

Political Ideology and Congressional Leadership

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Will add acknowledgements after orals.

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Abstract

This paper examines the differences in ideology in Congress between non-leaders and congressional leaders, the speakers, and whips. While past research has looked at the ideology of congressional leaders before they have taken their positions of power they have neglected to look at how their ideology changes as they have taken to their new position within the congressional power structure. Using measures of ideology from a **NOMINATE** dataset we fit models based on party and leadership status. The leaders are then compared to the non-leaders on how their ideology changes compared to the mean ideology of Congress at the time and the models are assessed for statistical significance. Results are then expanded on and a discussion follows.

Dedication

Will add dedication after orals.

Introduction

This paper examines the differences in ideology in Congress between non-leaders and congressional leaders, the speakers, and whips. While past research has looked at the ideology of congressional leaders before they have taken their positions of power they have neglected to look at how their ideology changes as they have taken to their new position within the congressional power structure. Using measures of ideology from a NOMINATE dataset we fit models based on party and leadership status. The leaders are then compared to the non-leaders on how their ideology changes compared to the mean ideology of Congress at the time and the models are assessed for statistical significance.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

1.1 Congressional Leaders

Party leaders are hugely important in Congress. Perhaps their most important role is setting the legislative agenda in Congress (Rohde 1991, and @Sinclair1983). By setting the agenda in arguably the most powerful branch of government, congressional leaders have extraordinary power over which bills are brought to a vote and eventually passed. They also have the power of being able to shift congressional actions away from an otherwise simple answer to a problem.¹ Leaders in Congress have large sway over the leaders who they can choose to fill the many roles below them. They are also the “brand image” of their party, especially when their party does not control the presidency. Understanding the ideology of leaders is important for a Congressional scholar to better understand why leaders act the way they do.

There has often been the question of whether or not congressional leaders are moderates in their party, near to their party’s mean, or extremists. Moderates would often be effective legislators, as they would be able to propose more centrist policies that might apply to both political parties. Extremists might be selected due to their

¹For a recent example of this, see how in 2008 Harry Reid (D) then the majority leader of the Senate, was able to remove the possibility of a nuclear waste repository from being created at Yucca Mountain.

Table 1.1: Ideologies Presented for Median Voter Theorem Example

Name	Ideology
Warren	-0.538
Reid	-0.422
Wyden	-0.381
Warner	-0.238
Collins	0.061
McCain	0.367
Rubio	0.531
McConnell	0.568
Cruz	0.754

ability to placate the louder wings of both the Republican and Democratic parties. A political scientist or an economist might be quick to answer that a congressperson near the median voter in a political party has a strong theoretical reasoning for being chosen.

Understanding what a median voter is as well as the median voter theorem is important for many quantitative approaches to the study of political ideology. A median voter is the voter in the middle of a group of voters measured among one or more dimensions.² An table of voters is displayed below with their names and respective ideologies, picked from the actual numbers from the Nokken and Poole version of the D-NOMINATE dataset. These are the first dimensions scores, often categorized as ideology, with -1 being extreme liberalism and 1 being extreme conservatism. They are from the 113th Congress, the most recent Congressional session available in the dataset.

Here the median voter would be Senator Susan Collins, as her ideology, 0.061, puts her at the middle point, or the median, of the list of voters. The median voter theorem applies in majoritarian voting systems. The median voter, in this circumstance Senator Collins, will have their preferred outcome chosen by the voters in the system. A

²As the number of dimensions increases however it can get more complicated to decide which voter is in fact the median voter. You have to properly scale each dimension to make sure some do not overpower others.

majoritarian voting system is when a vote is won when more than half of the votes are for a specific option. This is different than a plurality system, which just makes whichever has the most votes the winner, regardless of whether or not they have a majority of the votes. For example, if 40% voted for option A, 30% voted for option B, and 30% voted for option C then options A would be chosen under plurality rule, but not under majority rule. One of the options would need to be more than 50%. If say in a new vote option D got 50% of the vote that would not be enough to win in a majoritarian system as option E could also have 50% of the vote at the same time.

