Scenario Enabling Adaptability

SEA # 2

"Cartonville Patrol"

Case Study: "At eleven-fifty, Engineers attach to 1st platoon, machineguns DS to 2nd platoon. I think the enemy has withdrawn - the vehicles at the stadium are abandoned and the snipers to the south are just a delay. Our forces to the north can't be relieved until we've secured the main road. **Mission: At thirteen hundred, we attack east and seize the railroad bridge in order to prevent enemy interference with the MSR.** One platoon attacks north of the boulevard inclusive, one south. 1st platoon, main effort. Seize the railroad bridge in order isolate the town from enemy east of the river. 2nd Platoon Clear the south sector of town in order to prevent enemy interference with the main effort. 3rd platoon, reserve. Co-locate with mortars at checkpoint romeo-three-one. Confirm, over."

Carl Von Clausewitz explains that events in warfare are surrounded by uncertainty, and that there are few universal truths. Because of this, leaders must sort through this "fog" to find the truth, often a daunting endeavor that's permeated by chance. The commander must sift through this information and decide what pieces are relevant and require action. Clausewitz specifically refers to the capability of the mind to discriminate information allowing quick, correct decisions. He describes this ability as coup d'oeil, "the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection."[2] Napoleon faced such a scenario in the battles of Jena-Auerstadt. With limited information, he turned an entire field army in place to seek decisive battle with the Prussians and won the day. [[2]Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 100-102.]

II. Background and goals (Teacher refer to instructor handbook):

a. What do we want the student to understand?

1) Recognition Primed Decision-making or Rapid Decision Making

a) Time Critically
b) Speed through Verbal Orders
c) Use of FRAGOs

2) Intuition

a) coup d'oeil
b) Mental Wargaming

III. Description:

You are a rifle platoon leader.

a. What do we do?

1st Platoon, Team Charlie, Task Force Shield. You are currently engaged in stability and support operations in the country of Grapeland. Coalition forces have routed organized enemy resistance, but there are still numerous "dead-enders" who operate in squad-sized units.

These units utilize Soviet Bloc small arms to include AK–series assault weapons, light machineguns, rocket propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars. They are mostly former regime military officers augmented by terrorists from other countries. Their actions are well-thought out, rehearsed, and usually effective. Hostile threat is high, but you have not been engaged in any manner in the 14 days you have been there.

Your Task Force is in a defensive perimeter at a rundown airfield located within city limits of Cartonville, Grapeland.

Your rules of engagement state that you are only to fire if fired upon or if hostile intent is positively identified. You are to use the least amount of force necessary to gain fire superiority. There have been restrictive fire measures emplaced as well. In any situation, collateral damage is to be kept to a minimum.



Your platoon has been tasked with a security patrol in the city. You have two machinegun teams and two assault teams attached to you. The platoon has a standard combat load of ammunition (squad automatic weapon, M203 grenade launcher, M16), and each squad has one AT–4 rocket as well. You have no direct or indirect fire support due to the restrictive fire measures. Illumination is your only asset from your supporting weapons platoon and company.

There is a section of AH–64 Apaches armed with 30mm chain gun and Hellfire missiles, as well as a dedicated medevac bird (on 20-minute strip alert at a nearby forward operating base), that are within a 5-minute flight of you once they launch. It is 1 hour before dusk, and your patrol exits friendly lines.

Your patrol is spread out about 400 meters long and staggered on both sides of the road. As you come to the intersection in the city square, you see that two of the avenues are now barricaded with trash, vehicles, and wood and are impassable for your patrol. There are very few people in the streets as well. At this time you halt the patrol to look at your map in order to coordinate new routes. You are hit from the front by small arms and machinegun fire. The machineguns seem to have interlocking fire, and the small arms are in sporadic positions within

the buildings. All of the buildings in the square are two floors or higher and made of heavy concrete. (Fire Team A, 1st Squad is pinned down and taking casualties.)

As the patrol advances toward the contact, mortar fire begins to fall in behind your position, pushing you toward the kill zone. Fire Team B of the 1st Squad and a machinegun team move to join Fire Team A on their own initiative upon contact. 2nd Squad takes up hasty defensive positions upon contact. 3rd Squad moves into a reserve position between two buildings to the east or right side of the street, and all are awaiting orders.

