

# macOS privilege escalation via traceroute6

# Can we pwn

U.S. Patent Jan. 16, 1979 Sheet 1 of 2 4,135,240

FIG. 1A

106			
USER	PASSWORD	USER ID	PROGRAM
BOB	LXR2	33	PROLL
TED	FRTE	18	PROGI
JIM	STPA	6	EDIT
PASSWORD FILE			
16			
107			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	18
OWNER ID	18	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
0	0	0	
"PROGI" FILE CONTENTS			
108			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	0
OWNER ID	0	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"PROGI" FILE CONTENTS			
109			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	6
OWNER ID	6	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"EDIT" FILE CONTENTS			
110			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	6
OWNER ID	6	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"EDIT" FILE CONTENTS			
111			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	33
OWNER ID	33	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"PROLL" FILE CONTENTS			
112			
SUID BIT	1	OWNER ID	33
OWNER ID	33	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"PROLL" FILE CONTENTS			
113			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	18
OWNER ID	18	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
0	0	0	
"AFILE" FILE CONTENTS			
114			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	6
OWNER ID	6	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"BFILE" FILE CONTENTS			
115			
SUID BIT	0	OWNER ID	33
OWNER ID	33	OWNER	
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
NON-OWNERS			
RD	WR	EX	
I	I	I	
"BFILE" FILE CONTENTS			
116			

Qualys Security Advisory

pwnkit: Local Privilege Escalation in polkit's pkexec (CVE-2021-4034)

# SUID -r-Sr-Xr-X

Over the years it has provided truly horrid security flaws  
*UNIX Operating System Security*  
 By F. T. GRAMPP\* and R. H. MORRIS\*  
 (Manuscript received February 7, 1984)

# You will learn

- A few **vulns**
- New **libmalloc** exploitation technique
- Local userspace **PAC** bypass

- Paweł Gros Płatek

- Former  player

- Now  employee



# SUID attack surface

```
$ find / -user root -perm -4000
```

/usr/bin/quota	/usr/bin/top
/usr/bin/sudo	/usr/bin/atq
/usr/bin/login	/usr/bin/crontab
/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline	/usr/bin/atrm
/usr/libexec/authopen	/usr/bin/newgrp
/bin/ps	/usr/bin/su
/usr/sbin/traceroute6	/usr/bin/batch
/usr/sbin/traceroute	/usr/bin/at

# SUID attack surface

```
$ find / -user root -perm -4000
```

*https://opensource.apple.com/releases*

```
/usr/bin/top  
/usr/bin/atq  
/usr/bin/crontab  
/usr/bin/atrm  
/usr/bin/newgrp  
/usr/bin/batch  
/usr/bin/at
```

/usr/bin/login  
/usr/libexec/security\_authtrap  
/usr/libexec/authopen  
/bin/ps  
/usr/sbin/traceroute6  
/usr/sbin/traceroute

# SUID attack surface

```
$ traceroute phrack.org
```

traceroute to phrack.org (104.21.82.208), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets

1 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1) 6.083 ms 2.904 ms 2.942 ms

2 10.12.12.1 (10.12.12.1) 6.097 ms 3.806 ms 3.134 ms

3 host-33.22.201.32.pl (33.22.201.32) 6.757 ms 3.733 ms 3.857 ms

4 be-1.x.jajko.pl (1.2.102.49) 13.567 ms 12.248 ms 11.142 ms

5 x-x.techn.mem.pl (1.2.3.50) 13.852 ms 10.442 ms 11.810 ms

6 142.123.123.81 (142.123.123.81) 10.856 ms 12.085 ms 10.138 ms

# SUID attack surface - traceroute

```
static char domain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1], line[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
```

```
gethostname(domain, sizeof(domain) - 1)
```

```
hp = gethostbyname(domain);
```

```
if (hp != NULL)
```

```
    cp = strchr(hp->h_name, '.');
```

```
++cp;
```

```
memmove(domain, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
```

256+1

# SUID attack surface - traceroute

```
static char domain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1], line[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];  
  
gethostname(domain, sizeof(domain) - 1)  
hp = gethostbyname(domain);  
  
if (hp != NULL)  
    cp = strchr(hp->h_name, '.');  
++cp;  
  
memmove(domain, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
```

