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CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND SUPPORT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Recent studies of party leadership in Congress[1] call for comparative treatment with that other cadre of congressional leaders —the chairmen and ranking minority members of the standing committees. Such an effort seems worthwhile for two reasons. First, explication of the relation between these two congressional subsystems—in particular, the degree of "overlap" or "meshing" of the two leadership groups—seems important for a more complete understanding of the structure of congressional leadership. Second, such a comparative study provides an excellent opportunity to develop and test certain broader propositions concerning the influences shaping congressional leadership.

Considerable attention has been paid to the norms governing leadership selection—specifically, the seniority norm governing the selection of chairmen and what Richard Fenno calls the "seniority-protégé-apprenticeship" cluster of norms that distributes influence throughout the House.[2] Such explanations usefully stress the point that leadership-selection norms are part of a complex, ongoing process of institutionalization or institutional maintenance.[3] Yet emphasis on their contribution to institutional growth or maintenance may lead too facilely to the assumption that individual mem-

[1]See Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D. C.; The Brookings Institution, 1967; Randall B. Ripley, "The Development of Party Leadership in the United States Senate" (unpublished paper); and *Majority Party Leadership in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969); and Charles Jones, *Minority Party Leadership in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., forthcoming).

[2]Richard Fenno, "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House," in *The Congress and America's Future*, ed. by David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 52-76.

[3]See in addition to Fenno, Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March 1968), 144-168, and Polsby, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 1968).

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bers will support these norms solely out of institutional loyalty and thus fail to explore a possibly firmer political basis in the structure of group support. If norms governing leadership selection are prescriptions of how power in Congress should be distributed, one reasonable assumption is that power must exist in the first place to prescribe (or support the prescription) how power should be distributed. Norms are thus not only prescriptions of what should be, but descriptions of how things are. While "power in Congress" is widely agreed to be plural and situational, one important locus of power in such a collegial body with frequent decisions taken by majority vote is numerical predominance of members, i.e., strength of numbers. By this reasoning, one important source of support for norms governing leadership selection and stability in Congress would be the composition of the congressional party membership—in this case, the relevant "group" of followers whose structure may determine the kinds of leadership support.[4] Accordingly it may be useful to isolate this membership variable to explore the relation between attributes of leadership selected and attributes of congressional party membership support. This in no way disregards the complexity of the larger mutually reinforcing process of institutional growth and maintenance. It is rather an attempt to cut into this complexity to isolate and measure the impact of one key variable. While membership variables have been cited as one of a number of contributing factors in the institutionalization of the House,[5] and in party leadership change,[6] no attempt has been made to isolate this variable or to assess the magnitude of its impact, thus isolated, more generally on leadership selection and support.

By viewing congressional leadership as influenced by the com-

[4]For importance of group structure as influence in leadership, see Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership: Psychological Aspects," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. by David L. Sills, IX (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 99. For summary of related literature, see Gibb, "Leadership" in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, IV (2nd ed.; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 238-248.

[5]See Polsby articles, cited in fn. 3.

[6]Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September 1967), 675-693.

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position of congressional party membership (ultimately, the aggregate effect of election outcomes as formed over time), we can suggest a number of specific hypotheses that take us a considerable distance in exploring both the stability and structure of congressional leadership and the degree of overlap between the two leadership subsystems. (1) *The more stable and senior the congressional party membership, considered over a period of time, the more stable and senior the leadership.* Therefore, (2) *the two leadership subsystems should draw from the same senior stratum of congressional party membership and exhibit similarities in the stability of leadership careers.* Since norms are developed and strengthened over time, there would be no necessary expectation that extreme membership turnover in any one congress would result in an effective challenge to leadership in that congress, although the possibility has been raised by some writers. This is a point that can be explored below.