What do you do?

b. <u>Requirement</u>:

If using seminar or TDG in a class room, provide the following:

In a time limit of 5 minutes, come up with a fragmentary order for your squads and your attachments; include scheme of maneuver, commander's intent, and signal plan. Provide an overlay for your scheme of maneuver.

Also prepare any reports that you would send to higher headquarters, along with any requests for support.

c. <u>Instructor Notes</u>:

This is a Situational SEA

You may at your discretion, introduce the students to what a verbal order may look like, but do not have them write it down or make a check list out of it.

Recommended Verbal Order Technique

The standard for verbal orders should be: **Five sentences, in fifty seconds, while under fire**.

Task Organization. Organize your force before issuing the order. State the time of any attachments.

Orientation. One sentence on orientation, if needed, should precede the order to identify any new control measures or reference points.

Situation. Give a one-sentence assessment of what you *think* the enemy is trying to do. Start with **"I think..."**: *"I think those vehicles are the couterattack!"* Your orders make sense if your Marines know what you are thinking. Do not restate the obvious: *"We're under fire!"* Do not restate facts, *interpret* them. What does it mean? Draw conclusions! Then put your analysis in context. How do these enemy actions affect your higher headquarter's intent?

Mission. State the single collective unit mission before assigning any tasks. Start with **"We..."** Use the in-order-to (IOT) format to link mission and intent*: "At 1215, we will*

seize the pass IOT prevent enemy retreat." This is the single most important sentence of your order. Choose each word carefully.

Execution. A concept of operations lets everyone know the context of your plan and any support planned. If you jump straight to tasks*, "You buy meat! You buy cheese! You buy vegetables!",* your people may not know if they are building a salad, a pizza, or a sandwich.

Tasks. Phrase each task exactly like a mission statement. Use the IOT format to link mission and intent. Always designate one unit as the main effort. The main effort task needs to parrallel the unit mission. Always designate, and avoid tasking, a reserve. A single "Be Prepared To" statement for the reserve can guide that unit commander in his preparations.

Coordinating Instructions. The final sentence ties up the order with any instructions for all hands, usually timing, signals, or locations such as the casualty collection point. Most **Admin & Logisitics** and **Command & Signal** information should be SOP, and rarely needed in a verbal order.

The Army preoccupation with the planning process and written orders serves to *decrease* our ability to issue effective verbal orders.

Think of your own experiences with verbal orders. At a Tactical Decision Game at a field exercise, "We couldn't really do an order in only an hour, so these bullets represent some of our **thoughts**." At a wargame session , "If this were real, we'd have the imagery to permit us to make our **plans**." On a TDG at a battalion Officer Professional Development session, "We've outlined two **options** to think about." During an exercise, a voice crackles over the radio, "Move to phase line gold and **stand by** for further orders." Thoughts? Plans? Options? Stand By? Gentlemen, we need a clear order implementing your decision now! The above examples represent three negative trends you may have observed (1) an expectation of more time, (2) an expectation of more information, and (3) a lack of decisiveness and sense of urgency. Given ample time, each of the officers involved could have developed his thoughts into a coherent order in the recommended fashion. Without practice at rapidly producing succinct verbal orders, however, he is adrift.

Why are we not as good at verbal orders as we should be? The first reason our verbal orders technique suffers is because in school and in the field, "the orders process" is synonymous with "the planning process" which concludes with lengthy written orders development. The training rationale is that this develops an understanding of the components of an order. Once the concept is understood, unit SOPs can reduce the details of the order. The reality, of course, is that most well trained leaders mimic exactly what they are taught in school, generating six-page orders to direct a two-hour attack.

Even squad leaders are taught to write pages of orders. This has planted unrealistic expectations of "adequate planning time" and "proper orders format" in the heads of both leaders and Soldiers. When you are not granted adequate time in combat, is your order sufficient? Do you or your people now have doubts? A common opinion is that you cannot do a 'proper' or 'real' order unless you have a few hours available. Even the term

'frag order,' mistakenly applied to any verbal order, implies your directive is not a *real* order, but a fragment or offshoot of a properly written plan. A side effect of this model is that the comfort level we have discussing courses of action delays decisiveness and generates uneasiness with rapid decisions that have not been widely discussed or examined.