# SUID attack surface - traceroute

```
static char domain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1], line[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];  
  
gethostname(domain, sizeof(domain) - 1)  
hp = gethostbyname(domain);  
  
if (hp != NULL)  
    cp = strchr(hp->h_name, '.');  
++cp;  
  
memmove(domain, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
```

# Crash demo

```
# Demo
sudo hostname testbug
python -c 'print("1.1.1.1\t." + "A"*1025 + "\ttestbug")' | sudo tee -a
/etc/hosts
traceroute quildu.xyz
```

# SUID attack surface - traceroute

TRAIL  
BITS

- Not exploitable (**FORTIFY\_SOURCE**)
- Why the overflow?
  - DNS spec
- Go into DNS

- **gethostbyname -> libinfo**


- Try to resolve as IPv4
- Otherwise call `si_host_byname`
  - Dispatch table, multiple **modules**

```
/*
 * Default search order:
 * 1) cache
 * 2) Darwin Directory
 *      (where available)
 * 3) User Management
 *      (where available)
 * 4) DirectoryService/OpenDirectory
 *      (where available)
 * 5) flat file
 * 6) mDNSResponder
 */

const char * const modules[] =
{
    "default", // CATEGORY_DEFAULT
    "cache",
    "darwin_directory",
    "muser",
    "ds",
    "mdns",
    "file",
};

};
```

# DNS on macOS - mDNS module



# DNS on macOS - mDNS module

```
// Loop over DNS responses:  
read(socket, IPC_header, sizeof(IPC_header))  
data = malloc(IPC_header.datalen)  
read(socket, data, IPC_header.datalen)  
ProcessReply()  
  
get_string(&data, end, name, kDNSServiceMaxDomainName);  
rrtype = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rrclass = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdlen = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdata = get_rdata(&data, end, rdlen);  
ttl = get_uint32(&data, end);
```

# DNS on macOS - mDNS module

```
// Loop over DNS responses:  
read(socket, IPC_header, sizeof(IPC_header))  
data = malloc(IPC_header.datalen)  
read(socket, data, IPC_header.datalen)  
ProcessReply()  
  
get_string(&data, end, name, kDNSServiceMaxDomainName);  
rrtype = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rrclass = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdlen = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdata = get_rdata(&data, end, rdlen);  
ttl = get_uint32(&data, end);
```

# DNS on macOS - mDNS module

```
// Loop over DNS responses:  
read(socket, IPC_header, sizeof(IPC_header))  
data = malloc(IPC_header.datalen)  
read(socket, data, IPC_header.datalen)  
ProcessReply()  
  
get_string(&data, end, name, kDNSServiceMaxDomainName);  
rrtype = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rrclass = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdlen = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdata = get_rdata(&data, end, rdlen);  
ttl = get_uint32(&data, end);
```

# DNS on macOS - mDNS module

```
// Loop over DNS responses:  
read(socket, IPC_header, sizeof(IPC_header))  
data = malloc(IPC_header.datalen)  
read(socket, data, IPC_header.datalen)  
ProcessReply()
```

```
get_string(&data, end, name kDNSServiceMaxDomainName);
```

```
rrtype = get_uint16(&data, end);
```

```
rrclass = get_uint16(&data, end);
```

```
rdlen = get_uint16(&data, end);
```

```
rdata = get_rdata(&data, end, rdlen);
```

```
ttl = get_uint32(&data, end);
```

1008+1

256+1

domain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]

# DNS on macOS - mDNS module


TRAIL  
BITS

```
ping 'example.com'
```

```
ping 'e\120ample.\099\111\109'
```

```
\x07example\x03com\x00
```

# Intercepting local DNS traffic



# Intercepting local DNS traffic

```
DNSSD_UDS_PATH=/tmp/exp traceroute example.com
```

```
char* uds_serverpath = getenv("DNSSD_UDS_PATH");
if (uds_serverpath == NULL)
    uds_serverpath = "/var/run/mDNSResponder";
```

# Int overflow

```
// Loop over DNS responses:  
malloc && read  
  
get_string(&data, end, name, kDNSServiceMaxDomainName);  
rrtype = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rrclass = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdlen = get_uint16(&data, end);  
rdata = get_rdata(&data, end, rdlen);  
ttl = get_uint32(&data, end);  
  
name = _mdns_parse_domain_name(rdata, rdlen);
```

