



# ***Win in a Complex World***



## **Unified Quest Fighting on the Battleground of Perception**



### **Final Report 4 October 2016**



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## FOREWORD

From the Director,  
Army Capabilities Integration Center

Mission Command doctrine, ADRP 6-0, directs commanders “to inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.” Now, through modern internet and social media applications, commanders have an unprecedented ability to provide perspective, clarify intentions, and bolster the earned legitimacy of partner institutions. Simultaneously, commanders may use these and other platforms to counter disinformation, expose enemy brutality, and inoculate contested audiences against barrages of plausible but false narratives.

Winning on the “battleground of perception” is critical to success across the range of military operations. Commanders are responsible to inform, engage and influence key actors in the operational environment. Every military educational exchange, multinational operational planning effort, and joint or combined training event provides military professionals an opportunity to build relationships, enhance mutual cross-cultural communication and understanding perspectives and capabilities. These efforts shape the security environment, increase combat readiness, and enable commanders to gain the initiative and win in a contested, complex operational environment.

The U.S. Army Operating Concept, *Win in a Complex World, 2020 – 2040*, anticipates a future operational environment in which the rapid pace at which information proliferates globally, increases the speed of human interaction, number of interactions, and the ways that people interact. Individuals and organizations will connect to ideas and each other through television, radio, social engagements, the internet, cyber social media, and possibly technology not yet imagined. In this complex world, adversaries will use engagement, disinformation, information barrage, and propaganda to achieve political objectives in the battle spaces of public perception. Such rivals will use an array of means to target and negatively influence the perceptions, opinions, alliances, and the decisions of local, regional, and trans-regional populations, and multinational coalitions.

This increasing velocity of human interaction, compression of events in time, and growing ability to target and influence populations, requires the focused development of Army leaders capable of effectually engaging, informing and influencing both military and civilian populations. To win in a complex world, Army forces must integrate and maintain interoperability with partners while simultaneously shaping the narrative, seizing the initiative, operating across multiple domains, and establishing and maintaining security. To win, our Army must adapt.

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## UNIFIED QUEST OVERVIEW

The Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) annual future study program, Unified Quest (UQ), explores enduring challenges through a series of wargames, seminars, and workshops. UQ provides participants and senior leaders an improved understanding of the demands of future-armed conflict, and how the Army can innovate to fight and win in a complex world. The UQ seminars use the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) as the analytical framework to focus participants on critical issues identified through the Force 2025 Maneuvers: Army's Campaign of Learning. Seminar participants generate evidence based ideas and recommendations for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions. Finally, the seminar outputs integrate insights across the Army through the AWFC running estimates, and identify military problems requiring continued study.

## INTRODUCTION

Current doctrine and the anticipated operating environment (OE) indicate the need for commanders and subordinates to purposefully shape the security environment by engaging, informing and reassuring partners while establishing conditions that support the potential employment of joint forces. Now and in the future, commanders will need to employ synchronized use of all available assets to counter adversary-shaping efforts both prior to and during violent conflict. While this may seem obvious on the surface, most professional military education, training, exercises, and wargames focus military leaders across the ranks and echelons of command almost exclusively on the lethal aspect of major combat operations. This leaves the effort of determining which asset<sup>1</sup> should best engage an identified population,<sup>2</sup> by what means<sup>3</sup>, and for what purpose<sup>4</sup> -- to ad-hoc peace-time engagements with partner nations, or during combat.

To further Army understanding of influence and how the Army must adapt to meet the demands of the changing global and operational environment, Unified Quest<sup>5</sup> (UQ) seminar *Fighting on the Battleground of Perception (FBP)* was conducted at the United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership from 21 – 25 September 2015. This report provides a brief overview of the role of influence and information in the current and anticipated operational environment (OE), the Commander's intent and event methodology, followed by presentation of the study team's independent assessment and findings, proposed solutions, and emergent areas for further study.

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<sup>1</sup> "Assets" refers to the persons and their associated military occupational specialty or functional area. Examples include Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Special Forces, Military Police, Infantry Unit, and Foreign Area Officer.

<sup>2</sup> "Population" here refers to the group of people with whom the commander must engage and build capacity, deter, or influence. Examples: Contested foreign population, adversary, foreign military, foreign government.

<sup>3</sup> The "ways and means" are the specific methods that specific assets are skilled in applying, and the platforms used to deliver a given method. Examples: Way – Security Force Assistance, Means – Infantry or SF unit; Way –mil to mil staff engagement, Means – direct dialogue, email messages, conference. Way: Civil Affairs, Means – proved medical care to civilian population.

<sup>4</sup> Purpose: the commander's intended effect created by the engagement or influence effort. Examples include inform, build partnership, deter, influence.

For more information, the appendices provide detailed methodology, disaggregated group analysis, linkages to the Army Warfighting Challenges, and terms and definitions.

## **The Global and Operational Environment**

Cyberspace, modern communication systems and modern logistics continue to accelerate the scope of human ability to physically move geographically, and connect in expanding cyber and human-to-human social networks. Today, corporations and governments track the metadata (behavioral data, decision-making processes, identity, and social networks) of 87% of Americans. Yet, due to other means of interconnectedness such as public markets, buses and motorcycles, even actors not linked into the internet facilitate the faster movement of ideas. This interconnectedness has, and will, fundamentally reshape the global security environment and provide commanders both more opportunities and more dilemmas.

### ***Anticipate Future***

In the anticipated future, adversaries will continue to expand the use of engagement,<sup>6</sup> disinformation, information barrage<sup>7</sup>, and propaganda to achieve political objectives and shape the security environment in the battle spaces of public perception. Such rivals will use an array of means to target and influence the perceptions, opinions, alliances, and decisions of local, regional, and trans-regional populations, and multinational coalitions – including NATO. To counteract these efforts and gain the initiative, Commanders and their forces will need to engage within the Army, across Services, and with partners to build interoperability across Army, Joint and Combined forces. Simultaneously, the nation will require these same leaders to counter adversary influence efforts through synchronized application of conventional and Special Operations Force capabilities across all available platforms, and across the range of military operations.

### ***Current Situation***

In October 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey identified that the United States faces an “explosion of terrorist propaganda and training on the internet” that results in recruitment of American citizens to fight Americans at home and abroad. While the FBI works with partners to stop or mitigate attacks on the homeland, adversaries abroad continue to operate locally, regionally and globally counter to U.S. security interests below the threshold of war.

In Europe, NATO Commander General Philip Breedlove referred to one powerful nation’s efforts to shape the environment as “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare”. General Breedlove identified that aggressor nations use unconventional attacks, propaganda campaigns,

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<sup>6</sup> “Engagement” describes the purposeful interaction between people for an intended outcome to include building partnership, legitimacy, and interoperability.

<sup>7</sup> Information barrage: a technique used to overload a target so that it becomes inoperable. For humans, this equates to ‘information overload’ and/or ‘narrative overload’ such that the person or group cannot distinguish truth or solidify political will.

cyber assaults and “homegrown” separatist militias to prepare the battlefield for maneuver forces, and later, support maneuver operations.<sup>8</sup>

Currently, diverse foreign adversaries at home and abroad actively work to influence American and partner citizens using a myriad of ways and means. Collectively, their efforts aggregate to significant complex dilemmas for commanders. Negatively influenced local or regional populations may choose to attack U.S. and/or partner forces using asymmetric warfare techniques. Instead of informing or assisting friendly efforts, subverted or radicalized individuals may sabotage friendly force equipment, destroy supplies, kill key civilian allies, or even join enemy forces.

### ***Impact on Commanders***

In such an interconnected environment, commanders must consider the impacts of adversary influence at each other’s echelons of command. At the strategic level, influenced populations may pressure their governments not to fight against near-peer competitors when needed,<sup>9</sup> or to end membership in a key military alliance. Such actions limit a commander’s access to partner forces, transit or basing authorities, and logistics support for his forces. Further, adversely influenced populations may perceive legitimate partner governments as illegitimate, and work to overthrow U.S.-friendly leadership (unconventional warfare).

At the regional level, adversary nation states may engage and influence diaspora populations to build allegiance and the circumstances supporting a “plausibly-legitimate”<sup>10</sup> (Irregular Warfare) military action in support of the diaspora.<sup>11</sup> Adversaries’ increasingly effective ability to target and influence huge populations, requires the focused development of U.S. Army leaders and forces knowledgeable of all assets available to purposefully and successfully shaping the security environment. Now and in the future, commanders must successfully direct subordinates to inform, engage, and build partnership while simultaneously directing, synchronizing and integrating engagement and influence activities to counter adversary actions.

Essentially, to win in a complex world, conventional Army forces must build and maintain interoperability with other Army elements, Joint, Inter-organizational, and multi-national (JIM) partners, while Army Special Operations planners and operators support commanders in shaping the security environment through assisting partners, influencing contested populations, and presenting adversaries with multiple dilemmas. Every aspect of how the Army must fight to win in a complex world requires all Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers to connect, engage, and shape their environment for effect.

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<sup>8</sup> (Vandiver 2014)

<sup>9</sup> (Lucas and Nimmo, Information Warfare: What is it and How to Win It? 2015)

<sup>10</sup> “Plausible legitimacy” is the idea that in the age of information barrage and significant competing narratives, an actor, group or government may not need to act in a legitimate and transparent manner, but instead create the belief in target populations, that their narrative/version of reality is plausible and thus their actions are legitimate.

<sup>11</sup> Irregular Warfare: Violent struggle among (state and/or non-state) actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1-02).



## Fighting on the Battleground of Perception: Commander's Intent

To further Army understanding of influence and how the Army must adapt to meet the demands of the changing global and operational environment, UQ *FBP* seminar was conducted at the United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership from 21 – 25 September 2015. This seminar brought together representatives from the Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Centers of Excellence (CoE), and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO), Public Affairs (PA), Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), Intelligence, and Space communities.<sup>12</sup> Often referred to as “Information Related Capabilities” (IRCs), these communities and their associated capabilities comprise the military occupational specialties (MOS) and Functional Areas (FA) that expand a commander's means to engage partners, influence contested populations, and effect adversary decisions.<sup>13</sup> The following is a summary of the seminar's study framework.

**Problem.** U.S. forces are losing the battle of perception due to confusion over terminology, and a lack of understanding of how, when and to what degree each IRC community should integrate into Army Service Component Commands and their subordinate or parallel organizations.

**Seminar Problem Statement.** Confusion over terminology and lack of understanding of roles, responsibilities, and missions across the broader influence and information operations communities impedes unity of effort to decisively influence actors on the battleground of perception.

**Seminar Purpose.** Improve U.S. Army understanding of how to fight on the battleground of perception. Expanded: Understand the current operational environment, the anticipated operational environment, and assess how the Army must see itself and adapt to win battles of perception across a broad spectrum of populations.

**Key Tasks.** The *FBP* seminar used four objectives (see figure on page 5) and associated learning demands to achieve the following tasks:

1. Broaden understanding of Army methods and capabilities used by commanders to exert influence.
2. Understand and evaluate the roles, responsibilities and best placement of IRCs within Army and Joint, Inter-organizational and multi-national (JIM) organizational structures.
3. Develop a picture of how the Army must adapt to effectively train and educate and integrate the force; and

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<sup>12</sup> Detailed group demographics are included in Appendix B.

<sup>13</sup> When combined with daily joint and partner mil-to-mil engagements, these capabilities support Commanders in developing the relationships needed to deter aggression, strengthen partner land forces, increase cultural awareness, and establish the conditions that support the potential employment of joint forces.

4. Enable Commanders to match the right IRC forces, assets, and method to the right objective for an intended effect.<sup>14</sup> In other words, *whom* does a commander need to *do what* with *whom* for *what purpose*?

### **Objectives.**



**Objective:** *(All groups) Examine how we (communities within the United States Army) exert influence to include cooperative influence, persuasive influence, and coercive influence*



**Objective 2:** *(Groups 1-4) Determine the Army's influence roles and responsibilities within the Army Core Competencies of "shape the security environment, set the theater, project national power, combined arms maneuver across all domains, wide area security, cyberspace operations, and special operations"*



**Objective 3:** *(Group 5) Determine where Army influence capabilities must reside at the brigade combat team, division, corps, and theater Army echelons.*



**Objective 4:** *(Group 6) Define key terms, identify barriers and potential solution strategies to resolve terminology and doctrine challenge across the influence, cyber and information operations communities.*

**Outputs.** These objectives led participants to define terminology, describe baseline capabilities and gaps, and propose DOTMLPF-P<sup>15</sup> solution strategies to inform future force development efforts that support Commanders in employing synchronized use all available assets to shape the security environment both prior to and during violent conflict.

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<sup>14</sup> Who (PSYOP, CA, PA, SF, Infantry, Aviation, IO forces) does an commander need to do what (Inform, Engage, Influence, Synchronize) with whom (Foreign civilian population, adversary, domestic audience, partner military forces, diverse elements of a commanders staff) for what purpose (Deter an adversary, build popular support, inform civilians, build interoperability and partner capacity, synchronize Influence and Information Operations within the Commander's staff)?

<sup>15</sup> DOTmLPF-P: Doctrine, Organization, Training, material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, Policy

## PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The Influence, Information Operations, CEMA communities, and other experts representing Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC) and TRADOC Centers of Excellence conducted a two day plenary and discussion focus session. Then, to achieve the seminar objectives, participants broke into six predetermined groups (Appendix A) to identify means of improving U.S. Army understanding of cooperative, persuasive and coercive influence,<sup>16</sup> and assess how the Army should organize and posture conventional forces (CF) and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) to exert influence and conduct Information and Influence Operations in support of commanders' objectives. Additionally, participants considered how their organizations within the Army should adapt to increase combat power, shape the security environment, and assist commanders in consolidating gains across the range of military operations.

The UQ *FBP* seminar saw participants separated into six groups used to consider roles, responsibilities, organizational structures of IO and Influence assets in the current and future operating environment.

The six participant groups used a design approach<sup>17</sup> grounded in the Army Operating Concept, the AWFCs, and their professional experience, to examine seminar objectives, associated problem statements, and learning demands (Appendix A). From this, the participants developed an analysis brief and proposed DOTmLPF-P solutions to identified challenges. Subsequently, each group briefed their analysis and possible solution strategies to senior leaders.

Independently, a study team analyzed the aggregate professional military judgment of participants in six ways. First, plenary briefs and facilitated discussions elicited recorded participant insights. Second, participants entered comments into a survey subsequently assessed for trends and any significant outlier perspectives. Third, observers and U.S. Army War College trained facilitators met to identify trends across working groups. Fourth, analysts examined the working group briefs to senior leaders. Fifth, analysts conducted text-mining of discussions as they occurred. Sixth, analysts examined the emergent divergent cultural narratives both as part of the initial assessment and as part of preparing this report. The Army will incorporate these results through the Army Warfighting Challenge running estimates, Quarterly Review Process, and by initiating an Implementation Tasking Order that provokes action amongst responsible lead and supporting organizations.