The second reason our verbal orders technique suffers rests on our inability to stabilize units, stabilize commanders, and train progressively. Cohesive and well-trained units can operate on concise verbal orders because they have shared experiences and expectations, they know each other's capabilities, and can operate well on minimum guidance. Excessively detailed orders are required when a commander lacks familiarity with his unit's background, leadership and capabilities.

The third and most compelling reason we are poor at verbal orders is that most of our exercises and training events lack a capable, thinking opponent. We are not teaching our leaders that combat is a dynamic clash of wills. When our training 'enemy' does not react or willfully attempt to counter our efforts, we learn the dangerous tendency to precisely script our every move. Evidence of this trend can easily be found in orders that include seven or eight sequential tasks for each subordinate, and in matrices that precisely envision six phases for an attack. In the dynamic chaos of actual combat, we will never be able to predict the sequence or the results on the battlefield with such accuracy.

The Army publishes almost no guidance on verbal orders. We teach few good techniques, we do not demand competence, and we rarely practice. Most of us do not do well when verbal orders are required. On exercises, particularly over the radio, we issue haphazard verbal orders off the top of our heads.

Combat narratives, from World War II through Vietnam, show that the Army has historically operated well on verbal orders. According to Major General Blunt, commander of 3ID, the battle for Baghdad was fought primarily on verbal orders. Many biographies of wartime leaders, including Patton, Montgomery, Slim, Rommel, and von Mellenthin, show that these men were adamant in their insistence on verbal orders. These leaders knew combat as a rapidly changing competitive environment where decentralization and small unit initiative were energized by concise verbal orders.

The details of war plans, amphibious landings, movement plans, and large deliberate operations cannot be communicated by verbal orders. For the rapidly changing environment of combat, however, the Army needs to be good at verbal orders. This key skill accelerates our tempo and maintains our momentum. A tactical decision is meaningless without the ability to communicate it clearly and rapidly. Your ability to issue a brief, clear, unambiguous order is a difficult but essential combat skill. This requires guidance, training, and practice.

Good Orders

The above technique meets all the requirements of a good order. A good order includes:

- An analysis of the situation
- A tie to the higher intent
- A unit mission and intent
- A series of tasks with intents
- A designated main effort
- A designated reserve

Conversely, a good order avoids:

- Excessive "On Order" or "If Then." Too many conditional statements indicate a fragile plan, dependent on many linkages and good communications. In combat, these are the last things you'll have. Do not reserve all decisions to yourself.
- T/O Confusion. Too many independent units also indicates a fragile plan. Complex organizations require detailed orders and good communications to coordinate multiple moving parts. Generally, one organization should be responsible for each separate part of your plan. Be very clear on command relationships.
- Micromanagement (MM)
- More-of-the-obvious (MOTO)
  In any order there are three types of sentences. (1) Mission Specific: *"H-Hour is 0900,"* (2) MM: *"Have your third squad carry extra batteries for your beacons,"* and (3) MOTO: *"Use all means to minimize casualties."* MM statements might be good training advice, but they do NOT belong in your order. Do not step on the command prerogatives of your subordinates. MOTO phrases are self-evident statements that offend your subordinates' sense of competence. Do not restate SOPs. **Every sentence in your order should be mission specific.**

Verbal Order Philosophies

Less is more. Be painstakingly brief and clear. Construct an unambiguous order with the fewest number of carefully chosen words. Kill all adjectives and adverbs. Avoid excessive "Be Prepared To" sentences for future potentialities. Strive to meet the current situation. When another task needs to be accomplished later, issue another order. Avoid "phases" for the same reason. In the disorder of combat, simplicity is strength.

Cohesion and Training are the Pre-requisites. Cohesive and well-trained units have practiced battle drills and standing operating procedures that speed communications and are well understood. The leaders of cohesive units understand the tactical thoughts and expectations of their commander, they know and trust each other's judgment, and they have confidence in the capabilities of their Marines and their small unit leaders who make the crucial decisions on the battlefield. Train your unit and your leaders with these goals in mind.