Assuming leadership requires membership support, (3) *no congressional party majority or clearly predominant faction on a salient dimension will remain over a period of time without at least proportionate representation in the leadership.* In other words, majority attributes of membership will be represented or "mirrored by" majority attributes of leadership—an expectation that appears to run counter to the three-decade-old liberal Democratic charge that the seniority system and the congressional Establishment "misrepresent" the congressional Democratic majority. "Clearly predominant faction" refers to membership divisions that may miss the +50% mark but that nevertheless constitute a strong plurality vis-à-vis other groupings on the same dimension. The decision rule applied here is that such a clearly predominant faction comprises at least 45% of the membership with the next largest faction more than 10 percentage points below. In marginal cases, membership percentages will be supplied to permit readers' application and assessment of either more or less strict definitions. "Salient dimension" refers to attributes commonly perceived by congressmen and students of Congress as influencing legislative behavior. Perhaps the two most commonly cited and the two used in this study are region and ideology (i.e., "liberalism" and "conservatism"). The time qualification in the hypothesis is necessary to exclude the short-term disjunction between leadership and mem-

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bership attributes that may occur after elections that produce substantial change in the congressional party membership. The expectation is that such disjunction would be eliminated over a period of time either by a return to earlier electoral (membership) alignments or if the change were lasting, by a corresponding change in leadership selected. From this third hypothesis it follows that (4) *the two leadership subsystems should exhibit similarities on those salient dimensions where a congressional party majority or clearly predominant faction exists and no necessary similarities where such a majority or predominant faction does not exist.*

The subsequent testing of these hypotheses is demanding in that it assumes that *only* the influence of membership composition shapes leadership selection and support in order to preserve the parsimony of the explanation, whereas additional influences may apply and obscure the hypothesized membership-leadership relation. To cite a minimal qualification, the particular leadership-selection system, by definition, may exclude some members and, by this exclusion, may alter the hypothesized relation. The two selection systems are ostensibly quite different. Committee leaders are selected automatically by the seniority system, which stipulates that committee members shall be ranked, by party, according to years of consecutive service on the committee. The top-ranking majority party member becomes the chairman. In contrast, party leaders are formally elected by the congressional party caucus. Thus, committee leaders must have compiled committee seniority. Party leaders, it would seem reasonable, must have demonstrated at least average party loyalty. And congressmen who change committees or tend to be party mavericks accordingly will not qualify for committee or party leadership posts. With such a deliberate weighting in the testing design, evidence in support of the hypotheses should merit serious consideration.

The data base utilized is the committee and party leadership of the Eightieth through Eighty-ninth congresses (1947-66) with an extended time span employed for testing hypothesis 1. Committee leadership includes the chairmen and ranking minority members of the standing committees; party leadership, the Speakers, Majority and Minority Leaders and two chief Whips of the House, the Majority and Minority Leaders and Whips of the Senate. Data drawn from the two parties and two chambers will help test the

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generality of the hypotheses. Results from other published studies are employed supplementarily and may demonstrate that a number of separate findings can be integrated within this one explanatory paradigm.

Hypothesis 1: *The more stable and senior the congressional party membership, considered over a period of time, the more stable and senior the leadership.* This relation can be tested in two stages: first, from data available for a century-long time span and, second, from a more intensive comparative analysis of the leadership of the past two decades. To begin with the committee leadership, Nelson Polsby's study of the institutionalization of the House supplies data for 1880-1963 on (1) percent violations of seniority in selecting chairmen; (2) percent first-term members; and (3) mean terms served by incumbent congressmen. For present purposes, these latter two indicators can be taken as measures of membership stability and correlated with the measure of violations in seniority in selecting chairmen, with the following results. As congressional membership became more stable from 1880 to 1963 (i.e., as percent first-term members declined), the seniority rule grew stronger (i.e., percent violations in seniority decreased). The correlation coefficient is .95. Similarly, as the mean terms of service for incumbents increased, the percent violations in seniority decreased. The correlation coefficient is -.79. An interrelation, of course, is implicit in Polsby's point that the three are all indicators of the process of institutionalization. The present data could support alternative conceptualizations. However, for purposes of testing the conceptualization set forth here in which increasing membership stability is taken to influence the growth of the seniority rule, the data support the first hypothesis for House committee leaders.

