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The Institutionalization of Leadership In the U.S. Congress

The theory of institutionalization (Polsby 1968) provides a framework for understanding how Congress has changed. I apply this theory to leadership institutions in the House and Senate, focusing on the durability, boundedness, internal complexity, and universal norms and rules of the leadership. Existing theory does not fare as well in explaining why institutions change. Gradual historical forces, such as increased societal complexity, cannot explain the evolution of institutions, nor do they recognize the tensions between different aspects of change. I offer a theory of change, based on partisan stability, external conditions, member goals, and the utilization of leadership institutions.

Leadership in the U.S. Congress is constantly evolving. In the past century, "Czarist" Speakers, a "King Caucus," and powerful committee chairmen ruled the House, and autocratic leaders, committee barons, and collegial leaders led the Senate. Since the mid-1970s, leadership has responded to increased individualism and decentralization in the House and Senate by becoming more inclusive and service-oriented but also more institutionalized. This essay will examine the dimensions of institutionalization and ask the more general question, "How and why do leadership institutions change?"

The theory of institutionalization employed by Polsby (1968), Hibbing (1988), and others provides an excellent basis for answering the "how" part of the question. It also permits a focus on changes in leadership institutions that transcend the importance of any given leader. Most leadership studies are reluctant to generalize because of the perceived importance of leadership style and personality (Mackaman and Sachs 1988, 16–17, 38–39). The theory does not fare as well in explaining why institutions change (Hibbing 1988, 707–10). Gradual historical forces, such as increased societal complexity, cannot explain the evolution of institutions, nor do they recognize the tensions between different aspects of change.

The central part of this article addresses the question of how leadership institutions change, with a focus on the 1970s and 1980s. Changes in House and Senate leadership before this period are well doc-

umented (Ripley 1967; Peabody 1976) and therefore will be discussed only to place them within the framework of institutionalization theory. Differences between the two institutions are discussed throughout. In the conclusion, I speculate about the consequences of institutionalization and present a theory of why leadership institutions change.

Components of the Institutionalization of Leadership

The institutionalization of leadership in the House and Senate is indicated by four vaguely hierarchical characteristics. The first, durability, is the most fundamental; institutions must survive in order to develop. The second and third—internal complexity and boundedness—evolve together during the second stage; as institutions become more complex they are more well bounded and autonomous. The fourth, the universal norms and rules employed by the leadership, are the last to develop because they tend to undermine strong leadership. I will discuss each in turn.

Institutional Durability

The only constitutionally prescribed officers of Congress are the Speaker of the House, the vice-president (who serves as president of the Senate), and the president pro tempore of the Senate. The other leadership positions in the House and Senate survive by custom, inertia, and institutional need. Therefore, durability is not a foregone conclusion.

To be characterized as durable, leadership institutions must meet two conditions: first, clearly defined leadership offices must persist over time and, second, powers and duties must have institutional rather than personal definition. Evidence for the first condition is easily obtained, but distinguishing between institutional and personal power is more complicated. Dramatic changes in the patterns of leadership associated with leadership turnover would indicate personal, rather than institutional, leadership. Evidence presented in this section indicates that House leadership is highly institutionalized, while Senate leadership is less stable and more personalized, especially in the Republican party.

Durability of House leadership. Both parties in the House have met the first condition of durability for more than a half a century. The top three leadership positions have existed continuously since the turn of the century.[1] The next level of leadership—the whip system, the party caucuses (or Conference, for the Republicans), the Rules commit-

tees, and policy committees—have undergone changes in the twentieth century, but they too have had a continuous existence. However, until the 1970s, patterns of leadership often changed dramatically as a result of leadership turnover, thus violating the second condition of durability. Sam Rayburn did not use the whip system in the 1950s, breaking with past practices. Barbara Sinclair reports that the whip, Carl Albert, had nothing to do, and Hale Boggs, the deputy whip, had "double nothing to do" (1983, 55). The Republicans' whip system was more stable (Leslie Arends was whip from 1943 to 1974), but the role of their other party institutions, the Republican Conference and the Policy Committee, varied greatly. John Byrnes transformed the Policy Committee into a vital part of the leadership from 1959 to 1965, after which time the Conference became more central (Jones 1970, 153–60).