To continue the discussion above, the reason why you might expect the congressperson elected to serve a leadership position to occupy the median space in the party is because in these elections the votes taken solely within the party.³ The median voter theorem states that “a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter” (Holcombe 2006, 115). This builds off the assumption that there is only one dimension along which politics exists, for example, left to right or liberal to conservative. Is it also assumed that a voter will choose the option, or in this circumstance the politician, closest to their own ideal point along the singular dimension. In a majoritarian system this ideal median point will prevail, having more than 50% of the vote in the final vote tallied.

Studies have examined where leaders come from ideologically speaking. One has found, using the DW-NOMINATE scores of congressional leaders, that these leaders do in fact come from near the median of their party, with a tiny preference towards the slightly more extreme candidate, left-leaning for Democrats and right-leaning for Republicans. DW-NOMINATE scores place congresspersons on a single dimension from -1 to 1, with -1 being left-leaning and 1 being right-leaning. The numbers are found by taking the roll call votes over a single Congress and then placing the

³With the exception of the vote for Speaker in the House of Representatives, although that vote often ends up being made up entirely of the majority party’s congresspersons voting in affirmation with the minority party avoiding casting a positive ballot.

legislator's scores within the range of possible values. A senator like Ted Cruz would end up with a number close to 1⁴ whereas for senator like Elizabeth Warren you would see a point near to -1⁵. House Democrats were found to be on average -0.050 away from the median point whereas their leaders were on average -0.097, slightly farther away but still close to the median. For Senate Democrats these numbers are 0.016 and -0.059 respectively, again the the leaders being slightly more extreme than the median but still being quite close to it. For the Republicans the results are similar, although in the other direction. In the House, for leaders the average distance away from the party median for leaders is 0.044 whereas for the rest of the House Republicans it is -0.025. For the Senate Republicans the numbers are 0.048 and 0.057, respectively.⁶ They find it "hearening to note that leaders—who some political observers argue have strong influence over agenda setting and lawmaking under certain conditions—are, on balance, fairly representative of their parties. If leaders came from the far extremes of the chambers... then policy might be even less reflective of the preferences of the median voter in the electorate" (Jessee and Malhotra 2010, see specifically 386). Jessee and Malhotra (2010) also find that the winner of a congressional leadership race is not "ideologically distinctive" from the entire pool candidates (2010, 361).

This evidence found in Jessee and Malhotra (2010) looked to revise earlier studies on the subject. Harris and Nelson (2008) looked at the old "Austin-Boston" alliance that encourage the selection of middlemen in the Democratic party, and also examine the changes within the Republican party leadership as well. Surprised by the election of the relatively extreme Pelosi to the Speakership, the two authors felt the need to revisit the question of whether the median voter theorem still held.⁷ Using the same dataset as Jessee and Malhotra (2010), they came to a new conclusion, that perhaps

⁴In the 113th Congress his point was measured at 0.754.

⁵In the 113th Congress her point was measured at -0.538

⁶The Republicans in the Senate are the only group who elect leaders slightly more moderate on average than the party median in that chamber.

⁷While the *middlemen* theory could still hold, the *middleperson* theory was in doubt.

more partisan leaders were need as political polarization increased. Seeing the role switch from a place for compromise during a “bargaining era and bipartisan Congress” to a new bully pulpit, often active in the media and courting donors, middlepersons seemed to no longer be the most appropriate leaders of their party on the national stage of Congress (Harris and Nelson 2008, 54). Their final hypothesis is that as partisan divisions increase it will exacerbate the extremism of congressional leaders.

