



# Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning


## ***Executive Overview Brief***

*August 2016*





*We traditionally see ourselves at either peace or war, with war being an undesirable exception.*



*In response, we’re pre-disposed to seek a rapid, conclusive “end” and return to normalcy – even though that is not our historical experience.*


*At times, the DoD exhibits an incomplete understanding of war/conflict (Ex. our “first battles”). Moreover, we’ve created and maintained a framework to our liking – one in a manner of how we would prefer conflict to unfold, but not one reflecting reality.*

*Within the defense community, this has led to a narrow and inelastic interpretation of operational art and a flawed philosophy and model of campaigning.*



# Model of the Universe of Competitive Int'l Relations and Differing Styles of Warfare


## How can we leverage new concepts to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and prepare for future warfare?



**Do we have adequate theories, concepts, tools, practices, and elements of design to campaign effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict and competition?**



*Is the current “Notional Plan Phasing Construct “ the tool that seeks to account for that universe?*



Whether we meant it to be or not, this illustration has become a substitute campaign model across DoD.

## Elements of Operational Design

- Termination
  - Military end state
  - Objective
  - Effects
  - Center of gravity
  - Decisive point
  - Lines of operation and lines of effort
  - Direct and indirect approach
  - Anticipation
  - Operational reach
  - Culmination
  - Arranging operations
  - Forces and functions




# JCIC's Three Big Ideas

*In contrast to current joint doctrine, JCIC seeks a more relevant and broader interpretation of operational practice, clear articulation of principles to successfully campaign across the continuum of conflict and competition, and logic to translate that success into sustainable outcomes.*


- Since the early 1990's we've insisted that the idea of shaping is important. However, the joint community hasn't established a framework or usable description of shaping. JCIC seeks to establish clear terms and definitions, recognize patterns of effective shaping, identify principles, define a methodology for planning and execution, and highlight best practices.
- State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int'l community charter or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn't recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches that are characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous uses of force without sustained conflict
- Our current model focuses on decisive operations and orients on military victory. Even for the conflicts we're optimized to fight, it is weak in explaining how the joint force translates the idea of victory into outcomes. There is little explanation of translating success in conditions outside of armed conflict. Furthermore, it casts responsibility for enabling outcomes to others. JCIC seeks to replace the flawed terms of military end state, termination, and "post-war" with the ideas of the consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes, which are historically characterized by a long series of methodical and informed transitions leading to the accomplishment of aims.



# Where/What were the beginnings? – 1992 NMS



## The Base Force Supports the Strategy



NMS 1992. Page 17. "Spectrum of Conventional Conflict"

# *Where/What were the beginnings? 1993 Bottom-Up Review*

## **REPORT ON THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW**




Les Aspin  
Secretary of Defense

October 1993

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
***Both the NMS and BUR cognitive art/pictures are force planning constructs- over time these ideas and mental maps migrated and became campaign/operational constructs***





# Where were the beginnings? – 1993 BUR Conflict Dynamics


## Conflict Dynamics



Report on The Bottoms Up Review 1993. Fig. 6, P. 27 "Conflict Dynamics"



# When do we ‘think’ we actually campaign?




...the model suggests that either DoD is either at peace or waging warfare – but accounts for very little in-between.  
JP 1.0's Chapter IV characterizes CCDRs' duties as:

“CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders. During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required. During a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions.” -JP 1.0



# Where do we focus our institutional attention?



"Steady-State"??


"Sustained Conflict"?

Post-Conflict?



# What comes after military success?

What do we tell ourselves we do after achieving military success?




"Steady-State"??

"Sustained Conflict"?

Re-characterization



## Thoughts on Termination and Military End State




In one area of our joint doctrinal prose, we say the military end state's conditions are used to define termination criteria; in another area, we say termination criteria defines the military end state – just the opposite. Moreover, in our doctrine we declare “JFC must know how POTUS/SECDEF intend to terminate the joint op...” upfront. Does that reflect reality? Regardless, analysis of our model suggests these two terms are fairly synonymous, but not centered on or tied to achieving a sustainable political outcome – more so on ending military operations.



# An Incongruent Trinity

## The Relationship of Military End State, Termination, and Realizing the Aim




- There is an intellectual gap in how DoD theorizes the translation of military success/advantage into sustainable outcomes. Where in the model would you plot Termination?... Military End State?... or the point at which we realize the aim of the policy shift or outcome?
- We need to recognize that we have adopted a poor and ahistorical model to describe that translation, selected bad terms to describe that model, and defined those terms with even worse descriptions.
- Our current terms don't account for achieving a sustainable outcome in our philosophy of campaigning and joint design methodology.