Trust your people. Know your leaders and assume competence. The level of detail in an order depends on the proficiency of your subordinates. When you rely on you subordinate's self-reliance and judgment on the spot, you create enthusiasm for the task that increases the likelihood of success and the conditions for exploitation of opportunity. An order should contain everything a subordinate must know to carry out the order, and only that. Use the briefback technique to avoid surprises.

Missions and Tasks. Assign a single mission to your unit. Assign a single task to each subordinate. Select only the essential tasks and focus on those. A mission which includes several parts diverts attention from the primary goal.

Intent. Intent equals purpose. The IOT format is the most concise technique to link the mission and the intent. The commander's intent paragraph has no place in a verbal order. Avoid splitting your unit's focus with two intents*: "Seize Hill 160 IOT control the riverline AND permit our unhindered resupply."* The best intent focuses on the enemy, not friendly forces or terrain. Intent is not a tactical task, *"Attack IOT destroy."* The intent is far larger than the tactical task. A good intent will always provide your subordinate with multiple options. Your subordinates then have leeway to take action when the situation changes. Meaningful intent gives your order durability and longevity.

Nesting Intents. The intent of each task must be "nested." Supporting efforts support the main effort. The main effort supports the higher headquarters. From the highest headquarters to the leading squad, the intents of all units should cascade so that the actions of each unit contributes to the whole. This is the only way to make a large organization operate in a chaotic environment. Disciplined initiative at each level will contribute to the greater good only if the intent of each order supports the order above it.

Puppet orders. Avoid moving and placing your subordinate commanders: *"Continue moving north and then east to CP51."* You are not moving puppets. You are tasking commanders. Avoid using "orient." The intent of your order should clarify why a certain position or direction is important.

Schedules, target lists, manifests and other data sheets are the results of an order. They are not the order. Issue a verbal order, then develop and submit any lists or manifests needed.

Language. Use inclusive language, *"You are moving with me,"* and avoid exclusive language, *"You are not staying here."* Avoid qualified statements, *"Try to hold,"* or *"As far as possible."* These lessen responsibility. Avoid conditional statements*, "If you can get over the bridge."* Know and use precise tactical terms, the language of your profession. Mission and task statements, especially, need to be clear and correct. Tasks that focus on the enemy, *fix, suppress*, tasks that focus on terrain, *secure, occupy*, and tasks that focus on

friendly forces, *overwatch*, have very precise meanings and need to be understood by your Marines. Likewise, when organizing for combat, use the terms *attach, direct support,* and *take command*. Imprecise statements, *"The XO will supervise,"* or *"Machineguns move with 3rd Platoon Sergeant,"* can lead to dangerous confusion in combat.

Command. As far as possible, move to your subordinates and issue verbal orders face to face at a critical observation point on the battlefield. Beyond the words, a leader communicates far more by looking into the eyes of your Soldiers . When issued over the radio, a verbal order is far less likely to be misunderstood if it is well constructed, succinct and unambiguous. Remember also that issuing the order is only ten percent of the commander's responsibility. Supervision, pushing the plan vigorously to success, is the true role of the commander.

Conclusion

Success on the battlefield goes to the leader who can quickly assess the situation, decide and communicate his decision, and fight his unit effectively. How many verbal orders have you issued in your career? How many have you received? Capture good techniques for verbal orders. Train your leaders. Marine leaders at all levels need as much practice as possible in communicating their decisions. During exercises, wargames, planning conferences, and tactical decision games, critically discuss the order as well as the tactics. The essential skill of issuing clear, concise, unambiguous orders is difficult. It is not a skill you are born with nor is it acquired automatically with rank. Only those who practice in peacetime will be successful leaders in the chaos of combat.

IV. Tools & Tasks:

a. Tools:

1) Recommended use through Seminar Discussion or a Tactical Decision Game. This also lends itself to a terrain walk without the use of simulation aides such as paint guns or MILEs gear.

2) SEA 2 can be delivered using any tool, but use in a Force on Force, Free Play situation on its own may be too costly to achieve the desired result. Interject it as part of a larger SEA using Force on Force, Free Play. For example, your student platoon is tactical foot marching through a built up area. You feel that they have evolved enough to interject SEA 2.

