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Congressional Party Defection in American History

In this paper, we analyze the roll-call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two-party systems in American history: the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic-Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic-Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll-call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.

Introduction

The swift emergence of partisan factions in the early days of the republic is somewhat ironic, given the Founders' distaste for the partisan factions they believed would lead to divisive politics (Hofstadter 1969). Although both the nature of partisan politics and the parties themselves have changed over time, most scholars of American legislative politics take the existence of parties for granted. Borrowing from Schattschneider (1942), the operation of congressional politics in America is unthinkable save in terms of parties. The perpetual nature of partisan conflict in American politics has led to a somewhat static view of party affiliation, and for good reason: the vast majority of members of Congress (MCs) maintain a single party affiliation throughout their tenures in office. Nearly all MCs retain a single party label for the entirety of their congressional careers, yet party affiliation can be variable. Congressional scholars have recognized this disparity and investigated both the reasons for switching parties and the behavioral consequences of party defection on roll-call behavior by members of Congress. Although small, the group of party defectors allows for a direct assessment of the influence of political parties on individual-level congressional behavior.

Members of Congress are goal-oriented actors, and affiliation with a political party helps them achieve a variety of goals, namely reelection, enacting good public policy, and institutional advancement (Fenno 1973). Party affiliation not only assists members in pursuing these goals; it is actually a necessary condition to achieving them. In terms of reelection, parties provide members with a collective reputation, a sort of "brand name," to present to voters (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The electoral value of party affiliation is evident by the fact that successful candidates for office almost always opt to run under a party label. In the House especially, the majority party enjoys agenda power, making it important for members who seek to enact good public policy to be in good standing with their party's leadership. Finally, upward mobility within the institution is essentially upward mobility within the party apparatus. Most congressional leadership posts, for instance, are not constitutional offices but positions created by the parties themselves (Aldrich 1995). Considering the important roles that parties play in assisting goal-oriented members, we think it follows that changing party affiliation might lead members to make behavioral changes that will ensure they can still use the party apparatus to help them achieve all three goals: reelection, good public policy, and institutional advancement.

Party defection is extremely rare, but scholars have taken an increasing interest in its causes and consequences. Party labels are valuable commodities in electoral politics, and, like commodities, the relative values of a Democratic or Republican label fluctuate over time. Aldrich and Bianco (1992) show formally that MCs may have strong electoral incentives to switch parties. The implication of their theory is that by switching parties while in office, incumbent legislators can deter strong challengers from entering either primary or general elections. In other words, switching parties can be a rational strategy for election-oriented MCs. Changing parties is not a costless endeavor, however, as evidenced by the fact that nearly all members maintain a single party label throughout their careers. Grose and Yoshinika (2003) find that, contrary to the conclusions of Aldrich and Bianco (1992), members incur significant electoral costs when changing parties. On average, the MCs who switch parties face stiffer competition and lower vote shares in both primary and general elections following their defections.

Other scholars have analyzed party switching in an effort to identify the factors that cause individuals to change party affiliation. King and Benjamin (1986) study party defections over a wide swath of American history (1789–1984). They find that party switching is most likely to coincide with military conflict, important political events (such

as changes in partisan control of political institutions), and changes in key economic indicators. In recent Congresses, it is the ideologically cross-pressured members who are most likely to change parties (Castle and Fett 1996). In spatial terms, some Democrats (Republicans) might find themselves closer to the median member of the Republican (Democratic) Party; such cross-pressured members may find a party switch appealing for ideological reasons. During the past 30 years, the Republican Party has sought to facilitate the party defection of a number of conservative Southern Democrats at both the national and subnational level with an active recruitment process (Canon 1992; Canon and Sousa 1992).[1]

These previous works help shed light on why members might have an incentive to change parties, but they do not speak to the behavioral consequences of party defection. It is possible that members simply continue to compile a consistent roll-call voting record within the confines of their new party; that is, a change in party label produces no behavioral change. In fact, however, when one compares the pre- and post-switch roll-call behavior of party defectors, one finds significant changes in roll-call voting behavior at the point in time that a member crosses the aisle (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001; Nokken 2000; Oppenheimer and Hatcher 2003). Membership in a new party carries with it a different set of expectations regarding an appropriate voting record. Legislators cannot compile extremely liberal roll-call voting records and credibly call themselves Republicans. Party affiliation constrains roll-call behavior. Once members change parties, the set of constraints upon their roll-call behavior also changes. Some legislators may "switch with a vengeance" in order to show their colleagues in the new party that they are "real" Republicans or "true" Democrats (see, especially, Cox and McCubbins 1993, chap. 5; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chap. 3).

Findings of significant partisan effects resulting from party defection come primarily from post-World War II Congresses and essentially for individuals leaving one major party to join the other major party. We extend Oppenheimer and Hatcher's (2003) analysis of switchers from the Democratic-Republican Party system preceding World War II. We analyze and compare the roll-call behavior of party switchers both within and across the stable periods of the three major two-party systems in American history: the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican system, Democrat-Whig system, and Democrat-Republican system.

To measure change in behavior, we use a modified form of DW-NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 2001) that allows us to compare, for any pair of Congresses,

members who switch parties with those who do not switch. We analyze the behavioral consequences of party defections across the three two-party systems to learn how important differences in the political environment may have exerted different influences on the behavior of party switchers. The overall patterns of roll-call voting differ substantially across the three two-party systems (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). During the Whig-Democrat system, slavery divided both political parties internally. Consequently, a member could switch parties and not change voting behavior on slavery roll calls. More recently, roll-call voting has been marked by an increase in polarization between the two political parties such that roll-call voting falls almost entirely along liberal-conservative lines (King 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1997, 2001). Consequently, we would expect more recent switchers to exhibit substantial changes to roll-call voting behavior. We might expect a bigger behavioral change from recent party switchers than from those in the Whig-Democrat era but, *relative to their peers*, it is possible that switchers in previous eras substantially changed voting behavior also. These are the issues we address in this paper.

