

# Sugar-based tax design for healthier consumption: Empirical evidence in the French Dessert market

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# Context: obesity and Public policy



- The prevalence of overweight and obesity has increased worldwide.
- The fundamental cause of overweight and obesity is an imbalance between energy intake and energy expenditure. A major driver of a positive energy balance is an unhealthy dietary pattern with excess consumption of energy-dense.

## Context: obesity and Public policy

- Strong evidences of the large effects of tax on purchases of targeted beverage
- Modest impact on food choices generated by other implemented policies:
  - Informational campaign
  - food labelling
  - voluntary agreements
- Also effective in reducing purchases of targeted foods high in salt, sugars and fat, but less widely implemented (only 12 countries worldwide in 2020)

"There is need for a broader adoption of taxation on unhealthy foods"  
(WHO, 2015, 2022)

# Context: Regulatory measure evaluation

- Deep analysis on the SSB market
  - Largely implemented worldwide and particularly in Europe. Implementation of SSB taxes
  - Sugar content instead of volume (Allcott et al, 2019), (Scarborough, 2020), (STOP WHO, 2022)
  - Tiered tax more efficient to reduce sugar content (Scarborough, 2020)
- Other market have less scientific evidences
  - less implementation
  - (Barahona et al. 2023) study the implementation of a mandatory label in Chile on the breakfast cereal market

# Objectives

- How are excise sugar-based tax with tier design effective, when firms reformulate their products in order to avoid or limit the tax?
  - How tiers level affect sugar consumption, consumer surplus, profit and prices?
  - How are different households affected differently?
  - How reformulation and price strategies complement each other?
- > An empirical application on the french dessert market

# French dessert market

- Second contributor of simple carbohydrate intakes for children (behind cake, biscuits and pastries, Anses 2017)
- Purchases: 46kg/person/year in 2009 (only 6kg without added sugar)
- Heterogeneity in added sugar content: room for reformulation

# Data

- French representative consumer panel data of 20,144 households in January – May 2009 (KANTAR WorldPanel)
- 1,600,000 purchases of dessert
- Information: prices, quantity, brand, product characteristics
- We consider 131 differentiated products according to the brand, fat and sugar content, fruit and flavor content + 1 outside option
- Other substitutes: Fruits and pastries, cheese

# Methodology

- 1 - Demand model: a random coefficient logit model
  - Preferences of consumers
- 2 - Supply model: oligopolistic competition between firms
  - Pricing strategy, marginal costs of products
- 3 - Reformulation model
  - Assumption: new recipes reducing the added sugar content considering technical constraints (texture, sweetness, quantity, fermentation, gelation, regulatory)
- 4 - Counterfactual experiments: taxation (€0.20/100g of sugar if above of the threshold) and/or reformulation for several threshold
  - Effect on cost, prices, consumption and profits



# Demand for french dessert market

- Indirect utility function of individual  $i$  when buying good  $j$ :

$$V_{ijt} = \delta_{ijt} - \alpha_i p_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

Where,

- $\delta_{ijt}$  is observed by both consumer and econometrician Specification
- $\alpha_i = \exp(\alpha + \alpha^c C_i + \alpha^o O_i + \alpha^I I_i + \sigma \nu_i)$ : disutility from paying price  $p_j$
- $\nu_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$  captures unobserved consumer attributes
- $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  i.i.d. as an extreme value type I distribution Endogeneity
- Following (Nevo, 2001), the market share of product  $j$  at period  $t$ ,

$$s_{jt}(\theta) = \int \frac{\exp(\delta_{ijt} - \alpha_i p_{jt})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^{J_t} \exp(\delta_{ikt} - \alpha_i p_{kt})} dP_\nu(\nu_i) dP_D(D_i)$$

# Estimate marginal cost

- F firms compete in prices
- Firms solve the profit maximization problem:

$$\Pi_{ft} = \sum_{j \in G_{ft}} [M_t(p_{jt} - c_{jt})s_{jt}(p)]$$

where

- $G_{ft}$  : set of products sold by firm f at period t
- $M_t$  : size of the market at period t
- $c_{jt}$  : constant marginal cost to produce and sell product j at period t
- $s_{jt}(p)$  : market share of product j at period t given the vector of product price
- From the FOC, we get estimates of margins and marginal costs for each product j at period t

$$\gamma_{jt} = p_{jt} - c_{jt} = f(p, I_{1t}, \dots, I_{Ft} / \hat{\theta})$$

# Product reformulation and cost implication

Prior the implementation of a tax:

- Nutritional information provided by the French Food Observatory (OQALI)
- Recipes are determined using the ingredient lists and nutrition facts
- Minimum amount of added sugar calculated subject to technical constraints of formulation (texture, fermentation, and gelation process, ... more)

Firms reformulate to avoid the tax or at minimum to mitigate

$$\bullet \Delta cc_j = \rho_S \Delta Q_{Sugar,j} + \rho_Y \Delta Q_{Yogurt,j} + \rho_{FBPS} \Delta Q_{FBPS,j} + \rho_F \Delta Q_{Fruit,j}$$

# Counterfactual experiments: 3 policy scenario

Firms solve the new profit maximization problem under tax  $\tau_j$ :

$$\forall f \in F, \max_{\{p_{kt}\}_{k \in G_f}} \sum_{j \in G_f} (p_{jt} - \tilde{c}_{jt}) M_t \tilde{s}_{jt}(p/\hat{\theta})$$


$\tilde{c}_{jt}$  the new marginal cost

- Taxation only :  $\tilde{c}_{jt} = c_{jt} + \tau_j$
- Reformulation only :  $\tilde{c}_{jt} = c_{jt} + \Delta cc_j$
- Taxation with reformulation:  $\tilde{c}_{jt} = c_{jt} + \tau_j + \Delta cc_j$


$\tilde{s}_{jt}(p/\hat{\theta})$  taking into account exogenous change in product characteristics

- Without reformulation:  $\tilde{s}_{jt}(p/\hat{\theta}) = s_{jt}(p/\hat{\theta})$
- With reformulation:  $\tilde{s}_{jt}(p/\hat{\theta}) = s_{jt}(p, \Delta Sugar, \Delta Lipids/\hat{\theta})$


# Distribution of sugar in the dessert market



# Magnitude of the tax implementation




# How are excise sugar-based tax with tier design effective?



**Figure:** Changes in sugar consumption with respect to dairy dessert tax threshold for the three policy scenarios.

# Firms are better of reformulating



**Figure:** Variation in firms' profits with respect to dairy dessert tax threshold (set at 12g/100g for compotes) for the three policy scenarios.



# On our application to the french dessert market

- Importance of the choice of the level of the sugar tax threshold
    - affects the share of taxed and reformulated products
    - impact the magnitude of tax-related price increase
    - strongly affects the magnitude of welfare effects
  - Excise sugar-based tax are even more effective when firms reformulate
    - Few mechanical substitution toward lipids
    - Firms lose less profits
    - More impact on sugar intakes
    - Less elastic consumers will still be impact by reformulation
- > Setting the tax threshold based on the sugar content distribution is key

# Reformulation and price strategies complement each other

**Table:** Impact of alternative modelling assumptions on the nutrient intake from the four product categories

	Strategic pricing no reformulation	Strategic pricing reformulation
$\Delta$ sugar	-16.4%	-21.1%
$\Delta$ lipid	-12.9%	-12.4%
$\Delta$ calorie	-14.1%	-15.9%

# Well designed to target specifically population at risk

**Table: Taxation with product reformulation: Percent change in calories, lipid, and sugar intake**

Households	Adults obese			
	All	None	One	All
Sugar	-21.07	-21.00	-21.01	-21.28
	(-831)	(-830)	(-747)	(-988)
Lipid	-12.40	-12.37	-12.31	-12.59
	(-138)	(-137)	(-124)	(-164)
Calorie	-15.89	-15.84	-15.81	-16.09
	(-5252)	(-5240)	(-4722)	(-6246)

The percentage change in nutrient intakes is calculated over the initial intakes of the market under consideration. The corresponding intakes in grams/calorie per capita per year are in brackets.