Older research is more theoretical and is less likely to use datasets, like the many NOMINATE datasets available. In May (1973) leaders are suggested to be more extreme than the rest of their party when ideology is strongly important, which may connect well to the modern era. Studies of both British and Norwegian legislative systems cast doubt on May’s concept, the law of curvilinear disparity.⁸ The middleman theory is further promoted by Clausen and Wilcox (1987), who finds the best support for the theory in the House and then best within the Democratic party, which had at the time been the majority power for 32 years. Quickly stated, they claim that “leaders are chosen who are... dedicated to represent and prosecute the party position” (Clausen and Wilcox 1987, 261). More studies find evidence that leaders are more extreme than the median voter theorem would suggest, as Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann find that Democratic leaders are to the left of the median of their party and Republican leaders are to the right of the median of their party (Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann (2002)).

1.2 DW-NOMINATE

Keith Poole’s and Howard Rosenthal’s previous work about congressional ideology is the backbone of this study. they have constructed a way to fit members of Congress across a unidimensional metric that measures primarily ideology. Their typical dataset measures a single “ideal point” for each congressperson throughout their career and is

⁸„todo - Unlikely that I should go into more depth, but maybe I could within a footnote?

able to plot them against other members of Congress throughout its existence. There are alternative versions of their dataset that also exist, and I use the Nokken and Poole version, which allows members to shift their ideology throughout different sessions of Congress (Nokken and Poole 2004). There is often a clamoring by many for the structure of Congress to be displayed in multiple different dimensions, sometimes even one dimension for every issue available. More often however there is a request for a second dimension that allows not just a conservative versus liberal axis but instead a socially liberal versus socially conservative axis and a fiscally liberal versus fiscally conservative axis. While at times a second axis is useful, and in the most recent session of Congress can be viewed as a measure of establishment versus non-establishment leanings, Poole and Rosenthal as well as those who have use their datasets in the past primarily look to create their models solely from this one dimension due to its explanatory power (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 21). Part of the reason why complicated legislators are able to be represented along a single metric is due to the prevalence of logrolling or vote trading (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 17). The primary dimension is not solely concerned with political party however, it also strongly relates to issues of economic redistribution (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 70).

Looking ahead to how the legislators, specifically the leaders, might change within my own study is evidence that “essentially all movement is captured by simple linear movement” along the single explanatory dimension, which suggests that more complicated ideological flip flops are rare within Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 29).⁹

Poole and Rosenthal are able to look at the patterns of how ideology has changed in the history of Congress. I will solely be looking at post-WW2 data as that is when congressional leadership started becoming truly strong in both the House and Senate.¹⁰ They note that “[t]he period from the late New Deal until the mid-1970s

⁹„todo-would love to include more on this at some point

¹⁰Before that it was sometimes non-existent, especially in the smaller Senate, where leadership


saw the development of the only genuine three-political-party system in American history. The southern and northern Democrats may have joined together to organize the House and Senate but they were widely separated on the second dimension. This dimension picked up conflict over civil rights” (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 54). During this time there was a conservative coalition between the southern Democrats and most Republicans that was in conflict with the northern Democrats as well as a few northern Republicans (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 54–56). It is unfortunate that this sole time of a three-political-party system exists during the data that I plan to use, but this may make my results stronger in less turbulent times. By the “mid-to-late 1970s the party-line voting returned to a more [unidimensional] pattern” (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 57). This was due to the passage of civil rights legislation that either revolved conflicts within the parties or caused legislators to switch from one party to another. Throughout the rest of congressional history the single dimension remains but what the dimensions refers to evolves slowly. Within each individual Congress it is easy to see the majority of conflicts along a single dimension (MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987).

Something that should help my analysis is the movement towards a more “unidimensional politics” in the most recent sessions of Congress. The ideological overlap along this single dimension between the parties is essentially gone. The last Congress in which there was an overlap in the Senate was the 109th, which ended in early 2007. The second dimension has lost much of its explanatory power towards party since the 104th Congress, which began in 1995. Poole and Rosenthal say that “the modern Congress is truly unidimensional” in 2005, which was before the even greater polarization that began then and continues to move the two parties farther apart (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 55). The first dimension, while often referred to as “ideology,” can be thought of in a few different ways. It could be that the dimension is “thought



was not needed as much to organize the many members of each party.


of as ranging from strong loyalty to one party” to a strong dislike of the policies of another party; this can often explain the placement of many independent or otherwise third-party congressmen¹¹ existing seemingly deep within another party (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 55).