Since the early 1970s, Democratic leadership has met the second condition for durability, exhibiting continuity through several leadership changes. The whip system was greatly expanded and activated by Tip O'Neill, but the trend continued under John Brademas, Tom Foley, and Tony Coelho. The Speaker's task forces, used by O'Neill to promote an inclusive leadership style, have been expanded under the leadership of Jim Wright. Similarly, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) was transformed into a money-making machine under Coelho and the committee's practices were institutionalized by Beryl Anthony.

Leadership in the minority party tends to be volatile, responding more dramatically than majority party leadership to external events, such as changes in the party of the president and electoral disasters. However, the Republican leadership in the House has been more durable in the 1970s and 1980s. The whip system was strengthened under Trent Lott, and in the early days of the 101st Congress it appeared that Dick Cheney would carry on his practices.[2] William Connelly concludes that the Policy Committee "has not changed fundamentally" in the past 20 years, despite membership and leadership change (1988, 26). The leadership of Robert Michel has also contributed to continuity; in the 101st Congress, he will become the minority leader with the longest continuous service.

The increased durability of the Democratic and Republican party leadership in the House does not mean that institutionalization obliterates the imprint of individual leaders. Jim Wright is more involved in policy than Tip O'Neill was, and Tony Coelho has a style different from Tom Foley's. However, leadership discretion is constrained in an institutionalized setting (Smith 1985, 228). As leadership institu-

tions become durable, as I define that quality here, they develop inertia and expectations among the rank and file that are difficult to change.

Durability of Senate leadership. Senate leadership is not as durable as leadership in the House, especially in the Republican party. Party offices have fallen into disuse in various periods, and positions are defined by the skills and style of given leaders, rather than by the institution. There are several reasons for this lack of durability, each of which I will discuss in turn. First, there is not a long tradition of strong formal leadership in the Senate. While the House had a Speaker in the first Congress, the first floor leader in the Senate was elected in 1911 (Peabody, 1976, 325–29). The first Senate whip was elected in 1913, but did not play much of a role until the 1950s. Lacking clearly defined purposes, lower party offices have been unstable. Second, Senate leadership changes readily in response to changing external conditions (primarily, changes in which party controls the presidency). Third, given its size, the Senate has always been more disposed to personal leadership.

The first condition of durability has not been met by either party during the twentieth century. While parties have continuously elected majority and minority leaders in this period, stability in the lower leadership offices is less evident. Peabody reports that Republicans did not even bother to elect a whip between 1935 and 1944, and some whips, such as Lister Hill (Democratic whip from 1941 to 1947), "voluntarily gave up the job because they did not feel the position was worth the effort" (1976, 331). A deputy whip and assistant whips were appointed by the Democrats in 1937 but were soon discarded (Oleszek 1985, 9). More recently, the Republicans abolished their whip system, which had grown to 16 assistant whips by the 96th Congress. This incident deserves brief discussion because it illustrates the instability of Senate leadership and the importance of external conditions in dictating change.

In 1981, when the Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time in 20 years, they disbanded their whip system. This move is counterintuitive: the responsibilities of being in the majority and having to pass an ambitious presidential agenda should create a greater need for a whip system. But a top leadership aide explained that the principal service provided by the whip system was floor coverage, and the presiding officer of the Senate, who was now a Republican, could play that role.[3] The other two important functions of the whip system, whip counts and the dissemination of information, are done through other channels. Howard Green, the party secretary, handles whip counts, and the Policy Committee serves as the primary source of

agenda and policy information. The Republicans abolished their whip system in part because the division of labor broke down. The system was underutilized, because the whips did not know what they were supposed to do. "Functions were fairly ill-defined," the aide said. "There was not a clear sense of getting anything done, so the assistant whips did not feel they were having an impact. More basically, there just was not that much for them to do."[4]

