



Safely Integrating ERC20 Tokens to Your DeFi Application

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Who Am I?



- Josselin Feist, josselin@trailofbits.com, [@montyly](https://twitter.com/montyly)
- Trail of Bits: trailofbits.com
 - We help everyone build safer software
 - R&D focused: we use the latest program analysis techniques
 - [Slither](#)
 - [Echidna](#)
 - [Manticore](#)

Today Goals



- DeFi -> contracts composability
- Common risks when interacting with arbitrary tokens
- Recommendations and guidelines

General considerations

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General considerations

- **You have contacted the developers.**
 - You may need to alert their team to an incident.
 - github.com/crytic/blockchain-security-contacts
- **They have a security mailing list for critical announcements.**
 - Their team should advise users (like you!) when critical issues are found or when upgrades occur.

General considerations

- **The token has a security review.**
 - Check
 - The length of the assessment (aka “level of effort”),
 - The reputation of the security firm, and
 - The number and severity of the findings.
 - Keep in mind security review != safe code

ERC conformity

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- Is this ok with tokens strictly following the specification?

```
1. function get(ERC20 token) internal returns(uint, uint8){  
2.     uint8 decimals = token.decimals();  
3.     uint balance = token.balanceOf(address(this));  
4.     return balance, decimals;  
5. }
```


ERC conformity - Optional



decimals

Returns the number of decimals the token uses - e.g. 8 , means to divide the token amount by 100000000 to get its user representation.

OPTIONAL - This method can be used to improve usability, but interfaces and other contracts MUST NOT expect these values to be present.

```
function decimals() public view returns (uint8)
```

ERC conformity - Optional



- Similar for name and symbol

ERC conformity - Return value

- transfer/transferFrom returns a boolean

```
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success)
```

- You must check for this value
- Callers MUST handle `false` from `returns (bool success)`. Callers MUST NOT assume that `false` is never returned!

ERC conformity - Return value

- Several tokens miss the return value on `transfer/transferFrom`
 - Include high target (ex: USDT)
 - See [Missing return value bug — At least 130 tokens affected](#)
- `require (token.transfer (.., ..)) ;` **will always revert**

- **Two solutions**
 - Do not support ERC20 tokens that don't follow the specification
 - or... use a "safe ERC20" approach
 - Low level call
 - Check for contract existence
 - Check if return value size is zero, or the value is true

- [slither-check-erc](#)
- **Tool based on Slither that will perform common checks**
 - ERC20, 223, 777, 721, 165, 1820
 - Check for
 - Missing / incorrect functions
 - Missing / incorrect events
 - Missing / incorrect return values
 - ...

slither-check-erc 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7 TetherToken

slither-check-erc



```
# Check TetherToken

## Check functions
[✓] totalSupply() is present
    [✓] totalSupply() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] totalSupply() is view
[✓] balanceOf(address) is present
    [✓] balanceOf(address) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] balanceOf(address) is view
[✓] transfer(address,uint256) is present
    [ ] transfer(address,uint256) -> () should return bool
    [✓] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) is present
    [ ] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) -> () should return bool
    [✓] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] approve(address,uint256) is present
    [ ] approve(address,uint256) -> () should return bool
    [✓] Approval(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] allowance(address,address) is present
    [✓] allowance(address,address) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] allowance(address,address) is view
[✓] name() is present
    [✓] name() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] name() is view
[✓] symbol() is present
    [✓] symbol() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] symbol() is view
[✓] decimals() is present
```

Extensions Risks

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- **ERC777 (and equivalent) reentrancy**
 - Callback mechanism in `transfer/transferFrom`
 - Lead to reentrancy exploits in Uniswap and dForce

```
1. function withdraw(ERC20 token) internal{  
2.     require(token.transfer(msg.sender, balance[msg.sender]));  
3.     balance[msg.sender] = 0;  
4. }
```