The Senate experience over the past century is not directly comparable but provides confirmatory evidence. As its name makes clear, the Senate is the more "senior" chamber. The constitutionally set minimum age for members is older. Constitutionally staggered elections build in a stability of membership not found in the House whereby in effect no more than 33% of the Senate can be freshmen. In the nineteenth century when a House seat was considered a "good thing" to be passed around, the Senate was a more remote, not-popularly-elected chamber. Note Woodrow

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Wilson's comparison of the leadership and membership of the two chambers in the nineteenth century:

> Leaders of the Senate . . . are generally men of long training in public affairs who have been under inspection by their fellow members for many sessions together. The Senate is inclined to follow its veterans . . . who by long service have gained a full experience. . . . The leaders of the House win their places . . . in a restless and changeful assembly few of whose members remain in the public service long enough to know any men's qualities intimately.[7]

With these constitutionally built-in differences in membership stability evident in the nineteenth century, it should be expected that the seniority rule for selecting committee chairmen would have been adopted earlier and adhered to more strongly in the Senate than in the House. And this is indeed the case. Ripley gives 1877 as the date after which "seniority was almost never violated"[8]—well before the twentieth-century emergence of a strong House seniority rule (1911-1925).[9] Membership stability in the Senate has continued to increase through the twentieth century, paralleling the House trend. But since seniority violations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were so infrequent in the first place, no additional corelation between membership stability and seniority is possible.

With increasing membership stability, the seniority of House speakers also increased, as Polsby's data indicate.[10] No direct comparison with the Senate is possible: the emergence fairly recently in the twentieth century of the majority and minority leaders as the key Senate leadership positions and the relegating of the President Pro Tem to an honorary position traditionally given the most senior majority party member precludes any long-term analysis of trends.

But if the first hypothesis holds, given the current high levels of membership stability in both chambers, one should expect to find strong similarities between party leaders and committee leaders in their career patterns for the past two decades, a period of time for which comparison is possible. In view of the fact that the two

[7]Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1908; New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 137, 138.
[8]Ripley, "Party Leadership in the United States Senate," 24.
[9]*Ibid.*, 25; Polsby, "Seniority System," 27.
[10]Polsby, "U. S. House of Representatives," 149.

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selection processes are ostensibly quite different, such a similarity in outcomes of the process would constitute strong support for the first hypothesis and provide evidence directly for hypothesis 2: The *two leadership subsystems should draw from the same senior stratum of congressional party membership and exhibit similarities in the stability of leadership careers.*

Table 1 presents comparative data on party and committee leaders serving during the 1947-66 period. The first point it suggests is that both groups are quite clearly congressional seniors. Average age of congressional leadership is in the sixties. Both leadership groups have compiled substantial congressional seniority before gaining leadership posts. Indeed, party leaders outrank committee leaders in congressional seniority in three of the four congressional parties. It is commonly recognized that the seniority rule governing the election of chairmen by stipulating consecutive committee service presupposes advanced congressional seniority as a criterion for leadership. But party leadership selection appears to produce the same effect. In 1961, for example, the Speaker of the House (Rayburn) was also the most senior man in the House, and the majority leader (McCormack) ranked seventh in congressional seniority in the House.

TABLE 1

THE "SENIORITY" OF PARTY LEADERS AND COMMITTEE LEADERS COMPARED: 1947-66

	Median Age of Leadership (during terms of service)		Median No. Years to Gain Leadership		Median No. Years in Leadership Position	
	Party Leaders	CC's/ RMM's	Party Leaders	CC's/ RMM's	Party Leaders	CC's/ RMM's
Democrats						
Senate	60	66.0	10	10	6	8
House	62	65.5	21	16	16	6
Republicans						
Senate	64	63.5	11.5	7	3	4
House	62	62.5	16	12	8	6

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Given this similarity in congressional seniority, it might be expected that party leaders could also have succeeded to committee chairs. This is to some extent the case. Of the eleven party leaders who had received committee assignments during the 1947-66 period, four were chairmen or ranking minority members, one held a second rank, and three a third rank on committees by the time of their elevation to the position of party leader.[11] One clear difference between the two groups—the party leaders' tendency to change committees more frequently than all senior members and the committee leaders, with subsequent loss of the committee seniority necessary to gain a chairmanship[12]—can explain why even more party leaders had not attained top committee rank.