\*Aim or Outcome is not a current element of Joint Operational Design



# The Incongruent Trinity Plus+ One

*Military End State, Termination, Realizing the Aim, and “Post-conflict”*




*Furthermore, where would you plot the idea of “post-conflict”? Before, after, or on top of realizing the aim?*

*Does the idea of “post-conflict” help or hinder our intellectual framework in orienting on outcomes? Do the ideas of Military End State and Termination help us develop successful campaigns? How about in conditions beyond armed conflict?*

*Question: Are there adversarial approaches that avoid or are even immune to rapid, decisive operations? What are examples of relevant factors of design that would be useful in crafting campaigns to counter those styles of warfare? How would we describe translating military success in those conditions into outcomes? Again, do the terms we have help? .....How should we begin to re-think our philosophy of campaigning?*



# Joint Description of Phase IV




*JP 5.0 – mentions redeploy/ment 44x while it mentions Phase IV 4x and describes it a single paragraph with a narrow conception and a poor purpose of why we seek to stabilize an environment. JP 3.0 – mentions redeploy/ment 35x but I could only find where it mentions Phase IV twice. It doesn't describe it at all. As for Joint Stability Ops, JP 3.07 – it mentions redeploy/ment 14x; while highlighting outcomes 6x and "end states" in two sentences. The context of these outcomes in either the JP or the Army FM are with respect to the stability op, not the outcomes tied to a policy shift's aims or a greater campaign's consolidation of gains.*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Center of gravity</li><li>•Decisive point</li><li>•Lines of operation and lines of effort</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Arranging operations</li><li>•Forces and functions</li></ul> |
|--|---|




## How has the US effectively turned military victory into achievement of the aim and favorable, sustainable success?




*First of all, a sustainable outcome is the aim of every campaign, not simply the destruction of the adversaries' war-making capability, or merely to attain a Military Endstate and then seek Termination. Successful US-led campaigns account for the deep understanding required, amount of force needed, and time necessary to deliver/enable outcomes as we move beyond sustained conflict to navigating through a re-characterization period marked by expanding political stakes that can confound our vision of the future; to creating favorable conditions(when we do it right); then to acceptable security situations; and later to a partnership and an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains/realized advantage. Furthermore, successful campaigns seek to consolidate gains as they materialize. Consolidation isn't elective or discretionary, its required and perpetual. Joint leaders can't wait for an imaginary time/space where conflict and risk are absent in order to consolidate. Finally, Joint Forces execute tasks from all phases, all the time throughout the campaign. Our current joint campaign construct does not articulate or account for the level of effort and time required to turn military victory into successful and sustainable outcomes.*

# Trend of U.S. Consolidation/Commitment Beyond Armed Conflict 1898-2015






# Where do we think we see risk across the model?





# Where do we see risk?






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## Are our potential adversaries' approaches unfolding within a gap of our Joint Campaigning philosophy and construct? (2 of 2)



*State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int'l community charter(such as an UNSCR or NATO Defense Treaty Article) or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn't recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous force without sustained conflict*



# *The Frustration of Alternative Styles of Warfare*



- “Hybrid warfare is a term that sought to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categories of conflict. It uses a blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals.”
- “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has referred to these hybrid threats as an “inflection point” in modern war. Indeed, in the disordered post-Cold War world, hybrid warfare remains an excellent framework for understanding the changing character of war(fare).”
- “The concept,... allows NATO to avoid action because a range of activities – from the aggressive use of disinformation by Moscow, to economic pressure, to bribery and threats, to use of “locals” to stir up protests – become conveniently categorized as being under the threshold of war. Indeed as one expert, James Sherr, has observed,...Russia(n) hybrid warfare could “cripple a state before that state even realizes the conflict had begun,” and yet it manages to “slip under NATO’s threshold of perception and reaction.” Sherr is right.”
- Hybrid threats provide the “perfect” conundrum: the injection of so much uncertainty that NATO collapses under its own principle of allied consensus. At what point does the alliance decide if the Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaite, is correct when she remarked that Lithuania was “already under attack,” with the first stage of confrontation taking place – informational war, propaganda and cyber attack?



## Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict

According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War)</li><li>-Frontal Clash between large units consisting mostly of ground units</li><li>-Defeat of Manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control</li><li>-Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation</li><li>-Combat operations on land, sea, and air</li><li>-Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Military action starts by groups during peacetime (War is not declared at all)</li><li>-Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable inter-specific fighting groups</li><li>-Annihilation of the enemy's military power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure</li><li>-Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)</li><li>-Use of armed civilians (4 civilians; 1 military)<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Simultaneous strike on the enemies units and facilities in all of the territory</li></ul></li><li>-Use of Asymmetric and indirect methods</li><li>Management of troops in a unified informational sphere Sphere.</li></ul>



# Modern Russian Approach

Compared to DoD's JOPES Phasing Construct (Bins vs. Phases)

Invisible

Visible

Bin #4

**Destabilize thru propaganda** to increase discontent, boosted by the arrival of “bands” of militaries, escalating subversion.

Bin #3

**Coercion & Undermining**  
Bribe, Intimidate,  
Deceive government  
and military officials

Bin #2

**Info/Diplomatic Deception**  
Confuse/Stymie/Mislead Adversary’s understanding and decision making

Bin #1

**Non-military asymmetric warfare** - “Favorable POL/MIL & economic setup”

Bin #8

**Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations**

Bin #7

**Combined targeted information, electronic warfare & aerospace ops**  
continuous air force harassment, with the use of high-tech weapons

Bin #6

**Commence military action w/ all types, forms, methods, and forces.**  
Preceded by large scale recon and subversive missions.


Bin #5

**Establish of no-fly zones over the adversary’s country, impose blockades,**  
Extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

In the context of employment, these groupings of activities seem more like bins of tool boxes or capabilities the Russians apply based on local/area METT-TC as opposed to sequential and mechanical phases. They have simultaneously “presented” all eight – either through employment or unambiguous signaling.



# *Does the current campaign framework “substitute” help us think through the military’s role and contribution in countering our potential adversaries’ modern styles of warfare?*




The Russian “New Gen” Approach compared to how we prefer conflict to unfold

*What the Russians are willing to pursue against our partners’ interests in the space that we want to consider “peacetime” is dramatic.*

*Many nations, including our possible adversaries don’t have the same bi-furcated view that they are either at peace or war. They see their actions “...as a natural part of the ebb and flow of international relations “*




## *Are we seeing other similar approaches unfolding?*



*It's not too hard to intellectually place the Chinese, nK, ISIL, and Iranian unfolding activities in the same space.*



# Force without War – What can we learn from the past?



- In 1978, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan published the results of landmark study titled, ***Force without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument***. Their study chronicled and analyzed over 200 cases occurring since World War II, where the US employed forces to reinforce or modify foreign actors' behaviors.
  - Although several decades old, the study's context and analysis may be worth considering as we think through how military institutions might adapt to the contemporary environment.
- 
- Highlights that the US has a rich history of confronting antagonists and engaging allies and partners in ambiguous and uncertain conditions less than armed conflict to achieve political objectives.
  - The study's criteria for success was whether or not the specific actor(s) behaved in the manner desired by the policy's aim. Blechman and Kaplan analyze thirty-three substantive cases to determine rates of realization of antagonists' and protagonists' desired behavior sought by the U.S. where the policy included a military dimension.
  - The study captures the trends and results in terms of percentages(%) positive outcomes for both the short term (6 months) and longer term (3 years).
  - Regarding the military dimension's role in conditions beyond armed conflict, Blechman and Kaplan's effort may offer insights as to future optimal and effective applications of force.



## Force without War – What can we learn from the past?



- Examines three general categories of the US' discrete and purposeful use of force beyond armed conflict.
  - The first regards countering an antagonists use or threatened use of force against another actor.
  - The second regards an actor's support to a third party,
  - The third centers on support to regime/state authority.
- In terms of the approach of the US' commitment of force regarding an incident, the authors describe two primary modes.
  - First, the US force was seeking to reinforce existing behavior:
    - to deter the antagonist from behaving in a manner detrimental to US interests;
    - to assure potential protagonists so that they will continue or abstain from a behavior relative to US interests.
  - The second is to modify or change a direction of behavior:
    - to compel antagonists to either act in a manner or to stop behavior running counter to US interests.;
    - to induce a potential protagonist to initiate beneficial or cease harmful actions.
- The study analyzes the US' military experience and success rate in both direct and indirect involvement.
- Highlights circumstances of using force to alter behaviors in both interstate and intrastate conflicts.
- Examines excursions in how the Soviet Union's involvement in many of the cases alters the US' attainment of positive outcomes.