\x07example\x03com



example.com

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = reallocf(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
	\x0c
rdata	\x07 →
	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	\x03
	c
	o
	m
	\x00
ttl	\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = realloc(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
	-----\x0c
rdata	\x07 →
	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	\x03
	c
	o
	m
	\x00
ttl	-----\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = realloc(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
	\x0b
	\x07
rdata	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	\x03
	c
	o
	m
	\x00
	\xde
ttl	\xad
	\xca
	\xfe
remaining	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = reallocf(domain, domainlen);
    }
    while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
    {
        domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
    }
    domain[j] = '\0';
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
	\x04
	\x07
rdata	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	\x03
	c
	o
	m
	\x00
ttl	\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = reallocf(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
	\x04
rdata	\x07
	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	c
	o
	m
	\x00
ttl	\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = realloc(domain, domainlen);
        domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
    }
    domain[j] = '\0';
    return domain;
}
```

while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))

# Int overflow

rdlen	\x00
rdata	\x00
	\x07
	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	c
	o
	m
ttl	\x00
	\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0) ←
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = reallocf(domain, domainlen);
    }
    domain[j] = '\0';
    return domain;
}
```

0 != rdlen--


# Int overflow

rdlen	\xff
rdata	\x07
	e
	x
	a
	m
	p
	l
	e
	\x04
	c
	o
	m
ttl	\x00
	\xde
	\xad
remaining	\xca
	\xfe
	\xaa

```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0) ←
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = reallocf(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--)) →
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow



```
_mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t rdlen) {
    int i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;
    char *domain = NULL;
    while (rdlen-- > 0)
    {
        len = rdata[i++];
        domainlen += (len + 1);
        domain = realloc(domain, domainlen);

        while ((len-- > 0) && (0 != rdlen--))
        {
            domain[j++] = rdata[i++];
        }
        domain[j] = '\0';
    }
    return domain;
}
```

# Int overflow