A second suggestion is that career patterns for both groups are similar in that they include a recognized series of stages—i.e., apprenticeship posts—on the way to leadership. This situation is built in by the seniority system. But it also applies to party leadership selection, although in that case the series of apprenticeship posts are greatly abbreviated to a two-step (Whip-Floor Leader) or three-step (Whip-Floor Leader-Speaker) process. The clearest instance of this recruitment pattern is observable for the House Democrats where over the past two decades, Rayburn held sway as Speaker, was replaced at his death by Majority Leader McCormack, whose position as floor leader was filled in turn by Albert, the Majority Whip. Senate Democrats and Republicans, however, have each followed this recruitment pattern in at least one instance.

Some understanding of the stability of the process can be gained from Table 2 which lists occupants of these top party positions for the past two decades and underlines the instances when a "violation" of the seniority-apprenticeship process occurred: either

[11]The other three lower in rank held committee positions 4, 6, and 18, respectively. The last was the result of Representative Albert's committee change in the same congress in which he became Majority Leader.

[12]The simple dichotomy was employed for congressmen who have stayed on at least one committee of initial assignment and those who have not. By this measure, career patterns of party and committee leaders differ significantly. Eighty-five percent of the committee leaders serving from 1957 on had stayed with one committee of initial assignment as opposed to less than half of the party leaders (5 of the 11 or 45 percent). The average for all congressmen of ten or more years congressional service was 62 percent.

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TABLE 2

PARTY LEADERSHIP STABILITY, 1947-66

		80th C.	81st	82nd	83rd	84th	85th	86th	87th	88th	89th
HD	1	Rayburn	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	M	M
	2	McCormack	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	A	A
	3		Priest	P		Albert	A	A	A	Boggs	B
	No. of violations = 0										
HR	1	Martin	M	M	M	M	M	Halleck	H	H	Ford
	2	Halleck	Arends	A	H	A	A	A	A	A	A
	3	Arends			A						
	No. of violations = 3										
SD	1	Barkley	L	McFarland	J	J	J	J	M	M	M
	2	Lucas	Myers	Johnson	Clements	C	Mansfield	M	Humphrey	H	Long
	No. of violations = 0										
SR	1	White	W	W	Taft	Knowland	K	D	D	D	D
	2	Wherry	Salton-stall	S	S	S	Dirksen	Kuchel	K	K	K
	No. of violations = 3										

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(1) when a congressman was removed from his post; or (2) when he retained his post but was not raised to a vacant higher leadership position. An initial indicates that the same man continued in office or upon a vacancy was promoted from the next ranking office. A change in incumbents for an office where no underlining is shown indicates that the previous incumbent has left Congress—through death, retirement, or a move to the Vice-Presidency.

If one takes each of the nine organizations of Congress from the Eighty-first (1949-50) through the Eighty-ninth (1965-66) as providing opportunity for 67 of the two kinds of violations listed above (not counting appointment of new Whips, but counting reappointment of Whips), one finds that only six of the cases—all occurring in the Republican Party—could under the most generous estimate be called violations. The three occasions for Senate Republicans involve promotions over Saltonstall, who held the Whip position, to the position of floor leader. And there is no evidence that Saltonstall, who at the time was approaching retirement, wanted the job as floor leader. One instance for the House Republicans merely involved the "compression" in number of leadership posts caused by a change to minority party status. In 1949 and 1955 when the Democrats organized the House, Speaker Martin had to step down to become Minority Leader and floor leader Halleck was temporarily removed from leadership while Arends remained Whip. If the hierarchy assumed here had strictly followed, Halleck, not Arends, would have become Whip, so this has been counted as one violation. The only two clear-cut cases involved Halleck's election to minority leader over Martin in 1959 and Ford's election over Halleck in 1965. Even counting all six, however, the frequency (9%) of deviations from the recruitment process is sufficiently low to support the inference that party leaders, like committee leaders, are recruited through a stable, predictable series of subaltern posts to leadership.[13]

[13]As a sub-query on the relation between membership and leadership, do the infrequent effective challenges to committee or party leadership tend to occur in those congresses marked by extreme membership turnover, and in particular by a reduction in the seniority of the congressional party membership? Cf. Fenno, "The House," 71. Peabody's analysis of House party leadership change, cited in fn. 6 suggests that loss in party strength and seniority strength may both help produce leadership challenge. The two cases of

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In sum, career patterns of both subsystems would seem similar in length of prior service, existence of apprenticeship posts, the security that comes from the stability and predictability of the selection process, and in a common dependence on seniority norms.