In the next section, we describe our rationale for limiting our analysis to the aforementioned party systems, and we describe how we identified and defined party defections. In section 2, we explain the scaling procedure used to generate ideal point estimates for comparison of switchers within and across party systems. In section 3, we describe our findings, and in section 4, we conclude.

1. Identifying Party Switchers

Although party defection takes place across all of the partisan systems in American history, we limit our analysis to the stable periods of the three two-party systems. For the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican era, we use the 3d to 12th Congresses (1793 through the spring of 1813). By the 3d Congress, the voting blocs associated with Hamilton and Jefferson had solidified in the House and Senate (see Martis 1989, 27–28, and the literature cited therein) so we begin our analysis with this Congress. We end our analysis with the 12th Congress—the last to be elected before the onset of the War of 1812—because the opposition of many Federalists to the War of 1812 resulted in the disintegration of the Federalist Party, followed by what was essentially a one-party system during the Era of Good Feelings. For the Whig-Democrat system, we use the 20th to 30th Congresses (1827 through the spring of 1849). The 20th Congress was the first Congress elected after the divisive 1824 presidential election split the Jeffersonian-

Republican party into factions primarily identified with Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. We end with the 30th Congress (elected 1846) because the 31st Congress (elected 1848) wrote the disastrous Compromise of 1850, which caused the Whig party to disintegrate. For the Republican-Democrat system, we begin with the 46th Congress because it was the first Congress elected after the Compromise of 1877, which ended Reconstruction (Woodward 1951).

Our first task in assessing the effect of party switches on voting behavior involved identifying those individuals who changed party affiliation at some time during their congressional careers. To ensure we would not bias our results in favor of finding significant effects, we made our definition of *party switchers* purposely broad. In other words, we erred on the side of inclusion. Generally, any member who served in Congress under more than one party label, whether the switch occurred during that MC's term in office or between separate terms of service, was included as a party switcher.[2] That definition, however, created certain problems when we tried to classify party switches from a number of early Congresses.

In order to compile a complete list of party defectors, we utilized multiple procedures and sources. Party defections in the modern, post-World War II era are documented in works by Nokken (2000), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), and Grose and Yoshinika (2003). Oppenheimer and Hatcher (2003) provide an extensive list of party switchers dating back to the late nineteenth century. In addition to these sources, we used Martis's (1989) party labels to identify all House and Senate members who served under more than one party label. The individuals on the list did, indeed, serve under more than one party label, but not every change in affiliation can be categorized as a party switch.

Identifying party switches during the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican and Democrat-Whig party systems is somewhat tricky because of the fluidity of party labels and multiple changes in individuals' party codes. For example, at the outset of both the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican and Democrat-Whig party systems, MCs' party affiliations were often determined by their support for a specific presidential candidate. After generating a large list of possible party defectors, we went through the list and removed those individuals whose party labels changed but whose party affiliation remained essentially the same.[3] Every other instance of a party defection we assumed to be a meaningful change in affiliation.

We included in our list of switchers those members who left major parties to affiliate with minor ones. Some prominent examples include

South Carolinians who left the Democratic Party in the Jacksonian era to become Nullifiers and other opponents of Jackson who were members of the Anti-Mason Party before being classified as Whigs or Anti-Jacksonians. Another large bloc of party switching occurred during the Progressive era, when a number of individuals switched to or from the Progressive party or the various agrarian and labor movement parties, such as the Farmer Labor Party in Minnesota. Members whose party labels changed from Republican to Silver or Silver Republican (or vice versa), as well as members from Virginia from the late 1800s who switched from Readjuster to Republican, are included. Finally, members who left a party to serve as independents are also coded as party switchers.[4]

In the end, we identified 38 party switches in the Senate (1 from the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican era, 12 from the Whig-Democrat era, and 25 from the Democrat-Republican era) and 160 in the House (3 from the Federalist-Republican era, 76 from the Whig-Democrat era, and 81 from the Democrat-Republican era). These switches are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.[5]

Analysis of the post-World War II party defectors uncovered significant changes in roll-call behavior that are directly attributable to those members' shifts in party affiliation (Nokken 2000). While we expect party switching to carry with it some behavioral consequences, we do not expect every instance of party defection to generate identical patterns of change. The nature and magnitude of the defectors' behavioral changes depend heavily upon the prevailing partisan divisions within Congress at the time of the switch. In other words, some partisan divisions foster significant changes; others do not. The key factor that determines whether or not members make significant changes to their roll-call records when they switch is party polarization. We would expect MCs to exhibit dramatic changes in voting behavior during times of high polarization and less dramatic changes during less polarized periods. Why is this the case?

During periods of high polarization, there is little if any overlap between the internal poles of the parties; in less polarized periods, there is often significant overlap. When a member changes parties during a period of high polarization, that legislator must make dramatic adjustments in voting behavior in order to credibly commit to membership in a new camp. Given the ideological overlap of parties during periods of lesser polarization, a defector need not make a dramatic shift to fit in with new colleagues. A defector might even maintain a consistent voting record in such cases because there would be other members of the new party exhibiting similar behavior.