3) To further enhance this SEA or create a new one reference http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/index.html

b. **Tasks:** The Student may have to employ the following tasks in the execution of this SEA:

1)

IMPLEMENT THE ETHICAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS BOLC LN # 853

I	- Apply Leadership Fundamentals to Create a Climate that Fosters Ethical Behavior	158-100-1135
I	- Apply Ethical Decision Making Process as Commander, Leader, or Staff Member	158-100-1230
IV(unit)	- Comply with Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Ethics Regulatory (JER) Requirements	181-231-1001

2)

I	CONDUCT SMALL UNIT COMBAT OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF WAR - BOLC LN #1027	181-431-1001

3)

I	INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY HISTORY INTO THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - #773	
	- Integrate Historical Awareness and Critical Thinking Skills Derived from Military History Methodologies into the Training and Education of Self and Subordinate Leaders	155-297-1010

4)

V	COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY TO INFORM, PERSUADE OR DIRECT - BOLC LN #952	

5)

I	CONDUCT SMALL UNIT COMBAT OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF WAR - BOLC LN #1027	181-431-1001

6)

I	CONDUCT TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES - BOLC LN #293	071-326-3049
	- Issue an Oral Operations Order	071-326-5505

7)

I	ENAGE THE ENEMY WITH AN M16-SERIES RIFLE - BOLC LN #165	071-311-2007
II	EMPLOY HAND GRENDADES - BOLC LN #145	071-325-4407

8)

I	ANALYZE TERRAIN - BOLC LN #421	071-331-0820

9)

III(hip pkt)	ADJUST INDIRECT FIRE - BOLC LN #82	061-283-6003

10)

I	CONDUCT SMALL UNIT MOVEMENT - BOLC LN #1162	
	- Plan Unit Movement	551-88N-0003

11)

I	LOCATE MINE & BOOBY TRAP INDICATORS BY VISUAL MEANS - BOLC LN #131	052-192-1242

12)

	IMPLEMENT THE ETHICAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS BOLC LN # 853	
I	- Apply Leadership Fundamentals to Create a Climate that Fosters Ethical Behavior	158-100-1135
I	- Apply Ethical Decision Making Process as Commander, Leader, or Staff Member	158-100-1230

13)

I	PERFORM MOUTH TO MOUTH RESUSCITATION - BOLC LN #507	
	- Perform Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)	081-831-10
I	PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BLEEDING OF AN EXTREMITY BOLC LN #489	
	- Control Bleeding and Treat Burns	071-D-231
I	PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK BOLC LN #472	
	- Control Bleeding and Treat Burns	071-D-231

V. Facilitation hints:

a. The following techniques are recommended:

1) Either Objective Focus or Teaching to the Objective can be used with this SEA depending upon the level of proficiency already demonstrated and what is possible.

2) The process is a conundrum—on the surface, you are teaching the students to be innovative and adaptive by solving a "stream of problems that should

become more complex and ambiguous as the course progresses. Yet, at the same time you are still teaching, through facilitating, each student about their strengths and weaknesses in being creative and adaptable. You let them find their strengths and weaknesses by providing undeniable feedback—like if their plan fails, no one has to tell them they failed, it is obvious to them and everyone else. Your feedback must be swift and undeniable, so that they take it on board or own it. Only when they own their weaknesses will they take the necessary steps to do something about them.

b. Possible questions:

1) "Is the order **clear**?

2) If I were a subordinate commander receiving this order, would I understand the plan and my role in the action?

3) Is the order **complete**?

4) Are any key pieces of information missing?

5) Is the order **flexible**?

6) How well would a leader who received this order be able to exercise his initiative and react to changes in the situation?"

7) What is the decisive point of your operation?

VI. Insights: What did we learn?

a. Adaptability: In solving SEA 5, there are two board solution outcomes.

b. The instructor may want to enhance student learning with these tactical techniques:

- *Long unsupported assaults are deadly*. Assault for short distances, against a lightly armed or well-suppressed position. A single enemy soldier can destroy a squad across 100 meters of open ground.

- *A long covered approach is always better than a short open route.* Be careful of covered approaches that cannot be covered by an overwatching unit.

- *Every unit needs obscuration.* Smoke save lives. Every assault and every withdrawal should use smoke.