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<sup>16</sup> Understanding influence includes discussing terminology, types of influence, and influence roles in the Army.

<sup>17</sup> ADRP 5-0, 17 May 2012, p 1-4. Army Design Methodology: Understand the environment (causality), visualize a desired end state and potential solutions (operational approach), and describe the environment and operational approach. ADRP 5-0, 17 May 2012, p 1-4.

## SYTHESIZED ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

### Overview

Many of the results and proposed solutions emerged from a new comprehension of the trends shaping the current and future operating environments, and a recognition of both the diversity and the intertwined nature of the Influence, Information Operations and CEMA communities. Participants synthesized Army concepts and doctrine with unclassified TRADOC G-2 and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) G-9 plenary briefings, an understanding of recently changed adversary doctrine, and years of professional experience.

The results reflect the participants' reflection that to 'win in a complex world' requires multiple solutions to occur simultaneously. For example, the Aviation, Infantry, Armor, and Artillery communities that comprise combined arms have unique training, education, and equipment requirements. Each combined arms capability is inextricably intertwined, and sometimes provides overlapping potential effects. However, to fight effectively in the OE requires maintaining readiness across the Aviation, Infantry, Armor and Artillery forces, while simultaneously developing new concepts and doctrine that adapt how the Army fights as the OE shifts.

The Army must apply this and Combined Arms Maneuver analogies to the Influence, Information Operations, and CEMA communities. Civil Affairs officers do not have the same training, education, or area of expertise as Psychological Operations officers, or Information Operations officers, or Foreign Area officers, or Public Affairs officers, or Signal officers, or Special Forces operators. The Joint services and Army refer to these capabilities collectively as "Information Related Capabilities." And, like Combined Arms Maneuver, the Information Related Capabilities need a concept and associated doctrine of how they fight as the IRC, as well as a concept that delineates how to best integrate with the other assets engaged in operations.

Not surprisingly, all identified results intertwine. If the Army cuts Infantry operators (or in this case Civil Affairs) can Aviation still achieve the Army's mission? If Artillery forces do not hit their target, should the Army cut their soldiers and equipment? Or must the Army develop the means of maintaining combined arms synergy but with tiered readiness? *Fighting on the Battleground of Perception* participants collectively argued that no singular recommendation will entirely fix the problem it is associated with, as each problem has multiple causal linkages with other problems. Simply put, recommending increased SOF support to CF commanders will not work if the Army simultaneously downsizes Civil Affairs operators to rock-bottom capacity. Building interoperability between (SOF) Influence and Information Operations planners will have little impact without PSYOP operators assigned to the Commander. In summary, all recommendations require integrated implementation with inclusion of all communities of interest.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Communities of Interest include: Irregular Warfare, Engagement Warfighting Function, Security Force Assistance, Gray Zone, Unconventional Warfare, Cyber and Electromagnetic Spectrum warfare, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Information Operations, Human Dimension, Human Aspect, and Human Domain communities.

## ***Finding 1: Understanding the Operational Environment***

In the current and anticipated operational environment, adversaries engage in a constant state of aggression punctuated by the use of violence to achieve limited military objectives<sup>19</sup> in support of phased political objectives - all achieved below the U.S. threshold of war.<sup>20</sup>

**1.A. Adversary Influence.** Adversaries now place significant emphasis on influencing the local, national, and trans-national<sup>21</sup> perceptions of populations that potentially could effect, shape or fight on intended terrain. During discussion, participants identified that adversary influence operations span a huge range of diverse activities to include military posturing, influencing other nation's political campaigns, diaspora "friendship clubs", internet trolling to increase conflict, and internet social media recruiting. Adversaries have robust, targeted influence campaigns to actively shape the environment in their favor.

**1.B. Increased Adversary Gains.** Adversaries will continue to work to manipulate the perceptions, laws, and political will of local, national, regional, and global populations. These actions provide adversaries with increased popular support in targeted audiences, increased political and physical freedom of maneuver,<sup>22</sup> increased access to resources and potential battle space, and the ability to incrementally expand operations while simultaneously eroding local and national popular support to friendly transnational organizations and governments.

**1.C. Phase 0/1 Overmatch.** Adversary application of influence and information operations below the U.S. threshold of war overmatches current and planned influence-focused capacity and authorities during phases 0 and 1. Participants emphasized the difficulty in obtaining authorities for operations, and the need to develop a better process to synchronize all the IRCs in support of maneuver operations. However, participants also noted that including select portions of influence operations into the Army's Professional Military Education at all levels would assist the Army in better understanding and influencing the contested population, understanding the impact of adversary propaganda, and identifying how to best shape the commander's operational environment across the ROMO.

**1.D. Increased Risk - Phase 3.** Adversary freedom of maneuver and consolidation of gains<sup>23</sup> during phases 0 and 1 increases subsequent phase 3 risk due to adverse

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<sup>19</sup> Participants noted that while the violence may include unconventional warfare, irregular warfare and conventional warfare, the scale and political context (narratives) are meant to keep the conflict limited to very specific military objectives. An example in U.S. history is the 1<sup>st</sup> Gulf War where President Bush chose not to expand the mission and send ground troops into Baghdad.

<sup>20</sup> Examples include Russian invasion of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and East Ukraine, ISIS/ Daesh's first political then psychological/conventional war; and China's land reclamation projects and ADIZ changes.

<sup>21</sup> Trans-national populations include, but are not limited to, political (United Nations), military (NATO), economic (NAFTA), corporate (Monsanto), and religious (the Catholic church) organizations.

<sup>22</sup> Adversary doctrine indicates that an entity gains freedom of maneuver through promoting intentionally confusing and conflicting narratives that immobilize international political will.

<sup>23</sup> The term "consolidation of gains" specifically refers to the AOC description of how the Army operates: "Conventional and special operations forces work together to understand, influence, or compel human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational, social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission.

shaping of the environment, including successful adversary recruitment within friendly and contested populations (i.e. ISIS recruitment within the U.S. via social media).

**Overarching Implication:** The United States will have to adapt and innovate to counter adversary information warfare and influence campaigns occurring across all phases of operations (more analysis is required at a classified level).

### ***Finding 2: Adapt and Innovate to Fight in Phase 0***

To win against adversaries fighting on the battleground of perception during Phase 0 and 1 operations, the Army must organize, resource, and integrate the range of capabilities required to support commanders in this below-the-threshold fight.

**2.A. Total Force Mix.** The current Total Force<sup>24</sup> mix does not adequately support ASCC, Field, Corps, Division or Brigade commanders and their staffs with the diverse capabilities needed to understand, engage, and influence the complex human aspect and dynamics of each environment.

**2.B. Professional Military Education (PME).** Current PME does not adequately provide commanders, staffs or forces the tools needed to engage, inform and influence contested populations. This includes the utilization and operational integration of the diverse communities that provide cyber, electronic warfare, civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations and information operations capabilities.

**2.C. Staff Organization.** Several of the IRC personnel primarily reside in isolated staff elements across the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), Field Army, Corps, Division and Brigade staffs, making synchronizing efforts difficult. The absence of a single staff section to conduct synchronization between Joint Combined Arms Maneuver (JCAM), Influence and CEMA targeting and operations, undermines a commanders' ability to meet doctrinal influence responsibilities,<sup>25</sup> undercuts operational effects, and reduces the commander's ability to consolidate gains.

**2.D. Intelligence Support.** Current intelligence directorates focus primarily on understanding adversaries and enemies. To shape the security environment and consolidate gains, the Army requires increased intelligence support focused on understanding the human aspect of friendly, neutral and contested populations; adversary propaganda and media products; and influence activities occurring both on and off the internet.

### ***Finding 3: Integrate Capabilities During Phase 0/1 to Fight Better in Phase 3***

To prepare Army forces to fight against adversaries in Phase 3, the Army must integrate IRC forces into training, staffs, and operations prior to deploying.

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<sup>24</sup> The Total force is comprised of Active Duty, Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

<sup>25</sup> ADRP 6.0 Mission Command (May 2012), ADRP 6-22 Army Leadership (August 2012) and other doctrine require leaders to inform and influence. ADRP 6-22 defines influence as "the act of power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command".



**3.A. Adversary Friendly Environment.** Due to current and emerging adversary doctrine and operations, commanders should expect adversaries to have already shaped the will and perceptions of the targeted populations among whom they intend to fight. To overmatch adversaries during phase 3, U.S. Commanders must integrate and synchronize Combined Arms Maneuver, CEMA, and Influence for effect.

**3.B. Majority of Conventional Force (CF) support in Reserve.** The SOF CA and PSYOP active component staffs the ASCC, Corps, Divisions and Brigades planning requirements. However, the majority of the IRC operational capabilities reside in the Reserve Component. In theory, this allows the Army to leverage civilian-sector IRC skills. However, these forces require a greater lead-time to deploy in support of short notice major combat operations, and cannot support indefinite, continuous Phase 0/1/2 operations at a needed capacity. For example, due to CF dedicated PSYOP forces residing solely in the Reserve; ASCC, Field Army, Corps, Division and Brigade commanders have limited opportunity to integrate PSYOP operational capability prior to deploying. This inherently places the new arrivals on the fringe, reduces the utilization of their capabilities, diminishes staff synergy, and decreases a commander's options.

#### ***Finding 4: Lack of IRC, Operational Integration , and Institutional***

The IRC communities need better integration within Influence, within CEMA, with each other, within CF staffs, and with the Institutional and Operational Army writ large. This Integration must occur for the Army to better shape the security environment, gain access, win Joint and Combined fights against near-peer adversaries, and consolidate gains across the range of military operations.

**4.A. Internal Integration.** The Influence and CEMA communities need internal integration<sup>26</sup> for development of integrated DOTMLPF and force management solutions. Consider, the Aviation branch maintains, multiple aircraft, capabilities, schools, qualifications, and purposes of each asset. Likewise, multiple sub-communities form the base for Influence, and separately, CEMA. Core communities required to execute Influence operations include PSYOP, Civil Affairs, HUMINT, and Combat Camera. CEMA includes the Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Signal and SIGINT communities. All participant groups identified that an overarching lack of IRC conceptual interoperability causes significant synchronization challenges including the inability to mitigate risk in force management across capabilities.

Operationally, IRC assets need staff integration with each other in the form of a staff directorate or division. That staff directorate needs to integrate with JCAM capabilities synchronized through the current and future operations directorates and targeting process (see above Result 2.C.). In recognizing the need for an integrating staff element, multiple groups agreed to an IRC staff integrating structure presented by an

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<sup>26</sup> Consider aviation. Multiple aircraft, capabilities, schools, qualifications, and purposes of each asset. Likewise, multiple sub-communities form the base for Influence, and separately, CEMA. Core communities required to execute Influence operations include PSYOP, Civil Affairs, HUMINT, and Combat Camera. CEMA includes the Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Signal and SIGINT communities.

Information Operations officer during plenary (Appendix B, Group 1 Slide 2). More research is required.

**4.B. Army Functional Concept – Influence or Information Operations?** No overarching organization, center of excellence or proponent bears responsibility for integrating the activities or doctrine of the influence focused capabilities across CoEs and its subordinate SOF and CF communities. This fragments the community of practice, which reduces focus and integration of IRCs in both the Generating and Operating forces. To win the battleground of perception across the ROMO, the Army must integrate management and resourcing of the IRCs. Currently, IRC capabilities are spread across multiple military occupational specialties, functional areas, SOF and CF commands, TRADOC CoEs and the Army National Guard and Reserve.

Participants identified the lack of an Army Functional Concept (AFC) as a key problem. However, some groups identified the need for an *Influence* AFC, while others identified the need for an *Information Operations* AFC. The distinction is significant and highlights a key fissure within the IRC communities. An Influence AFC would integrate the Influence focused IRC to develop a concept to build and codify IRC interoperability in support of an Engage, Inform and Influence Warfighting Function. In contrast, an Information Operations AFC would build a concept that explains the roles, responsibilities and inter-relationships of the IRC across the ROMO, as well as define how to synchronize Influence, CEMA, and maneuver in support of tactical and operational commanders within a maneuver battle space. During the event out-brief, senior leaders asked participants why the Engagement AFC did not solve the need for a new AFC. In sum, the group assessed that while the Engagement Warfighting Function (E-WfF) could have solved the problem for *Influence*,<sup>27</sup> it did not. Further, participants identified that E-WfF focuses towards Engagement and Influence, whereas Information Operations provides the linkage and synchronization of Cyber warfare, Electronic Warfare, PSYOP and Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Civil Affairs and other IRC with JCAM. Follow on research and thought is required.

**4.C. Centers of Excellence.** Currently, the IRCs have three underlying groupings: Cyber and Electronic Warfare; Engage, Inform and Influence; and Information Operations (IO). The Army tasks the IO staff officer (FA-30) to integrate Influence and CEMA with JCAM within ASCC, Field Army, and Corps staffs. As the IRC staff integrator, IO institutionally falls under the Mission Command CoE. In contrast, the lead Engage and Influence operational capabilities (PSYOP, CA, SF), fall under Special Operations CoE, CEMA falls under Cyber CoE, and Public Affairs under Office of the Commander of Public Affairs (OCPA). Participants assessed this distribution of related Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and Functional Areas (FA) under multiple CoEs leaves the IRC community without a lead CoE.

**4.D. The Army Warfighting Challenges.** The 20 Army Warfighting Challenges do not include an “Engage, Inform, and Influence” AWFC. However, the AWFC framework and process provide the means for the Army to think, learn, and analyze enduring

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<sup>27</sup> The participants argued that the E-WfF problem statement correctly identified the problem, but the follow-on document and ongoing Capabilities Based Assessment had gone in the wrong direction.

challenges in way meant to cut across all Warfighting Functions and Centers of Excellence stovepipes. Further, through the Quarterly Army Warfighting Challenge Review (QAR) process, senior leaders hold the CoEs accountable to integrate Campaign of Learning outputs, implement solutions, and support the Army new capability development. The absence of an AWFC for Influence results in isolation of the associated IRC, lack of a COE advocate in the QAR process, and difficulty in integrating into capability development. While the CEMA community has AWFC 7 *Conduct Space and Cyber Electromagnetic Operations and Maintain Communications*, Information Operations (FA-30) integrates via Mission Command led AWFC 19 *Exercise Mission Command*, and the Engagement Community focuses on AWFC 3 *Provide Security Force Assistance*, the Inform and Influence community requires integration into the Institutional Army's AWFC framework and QAR process.