Hypothesis 3: *No congressional party majority or clearly predominant faction on a salient dimension will remain over a period of time without at least proportionate representation in the leadership.* And hypothesis 4: *The two leadership subsystems should exhibit similarities on those salient dimensions where a congressional party majority or clearly predominant faction exists and no necessary similarity where such a majority or predominant faction does not exist.* These two hypotheses may be tested together, following the decision rules explained above, first for region and then for ideology in the Eightieth through Eighty-ninth congresses. A conventional four-part classification scheme is utilized for region—East, South, Midwest, and West.[14] It should be clear that the measures utilized may only tap "descriptive" or "symbolic" representation between membership and leadership subsystems and not deeper

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effective challenge to House party leaders as defined by this study—the Halleck victory over Martin in the Eighty-sixth Congress and the Ford victory over Halleck in the Eighty-ninth—occurred in congresses marked by sharp reductions in Republican House seats and increases in the percent of Republicans found in the five most junior classes (but not congresses marked by increases in the percent of freshmen). Adam Clayton Powell's loss of his chairmanship occurred similarly after House Democrats had suffered a sharp loss in party strength, but no increase in the percent of Democrats in the five most junior classes. At this point, however, the data are too limited to specify whether change in either party or seniority strength or both are necessary correlates of leadership challenge.

[14]There is general agreement on state classification when a four-part scheme is used. See, for example, the usual *Congressional Quarterly* regional breakdowns, and Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Baine, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960). States are classified as follows: East includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia; South includes Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; Midwest includes Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas; West includes Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, California. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted as being too new to receive leadership posts.

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differences in legislative behavior that may or may not lie beyond superficial similarities. Any further in-depth study of leadership characteristics is beyond the scope of this study.[15] Yet given the recurring congressional battles to "liberalize" steering committees or modify the "Southern-biased" seniority system, even such symbolic representation would seem of considerable importance to the congressmen themselves. Such analysis, therefore, would seem at least a necessary first step for more detailed exploration.

Table 3 presents ample evidence to characterize each of the ten-year spans. In the three cases where a predominant regional faction could be identified for the congressional party membership —the South for Senate and House Democrats in 1947-56 and the Midwest for House Republicans—that region also comprised the predominant faction in the two leadership groups. It can be noted that for three cases marked by no predominant membership faction, a dominant and similarly dominant faction could be identified for the leadership. The only case in the table where the two leadership groups differed—1957-66 Senate Republicans—indicated no predominant membership faction.

Beyond this summary data, it should be noted that the full regional distributions for membership and committee leadership in the four congressional parties are quite closely aligned. Thus regions with smaller numbers of congressional party members have correspondingly smaller numbers of committee posts.[16] What these findings mean, of course, is that over a period of time the seniority system does not build a substantial regional bias into the selection of chairmen—a point that contradicts the traditional liberal Northern Democratic charge against the seniority system. Rather, within a generally safe, senior congressional membership, where only the minority fraction of seats are subject to doubt at any election, a

[15]Few intensive studies of individual leaders exist, but see Ralph Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (June 1961), 333-344; Charles Jones, "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (August 1968), 617-646; and John Manley, "Wilbur Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June 1969), 442-464.

[16]For documentation of the point, see Barbara Hinckley, "Seniority in the Committee Leadership Selection of Congress," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 13 (November 1969), 613-630.

