

# **Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning**



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## **FOREWORD**

**TBD**

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
JOSEPH F. DUNFORD

General, United States Marine Corps

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

*“Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased.”*

On War, Carl von Clausewitz



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## **I. Introduction**

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) adapts how the Joint force applies military power in concert with non-military efforts to promote and defend U.S. national interests. Its purpose is to guide force development and inform how leaders and planners visualize, understand, decide, and direct lethal and non-lethal activities at the strategic and operational levels of war. Driving the publication of this concept is a new-found appreciation of the changes in the future operating environment and an examination of lessons from recent campaigns.

More than simply recognizing change, this concept aims to instill a deep appreciation that many aspects of the future security environment are likely to be significantly different than what we have experienced over the past several decades. Adversaries have carefully studied the Western way of war and are adapting in ways that exploit our vulnerabilities. They are avoiding U.S. strengths and finding ways to achieve their political objectives in ways not easily countered by the Joint Force and other instruments of national power. Furthermore, they are taking steps to seize the initiative, which means the Joint Force will likely not begin every conflict on the offense. With this context in mind, the JCIC aims to begin the process of eliminating gaps and mitigating vulnerabilities in the way the Joint Force designs, plans, and executes campaigns. It seeks to alter the way in which the Joint Force campaigns so that military operations do more than simply achieve military objectives. Synchronized with inter-organizational and multinational partners, Joint Force campaigns will ensure military objectives contribute to a range of favorable, enduring political outcomes.

This document aims to be evolutionary in many regards and revolutionary in others. It builds on the lessons of the past and offers what some may regard as a paradigm shift in the way the Joint Force employs military power. The concept recognizes the enduring nature of war and the fact that war remains a clash of irreconcilable wills, each aiming to dominate through the use of violence. The endeavor is inherently human, political, and uncertain. The concept highlights that in some circumstances subtle, non-lethal employment of military power, when combined with limited lethal force that is not easily attributable, can achieve substantial political aims. Finally, it aims to elevate the importance of consolidating gains once military objectives are met. Military gains alone are meaningless if they do not, in concert with the other instruments of national power, achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign.

## **II. Scope**

This concept focuses on future Joint Force campaigning which will occur within the context of an increasingly complex international order. It offers a solution to state and non-state actors seeking to alter the international order

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using novel combinations of lethal and non-lethal power. It does not intend to account for each and every security challenge but instead principally addresses the application of military and non-military instruments of national power to achieve enduring political outcomes.

### **III. Future Operating Environment**

As described in the *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2016: Risk and Choice in a Contested and Disordered World*, the future OE will present the Joint Force with both high and low end threats.<sup>1</sup> While leaders today will find some challenges to be familiar, other challenges will differ significantly from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are categorized as *persistent disorder* and *contested norms*. Both will have significant implications to how the Joint Force campaigns.

#### **Persistent Disorder**

The challenge most familiar to leaders of today is the one of *persistent disorder* in various regions of the world. It is characterized by an array of weak states that remain or become increasingly incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance.<sup>2</sup> While the Joint Force will not be called upon to assist each failing state or resolve every civil war, the likelihood that it will operate in these conditions is high.<sup>3</sup> The fact that nearly nine out of every ten wars is a civil war indicates that the Joint Force is highly likely to be involved in stabilization missions ranging from intervention in an internal conflict, to relief of human suffering, to combating terrorist networks.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Implications of the *Persistent Disorder* Challenge**

The implications to the Joint Force of persistent disorder are significant. The following implications pertain to the way the Joint Force designs, plans and executes campaigns:

- **Preventing war will remain critical to U.S. national security.** Because disorder emanating from weak states results from internal struggles for primacy, impacts to U.S. interests and values are likely to be unintentional. Consequently, threats of punitive action will be largely ineffective in preventing this type of conflict. Instead, the Joint Force must be prepared to employ more positive approaches to limit and contain the spread of disorder, such as activities to influence neutrals while providing assistance and reassurance to partners.

- **Stabilizing environments will become increasingly important.** The spread of disorder raises the likelihood that the Joint Force will once again be involved in stability operations. Although policy makers and public opinion have generally been averse to such operations in the years following OIF and

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OEF, lessons of history indicate that state-internal disorder will impact U.S. interests. Looking to the future, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, said in 2007 that unconventional wars were “the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead.”<sup>5</sup> While this concept makes no policy prescriptions, it recognizes the high likelihood that the future Joint Force will be called upon to stabilize troubled regions.

Further, the spread of regional disorder highlights the need for enduring political outcomes. The achievement of which will require a recognition of the dual nature of war. On the one hand, there is a coercive, negative component necessary to defeat an adversary, and on the other hand, a positive, constructive component to bring about a stable and desirable political settlement.<sup>6</sup> While the second component is often overlooked or misunderstood, the establishment of political order is part of war itself.<sup>7</sup> The two components cannot be disaggregated. While the Joint Force must be prepared to excel in armed conflict, success on the battlefield by itself is inadequate. Victory over one’s adversary is merely a prerequisite for attaining a seat at the negotiating table for the post-war order.<sup>8</sup> Or, stated more simply, force is subservient to politics.<sup>9</sup>

For joint leaders and planners designing, planning and executing campaigns, there should be an emphasis on consolidating activities from early in the planning process to ensure consistency with the national security interests at stake. The need to consolidate gains has profound implications for planning, command relationships, and organization. Leaders should view combat operations and governance operations as both integral to war and occurring in tandem.