***Finding 5: Need for Increased Internalization of Influence Concepts Writ Large***

The Army provides limited education on the application of influence, and limited training opportunities on IRC utilization and operational integration. Leaders at all levels require increased opportunities to exercise engaging and influencing target populations across the ROMO.

**5.A. Negative Perception of the IRC.** Over the duration of the seminar, participants collectively expressed a perception of negative leader bias against IO and PSYOP due to negative command experiences. These negative experiences included lack of IRC ability to conduct operations due to lack of authorities, Information Operations officers unable to produce the results the leaders expected, commander frustration with obscure, changing and multi-use terminology, IRC staff positions left unfilled, lack of diverse IRC force capacity to execute operations, and poor IRC integration.

**5.B. Limited Ability to Demonstrate Effects of IRC Operations at Combat Training Center (CTC) Rotations.** IRC proponents and commanders identified that CTCs do not adequately expose Army professionals to influence, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information operations or IRC utilization. Many participants also noted that leaders and staffs have little exposure to IRC planners or operators prior to executing their CTC rotations due to force structure challenges. Further, limitations on the ability to replicate the impacts of IRC operations at the CTCs limits many leaders' ability to visualize, plan and execute synchronized JCAM, Influence and CEMA operations.

***Finding 6: Confusing Terminology = Confused Staffs***

Operational and Institutional Army leaders require coordinated, defined, and approved concepts, doctrine and terminology to conduct effective and synchronized operations in the current and emerging environment.

**6.A. The IRCs Lack a Common, Professional Lexicon.** As ideas matter, so do the words used to articulate them. The Army requires a common lexicon developed within a military context, that defines inform, engage, influence, and information operations ideas and actions. Without this, military and civilian professionals cannot fully understand their environment, think clearly about and articulate concepts, or describe a strategic, operational or tactical plan that effectively integrates Inform, Engagement, Influence, and CEMA. Additionally, many terms in use across Army and Joint communities muddle discussion.

**6.B. Challenges.** Participants identified the following challenges: 1) Multiple uses of the same word or phrase<sup>28</sup>, 2) Similar terms with overlapping application<sup>29</sup> and 3) Terms not defined in a military context<sup>30</sup> 4) Terms that require, but do not have, clear conceptual linkages and disaggregation<sup>31</sup>. The lack of clearly defined terms and associated concepts within the military context undermines all other efforts to holistically adapt the Army. Fundamentally, to integrate Influence and CEMA concepts, capabilities and forces into PME and with the other war fighting functions, the Army must define words and ideas precisely.

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<sup>28</sup> Multiple uses for the same word or phrase. Example: Information Operations (IO) – the synchronization of the information related capabilities vs. the IO officer FA30.

<sup>29</sup> Similar terms with overlapping application: Information Operations and Influence Operations; Military Information Support Operations (Influence) vs. Information Operations; human aspect, human dimension, human terrain and human domain; human domain, cognitive domain, human environment and information environment.

<sup>30</sup> Terms include but are not limited to: Influence, hybrid warfare, information-psychological warfare (Russian).

<sup>31</sup> Irregular Warfare, Engagement, the Gray Zone, (former) Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Doctrine and Concepts: AWFC 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 17, 19**

1. Refine concepts and doctrine by identifying, delineating, and synchronizing CEMA (Cyber CoE), inform (OCPA), engage (SO CoE and M CoE), influence (SO CoE) and information operations (FA 30 – MC CoE) roles and responsibilities.
2. Develop a professional military lexicon that clarifies and codifies communication, information, engagement, influence, and CEMA terms and concepts.
3. Update the Engagement Army Functional Concept to ensure inclusion and integration all SOF and CF Inform, Engage and Influence responsibilities.
4. Integrate Influence and Information Operations into the Army Warfighting Challenges and Learning Demands (OPR: SO CoE and MC CoE. OCR: Cyber CoE, M CoE).
5. Develop a white paper on the integration and operational synchronization of all IRC (CAC, MC CoE).

### **Organization: AWFC 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19**

1. Develop a comprehensive Capability-Based Assessment for Information Operations that simultaneously assesses SOF and CF Inform, Engage and Influence capabilities; Information Operations (FA 30) and CEMA. (MC CoE, SO CoE; M CoE, Cyber COE).
2. Charter Engage, Inform, Influence, Information Operations and CEMA Integrated Concept Development Team (ICDT).
3. Determine most effective AC/RC mix for SOF Engage and Influence support to CF (OPR: SO CoE; OCR: MC CoE; M CoE, MS CoE, I CoE).
4. Determine most effective AC/RC mix for CF PSYOP and CA support to CF Commanders.

### **Training and Leader Development: AWFC 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 14**

1. Integrate Engage and Influence concepts, doctrine, and capability utilization into PME and training (including CTC rotations). (SO CoE)
2. Integrate CF Commander and staff influence responsibilities into training during CTCs (OPR: M CoE; OCR: MC CoE; SO CoE).
3. Increase CF SOF integration, interoperability, and interdependence.

### **Personnel: AWFC 4, 9, 20**

1. Develop a white paper on the creation of a new functional area that includes participant recommended courses of action for consideration: Recruit exclusively from high achieving PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Combat Camera, Public Affairs, Cyber and Information Operations officers: 1) into a new Functional Area; 2) into a new Engage and Influence FA; 3) into a new CEMA and Cyber-Influence FA (MC CoE and SO CoE).
2. Create multi-compo influence teams to support CF commanders. (SO CoE)
3. Develop multi-compo IRC teams to support commanders (All IRC CoEs).

## **Policy: AWFC 4**

Increase Reserve CF PSYOP and CA force accessibility for mobilization in support of conventional forces prior to Phase 3.

**Integration (AWFC Process):** Establish a working group to initiate and track solution strategy progress and build an integrated community of practice linked across the AWFC and WfF.

### **Additional Recommendations:**

1. During next update of the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, align revision with the Army Operating Concept to include all SOF and CF inform, engage (CONUS), and influence (OCONUS) tasks. Ensure to address CF mil-to-mil, partner engagement, building partner capacity, and combined staff roles and requirements at the ASCC, Field Army, Corps, and Division echelons. (CDLD JACD, CDD Engagement, SO CoE, USASOC, M CoE, MC CoE and FORSCOM)
2. Codify staff integration (ex. Information and Engagement Operations Directorate (G-39) in support of OCONUS CF commanders and staffs. (OPR: MC CoE; OCR SO CoE, Cyber CoE)
3. Integrate Influence and Information Operations into the AWFC learning demands, and AWFC governance process. Participants identified IO and Influence integration requirements in all 20 AWFC. (SO CoE, MC CoE, Force 2025 IAW QAR briefing cycle)
4. Ensure CEMA integration into the AWFC learning demands. In examining both the Army Core Competencies and the AWFCs, Group 1 identified CEMA integration as a critical component to 17 of 20 challenges, with AWFC 8, 9, 10 and 20 as key to integrating CEMA into future force development.
5. Identify an ARCIC lead to link all communities working on “human” and “influence” focused efforts. This includes: Irregular Warfare, Engagement Warfighting Function, Security Force Assistance, Gray Zone, Unconventional Warfare, Cyber and Electromagnetic Spectrum warfare, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Information Operations, Human Dimension, Human Aspect, and Human Domain communities.



## Questions for Further Study

1. **Engagement Warfighting Function (E-WfF).** Can the E-WfF serve as the integrating Warfighting Function for all inform, engage, influence and counter-influence capabilities?
2. **IO AFC.** The IO (FA-30) community argues that the IRC require an Army Functional Concept to synchronize efforts. the Army needs a concept that rethinks the role of the IO officer at the tactical level to counter adversary IO-CEMA-CAM efforts, and at the operational level to integrate Influence and CEMA with maneuver operations. Questions for consideration include: How does IO best integrate into Mission Command? Does IO need an overarching Functional Concept that links the Engage and Influence Communities and the CEMA Communities collectively into mission command, or should each community link into the AWFC and Operational staffs as their own entity?
3. **AWFC – Influence.** How should Influence integrate into the Army Warfighting Challenge Structure? As concepts cannot move to capability without clear linkage to an AWFC, Influence needs AWFC structural and COE representation.
4. **AWFC Integration – Information Operations.** How should the synchronizing function (FA-30) of Information Operations integrate into the Army Warfighting Challenges?
5. **Concepts.** Should the Army distinguish between Cyber Warfare, CEMA, Cyber-PSYOP, Influence operations and Information Operations? A majority of non-IO participants appeared to think a distinction is required, whereas IO officers and associated civilian experts generally expressed that these communities all fall under IO.
6. **Organization – Institutional Level.** Does the Army need one Center of Excellence for “Engage and Influence” (SO COE), one for Cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare (Cyber COE), and a third for the IO synchronizing Function (MC COE)? Or, should the Army identify one CoE responsible for all the IRCs?
7. **Organization – Operational Staffs.** What organizational structure should the Army adopt to best synchronize the IRC internally? What organizational structure should the Army adopt to best integrate the Influence and CEMA capabilities into JCAM targeting and operations?
8. **Electronic Warfare.** Group 4 observed that the Army does not maintain any Active Component Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces. Does the Army need EW capabilities to enable counter-influence, military deception, and Cyber Operations during phases 0 and 1?

Many participants expressed a visceral reaction to subordinating the conceptual elements of influence and the IRCs to Security Force Assistance engagements, and felt this had occurred during the Engagement CBA process. However, many of the same participants identified the need for a warfighting function to unify the IRCs in concept, CBA, Capabilities Needs Analysis (can), terminology and doctrine. The Proponents of PSYOP, IO, CA, Cyber, EW, PA, FAO, Intelligence and CF commanders responsible to

understand, engage, inform and influence populations, may consider forging a new path through the Engagement Warfighting Function.

## CONCLUSION

### Summary of Results:

1. **Adversaries engage in a constant state of aggression punctuated by use of force to achieve incremental political objectives.** Army Total Force structure, training and exercises focus on preparation for major combat operations. Adversary application of information and psychological warfare below the U.S. threshold of war, overmatches current and planned IRC capacity during phase 0 and 1, and provides adversary with the initiative and freedom of maneuver in subsequent phases. Synchronized Strategic Communication, Influence, and Cyber operations need main effort resourcing to fight adversaries prior to the engagement of major JCAM operations.
2. **Integration.** The IRC communities need better integration with each other, the Operations directorates within staffs, and the Army writ large. The diverse IRC communities' need an integrating concept, and follow on capability based assessment. Further, the IRC communities require new doctrine, organizational structures, and means to balance force reductions across capabilities for synchronized effect. The Army should integrate opportunities for leaders to utilize Influence capabilities and concepts into Army training, education. Military and associated civilian professionals need education and training on understanding influence, and how to exert it.
3. **SOF, CF, Active, Reserve mix.** Due to a myriad of past force structure decisions, many critical capabilities required to assist CF Commanders in preventing wars and in shaping the security environment exist primarily in the Reserves. This reduces the Army's ability to effectively respond to continuous steady-state adversary actions.

To win in a world where war remains fundamentally a contest of wills and where adversaries use the increased velocity of human interaction, disinformation and propaganda to achieve political objectives, the Army will need to win on the battleground of perception. To influence the populations that effect this battle space, the Army must employ combinations of cooperative, persuasive, and coercive means that assist the Commander's objectives, support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies. At the same time, the Army must achieve operational overmatch in Joint Combined Arms Maneuver synchronized with Influence, CEMA and Information Operations. This requires an increase in the Army's collective understanding of the concepts and capabilities that underpin information, cyber, electronic warfare and influence operations. It requires the establishment of systems to effectively train with and integrate the IRCs. Ultimately, winning in an increasingly complex and interconnected world, requires an increasingly interconnected, diverse, and synchronized Army.

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## **Appendix A: Methodology**

### **Pre-Event Planning**

Event preparation included reviewing the Army Operating Concept, the Army Warfighting Challenges, and Joint and Army concepts and doctrine. More importantly, the event lead conducted informal stakeholder interviews to gather community-specific narratives, and identify power brokers, academics, and operators within each IRC community. This effort provided insights into the challenges and complex issues the communities face in synchronizing their efforts. Some of the challenges appear to include perceived negative power relationships, conflicting views on the need to define terms, the use of the same term for multiple meanings<sup>32</sup>, and the use of many similar sounding terms that have very different meanings<sup>33</sup>. This combined research grounded in the AWFC framework, provided the foundation to establish the seminar objectives and learning demands.

From this, the ARCIC Future Warfare Division (FWD) Integration and Analysis (I&A) team used the approved objectives and associated AWFCs, learning demands and study questions to develop a detailed event analysis plan with associated methodology. Concurrently, the event planning team balanced the IRC community proponents, commanders, concept developers, program managers, science and technology organizations, COE leads and representatives from the Combined and Joint communities, into six focus groups designed to promote professional diversity and mitigate imbedded rank related cultural norms.

### **Conduct of the Event**

The five-day seminar included two days of plenary, two days of small group work focused on learning objectives, and concluded with a senior leader brief. The plenary session provided a baseline understanding of historical case studies<sup>34</sup>, current adversary operations<sup>35</sup>, and trends shaping the near-future global environment.<sup>36</sup> Plenary day two focused the participants on the new Engagement Warfighting Function, the emerging (Joint) Human Aspects of Military Operations (HAMO), and concluded with an update from each IRC community.

The plenary briefs provoked participant discussion on IRC integration challenges, operational authorities, organizational structures and the (inadequate) capability/force

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<sup>32</sup> Information Operations – the officer (FA 30), the information operations (Staff synchronizing function), influence operations (what many non-IO staff officers think IO is), information technology operations (Physical or Cyber attack of information lines of communication and infrastructure).

<sup>33</sup> Human Dimension, Human Aspect, Human Domain, Human Terrain, Human Network Analysis.

<sup>34</sup> TRADOC G-2.

<sup>35</sup> TRADOC G-2.

<sup>36</sup> TRADOC G-2 and U.S. Special Operations Command G-9.

balance of Special Operations Forces (SOF), Conventional Force (CF) and the Army National Guard and Reserve both before and during Joint Combined Arms Maneuver. After the plenary, the participants spent two days divided into small groups focused on the following four seminar objectives, (Objective 2, Groups 1-4) and associated focus questions:

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*Objective 1. Examine how we exert influence to include cooperative influence, persuasive influence, and cohesive influence.*

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All six working groups addressed Objective 1. The primary method of engaging this objective consisted of facilitated discussion primed by presentations regarding methods and cases of influence activities. Rapporteurs recorded observations in a database using the following question structure:

- 1.1 Define cooperative, persuasive, and cohesive influence.
- 1.2 How (by what methods) do we accomplish those tasks?
- 1.3 How well (at what quality) do we accomplish those tasks?
- 1.4 Which activities should be changed in the future?
- 1.5 How should those changes be made?
- 1.6 What obstacles to change exist?
- 1.7 What unrealized opportunities exist?
- 1.8 What are the ways forward to achieve change?
- 1.9 Other

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*Objective 2: Determine the Army's influence roles and responsibilities within the Army Core Competencies of shape the security environment, set the theater, project national power, combined arms maneuver across all domains, wide area security, cyberspace operations, and special operations.*

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Groups 1-4 examined Objective 2 through separate focus questions (listed below by group).