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TABLE 3

MEMBERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP SUBSYSTEMS COMPARED: PREDOMINANT REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1947-66*

	Membership		Committee Leadership		Party Leadership	
			1947—1956			
	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction
SD	117	South 52%	40	South 48%	6	South (3)
HD	1131	South 51%	95	South 60%	4	South (3)
SR	117	No Predom. Faction (Midwest 44%; East 34%)	39	No Predom. Faction (Midwest 49%; East 41%)	5	No Predom. Faction (East (2); Midwest (2))
HR	1037	Midwest 54%	95	Midwest 62%	3	Midwest (2)
			1957—1966			
	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction
SD	143	No Predom. Faction	40	South 57%	4	South (2)
HD	1324	No Predom. Faction	99	South 62%	4	South (3)
SR	99	No Predom. Faction	37	East 46% (Midwest 35%)	3	West (2)
HR	839	No Predom. Faction (Midwest 43%; East 36%)	95	Midwest 51%	4	Midwest (3)

*Numbers refer to congressmen counted for each election won.

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"seniority" rule is not that restricting, or biasing, a leadership requirement.[17]

The time qualification is necessary here since the seniority system builds a time lag into the process of leadership selection. Thus by the Eighty-eighth Congress the South had fallen to 36% of the Senate Democratic membership, but still possessed well over half the chairmanships, reflecting membership relations of earlier years. Indeed, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that a similar time lag may affect party leadership selection, which is understandable in view of the similar seniority required of them. Comparing the 1947-56 and the 1957-66 results, it is noticeable that as the South lost its predominant place in Senate and House Democratic membership, it retained predominance among both leadership groups in the 1957-66 period. And as the Midwest lost its predominance in the House Republican membership, it similarly retained its leadership predominance.

It is more difficult to test the hypotheses for ideological parallels in membership and leadership. But some indication can be provided by utilizing *Congressional Quarterly*'s scores based on the percentage of times a congressman opposed the Conservative Coalition on those roll calls where the Coalition was in evidence.[18] On that basis, it is possible to identify congressmen as "liberal," "moderate," or "conservative" and to assess the relative strength of these groupings among the membership and leadership. Although admittedly arbitrary, we have employed the following definitions which accord well with widely accepted perceptions of individual congressmen:[19]

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (1960), 117-125; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 (November 27, 1964), 2741-2750; and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 24 (December 30, 1966), 3078-3090.

[19] For example, Clark of Pennsylvania is a "liberal," Johnson of Texas and Muskie of Maine are "moderates." In this case, such a classification scheme seemed preferable to one based on the distribution of scores, since the latter would have prejudged the relative strength of the three categories (e.g., by an equal tri-part classification, or by use of the standard deviation). It may be noted that no reasonable classification scheme would have resulted in a predominant faction for Senate or House Democrats.

Scores of congressmen whose combined coalition support and opposition did not total 80 percent were excluded since low voting attendance would lower the "liberalism" of the score.

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"Conservative": votes less than 40% opposed to the Conservative Coalition

"Liberal": votes 80% or more opposed to the Conservative Coalition

"Moderate": votes between 40% and 79% opposed to the Conservative Coalition.

Despite the limitations of the data, results reported in Table 4 supply some indication of ideological alignments in the four congressional parties from 1959 to 1966. Results in three of the four cases accord with the relation stated in hypothesis 3. The Senate Republican conservative membership, however, has produced a shared conservative-moderate party leadership.

Differences between the two leadership groups can be explained by specific criteria of the two selective processes without denying the validity of the hypotheses tested here. Party leadership roles require not only support but active leadership in behalf of the party in Congress. With this expectation, it would seem that as a minimum requirement the recruitment process would need to exclude party voting mavericks—i.e., in terms of the *Congressional Quarterly* scoring employed above, Democratic conservatives and Republican liberals. A further criterion has been suggested by David Truman and others that party leaders should be moderates, capable of mediating across intra-party factions, although Truman points out that in the time of his study, this criterion held for the Democratic, but not the Republican leadership.[20] Applied to the present findings, the criterion of moderateness appears to hold for three of the four congressional parties. The party-support criterion applies to all four. For committee leadership selection, the seniority system stipulates years of consecutive service on the committee—or committee seniority—and thus presupposes years of consecutive service in Congress—or congressional seniority. No clear relation between region and either seniority variable could be ascertained, but there is some indication that for the Democrats those lowest in party support and in opposition to the Conservative Coalition (i.e., most conservative) tended to have relatively more committee seniority than other congressional Demo-

[20]David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959), 131, 132.