Poole and Rosenthal put dimensionality and roll call voting agendas well in the following quote: “In a nutshell, the roll call voting agenda of Congress is always a cornucopia of diverse issues, even if many issues are screened from the agenda. This diversity notwithstanding, to the extent that spatial models are useful in describing the roll call voting data, only low-dimensional models are needed” (2007, 69).



¹¹As every third-party Representative or Senator has been a man.








Figure 1.1: Here is a caption

Chapter 2

Dataset and Methodology

2.1 Dataset

2.2 Methodology

I will use the `acf` function available in **R** to best estimate the number of years I should lag my data. It is assumed that I will see the highest correlation and covariance at the with a lag of 1, meaning one congressional session behind. The correlation and covariance will be expected to slowly drop off. Once this `acf` function has been properly plotted I will be able to then move towards the fitting of a model to my data. To do that I will first separate the data into two groups, Republicans and Democrats. Then again that data will be separated into two groups, leaders and non-leaders. I will find the mean change of each party's ideology by congressional session within the D-NOMINATE dataset. Then I will compare the changes through each Congress of non-leaders to leaders within each party. This will allow me to see the differences in ideological change of one group versus the others.

Chapter 3

Results

3.1 Results for Complete Dataset

Some statistically significant results are found in my most basic regression. These are the linear regressions computed across all the available congressional sessions that have complete leader data in both the House and the Senate, from the 67th Congress (1921-1923) to the recent 113th Congress (2013-2015).

Table 3.1: Summary of Models Across All Years, House and Senate

	Senate Ds	Senate Rs	House Ds	House Rs
(Intercept)	0.00489	0.00259	0.01131	0.00405
cong_ideo_mean	0.51583	0.61344	0.73047	0.67749
last_cong_ideo_mean	-0.38112	-0.50989	-0.57483	-0.53415
last_ideo	0.87467	0.87061	0.87636	0.85013
leaderY	-0.01863	0.01289	-0.03022	-0.00417
Adjusted R-Squared	0.802	0.781	0.781	0.824
N	2239	1817	11380	9270

All of the control variables that were enlisted were found to be statistically significant. These three variables were the ideological mean of congress, the ideological mean of congress from the previous congressional session, and the congressperson's ideology from the previous congressional session. For all three of these variables across both parties in both the House and Senate the p-value was always less than 0.0001. It is

clear that a legislator's current ideology would be affected by what their ideology was in the previous congressional session. While not as obvious, it also makes sense that you would need to understand the greater political environment that their party is in within their chamber. For example, if congresspeople as a whole were becoming more polarized at a rapid rate, as they are currently, you would expect a singular congressperson to be rapidly polarizing as well. Knowing how the party has changed from the previous Congress to the most recent one allows you to help control for this effect.

3.1.1 Democrats

Across all of the years the leadership variable was statistically significant for the Senate Democrats and the House Democrats, represented by the bold text in Table 3.1 above. The Senate Democrats noticed a small shift, approximately a 0.02 leftward shift on the NOMINATE scale, indicating that leaders become slightly more liberal across Congresses than their non-leader counterparts. The result was not significant at a confidence level of the normal 0.05, but with a p-value of 0.059 it would be recognized as significant at a slightly higher confidence level. For reasons laid out farther below, I do not think that this is reason enough to disregard this result, as I would guess that this is an underestimate rather than an overestimate. The overall shift is small, only a 0.02 movement towards the more liberal side, but not insignificant.

A statistically significant shift was also noticed among the House Democrats. They had an even more statistically significant result, with a p-value of about 0.015, a much stronger result than that found above with the Senate Democrats. It is strong enough that with the somewhat arbitrary confidence level of 0.05 the predictor remains significant. The coefficient attached is also larger, 0.03, again with a leftwards shift farther towards the Democratic party extreme, farther towards congresspeople like Senator Sanders and Senator Brown and away from conservatives like Senator Collins

and Senator Risch. Again, the overall shift is small but not worth disregarding, however if one was looking to predict the ideological score of a House Democrat you would not pick leadership status as one of your first predictors.