Because political issues permeate every aspect of war, the creation of a favorable political order has been central to all wars fought by the United States which resulted in a strategic victory.<sup>10</sup> Failure to do so results in strategic failure. This was demonstrated during OIF, where inadequate planning for the restoration of political and economic order following major combat operations led to an inability to consolidate gains, which in turn has resulted in a protracted and ongoing disorder.

## **Contested Norms**

The other challenge described in the JOE 2016 is that of *contested norms*. This is the idea that increasingly powerful revisionist states and non-state actors will use any and all elements of national power to establish their own set of rules in ways unfavorable to the U.S. and its interests. Already the world has witnessed adaptive state and non-state adversaries using creative strategies to apply purposeful combinations of conventional and non-

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conventional force. These strategies attempt to achieve objectives while avoiding direct armed conflict with the U.S. by exploiting the seams and gaps in Joint Force's institutional processes, thinking, and operational constructs.

Adversaries will operate in ways that frustrate joint leaders and planners. They will accomplish objectives in the competitive space between war and peace. Rivals employing coercive force to achieve their objectives *below our political / military response* thresholds will prove particularly problematic. They will aim to change international norms with operations characterized by the uncertainty, murkiness of the parties involved, or ambiguity about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.<sup>11</sup> This approach of coercive gradualism is currently referred to by some as "gray zone" challenges.

Efforts to change international norms may resemble traditional, "conventional" conflicts between states. More likely, however, adversaries will combine some type of coercion with the use of force. They will maintain an air of ambiguity about the ultimate objectives, the players, and continued legitimacy of international treaties and norms. Adversaries may combine sabotage, social media campaigns, cyber-attacks, and proxy forces instead of easily recognizable armed forces of a state violating international borders.

A recent example of such an approach is China's rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratly island chain. Building an island is clearly not an act of war, but one that over the long-term can significantly increase China's territorial control and regional influence. China's efforts to build military bases in the middle of an international waterway is indicative of creeping tactics and is difficult to define as openly hostile to international norms.<sup>12</sup>

Another example is Iran's proxy wars. Since the 1980s Iran supplied the militant organization Hezbollah in Lebanon with substantial amounts of military training, weapons, political, and financial aid. Acting on behalf of Iran, Hezbollah fought against Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War. Iran currently has involved itself in the conflict in Syria, where it is training and equipping government forces. Iran's involvement in the Syrian conflict is a proxy conflict against other regional powers.

Finally, Russia's aggression against the Ukraine and the Crimea using non-linear tactics highlights the distinction Russia makes between the political realm and the security realm. Russia now appears to be waging competition through a shrewd combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. Moscow likely recognizes its weakness relative to the U.S. and is therefore subtly competing rather than using more confrontational approaches.<sup>13</sup> Many implications of Russia and others contesting norms critical to the international order are emerging.


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## Implications of the *Contested Norms* Challenge

The implications of challenges to contested norms emerging in the future operating environment are substantial. The following implications pertain to how the Joint Force currently designs, plans and executes campaigns:

- **The binary, peace/war model found Joint Force doctrine and its processes is becoming inconsistent with emerging patterns of warfare.** When considering the range of military operations, current Joint doctrine describes those operations in the context of some degree of conflict. Conflict, in whatever degree, is the only condition requiring the military



**Figure 1: The Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0, 11 Aug 2011)**


instrument of national power. Similarly, DoD processes are primarily designed to resource commands when in conflict and then withdraw those resources when conflict terminates. However, the trends of the emerging operating environment indicate that adversaries will achieve war-time like objectives in what is not initially perceived to be conflict. Rather, they will operate beneath the threshold that constitutes a state of conflict so as not to trigger a meaningful response by the U.S., its allies, or partners. The current conflict continuum, as depicted in Joint Publication 3-0 and in Figure 1, does not adequately recognize the wide range of conditions, or what was earlier described as the gray zone. Within the conditions between peace and war adversaries are increasingly employing strategies and tactics to achieve their objectives previously secured primarily by way of open armed conflict. The military instrument of national power will have utility *well outside conditions considered to be conflict* to counter adversaries that seek to subtly undermine U.S. national security interests. Left unchecked, adversary strategies will seize

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upon the inability of U.S. Joint Force and its institutional processes to react to or be aware of threats that occur gradually.

• **Combatant Commands will lack the agility to deny active competitors their objectives.** Because so many of the activities required to actively counter an adversary operating below the threshold triggering a U.S. response are only executed within early phases of a contingency plan, GCCs do not have at the ready the authorities, permissions, and resources needed to campaign effectively. Until unambiguous conflict warning triggers a contingency response, GCCs will be out of position and not fully empowered to regain the initiative. They will not be optimized to counter an adversary's efforts to undermine U.S. national security objectives early and thereby prevent broader conflict. Mindful of this vulnerability, adversaries will operate below the threshold likely to activate a contingency plan.



**Figure 2: JP 5-0 Notional Operation Plan Phases**

Currently, GCCs develop a theater strategy which articulates the commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) flows from the Theater Strategy and provides an action plan to implement the strategy. Theater Campaigns employ "normal and routine" shaping activities designed to influence the security environment, not actively counter a dynamically adaptive enemy.

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In contrast, contingency plans are the specific branch plans to a TCP designed to deal with potential crises in the region, rectify failures of the steady-state activities, or defeat enemies. Although not originally intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all joint operations, the Notional Operation Plan Phases in Figure 2 have become the accepted model for phased delegation of authorities, permissions, and resources. This model is ill-suited for the patterns of emerging warfare.