```
mdns_parse_domain_name(const uint8_t *rdata, uint32_t ralen) {  
    + i = 0, j = 0; uint32_t len; uint32_t domainlen = 0;  
    + p = NULL;
```

AntiSniff is a Graphical User Interface (GUI) driven tool for detecting promiscuous Network Interface Cards (NICs) on your local network segment. AntiSniff was designed to be run in two ways. First, for a "spot check" to quickly identify what machines on a local network segment are most worthy of further investigation. Second, AntiSniff may be run on a continual basis, scanning the network at scheduled intervals, comparing host test responses over time and setting off alarms based on user-defined events surrounding those test responses.

# CVE-2000-0405

# Heap overflow

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106117000-10611b000	16K
MALLOC metadata		10611c000-106127000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106129000-106134000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106136000-106141000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K

MALLOC_LARGE	7fee0ff00000-7fee17f00000	28.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee17f00000-7fee1ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee1ff00000-7fee27f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee27f00000-7fee2ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee2ff00000-7fee37f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee37f00000-7fee3ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee3ff00000-7fee47f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee47f00000-7fee4ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_TINY	7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K

Stack	7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
__OBJC_RW	7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
__OBJC_RW	7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

28.0M

domain[0]

1024K

domain[INT\_MAX]

# Heap overflow

REGION TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once	10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata	106117000-10611b000	16K
MALLOC metadata	10611c000-106127000	44K
MALLOC metadata	106129000-106134000	44K
MALLOC metadata	106136000-106141000	44K
MALLOC metadata	106144000-10614b000	29K
?		
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee0ff00000-7fee17f00000	28.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee17f00000-7fee1ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee1ff00000-7fee27f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee27f00000-7fee2ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee2ff00000-7fee37f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee37f00000-7fee3ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee3ff00000-7fee47f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee47f00000-7fee4ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_TINY	7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K
Stack	7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
__OBJC_RW	7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
__OBJC_RW	7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

domain[ INT\_MIN ] ==  
domain - 2GB

domain[ 0 ]

# Exploit - libmalloc

- zones -> racks -> magazines -> regions -> chunks



Corresponds to virtual memory pages

==== Writable regions for process 43318							
REGION	TYPE	START	- END	VSIZE	RSNNT	DIRTY	SWAP PRT/MAX
__DATA		10227c000	- 102280000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K] rw-/rw-
Kernel Alloc Once		102284000	- 10228c000	[ 32K	16K	16K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		102298000	- 10229c000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022a0000	- 1022ac000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022b4000	- 1022c0000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022c8000	- 1022d4000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022e0000	- 1022e4000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K] rw-/rwx
mapped file		1022e4000	- 1022f8000	[ 80K	16K	0K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145600000	- 145700000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145700000	- 145800000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		145800000	- 146000000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		146000000	- 146800000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K] rw-/rwx
MALLOC_MEDIUM		148000000	- 150000000	[ 128.0M	144K	144K	0K] rw-/rwx
Stack		16d394000	- 16db90000	[ 8176K	32K	32K	0K] rw-/rwx
__DATA		20725c000	- 20725f5c0	[ 13K	13K	13K	0K] rw-/rw-

# Exploit - libmalloc

- zones -> racks -> magazines -> regions -> chunks

↓  
per-CPU

==== Writable regions for process 43318							
REGION	TYPE	START	- END	VSIZE	RSNNT	DIRTY	SWAP] PRT/MAX
__DATA		10227c000-102280000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rw-
Kernel Alloc Once		102284000-10228c000	[ 32K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		102298000-10229c000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022a0000-1022ac000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022b4000-1022c0000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022c8000-1022d4000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022e0000-1022e4000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
mapped file		1022e4000-1022f8000	[ 80K	16K	0K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145600000-145700000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145700000-145800000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		145800000-146000000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		146000000-146800000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_MEDIUM		148000000-150000000	[ 128.0M	144K	144K	0K]	rw-/rwx
Stack		16d394000-16db90000	[ 8176K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
__DATA		20725c000-20725f5c0	[ 13K	13K	13K	0K]	rw-/rw-

# Exploit - libmalloc

- zones -> racks -> magazines -> regions -> chunks



tiny / small / medium / large

==== Writable regions for process 43318							
REGION	TYPE	START	- END	VSIZE	RSDNT	DIRTY	SWAP] PRT/MAX
__DATA		10227c000-102280000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rw-
Kernel Alloc Once		102284000-10228c000	[ 32K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		102298000-10229c000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022a0000-1022ac000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022b4000-1022c0000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022c8000-1022d4000	[ 48K	48K	48K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC metadata		1022e0000-1022e4000	[ 16K	16K	16K	0K]	rw-/rwx
mapped file		1022e4000-1022f8000	[ 80K	16K	0K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145600000-145700000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_TINY		145700000-145800000	[ 1024K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		145800000-146000000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_SMALL		146000000-146800000	[ 8192K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
MALLOC_MEDIUM		148000000-150000000	[128.0M	144K	144K	0K]	rw-/rwx
Stack		16d394000-16db90000	[ 8176K	32K	32K	0K]	rw-/rwx
__DATA		20725c000-20725f5c0	[ 13K	13K	13K	0K]	rw-/rw-

# Exploit - libmalloc

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K

<entropic_address>		
MALLOC_TINY	7fee4ff00000-7fee5000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee5000000-7fee5080000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee5080000-7fee5100000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee5100000-7fee5180000	8192K

<entropy_limit>		
Stack	7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
--OBJC_RW	7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
--OBJC_RW	7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

# Exploit - libmalloc

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K

<entropic_address>			
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee0ff00000-7fee17f00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee17f00000-7fee1ff00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee1ff00000-7fee27f00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee27f00000-7fee2ff00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee2ff00000-7fee37f00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee37f00000-7fee3ff00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee3ff00000-7fee47f00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_LARGE	7fee47f00000-7fee4ff00000	128.0M	
MALLOC_TINY	7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K	
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K	
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K	
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K	
<entropy_limit>			
Stack	7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K	
--OBJC_RW	7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K	
--OBJC_RW	7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K	



allocate a lot

# Exploit - libmalloc

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K

<entropic\_address>



free

MALLOC_TINY	7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL	7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K

<entropy\_limit>

Stack	7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
--OBJC_RW	7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
--OBJC_RW	7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

# Exploit - libmalloc

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K
		<i>&lt;entropic address&gt;</i>	
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee0ff00000-7fee17f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee17f00000-7fee1ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee1ff00000-7fee27f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee27f00000-7fee2ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee2ff00000-7fee37f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee37f00000-7fee3ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee3ff00000-7fee47f00000	128.0M
		<i>&lt;entropy_limit&gt;</i>	
MALLOC_TINY		7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K
Stack		7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
--OBJC_RW		7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
--OBJC_RW		7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

domain[ INT\_MIN ] ==  
domain - 2GB

domain[ 0 ]

- Need 2 `gethostbyname` calls
- First
  - alloc a few GBs, then free it
- Second
  - to trigger the overflow

# Exploit - setuid

traceroute

