized as fundamental to campaign and operational-level planning and execution, this is different. Furthermore, these factors of campaign design are far more relevant than the current array.
- Recent history shows that we accommodate policy shifts with joint efforts formulated using the current elements of operational design, only to discover the critical nature and necessity of these foundational factors and underpinnings of actual campaigning after the fact, or worse – during implementation and execution.
- These factors or these styles of factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective campaign design and adaptive revision in execution.



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Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) -Emerging Solutions-



Central Idea

To meet the military challenge, the future Joint Force will employ an *Integrated Campaigning Approach* that:

- Views the environment as one comprised of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict;
- Employs an alternative joint campaigning construct;
- Aligns efforts with the other instruments of power; and
- Applies an expanded set of principles for planning and execution.

The *Integrated Campaigning Approach* combines military and non-military activities with greater agility to gain and maintain the initiative in a complex environment against adversaries aiming to subtly undermine U.S., allied, and partner national security interests.



A Different View of the Environment



Integrated Campaigning Construct