- **Adversaries will be more agile than the U.S. in synchronizing and applying their elements of national power.** Future adversaries will be adept at exploiting the lack of coordination between USG departments and agencies. Disjointed efforts and the lack of unity of command between the Department of Defense and other USG Departments comprising the national security apparatus will create opportunities for adversaries to shape the security environment in ways detrimental to U.S. and partner interests. Autocratic and semi-autocratic regimes will possess a marked advantage for making strategic decisions quickly and ensuring unity of effort. Whereas the U.S. political system relies heavily on consensus and domestic support to national security approaches, regimes seeking to undermine US national security enjoy an atmosphere of compliance allowing decisions across agencies to be carried out quickly. While there are notable drawbacks inherent to autocratic governments, they will hold a pronounced advantage with regard to strategic agility and national power synchronization.

- **A complex and rapidly changing operational environment will challenge GCCs to understand and develop solutions.** The degree of change in enemy tactics, coupled with the shifting relative U.S. advantage in the military and diplomatic spheres will present difficult, complicated problem sets for leaders and planners. While the mental models resident in Joint and Service doctrine<sup>14</sup> will remain of great value, the profoundly unfamiliar future will complicate planning and solution development. The practice of modifying operational approaches that proved successful in the past will fall short of achieving national security objectives.

#### **IV. The Military Challenge.**

*How will the Joint Force design, plan, and execute joint campaigns in conjunction with interorganizational and multinational partners to overcome the emerging complexities of the future operating environment?*

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**V. A Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.**

**Central Idea.** To meet the military challenge, the future Joint Force will employ an *Integrated Campaigning Approach* that:

- 1) Views the environment as one comprised of *cooperation*, *competition*, and *armed conflict*;
- 2) Employs an alternative joint campaigning construct;
- 3) Aligns efforts with the other instruments of power; and
- 4) Applies an expanded set of principles and considerations for planning and execution.


The *Integrated Campaigning Approach* combines military and non-military activities with greater agility to gain and maintain the initiative in a complex environment against adversaries aiming to subtly undermine U.S., allied, and partner national security interests.

**Central Idea Component 1: A Different View of the Environment**

Since emerging patterns of warfare are becoming inconsistent with a binary, peace/war model, the *Integrated Campaigning Approach* employs a different conception of the international security environment. The approach no longer considers the U.S. as simply at either peace or at war with a particular actor but instead outlines three categories. The *Integrated Campaigning Approach* visualizes geostrategic relationships as being in either a condition of *cooperation*, *competition*, or *conflict*. While the boundaries between these conditions may not always be clear, the conditions are mutually exclusive of one another. For instance, the relationship between the U.S. and an adversary may be characterized as being in geostrategic competition, even though at some lower levels there is some evidence of cooperation. Visualizing the geostrategic relationship between the U.S. and its adversaries enables leaders and planners to understand the challenges, some of which will be overcome using military power.

In the *zone of cooperation*, the U.S. is working with a state or non-state actor to achieve mutual interests and arrangements. This is characterized, for example, by trade agreements, mutual defense pacts, and treaties to promote, strengthen, and support. In this zone, elements of national power are primarily employed to influence using diplomatic, informational, and economic means. In this condition, the Joint Force may be employed to assure an ally or partner, enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon security objectives, collectively deter an adversary, or even to prepare for conflict. Operations may include those to build partner capacity, provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. Although the military does not employ coercive or punitive measures against those with whom it cooperates, a strong and ready Joint Force mitigates the risks associated with the transient nature of some relationships in the international system.

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**Figure 3: Seeing the Environment Differently**

Despite the benefits made possible through cooperation, some actors choose not to engage in mutually beneficial relations. Instead, they view international relations as a zero-sum game, where the gains of one actor are commensurately balanced by the losses of another. These actors are viewed as strategic competitors and operate in what this concept refers to as a *zone of competition*. This is a condition in which the U.S. government is not currently organized to effectively employ the military instrument of power. Competition on one end can be friendly and benign; at the other extreme it can become confrontational (ambiguous or unambiguous) and may escalate to crisis. Within this *zone of competition*, the Joint Force will counter actors employing the previously mentioned tactic of coercive gradualism as well as those openly challenging U.S. interests. In this zone there may be an appearance of cooperation along with elements of conflict. Relations do not escalate to armed conflict because one or both actors lack the means or the will to do so. In the *zone of competition*, the military instrument of power deters those adversaries contemplating armed conflict, contains ambitious adversaries and demonstrates resolve to geopolitical rivals. These political ends are achieved through operations such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, show of force, or support to insurgencies.

Finally, there is a *zone of armed conflict* where core interests are so



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irreconcilable that violence is the primary means used to achieve political objectives. Conflict, up to and including intense armed conflict, occurs until one or both actors capitulate. This is the one condition in which the Joint Force is primarily organized to operate. In armed conflict the Joint Force fights and wins major operations, whether defeating an insurgency, conventional force, or combination of the two.

Visualizing the environment in terms of *cooperation*, *competition*, and *armed conflict* is vital to understanding the challenges and organizing activities of the future.

## **Central Idea Component 2: An Integrated Campaign Construct**

The second and arguably the core aspect of this concept is the *Integrated Campaigning Construct*. It is an alternative to the existing campaign construct that will guide how the Joint Force designs, plans, and executes campaigns. The *Integrated Campaigning Construct* is a deliberate departure from existing doctrine and campaign construct found in CJCSM 3130.01A, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*, dated 25 November 2014. This new framework will enable commanders to develop a menu of authorized and resourced options at his or her disposal. In the future, campaigns will simultaneously employ multiple elements of engagement, deterrence, denial, disruption or even degradation.