The second condition, that leadership be institutionally defined, is less likely to hold in the Senate than in the House. For example, the roles of the Republican Policy Committee and the Democratic Conference have depended greatly on who led those groups. When Robert Taft or Styles Bridges chaired the Policy Committee, it was an important arm of the leadership. However, because the leadership was not institutionally defined, the committee's role changed greatly under the guidance of Bourke Hickenlooper and John Tower. Similarly, Robert Byrd as secretary of the Democratic Conference transformed it into a valuable service organization, but he was unique in that regard. For others, there is an initial period of adjustment, before they put their own imprint on the office. Robert Dole, for example, initially exhibited institutionalized leadership by following past practices: "Not having served as Party leader of the Senate, Senator Dole concluded that instead of trying out some new procedures immediately, he would utilize selected established processes until he had more time to examine and study the existing procedures" (Riddick 1985, 20). Within a few months, Dole had implemented his own brand of leadership, with his "quorum government" allowing him to be at the center of most negotiation (Deering 1986). This pattern typifies personalized leadership and is less likely to happen in an institutionalized system.

Another way of understanding the same point is that leadership institutions in the Senate are not strong enough to compel a reluctant to lead. Two successive Democratic Whips, Russell Long (1965–69) and Edward Kennedy (1969–71), were not willing to make the personal sacrifices that are required of Senate leaders. Long complained that the whip's position is "a grueling, day-to-day, thankless, time-consuming job of being around when nobody else cares to be" (quoted in Peabody 1976, 366). Kennedy, who defeated Long in 1969, found that he did not enjoy the duties of the position any more than his predecessor.

Robert Byrd's actions as whip and floor leader are further evidence of the personal rather than institutional, nature of leadership in the Senate. Byrd transformed the whip's office, becoming very active in scheduling and in the formation of complex unanimous consent agreements. But when he was elected majority leader, he continued to play

the same role. Steven Smith and Marcus Flathman show in this issue of *LSQ* that in the 92d Congress (Byrd's first year as whip) the majority whip sponsored 66 complex unanimous consent agreements on key-vote measures, while the majority leader sponsored only 37. By contrast, in the 88th Congress, the majority leader had sponsored 23 of the 24 complex unanimous consent agreements formed by the leadership. When Byrd became majority leader, he sponsored all 71 of the agreements formed by the leadership, while Cranston was relegated to a much smaller role as whip. In a durable leadership system, the tasks would have remained in the whip's domain, once they had been defined as tasks performed by that office.

Institutional Boundaries

Polsby defines a well-bounded institution as one that is "differentiated from its environment" (1968, 145). Well-bounded leadership systems are not permeable; they have career structures that promote leaders from within. Other defining characteristics include long apprenticeships before top leadership positions are attained, lengthy tenure in leadership, and careers that finish in leadership positions (Polsby 1968, 148–52). By these measures, the top level of leadership in the House was well bounded by 1900.[5] Institutionalization is well documented for the House Democratic leadership (Hinckley 1970; Sinclair 1983; Brown and Peabody 1987), but relatively little attention has been directed to leadership career paths in the other three legislative parties, where leadership boundaries have been less distinct, or to careers in the extended leadership systems. I will show that boundaries have become more clearly defined for Senate Democrats and House Republicans and that additional evidence of institutionalization may be gained from examining career patterns below the top leadership in all of the legislative parties.