## Force without War – What can we learn from the past?

Assessed as percentage of positive outcomes in 6 months and after 3 years


- Reinforce existing behavior when a change appeared imminent; maintain status quo
- Change behavior once a state embarked upon a certain policy, or initiate actions



Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, The Brookings Institute: 1978




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## Force without War – What can we learn from the past?

Objectives	%Percentage of Positive Outcomes	
	After 6 Months	After 3 years
Use of Force	75	30.6
Contain Use of Force	71.4	14.3
Prevent Initial Use	70	50
Initiate Use of Force	100	**
Prevent Further use	87.5	75
Perm Cessation of use	71.4	0
Regime/State Authority	87.5	62.5
Give up	66.7	66.7
Maintain	100	60
Seize	66.7	66.7
Third Party Support	45.8	29.6
Curtail Support	50	9.1
Do not Initiate	50	50
Initiate Support	33.6	33.6
Other	88.9	92.3
<u>Mode of Use of Force</u>		
Assure	94.7	61.1
Deter	85	66.7
Compel	67.9	17.9
Induce	33.3	22.2
<u>Style of Use of Force</u>		
Direct	79.4	44.1
Indirect	53.8	28.6
Latent	67.9	52
Total	73.1	43.9

"Of the three principle categories of objectives, positive outcomes were most frequent when armed forces were aimed at objectives related to regime/state authority, less frequent when they were aimed at the use of force by another actor, and least frequent when they were aimed at an actor supporting a third party." (Blechman and Kaplan)



# **Force without War – What can we learn from the past?**

***Positive Outcomes were proportionally higher when:***

- A clear and easily interpreted narrative led the commitment of force
- A treaty existed that was supportive of an outcome relative to the incident.
- Previous/Demonstrated willingness to engage in armed conflict/war in that region
- Policy makers were able to deal with US allies without the presence (even the strictly a political sense) of the Soviet Union or Soviet allies.
- The force engaged in recognizable activities germane to the circumstance
- Armed forces were used to reinforce existing behavior before change occurred
- Force was used as a direct and overt instrument to achieve the desired behavior.
- The objective was that an actor not use force again or should not initiate using force.
- Regarding support to existing governments, when they had to deal with principally an internal rather than external antagonists.

# **Force without War – What can we learn from the past?**


***Positive Outcomes were proportionally lower when:***

- The US did not have a relevant presence in the region before the circumstance.
- A poor diagnosis of an antagonist's behavior drove the purpose
- Mis-interpreted a protagonist's propensity to act in friendly interests
- A statement or narrative followed the commitment of force
- The USSR or an ally of the USSR was involved.
- Forces were used to try to modify (compel or induce) behavior after the fact.
- Used in an indirect fashion to achieve the desired behavior.
- U.S. aim was for an actor to continue or permanently cease the use of force.
- The objective was curtailing or seeking an actor to initiate support to a Third Party
- The longer the time horizon; success has a short half-life if not consolidated



# ***Framework for Competition***

*Many of the observed antagonistic approaches are limited, but may not necessarily exercised through proxies. As these issues are matter of great powers in direct competition, the actor in question should be considered both an antagonist and protagonist.*



## Reinforce Existing Behavior

## Modify Behavior

## Actor

# Assure

Deter


## Induce

Compel



# Framework for Competition

An activist approach should consider all methods to coerce favorable behavior, but recognize aspects of the antagonists policy that can't be changed (accept) and delimit what we can still modify.



- Reinforce existing behavior:
  - Deter the antagonist from behaving in a manner detrimental to US interests;
  - Assure potential protagonists so that they will continue or abstain from a behavior relative to US interests.
- Adapt to changes in Antagonistic behavior
  - Accept and recognize a change in an antagonists behavior; appreciate how a fraction of the implications of the change cannot be undone.
  - Delimit to fix, set or define the limits of the behavior and corresponding implications
- Modify or change a direction of behavior:
  - Compel antagonists to either act in a manner commensurate with US interests or to stop behavior running counter to US interests.
  - Induce a potential protagonist to initiate beneficial actions – maybe not directly associated with the circumstance.



# Framework for Competition

Although varying degrees of assurance, deterrence, and exposing the truth exist within conditions of cooperation, they are usually applied individually and only as necessary. The current aspirational model artificially and mistakenly separates current doctrines of Shaping, Deterring, and leveraging/seizing the Initiative for use in different conditions and at different times. A framework for competition focuses on behavior and leverages multiple ideas simultaneously to control escalation and orient on the circumstance.