In order to aggregate responses across groups and provide a consistent baseline analytical framework, rapporteurs recorded observations in a database using the following question structure:

- 2.1 Inventory influence operations by phase and proponent (in Phase 0, what is happening and who is doing it; likewise with Phase 1, and so on)?
- 2.2 Inventory influence operations by Army Warfighting Challenge.
- 2.3 Identify proponent by task – who does what? (e.g., who produces and distributes printed material).
- 2.4 Address conflicts regarding proponent by task and phase.
- 2.5 Which necessary tasks are unmet and/or unlisted?
- 2.6 What should roles and responsibilities look like in the future?
- 2.7 Identify conflicts and gaps.
- 2.8 What DOTmLPF-P solutions exist to address these challenges?
- 2.9 What stakeholders are impacted by these gaps / solutions?
- 2.10 What are the second and third order consequences of these gaps/solutions?
- 2.11 Other.

**Group 1 Focus Question:** *How do Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) enable, attack, deny, defend and integrate with influence operation and Mission Command in support of the Army Core Competencies?*

**Participants:** The eleven-member group represented a broad cross section of the CEMA community of practice balanced by Asymmetric Warfare Group's SME on Human Narrative and Influence.

**Group 2 Focus Question:** *What capabilities and organizational structures does the Army need to connect with, shape and/or influence target audiences across all Army Core Competencies?*

**Participants:** Two field grade officers and seven civilian SMEs representing USASOC G-9, PA ANG193rd Special Operations Wing (EW, PSYOP platform), Joint IO Warfare Center, U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Engineering Research and Development Command (geospatial and human centric sociocultural analysis to CMO), Army Research Institute (ARI) support to PSYOP and IO, 1<sup>st</sup> IO Command, MC COE, and ARCYBER.



**Group 3 Focus Question:** *Synchronize and integrate – Within the construct of the AOC ACC, how should the Army synchronize, integrate, and command engage, shape, inform and influence activities with Combined Arms Maneuver both CONUS and OCONUS?*

**Participants:** A diverse group of Colonels representing the leadership of and voice for their respective MOS or Functional Area within the CF, SOF, generating force and operational IRC community. This group included IO Proponent, CDR 1<sup>st</sup> IO Command, Director of the Army Public Affairs Center, Cyber COE, Director U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, PSYOP Proponent / USASOC PSYOPS Commandant / USASO COE, Commander 2<sup>nd</sup> PSYOP Group/ USACAPOC, Deputy Director JIOWC, and Strategic Planner (Lt. Col), and the Joint Staff.

**Group 4 Focus Question:** *How do we synchronize and integrate cyber, shape inform and influence activities across all Domains against our adversaries in support of the ACC?*

**Participants:** This group consisted of two Colonels, six Lieutenant Colonels, a Chief Warrant 5, and two senior civilians representing, USASOC, USAWC, USACAPOC, CASCOM, ARCYBER, 152<sup>nd</sup> Theater Army IO Group, Fires COE, 193<sup>rd</sup> SOW, National Guard Bureau, and CSLD.

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*Objective 3. Determine where Army influence capabilities must reside at the Brigade Combat Team, Division, Corps, and Theater Army echelons.*

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**Group 5.** Working group 5 focused on Objective 3. Participants identified capabilities, placed them in relation to one other with and across echelons, and then described the system as whole. Rapporteurs recorded observations in a database using the following question structure:

- 3.1 Inventory influence capabilities/elements/sub-elements by echelon, ensuring that topics on the provided slides are addressed.
- 3.2 What outputs do those capabilities generate?
- 3.3 What inputs do those capabilities need?
- 3.4 Are the inputs generated by the environment, internally, or by another echelon?
- 3.5 Are the outputs used/monitored/needed internally or by another echelon?
- 3.6 What would the ideal system look like?
- 3.7 What DOTmLPF-P solutions will enable the move from the present to the ideal system?
- 3.8 What stakeholders inform or are affected by the proposed solutions?
- 3.9 What are the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> order consequences of the proposed solutions?

### 3.10 Other

**Participants:** This group of 12 included one Colonel (1<sup>st</sup> SF Command (A) MISO Director), a Captain (Fires COE), and 10 civilians representing TRADOC G2, RDECOM, ARCYBER, Cyber COE, USASOC G9 Capabilities and ERDC.

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*Objective 4. Define key terms, identify barriers and potential solution strategies to resolve terminology and doctrine challenge across the influence, cyber and information operations enabler communities.*

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**Group 6.** Working Group 6 focused on Objective 4. Rapporteurs recorded observations in a database using the following question structure:

- 4.1 Define: Connect, Engage, Shape, Influence, Human Dimension, Human Terrain, Human Domain, Engagement, Coercive Influence, Persuasive Influence, Interest based negotiation, position based negotiation, Information Operations, MISO, PsyOP, Public Affairs, influence operations, influence operator, influence enabler, complicated systems theory, complex systems theory, human systems theory, network operations, human network operations, cyber network operations, cyber operations, cyber space operations, electronic warfare, electromagnetic activities.
- 4.2 What additional terms need clarity to help better define roles and responsibilities?
- 4.3 Which terms are context specific?
- 4.4 Which terms conflict with or support legal authorities?
- 4.5 Which words shape how we see ourselves?
- 4.6 Which terms shape our understanding of warfare, operations and how we influence conflict?
- 4.7 Would creating new terminology help better distinguish roles, responsibility and capability requirements?
- 4.8 What terms have overlap? How can we better distinguish those terms?
- 4.9 What terms drive decisions?
- 4.10 What terms cause the most friction?
- 4.11 Why are these terms important to the mission?
- 4.12 Where is there space for easy terminological fixes?
- 4.13 Propose definitions for all identified terms.

On Day 4, Group 6 was tasked to discuss doctrine. Rapporteurs recorded observations in a database using the following question structure:

- 4.14 Does each proponent have the doctrine needed execute its roles and responsibilities?

- 4.15 What doctrine does each proponent need updated to enable influence operations, enabling operations, cyber operations, and synchronize operations?
- 4.16 If doctrine needs revision or drafting, who (which COE) should write it?
- 4.17 Does doctrine sufficiently describe the integration and application of SOF, GP, Active, Guard and Reserve across the Army Core Competencies?
- 4.18 Other (emergent discussion).

**Participants:** Group 6 had 10 participants, two active duty, and 8 civilians. The group included 6 IO, 1 PSYOP, 1 PAO, 1 HAMO, and one Cyber representative.

The study team employed text analysis, systems analysis, stakeholder analysis, an observation database, and facilitated discussion analysis to gather, analyze, and present data in support of the identified learning objectives.

- **Text Analysis:** In order to get a sense of how the community views itself and its challenges, facilitators asked participants to identify three things that they thought was most important for the Army to understand about IRCs and the most important lesson from the plenary sessions for their respective communities. The analysis team analyzed the terms and created word cloud packages. The word clouds represent the frequency of terms used by size and color. Facilitators reintroduced the visualization to the group during daily briefings to focus further discussion.
- **Systems Analysis:** Objective 3, which focuses on echelonment, required the production of a system diagram that charts the inputs and outputs of the IO system by echelon in both present and ideal-type systems. The purpose of this exercise was to visualize the system, identify frictions, redundancies, and opportunities from an integrated systems-level perspective. The participants were unsuccessful in this endeavor, but created a table with IRC needs by echelon.
- **Stakeholder Analysis:** All objectives asked participants to identify stakeholders impacted by the potential DOTMLPF-P solutions they propose to identify problems. Significant discussion focused on commanders and staffs.
- **Observation Database:** All groups recorded observations using the provided database architecture. The analysis team used observations to ensure the validity of conclusions presented in the final event report, and to enable process tracing to explore contentious findings.
- **Facilitated Discussion:** Facilitators used discussion to elicit information and foster the creation of insights by group participants. The seminar employed a semi-structured facilitation technique based on the focus areas objectives, supporting questions, and discussion analysis.

The individual group results of the seminar, all objectives, focus questions, group structure and group collated responses are provided in Annex B of this report.

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## Appendix B: Group Analysis and Recommendations

### Overview

This section examines the specific seminar objective, focus question, analysis and recommendations each group worked through. Most of the writing was left in the original wording as documented in transcripts and/or slides, and only modified for formatting or grammar. Group composition, group analysis and select senior leader out-brief slides are provided for those wishing to go deeper into understanding the conditions and group dynamics. Additional raw data and transcripts are available by request.

As with the findings, many of the results and proposed solutions emerged from a new comprehension of the trending future operational environment. Participants synthesized the Army Operating Concept *Win in a Complex World 2020-2040* anticipated characteristics of the future operational environment and elements of how the Army operates, with unclassified TRADOC G-2 and USASOC G-9 plenary briefings, case studies, an understanding of recently changed adversary doctrine, and years of professional experience.

The results reflect the participants' intuitive understanding that to 'win in a complex world' requires a complex systems approach. In this case, all results interrelate to and affect each other, often overlapping. Therefore, no singular recommendation will entirely fix the problem it is associated with, as each issue has multiple causal linkages. Planning and executing synchronized operations that support commanders in fully utilizing all capabilities will require a comprehensive approach to the proposed solution set.

### Objective 1. All Groups

**OBJECTIVE 1: Examine how to exert influence to include cooperative influence, persuasive influence, and coercive influence.**

### ISSUE: Lack of a comprehensive synchronized lexicon

IRC communities collectively require a published professional lexicon to support conceptual integration among IRC communities, IRC community organizational integration within staffs, and synchronized operations in support of maneuver, protection and logistics operations. For example, current doctrine references but does not define *cooperative influence*, *persuasive influence*, or *coercive influence*

**DISCUSSION:** The 2009 Army Capstone Concept references "Psychological influence efforts employ combinations of cooperative, persuasive and coercive means to assist and support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies."<sup>37</sup> While each term represents a type of influence, collectively these

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<sup>37</sup> (United States Training and Doctrine Command, 2009)



terms provide a baseline options for leaders seeking to shape military engagements and activities to influence the perceptions and choices of enemy, partner and civilian populations in ways that contribute to mission accomplishment.

Some groups examined these terms by defining each word and considering the definition within a military context, as doctrine does not define any of these terms. Possible definitions include:

1. **Cooperative influence**: to produce a desired effect by building a relationship in which stakeholders agree work together within understood mutual interests
2. **Persuasive influence**: to attempt to change another stakeholder's position by offering incentives
3. **Coercive influence**: to reshape a stakeholder's decision or behavior by removing their choice, typically by using force or other negative means

#### **RECOMMENDATION: AWFC 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10**

Develop a comprehensive professional lexicon for incorporation into Army and Joint publications. In that document, define cooperative influence, persuasive influence, and coercive influence in Army doctrine. Further, develop and promulgate training, leader development and education solutions across all levels of Professional Military Education (PME) that include how to better exert influence on specific audiences through cooperative, persuasive and coercive means.

## Objective 2. Focus A. Group 1. (2.A.1)

**OBJECTIVE 2: Determine the Army's shape and influence roles across the Army Core Competencies of shaping the security environment; setting the theater; conducting combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special operations.**

**2.A.1. Focus Question:** How do Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) enable, attack, deny, defend and integrate with influence operations and Mission Command in support of the Army Core Competencies?

**Group 1 Composition:** The eleven-member group represented a broad cross section of the CEMA community of practice balanced by Asymmetric Warfare Group's SME on Human Narrative and Influence, and USASOC's SME on the Engagement WfF Information Operations. This group did not have any CA or PSYOP participants.

Working Group 1			
	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	Asymmetric Warfare Group	MSG Sohail Shaikh	Human Narrative & Influence
2	RDECOM - CERDEC	Mr. Kevin Boyle	EW, ISR, and Cyber tech. development. Cyber offensive operations. Network Warfare and Tactical SIGINT tech.
3	US Army IO Proponent	Dr. Rob Hill	Military Analyst - Doctrine
4	RDECOM - ARDEC	Mr. Louis Mazziotta	Computer Science
5	Joint IO Warfare Center	Mr. Douglas Marrs	Joint Integration
6	USASOC	Mr. James (Bud) Yarbrough	Information Operations
7	ARCYBER	Mr. Michael Muztago	AWC Student
8	RDECOM - ARL	Dr. Paul Pellegrino	Quantum sciences and its application in the information science space
9	ERDC	Mr. Tim Perkins	Research in complex sociocultural environments through interactive analysis, modeling and simulation, and visualization of dynamic, multifaceted data
10	USAWC Cyber	COL Jim Skelton (Lead)	Cyber
11	193d SOW	SMSGT David Wells	Electronic Communications Systems Tech
12	Facilitator	Prof. Peter Hull	
13	Recorder	MAJ Phillip Serpico	S&T
14	Observer	Dr. Troy Alexander	RDECOM- ARL - Electronic Warfare and Directed Energy technologies. Experience in Cyber and Intelligence applications.
15	Cubic (Event Admin Support)	Mr. Gary Anderson	


### 2.A.1.a. Challenge: Integrating CEMAs roles into maneuver operations

Army forces are increasingly dependent on electromagnetic, computer network and space based capabilities. Those conduits of information are converging. Therefore exerting technical influence will require forces prepared to fight and win on an emerging "cyber-electromagnetic battleground."

Group one identified three overarching concerns for successful CEMA-Influence and CEMA operations.

- 1. Speed of Change of Technology.** Technology that effects how information moves, changes rapidly. The Army must continuously reassess its competencies and capabilities required to gain, protect and exploit advantages in highly contested cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrums. (TRADOC 2009)

2. **AWFC.** In examining both the Army Core Competencies and the AWFCs, Group 1 identified CEMA integration as a critical component to 17 of 20 challenges, with AWFC 8, 9, 10 and 20 as key to integrating CEMA into future force development.
3. **Roles and Responsibilities.** Participants articulated that ambiguity of roles and responsibilities between ARCYBER, Cyber COE, MC COE, I COE and U.S. Army Special Operations (SO) COE will hinder CEMA integration efforts.