```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
  
    // drop privs  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
}
```



# Exploit - setuid

traceroute

```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
    // drop privs  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
}
```

effective	real	saved
0	1000	0
1000	1000	1000

# Exploit - setuid

## traceroute

```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
  
    // drop privs  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
}
```



## traceroute6

```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
  
    // drop privs  
    seteuid(getuid());  
  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
  
    gethostname();  
}
```

# Exploit - setuid

## traceroute

```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostbyname();  
  
    // drop privs  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
    gethostbyname();  
}
```

effective	real	saved
0	1000	0
1000	1000	0
1000	1000	0

## traceroute6





```
main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    // some code  
  
    gethostbyname();  
  
    // drop privs  
    seteuid(getuid());  
  
    setuid(getuid());  
  
    // some code  
    gethostbyname();  
}
```

# Exploit - setuid

## Setuid Demystified\*

Hao Chen      David Wagner  
*University of California at Berkeley*  
{hchen, daw}@cs.berkeley.edu

Drew Dean  
*SRI International*  
ddean@csl.sri.com



# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- What to overwrite?

- What to overwrite?
- Application data?
  - Nothing useful

- What to overwrite?
- Application data?
  - Nothing useful
- Chunks' free lists?
  - 4-16 bit signatures

## What's left?



- Not much :)
- You may try to attack metadata at the end of a region
  - but that's another story...

[https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/Sthack\\_2018\\_Heapple\\_Pie.pdf](https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/Sthack_2018_Heapple_Pie.pdf)

# Exploit - libmalloc

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106117000-10611b000	16K
MALLOC metadata		10611c000-106127000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106129000-106134000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106136000-106141000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K

MALLOC_LARGE		7fee0ff00000-7fee17f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee17f00000-7fee1ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee1ff00000-7fee27f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee27f00000-7fee2ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee2ff00000-7fee37f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee37f00000-7fee3ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee3ff00000-7fee47f00000	128.0M
MALLOC_LARGE		7fee47f00000-7fee4ff00000	128.0M
MALLOC_TINY		7fee4ff00000-7fee50000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee50000000-7fee50800000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee50800000-7fee51000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee51000000-7fee51800000	8192K

Stack		7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
__OBJC_RW		7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
__OBJC_RW		7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

Tiny region

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
typedef struct small_region {
    region_trailer_t trailer;
    msize_t small_meta_words[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];
    oob_free_entry_s small_oob_free_entries[SMALL_OOB_COUNT];
    uint8_t pad[SMALL_REGION_PAD];
    region_cookie_t region_cookie;
    small_block_t blocks[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];
} * small_region_t;
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
typedef struct small_region {
    region_trailer_t trailer;
    msize_t small_meta_words[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];
    oob_free_entry_s small_oob_free_entries[SMALL_OOB_COUNT];
    uint8_t pad[SMALL_REGION_PAD];
    region_cookie_t region_cookie;
    small_block_t blocks[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];
} * small_region_t;
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
typedef struct small_region {  
    region_trailer_t trailer;  
    msizes_t small_meta_words[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];  
    oob_free_entry_s small_oob_free_entries[SMALL_OOB_COUNT];  
    uint8_t pad[SMALL_REGION_PAD];  
    region_cookie_t region_cookie;  
    small_block_t blocks[NUM_SMALL_BLOCKS];  
} * small_region_t;
```

```
typedef struct region_trailer {  
    struct region_trailer *prev;  
    struct region_trailer *next;  
    unsigned bytes_used;  
    unsigned objects_in_use;  
    mag_index_t mag_index;  
    volatile int32_t pinned_to_depot;  
    bool recirc_suitable;  
    rack_dispose_flags_t dispose_flags;  
} region_trailer_t;
```



# Exploit - libmalloc

```
static MALLOC_INLINE void
recirc_list_extract(rack_t *rack, magazine_t *mag_ptr, region_trailer_t *node)
{
    node->prev->next = node->next;
    node->next->prev = node->prev;

    node->next = node->prev = NULL;
    mag_ptr->recirculation_entries--;
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
static MALLOC_INLINE void
recirc_list_extract(rack_t *rack, magazine_t *mag_ptr, region_trailer_t *node)
{
    node->prev->next = node->next;
    node->next->prev = node->prev;

    node->next = node->prev = NULL;
    mag_ptr->recirculation_entries--;
}
```