- Reinforce existing behavior:
  - Deter the antagonist from behaving in a manner detrimental to US interests;
  - Assure potential protagonists so that they will continue or abstain from a behavior relative to US interests.
- Adapt to and Modify changes in Antagonistic behavior
  - Accept, recognize, and Expose a change in an antagonists behavior; appreciate how a fraction of the implications of the change cannot be undone.
  - Delimit to fix, set or define the limits of the behavior and its corresponding implications
  - Compel antagonists to either act in a manner commensurate with US interests or to stop behavior running counter to US interests
  - Induce favorable behavior in associated actors relevant to the circumstance.



# JCIC's Three Big Ideas

*In contrast to current joint doctrine, JCIC seeks a more relevant and broader interpretation of operational practice, clear articulation of principles to successfully campaign across the continuum of conflict and competition, and logic to translate that success into sustainable outcomes.*

- Since the early 1990's we've insisted that the idea of shaping is important. However, the joint community hasn't established a framework or usable description of shaping. JCIC seeks to establish clear terms and definitions, recognize patterns of effective shaping, identify principles, define a methodology for planning and execution, and highlight best practices.
- State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int'l community charter or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn't recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches that are characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous uses of force without sustained conflict
- Our current model focuses on decisive operations and orients on military victory. Even for the conflicts we're optimized to fight, it is weak in explaining how the joint force translates the idea of victory into outcomes. There is little explanation of translating success in conditions outside of armed conflict. Furthermore, it casts responsibility for enabling outcomes to others. JCIC seeks to replace the flawed terms of military end state, termination, and "post-war" with the ideas of the consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes, which are historically characterized by a long series of methodical and informed transitions leading to the accomplishment of aims.



# What are the Joint Forces' capabilities and range of activities within in the theater campaign's current description?

Public Affairs	MISO	Precision Strike
Civil Affairs	IO	
Coop w/ NGOs	Missile Defense	UW
HA/DR	IAD	
	Detect Threat Networks	R&S
SSA	CT	Personnel Recovery
FID	1206	
FMO	MIL Deception	Raids
NEO	COIN/SFA	EW
MIL Engagement	Counter WMD	ISR
MN Exercises	Intel Sharing	Strategic Deploy

What do our bins of capabilities look like? What should the bins look like? Are these “tools” really integrated or synchronized within a coherent model for campaigning beyond traditional armed conflict? Are these just functional activities employed wherever they can be “squeezed in”, toward loosely or ill-defined objectives? Can we organize, authorize, and arrange these capabilities to counter the adversaries approaches we see currently unfolding?



# How has previous doctrine tried to define shaping?

Military Operations Other Than War focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises; Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands.

- JP 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (16 June 1995)

Peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment shaped by a number of factors and variables that strongly influence the manner in which operations can be conducted. Successful commanders grasp the importance of these variables. The critical variables of peace operations are *The level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality.*

- FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* (December 1994)

Military participation in security cooperation activities to support fragile states, avert crisis, or prepare for future operations; Activities in the shaping phase primarily focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent phases.

-JP 3-07 *Stability Operations* (29 September 2011)

The national security and national military strategies establish an imperative for engagement. The US will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world and will maintain military superiority over potential adversaries. Engagement elevates to mission status the role of the US armed forces in shaping an international environment that promotes and protects US national security interests, before the threat of conflict arises. Forward basing, forward presence, and force projection enhance the ability of Army forces to engage other nations—their people, governments, and militaries

- FM 3-0 *Operations* (June 2001)

*Historically, we have focused on indirectly describing some components of shaping. Absent from doctrine is a comprehensive way to think about how operations other than war fit in the larger specific strategic objective and the overall campaign plan—we just say that it is important.*



# How do we currently attempt to define 'shaping'?

Current Joint Publications

- Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations.
- Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations.
- A TCP is based on planning guidance provided by the GEF and JSCP. A TCP operationalizes CCDR functional and theater strategies. Campaign plans focus on the command's steady-state (Phase 0) activities, which include ongoing operations, security cooperation, and other shaping or preventive activities for the next 5 years.