Because competition and conflict will likely not unfold in the predictable manner depicted in the existing model for Operation Plan Phases, Theater Campaigns will no longer be comprised of only “normal and routine” shaping activities, commonly referred to as Phase 0 operations. Conversely, a dynamic combination of activities previously only authorized, permitted, and resourced with the activation of a contingency operation will be options for the commander. To compete with adversaries short of armed conflict, many of the activities previously executed only in specific phases of contingency plans will now be conducted as part of the Theater Campaign. Military activities will be arranged to seize the initiative and when necessary, regain the initiative to alter a trend that runs counter to U.S. national security objectives.

Of note, major combat operations required to defeat an opponent in open armed conflict will remain distinct branch plans of Theater Campaigns. Contingency operations will remain branches of a Theater Campaign and require a separate execution order, activated only upon the issuance of a National Command Authority directive.


Contrary to what is depicted in the Notional Operation Plan Phases, the level of military effort required to defend and secure national objectives will not necessarily be greatest during a “dominate” phase of an operation. The level of effort required to deter an opponent or stabilize the regional security environment may, overtime, be more substantial than that required to defeat a

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military force in open armed conflict. This represents a significant change from the previous peace/war construct that tied resources, authorities and permissions to phases of contingency operations.

Intended to significantly increase the agility with which Combatant Commands counter adversaries with whom we compete, the *Integrated Campaigning Construct* enables commanders to dynamically employ military capabilities, aligned with the other USG efforts, based on mission orders. Beginning with a clear understanding of the desired conditions the Joint Force is tasked to achieve, commanders are empowered to counter state and non-state actors who seek to increase their strategic position and influence at the expense of U.S., ally and partner interests. Countering state and non-state actors will be accomplished through several means such as deterrence or regional engagement.



**Figure 4: Integrated Campaigning Construct**

The *Integrated Campaigning Construct*, depicted in Figure 4, first calls for leaders and planners to understand and then describe the present relationship between the U.S. and a particular state or non-state actor in terms of cooperation, competition, or armed conflict. The second step is to then forecast what the future situation is likely to be if measures are not taken to alter that

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trajectory. Lastly, planners arrange military shaping or deterring activities that, once executed, alter the trajectory of the relations between the U.S. and the adversary.

Commanders will require authorities, permissions, and resources delegated to them well in advance in order to proactively operate in this future security environment. The nature and scope of these activities as well as their intentions will be the subjects of rigorous discourse between the National Command Authority, the interagency, regional allies and partners, the Country Team(s), and the Combatant Command.

When *cooperating* with an actor, theater campaigns are crafted to strengthen relations and promote regional security. Activities may include maintaining forward presence, aligning forces regionally, working to enhance interoperability, providing advice, conducting theater security cooperation, or providing security force assistance. Reserve units may be employed to sustain long-term relationships by applying their unique civil-military expertise across military, government, economic, and social spheres. Cooperative relations produce more informed campaigns through early warning, indigenous solutions, and enhanced situational awareness.

Campaign activities intended to *compete* with the Nation's adversaries or geopolitical rivals will be distinctly different than those of the past. They may include complex information operations designed to counter propaganda campaigns, or, for instance, security force assistance missions to restore the stability of a partner nation. Campaigns in this future environment will aim to achieve conditions that are closest to our desired strategic aims knowing full well that competition will remain on-going and that there will likely be no permanent resolution.

The articulation of a military end state in this situation would run counter to the *Integrated Campaigning Approach* due to the fact that many military operations such as those designed to deter an adversary, reassure or support an partner, will not have discrete end points. Missions to achieve these objectives, as well as other missions involving U.S. forward presence to deter an opponent, will remain on-going as long as they support U.S. national security interests. Desired political outcomes will be expressed in terms of a future state of competition or one of cooperation. Therefore, the approach will not call upon commanders to pre-determine a military end state as contingency operations have in the past but describe the desired condition(s) of the U.S. and the adversary relative to a state of *cooperation*, *competition*, or *armed conflict*. While that desired condition will never be permanently secured, consolidating the gains made as a result of the campaign will be critical.

Ambiguity in the future operating environment will challenge the ability to understand the strength of one's position. The need to consolidate gains, or, strengthen the Joint Force's or the alliance's position following a successful campaign activities may not be entirely obvious. *The Integrated Campaigning*

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*Approach* cautions commanders to guard against the temptation of terminating military effort once having seized the initiative. In all likelihood, partner institutions in areas such as governance and rule of law will require sustained support. Strengthening the state and its institutions will likely remain key to enabling lasting success and perpetuating conditions well into the future.

Finally, this concept alters the manner in which the Joint Force will campaign in *armed conflict* in two significant ways. First, when deterrence fails, the joint force will conduct joint combined arms operations in order to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas. The other deals again with the consolidation of gains. Strengthening critical institutions will follow tactical and operational success so that military victory yields enduring strategic outcomes. Contingency planning and operations will occur as in the past, but the Joint Force will confound its enemies with the synergistic effects of joint operations and plan to ensure hard earned results are transitioned into lasting, favorable strategic success.

One of the more complex challenges this concept seeks to address is integrating Functional and Geographic Campaigns. Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs) develop trans-regional strategies and integrate their campaigns into Geographic Combatant Command's (GCC) Theater Campaign. Both FCCs and GCCs must work with a common purpose, share operational assessments and aim to achieve the same range of strategic outcomes.