Overwrite region's trailer +  
Execute `recirc_list_extract ==`  
“overwrite pointer with a pointer” primitive

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
static MALLOC_INLINE void
recirc_list_extract(rack_t *rack, magazine_t *mag_ptr, region_trailer_t *node)
{
    node->prev->next = node->next;
    node->next->prev = node->prev;

    node->next = node->prev = NULL;
    mag_ptr->recirculation_entries--;
}
```

free

free\_small

small\_free\_no\_lock

small\_free\_try\_recirc\_to\_depot

small\_free\_try\_depot\_unmap\_no\_lock

**recirc\_list\_extract**

moves the region out of list of **almost** free regions



- Requirements:

- Allocate a few regions, free them but not fully
  - At least two in “depot”
- Set target region’s metadata
  - All SMALL\_IS\_FREE bits cleared in small\_meta\_words
  - All entries in small\_meta\_words must be the same and non-zero
  - mag\_index set to -1
  - bytes\_used and pinned\_to\_depot must be zero

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
recirc_list_extract(rack, depot_ptr, node);

int objects_in_use = small_free_detach_region(rack, depot_ptr, sparse_region);
if (0 == objects_in_use) {
    return sparse_region;
} else {
    malloc_zone_error(rack->debug_flags, true,
                      "small_free_try_depot_unmap_no_lock objects_in_use not zero: %d\n",
objects_in_use);
    return NULL;
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
recirc_list_extract(rack, depot_ptr, node);

int objects_in_use = small_free_detach_region(rack, depot_ptr, sparse_region);
if (0 == objects_in_use) {
    return sparse_region;
} else {
    malloc_zone_error(rack->debug_flags, true,
                      "small_free_try_depot_unmap_no_lock objects_in_use not zero: %d\n",
objects_in_use);
    return NULL;
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
recirc_list_extract(rack, depot_ptr, node);

int objects_in_use = small_free_detach_region(rack, depot_ptr, sparse_region);
if (0 == objects_in_use) {
    // handle error
} else {
    malloc_zone_error(rack->debug_flags, true,
                      "small_free_try_depot_unmap_no_lock objects_in_use not zero: %d\n",
objects_in_use);
    return NULL;
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)  
{  
    if (WRITE_TO_DEBUG_FILE(flags)) {  
        _simple_put(b, STDERR_FILENO);  
    }  
    abort();  
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)  
{  
    if (WRITE_TO_DEBUG_FILE(flags)) {  
        _simple_put(b, STDERR_FILENO);  
    }  
    abort();  
}
```

```
_simple_put(_SIMPLE_STRING b, int fd)  
{  
    ((BUF *)b)->fd = fd;  
    _flush((BUF *)b);  
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)  
{  
    if (WRITE_TO_DEBUG_FILE(flags)) {  
        _simple_put(b, STDERR_FILENO);  
    }  
    abort();  
}
```

```
_simple_put(_SIMPLE_STRING b, int fd)  
{  
    ((BUF *)b)->fd = fd;  
    _flush((BUF *)b);  
}
```

```
_flush(BUF *b) {  
    char *buf = b->buf;  
    ssize_t n = b->ptr - buf;  
    ssize_t w;  
  
    while (n > 0) {  
        w = write(b->fd, buf, n);  
        if (w < 0) {  
            if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)  
                continue;  
            break;  
        }  
        n -= w;  
        buf += n;  
    }  
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)  
{  
    if (WRITE_TO_DEBUG_FILE(flags)) {  
        _simple_put(b, STDERR_FILENO);  
    }  
    abort();  
}
```

```
/* simple syscalls (0 to 4 args) */  
#define      SYSCALL_0to4(name, cerror)  
            \  
            MI_ENTRY_POINT(_##name)  
            ;\  
            DO_SYSCALL(SYS_##name)  
            ;\  
            bxcc lr  
                /* return if carry is clear  
(no error) */ ; \  
1:    MI_BRANCH_EXTERNAL(_##cerror)
```

```
_simple_put(_SIMPLE_STRING b, int fd)  
{  
    ((BUF *)b)->fd = fd;  
    _flush((BUF *)b);  
}
```

```
_flush(BUF *b) {  
    char *buf = b->buf;  
    ssize_t n = b->ptr - buf;  
    ssize_t w;  
  
    while (n > 0) {  
        w = write(b->fd, buf, n);  
        if (w < 0) {  
            if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)  
                continue;  
            break;  
        }  
        n -= w;  
        buf += n;  
    }  
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)  
{  
    cerror(int err)  
    {  
        _pthread_exit_if_canceled(err);  
        return cerror_nocancel(err);  
    }  
}
```

```
/* simple syscalls (0 to 4 args) */  
#define      SYSCALL_0to4(name, cerror)  
            \  
            MI_ENTRY_POINT(_##name)  
            ;\  
            DO_SYSCALL(SYS_##name)  
            ;\  
            bxcc lr  
                /* return if carry is clear  
(no error) */ ; \  
1:      MI_BRANCH_EXTERNAL(_##cerror)
```

```
_simple_put(_SIMPLE_STRING b, int fd)  
{  
    ((BUF *)b)->fd = fd;  
    _flush((BUF *)b);  
}  
  
_flush(BUF *b) {  
    char *buf = b->buf;  
    ssize_t n = b->ptr - buf;  
    ssize_t w;  
  
    while (n > 0) {  
        w = write(b->fd, buf, n);  
        if (w < 0) {  
            if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)  
                continue;  
            break;  
        }  
        n -= w;  
        buf += n;  
    }  
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