3.1.2 Republicans

It is important to talk about the null results received for Republicans in both the House and Senate. While neither of the results were significant, the regression for the Senate did hint at a possible ideological change due to leadership, with a coefficient of 0.013 towards the more conservative side. Accompanied by a p-value of 0.19 they must be looked at skeptically, and instead perhaps taken as a hint for future study as opposed to a specific result. The coefficient found here is similar to the results found for the Democrats, they they moved more towards their party's extreme edges when they were leaders. It was not as strong as the coefficient found for either the House Democrats or the Senate Democrats, but it is no as weak as the Republican House, covered below. While significant was not found in this elementary regression, perhaps a regression with better controls and a stronger method might be able to find results that are not just statistically significant but also are statistically sound.

The House Republicans however seem to be very far away from any possible impact of leadership on ideology. They had a p-value of 0.65, far away from any reasonable confidence level. Even if it had been significant the coefficient attached was incredibly small, 0.004, towards the more moderate wing fo the Republican party or the Democratic party itself. These results are not in sync with the results found for the other three groups analyzed here, and I might suggest that looking at

3.1.3 Comments on Null Results

With the model I have created I think it is likely that the significance of leadership on ideology is underestimated. The change in leadership could have an effect on how

the ideology of an entire caucus moves. Speaker Ryan right now is trying hard to make his ideology the ideology of the entire party, as he has pushed his agenda of “Confident America” (Steinhauer 2016). Ryan is closer to the mean ideological scores of the Freedom Caucus, and one would imagine that a concerted effort to continue to elect leaders of more extreme ideologies might allow the rest of the party to move along with them towards their more extreme wings (Enten 2015).

Also the model might underestimate the importance of being a leader for a few other reasons. For example, leaders are a part of the data on the last congressional ideological mean and the current congressional ideological mean. Also leaders might have altered their early, pre-leader ideology because they expected or wanted to become leaders in the future. All of these could account for the differences among the significance of the leadership variable among the Democrats when compared to the Republicans. Perhaps Republicans were more likely to know they wanted to pursue leadership since they first entered office, or maybe they were more likely to shift along with their leaders, causing the entire mean of the party to move, possibly nullifying the effects of a leader’s move.

3.2 Results for Subsets of Dataset

I took subsets of the data by Congressional periods to try to see if leaders were ever more important across certain time periods than they were over the entire dataset. There are many different ways to break up Congress, one way suggested by (Stewart 2012, 96–97) is the breaking into six different eras, or systems, of which only three are during the time period that was able to be coded with leaders.¹ They are:

- **Industrial System:** 1921-1932: Actually 1894-1932, but for the purposes of our coding only a smaller amount of it can be analyzed. A party of industry and

¹The rest were pre-1921 and before my data was able to be clearly coded due how Congressional leadership existed back then.

a party of labor, with northern and southern regionalism factoring into parties heavily. Republicans were primarily northern and industrial, whereas Democrats were primarily southern and labor focused.

- **New Deal System:** 1932-1972: Democrats become more liberal as the Republicans become more conservative compared to industrial system, but the regionalism does not completely fade away.
- **Candidate-centered system:** 1972-present: After the tension that existed in the United States in the sixties, the regional importance shifts away as ideology begins to matter more and polarization of the parties continues (Stewart 2012, 96).

This system of breaking up the parties is not the only manner in which one could break them up, and subscribes to the views that are not taken as true across all of the political science literature. Some push both the Industrial and New Deal system together as one Congressional period. Yet the years themselves above seem to delineate good beginning breaking points for me to subset the data.

3.2.1 Republicans

Subsets were not useful to explain how House Republicans voted. During all of the systems the p-value were relatively high. That being said the subsetting did reduce the p-value by a significant amount, bringing the p-value for all three eras to between 0.22 and 0.26. This is an improvement when compared to the original 0.65 value received, but not enough to pass a positive judgement on the effects of these values. The coefficients were also stronger than they were when all of the systems were lumped together, but they still are smaller than the absolute value of the coefficients that exist for the Republicans in the House and Senate.