# Demand specification

$$\delta_{ijt} = \beta_{b(j)} + \gamma_{c(j)} + \delta_{Si}S_j + \delta_{Li}L_j + \delta_{SL}S_jL_j + \theta_N N_j + \theta_F F_j$$

- $\beta_{b(j)}$  and  $\gamma_{c(j)}$  respectively brand and dessert category fixed effect
- $N_j$  and  $F_j$  dummy related to nature flavor and presence of fruits
- $\theta_N$  and  $\theta_F$  captures consumer taste for these characteristics
- $\delta_{SL}S_jL_j$  captures consumer preference for sugar and fat taste,  $S_j$  and  $L_j$

We also allow sugar and fat tastes to vary across households characteristics,

$$\delta_{Si}S_j = \delta_S S_j + \delta_S^c S_j C_i + \delta_S^o S_j O_i \text{ and } \delta_{Li}L_j = \delta_L L_j + \delta_L^c L_j C_i + \delta_L^o L_j O_i$$

- $C_i$  and  $O_i$  the presence of children or obese individuals in the household
- $\delta_S^c$  and  $\delta_L^c$  allow the marginal effects of sugar and fat taste to shift with the presence of children
- $\delta_S^o$  and  $\delta_L^o$  with the number of obese individuals within the household.

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Demand

# Endogeneity of price

We use a control function approach (Petrin and Train, 2010)

Decomposition of the error term,  $\varepsilon_{ijt} = \xi_{jt} + e_{ijt}$

- $\xi_{jt}$  a product-specific error term varying across periods
- $e_{ijt}$  an individual-specific error term

First we regress,  $p_{jt} = W_{jt}\gamma + X_{jt}\mu + \eta_{jt}$

- $X_{jt}$  included instruments
- $W_{jt}$  a vector of excluded instruments (distance to competing products,...)

Exogeneity of this BLP-type instrument rests on the common assumption that product characteristics are uncorrelated with  $\xi_{jt}$  (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) and some input cost (Here the exogeneity relies on the assumption that the french dessert industry represents only a small share of the world demand)

$$\text{then, } s_{jt}(\theta) = \int \frac{\exp(\delta_{ijt} - \alpha_i p_{jt} + \lambda \hat{\eta}_{jt})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^{J_t} \exp(\delta_{ikt} - \alpha_i p_{kt} + \lambda \hat{\eta}_{kt})} dP_\nu(\nu_i) dP_D(D_i)$$

where  $\lambda$  is a parameter capturing the mean utility generated by unobserved product attributes that are correlated with retail prices

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## Recipe assessment using Oqali dataset

- 476 marketed yogurts
- 183 FBPS
- 408 compotes and fruit purees.

To simplify, we considered that each recipe consists of three main ingredients:

- The sweetening ingredients
- A matrix ingredient ( plain yogurt for yogurts, plain fromages blancs or petits suisses for FBPS and fruit puree for compotes)
- A fixed ingredient for which quantity remains constant when reformulating

-> Computation of the minimum amount of added sugar for 18 recipes:  
Such as sweet yogurt with skimmed, semi-skimmed, or whole milk, fruit petits suisses with semi-skimmed, or whole milk, compotes, diet compotes ,...

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**Table: Technical constraints of formulation**

Constraint	Description	Mathematical transcription
Texture	In order to obtain a satisfying texture, the dry extract of the product has to be in a certain scale of values	$B^- \leq \frac{(B_m * y_m + B_s * y_s)}{(y_m + y_s)} \leq B^+$ <p>where <math>B_i</math> is the dry extract of ingredient i</p>
Sweetness	In order to obtain a satisfying taste, the sweetness of the product has to be in a certain scale of values	$S^- \leq \frac{(S_m * y_m + S_s * y_s)}{(y_m + y_s)} \leq S^+$ <p>where <math>S_i</math> is the sweetening power of ingredient i</p>
Quantity	The sum of the proportions of each ingredient must be equal to 100%	$y_m + y_s + y_f = 100\%$
Fermentation	Sweetening ingredients, in too high proportion, can inhibit the growth of bacteria, and thus the fermentation process	$\frac{B_s * y_s}{(y_m + y_s)} \leq F^+$ <p>where <math>B_s</math> is the dry extract of the sweetening ingredient</p>
Gelation	Sweetening ingredients, in too high proportion, can dilute milk proteins and thus hinder the gelation process	$\frac{y_m * Prot_m}{(y_m + y_s)} \geq G^+$ <p>where <math>Prot_m</math> is the protein content of matrix ingredient</p>
Regulatory	According to French regulations, fermented milks (such as yogurts) may be supplemented with ingredients (sugar, flavorings, fruit preparations, additives) to give it a specific flavor, provided that this addition does not exceed 30% of the weight of the finished product	$y_s + y_f \leq 30\%$