**RECOMMENDATION:** TRADOC should task Cyber CoE to integrate CEMA learning demands, and SO CoE to integrate Cyber-Psychological Operations learning demands into the AWFC CIEF and QFR process.

## 2.A.1.b. Lack of an integrated Common Operating Picture (CoP)

**ISSUE:** Current stove-piping of individual IRC common operating pictures (CoP) requires commanders to mentally integrate as many as 14 unrelated IRC CoPs. This degrades a commander's ability to effectively understand, visualize and effect key (cyber and human) terrain in his OE.

**DISCUSSION:** Commanders rely on experts to develop CoPs for cyberspace, the Electromagnetic Spectrum and the human aspect of that commander's operational environment. Even if staffed appropriately, the multiple CoPs do not provide an integrated understanding of the OE. This negatively affects a commander and his staff's ability to conduct IRC Mission Command in cyberspace – to include gaining authorities to conduct activities. To assist leaders consider adopting an integrated

**RECOMMENDATION:** Commanders, concept developers, and integrated doctrine writers, consider developing a new baseline staff structure that integrates the IRCs into a J/G39 Directorate with four Divisions (HQ, PAO, CEMA, and Influence and Engagements).



**ISSUE:** Current, planned and emerging force structures degrade staff understanding and integration of the CEMA, Influence operational capabilities, IRC staff level synchronized planning efforts (IO), and provide adversary IW overmatch during Phase 0-2 *below-the-threshold-of-war* attacks.

**DISCUSSION:** The IO FA-30 has lost 72 out of 340 MTOE positions across all echelons. PSYOP have no active duty operational capacity to support conventional force commanders in fighting adversary Information Warfare attacks during Phase 0, 1, 2 operations.

Further, the lack of CF active duty PSYOP support degrades readiness such that when a crisis occurs, Reserve forces have not trained or integrated with the deploying units. In addition, all IO operating force units will shortly move to support Army Cyber Command despite the requirement to integrate significant non-cyber influence operations including BPC, CA, CMO, SFA, KLE, SLE and others. Effectively, instead of integrating the IRCs, the Army is further fragmenting all influence capabilities through force reductions, maintaining niche capability support to CF only in the Reserves, and subordinating IO units to ARCYBER.


**RECOMMENDATION:** ARCIC authorize and execute a comprehensive capabilities based assessment of AC/RC force structure, training and IRC SOF/CF integration across all echelons and ROMO.

#### **2.A.1.c. Adversary Freedom of Maneuver**

**ISSUE:** Lack of active duty PSYOP support to CF prior to Phase 3, lack of streamlined authorities, and lack of capacity for CF to plan and execute Influence Campaigns during Phase 0, 1, and 2, provide adversaries freedom of maneuver in uncontested terrain.

**DISCUSSION:** Current and future OE predict increasing speed and interaction of human and cyber networks. Lack of U.S. Army resourcing and will to train and fight against information, cyber and psychological warfare steady state attacks, provides adversaries initiative, control of the narrative, and the ability to consolidate gains.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Reassess force structure, training and IRC SOF/CF integration by Phase across all echelons.



"Cyber (and the other IRCs) impact all of the AWFCs and Army's Core Competencies"

## Objective 2. Focus B. Group 2

**OBJECTIVE 2: Determine the Army's shape and influence roles across the Army Core Competencies of shaping the security environment; setting the theater; conducting combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special operations.**

**2.B.2. Focus Question:** What capabilities and organizational structures does the Army need to connect with (engage), shape and/or influence target audiences across all Army Core Competencies?

**Group 2 Composition:** Two field grade officers and seven civilian SMEs representing USASOC G-9, Pennsylvania Air Force National Guard - 193rd Special Operations Wing (EW, PSYOP platform), Joint IO Warfare Center, U.S. Army War College (USAWC), ERDC (geospatial and human centric sociocultural analysis to CMO), Army Research Institute (ARI) support to PSYOP and IO, 1<sup>st</sup> IO Command, MC CoE, and ARCYBER.

Working Group 2			
	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	USASOC G-9	Dr. John Haynes	Experimentation Analyst
2	193d SOW	Lt Col Michael Hackman	MISO enabler and EW Ops (Airborne delivery platform)
3	Joint IO Warfare Center	Mr. Eric Wallace	Concepts & Technology Analyst
4	USAWC	COL Samuel Russell	PKSOI Strategy and Policy Chief
5	ERDC	Ms. Angela Rhodes	Research Project Manager - Geospatial and human centric analysis/ Socio-Cultural Analysis and support to Civilian Military Operations
6	US Army Research Institute	Dr. Anna Sackett	ARI Lead Coordination with IO Proponent; messaging
7	1st IO Command (Land)	Ms. Andrea Rodman	Team Chief
8	MCCoE	LTC Jasper Pennington	Concepts Chief
9	ARCYBER	Mr. James N. Anderson	Wargames Manager
10	Facilitator	Dr. Steven Metz	
11	Recorder	Mr. Mark Moncure	ARCIC FWD
12	Observer	Dr. George Calfas	Research Archaeologist/ Anthropologist with ERDC's Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
13	Cubic (Event Admin Support)	Mr. Eric Hartman	

### 2.B.2.a. Diminished combat power<sup>38</sup> due to lack of IRC integration

**DISCUSSION:** The Army culture indicates that soldiers must train as they fight, and fight as they organize, train and equip. Currently, the IRCs do not effectively integrate into Army training and exercises, integrate with each other within staffs (due to both organizational structures and inadequate IRC manning), or fight as an integrated, synchronized force, largely due to heavy reliance on an inaccessible reserve force and lack of structural integration with G3 Operations.



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<sup>38</sup> Combat Power: The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action (FM 3-0).



**RECOMMENDATION:** Designate an “Influence Center of Excellence” to:

1. Develop a concept on “how we fight” in the information environment.
2. Conduct one integrated CBA for all inform and influence IRCs.
3. Develop integrated DOTMLPF-P solutions.
4. Review IRC capacity & availability (AC/RC & SOF/CF).
5. Develop an Influence knowledge management plan for integrated IRC and staff use.





### ***Current Environment***

- Army has a versatile tool kit
- Ineffective integration (Institutional & Operational)
- Unintentional redundancies
  - Boundaries
  - Utilization
- Tribal mentalities

Proposed solution: create a unified *Information* branch

Victory Starts Here! 17



### ***Desired Outcomes***

- Integrate IRCs to increase *Combat Power*
- Optimize employment of IRCs
  - Intelligence support
  - Cultural acuity
- Synchronize all combat capabilities for greatest effect
- Minimize risk of escalation
- Avoid Phase III & reinforce success

Fixating solely on Phase III focuses on the fight and not the win...

Victory Starts Here! 18

DOTMLPF-P	Potential Interim Solution
<b>Doctrine</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Implement and use existing doctrine</li> <li>– Refine integrating IRC FM (White Paper; Concepts)</li> <li>– Develop KM concept for IRC support</li> <li>– Accelerate ATTPs for operating in the information environment</li> </ul>
<b>Organization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Designate COE or Force Management Program</li> <li>– Consider redistribution of CA, PA, MISO, COMCAM, etc. to meet capacity/availability and unity of effort gap</li> </ul>
<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Provide influence training to the Force (words, deeds, &amp; images) communicated as <i>combat power</i></li> <li>– Provide planner training to address AC/RC access/ availability gap (CA, MISO, TIOGs, etc.)</li> <li>– Integrate IRCs int CTC</li> <li>– Emphasize IRC intelligence requirements into CCIRs</li> </ul>
<b>Materiel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Sharable knowledge management tool (i.e. Cultural Depot)</li> <li>– Sharable information environment COP</li> </ul>
<b>Leadership &amp; Education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Integrate IRC training into pre-command course &amp; professional military education</li> </ul>
<b>Personnel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Align talent with current and future IRC needs</li> <li>– Recruit, select, develop, promote and retain talent</li> <li>– Dedicated knowledge manager</li> </ul>
<b>Policy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– HQDA sponsors words, deeds, images campaign (“an integrating narrative”)</li> </ul>

### Objective 2, Focus C. Group 3.

**OBJECTIVE 2: Determine the Army’s shape and influence roles across the Army Core Competencies of shaping the security environment; setting the theater; conducting combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special operations.**

**2.C.3. Focus Question:** How should the Army synchronize, integrate, and command engage, shape, inform and influence activities with Combined Arms Maneuver both CONUS and OCONUS?

**Group 3 Composition:** This group formed from a diverse group of Colonels representing the leadership of and voice for their respective MOS or Functional Area within the CF, SOF, generating force and operational IRC community. This group included IO Proponent, CDR 1<sup>st</sup> IO Command, Director of the Army Public Affairs Center, Cyber COE, Director U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, PSYOP Proponent / USASOC PSYOPS Commandant / USASO CoE, CDR 2<sup>nd</sup> PSYOP Group/ USACAPOC, Deputy Director JIOWC, and Strategic Planner (Lt. Col), Joint Staff OCJS.

Working Group 3			
	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	CAC / IO Proponent Office	COL John Bircher	Information Operations
2	Cyber CoE	COL Joseph Dworaczyk	Cyber Concepts and Doctrine
3	Office Chief Public Affairs (OCPA)	COL Richard McNorton	Director, Army Public Affairs Center
4	1 <sup>st</sup> IO Command	COL Jayson Spade	Commander Information Operations Command
5	US Army War College	COL Daniel Pinnell	Director, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
6	USSOCOM	COL Kevin J. Petro	J39 MISO Branch
7	PSYOP Proponent	COL John Grimes	USASOC/PSYOPS Commandant
8	Joint Staff, OCJCS	Lt Col Dawn Junk	
9	USACAPOC	COL Mike Barger	Civil Affairs
10	Joint IO Warfare Center	COL James Harrell	Deputy Director, JIOWC
11	Facilitator	Mr. Sam White/Mr. Dana Hare	
12	Recorder	MAJ Mickey Clayton	ARCIC FWD
13	Observer	Dr. Farzana Nabi	Human dimension (ARCIC HDD)
14	Cubic (Event Admin Support)	Ms. Amanda Brazzel	

**ASSESSMENT:** Current conditions and assessed challenges all intertwine and overlap such that recommendations require a comprehensive integrated approach.

**DISCUSSION:** Over the duration of the seminar Group 3 participants emphasized the interconnectivity between current conditions and assessed challenges. They defined the current conditions as:

a. **Understand.** The Army does not understand Information Operations (the Combat Power that results from integrated and synchronized IRC operations which links back to AWFC 1 – Develop Situational Understanding).

b. **Posture.** Present IRC posture and profile supports neither current steady state operations nor future military operations.

c. **Training and Education.** Army training, education, and leader development do not adequately include the IRCs or core IRC concepts (*AWFC 4 – Adapt the Institutional Army*).

d. **Integration.** Individual IRCs integrate into the DOTML-PF process but have no collective, integrated process that crosses COEs, SOF (SOCOM, USASOC), CF (FORCECOM, TRADOC) Active and Reserve. (*AWFC 20 – Develop Capable Formations*).


e. **Unity of Command.** Equities and misconceptions complicate building the capabilities needed at the capacity required to influence and win in the future (between the IRCs, the COEs, and SOF/CF). (*AWFC 19 – Exercise Mission Command*).

f. **Policy.** Policies and practices prevent synchronized employment of the IRCs. (Based on desired effects this links back to *AWFC 17 – Integrate Fires* and *AWFC 18 – Deliver Fires*).

g. **Inadequate or under resourced staffs.** Many individuals selected for IRC functional do not meet commanders' expectations as the IRCs do not provide

interchangeable capabilities, and selection standards required adjustment. Most IRC C2 or coordination organizations (Information Operations Task Force, Psychological Operations Task Force, etc.) are ad hoc and under resourced, because the majority of IRC capabilities allocate to the CF reside in the reserve component. IRC organizations require modification to support the future force ROMO requiring an increase in IRC capacity. Finally, Steady State Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) driven operational demands for the spectrum of IRCs exceed capacity– and the challenge will grow exponentially in the future.

**RECOMMENDATION:** (U) Simultaneously work through the process of developing a WfF, a COE, doctrine, terminology, and organizational structures (e.g. multi-composition units) that effectively integrates all IRCs with each other and into the CF Army. Also, develop an integrated IRC track where top performers in their branch can apply for selection after their attendance at staff college to the IRC integrator Functional Area (currently FA 30) qualified to command Multi-compo units and integrate IRC capabilities through the G-3. Finally, work for policy solutions that rebalance the AC/RC mix across the ROMO.



## RECOMMENDED COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION STRATEGY:

- Create a Military Information Warfighting Function (WfF) with a designated COE responsible for integrating all IRCs and capable of executing a cross CF/SOF IRC integrated CBA and CNA.
- Under the new WfF, develop multi-functional, multi-component IRC organizations to ensure standard base capability mix; experiment and exercise to determine appropriate echelons

- c. Assign Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) multi-functional IRC Groups (Brigades) to Corps to assure readiness, CF integration, and right capabilities at the right place at the right time
- d. Increase the Army's IRC capacity in the AC, or change policy to improve access and integration of the RC during steady state operations
- e. Examine creative solutions to capacity and integration challenges for planning at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) e.g. AGR, DAC, Contractor, AC/RC mix
- f. Posture. Fully resource IRC staff capability and capacity all levels of war.
- g. IRC proponents and experts should assist in building Joint Manning Documents.
- h. Build an integrated IRC career track option

### **2.C.3.a. Wrong soldier or no soldier = failure to meet commander expectations**

**ISSUE:** To mitigate adversary Phase 0/1 operations and prepare the future force to fight across the ROMO requires an increase in IRC staff slots and manning to fully resource IRC planning, execution and assessment at all levels of war.

**DISCUSSION:** The communities that comprise the IRC collectively have maintained too few IRC specialists force wide to meet overall Commander demand. As a result, untrained and/or undertrained O1A soldiers frequently have filled empty IRC slots resulting in inadequate operational support to commanders and a negative perception of the collective capabilities. As a result, Commanders have selected a significant proportion of remaining IRC positions for required staff cuts. Below capacity IRC operations led to lack of perceived value to CDRs and increasing IRC staff cuts

**RECOMMENDATION:** Ensure a balanced mix of IRC soldiers assigned to a staff. Do this by assessing Army formation staffing focused on sufficient and diverse IRC capabilities represented in sufficient capacity to plan and execute integrated operations.

### **2.C.3.b. Impacts of OE change require Total Force rebalance**

**ISSUE:** Changing global OE requires a rebalancing of the AC/RC Force structure.

**DISCUSSION:** The majority of IRC capacity resides in the Reserve Force. Due to policy and funding structures, CF commanders cannot access CF PSYOP and CA operators prior to combat operations. This limits the ability of IRCs to support ASCC, Field Army, Corps and Division persistent engagements in all operational phases, and counter increased and growing adversary information warfare operations in Phase 0 and 1. Existing policies, practices, and force structure degrades effective (integrated) employment of the IRCs during subsequent phases.