TABLE 1
Senate Party Switchers

Jeffersonian-Republican vs. Federalist

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1799	6	Federalist	1801	7	Republican	FOSTER, T	17	71	+

Democrat vs. Whig

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1827	20	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	**BERRIEN, J**	4	100	+
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	HAYNE, R	34	85	0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Anti-Jackson	POINDEXTER	34	94	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	BLACK, J	35	23	–
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	MANGUM, W	35	91	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	MOORE, G	35	71	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	TYLER, J	35	57	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	WHITE, H	39	82	+
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Democrat	CALHOUN, J	44	93	0
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Whig	PRESTON, W	44	71	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	RIVES, W	43	91	+
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	TALLMADGE	43	5	+

Democrat vs. Republican

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	MAHONE, W	61	2	0
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	RIDDLEBERGE	61	61	0
1891	52	Republican	1893	53	Silver	STEWART, W	74	92	0
1893	53	Republican	1895	54	Silver	JONES, J	72	90	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	CANNON, F	68	63	0
1895	54	Republican	1901	57	Democrat	DUBOIS, F	38	92	+
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	MANTLE, L	68	2	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	**PETTIGREW**	68	95	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	TELLER, H	68	12	0
1899	56	Populist	1901	57	Democrat	HEITFELD, H	69	70	0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Republican	JONES, J	69	75	0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Republican	STEWART, W	69	77	0
1899	56	Silver Republic	1901	57	Democrat	TELLER, H	69	22	0
1899	56	Silver Republic	1901	57	Democrat	TURNER, G	69	4	0
1911	62	Republican	1913	63	Progressive	POINDEXTER	76	88	0
1913	63	Progressive	1915	64	Republican	POINDEXTER	85	59	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	LA FOLLETTE	83	13	0
1935	74	Republican	1937	75	Independent	NORRIS, G	79	1	0
1939	76	Farmer-Labor	1941	77	Republican	SHIPSTEAD, H	80	91	0
1951	82	Republican	1953	83	Independent	**MORSE, W**	79	100	0
1955	84	Independent	1957	85	Democrat	**MORSE, W**	86	98	0
1963	88	Democrat	1965	89	Republican	THURMOND, J	91	77	–
1969	91	Democrat	1971	92	Independent	BYRD, H	90	92	0
1993	103	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**SHELBY, R**	89	100	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**CAMPBELL, B**	86	100	+

N = Number of MCs that served in pair of Congresses for the corresponding switcher.
PCT = Percentage of MCs serving in pair of Congresses with smaller shifts than switcher.
+ = Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Proper Direction.
– = Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Wrong Direction.
0 = Switch to/from Minor Party.
Note: Senators whose names appear in **BOLDFACE** exhibited significant behavioral changes in voting behavior following their party switch.

TABLE 2
House Party Switchers

Jeffersonian-Republican vs. Federalist

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY					
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1795	4	Federalist	1797	5	Republican	FREEMAN, N	61	8	+
1795	4	Federalist	1799	6	Republican	KITCHELL, A	34	50	+
1797	5	Federalist	1801	7	Republican	TILLINGHAST	35	54	–

Democrat vs. Whig

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY					
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1827	20	Jackson	1829	21	Anti-Jackson	CROCKETT, D	112	65	+
1827	20	Adams Dem	1829	21	Anti-Masonic	TRACY, P	112	68	0
1827	20	Adams Dem	1831	22	Jackson	WARD, A	67	90	+
1827	20	Adams Dem	1829	21	Jackson	WILSON, E	112	59	+
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	BARNWELL, R	123	84	0
1829	21	Jackson	1837	25	Nullifier	CAMPBELL, J	23	44	0
1829	21	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	CHILDS, T	40	38	0
1829	21	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	CHILTON, T	67	24	–
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	DAVIS, W	123	17	0
1829	21	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Masonic	MARTINDALE	67	48	0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	MCDUFFIE, G	123	32	0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Anti-Jackson	STANBERRY	123	81	+
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Masonic	ADAMS, J	104	58	0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	BARRINGER	104	25	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	DAVENPORT	104	82	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Nullifier	FELDER, J	104	35	0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Nullifier	LEWIS, D	104	92	0
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Masonic	**PEARCE, D**	104	97	0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	RENCHER, A	104	52	+
1831	22	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	RUSSELL, W	19	42	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	SHEPPERD, A	104	6	–
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Masonic	WHITTLESEY	104	67	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	**BELL, J**	140	97	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	**BUNCH, S**	140	95	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	CLAIBORNE	140	1	–
1833	23	Jackson	1843	28	Whig	DICKINSON	11	91	+
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1837	25	Whig	FILLMORE, M	55	62	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	**FORESTER, J**	140	98	+
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	FOSTER, T	27	19	+
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	FULLER, P	140	69	0
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	GAMBLE, R	27	4	+
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	HARD, G	140	68	0
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	HAZELTINE	140	54	0
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	LAY, G	140	15	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	LEA, L	140	6	+