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TABLE 4

MEMBERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP SUBSYSTEMS COMPARED: "LIBERAL"-"CONSERVATIVE" VOTING BEHAVIOR, 1959-66[a]

	Membership		Committee Leadership		Party Leadership	
	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction	N	Predom. Faction
SD	210	No Predom. Faction (Moderate 43%; Conservative 31%)	62	Conservative 63%	8	Moderate (7)
HD	918	No Predom. Faction (Liberal 42%; Moderate 31%)	77	Conservative 57%	7	Moderate (5)
SR	112	Conservative 80%	57	Conservative 84%	8	No Predom. Faction (Conservative (4); Moderate (4))
HR	567	Conservative 81%	75	Conservative 83%	8	Conservative (8)

[a]Numbers refer to congressmen's scores for each congress counted separately. Essentially the same results would be obtained by averaging a congressman's scores. Thus party leaders' average scores yield the following results and the same factional divisions as reported in the table: Senate Democrats, 4 Moderates of 4; House Democrats, 3 Moderates of 3; Senate Republicans, 1 Conservative and 1 Moderate of 2; and House Republicans, 3 Conservatives of 3.

Scores for party and committee leaders are counted only for congresses when they occupied a leadership post. Since the Speaker does not vote, only scores for floor leaders and Whips are included in the House congressional parties.

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crats.[21] This indication combined with the Southern predominance in congressional party membership can help explain the conservative cast to the Democratic committee leadership. Given these different tendencies in the two selection processes, the similarities that do obtain are impressive. Thus Democratic party leaders, like committee leaders, are drawn from the predominant Southern membership even though that requires finding non-conservative, party-supporting Southerners to fill the requirements of the party leadership role. Indeed, to name the congressmen who in the past two decades have fulfilled the dual requirements of being (1) senior and Southern and yet (2) non-conservative is virtually to give the list of Democratic party leaders—a point suggesting how very restrictive Democratic party leadership selection has been in the 1947-66 period.

These findings permit a clearer delineation of the degree of overlap between the two leadership groups. Within the same senior stratum of congressional membership, party leaders are drawn from the same regional, but different ideological, substratums.

IMPLICATIONS

The present study has attempted to subsume a number of disparate findings concerning congressional leadership within one explanatory paradigm. Such attempts at ordering seem increasingly necessary as empirical research proliferates in the legislative behavior field and particularly helpful in the case of leadership studies dealing with the complex, dynamic interaction processes that accompany institutional growth and maintenance. Support for the hypotheses derived from this "membership" or "group-structural" model may be of wider interest to students of leadership in addition to contributing directly to the study of congressional behavior. Thus comparative committee studies might usefully employ such a group-structural model to categorize and explain varie-

[21]Barbara Hinckley, *Seniority and Representation in Congress* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).

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ties of committee leadership based on the recent evidence of differences in committee norms and committee cohesiveness.[22]

The empirical findings presented here offer a first exploration of the degree of "meshing" or "overlap" of the two leadership subsystems. Similar career patterns can be identified in length of service prior to leadership, existence of apprenticeship posts, and the security that comes from the stability and predictability of the selection process. Similarities extend to seniority and region. Differences, built in by the different criteria of the two selection processes, can be observed in ideology and party support and in distinct committee career patterns—as marked by the decision to stay or not to stay with at least one committee of initial assignment. These differences in turn suggest that the initial leadership recruitment is in some part a self-selection process that begins quite early in the congressional career. By changing committees (as a majority of party leaders have tended to do) or by voting frequently against party positions (as Democratic, but not Republican, committee leaders have tended to do), an ambitious congressman may foreclose early in his congressional career one of these routes to influence in Congress.