When positions below the top leadership are examined, it is evident that a well-bounded leadership system emerges in four stages. In the first stage, newly formed leadership positions are not the objects of intense competition; the leadership is permeable and turnover is high. In the second stage of development, as the number of leadership positions expands, top positions will be hotly contested but lower-level positions will not. In the third stage, there is competition at all levels of the leadership structure, and lower positions emerge as stepping stones to high party office; apprenticeship in the institution becomes a requirement for movement into the leadership. Voluntary retirement from the leadership system is relatively rare, and careers in leadership tend to be

long. Finally, in a fully institutionalized system, competition continues at lower levels in the structure, but the top position will be uncontested as the heir apparent reaches the top of the ladder. The ladder extends deeper into the structure as the leadership becomes more institutionalized (in the 100th Congress, neither Tom Foley nor Jim Wright was challenged for the top position in his party in the House).[6]

Establishing boundaries in House leadership. The House Democratic party is the most institutionalized of the legislative parties. Having held majority status continuously for 36 years, the House Democrats have developed long-term career expectations and stable institutions. Though the pattern of succession is not written in stone, recent experience indicates it has solidified for the top three positions (whip to majority leader to Speaker). This ladder is unlikely to be challenged in the near future. With the top leadership progression firmly in place, most career decisions are made lower in the system. Little is known, however, about career patterns in the extended leadership.

The whip system is now the training ground and incubator for aspiring leaders. The top three Democratic leaders in the 101st Congress—Jim Wright (TX), Tom Foley (WA), and Tony Coelho (CA)—all served in lower leadership positions. Other prominent Democrats who have competed for access to the leadership ladder have also been weaned in the whip system, including Norman Mineta (CA), Bill Alexander (AR), Dan Rostenkowski (IL), and Charles Rangel (NY). However, all leaders do not attempt to climb the ladder.[7] Three distinct career types were identified in an examination of the leadership structure from 1973 to 1988: dabblers, whippers, and ladder climbers. Examining the careers of these three types will provide a picture of the boundedness of the leadership system. More institutionalized systems should have a larger proportion of ladder climbers and fewer members who voluntarily leave the system.

Dabblers are those who serve in the leadership for one or two terms and then leave. More than half of the 40 Democratic dabblers remained in the House after leaving the whip system (57.5%), the others retired or were defeated (27.5%), or sought higher office (15%). Despite the relatively large number of members in this category, careers in the extended leadership do not resemble the revolving door of the nineteenth-century leadership (Polsby [1968] mentions Henry Clay's wild career as being indicative of the fluid congressional careers in that period). Only 4 of the 122 Democrats and 1 of the 70 Republicans in this 14-year period reentered the leadership structure after leaving.

Whippers are the relative few who continue as at-large or regional whips year after year (the coding rule was three terms or more).

Some, such as John P. Murtha (PA) and Tom Bevill (AL), seem to enjoy the cajoling and persuading, while others perform the whipping function out of a sense of duty or loyalty to the party. These members do not aspire to move beyond this limited but valuable role, and often they are heavily involved in committee work and other legislative concerns. Democratic whippers are loyal; only 5 of the 43 (11.6%) left the leadership voluntarily and only 2 were defeated.

Ladder climbers aspire to the speakership. Generally they move from regional whip to at-large whip to deputy whip and wait their turn to compete for the top positions (occasionally the intermediate level is skipped).[8] Members are included in this group if they have served at least three terms in the whip system and have climbed at least one level. Of the 39 in this category, 21 can be considered "super ladder climbers," by virtue of having progressed at least to the level of deputy whip. None of the ladder climbers voluntarily left the leadership system, indicating their commitment to a leadership career and their intense ambition. Two—McFall and Alexander—dropped out of the leadership after being defeated for a higher party office, and five were defeated in reelection attempts, including Whip John Brademas in 1980.

For most of the twentieth century, the leadership of the House Republicans has not been as well bounded as the Democratic leadership. Republicans were much quicker to turn their leaders out of office when the times got tough, and they did not establish clear patterns of succession. House Republicans revolted four times in the twentieth century against incumbent floor leaders or heirs apparent to the top position (1919, 1931, 1959, and 1965).