```
void malloc_zone_error(...)

{
    perror(int err)
    {
        _pthread_exit_if_canceled(err);
        return perror_nocancel(err);
    }
}
```

```
/* simple syscalls (0 to 4)
#define      SYSCALL_0to4 \
    MI_ENTRY_POINT(_##) \
    ;\ \
    DO_SYSCALL(SYS_##n) \
    ;\ \
    bxcc lr \
        /* return if carry is clear
(no error) */ ; \
1:    MI_BRANCH_EXTERNAL(_##perror)
```

```
_simple_put(_SIMPLE_STRING b, int fd)
{
    ((BUF *)b)->fd = fd;
    _flush((BUF *)b);
}
```

```
_flush(BUF *b) {
    char *buf = b->buf;
    ssize_t n = b->ntr - buf.
```

```
_pthread_exit_if_canceled(int error)
{
    return _libkernel_functions->_pthread_exit_if_canceled(error);
}

continue,
break;
}
n -= w;
buf += n;
}
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- Requirements:

- Set target region's metadata
- Allocate a few regions, free them but not fully
- Make write syscall fail

# Exploit - libmalloc

- Requirements:
  - Set target region's metadata
  - Allocate a few regions, free them but not fully
  - Make write syscall fail
    - Close stderr (TTY)
    - Local exploits only
      - Remote can target other region types than small - less stable

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- Heap overflow -> “overwrite pointer with a pointer”
- Where to write? `_libkernel_functions`
  - address?
- What to write?

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- `/usr/lib/system/libsystem_kernel.dylib`
- Shared dylib cache -> **const addresses!**
  - Even for SUID programs
  - Randomized once at system boot

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- Heap overflow -> “write a pointer anywhere” primitive
- Where to write? `_libkernel_functions`
- What to write?
  - Pointer to the heap

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- Heap overflow -> “write a pointer anywhere” primitive
- Where to write? `_libkernel_functions`
- What to write?
  - Pointer to the heap
  - ASLR ;/

# ASLR bypass demo

TRAIL  
BITS

```
RES_DEBUG=1 traceroute6 ::1
```

# Exploit - libmalloc

TRAIL  
BITS

- Heap overflow -> “write a pointer anywhere” primitive
- Where to write? `_libkernel_functions`
- What to write? Heap address
- RIP control!
  - JOP
  - setuid(0) + execve

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

TRAIL  
BITS

- Got a brand new mac with M4
- Changing target

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

Intel

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		10610f000-106111000	8K
MALLOC metadata		106117000-10611b000	16K
MALLOC metadata		10611c000-106127000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106129000-106134000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106136000-106141000	44K
MALLOC metadata		106144000-10614b000	28K
MALLOC_TINY		7fee4ff00000-7fee5000000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee5000000-7fee5080000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee5080000-7fee5100000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		7fee5100000-7fee5180000	8192K
Stack		7ff7b95f4000-7ff7b9df4000	8192K
--OBJC_RW		7ff8471fe000-7ff847200000	8K
--OBJC_RW		7ff847200000-7ff847400000	2048K