This concept acknowledges that the various regions of the world are not the same and therefore Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) problem sets are vastly different. For those GCCs contending with an intense security competition in its area of responsibility will have delegated authorities and permissions unlike those GCCs that are not experiencing significant threats to the international order. In other words, the *Integrated Campaigning Approach* will have differing applicability to each Combatant Command. Further, how each GCC synchronizes its activities with the other instruments of national power will also vary.

### **Central Idea Component 3: Greater intra-governmental synchronization.**

This concept does not aim to solve the multifaceted challenge of interagency coordination. While the USG has made impressive progress, especially since the 9/11 attacks, this concept appreciates that the President of the United States is the lowest level at which interagency coordination is directed. This challenge nevertheless does not preclude the Department of Defense from articulating how Geographic and Functional Combatant Command activities may relate to and support the efforts of other U.S. department and agencies.

To overcome the challenges inherent in cooperation, competition, and conflict, commanders will work to align military activities in time, space, and purpose so that they are synchronized with the activities of other governmental

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departments and agencies. For example military activities conducted outside of a combat zone require coordination with the ambassador and the Country Team. Theater and Functional Campaigns will consider how military activities can support diplomatic, informational and/or economic efforts to counter an adversary or, where required, articulate how these instruments of power can support military efforts. Achieving this integration will require a planning process which includes participants outside the DoD. Because the Joint Force is the most resourced entity in the national security apparatus, it may often fall upon the military to lead coordination efforts even though it will clearly not dictate how other departments and agencies achieve objectives in their respective areas of responsibility.

#### **Central Idea Component 4: Principles and Considerations for Planning and Execution.**

*Integrated campaigning* is guided by a foundational set of principles and considerations that inform campaign planning design and doctrine.

a. *Campaigning in conditions other than sustained armed conflict.* Problems in international relations beyond open armed conflict don't necessarily lend themselves to solutions based on rapid, decisive operations and quick victory. Moreover, success in this space can't be articulated through the ideas of achieving a military end state and termination.

Alternatively, actual success requires deep understanding of the environment, persistence, perseverance, and adaptation. Success is measured in terms of favorable conditions and preferable international behaviors. Furthermore, patterns or principles of effective use of the military requires an agile model of joint campaigning to drive joint forces' thinking on how to seize the initiative to create conditions and enable outcomes in our favor and interests. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches characterized by episodic, but consistent confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and application of ambiguous force.

#### **Principles and Considerations for Planning and Execution**

- Campaigning in conditions other than sustained armed conflict
- Factors of joint campaign design
- Assume political aims will evolve
- Remain focused on strategic objectives
- Consider all facets of risk
- Employ hybrid command relationships
- Promote a culture of mutual support
- Utilize embedded and disciplined assessments

Currently, DoD describes activities in conditions other than conflict as Shaping and Deterring. However, a joint methodology of shaping doesn't exist and the doctrine's description is open to broad interpretation. Many

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assumptions regarding conventional deterrence are challenged by adversarial actions. In some cases, we continue to use these terms even though the adversaries' efforts are well underway and creating conditions and driving behaviors in their favor. Although, DoD has a broad array of tools and methods to employ, we don't really have a descriptive model or coherent logic that enables the application of DoD capabilities to situations other than state on state combat. JCIC's framework identifies six distinguishable aspects of campaigning that identify the range of conditions we seek. These aspects enable the joint force to organize around the problem and eliminates the constraints of the current campaign phasing construct. These initial terms are Advance, Create, Change, Maintain, Counter, and Restore specific conditions that enables the joint to organize to confront, respond, and build resilience to these alternative malign approaches or dramatic shifts to international order to somewhat inoculate the environments from their pursuits and effects. By and large these are interagency friendly or at least neutral terms. The proposed descriptions are:

**Advance** – There is some level of existing condition that aligns w/ our interests, but not at the level which meets our OBJ or purpose. Examples:

- NATO structure and military capabilities exist, but we wish to increase readiness and capabilities of member state contributions in order to meet an objective of deterrence
- NATO member states' defense budgets already exist, but we desire for them to meet 2% GDP minimum goal.

**Maintain**- The desired condition exists, and we want to neither degrade to increase significantly, where increasing would risk changing the condition unfavorably. In contrast to 'Restore', no large shock has occurred to disrupt this condition. Examples:

- Sustainment and medical infrastructure and US military posture in Europe are satisfactory – where return of entire Cold War land force levels might have negative impact on partner, domestic, or adversary behavior
- ROK-US and Japan-US bilateral defense treaties remain supported by host-nation representative government. Insisting that either ROK or Japan govt's alter their bilateral treaties with the US to such an extent that they become trilateral mutual defense treaty (ROK-Japan-US) may have negative impacts on status quo behavior of either govt. towards their US bilateral treaties.

**Change** - The existing condition is not malignant nor counter to U.S. interests, but it has the potential to positively align w/ U.S. OBJs. There is no assumption of malign intent. Examples:

- Non-aligned state (e.g. India during Cold War) has the military

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561 capability to withstand Soviet coercion.

562  
563 • Countries along northern distribution route to Afghanistan  
564 tolerate delivery of cargo through their territory, based on agreed caveats, but  
565 their governments do not actively align their foreign policy with coalition  
566 objectives.