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TABLE 2
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Democrat vs. Whig (continued)									
OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	MCCARTY, J	140	72	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	MCCOMAS, W	140	45	–
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	PEYTON, B	140	27	+
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	RAMSEY, R	27	78	+
1833	23	Anti-Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Masonic	REED, J	140	2	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	**STANDIFER**	140	99	+
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1843	28	Whig	STEWART, A	11	27	0
1833	23	Anti-Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	WHITTLESEY	140	28	0
1835	24	Anti-Masonic	1837	25	Whig	ADAMS, J	119	15	0
1835	24	Jackson	1837	25	Whig	LAWLER, J	119	54	+
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Democrat	LEWIS, D	119	91	0
1835	24	Anti-Masonic	1837	25	Whig	REED, J	119	13	0
1835	24	Anti-Masonic	1837	25	Whig	SLADE, W	119	72	0
1835	24	Jackson	1837	25	Whig	WISE, H	119	87	+
1837	25	Democrat	1841	27	Whig	BORDEN, N	68	2	+
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	CAMPBELL, J	118	83	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	**CLARK, J**	118	98	+
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Conservative	GARLAND, J	118	56	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	GRIFFIN, J	118	24	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Conservative	HOPKINS, G	118	92	0
1837	25	Anti-Masonic	1841	27	Whig	MCKENNAN, T	68	4	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	PICKENS, F	118	45	0
1837	25	Independent	1839	26	Whig	POPE, J	118	69	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	RHETT, R	118	21	0
1837	25	Whig	1839	26	Democrat	SHEPARD, C	118	93	+
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	BLACK, E	126	58	+
1839	26	Democrat	1841	27	Ind. Democrat	CASEY, Z	126	85	0
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	COLQUITT, W	126	91	+
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	COOPER, M	126	37	+
1839	26	Anti-Masonic	1841	27	Whig	EDWARDS, J	126	21	0
1839	26	Anti-Masonic	1841	27	Whig	HENRY, T	126	52	0
1839	26	Conservative	1841	27	Democrat	HOPKINS, G	126	94	0
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Independent	**HUNTER, R**	126	99	0
1839	26	Anti-Masonic	1841	27	Whig	JAMES, F	126	35	0
1841	27	Whig	1843	28	Democrat	GILMER, T	53	9	–
1841	27	Independent	1845	29	Democrat	HUNTER, R	26	50	0
1841	27	Whig	1843	28	Democrat	WISE, H	53	74	+
1843	28	Law and Order	1845	29	Whig	CRANSTON, H	105	8	0
1843	28	Ind. Democrat	1847	30	Whig	NES, H	56	75	0
1843	28	Ind. Whig	1845	29	Whig	WRIGHT, W	105	22	0
1845	29	Democrat	1847	30	Ind. Democrat	**SMITH, R**	98	98	0

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TABLE 2
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Democrat vs. Republican									
OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1879	46	Ind. Democrat	1881	47	Democrat	TURNER, O	179	82	0
1881	47	Democrat	1883	48	Independent	**CHALMERS, J**	140	99	0
1881	47	Democrat	1883	48	Ind. Democrat	TURNER, O	140	34	0
1883	48	Readjuster	1887	50	Republican	**BOWEN, H**	103	96	0
1883	48	National Greenb	1885	49	Republican	**BRUMM, C**	183	99	0
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	LIBBEY, H	183	67	0
1883	48	National Greenb	1887	50	Democrat	SHIVELY, B	103	25	0
1885	49	Republican	1887	50	Ind. Republic	ANDERSON, J	192	5	0
1885	49	Ind. Democrat	1887	50	Democrat	MERRIMAN, T	192	49	0
1887	50	Ind. Republican	1889	51	Republican	ANDERSON, J	192	7	0
1887	50	Republican	1897	55	Democrat	**BAKER, J**	34	97	+
1887	50	Republican	1889	51	Democrat	FITCH, A	192	91	+
1891	52	Republican	1903	58	Democrat	**LIND, J**	21	95	+
1891	52	Democrat	1893	53	Ind. Democrat	MCALEER, W	201	31	0
1893	53	Ind. Democrat	1897	55	Democrat	MCALEER, W	107	22	0
1893	53	Democrat	1909	61	Republican	**MORGAN, C**	20	95	+
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republ	**HARTMAN, C**	203	99	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republ	SHAFROTH, J	203	81	0
1895	54	Republican	1899	56	Silver Republ	WILSON, E	135	93	0
1895	54	Republican	1905	59	Democrat	**TOWNE, C**	66	99	+
1897	55	Ind. Republican	1899	56	Republican	BUTLER, T	236	16	0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Democrat	NEWLANDS, F	249	29	0
1911	62	Republican	1913	63	Independent	**KENT, W**	268	98	0
1913	63	Republican	1915	64	Progressive	COPLEY, I	294	35	0
1913	63	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	HULINGS, W	169	62	0
1913	63	Republican	1917	65	Progressive	KELLY, M	237	31	0
1913	63	Republican	1915	64	Progressive	STEPHENS, W	294	89	0
1913	63	Progressive	1915	64	Republican	TEMPLE, H	294	39	0
1913	63	Progressive	1921	67	Republican	WOODRUFF, R	117	54	0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	CHANDLER, W	343	15	0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	COPLEY, I	343	87	0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	ELSTON, J	343	76	0
1917	65	Ind. Republican	1919	66	Republican	FULLER, A	320	66	0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	KELLY, M	320	93	0
1917	65	Republican	1933	73	Farmer-Labor	LUNDEEN, E	59	9	0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Democrat	MARTIN, W	320	86	0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	SCHALL, T	320	81	0
1919	66	Republican	1921	67	Ind. Republic	SHREVE, M	311	77	0
1919	66	Union Labor	1925	69	Farmer-Labor	CARSS, W	203	94	0
1919	66	Ind. Republican	1921	67	Republican	KELLER, O	311	69	0
1921	67	Democrat	1923	68	Republican	CAMPBELL, G	285	93	+
1921	67	Ind. Republican	1923	68	Republican	SHREVE, M	285	9	0
1923	68	Democrat	1927	70	Republican	**CLANCY, R**	314	100	+

(continued on next page)

TABLE 2
(continued)

Democrat vs. Republican (continued)