The absence of well-defined boundaries is further illustrated by the different paths to the top of Republican leadership. In contrast to the House Democrats, the Republicans do not use the whip system extensively as a stepping stone. Instead, they use the six positions below the floor leader as outlets for leadership ambitions. Trent Lott was elected whip in 1981 from the Rules Committee and Research Committee, and neither Rhodes nor Ford served in the whip system. Ford used the Conference and Rhodes used the Policy Committee as stepping stones to the top.

This career pattern undermines the incentive to serve in the whip system. If there is no long-term payoff of a high leadership position, ambitious members may not be willing to commit the time and energy to serve in the whip system. Consequently, Republicans are far more likely to leave the system voluntarily than are their Democratic counterparts, perhaps seeing little value in the ultimate prizes. More

than a third of all "whippers" (those who serve for three terms or more as a whip) voluntarily left the leadership between 1973 and 1988 (11 of 30), but only 14.7% of the Democratic whippers did so. Only 18.6% of those in the Republican leadership can be classified as ladder climbers, but 32% of the Democrats can be so classified. Even fewer stay in the leadership long enough to climb several levels.

It is too early for conclusive statements, but the 1980s may indicate that Republicans are creating a more bounded leadership system. The top four Republican positions in the House were held by the same people from 1980 until Jack Kemp stepped down as conference chairman in June 1987. The Republicans resisted their tendency to change leaders in the face of electoral defeat in 1982, and the 1987 and 1989 successions were chapters from the Democratic escalator.[9] Despite the recent election of Newt Gingrich to the whip position, the patterns of Republican leadership in the 1980s seem to contradict Peabody's hypothesis that "the longer the period of minority status, the more prone the minority party is to leadership change through revolt" (1976, 297).

Recent patterns of leadership succession in the House indicate that both parties have reached the fourth stage of the establishment of leadership boundaries. Top leadership positions are filled by heirs apparent in smooth transitions; the competition occurs lower in the leadership structure. The whip system is the vehicle for ambition in the Democratic leadership, while for the Republicans the outlet is the plethora of lower-level leadership positions. The stages of development are most clear for the Republicans. In the period from 1955 to 1974, the three successions to minority leader occasioned two successful revolts against an incumbent and one defeat of an heir apparent. In this same period, there was little competition for lower leadership positions. In the next three elections (1975–79), there were no challenges to the minority leader, and competition increased for lower offices. Stepping stones began to emerge in lower offices: Bob Michel moved from campaign chair to Whip in 1975; two Research Committee chairs, Louis Frey and Bill Frenzel, attempted to move to Policy in 1977 and 1979; and Samuel Devine moved from conference vice-chair to conference chair in 1979. Between 1981 and 1989 the Republicans reached the fourth stage. Michel moved unopposed from whip to minority leader in 1981, and the regular patterns of succession described above emerged in the lower offices.

Establishing boundaries in Senate leadership. Peabody begins his chapter on Senate leadership by wondering, "why do so few Senators gravitate toward elected party leadership, while the vast majority

choose to make their mark on public policy primarily through legislative specialization?" (1976, 321). The primary reason is that the legislative process is more open and the leadership more fluid than in the House. Senators do not have to be in the formal leadership to help shape legislation. Though informal leaders and "leaders without portfolio" have recently played a more prominent role in the House (Calmes and Gurwitt 1987; Hammond 1988), these players have always been central in the Senate. As a consequence, leadership ladders have not developed fully and the leadership is very permeable, especially in the Republican party.

The measures used by Polsby in his seminal work—the number of years in Congress before succeeding to a top leadership position, the number of years in the leadership, and the length of time out of Congress after retirement from the leadership—indicate that the boundaries have not become better defined for either the Democratic or Republican leadership in the post-World-War-II period (see Table 1). The mean years of prior service in the Senate have increased for Democratic leaders but have fallen dramatically for Republicans. The length of time in the leadership has increased for Democratic floor leaders and Republican assistant leaders but stayed about the same for Republican leaders and Democratic whips.[10] The most significant change is that Democratic and Republican floor leaders are much less likely to finish their careers in the Senate.