- *Fire and maneuver is the key tactic.* Use the majority of your force to overwhelmingly suppress the enemy, and a small assault unit to rapidly close on the objective.

- *It's all about suppression***.** Fire without maneuver is wasteful and indecisive. Effective suppression is the basis for all infantry tactics.

- *Units without mutual support are doomed.* Mutually supported units protect each other from being fixed or assaulted.

- *Mortars are inherently inaccurate*. Area suppression is NOT destruction. Rounds are limited, use them well. Don't waste mortars on bunkers or buildings.

- *Concentrate your fire*. Fire control insures decisive action. In contact, men will disperse their fire. Sequentially destroying targets with point fire is more effective than distributing ineffective fires.

- *Every unit— squad, platoon, and company—needs antitank capability when facing tanks*. An infantry unit with no organic antitank weapon is either *retreating* or *overrun*. Infantry can only fight tanks in close terrain.

- *For anti-tank positions, deep and narrow sectors of fire with defilade on both sides are best.* The best sector of fire allows you to engage only *one* tank at a time.

- *Defensive positions are temporary*. All units need multiple positions and the ability to withdraw.

- *For machinegun positions, deep and narrow sectors of fire, with defilade on both sides, are best*. Primary and secondary sectors separated by frontal protection are better.

- *Cover is life.* Move from one covered position to another. Good cover is relative to a single enemy position. Mutually supporting enemy positions can overcome the protection of your cover.

- *Use bounding overwatch to move*. A squad in contact needs immediate suppression from another unit. The measure of success is the number of units that can immediately bring suppression to bear upon enemy contact.

Enemy techniques:

- The urban insurgent works alone or in small cells.

- Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.

- Generating widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force.

- Creating incidents or massing crowds to lure the opposition force into a trap.

- Provoking the opposing force into overreacting, which would provide hostile propaganda.

- Provoking inter-factional strife.

- Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, sentries, and individuals.

- Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.

- Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or at random, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale.

- Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

c. Possible Student Solutions:

1) Key Students Issues that must at least touch upon:

a. Does the Student try to secure the tactical landing zone?
If not, do they at least try to ask where another one is at in order to change it?
b. How does the Student handle his casualties?
c.

2) The first may broadly be called the "de-escalation approach"

a. Student Solution 1:

Platoon Leader's Orders

S: Scattered EN units, maybe (5-10) soldiers, remain in the vicinity of the of the tactical airfield with their fires concentrated on the circle. They may have a HMG, mortar.

We can evac our guys and get reinforcements into the tactical landing zone once the AA threat is reduced IOT stage for follow-on OPS. I think the EN will avoid contact with us and wait to target the helicopters.

M: Platoon clears the area around the tactical landing zone IOT prevent EN interference with air OPS.

E: While (1) Plat blocks the (N) access road, (2) Plats will clear both sides of the airfield from (N) to (S). FS: R/W CAS O/C. No artillery. Mortars with 1st Plat.

Tasks: **ME. Clear (W) side of airfield IOT prevent EN interference with air OPS**.

1st Sqd: Defend, secure casualties, support other two squads
2nd Sqd: Clear (N) side of airfield focused on mosque IOT prevent EN interference with air OPS.
3rd Sqd: Block (E) side to tactical landing zone IOT prevent EN CATK.

Issues for Discussion

a. What does "clear" mean when given as a task to an infantry unit?

b. How large an area must be cleared to make an airfield completely safe from enemy small arms fire? From RPGs or anti-air missiles? From heavy machine guns?

c. What does it mean when you receive mortar fire? How do you deal with indirect fire? How do you avoid being targeted?

d. Did you use all three squads to search a wide area or did you keep one back to be able to respond to enemy contact?

e. What caused most of your casualties? How could these casualties have been reduced?

4. Tactical Themes

a. Movement to Contact by bounding overwatch.

b. Bounding overwatch by teams within the squad. Bounding overwatch by squads within the platoon. The measure of success is the number of units immediately able to fire on the enemy when contact is made.

c. On contact, a squad envelopment is a two-team BOF and team assault. A platoon envelopment is a two-squad BOF and squad assault.