567  
568 **Counter** – An existing condition has emerged or transformed that is  
569 contradictory to U.S. interests. In contrast to ‘Change’, where there is no clear  
570 intent to counter U.S. interests, Countering assumes some level of malign  
571 intent, and seeks to alter its course back to acceptable an condition. Examples:

572 • Support to the Greek government fighting Communist  
573 insurgents (1946-49)  
574 • Economic and diplomatic isolation (DPRK, Cuba, Iran)  
575 • Adversary (DPRK, Iran, USSR, Russia) does not risk  
576 conventional attack on US or its partners  
577 • Operation Blue Bat during the 1958 Lebanon crisis  
578 • 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution  
579 • Occupation of Haiti in 1915 due to apprehension about German  
580 designs on the island.

581  
582 **Create** - The condition does not exist, and its existence could positively impact  
583 achievement of national interests. Examples:

584 • Establishing NATO alliance in the aftermath of WWII  
585 • Bilateral defense treaties between US-ROK, US-Japan -  
586 • Formal coalitions (KFOR, ISAF, SFOR)  
587 • Building dual-purpose host-nation infrastructure (e.g. C-17  
588 capable airfields, deep-hull capable port facilities)  
589 • Training professional security forces where none existed before  
590 • Partner nations are willing to contribute forces and resources  
591 within the established coalition structure

592  
593 **Restore** - Some condition that was aligned or sympathetic w/ US interests  
594 existed, but a shock (e.g. natural disaster, conflict) happened to significantly  
595 alter it. It is w/in US interest to return to some state that resembles the  
596 condition before the shock. Examples:

597 • Marshall Plan, Tsunami assistance, Pakistan earthquake  
598 assistance all work to restore the economic and infrastructure viability of the  
599 recipient states to a level approaching their pre-shock level  
600 • Civil War and WWII’s transition from occupation to  
601 reconciliation to full restoration of relations between populations.

602  
603 Once the joint force leader determines the desired condition,  
604 subordinate leaders and staffs will have to exercise narratives and long-  
605 standing or emerging relationships. Recognizing the state of each relationship

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relative to the preferred condition is key. The combination of a deep understanding of the environment, determining the desirable condition, and recognizing the state of existing relationships relative to the interests at stake, guides the CCDR understanding a range of what could possibly be accomplished, and therefore develop a useful military purpose. Once established, the CCDR and Staff can begin to imagine how to link and arrange military activities to operational objectives that result in the desirable conditions needed to counter the adversary's alternative styles of warfare. Once, understood CCDRs and Staffs can develop and request the required coherent groupings of authorizations, collaborate to align efforts across the germane elements of the interagency, and seek to synchronize funding. This type of logic underpins and characterizes proactive, competitive methods and measures, not simply reactive.

*b. Factors of joint campaign design.* Currently, joint operational planning and execution has thirteen elements of operational design. These are overly simplistic and focused on assisting Joint Commanders and staffs to craft operations to defeat adversaries' war-making capability in conditions of open armed conflict. Necessary of course, but the current elements of design don't reflect our historical experiences in translating military success into sustainable outcomes. Additionally, the existing elements really don't assist and guide joint leaders and staffs toward informed and effective applications of the joint force in conditions beyond or outside of sustained armed conflict.

#### Elements of Operational Design

- |   |                               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| •Termination                            | •Direct and indirect approach |
| •Military end state                     | •Anticipation                 |
| •Objective                              | •Operational reach            |
| •Effects                                | •Culmination                  |
| •Center of gravity                      | •Arranging operations         |
| •Decisive point                         | •Forces and functions         |
| •Lines of operation and lines of effort |                               |

Elements of Operational Design, JP 5.0 (2011)

The existing array is insufficient in scope, irrelevant in many operational contexts, and lacks the necessary precision and depth to effectively guide the development and execution of joint campaigns across the universe of known, emerging, and anticipated patterns of warfare. In fact, the ideas of several of the current elements inhibit the design of effective campaigns and operations. An alternative campaign framework must have a much broader, relevant, and precise set of factors of design that expands our understanding of operational art and ability to coherently develop successful campaigns that orient on outcomes. Below are examples of new and logical considerations or factors of

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actual campaign design. Although discrete, each factor wouldn't be considered in isolation. Moreover, as these are all mutually supportive, they couldn't be considered sequentially, but collectively as a function toward an informed application of the joint force aligned with other forms of power. This array includes, but is not limited to:

- 1.) Deep and relevant understanding of the environment, the adversary and its behavior, and the contested political issue(s) at stake within the context of international relations.
- 2.) Living estimate/forecast of the range and time interval of the possible political consequences of the circumstance, in terms of both acceptable & unacceptable futures.
- 3.) Comprehension of the conditions and behaviors the joint force *must produce* to achieve and enable an outcome within the range of acceptability.
- 4.) Methodology of long-term consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes.
- 5.) Recommendation, selection, legitimization of the initial aim of the associated policy shift – followed by continual maintenance and refinement. (Effective Civ/Mil dialogue)
- 6.) Principle and cascading narratives that military actions and activities promote, reinforce, and enable, which in turn empowers the campaign
- 7.) Coherent groupings of authorizations and permissions that enable multiple forms of national power to employ and work in unison.
- 8.) Interagency alignment of simultaneous and inter-related efforts orchestrated toward the outcome.
- 9.) Synchronization, prioritization, and de-confliction of funding over extended periods.
- 10.) Logic and methodology for linking and arranging military actions and activities toward the necessary condition, required adversarial behavior, and range of outcomes. This may include concepts for achieving surprise, denial, and deception.
- 11.) Description of the intricate, simultaneous application and command and control of relevant forces, resources, and capabilities, including the alignment of efforts of all participating combatant commands and specific description of how their contributions enable the campaign and deliver outcomes. (Some of the existing elements of operational design may be informative within this factor)