Unexpected Balance Update

- Does `balance[msg.sender]` always track correctly value?

```
1. function add(uint value) internal{  
2.     require(token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), value));  
3.     balance[msg.sender] += value;  
4. }
```

Unexpected Balance Update

- **Transfer fee.**
 - Deflationary tokens can lead to unexpected behavior.
 - Ex: USDT has a potential fee
- **Token can earn interest.**
 - Some tokens distribute interest to token holders. This interest might be trapped in the contract if not taken into account.
- **Both require manual inspection at the moment**

Contract Composition

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Contract Composition

- The token avoids unneeded complexity.
 - The token should be a simple contract; a token with complex code requires a higher standard of review.
 - Use Slither's [human-summary printer](#) to identify complex code.

Name	# functions	ERCS	ERC20 info	Complex code	Features
SafeMath	4			No	
ERC677Receiver	1			No	
LinkToken	22	ERC20	No Minting	No	Assembly

- **The token has only a few non-token-related functions.**
 - Non-token-related functions increase the likelihood of an issue in the contract.
 - Use Slither's [contract-summary printer](#) to broadly review the code used in the contract.

Contract Composition

```
+ Contract SafeMath (Most derived contract)
- From SafeMath
  - add(uint256,uint256) (internal)
  - div(uint256,uint256) (internal)
  - mul(uint256,uint256) (internal)
  - sub(uint256,uint256) (internal)

+ Contract ERC20Basic
- From ERC20Basic
  - balanceOf(address) (public)
  - transfer(address,uint256) (public)

+ Contract ERC20
- From ERC20Basic
  - balanceOf(address) (public)
  - transfer(address,uint256) (public)
- From ERC20
  - allowance(address,address) (public)
  - approve(address,uint256) (public)
  - transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (public)
```

- **The token uses SafeMath.**
 - Contracts that do not use SafeMath require a higher standard of review.
- **The token only has one entry point.**
 - Tokens with multiple entry points for balance updates can break internal bookkeeping based on the address (e.g. `balances[token_address][msg.sender]` might not reflect the actual balance).

Testing Basic Properties

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- [slither-prop](#)
- **Generate automatically ERC20 properties**
 - Unit tests (Truffle)
 - Fuzzing (Echidna)
- **Contain 18 checks**
 - Self transfer is correctly implemented
 - Balance of the user is less or equal to the total supply
 - Cannot transfer more than the balance
 - ...

Owner privileges

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Owner privileges

- **The token is not upgradeable.**
 - Upgradeable contracts might change their rules over time.
 - Use Slither's [human-summary printer](#) to determine if the contract is upgradeable.
- **The owner has limited minting capabilities.**
 - Malicious or compromised owners can abuse minting capabilities.
 - Use Slither's [human-summary printer](#) to review minting capabilities, and consider manually reviewing the code.

Owner privileges

- **The token is not pausable.**
 - Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on pausable tokens. Identify pauseable code by hand.
- **The owner cannot blacklist the contract.**
 - Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist. Identify blacklisting features by hand.

- **The team behind the token is known and can be held responsible for abuse.**
 - Contracts with anonymous development teams, or that reside in legal shelters should require a higher standard of review.

Token scarcity

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- **No user owns most of the supply.**
 - If a few users own most of the tokens, they can influence operations based on the token's repartition.
- **The total supply is sufficient.**
 - Tokens with a low total supply can be easily manipulated.
- **The tokens are located in more than a few exchanges.**
 - If all the tokens are in one exchange, a compromise of the exchange can compromise the contract relying on the token.

- **Users understand the associated risks of large funds or flash loans.**
 - Contracts relying on the token balance must carefully take in consideration attackers with large funds or attacks through flash loans.
- **The token does not allow flash minting.**
 - Flash minting can lead to substantial swings in the balance and the total supply, which necessitate strict and comprehensive overflow checks in the operation of the token.

Summary

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- Review every token that will interact with your codebase
- github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts
 - Token integration checklist
 - Guidelines and tools training