**RECOMMENDATION:** HQDA G3/5/7 should develop policy solutions that rebalance the AC/RC mix across the ROMO, and advance strategies to mitigate capacity and integration challenges for planning at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB). HQDA should

assess rebalancing the AC/RC mix, increasing the Army's IRC capacity in the AC, and changing policy to improve access and integration of the RC during steady state operations. AWFC 1, 2, 3, 14, 17, 18

### **2.C.3.c. IRC Stovepipes.**

**ISSUE:** IRC stove-piped communities inhibit a holistic approach to resourcing, and conceptually synchronizing all the IRC functions.

**DISCUSSION:** This complex problem has multiple tiers within the institutional and operational Army. (AWFC 20)

- 1) DOTML-PF solutions are developed for each information related capability. No systemic approach exists to integrate requirements or solution sets. (Not part of AWFC)
- 2) The Army resources each IRC individually. In other words, neither SOCOM nor FORSCOM provides an integrated and balanced approach to resource the collective capabilities.
- 3) SOCOM resources the Active Components of PSYOP and CA, while FORSCOM resources the Reserve Components.
- 4) As no one AWFC specifically addresses influence, no process exists to integrate efforts or promote learning across the eight TRADOC and SOF Centers of Excellence.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Designate CG, CAC and CG USASOC as co-leads for chartered Integrated Concept Development Team (ICDT). Determine feasibility of developing a WfF, COE, doctrine, terminology, and organizational structures (e.g. multi-composition units) that effectively integrates all IRCs with each other and into the Total Force. This includes developing an integrated IRC track where top performers in their branch can apply for selection post CGSC to an IRC integrator Functional Area, qualified to command Multi-compo units and integrate IRC capabilities through the G3.

### 2.C.3.d. IRC integration into PME

**ISSUE:** The Army requires a better understanding of the capabilities, concepts and doctrine that form the base of Information Operations<sup>39</sup>

**DISCUSSION:** Army training, education, and leader development do not adequately include the IRCs or core IRC concepts (AWFC 4 – Adapt the Institutional Army). This results in a negative cascade of integration challenges that degrade operations and diminish a commander's perceived options.

**RECOMMENDATION:** CG CAC and CG USA SO COE incorporate into all Army training and professional military education, modules on influence and synchronized capability effects across the ROMO, and the impact of IW, through synchronized Inform, Influence and CEMA operations.

### Select Group 3 Senior Leader Discussion Slides

#### ***Assessment***

- IRC expertise on staffs inadequate or not resourced
- IRC C2 or coordination organizations (e.g, IOTF, POTF, etc.) are ad hoc and under-resourced
- Access to Reserve component IRC is insufficient due to scarce resources and prohibitive processes
- IRC organizations require modification to support the future force
- TSC driven operational demand for IRC exceeds capacity (and is not captured in TAA) – and the challenge will grow exponentially in the future OE

- Policies and practices prevent synchronization and employment of Army IRCs

*The success of any military operation depends on the synchronization of all capabilities in a holistic plan designed to influence and win across the spectrum of conflict.*

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<sup>39</sup> The Combat Power that results from integrated and synchronized IRC operations.



## ***Proposed Organizational Structures***

- Develop a “Military Information” branch; create focus, proponentcy and integration
  - Develop multi-functional, multi-component IRC organizations; experiment and exercise to determine the appropriate echelon
  - Assign AC and RC multifunctional IRC Groups (Brigades) to Corps
  - Increase the Army’s IRC capacity in the Active component – change policy to improve access to Reserve component
  - Examine creative solutions to capacity and integration challenges (e.g., AGR, DAC, Contractor, AC/RC mix)
  - Fully resource IRC staff capability and capacity for planning at EAB
  - IRC proponents / experts should assist in building Joint Manning Documents
- Retains Specialty cap and integrity
  - Consider an ASI
  - Entry at tactical level for generalist
  - Multifunctional integrator after CGSC for officers.
  - Opportunity for recruitment for TWI and further schooling opportunities.
  - WO/Enlisted retained at CMF
  - Career progression model is the “A” track per DA Pam 600-3.
  - Part of the Information Management Category
  - Provide capabilities at BN?STB?

## Objective 2. Focus D. Group 4:

**OBJECTIVE 2: Determine the Army's shape and influence roles across the Army Core Competencies of shaping the security environment; setting the theater; conducting combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special operations.**

**2.D.4. Focus Question:** How do we synchronize and integrate cyber, shape, inform and influence activities across all Domains against our adversaries in support of the ACC?

**Group 4 Composition:** This group consisted of two Colonels, six Lieutenant Colonels, a Chief Warrant 5, and two senior civilians who collectively represented USASOC, USAWC, USACAPOC, CASCOM, ARCYBER, 152<sup>nd</sup> Theater Army IO Group, Fires COE, 193<sup>rd</sup> SOW, National Guard Bureau, and CSLD.

Working Group 4			
	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	USASOC	Mr. Michael Ceroli	Concept Developer - DCS G9, Concepts Division
2	USAWC	COL Cheryl Phillips	Public Affairs
3	USACAPOC	LTC Patrick Dillon	7 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group
4	CASCOM/SCoE	Mr. Christopher Wallace	Chief, Concepts Combined Arms Support Command
5	ARCYBER	LTC Dave Ambrose	Cyber/Signal, IO Branch Chief
6	USACAPOC	LTC Jason Arndt	S3, 2d PSYOP Group
7	152d Theater Army IO Group	COL Janet Tsao	Operational Command
8	Fires CoE	CW5 Nathan Dukellis	Fires Targeting Center
9	193d SOW	Lt Col Kristian Post	
10	National Guard Bureau	LTC William McKern	Strategic Plans
11	CSLD	LTC Efrain Fernandez	Future Networks and Future IA Requirements
12	JHU SAIS	Ms. Andrea V. Jackson	
13	Facilitator	LTC Don Travis	USAWC
14	Recorder	Mr. Larry Fowler	ARCIC FWD
15	Observer	Mr. Kevin Maley	TRADOC G-2
16	Cubic (Event Admin Support)	Mr. Robert Ealy / Ms. Melissa Saunders	

### 2.D.4.a. Lack of a War Fighting Function

**ISSUE:** No one WfF has the mission of breaking the will of the enemy.

**DISCUSSION:** The participants of this group discussed that the Army does not have a war fighting function that focuses on understanding adversary will the causality factors that shape, maintain or build that will. Without any one CoE, WfF, or AWFC specifically focused on breaking the will of the enemy, participants argue that all Army efforts focus on winning tactical and operational battles instead of winning the war of political objectives. This group further argues that the Army cannot achieve Unity of Command, Unity of Effort or effectively execute operations for strategic effect without having a warfighting function focused understanding and breaking the enemy's human aspect.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Incorporate Influence Operations as the 21<sup>st</sup> AWFC and i as an Army Core Competency in the AOC. Once incorporated into the concept to capability framework, the Army should evaluate Influence as part of a DOTMLPF-P integrated IRC capability based assessment (CBA), with integrated doctrine development.

#### **2.D.4.b. No Electronic Warfare Forces in the Active Duty component (AWFC 7)**

**ISSUE:** The Army does not maintain any Active Component Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces.

**DISCUSSION:** Due to changes in the operational environment, the Army needs Electronic warfare capabilities to enable counter-influence, military deception, and Cyber Operations during phases 0 and 1.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Build EW units with ability to support operations at the tactical levels of war (Corps, Division, and BCT) during steady state operations.

#### **2.D.4.c. Doctrine.**

**ISSUE:** Existing doctrine (FM3-13) does not provide a clear understanding of how to conduct integrated perception management operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Authorities and confusing terminology make discussions challenging as the terms change based on audience. Also, no overarching doctrine exists to describe how the 15+ IRCs should interact to best conduct operations.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Develop doctrine that spans and integrates all IRCs to shape and manage perceptions.

#### **2.D.4.d. Policy.**

**ISSUE:** The United States does not have a national strategy to counter adversary influence operations or shape perceptions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

**DISCUSSION:** Lack of a national strategy creates a chaotic and ineffective influence effort.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Senior leaders socialize a NSC-68 type of national strategic communications strategy for development on both the classified and unclassified levels.

#### **2.D.4.e. AC manning inadequate for OE**

**ISSUE:** Distribution of Army capabilities between AC and RC is inadequate.

**DISCUSSION:** Active and Reserve roles and missions do not adequately address Theater Army /GCC steady state command objectives; the preponderance of mission requirements and capabilities geared toward phase 0 and 1 are in the Army Reserves.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Re-alignment of skill sets, roles and missions such that Active Forces focus on phases 0, I, II, V; and Army Reserve forces train for phase III and IV, thus extending the timeframe available for Army Reserve training and integration.

#### **2.D.4.f. The IRC are fragmented across the institutional and operational Army**

**ISSUE:** The IRCs do not have a lead focused on influencing the contest of wills. The IRCs are fragmented under too many COEs, not included in the AWFC framework, don't have a COE to champion AWFC inclusion, and, absent unifying doctrine, the Army will continue to lose the battle of perception.

**DISCUSSION:** Post Goldwater-Nichols, consistent discussion takes place arguing that integration, interoperability and unity of effort is the key to successful operations. However, instead of aligning the complimentary capabilities of the IRCs into one COE that integrates related SOF and CF capabilities, the Army continues to fragment and isolate the community of practice conceptually, physically, and organizationally. This is the basic method of how to defeat an adversary, not win a war.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Create or identify one COE responsible for conceptually integrating the communities that provide the capabilities, techniques and activities designed to inform the public, counter-adversary influence operations and influence target audiences across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict.

#### **More research required:**



#### **2.D.4.g. Future role of Cyber**



**ISSUE:** Cyber operations organizations (ARCYBER and Cyber COE) are still developing roles, responsibilities and doctrine. In the future Cyber will have a much larger role to play in all warfare that requires study to develop an understanding.

**DISCUSSION:** Current developing structures will not meet the requirements of the future warfare environment. Like the air domain eventually led to the development of the Air Force, cyber domain will require a Cyber Force.

**RECOMMENDATION.** Consider supporting Cyber Operations in becoming its own branch of service with an associated proponent.

## Group 4 Slides:





**Note:** Group 4 provided a thorough analysis of AWFC Influence and Influence Enabler learning requirements for integration into the AWFC posted in Appendix C.

### Objective 3. Group 5.

**OBJECTIVE 3. Determine where Army influence capabilities must reside at the brigade combat team, division, corps, and theater Army echelons.**

**Group 5 Composition:** This group of 12 included one Colonel (1<sup>st</sup> SF Command (A) MISO Director), a Captain (Fires COE), and 10 civilians experts representing TRADOC G2, RDECOM, ARCYBER, Cyber COE, USASOC G9 Capabilities and ERDC.

Working Group 6			
	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	Cyber CoE	Mr. Steven Townsend	Cyber
2	TRADOC G-2	Mr. Thomas Schmidt	Operational Environment
3	1 <sup>st</sup> SF Command (A)	COL Bruce E. Leahy	MISO / IO, Director, G-39
4	USASOC G9	Mr. William Malli	Capabilities Analyst
5	Fires CoE	CPT Ji Hoon Ham	Intelligence Officer
6	ARCIC, MC&I Division	Mr. Ron Garhart	IO and Engagement
7	ARCYBER	Mr. Bill Edwards	Cyber Capabilities
8	MCCoE	LTC Michelle Bronell	Chief of Leader Development, Education & Training
9	RDECOM – ARL	Mr. Scott Christensen	Network Defense
10	RDECOM - CERDEC	Mr. William Taylor	R&D in the areas of SIGINT, EW, and Offensive Cyber Operations
11	RDECOM - AMRDEC	Mr. Mark Hand	Development of the JBC-P)system for the Army for the past 6 years
12	RDECOM - ARL	Dr. Barbara Broome	Manages the Information Sciences Division at ARL
13	114 <sup>th</sup> Signal Battalion	Mr. Lynn Graham	Comms Project Officer
14	Facilitator	LTC Derek Burt/ Prof. James Kievit	
15	Recorder	Mr. Rick Bierie	ARCIC FWD
16	Observer	Dr. James Bald	Special Assistant to the Director of the CERDEC Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate; expertise in diverse R&D and ISR technology areas
17	Cubic (Event Admin Support)	Ms. Catherine Jones	

### 3.5.A. Terms and Definitions.

**ISSUE:** Overlapping terms and definitions cause confusion for both the Army and the IRC community.

**DISCUSSION:** For clarity, Group 5 defined the following terms to ensure a consolidated group baseline understanding.

Information operations — The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

Information-related capability (IRC) — A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension (individuals, organizations, systems) of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.

**RECOMMENDATION.** Define terms to increase understanding.

### **3.5.B. Lack of a comprehensive approach**

**ISSUE:** The Army lacks a “big idea” behind the need to conduct Information operations.

**DISCUSSION:** While the Army Operating Concept describes an operational environment focused primarily on contested populations and cyber space, and designates “shape the security environment” as a core competency, the Army continues to undervalue, under-resource and under-integrate Engage, Influence and Information Operations. Group 5 assesses that “force reductions at all echelons are creating a capability gap across all components.” Further, if the Army values Engagement, Influence, and Information Operations, leaders need education on the types of Influence and Information Operations, the capabilities that support commanders in planning and executing their strategies, concepts that describe how to apply and synchronize all Influence, Information Operations, and CEMA capabilities, and doctrine to describe how the IRCs fight on the battleground of perception across the ROMO. If the Army assesses that it requires a means to effectively counter adversaries in Phase 0 and 1, then it must resource PSYOP, CA, IO and CEMA operators in support of CF Commanders. The Army must also develop a plan for streamlining authorities to pull forces from the Reserves to plan and execute operations as needed by Commanders (brief associated with slides 41-43).

**RECOMMENDATION:** Prioritize and resource Information Operations as the main effort requiring full time engagement during phase 0 and 1. Senior Leaders and staffs have several options available to operationalize IO as the main effort steady state, but will need to assess SOF, CF, AC and RC mix across all IRC.