OLD PARTY			NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	PCT	
1923	68	Republican	1925	69	Amer. Labo	LA GUARDIA	351	30	0
1925	69	American Labor	1927	70	Republican	LA GUARDIA	367	92	0
1929	71	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	HULL, M	144	94	0
1931	72	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	AMLIE, T	198	51	0
1931	72	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	SCHNEIDER	198	71	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	BOILEAU, G	320	87	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	WITHROW, G	320	81	0
1935	74	Republican	1939	76	Amer. Labo	**MARCANTON**	247	99	0
1937	75	Progressive	1939	76	Democrat	HAVENNER, F	309	63	0
1937	75	Progressive	1949	81	Republican	WITHROW, G	97	14	0
1941	77	Republican	1959	86	Democrat	**OLIVER, J**	67	99	+
1941	77	Ind. Democrat	1943	78	Democrat	PRIEST, J	322	43	0
1943	78	Farmer-Labor	1945	79	Republican	HAGEN, H	349	92	0
1945	79	Progressive	1947	80	Republican	**HULL, M**	322	99	0
1949	81	Liberal	1951	82	Democrat	ROOSEVELT	358	74	0
1957	85	Republican	1957	85	Democrat	**DELLAY, V**	351	100	+
1959	86	Ind. Democrat	1961	87	Democrat	ALFORD, T	369	23	0
1965	89	Democrat	1967	90	Republican	WATSON, A	359	77	–
1971	92	Republican	1973	93	Democrat	**REID, O**	361	99	+
1973	93	Democrat	1975	94	Republican	JARMAN, J	339	9	–
1973	93	Ind. Democrat	1975	94	Democrat	MOAKLEY, J	339	41	0
1973	93	Republican	1975	94	Democrat	**RIEGLE, D**	339	99	+
1975	94	Republican	1979	96	Democrat	**PEYSER, P**	292	100	+
1979	96	Democrat	1981	97	Republican	ATKINSON, E	354	89	+
1981	97	Independent	1983	98	Democrat	FOGLIETTA	351	89	0
1981	97	Democrat	1983	98	Republican	**GRAMM, W**	351	99	+
1981	97	Democrat	1983	98	Republican	STUMP, B	351	89	+
1983	98	Democrat	1985	99	Republican	**IRELAND, A**	390	100	+
1987	100	Democrat	1989	101	Republican	**GRANT, B**	395	100	+
1987	100	Democrat	1989	101	Republican	**ROBINSON, T**	395	100	+
1989	101	Democrat	1997	105	Republican	**WATKINS, W**	168	100	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**DEAL, N**	360	100	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**HAYES, J**	360	100	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**LAUGHLIN, G**	360	100	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**PARKER, M**	360	99	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	**TAUZIN, W**	360	100	+
1999	106	Republican	1999	106	Democrat	FORBES, M	0		
1999	106	Democrat	1999	106	Independent	GOODE, V	0		

N = Number of MCs that served in pair of Congresses for the corresponding switcher.
PCT = Percentage of MCs serving in pair of Congresses with smaller shifts than switcher.
+ = Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Proper Direction.
– = Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Wrong Direction.
0 = Switch to/from Minor Party.
Note: Senators whose names appear in **BOLDFACE** exhibited significant behavioral changes in voting behavior following their party switch.

FIGURE 1
Party Polarization, 1st to 106th Congresses,
U.S. Senate



To understand how polarization can influence the behavioral consequences of party defection, think of the actions a member must take following defection simply to maintain institutional standing within the Congress. A liberal Democrat, for example, could switch parties to capture electoral benefits and ensure reelection. Simply winning that seat, however, would not guarantee the member continued service on standing committees, for example. Service on committees, especially the power committees, is contingent upon loyal party service (Cox and McCubbins 1993). It is highly unlikely that the member's new party would simply reappoint the MC to his or her current portfolio of committees, let alone promote the MC to more-desirable slots, unless that individual credibly committed to voting like a loyal, conservative Republican. Simply put, party defection to capture short-term electoral benefits carries with it potentially important changes in a member's institutional standing within Congress.

Levels of polarization vary noticeably throughout American history. During some periods, the two parties are quite far apart ideologically; in other periods, there is significant ideological overlap. Figures 1 and 2 show the average distance between and within the two major parties

FIGURE 2
Party Polarization, 1st to 106th Congresses,
U.S. House of Representatives



during the three major two-party systems using DW-NOMINATE two-dimensional coordinates (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997). Following Poole and Rosenthal (1997), we use between-party distance as our measure of party polarization. Between-party distance is the average distance between all pairs of members of the two opposing parties. To measure the dispersion of the parties—the within-party distance—we compute the average distance between all pairs of members of the same party. The switches in the Democrat-Republican system are concentrated between the 47th and 54th Congresses—at the height of the conflict over bimetallism and industrial capitalism (8 switches)—and in the period from the 92d Congress onward—when party polarization began to increase rapidly (13 switches).

Because parties play extremely important roles in structuring both the political agenda and members' roll-call voting strategies during times of increased polarization, we should expect the effects of shifts in party affiliation to differ with differing levels of polarization. When a member switches parties during a period of high polarization, a significant alteration of that MC's roll-call voting record is required to achieve any sort of fit within the new party. The significant shift in behavior can stem from either (or both) of two sources. First, the party leadership within

the institution may enhance the magnitude of a switcher's change in voting behavior. Party leaders control a number of important resources that members want. Desirable committee assignments, for instance, are more likely to go to MCs who exhibit party loyalty on important roll-call votes (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991); this was especially so during the highly polarized, strong-Speaker era of the late nineteenth century (Jones 1968; Lawrence, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck 2001; Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist 1969). Because they wish to acquire important institutional resources controlled by the party leadership, party defectors have strong incentives to become loyal members of their new party.

Electoral concerns also explain why party defectors exhibit significant shifts in roll-call behavior during the modern period of high polarization. In order to remain in office, the party switchers must safely navigate through potentially dangerous waters, namely, the primary constituency of their new party. It is not obvious that the former foes of a party switcher will let bygones be bygones and welcome that member into the party. The immediate electoral danger for the switcher is the new party's primary. In order to reduce the likelihood of strong challengers in the primary, the defector has a strong incentive to start to compile a voting record that closely resembles the ideological preferences of the primary voters in the new party. Should members switch parties and not alter voting behavior in any meaningful way, a strong primary challenge from an individual who does mirror the party's preference would be nearly certain.