- *JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 March 2013)*

- Steady-state operations and activities, which encompass shaping activities (including shaping elements of contingency plans)... (JP 5-0 pg. II-22)
- Developing the Operational Approach...What will be the likely consequences as we seek to **shape the operational environment toward a desired set of conditions?** (JP 5-0 pg. III-14)
- Stability Mechanisms...Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help **to shape the human dimension** of the operational environment more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. Stability mechanisms may include **compel, control, influence, and support.** (JP 5-0 pg. III-30)
- Ensure success by **shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations**, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access.

- *JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (11 August 2011)*


- Shape phase missions, tasks, and actions are those that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur routinely during the shape phase.
- Since the focus of the shape phase is on prevention and preparation, any stability operations in the JFC's proposed operational area might continue, and combat (offense and defense) may be limited or absent.
- Considerations for Shaping: JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations before committing forces...enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations. and prevent crises from developing.

- *JP 3-0 Joint Operations (11 August 2011)*

*Our current doctrine focuses on what types of activities are included under 'shaping'. The definitions largely refer to themselves. The closest doctrinal discussion of operational approach occurs in JP 5-0, which describes a desired set of conditions.*

# *An Alternative Description and Framework*

- Currently, DoD describes activities in conditions less than conflict as Shaping and Deterring. Additionally, DoD has a broad array of tools and methods to employ. However, we don't really have a description or model or coherent logic that really helps the joint community think through designing efforts whereby military actions/activities link and lead to desirable conditions.
- A current joint theory of shaping doesn't exist and the doctrine's description is open to broad interpretation. Furthermore, we don't have a joint organizing framework to plan and execute the concept of "Shaping." This discussion seeks to put some finer points on the matter. On the other hand, each service, joint, and OSD communities have published volumes on cooperation, just not in the context of campaigning – because its not armed conflict. Therefore, we initially propose six distinguishable aspects of campaigning – beyond just actions within a theater of war, to realize favorable conditions in the context of pursuing strategic guidance and US interests. They are:



*These aspects underpin and characterize proactive, competitive methods and measures within our revised philosophy to promote favorable conditions.*



# An Alternative Description and Framework

The Differing/Range of *Conditions* we desire, seek to realize

## Advance

There is some level of existing condition that aligns w/ our interests, but not at the level which meets our OBJ or purpose.

### Examples:

- NATO structure and military capabilities exist, but we wish to increase readiness and capabilities of member state contributions in order to meet an objective of deterrence
- NATO member states' defense budgets already exist, but we desire for them to meet 2% GDP minimum goal.

## Maintain

The desired condition exists, and we want to neither degrade to increase significantly, where increasing would risk changing the condition unfavorably. In contrast to 'Restore', no large shock has occurred to disrupt this condition.

### Examples:

- Sustainment and medical infrastructure and US military posture in Europe are satisfactory – where return of entire Cold War land force levels might have negative impact on partner, domestic, or adversary behavior
- ROK-US and Japan-US bilateral defense treaties remain supported by host-nation representative government. Insisting that either ROK or Japan govt's alter their bilateral treaties with the US to such an extent that they become trilateral mutual defense treaty (ROK-Japan-US) may have negative impacts on status quo behavior of either govt. towards their US bilateral treaties.

## Change

The existing condition is not malignant nor counter to U.S. interests, but it has the potential to positively align w/ U.S. OBJs. There is no assumption of malign intent.

### Examples:

- Non-aligned state (e.g. India during Cold War) has the military capability to withstand Soviet coercion
- Countries along northern distribution route to Afghanistan tolerate delivery of cargo through their territory, based on agreed caveats, but their governments do not actively align their foreign policy with coalition objectives.

## Counter

There is a condition that opposes U.S. interests. In contrast to 'Change', where there is no clear intent to counter U.S. interests, 'Counter' assumes some level of malign intent.

### Examples:

- Support to the Greek government fighting Communist insurgents (1946-49)
- Economic and diplomatic isolation (DPRK, Cuba, Iran)
- Adversary (DPRK, Iran, USSR, Russia) does not risk conventional attack on US or its partners
- Operation Blue Bat during the 1958 Lebanon crisis
- 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
- Occupation of Haiti in 1915 due to apprehension about German designs on the island.

## Create

The condition does not exist, and its existence could positively impact achievement of national interests.