Apple Silicon

REGION	TYPE	START - END	VSIZE
Kernel Alloc Once		1003d0000-1003d8000	32K
MALLOC metadata		1003e4000-1003e8000	16K
MALLOC metadata		1003ec000-1003f8000	48K
MALLOC metadata		100400000-10040c000	48K
MALLOC metadata		1004114000-1004120000	48K
MALLOC metadata		10042c000-100430000	16K
MALLOC_TINY		13ee00000-13ef00000	1024K
MALLOC_SMALL		13f800000-140000000	8192K
MALLOC_SMALL		140000000-140800000	8192K
Stack		16f240000-16fa3c000	8176K
--DATA		1f22c4000-1f22c75c0	13K
--DATA		1f22c75c0-1f22c75d8	24


## Pointer Code Authentication (PAC)

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

TRAIL  
BITS

traceroute6

0x000000011f000120



0x~~abcd~~00011f000120

## PAC crypto keys:

- Userland
  - Platform binaries
  - Per-team
- Kernel

system

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

TRAIL  
BITS

traceroute6

0xabcd00011f000120



0x000000011f000120



## PAC crypto keys:

- Userland
  - Platform binaries
  - Per-team
- Kernel

system

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

TRAIL  
BITS

- libmalloc: custom signatures (4-16 bits)

```
// TODO: replace uses in small and medium with data PAC when possible
```

- But \_libkernel\_functions uses PAC

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

TRAIL  
BITS

- Same PAC key for all platform binaries
  - SUID: sudo, traceroute6, ...
  - Normal: ls, vim, ...
  - Services?
- Local exploit
  - Get some Apple program and make it PAC-sign for us

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

- Abusing Apple binaries

- Code execution by design (e.g., bash enable -f) - nope
  - XNU disables PAC altogether

```
/* From /System/Library/Security/HardeningExceptions.plist */
const char *const hardening_exceptions[] = {
    "com.apple.perl5", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.apple.perl", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "org.python.python", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.apple.expect", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.tcltk.wish", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.tcltk.tclsh", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.apple.ruby", /* Scripting engines may load third party code and jit*/
    "com.apple.bash", /* Required for the 'enable' command */
    "com.apple.zsh", /* Required for the 'zmodload' command */
    "com.apple.ksh", /* Required for 'builtin' command */
}
```

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

- Abusing Apple binaries
  - DYLD\_INSERT\_LIBRARIES - nope
    - Hardened runtime
    - Library validation
    - DYLD\_\* restrictions for SUID
    - System Integrity Protection (SIP)

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

- Abusing Apple binaries
  - Unprotected Apple binary?
    - Signed with Apple certificates
    - Without hardened runtime
    - Can be executed outside of SIP-protected paths

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

- **Abusing Apple binaries**

- Unprotected Apple binary?
  - Signed with Apple certificates
  - Without hardened runtime
  - Can be executed outside of SIP-protected paths

```
cp /Library/Apple/usr/bin/rvictl /tmp/rvictl
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=./pac.dylib /tmp/rvictl
```

# PoC demo

```
python ./exp_poc.py
```

# Exploit - Apple Silicon

- **/Library/Apple/usr/bin/rvictl**
  - Still working?
- **Constraints**
  - Only A keys (code), B keys (data) are per-process
  - com.apple.pac.shared\_region\_id
  - Gatekeeper

# Takeaways

- A few bugs
  - envvars: DNSDS\_PATH, RES\_DEBUG
  - while (0 != var--)
  - seteuid / setuid
- libmalloc region metadata exploitation technique
  - metadata control, almost free list, fail write syscall
- Local PAC bypass for userspace

- disconnect3d
- tmac
- Apple

# Links

## Code:

- <https://github.com/trailofbits/exploits>

## Previous libmalloc research:

- [https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/Sthack\\_2018\\_Heapple\\_Pie.pdf](https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/Sthack_2018_Heapple_Pie.pdf)
- <https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/macos-memory-allocator-libmalloc-exploitation/179588189>
- <https://blackwinghq.com/blog/posts/playing-with-libmalloc/>

# Reporting

- Reported to Apple in January, 2025. Assigned CVEs:
  - CVE-2025-24195 (integer overflow in libinfo)
  - CVE-2025-31222 (DNSSD\_UDS\_PATH)
  - CVE-2025-30440 (RES\_DEBUG)
  - One more bug missing a CVE due to "process issues" (seteuid/setuid)

# That's all folks!