Additionally, we expect behavioral changes to take a particular form. Specifically, members should modify their roll-call voting behavior by becoming more liberal or more conservative, depending upon which party they ultimately join. More generally, behavioral change should take place along the primary dimension of American political conflict, the traditional liberal-conservative dimension. For much of the nation's history this liberal-conservative dimension has served to structure political conflict, which the 1st dimension of DW-NOMINATE used in this analysis captures. We do not expect significant behavioral changes to be observed on the second DW-NOMINATE dimension because that dimension captures regional variation for the Congresses we analyze.

Extrapolating from the polarization prediction, we also expect significant behavioral changes to be concentrated among those members who left one of the two major parties to join the other. Switches between the two major parties almost certainly involve disputes over issues that fall along the primary dimension of ideological conflict. That said, our set of party defectors includes numerous instances of movement

between major and minor parties. Those defections, we contend, would be much more likely to result from regional issues. Thus, we do not expect to observe statistically significant changes in those members' spatial locations along the first dimension.

Finally, we expect the party defections that took place over the past 30 years to be qualitatively different from those of earlier eras. Namely, we expect recent party switchers to exhibit larger changes in their voting behavior, for two reasons. First, this time frame is characterized by increasing ideological polarization (King 1998; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1987). Second, following the divisive battles over civil rights in the 1960s, the explanatory power of the second NOMINATE dimension has declined noticeably. Voting on race-related issues is now indistinguishable from voting on the more traditional economic issues that divide the two major parties. The combination of increased ideological polarization and the evaporation of the second dimension suggest that party defectors have no choice but to shift significantly along the first dimension. Because there is no overlap between the two parties, switchers cannot take refuge among the moderate wing of the other party—that moderate wing no longer exists. Likewise, with the disappearance of the second dimension, the parties have become more ideologically homogeneous, so the region-specific factors that once drove party defection are no longer present.

2. Measuring the Effect of Party Switching

To measure the effect of a change in political party on a legislator's voting record, we used a modified version of DW-NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 2001) computed for the House and Senate for the 1st to 106th Congresses. To create a baseline, we first estimated the DW-NOMINATE two-dimensional *constant* coordinate model; that is, every legislator has the same ideal point throughout his or her career in the two-dimensional space. Then, holding the roll-call outcomes from the two-dimensional constant model fixed, we estimated an ideal point for every legislator in every Congress. This method allows us to compare the changes in ideal points of party switchers versus members who did not switch parties between any pair of Congresses.

The policy outcomes corresponding to "yea" and "nay" for the jth roll call on the kth dimension for Congress t are z_{jkyt} and z_{jknt}, respectively. The ith legislator's coordinate on the kth dimension is x_{ik}. (In the constant model, there is no time index for the legislators.) If q is the total number of roll calls, p is the number of unique legislators, and

s is the number of dimensions, then $2qs + ps + s–1 + 1$ parameters are estimated in the DW-NOMINATE constant model. $s–1$ are the dimension weights for dimensions 2 through s (the "W" in DW-NOMINATE stands for *weighted*—the model utilizes a weighted Euclidean metric) and 1 is the variance of the error.

Let x_{ikt} be the ith legislator's coordinate on the kth dimension in Congress t estimated from the roll-call outcomes—z_{jkyt} and z_{jknt}—for Congress t from DW-NOMINATE. (Note that we now have a t index on the legislators—x_{ikt} should not be confused with x_{ik}.) To estimate the x_{ikt}, we use a standard random utility framework with a normal distribution deterministic utility function and normally distributed random error.

Specifically, the squared distance of legislator i to the "yea" outcome of roll call j on the kth dimension at time t is

$$d^2_{ijkty} = (x_{ikt} - z_{jkty})^2.$$

Legislator i's utility for the "yea" outcome on roll call j at time t is

$$U_{ijty} = u_{ijty} + \varepsilon_{ijty} = \beta \exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^{s} w_k^2 d^2_{ijkty}\right] + \varepsilon_{ijty}, \tag{1}$$

where u_{ijty} is the deterministic portion of the utility function, ε_{ijty} is the stochastic portion and w_k are the dimension weights from DW-NOMINATE. (Note that $w_1 = 1$.) The parameter β adjusts for the overall noise level and is proportional to $1/\sigma^2$, where σ is the standard deviation of the ε; that is,

$$\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2).$$

Hence, the probability that legislator i votes for the "yea" outcome can be written in terms of the distribution function of the normal:

$$P_{ijty} = P(U_{ijty} > U_{ijtn}) = P(\varepsilon_{ijtn} - \varepsilon_{ijty} < u_{ijty} - u_{ijtn}) =$$

$$\Phi\{\beta(\exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^{s} w_k^2 d^2_{ijkty}\right] - \exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^{s} w_k^2 d^2_{ijktn}\right])\}. \tag{2}$$

The only unknown in equation (2) is the legislator's ideal point—the x_{ikt}. It is a simple matter to estimate this point by standard methods from the likelihood function formed from equation (2).

To measure the effect of a change in political party, we computed the distance between the legislator's ideal point in the last Congress of the old party and the first Congress of the new party and compared this

distance to the distances computed for all legislators in the corresponding pair of Congresses. The distance for the *i*th legislator is

$$d_{ion} = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{s} w_k^2 (x_{iko} - x_{ikn})^2} \ ,$$

where *o* indicates the last Congress of the old party and *n* indicates the first Congress of the new party.

In Tables 1 and 2, the column on the right marked "N" shows the number of legislators that served in the pair of Congresses for the corresponding party switcher. For example, in Table 1 the only party switcher in the Jeffersonian-Republican versus Federalist period was Foster (RI), who switched from Federalist to Jeffersonian-Republican between the 6th and 7th Senates. Foster was one of 17 Senators who served in both the 6th and 7th Senates. The column marked "PCT" shows what percentage of the legislators serving in the pair of Congresses had d_{ion} values *less than* that of the party switcher. For Foster, 71% or 12 of the 17 Senators had smaller distances than Foster; four had larger distances.