### Examples:

- Establishing NATO alliance in the aftermath of WWII
- Bilateral defense treaties between US-ROK, US-Japan -
- Formal coalitions (KFOR, ISAF, SFOR)
- Building dual-purpose host-nation infrastructure (e.g. C-17 capable airfields, deep-hull capable port facilities)
- Training professional security forces where none existed before
- Partner nations are willing to contribute forces and resources within the established coalition structure

## Restore

Some condition that was aligned w/ US interests existed, but a shock (e.g. natural disaster, conflict) happened to significantly alter it. It is w/in US interest to return to some state that resembles the condition before the shock.

### Examples:


- Marshall Plan, Tsunami assistance, Pakistan earthquake assistance all work to restore the economic and infrastructure viability of the recipient states to a level approaching their pre-shock level
- Post-war (Civil War, WWII) transition from occupation to reconciliation to full restoration of relations between populations.



# An Alternative Description and Framework

## Exercising Relationships


### Understanding The Character of Relationships





# An Alternative Description and Framework

## *State of Partners' National Power & Propensities*





# ***DoD Security Cooperation Focus Areas***



- Capacity building
- Operational capacity and capability building
- Human capacity and/or human capital development
- Institutional capacity and/or security sector reform
- Support to institutional capacity and/or civil-sector capacity building
- Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization
- Facilitating access and relationships
- Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action (U.S. Defense Posture)
- Intelligence and information sharing
- Assurance and regional confidence building
- International armaments cooperation
- International suasion and collaboration

# An Alternative Description and Framework

A deep understanding of all six of these aspects leads to good choices and realistic expectations.


## USG Inter-agency relationships

- Varying Interests
- Their Objectives
- Priorities



## State of Relationships

### Issue & Consequences



## Required Conditions

### US Foreign Assistance (\$33.9 B FY2017)

#### Current and Imminent Lines of Funding

- Over 100 Countries
- 20 Different USG Agencies
- Global Peace, Security, Development
- 9x major categories, 52 Sectors
- <http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/>

The Joint Force can begin to identify and align common interests and facilitate efforts toward creating the necessary conditions in our and partner's favor, minimize wasted effort, reduce risk of alienating a partner from their power base, avoid actions that run counter to our partners' long-term interest.

- Additionally, this helps the Joint Force empathize with a partner, understand their calculus, and vision of the future.
- Aids in estimating the range of possible futures – both good and bad.

#### DoD Security Cooperation Focus Areas

- Capacity building
- Operational capacity and capability building
- Human capacity and/or human capital development
- Institutional capacity and/or security sector reform
- Support to institutional capacity and/or civil-sector capacity building
- Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization
- Facilitating access and relationships
- Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action (U.S. Defense Posture)
- Intelligence and information sharing
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- International armaments cooperation
- International suation and collaboration



# What is next for the idea of Shaping?



- Determine if the term of “Shaping” is truly indicative and characteristic of what we expect of the Joint Force in conditions of Cooperation.
- Identify Patterns of successful Shaping, which leads to Principles
- Develop a logical intellectual framework for Shaping, describe success and how that translates in to outcomes short of armed conflict.
- Methodology within the framework
- Research, discover, and identify best practices
- Re-examine our interpretation of operational art specific to conditions of cooperation.



# *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*

## *Factors of Joint Campaign Design*

*August 2016*

*Coherent Arrangement – Putting it all together*



# *Shortcomings of the Existing Elements of Operational Design*



- Joint operational planning and execution currently has thirteen elements of operational design.
- Overly simplistic, this array is focused on assisting Joint Commanders and staffs to craft operations to defeat adversaries' war-making capability in armed conflict. In other words, collectively these are about "big-battle"
- Don't reflect our historical experiences in translating military success into sustainable outcomes.
- Insufficient in guiding joint leaders and staffs toward informed and effective applications of the joint force in conditions beyond or outside of sustained armed conflict.

## **Elements of Operational Design**

- |   |                               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| •Termination                            | •Direct and indirect approach |
| •Military end state                     | •Anticipation                 |
| •Objective                              | •Operational reach            |
| •Effects                                | •Culmination                  |
| •Center of gravity                      | •Arranging operations         |
| •Decisive point                         | •Forces and functions         |
| •Lines of operation and lines of effort |                               |

- Limited in scope, irrelevant in many operational contexts, and lacking the necessary precision and depth to effectively guide the development and execution of joint campaigns across the universe of known, emerging, and anticipated patterns of warfare.
- Several of the current elements even may inhibit the design of effective campaigns and operations.