The values obtained for the Senate Republicans did not all become more explanatory as they did for the House Republicans. The p-value increases for all eras except for the

New Deal era, when it moves down to 0.14. But during the Industrial and Candidate-centered systems the p-values increase dramatically to point where they seem unable to be rationalized in any way. So again subsetting is overall mostly ineffective at helping try to tease out statistically significant ideological change due to a leadership position.

3.2.2 Democrats

Subsetting is more effective in talking about the importance of leadership when it comes to ideological change among House Democrats however. Null results are found for both the industrial and candidate centered systems, with p-values reaching far above 0.20. However for the House Democrats during the New Deal era, from 1932-1972 or the 73rd Congress to the 92nd Congress, the subsetting increases the significance of the data. Not only does the p-value decrease from the all full dataset p-value of 0.015 to the even stronger p-value of 0.006 but the coefficient increases as well, doubling from a 0.03 shift towards the left to a 0.06 shift towards the left. This is a very significant shift among the NOMINATE scale, so this will be revisited in the discussion of the results later. It did not come at a reduction of the importance of the other variables, which stayed statistically and substantively significant.

Subsetting is also effective in explaining during which congressional systems leadership has its greatest effect on the ideology of Senate Democrats. Again, the period in which the strongest p-value and coefficient is found is during the New Deal system (1932-1973). The p-value for this time period is 0.08 and its corresponding coefficient is a 0.03 shift towards the left, stronger by 0.01 than the baseline analysis of the Senate Democrats. Due to slowed polarization in the Senate compared to the House this ideological shift means more than it would otherwise.

3.3 Conclusion

Overall it is clear that Democrats were more likely to have significant results than Republicans. The New Deal system was also more likely to produce significant results than the other systems were. In the discussion section below I expound on these results and try to tie them into my earlier hypotheses about how leadership positions affect ideology.

Chapter 4

Discussion

As discussed above, there were five different possible hypotheses that we were able to come up with - one null hypothesis and four alternative hypotheses. Again, I will repeat all five of them below.

1. A null result is found - the leaders and non-leaders do not change in significantly different ways.
2. Leaders move to be more conservative, or right-leaning, when compared to non-leaders.
3. Leaders move to be more liberal, or left-leaning, when compared to non-leaders.
4. Leaders move to be more moderate, or centrist, when compared to non-leaders.
5. Leaders move to be more extreme when compared to non-leaders.

Luckily I need not pick only one hypothesis above to describe the phenomena observed because three of the hypotheses seemed to be correct, depending on the circumstance.

Firstly, the null hypothesis seems to be correct in the vast majority of situations. While the

Secondly, the Democrats seemed to be explained well by the third hypothesis above, that leaders become more liberal when compared to non-leaders. There are a

number of reasons why this could take place. Perhaps one of the most largest reasons I see being the case is that one of the largest threats for these leaders is that they are receiving a large amount of media attention and may attract a primary opponent.

<< ALSO GOING TO REFER TO EXTEMISM LITERATURE THAT I TALKED ABOUT IN LIT REVIEW, MAY EXPAND ON IT IN LIT REVIEW AS WELL >>

Thirdly, the fifth hypothesis also can follow from the third hypothesis above because there are only results on the Democratic side.

Conclusion

This study was particularly important because while a reasonable amount of information exists about how leaders are chosen to their positions based on their ideology it was not completely clear about how their ideology might shift after they have been selected by their fellow members of Congress. This thesis has looked to narrow our gap of understanding of these topics. However, more research is need in the long run especially research that involves stronger statistical methods that can better compensate for the sometimes small number of observations that exist on the models that make reference to the leaders. Research could also be done on whether these leaders are encouraging partisanship in Congress due to their ideology or halting it, as one of the key pieces of information found within this dataset is the great partisanship and polarization of the two dominating parties within American politics.

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