Although the traditional measures of well-boundedness do not provide clear evidence, the Democratic leadership is more institutionalized on several other dimensions of well-boundedness: membership is more stable for the Democrats, succession at top levels is more structured, and, until recently, patterns of contesting leadership positions indicated a higher level of development.

From 1977 to 1989, the same three individuals occupied the top positions in the elected Democratic leadership. This degree of stability was unprecedented in the Senate. The Republicans, during the same period, had two different floor leaders, two whips, four conference chairs, three conference secretaries, and two policy committee chairs. The pattern holds in lower leadership positions. Almost 40% of the Republican membership held an assistant whip position in the 96th Congress; according to a top leadership aide, anybody who wanted the title of assistant whip could have it. Less than 20% of the Democratic membership is generally in the whip system, and the current figure is one in six. As might be expected, the less bounded system also has greater turnover. In its last year, the Republican whip system had a 50% turnover, whereas the Democratic system's membership remained

TABLE 1
The Establishment of Boundaries in the Senate:
The Careers of Floor Leaders and Party Whips, 1911–89
(in numbers of years)

Position	Period	In Senate before Election		In Leadership[a]		After Leadership until Death		(N)
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	
Democrats								
Floor Leaders	1911–49	8.5	7.5	6.3	4.0	3.5	1.5	(6)
	1949–89	10.0	10.0	8.0	8.0	18.0	14.5	(5)
Party Whips	1913–49	5.6	4.0[b]	5.1	6.0			(7)
	1949–89	7.3	8.0	4.4	4.0			(9)
Republicans								
Floor Leaders	1911–49	18.9	16.0	5.6	5.0	3.8	1.0	(7)
	1949–89	11.0	10.5	5.0	5.0	5.6	4.0	(8)
Party Whips	1915–49	5.7	6.0	4.2	4.0			(6)
	1949–89	6.0	6.0	6.2	7.5			(7)

Sources: Peabody 1976, Tables 11–1 and 11–2; Riddick 1985, Table II; various editions of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Politics in America,* and *The Almanac of American Politics.*

[a]Includes leadership in the 100th Congress.

[b]J. Hamilton Lewis served two nonconsecutive terms (1913–19, 1933–39) and served all 12 years as Whip. Thus Lewis is counted twice: the first time with zero years of prior experience in the Senate, the second time with six years.

unchanged from the 97th through the 99th Congresses, except for the loss of Walter Huddleston (KY) through electoral defeat in 1984. Such stability is not observed even in the highly institutionalized Democratic whip system in the House. The average tenure of Republican whips in the last year of their system was 1.9 years; for Democrats in the 99th Congress it was 7.8 years.[11]

Both the Democrats and Republicans have gone through the first two stages of career ladder development in fits and starts. The cyclical low interest in leadership positions that was typical before World War II has now given way to generally intense competition for the top leadership positions. Neither party has evolved to the final stage, in which top positions are not contested, but the Democrats have come closer than Republicans to reaching the third stage, characterized by competition at all levels, with stepping stones emerging. Since 1949, the whip position has become a regular stepping stone to majority leader

for Democrats. Before 1949, six of the seven incumbent whips who had an opportunity to become floor leader when there was a vacancy were passed over (Peabody 1976, 330–32). Between 1949 and 1988, all four incumbent Democratic whips who had an opportunity were elected floor leader. This pattern was broken in the 101st Congress, when Alan Cranston did not run for majority leader.[12] Republicans also had established a pattern, with three whips out of four succeeding to floor leader between 1947 and 1976; however, in 1976 Howard Baker was elected over whip Robert Griffin, and in 1984 Robert Dole won over whip Ted Stevens.[13]

Since the revolts against incumbent whips in 1969 and 1971, the contests for Democratic leadership positions have been relatively peaceful. Frank Moss was unopposed in 1971 to fill Byrd's position as conference secretary, which he held for three uncontested terms. The next change in leadership was 1977, when Byrd moved up to majority leader with a brief challenge from Hubert Humphrey. Cranston and Inouye were unopposed for the number two and three positions. The only challenge to the leadership in the next 12 years was Lawton Chiles's race for majority leader in 1984, in which he gained only 11 supporters. In 1989, Wendell Ford challenged Cranston, winning 12 votes, but in general it seems the Democrats have moved away from their more rebellious days. A true leadership ladder has not emerged, but the system is not as permeable as the Republican leadership.