The last column in Tables 1 and 2 indicates the *direction* of the shift of the party switcher. Different types of switches might imply different types of behavioral changes. Switches from one major party to the other are qualitatively different from switches between major and minor parties. MCs who switch from the Democratic to Republican Party, for example, would be expected to exhibit more conservative voting behavior after their switch. If a member switched from one major party to the other major party and that member's ideal point moved closer to the mean of the new party, we placed a "+" in the final column. If, however, a major-party switcher moved away from the mean of the new party, we placed a "–" in this column. A "0" indicates a non-major-party switch. As an illustrative case, take Representative Billy Tauzin, from Louisiana who switched from Democrat to Republican in 1995 (Table 2). We compared Tauzin's pre- and post-switch behavior with a set of 360 members who served with Tauzin in the corresponding Congresses (the column N). The magnitude of Tauzin's change in voting behavior was greater than all the members who did not switch (the PCT column). That shift was in the correct direction for a switch from Democrat to Republican (hence, the "+" in the final column) and significant (so his name appears in boldface).

Finally, our last indicator of change is a comparison of the magnitude of the change of the switcher *on the first dimension only*

(d_{ion} computed on the first dimension) with the corresponding standard errors of the first-dimension ideal points. Because the first dimension divides the two major parties in each of the three major party periods, major-party switchers will tend to move mostly along the first dimension. When a member's name appears in boldface in Tables 1 and 2, that member's d_{ion} computed along the first dimension is greater than the sum of the standard errors for the corresponding two ideal points.[6]

Most party switchers change either between Congresses or near the beginning of a Congress. There are, however, a few legislators who switched during a Congress. For those legislators, we determined when the switch took place and used the roll calls prior to the change to estimate x_{iko} and the roll calls after the switch to estimate x_{ikn}. We computed d_{ion} from these two ideal points and then compared it to all members who served in the current and next Congresses. Because fewer roll calls were used to estimate the ideal points of the within-Congress switchers, d_{ion} tends to be inflated somewhat for those legislators. Nevertheless, there were at least 70 roll calls to estimate the ideal point in every case.

To check our methodology, we computed measures of fit for DW-NOMINATE, our model (fixed cutting lines with legislators estimated for each Congress), and NOMINATE applied to each Congress separately (cutting lines and legislators estimated for each Congress). If our model accounts for most of the increase in fit from DW-NOMINATE to scaling each Congress separately, then our assumption of fixed cutting lines is reasonable.

For the House, the two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scaling correctly classified 86.1% of member votes with an aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) of 0.580 and a geometric mean probability (GMP) of 0.733. The figures for our model were 86.7%, an APRE of 0.595, and a GMP of 0.742, respectively. For each Congress separately, the figures are 86.8%, an APRE of 0.601, and a GMP of 0.743. For the Senate, the two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scaling correctly classified 84.8% of member votes with an APRE of 0.550 and a GMP of 0.719. For our model, the correct classification is 85.8%, an APRE of 0.579, and a GMP of 0.731. For each Congress separately, the figures are 85.9%, an APRE of 0.581, and a GMP of 0.733. In sum, our model fits almost as well as estimating each Congress separately. Thus we are capturing most of the change of fit from DW-NOMINATE to the separate Congress scalings with our model. That is, most of the difference in fit is due to shifting ideal points, *not* to shifting cutting lines.

As a further check on our methodology, we replicated the approach of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), who treat party switchers as

two separate legislators and then compare the two ideal points produced for each party switcher. We performed the same experiment, only with DW-NOMINATE coordinates rather than a rank ordering. Every party switch shown in Tables 1 and 2 was treated as two individuals in the roll-call data, with members who did not switch parties being treated as single individuals. We then estimated two-dimensional constant coordinates for the House and Senate of the 1st to 106th Congresses. Members who did not switch parties have the same ideal point throughout their careers, whereas members who switched have separate ideal points for each party. The magnitude and direction of the shift in the ideal points for the switchers closely parallel the results shown in Tables 1 and 2. We believe our approach of comparing switchers to other members in the same pair of Congresses is better than the paired ideal point approach because our approach provides a natural baseline for assessing ideal point shifts, since all legislators are allowed to move vis-à-vis a "fixed background."[7]

3. Discussion

Our three indicators of shift show that significant party shifts are relatively rare. The total number of party switches is 38 for the Senate and 160 for the House. We define a significant shift as one in which the switcher's movement is greater than at least 95% of the members in common between a pair of Congresses. In addition, if the switch is from one major party to another, we require that the switcher's movement be *toward* the new party—namely a "+" in the final column of Tables 1 and 2. By these criteria, only 6 of the 38 switches in the Senate are significant. One of these 6 is suspect because of the long time period between the two Congresses: Berrien (GA) was a Jackson supporter in the 20th Senate and returned as a Whig in the 27th Senate. Only four Senators served in both Senates. Berrien's change is the largest of the four and in the correct direction.

Four of the remaining five significant Senate switches occurred after World War II, with Wayne Morse (OR) accounting for two of them. In sum, there are too few cases in the Senate to establish a historical pattern.