Reformulation

# Sugary drink taxes: Europe

## **BELGIUM: €0.068 per L (\$0.08) excise**

on soft drinks with added sweeteners: **€0.41/L (\$0.46) and €0.68/100 kg (\$0.77) excise** on liquid and powder concentrates, respectively.  
*Implemented Jan. 2016*

## **UNITED KINGDOM: £0.18 per L (\$0.24)**

on drinks with 5–8 g total sugar/100 mL: **£0.24 per L (\$0.28)**  
on drinks with >8 g total sugar/100 mL. Exempts dairy drinks (>75% dairy) and 100% fruit/vegetable juices. *Implemented Apr. 2018*

## **ISLE OF MAN: £0.18 per L (\$0.21)**

on drinks with 5–8 g total sugar/100 mL: **£0.24 per L (\$0.32)**  
on drinks with >8 g /100 mL. Mirrors UK levy. *Implemented Apr. 2019*

## **IRELAND: €0.20 per L (\$0.23)**

on drinks with >5 g total sugar/100 mL: **€0.30 per L (\$0.34)**  
on drinks with >8 g total sugar/100 mL.  
*Implemented May 2018*

## **FRANCE: €0.11 per 1.5 L (\$0.08 per L)**

on drinks with added sugars or artificial sweeteners.  
*Implemented Jan. 2012. 2018 UPDATE:* Sliding scale tax, up to **€20 per hL (\$0.23/L)** if >11g sugar/100mL.

## **SPAIN: 21% VAT (increase from 10%)**

on drinks containing added natural and derived sweeteners and/or sweetening additives, excluding dairy. *Implemented January 2021*

## **PORTUGAL: 4-tiered tax**

**€0.01 per L (\$0.01)** on drinks with <25 g sugar per liter;  
**€0.06 per L (\$0.07)** on drinks with 25 to <50 g sugar per L;  
**€0.08 per L (\$0.09)** on drinks with 50 to <80 g sugar per L; or  
**€0.20 per L (\$0.23)** on drinks with ≥80 grams sugar per L.  
Applies to non-alcoholic beverages; exempts milks (cow or substitute) and 100% juices. *Implemented Feb. 2017, updated 2018*

## **ST HELENA: £0.75 per L (\$1.01) excise duty**

on carbonated drinks with ≥15 g sugar/L.  
*Implemented May 2014*

## **CATALONIA, SPAIN: €0.12 per L**

**(\$0.14) levy** for drinks with added sugars and >8 g sugar/100 mL, or **€0.08 per L (\$0.09)** for 5–8 g sugar/100 mL. *Implemented May 2017*

## **FINLAND: €0.22 per L (\$0.25)**

on sugar-containing soft drinks; **€0.12/L (\$0.14)** on sugar-free soft drinks, mineral waters.  
*Implemented 1940, updated 2011*

## **LATVIA: €0.074 per L (\$0.08) excise**

on drinks with added sugar, sweetener, or other flavoring; excludes fruit/vegetable juices with <10% added sugar and flavored/functional waters without added sugars, sweeteners, or flavorings.  
*Implemented May 2004; increased tax rate 2016.*

## **POLAND: PLN 0.5 per L (\$0.12)**

on soft drinks with added sweeteners, caffeine, or taurine; **PLN 0.05 (\$0.01)** extra fee per gram of sugar >5 g/100 mL; **PLN 0.09 per L (\$0.02)** for drinks containing caffeine or taurine. Total soda fee cannot exceed PLN 1.2 (\$0.32). Excludes sports or juice drinks with <5g sugar/100mL and dairy drinks. Drinks with >20% juice content and >5g sugar/100mL are not charged the base fee of PLN 0.5 per L.  
*Implemented January 1, 2021*

## **HUNGARY: HUF 7 per L (\$0.02)**

on soft drinks; **HUF 200 /L (\$0.62)** on syrup concentrates. *Implemented 2011*

*Updated May 2022*

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