Party and committee leaders have "grown up together" congressionally speaking. Their shared seniority and dependence on the stability of the leadership selection processes suggest common institutional loyalties and well-developed lines of communication and support. It might then be expected that, despite differences in policy stands, mutual accommodation and support should occur on precisely those questions of "seniority" and "reform" that touch their vested interest in the congressional institution. No reliable

[22]See especially Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (June 1962), 310-324; and Manley, "Wilbur Mills." On the "representativeness" of committee leadership, note Lewis Froman's analysis of Senate and House committee membership in the Eighty-eighth Congress. There were only three Senate committees where a combination of Southern Democrats and Republicans did not equal a majority or only one less than a majority—Commerce, Interior, and Public Works. In the House, there was only one such committee—Education and Labor. Froman, *The Congressional Process* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 180. The chairman in each of these exceptional cases was also a Northern non-conservative Democrat: Magnuson (Washington) of Commerce; Jackson (Washington) of Interior; McNamara (Michigan) of Public Works; and Powell (New York) of House Education and Labor.

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evidence exists on this point, and it would well repay some systematic study. Two recent instances can be noted. Although Majority Leader McCormack had by 1962 accumulated considerable unpopularity among both Southerners and Democratic Study Group Liberals, his election to the Speakership was not contested. One key reason cited was that McCormack received the support of two powerful House chairmen—Vinson and Smith.[23] A second, more detailed illustration of the consultation and interaction between party and committee leaders is provided by Speaker Rayburn's long-awaited acquiescence in the Eighty-seventh Congress to the plan to expand the Rules Committee.[24]

Democratic Study Group Liberals had been negotiating with Rayburn since the Eighty-sixth Congress for changes on the Rules Committee, which was notorious for obstructing liberal legislation through a combined conservative Democratic and Republican majority. Rayburn demurred on the grounds that he had an "agreement" with the Republican leadership not to change the size of the committee or the eight to four majority-minority ratio. At the beginning of the Eighty-seventh Congress, the issue was raised again in the form of a liberal attempt to "punish" the five Democrats who had refused to back the Democratic presidential candidate in the 1960 election by stripping them of their seniority and their committee posts. One of the five was William Colmer, a conservative and second-ranking majority member on the Rules Committee. The proposed party discipline was to affect the liberal-conservative ratio of the Rules Committee by replacing conservative Colmer with a moderate. While Rayburn did not agree to the liberal proposal, he did agree to try for an enlargement of the committee, which would give the liberals a tenuous eight to seven majority, but which would allow the five threatened conservatives to keep their committee seniority. Prior to this decision, he discussed the matter with committee chairman Vinson and received his support for enlargement. Rayburn consulted with Howard Smith, Chairman of

[23]Peabody, "Party Leadership Change," 682.

[24]See Richard Bolling, *House Out of Order* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965), 207-216; and Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and Robert L. Peabody, "The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules . . .," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1963), 167-194.

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Rules. Bolling reports that throughout the days preceding the Rules fight, "messages shuttled back and forth between Rayburn and Smith."[25] Smith agreed to report out the resolution for enlargement, although he reserved the right to vote against it. Despite the severe differences between Rayburn and Smith on the issue, the existence of this consultation and communication deserves emphasis. And the nature of Rayburn's decision itself merits further comment. Liberal Democratic Senator Clark remarks on Rayburn's decision not to remove Colmer:

> That would have constituted a crime against the Establishment, which places far more emphasis on the prerogatives and traditions of the Congress as an institution than it does on a Presidential program. To remove Colmer could have meant tampering with seniority. . . risking a rupture with the Southern wing of the Party.[26]

Rayburn's decision can be seen as a compromise that supported neither faction, but one that, given the alternatives, was not wholly unsatisfactory to either. It was a decision taken after consultation with key committee chairmen and, throughout, an excellent example of a senior party leader's support of the principle of seniority. Of course, whether these two cases represent the normal pattern in leadership interaction and support would require considerably more research to determine.

Finally, the present findings underscore a crucial fact that is often lost sight of—that congressional elections make a difference. In dictating the composition of congressional party membership, they not only affect what may or may not be done in any one congress, but they also build in patterns of leadership for a number of future congresses.

[25]Bolling, *House Out of Order*, 216.

[26]Joseph Clark, *The Sapless Branch* (rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 132.

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