# Factors of Joint Campaign Design

**Factor - NOUN 1.** *a circumstance, fact, or influence that contributes to a result or outcome.*

**Campaign - VERB 1.** *work in an organized and active way toward a particular goal, typically a political or social one.<sup>1</sup>*

- An alternative campaign framework must have a more relevant and precise set of factors of design that:
  - Expands our understanding of operational art and practice beyond our narrow conception of armed conflict and what's required to prevail
  - Provides a model connected with, responds to, and informs evolving policy and strategy
  - Orients on long-term political outcomes – not just military success and ending operations.  
Recognizes that finality and clear conclusion are elusive
- Examples of new and logical considerations or factors of actual campaign design. Although discrete, each factor wouldn't be considered in isolation. Moreover, as these are all mutually supportive, they couldn't be considered sequentially, but collectively as a function toward an informed application of the joint force aligned with other forms of power. This array includes, but is not limited to:

- 1) Deep and relevant understanding of the environment, the adversary and its behavior, the vector, direction, and the driving logic behind their actions, the dynamics and perspectives of other relevant actors, and the contested political issue(s) at stake within the context of international relations. True empathy and identification of change.**
- 2) Recognition of an evolving range of possible outcomes. A living estimate/forecast of the range and time interval of the possible political consequences of the circumstance, in terms of both acceptable & unacceptable futures. (Range of possible outcomes)**
- 3) Comprehension of the conditions and behaviors the joint force must produce to achieve and enable an outcome within the range of acceptability.**



# *Factors of Joint Campaign Design*



- 4) Methodology of long-term consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes.**
- 5) Recommendation, selection, and legitimization of the initial aim of the possible policy shifts – followed by continual adaptations and refinement of Pol guidance. (Effective Civ/Mil dialogue)**
- 6) Principal and cascading narratives that orient on outcomes – unmasking and delegitimizing the adversary and championing our vision - that military actions and activities promote, reinforce, and advance; in turn empowering the joint force in producing the required condition(s) and behaviors<sup>2</sup>**
- 7) Coherent groupings of authorizations and permissions that enable multiple forms of national power to employ and work in unison – accompanied by and understanding of how they enable the campaign and when required.**
- 8) Interagency alignment of simultaneous and inter-related efforts orchestrated toward the outcome.**
- 9) Synchronization, prioritization, and de-confliction of funding over extended periods.**



# Factors of Joint Campaign Design



**10.) Logic of why the military campaign will work. Methodology of linking and arranging military actions and activities that produce the necessary condition, forces the required adversarial behavior, and leads to a sustainable situation within the range of outcomes. This may include concepts for achieving surprise, denial, and deception. Requires continual assessment.**

**11.) Description of the intricate, simultaneous application and command and control of relevant forces, resources, and capabilities, including the alignment of efforts of all participating combatant commands and specific description of how their contributions enable the campaign and deliver outcomes. (Detailed planning - Some of the existing elements of operational design may be informative within this factor)**

- In terms of being grouped together and characterized as fundamental to campaign and operational-level planning and execution, this is different. Furthermore, these factors of campaign design are far more relevant than the current array.
- Recent history shows that we try to accommodate possible policy shifts using the current elements of operational design, only to discover the critical nature and necessity of these foundational factors and underpinnings of actual campaigning after the fact, or worse – during implementation and execution.
- These factors or these styles of factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective campaign design and adaptive revision in execution for conditions of both armed conflict and beyond.

1. Oxford Dictionaries - OxfordDictionaries.com <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/>  
- [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\\_english/factor](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/factor)  
- [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\\_english/campaign](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/campaign)
2. LTG(R) Dubik, James "Winning The War We've Got, Not the One we Want" Army Feb 2016  
<http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/01/12/winning-the-war-weve-got-not-the-one-we-want/>



# *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*

## *Alternative View of the Environment*


*August 2016*

***“Organize around the problem, don’t organize  
the problem around the Phasing Construct”***

*-Famous Strategist*




# Alternative View of the Contemporary Environment






# The Six Logics of JCIC






# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative





# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative Framework


*When we recognize a change in an adversary's behavior  
We nonsensically ask: What Phase are we in?*






# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative

We should ask: How can organize around the problem?






# Liberation - How to begin thinking about organizing around the problem






# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative Model

***“Organize Around the Problem”***






# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative Model





# Bridging the Phasing Construct to the Alternative Model

## *“Organize Around the Problem”*






# *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*

## ***Alternative View of the Environment***

*August 2016*



# Are we really accounting for the universe of competitive International Relations and Conflict in our model?





# Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning

## ***Executive Overview Brief***

*August 2016*