### **3.5.C. The IRC need a unifying concept, CBA and doctrine**

**ISSUE:** The IRC community does not have a unifying concept, CBA or doctrine.

**DISCUSSION:** The IO Community of Practice, inclusive of all IRCs, needs a concept that groups the capabilities under one Army Functional Concept for Information Operations (Out-brief slides 41 and 42). The continued fragmentation of the IRCs under multiple COEs leads to capability specific CBAs as opposed to an integrated assessment. Current doctrine addresses each capability but does not provide and integrated operational approach to adequately prepare commander to execute his mission command task to inform and influence the enemy, partners, and contested civilian populations.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The proponents representing all IRCs should collectively work together to develop an Army Functional Concept for Information Operations, followed by an overarching CBA, Capabilities Portfolio Review, and IRC doctrine.

### **3.5.D. PME and Training do not prepare commanders to fight this battle.**



**ISSUE:** Current the Army does not educate (PME) or train to fight on the battleground of perception in support of its “Shape the Security Environment” core competency.

**DISCUSSION:** Adversaries prioritize information and psychological warfare as the main effort prior to maneuver operations. As such, they fight with initiative and consolidate gains without engaging in war. Lack of U.S. Army Phase 0 and 1 IW inclusion into training, CTC rotations, scenarios, and education results in adversary overmatch, and poor integration of the IRC forces. However, educators have tightly controlled subject matter requirements and may not have the time, money or other resources to add study hours.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Integrate CEMA and Influence concepts, terms, scenarios and capabilities into exercises, and education as part of existing requirements.

### **3.5.E. Lack of internal, institutional, and operational integration**

**ISSUE:** Lack of IRC integration internal to the IRC communities, and Army staffs.

**DISCUSSION:** Group 5 looked at 17 IRC across the BCT, Division, Corp, and Theater Army levels<sup>40</sup>. In examining staff structure, Group 5 identified that existing structures spread the capabilities across the command and do not effectively integrate the IRCs into the targeting process, do not effectively synchronize the separate capabilities with each other, or integrate the IRCs synergistically into the overarching planning process. This lack of integration is often due to lack of one or more components of the IRC on staff.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Create a multifunctional/multicomponent unit that integrates all IRCs, integrates with the CF and engages full time during steady state operations.



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<sup>40</sup> Published FM 3-13 identifies 14 IRCs, draft doctrine identifies 17 IRCs and Joint Pub 3-13 does not enumerate IRCs, but focuses on any capabilities application to achieve influence (Joint Pub 3-13, p 1-7).

1. Army Functional Concept for Information Operations
2. Capabilities Based Assessment, Capabilities Portfolio Review, regarding IO
3. Authority/capabilities to conduct influence operations distributed to unit of action level
4. Phase 0/I require full time engagement
5. Broadened training for all focused on Phase 0/I
6. Flatten DoD
7. Embrace the JOINT concept of IO
8. Force structure growth for influence operations  
e.g. Combat Camera expansion
9. Command personality (emphasis)
10. Level RC with AC capabilities (training)
11. Talent management (professionals and leaders)  
e.g. Warrant Officers introduction into influence operations

#### Requirements

1. IO community requires a concept, Capabilities Based Assessment, and doctrine
  - A. Does not adequately address commanders' mission command task to inform and influence
  - B. Role of IO and IRCs across ROMO
  - C. Publish FM 3-13 with emphasis on IRC synchronization
2. Need to create a multifunctional/multicomponent unit that integrates all IRCs
3. Training IO capabilities and effects during Phase 0/I/II
1. IO lacks synchronization across staffs and units at every echelon and integrated during collective training and CTC rotations
4. Leadership needs to be informed of the role of IO and IRCs
5. Education on the IRCs and targeting process across the IO community
6. Current IO force structure does not support GCC requirements
7. Force reduction at all echelons is creating a gap in capabilities across all components
8. Archaic processes and timelines

 <h2>Future Considerations by Echelon</h2> 	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Combat Camera - 1 each</li> <li>2. Retain IO Integrator</li> <li>3. EBDE, expand accessions from other IRCs</li> <li>4. Dedicated Intel Support to IO</li> <li>5. Focused IO training for Brigade Staff (CTC)</li> <li>6. KD positions</li> <li>7. Redesign dedicated PO/CA support</li> <li>8. Change Physical Destruction to Lethal / Non-Lethal Effects</li> </ol>	Brigade
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Empower/Leverage G39...today</li> <li>2. Expand accessions from other IRCs</li> <li>3. Dedicated Intel Support to IO</li> <li>4. Focused IO training for Division Staff (Warfighter)</li> <li>5. KD positions</li> <li>6. Redesign dedicated PO/CA support</li> <li>7. Merge with Corps</li> <li>8. Add cultural analysis capabilities</li> <li>9. Add social network analysis capabilities</li> <li>10. Change Physical Destruction to Lethal / Non-Lethal Effects</li> </ol>	Division
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Empower/Leverage G39</li> <li>2. Expand accessions from other IRCs</li> <li>3. Dedicated Intel Support to IO</li> <li>4. Focused IO training for Corps Staff (Warfighter)</li> <li>5. CSL positions for IO</li> <li>6. Redesign dedicated PO/CA support</li> <li>7. Flattening with Division and ASCC</li> <li>8. Add cultural analysis capabilities</li> <li>9. Add social network analysis capabilities</li> <li>10. Change Physical Destruction to Lethal / Non-Lethal Effects</li> </ol>	Corps
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Title 10 - IO / Influence operations</li> <li>2. Dedicated PO/CA support</li> <li>3. Empower/Leverage G39</li> <li>4. Expand accessions from other IRCs</li> <li>5. Dedicated Intel Support to IO</li> <li>6. Focused IO training for ASCC Staff (Warfighter)</li> <li>7. CSL / Flag officer positions for IO</li> <li>8. Flattening with Corps</li> <li>9. Title 10 - cultural analysis capabilities</li> <li>10. Title 10 - social network analysis capabilities</li> <li>11. Change Physical Destruction to Lethal / Non-Lethal Effects</li> </ol>	ASCC



## Objective 4. Group 6.

**Objective 4: Define key terms; identify barriers and potential solution strategies to resolve terminology and doctrine challenge across the influence, cyber and information operations enabler communities.**

**Group 6 Composition:** Group 6 had 10 participants: two active duty officers, and eight civilians. The group included six Information Operations SMEs, one PSYOP, one PAO, one HAMO, and one Cyber representative.

	Organization	Name	Expertise
1	Joint IO Warfare Center	Mr. Ronald Walters	Joint integration, Doctrine
2	USAJFKSWCS	Mr. Alfred Lunt	MISO - Chief Doctrine Division (Unit funded)
3	US Army War College	COL John Greenmyer	Director, IO, US Army War College
4	MCCoE	Mr. Michael Flynn	CADD
5	XVIII Airborne Corps	LTC Sean C. Heidgerken	Deputy G3 IO
6	Cyber CoE	Mr. Rodney Edmond	Deputy Chief, Concepts Branch, <u>Cyber</u> COE
7	Joint IO Warfare Center	Mr. Raymond L. Younger	Joint Integration, Human Dimension, Terminology, Doctrine
8	CAC IO Proponent Office	Mr. Robert Meier	Information Operations Military Analyst
9	USAWC PAO	Ms. Carol Kerr	Public Affairs
10	HQDA G-39	Mr. Patrick Scribner	Senior IO Analyst
11	Facilitator	Mr. James Markley	USAWC
12	Recorder	MAJ C. Abeyawardena	ARCIC FWD
13	Observer	LTC Thomas Kochenauer	80 <sup>th</sup> Training Command
14	Event Support	Mr. Travis Shedrick	

While the study team assigned Group 6 to this objective, other groups included analysis of terms and doctrine in their assessment. Where appropriate, we have included other group perspectives.

### 4.6.A. Definitions require concepts

**ISSUE:** IRC experts cannot develop a professional lexicon in the absence of an overarching concept or doctrine describing how the 14 information related capabilities integrate to fight across the range of military operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Capstone doctrine (ADRP 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) does not adequately address commander's mission command task of inform and influence or the role of IW across the ROMO. No one COE or IRC holds the authority or responsibility to develop doctrine or language that integrates all other capabilities in support of a Commander. While the FA-30 IO officer bears responsibility of synchronizing efforts in support of a commander, she cannot dictate capability specific terminology or concept of operations across the ROMO to the IRC.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Draft an Army Functional Concept for Commander's Inform and Influence task to visualize and describe how to best organize, synchronize and structure the IRC to fight across the ROMO.

#### **4.6.B. Lack of defined terms reflected in JP 2-01 or ADP 2-01**

**ISSUE:** Neither Joint Pub 2-01 nor Army pub 2-01 defines many terms referenced or defined in other military publications.

**DISCUSSION:** The collective participants agreed that the lack of a professional lexicon shared across the Inform, Engage and Influence communities undermines a staff's ability to develop a common understanding of operational objectives, synchronize the information related capabilities to fight effectively, and integrate the SOF and CF concepts of operations. ARSOF identifies understanding the human domain as key to operational success, whereas TRADOC does not recognize a human domain but instead focuses on the human dimension (Soldier resiliency and capability) and the human aspect (focused on enemy and contested population).


Many participants indicated that the term Military Information Support Operations confuses leaders and disconnects the focus and intent of the operations (psychological operations and influence activities). However, group 6 assessed the current Joint definitions of MISO, EW, and cyberspace operations are sufficient as written, but recommended the following changes:

**Information Operations:** The integrated employment, during *the full range of* military operations, of information related capabilities *within the concept of operations* to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of (relevant foreign audiences; contested and enemy audiences) while protecting our own. [Group note: This proposed revision seeks to clarify that IO has a role across all phases of conflict and can address the full array of audiences affecting operations – not just enemy}.


**Public Affairs** – Those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics *to inform and educate on behalf of the Commander*.



## Doctrinal Gaps/Fixes



1. Capstone doctrine (ADRP 3-0, ADRP 5-0, ADRP / FM 6-0) does not adequately address:
  - Commanders' Mission Command task to inform and influence
  - The role that IO and IRCs have across the ROMO.
2. Better cross-doctrinal congruency between IO and IRCs.
3. The Army lacks a "big idea" behind the need to conduct Information Operations
4. Draft **Army Functional Concept** for *Commanders' Inform and Influence Task* to bring clarity to:
  - Information Operations
  - Human Domain, etc.
5. Add information that the entire force must know to enable commander to fulfill inform and influence task, equivalent to CCIR
6. Publish FM 3-13, with emphasis on IRC synchronization, in near-term to align with changes to FM 6-0 (removal of IIA)



Δ Figure 3-2. Mission command warfighting function tasks

**RECOMMENDATION:** ARCIC approve the drafting of an Army Functional Concept and associated doctrine for "Commander's Strategic Communications and Influence" tasks with the purpose of visualizing and describing how to best organize, synchronize and structure the IRC to fight across the ROMO. Define all terminology used in published doctrine.

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## **Appendix C: Army Warfighting Challenges**

### **Overview**

The Army Warfighting Challenges have two key components: the framework, and the integration process. The framework outlines the enduring problems that all Centers of Excellence must address. Each AWFC has an assigned CoE lead responsible to update the AWFC associated problem statement, learning demands, and running estimate. The AWFC governance process holds each CoE accountable for integrating learning, updating the running estimate, and collaborating with the other stakeholders impacted by the assigned AWFC.

Each CoE should consider the outputs to this event for integration into its AWFC learning demands and running estimate. CoEs brief updates to the running estimates as part of the Quarterly AWFC Review (QAR).

Several groups worked to highlight the AWFC their work most impacted. However, due to the dynamic application of influence across a broad range of activities, audiences, desired effects, and phases of war planning, participants found that influence operations, information operations, and cyber-electromagnetic activities require consideration across all Army Warfighting Challenges.

### **AWFC**

To assist with integrating learning into the AWFC learning demands and running estimates, this report identifies the following AWFC in reference to the broad scope DOTMLPF-P recommendations: (pp.14-15)

**Doctrine and Concepts:** AWFC 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 17, 19

**Organization:** AWFC 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19

**Training and Leader Development:** AWFC 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 14

**Personnel:** AWFC 4, 9, 20

**Policy:** AWFC 4

Additionally, Group 1 identified CEMA integration as a critical component to 17 of 20 challenges, with AWFC 8, 9, 10 and 20 as key to integrating CEMA into future force development. Group 4 divided learning demands by conceptually grouping the questions and capabilities that design, plan and execute influence operations, and separately, those capabilities that enable the influence capabilities to execute their mission.



**Group 4 assessment of required learning:**

<b>Army Warfighting Challenges</b>	<b><u>Influence:</u></b> <i>to have an effect; to make possible; to impact; working to get someone to take an action that benefits the State, the Commander, the mission...</i>
<b>1. Develop Situational Understanding</b>	Deep knowledge of subject: enhance cultural capabilities of strategic studies detachments and cultural intelligence element to support conventional forces; provide knowledge of societies and key vulnerabilities of cultures; promote interdependence between SOF and conventional forces
<b>2. Shape the Security Environment</b>	Military information support teams at embassies; integration of IO with other instruments of national power (DIMEFIL); overseas deployment training to work with partners; Regionally Aligned Forces execute actions and activities; build enduring mil-civil and mil-mil relationships at multiple levels: from Ambassadors to Corporals
<b>3. Provide Security Force Assistance</b>	Increase Army capacity to support and enable regional partners and host nations. Improve our capabilities and increase our capacity. (Do we grow SOF, or work to enhance conventional force capabilities?); develop National Guard (SPP), Reserve, and Active Forces coordination
<b>4. Adapt the Institutional Army</b>	Forces should be consistently aligned to regions; and allow for enduring alignment to establish enduring partnerships
<b>6. Conduct Homeland Operations</b>	Active Army with Army National Guard and Reserve actions, activities, roles and missions need to be reviewed. Review barriers to Inter-agency coordination
<b>10. Develop agile and adaptive leaders</b>	Enhanced IO curriculum in professional military education; train with information-related capabilities organizations; broadening assignments for maneuverists to IRCs (information related capabilities)

<b>16. Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain Freedom of Movement</b>	The main effort in Phase 0 and Phase I; part of a whole-of-government approach; employing information-related capabilities; Military Information Support Team at embassies; Regionally Aligned Forces
<b>17. Integrate Fires</b>	Synchronization and integration of influence operations into the operations process through the targeting process: Army and Joint, and inter-agency
<b>Army Warfighting Challenges</b>	<b><i>Enabling:</i></b> to provide the means (and authorities) to achieve our Ends; to make possible; tools that allow us to shape the environment
<b>1. Develop Situational Understanding</b>	SIGINT and Cyber Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>2. Shape the Security Environment</b>	Cyber Operational Preparation of the Environment – (OPE; authorities coordination to conduct military deception; authorities to conduct military deception
<b>3. Provide Security Force Assistance</b>	Improve or increase information sharing and doctrine to partners
<b>4. Adapt the Institutional Army</b>	Education of IRCs; raise understanding of cyber actions and operations for both maneuver forces and cyber planners and managers; develop Electronic Warfare organizational structure
<b>7. Conduct Space and Cyber Electromagnetic Operations and Maintain Communications</b>	Authorities coordination in cyber domain for Phase 0 (impacting other Warfighting Challenges); to conduct cyber Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; intelligence support to IO; target audience identification, then analysis; ARCYBER have training readiness oversight of IO, cyber, and electronic warfare units and organizations; deception inside cyber domain; scaling plan addressing actions, and corresponding authorities, in Phase 0 and Phase I

<b>11. Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance</b>	Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance brigades; target audience identification, then analysis; identification friend or foe
<b>15. Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver</b>	Integration of IRCs to enable access, security, and surprise; improve military deception actions and activities
<b>16. Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain FoM</b>	Use IO to support the conduct of actions and activities in concert with partners and allies through exercises, key leader engagements, military-to-military training, planning, and agreements; to gain access: overcome A2AD
<b>17. Integrate Fires</b>	Synchronization and integration of enablers into the operations process through the targeting process: Army and joint, and inter-agency; gaining authorities at the operational and tactical level
<b>20. Develop Capable Formations</b>	<i>Allocate a tactical PSYOP company to every BCT; ability to integrate IRC into allocated BCTs formations; enhance training and education to senior NCOs and officers</i>

## ***Appendix D: Terms and Definitions***

This collection of terms and definitions includes current Joint definitions, Army terms as defined within published MOS or functional area Army field manuals, terms still used but no longer defined, and proposed definitions for emerging and undefined terms. And, while group 6 proposed that doctrine need not define terms if found in the dictionary, many other participants discussed the need for a unifying professional lexicon that commanders, staffs, and the influence communities can use to articulate requirements for authorities, roles and responsibilities. Such a lexicon should enable commanders in understanding and visualize their environment so as to effectively influence it.