In terms of being grouped together and characterized as fundamental to campaign and operational-level planning and execution, this is a different idea. Furthermore, these factors of campaign design are far more relevant than the current array. Recent history shows that we accommodate policy shifts with

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joint efforts formulated using the current elements of operational design, only to discover the critical nature and necessity of these foundational factors and underpinnings of actual campaigning after the fact, or worse – during implementation and execution. These factors or these styles of factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective campaign design and adaptive revision in execution.

c. *Assume political aims will evolve.* Although doctrine calls for the receipt of clear and timely guidance, the nature of the strategic environment is ambiguous, uncertain and often volatile. Strategic ends may not translate easily to the given environment, or they may evolve as political aims change. In spite of this, commanders and staffs must understand the environment, anticipate developments, and build flexible plans that give direction to joint forces operating in the theater. Revisions to planned activities based on assessments and feedback will often be conducted in a fluid environment. As such, leaders must closely observe ongoing developments and revise plans, when necessary, at a speed that matches the dynamic changes within the environment.

d. *Remain focused on the strategic objectives.* DOD and Joint doctrine have incorporated the concept of the operational level of war for almost forty years. The connecting level of war between strategy and tactics, it provides a mechanism for senior military leaders to translate political goals into concrete tasks for military forces. Over time, however, the understanding and practice of this concept have become muddled, leading to what amounts to transposing high tactical actions to the operational level, and a seemingly resulting gap between military actions and achieving desired strategic objectives. The alignment of political and military objectives is not a bonus, it is required to translate advances made through the use of military power to strategic (political) success. This is accomplished by integrating activities and aligning the objectives of all elements of national power, and leveraging the alignment of allied, partner and even rival stakeholder activities to pursue US interests. In this sense all instruments of national power, and some instruments of partner, ally and rival power, are interdependent – requiring alignment and mutual support to achieve strategic success.

e. *Consider all facets of risk.* Joint doctrine currently defines risk as “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.” (JP 1-02, p 248) However, this sterile definition lacks context and therefore applying it as part of a campaign often proves to be challenging. More nuance is required for leaders to be able to consider and mitigate all aspects of risk, particularly as part of campaign planning.

Strategic risk can be described as the balance between probability and consequence of threats to the Nation. At a high level, military risk could be considered bounded by the Joint Force’s ability to generate ready forces,

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execute current operations, and respond to potential contingencies over time. More specifically, military risk is affected by the ability of US Armed Forces to adequately resource, execute, and sustain military operations in support of strategic objectives of the NMS. Historically, military planning has focused military risk considerations on three aspects: 1) Risk to Mission, 2) Risk to Force, and 3) Risk to Readiness. Risk to Mission considers our ability to execute assigned missions and the strategic costs, given available resources and the threat. Risk to Force centers on the human, material, and financial costs of our actions and whether they are acceptable. Risk to Readiness includes the Military Departments' or Services' risk associated with the ability to recruit, man, train, equip, and sustain the force to meet strategic objectives described in the NMS. While all of these aspects of risk are certainly valid, they are incomplete when applied against the broad spectrum of potential military action, our strategic objectives, and the play of international relations.

In campaigning, consideration of risk must be all encompassing. In addition to simple considerations of risk to mission, force and readiness, prudent planning must also consider other aspects of risk that better connect strategic objectives to tactical actions. For instance, in a pre-conflict scenario, there is risk associated with non-action, or opportunity risk, with absence of U.S. military involvement potentially leading to an escalation of tensions, destabilization of the region or state, or kinetic action. Alternatively, there is also risk associated with engagement, or consequence risk, since every action creates a counter-action thereby leading to a changed environment following U.S. operations. In addition, there is risk associated with the scale of commitment, or proportionality risk, with too much or too little commitment both risking strategic or operational failure.

With campaign plans and their execution simply being a means to put decisions in motion, ensuring that those decisions take into consideration all aspects of risk as part of the planning process and during execution is vital to campaign success. Holistic risk examination, followed by tangible mitigation planning, ensures that decision makers are fully equipped to provide guidance for campaign development that leads to achievement of both short and long term objectives.

f. *Employ hybrid command relationships.* The *Integrated Campaigning Approach* requires adaptive and innovative methods of exercising joint force command relationships during operations. Hybrid command relationships are defined as new approaches, consistent with current statutory direction, to the traditional joint force command relationships defined in joint doctrine. While enduring joint command relationships such as combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support will continue to be used to exercise command over assigned and allocated joint forces, future supported JFCs may need to exercise, pre-define, or re-define command relationships by operational phase, operational task(s),

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mission, or threat-based considerations both within or across established theater or operational boundaries in order to gain strategic agility, retain the initiative, address trans-regional challenges, or more effectively apply scarce resources. New command relationship approaches will be exercised or delegated by supported combatant commanders through pre-coordinated arrangements with their supporting combatant commands with assigned and attached forces when possible. These arrangements will be codified and endorsed through subsequent CJCS execution orders during campaign execution. Supported combatant commanders will continue to exercise and direct command relationships, to include hybrid command relationships, through direction to their assigned subordinate commands and forces as required. Reallocation of allocated subordinate forces to meet another supported combatant command's emergent requirements will be managed and executed through Global Force Management (GFM) allocation processes and procedures.