In the House, 35 of the 160 party switches are significant—8 in the Democrat-Whig party system and 27 in the Democrat-Republican party system. Four of the eight switchers during the Democrat-Whig system were from Tennessee—Bell, Bunch, Forester, and Standifer[8]—and they all switched between the 23d and 24th Houses. The remaining four switchers were scattered, with no clear pattern. The 27 significant

switches in the Democrat-Republican party system are concentrated during the periods of high polarization[9] in the system, namely, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and during the past 30 years. Indeed, every switch in the House and Senate since 1983 has been significant (whether or not the shifts of Forbes and Goode in the House are significant cannot be determined until after the 107th Congress).[10]

Our results also bear upon the recent debate over Keith Krehbiel's question: "Where's the party?" That is, to what extent do political parties affect how members vote on roll calls over and above their personal preferences (Cox and Poole 2002a, 2002b; Krehbiel 1993; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001; Snyder and Groseclose 2000)? Detecting party pressure is an exceedingly difficult measurement problem. For example, suppose all members lie on a single liberal-conservative dimension and party leaders are applying pressure on members to vote the party line. If the party pressure moves the cutting point for the roll call past a "pressured" legislator and others very close to this MC ideologically, then the pressured member is on the correct side of the cutting point and is not voting contrary to his or her ideal point. In this case, party pressure is indistinguishable from leaders moving the cutting point using "explanations" and "interpretations" (Fenno 1978). For a member to be pressured, the MC must vote with the leadership *and* be on the wrong side of the cutting point. Hence, party pressure can only be detected by analyzing voting errors. *But this in turn means that the voting space must be properly estimated so that the errors are meaningful.* Even if this estimation is done correctly, the evidence suggests that party pressure is a very low-level effect *for those members not switching parties* during the post-World War II era (Cox and Poole 2002a, 2002b; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001).[11] Our findings for the past 30 years of increasing party polarization echo those reported by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001, Table 4). Namely, the roll-call voting patterns of major-party switchers change significantly. In our view, party is clearly important and common sense tells us that party pressure is real. Nevertheless, we cannot *directly* address the party pressure controversy with our results beyond stating that within periods of major party polarization, we find significant changes in roll-call voting behavior of major-party switchers.

4. Conclusion

In this article, we analyzed the roll-call voting behavior of legislators who switched party affiliation within three important party eras in American history. We observed very few instances of party defection

over a period of 79 Congresses (158 years). Although party defection is rare, the 198 instances of party switching during these periods allow us to form some important conclusions about the role that party plays in structuring roll-call behavior. Most notably, the effects of party switching are not constant over time. Party defections in periods of relatively low ideological polarization tend not to result in significant shifts in members' ideological positions within the chamber. Likewise, changes to and from major parties and minor parties or independent status tend not to result in major position shifts by party defectors. Significant changes in roll-call behavior among switchers are concentrated among those who leave one major party to join the other in periods of high ideological polarization.

While far from providing a definite conclusion to the work on party defection, our results serve both to inform scholars about the varying salience of party labels across time and to offer an important insight into another consequence of increasing ideological polarization.

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NOTES

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1. Canon and Sousa (1992) argue more generally that the instability associated with partisan realignments is at least partially the result of the decisions made by strategic politicians. They argue that party switching is one avenue available to ambitious politicians during such periods of instability. We focus primarily upon periods of partisan stability, but we do address the topic of party defection in other eras in a subsequent section of this paper.

2. Party labels were taken from Martis's (1989) *Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989*.

3. More precisely, with respect to Martis's (1989) codings, we did not include Pro- and Anti-Administration members who would later be classified as Federalist and Jeffersonian Republicans, respectively. We also excluded members whose codes changed from Jackson to Democrat, from Adams to Anti-Jackson, and from Anti-Jackson to Whig.

4. Keeping with our aim to err on the side of inclusion, we coded members who served as Democrats or Republicans and later labeled themselves Independent Democrats or Republicans as party switchers.

5. These numbers reflect the number of party switches, not the number of individuals who switched parties. The number of individuals who changed parties would actually be smaller because some individuals had multiple changes in party affiliation.

6. If we treat the roll-call parameters as exogenous, then we can use the information matrix for each legislator to compute standard errors for the x_{ikt}. Technically, these are *conditional* standard errors because the roll-call parameters are treated as being fixed.

7. Nokken (2000) also treats switchers as separate legislators and calculates pre- and post-switch agenda and leadership scores to determine whether or not party switches cause changes in roll-call behavior. Unlike Nokken, however, we do not run regressions with a set of ideologically proximate members. We compare member behavior with a set of common MCs who served in the subsequent session of Congress. Nevertheless, we are able to draw nearly the same set of conclusions from our analytical strategy, and we are able to assess the behavioral consequences of a larger set of switchers over a longer period of time with a consistent methodological approach.

8. According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives), the four representatives broke from the Jacksonian ranks and entered the 24th Congress as "White Supporters." Their break was the result of a disagreement with Jackson over the allotment of patronage positions and his antibanking policies. The representatives ultimately supported the presidential candidacy of Tennessee Senator Hugh Lawson White, also a former Jacksonian, over Jackson's preferred successor, Martin Van Buren, in 1836 (Holt 1999).

9. Detailed discussions of party polarization can be found in Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1997, 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; and King 1998.

10. As an additional check on our analysis, we also identified the set of House and Senate party switchers from the excluded Congresses. We identified 67 Senate and 254 House switchers. Three of the 67 Senate defectors and 19 of the 254 House defectors exhibit statistically significant shifts in their voting behavior following the move to a new party. We were unable to compute statistics for 40 members of the House, however, because so few members served in the corresponding pairs of Houses. The vast majority of statistically significant switches are centered in the Congresses that led up to the Civil War: all three significant Senate switches appear just prior to the Civil War, as do 15 of the 19 significant shifts in the House. Of the remaining four in the House, one significant switch appears in the Era of Good Feelings, during the Federalist-Jeffersonian system, and three occur in the 1870s. [The full list of members and results are available from the authors upon request.]

11. Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find substantial effects but their methodology—linear probability—is flawed. See the refereed but unpublished appendix to McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001, Appendix B (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001a). Also see Cox and Poole 2002a, 2002b for further criticisms.

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