**Adversary:** A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

**Army Functional Concepts (AFCs):** AFCs describe how the Army force will perform military functions as part of decisive action, across the range of military operations, from national strategic to tactical levels, for a specified function, yet integrated across all functional concepts. The AFCs draw operational context from joint concepts, the Army capstone concept, and the AOC. An AFC develops sufficient required capability granularity in the body of the document or the appendices to initiate a CBA.

**Attitudes:** 1. (Army) The beliefs, feelings, values, and disposition that cause an individual to respond in a particular way to a given object, person, or situation. (FM 3-05.301) 2. (NATO) Enduring systems of judgments, emotions and action tendencies, which pre-dispose an individual to behave in certain ways to achieve particular objectives or goals. (AJP-3.10.1)

**Building Partnerships:** The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, Joint Capability Areas).

**Building Partner Capacity:** The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities - for mutual benefit - to address U.S. national or shared global security interests (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, Joint Capability Areas).

**Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA):** The CBA is the JCIDS analysis process. It includes three phases: the FAA, the FNA, and the FSA. The results of the CBA are used to develop an ICD. See the TRADOC CBA Guide for the FAA, FNA, and FSA. See the JCIDS Manual for the CBA. TRADOC Reg 71-20

**Capabilities Development:** Sponsors (capability developer) identify, assess, and document capability requirements related to functions, roles, missions, and operations, and then determine if there are any capability gaps which present an unacceptable risk and warrant further action in JCIDS. Identification of capability requirements and associated capability gaps begins with the Sponsor's organizational functions, roles, missions, and operations, in the context of a framework of strategic guidance documents, and if applicable, overarching plans. These changes occur in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy that collectively produce the force capabilities and attributes prescribed in approved concepts, CONOPS, or other authoritative sources. **TRADOC Regulation 71-20**

**Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition:** A process used to determine the future disposition for rapidly equipped capabilities. ARCIC conducts the CDRT initiative to identify promising capabilities, determine operational support for identified capabilities and make a recommendation to senior Army leadership for future action. The result of the CDRT determination is a recommendation to convert the capability to an acquisition program, sustain it in theater, termination of the capability or, in the case of a non-materiel capability, make it enduring or non-enduring. TRADOC Reg 71-20

**Capability:** 1. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) 2. A capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an ICD, DICR or a DCR. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD. A DICR will be the document used for Army managed DOTmLPF capabilities recommendations. TRADOC Reg 71-20. See AR 71-9.

**Capability Developer (CAPDEV):** A person who is involved in analyzing, determining, prioritizing, and documenting requirements for doctrine, organizations, training, leader development and education, materiel and materiel-centric DOTMLPF requirements, personnel, facilities and policy implications within the context of the force development process. Also responsible for representing the end user during the full development and lifecycle process and ensures all enabling capabilities are known, affordable, budgeted, and aligned for synchronous fielding and support. TRADOC Reg 71-20

**Capability Gaps:** The inability to execute a specified course of action. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap. See CJCSI 3170.01.

**Civil Affairs:** Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. (JP 3-57)

**Civil Affairs Operations:** Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (JP 3-57)

**Civil Authorities:** Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States possessions and territories, and political subdivisions thereof. (JP 3-28)

**Civil Authority Information Support:** The use of military information support operations capabilities to conduct public information dissemination activities to support national security or disaster relief operations within the United States and its territories in support of a lead federal agency. Also called **CAIS**. (JP 3-13.2)

**Civil-military Medicine:** A discipline within operational medicine comprising public health and medical issues that involve a civil-military interface (foreign or domestic) including military medical support to civil authorities (domestic), medical elements of cooperation activities, and medical civil-military operations. (JP 4-02)

**Civil-military Operations:** Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. (JP 3-57)

**Civil-military Operations Center:** An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the

United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also **civil-military operations; operation**. (JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Team:** A temporary organization of civilian and military personnel task organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks. (JP 3-57)

**Civil Support Operations:** DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 3-26).

**Clandestine:** Any activity or operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies with the intent to assure secrecy and concealment. (JP 2-01.2)

**Clandestine Intelligence Collection:** The acquisition of protected intelligence information in a way designed to conceal the nature of the operation and protect the source. (JP 2-01.2)

**Clandestine Operation:** An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. See also **covert operation; overt operation**. (JP 3-05)

**Coercive Influence:** The attempt to reshape a stakeholder's decision or behavior by removing their choice by threat, use force or other negative means.

**Combat Power:** The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action (FM 3-0).

**Combined Arms:** Synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element of combat power was used separately or sequentially (FM 3-0).

**Complex Catastrophe:** Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and caused extraordinary

levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions. (DepSecDef Memo OSD001185-13)

**Computer Network Operations:** Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations (JP 1-02).

**Conventional Forces:** 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. Also called **CF**. (JP 3-05)

**Comprehensive Information Warfare:** China's military doctrine that incorporates technical warfare (information technology, networked information operations, signal and integrated network electronic warfare, cyber warfare, information confrontation operations and attacks on satellites), psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare in support of political, diplomatic and security objectives. (Strategic Studies Institute *Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare*, 2014)

**Control:** Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 3-0)

**Cooperative Influence (Draft):** To produce a desired effect by building a relationship in which stakeholders agree to work together within understood mutual interests. (Army Capstone Concept 2009 discusses cooperative means to influence; also see FM 3-98)

**Cultural Intelligence Element:** An organic element of the Military Information Support Operations Command, providing culturally nuanced analyses and intelligence to subordinate unit commanders and their staffs, as well as to other agencies, focused on political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure, and other political-military factors. (FM 3-53)

**Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA):** Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system. (FM 3-13, 2013)



**Cyberspace:** (DOD). A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02).

**Cyberspace Operations:** The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace (Chief Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (CJCS-M-0527-08).

**Disinformation:** Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence U.S. decision makers, U.S. forces, coalition allies, key actors, or individuals via indirect or unconventional means. (FM 3- 53)

**Disintegrate:** Disrupt the enemy's command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of enemy's capabilities or will to fight (FM 3-0).

**Effect:** 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

**Electronic Warfare:** Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (JP 1-02)

**Enemy:** A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (FM 3-53)

**Foreign Internal Defense:** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**Foreign Security Forces:** Forces, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and

prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission. (FM 3-22)

**Functional area:** A functional area is a broad scope of related joint warfighting skills and attributes that may span the range of military operations. Specific skill groupings that make up the functional areas are approved by the JROC. See CJCSI 3170.

**Human Factors:** The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions. (JP 2.0)

**Host Country:** A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP 2-01.2)

**Host Nation:** A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory (JP 3-57)

**Human Dynamics:** The actions and interactions of personal, interpersonal, and social contextual factors and their effects on behavioral outcomes. Human dynamics are influenced by factors such as economics, religion, politics, history, organizational affiliation, individual and group experiences, and culture. Z9

**Human Elements:** The elements that affect and influence human behavior and decision making of external individuals, groups, and populations for the purposes of preventing and deterring conflict. (US Army War College Human Elements Workshop 2015)

**Human Factors:** The psychological, cultural, behavioral and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups. (JP 2-0)

**Hybrid Threat:** The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADRP 3-0)

**Indirect Operations:** Operations accomplished by, with, and through other organizations in which the U.S. takes on the role of funding, training, and or advising. Examples include counter drug, foreign internal defense, or unconventional operations.

**Inform and Influence Activities:** The integration of designated information related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences. And affect adversary and enemy decision making. (ADRP 3-0)

**Influence Operations:** Operations intended to assist and support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, sway contested populations, and isolate and defeat enemies.

**Information:** (DOD) Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation (JP 1-02).

**Information Engagement:** The integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts. Commanders use continuous information engagement shaped by intelligence to inform, influence, and persuade the local populace within limits prescribed by U.S. law (FM 3-0).

**Information Operations:** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or, usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting U.S. information operations (JP 3-13).

**Information Warfare (draft update):** A nation or organization's coordinated and synchronized use of cyberspace, media, information, and influence campaigns (strategic), operations (operational) and activities (tactical), to affect foreign contested political will, shape the security or operational environment, engage local leaders to influence contested populations, isolate enemies, influence adversary decisions, and consolidate gains to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

**Information Environment:** The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

**Information Operations:** The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; military information support operations. (JP 3-13)

**Information Operations Intelligence Integration:** The integration of intelligence disciplines and analytic methods to characterize and forecast, identify vulnerabilities, determine effects, and assess the information environment. Also called IOII. (JP 3-13)

**Information-Related Capability:** A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension (psychological, engagement, Cyber-electromagnetic) of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. Also called IRC. (FM 3-13)

**Information Superiority:** The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (JP 3-13)

**Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT):** An integrated team of key stakeholders and SMEs from multiple disciplines chartered by the director, ARCIC to initiate the JCIDS process through conduct of the CBA to identify capability gaps in a functional area, identify non-materiel and/or materiel approaches to resolve or mitigate those gaps, and develop an ICD and/or a DCR or DICR, when directed.

**Interim Solution Strategy (ISS):** Presents action plans, a way ahead, and decisions points for actions addressing Army Warfighting Challenges, which can include initiating JCIDS actions across DOTMLPF; POM and TAA submissions to HQDA; context and input to capability package development; input to the CNA and organizational based assessment; S&T program input and warfighting future operating capability revisions; and feedback to concept developers for concept revisions. TRADOC 71.20

**Information Warfare (Draft):** A nation or organization's coordinated and synchronized use of cyberspace, media, information, and influence campaigns (strategic), operations (operational) and activities (tactical), to affect foreign contested political will, shape the security or operational environment, engage local leaders to influence contested populations, influence enemy decision making, and consolidate gains to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

**Internal Defense and Development:** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**Irregular Warfare:** Violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will (JP 1-02).

**Joint Synergy:** Combining the advantages of the joint team across all domains and applying those advantages against opponents.

**Legal Warfare (Draft):** 1. The manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen a diplomatic, political or security position; 2. Action taken in the absence of international law or in the presence of international legal ambiguity.

**Media Warfare:** The manipulation of public opinion.

**Military Engagement:** Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0) (FM 3-22)

**Military Information Support Operations (MISO) (DOD):** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 3-13.2) See ADP 3-05, ADRP 3-05, FM 3-05, FM 3-18, NOTE: The Psychological Operations MOS/ branch plans and synchronizes MISO influence campaigns, operations, and activities.FM 3-53, ATP 3-07.31.

**Operational Environment:** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**Persuasive Influence (draft):** To attempt to change another stakeholder's position by offering incentives.

**Proponent:** Army organization or staff element designated by the HQDA DCS, G-3/5/7 which is an agency or command responsible for initiating, developing, coordinating, approving content, and issuing a publication and identifying them for removal. Each publication has only one proponent. See AR 5-22.

**Psychological Influence:** The employment of cooperative, persuasive and Coercive means to assist and support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, sway contested populations, and isolate and defeat enemies. (2009 Army Capstone Concept)

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP):** Operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Includes Strategic PSYOP, Operational PSYOP, Tactical PSYOP, and Consolidated PSYOP. (Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations 1996)

**Psychological Operations Officers and Specialists:** The Army military occupational specialty (MOS) Soldiers trained, educated and authorized to plan and conduct MISO Influence Campaigns, Influence Operations, and Influence Activities.

**Regionally Aligned Forces:** Those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. (FM 3-22)

**Security Assistance:** A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (JP 3-22)

**Security Cooperation:** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

**Security Cooperation Organization:** All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. (JP 3-22)

**Security Force Assistance (SFA):** The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance improves the capability and capacity of host nation or regional security organization's security forces (FM 3-07).

**Shaping Operations:** Operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operations are shaping operations (FM 3-0).

**Situational Understanding:** The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision making. (ADRP 6-0)

**Soldier and Leader Engagement:** Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations.

**Strategic Direction:** The processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. (JP 5-0)

**Strategic PSYOP:** International information activities conducted by U.S. Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and be supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts (JP 3-53, 1996)

**Subversion:** Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. See also **unconventional warfare**. (JP 3-24)

**Synergy:** Integrating, synchronizing ,and employing military forces and capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, in a manner that results in greater combat power and applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Integrating and synchronizing the actions of conventional and special operations forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains (JP 3-0, JP 3-1).

**Technical Influence:** That combination of electronic and informational technologies such as the internet that can both influence and be used as means to convey influence on people. (2009 Army Capstone Concept)

**TRADOC Proponents:** This is a generic term to refer collectively to the commanders of TRADOC centers and schools designated by AR 5-22 as force modernization proponents

**Uncertain Environment:** An operational environment in which the hosting government security forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (JP 3-0)

**Unified Action:** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**Warfighting Function (WfF):** A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions. The Army's WfFs are fundamentally linked to the joint functions. They consist of mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, and protection. See Army Doctrine Publication 3-0. TRADOC Regulation 71-20.



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