5. Options

a. a. Edit the scenario. Add (2) machinegun teams. How do machineguns change your movement techniques? What changes when mortar fires are not available?

b. b. Edit the scenario. Add supporting mortar fires (2) missions of smoke or HE (see if the student even asks for them, if they do, then give it to them). In the close terrain of urban terrain, what are the benefits and disadvantages of indirect firepower?

b. Student Solution 2:

Platoon Leader's Orders

S: EN patrols, mostly sqd size, have become increasingly bolder as we have patrolled. They want to shot down our helicopters.

COS (N) patrolling to secure area.

M: 1st platoon conducts security patrol IOT prevent EN interference with our stability operations.

E: Platoon establishes defensive positions until arrival of supporting fires from Apaches allows us to maneuver to clear the square and the tactical landing zone.

Tasks:
1st Sqd: Defend (N)
2nd Sqd: Defend (W)
3rd Sqd: Move (NE) and bound on east side of buildings to overwatch tactical landing zone.

A: SOP
C: SOP

Issues for Discussion

a. How did you control fires? Did you concentrate or distribute your fires?

b. How did you plan to withdraw? In what order did units withdraw? What triggered withdrawal? Did this trigger give you enough time?

c. What caused most of your casualties? How could these casualties have been reduced?

4. Tactical Themes

a. Defensive control of fires in built-up areas.

b. Withdrawal plans for small units.

Teacher Notes: CPT Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. sums up the difference between the novice and the expert decision maker in the following

statement: "We're forcing a multiple choice answer on what should be an essay question." Numerous studies have demonstrated that expert decision makers "tended to see the situation as more complex" than novices.

Expert decision makers also were able "to handle adversity, to identify exceptions, and to adapt to changing conditions." By embracing complexity, expert decision makers are able too, as one researcher describes it, develop a "richer mental model." Mental models are "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action."

Mental model development is a common feature of the research on expert decision-making and is an important component of critical thinking. In *The Fifth Discipline*, Peter Senge wrote extensively on the use of mental models in the business community—with both positive and negative results. The power of mental models is that they help "managers clarify their assumptions, discover internal contradictions in those assumptions, and think through new strategies based on new assumptions." From this description, two concepts stand out—reflective thinking and contingency planning.

Senge uses the phrase "skills of reflection" to describe the process by which the decision maker questions how he came to form his mental model and the ways it influences his actions. It is through the development of skills of reflection that the expert decision maker begins to discover hidden assumptions, and these hidden assumptions become the foundation for contingency planning.

The findings of a study conducted by researchers from ALPHATECH support the power of mental models used by expert decision makers as proposed by Senge. This study evolved from 46 interviews with U.S. Army officers who ranged in rank from Captain to General. A battlefield scenario set in the Persian Gulf was presented to each officer. They produced both written products and verbally explained the rationale for their solution to the tactical problem. The experts who judged the levels of expert decision-making were retired three and four star generals.

Expert decision makers did not develop an initial COA any faster than the novice. Their COAs were much more complex. Consequently, the expert decision makers had a clearer understanding of gaps and conflicts within their mental models; they were able "to ask the right questions, and to gather the most relevant information." The expert decision makers were also able to use mental models to better visualize the outcomes of their COAs. Then determine what could go wrong with

their plan, and develop contingencies to deal with "showstoppers" they encountered as a result of visualization.

This is consistent with the theory that mental models are effective tools that help the decision maker discover the hidden assumptions that form the basis of his COA, test those assumptions for validity, and prepare assumption-based contingencies. Through this process, the decision maker not only gains situational understanding of when the plan is failing, but also understands when the plan is succeeding and is able to recognize opportunities.

By the nature of the environment, uncertainty will always breed assumptions. However, the key to effective decision-making is determining which assumptions are plausible, and discovering conflicts within your assumptions and your mental model. Research on the naval officers' decision-making in the high-stress environment of a naval combat information center (CIC) has concluded that experts are better at discovering conflicts in their assumptions and mental models and then generating alternative scenarios to support their assumptions or resolving conflicts.

In summary, the number of years of military service does not define decision-making expertise. The expert decision maker distances himself from the novice through the development of complex mental models about the enemy as well as friendly forces. This is analogous to the development of enemy and friendly courses of action within the current MDMP. There is one critical difference; the expert rigorously screens his mental model for gaps and conflicts in information and weak or implausible assumptions.