*g. Promote a culture of mutual support.* In the future, global problems will not be solved by the U.S., and joint force, alone. An organizational culture able to identify, integrate as appropriate, and routinely leverage the comparative advantages of U.S. and foreign networks in defense, development, and diplomacy will be required. Multiple venues, contingent on specific environmental circumstance, will dictate how this principle is pursued; but the outcome is the integrated, aligned & mutually supporting elements of national power and U.S. partner's objectives and activities.

The difference from previous doctrinal discussions of inter-organizational coordination, unified action, and unity of effort, is in viewing mutually supporting, cooperative activities as a persistent and flexible element of campaigning, vice simply a specific operational requirement. A culture of broad mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities doesn't invalidate previous doctrine, it simply broadens its application for Combatant Commands (CCMDs). CCMDs view alignment of objectives and activities across the spectrum of 'design, coordination, plan, and execute' of joint campaigning, while consistently assessing/re-assessing the requirements and effectiveness, across the environment of cooperation and competition.

We live in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. U.S. vital interests, and challenges to those interests, must leverage all elements of national power, allies, partners, and even some rivals to adapt and respond. Integration and harmonization of stakeholder objectives and activities into a mutually supportive and aligned campaign is an essential principle of integrated campaigning.

In the future, implementing this strategy will require a broader and deeper culture of integration and alignment of activity to maintain and advance global mutual interests. A culture of mutual support recognizes the limitations of US

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capacity and capabilities, and that joint force campaign(s) are a primary component to U.S. global leadership in an increasingly complex and uncertain world.

Generally, and in priority order, the following are the targets of a sustained culture of mutual support, and alignment of objectives and activities within the Joint Force; within DoD (i.e. SOF-CF, Maneuver-Support, Service-Service); amongst the USG (i.e. DoD-Departments/agencies); amongst allies and partners (i.e. DoD-Foreign Forces & Ministries); amongst non-state and non-governmental entities (i.e. DoD-Regional/Global Security & Governance entities; civic organizations; popular movements). The specific 'who?' will be driven practically by the operational and strategic conditions and challenges as they emerge and evolve. The more general 'who?' is foundationally built on our traditional, and more capable, networks of allies and partners – regionally and globally.

This culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities must be a continuous and constant element and consideration within joint planning. It must be a central consideration that seeks to leverage partners' capabilities, and then integrate those capabilities as part of campaign plans. We must continuously reevaluate those campaigns to flexibly adapt to changing conditions that may point to different partners in different situations, addressing evolving or different challenges, and sustaining conditions for stability and continued development.

This culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities must generally be applied continuously and globally. The joint force must contextually prioritize the 'why?', 'where?', and 'when?' to coordinate and synchronize capabilities and capacities that leverage the greatest value for US national interests regionally and trans-regionally.

Ultimately this new culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities will be part of more flexible and expanded options to U.S. policy makers. It will enable the Joint Force to advance, sustain, and protect US national interests and objectives globally through sharing of capacity, capabilities, and risk. It will better enable the CCMDs to adapt to constant and continuous changes in conditions in the global operating environment, and evolve and adapt U.S. campaigns to maintain global stability and continued development and prosperity.

h. *Utilize embedded and disciplined assessments.* Information requirements across all echelons have increased exponentially as the world has grown more complex and volatile. The current demand for information exceeds the analytical abilities of the joint force and is straining collection assets. Furthermore, Combatant Commands are challenged to collect, process, analyze, and incorporate information in a timely manner. In order to focus efforts and provide more accurate assessments, a robust analysis program must be embedded into the campaign planning process.

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A robust analysis program is comprised of an assessment plan supported by an accompanying information collection plan. These plans are embedded into every step of the campaigning process. Integrating information collection and assessment plans into the campaigning process serves three purposes: (1) it will confirm baseline conditions, (2) it will facilitate real-time monitoring mechanisms, and (3) it will enable accurate assessments of campaign progress. Evaluating baseline conditions is paramount to developing an effective campaign plan. In competitive environments plans are developed without an thorough understanding of preexisting conditions. Once a baseline is established, an effective campaign can be developed. As the campaign progresses, a deliberate data collection and assessment plan allows staffs to accurately monitor the campaign. Focused collection and assessment efforts provide staffs with essential information, reducing the flood of superfluous information received under current practices. Access to the 'right' information at the 'right' time grants commanders the operational flexibility to react to emerging trends. Finally, a detailed assessment and collection plan facilitates an accurate measurement of the campaigns' performance. Performance evaluations and assessments will become increasingly important as financial resources continue to diminish.

Finally, assessment as part of integrated campaigning requires discipline, both of the process and in the minds of those involved. Focus, both in the application of collection activities and in the resulting evaluation of data, leads to more certainty in assessment results. This focus only comes through careful and deliberate consideration of the operating environment, objectives, and available resources as the plan is developed and while it is executed. Disciplined and thorough thought about what to measure, how that data relates to the objectives, how to measure it, and how to analyze it must be done in advance, and continuously updated, in order to reap the full benefits of assessment as an element of the campaign.

## **VI. Concept Required Capabilities. (TBD)**

## **VII. Risks of Adopting this Concept. (TBD)**

## **VIII. Conclusion. (TBD)**

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896 **Appendix A: Glossary (TBD)**

897

898 *Campaign-* a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing  
899 a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

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<sup>14</sup> E.g., the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP); Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) analytical framework, Operational Design, etc...

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