Senate Republicans exhibit a pattern of contesting leadership positions that does not fit neatly into the theory of stages of development presented above. Between 1955 and 1969, the Republican leadership was in a classic stage two: elections for the top three positions were all contested (seven successions), and there was little interest in the lower offices of conference chair and conference secretary. Milton Young was the only secretary through the 1950s and 1960s, and only three people occupied the conference chair between 1948 and 1972 (Milliken, Saltonstall, and Smith). In the 1970s and 1980s, competition for the top positions abated slightly (four of six successions contested), and the lower positions were hotly contested. In 10 elections, Republicans elected 6 different conference chairs (4 contested) and 6 different conference secretaries (3 contested). This pattern would be consistent with third stage development if lower positions became stepping stones to higher office, but the opposite happened. The tentative first step on the ladder that began to emerge in the 1960s and early 1970s (whip to floor leader) disappeared with the defeats of Griffin and Stevens, and lower offices did not develop patterns of succession.

Autonomy. Thus far, I have defined the boundedness of leader-

ship by the patterns of careers within the leadership. Congressional leadership is also differentiated from its environment by the degree to which congressional parties are autonomous or distinct from national parties. Until recently, congressional parties had little autonomy in one important area: fundraising. For example, John F. Kennedy used his considerable fund-raising power to help the congressional committees, but the cost to congressional leadership was a merger of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the DCCC and a complete loss of control. This relationship remained intact until 1968, though Lyndon B. Johnson exerted less control over the congressional committees than Kennedy had (Menefee-Libey, forthcoming). Recently, congressional parties have strengthened their fund-raising committees to gain autonomy.

In the early 1980s, the Republican congressional campaign committees surpassed the Republican National Committee (RNC) in total receipts, and the Democratic committees pulled even with the DNC, surpassing it in 1986 (see Figure 1). The increases are stunning, not only in relative terms but also in absolute terms. The Democratic Senate and House campaign committees raised their revenues from just under $2 million in 1976 to $25.7 million in 1986, while Republicans increased their totals from nearly $13 million to almost $126 million (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1987, 99–101; FEC Press Release, 3 November 1988).

Increased financial power has allowed the congressional committees to become organizationally independent of the national party committees (Menefee-Libey, forthcoming), and it has influenced leadership ladders. Tony Coelho used his position as DCCC chairman to win the first election for Democratic whip in the House, and George Mitchell's chairmanship of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) put him in good standing with the 1986 freshman class, who contributed to his election as majority leader of the Senate in December 1988. "Money, whether we like it or not, is a pretty powerful tool," commented W. G. Hefner, one of Coelho's opponents in the whip race. "He was the man who signed the checks," noted Charles B. Rangel, the other defeated candidate (Hook 1986, 3068).

Others who aspire to leadership positions recognize the power of money. "Member PACs" have become an increasingly popular tool for gaining favor with colleagues. Party leaders use PACs to solidify their position within the leadership and to strengthen party leadership generally. Others use PACs to win support in leadership races (Baker 1989). Lyndon Johnson was the first to systematically raise and distribute campaign funds within Congress for personal gain (though his

FIGURE 1
Campaign Funds Raised by the Legislative Party Campaign Committees as a Percentage of Total Party Receipts, 1976–88



Source: Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987, Table 3–13 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press). Reprinted in Federal Election Commission Press Release, 3 November 1988, 2–3.