The expert conducts this examination through a reflective process of critical thinking. This ensures the expert decision maker "will be less likely to miss or fail to account for significant data; they will be less likely to overlook unreliable assumptions or conflicts in the data; and they will be less likely to engage in excessive explaining away (confirmation bias). This is what this SEA covers, the approach to decision-making that CPT McKenzie describes; the expert decision maker designs a mental model that makes logical sense, as opposed to selecting from a list of COAs.

c. Next steps and recommendations:

This appears complicated for the students, especially as their second exercise, but its purpose is to also expose them to the difficulty of their profession, to raise the bar in their pursuit of answers.

Follow this with SEA 3, back to a squad exercise where, after doing SEA 2, they begin to understand the larger picture before going to SEA 4.

VII. Resource Considerations:

a. Terrain Walks

Terrain walks are essential to expose your students to the tremendous variety of obstacles and opportunities that are present in any urban area. To prepare for a terrain walk, obtain copies of local city graphics, sewer maps, power lines, etc. from the city office. Download overhead imagery. Write a simple mission statement and commanders' intent to serve as the basis for the planning.

Then as your students walk an urban area have them plan, sketch, and discuss how they would site individual and crew served positions; how they would move as individuals and teams; what surprises they might run into; how they think about all the factors that make urban operations so difficult. To supplement terrain walks, conduct battle studies. There are literally thousands of books, articles, films, and maps about urban battles. Study Stalingrad, Berlin, Mogadishu, Belfast, Hue City, Chechnya (especially Grozny), or Kabul.

b. Facilities

There are a number of facility changes we need to implement. We still have pristine combat towns. Every brick in place, every room swept no furniture allowed, and no disorder. Yet we claim these are our premier urban training sites.

We can easily make them more realistic, and simultaneously provide education on the effect of breaching weapons. First, we select certain walls to breach – preferably using standard breaching charges and assault weapons. Once the walls are breached, we mark each with visual evidence of what their weapons will do. As a bonus, breaching the walls and leaving the rubble in place will allow more realistic and tactically sound movement in our combat towns. The current construction virtually forces our students to move in the streets and enter via doors and windows – the worst possible places to be in urban combat. Next, we need to make the combat towns look lived in. Fortunately, this is even cheaper than breaching. WE simply go to the Defense Reutilization Management Office and pick up old furniture.

Then give it to our students and tell them they are free to use the furniture, as they deem fit for tactical purposes. Depending on the scenario – security operations to mid-intensity conflict, students can arrange the furniture to reflect houses being lived in or fought over. students may push the furniture in front of doors, block hallways, and build hiding places. The key is: no limits – let them create the environment they will fight in.

As for the long term, we should fill in the open areas in our combat towns. Very little of the world consists of the semidetached and detached buildings that typify our combat towns. We need to build between them to form the solid blocks typical or most of the world. We also must

create slum/refugee areas; establish junkyards, tow in more vehicles. In short, make our combat towns look like real urban areas.

c. Force-on-Force

Finally, force-on-force exercises conducted at the small unit level should be used to put it all together. The new simulations are the training tool of choice for force-on-force in urban operations. Unfortunately, they are relatively expensive. One substitute that proved highly effective for Georgetown Army ROTC were Paint guns. For about $130, we can equip a student with a paint ball mask and a paint gun. A course can buy at least 50 sets, allowing for exercises up to platoon versus squad. After the initial purchase, training is very cheap with paint guns only a penny for every 5 paint balls.

While paint ball guns have distinct range limitations, they are ideal for interior urban operations because they provide immediate feedback to your students. They can be used in combat towns, warehouses, close terrain, and even condemned buildings. The very real possibility of being hit (hurting both your hide and your pride) forces our students not only to shoot well but to move and communicate the way they will in combat. And, it's a lot of fun!

In summary, the choice is ours. We can continue to pay lip service to urban operations or we can modify our training, education, and facilities for urban combat. The steps are simple. We can take them now. All we have to do is get serious.

VIII. Task Support Packages:

[attached to after this last page, each TSP listed earlier for reference]