Note: For each party, the total party receipts are the sum of funds raised by the national party committee (the DNC or RNC) and by the Senate and House campaign committees (the DCCC and DSCC or the NRCC and NRSC). The points plotted are for two-year election cycles.

activities were nominally under the auspices of the DCCC). In 1940, he became a "one-man national committee for congressmen" when he raised many thousands of dollars for marginal congressmen in desperate need of money (Caro 1982, 606–64). In the 1980s, there have been 111 PACs "associated with recognized individuals," ranging from Jerry Falwell's "I Love America Committee" to William Buckley's "BuckPAC" and Jim Wright's "Majority Congress Committee."[14] Seventy-six of these were still active at the end of the 1987–88 campaign cycle, and 31 are leadership PACs (those associated with congressional leaders or members who were campaigning for a leadership position).

In 1980, there were only five leadership PACs, and these raised a total of $563,061 (for O'Neill, Wright, Rhodes, Dole, and Tower). In 1986, 26 leadership PACs raised $13.3 million; in 1988, 26 leadership PACs raised $10.1 million. The proliferation of leadership PACs indicates the attractiveness of leadership positions. Members would not be willing to spend so much time and money to be part of a leadership organization that was not well bounded.[15]

Internal Complexity

As leadership institutions become more highly developed, they delegate responsibility to lower party offices, devote more resources to the organization, and regularize patterns of communication and behavior. The degree of integration within the leadership—that is, the extent to which the various offices of the party structure are coordinated and utilized—is a new indicator of complexity that will be addressed here.

Internal complexity in House leadership. Democratic leadership in the House has become more internally complex. This development is most evident in the whip system, which has evolved slowly throughout the twentieth century. The first whips worked alone, but the Republicans greatly expanded their whip system in 1931, and in 1933 the Democrats expanded theirs. However, growth was not continuous. As Speaker, Sam Rayburn did not make much use of the whip system and instead "ran the whole thing out of his back pocket" (Sinclair 1983, 55). John McCormack moved toward institutionalized leadership by expanding the powers of the whip system in 1962 (Ripley 1967, 102), but he did not use the system extensively either (Ripley 1967, 212). In 1969, the leadership used the whip system more aggressively because the president's liaison office was no longer in friendly hands.

The transition to a fully institutionalized House leadership system occurred between the 91st and the 94th Congresses. In the 92d Congress the leadership disseminated whip packets, which contain the floor schedule, information on bills up for consideration, and copies of bills. Also, the division of labor became increasingly well defined: elected regional whips were responsible for headcounts and at-large whips for persuasion (Dodd and Sullivan 1983). In the 93d Congress the leadership circulated whip advisories, which detailed the party's position on important legislation. The use of whip counts increased from 17 counts in 1962–63, to 53 in the 93d Congress (Dodd 1979, 37) to 80 in the 95th and in the 96th Congresses (Sinclair 1983, 56).

The Democratic whip system has also expanded. The number of at-large whips doubled from the 96th to the 98th Congresses and then doubled again in the next four years; the number of deputy whips tripled in that period (there were 81 members in the Democratic whip system in the 100th Congress). The system was originally expanded to give more balance to the party leadership, but more recently appointive whips have been used as an arm of the top leadership and the leadership team has been better integrated.

Republican leadership in the House is not as internally complex as Democratic leadership. Charles Halleck attempted to activate the Policy Committee and to make extensive use of the whip system, but members complained of his leadership style, claiming there was too much whipping (Ripley 1967, 108). Under Gerald Ford, the Policy Committee was downgraded and there was not as much use of the whip system, but a hierarchical chain of command was implemented in the leadership. The goal, to develop policy alternatives to majority party proposals, met with some success. (The new breed of Republican activists in the House today has a colorful acronym for this minority strategy: CRAP—Constructive Republican Alternative Policies.)

John Rhodes and his successor, current minority leader Robert Michel, moved to integrate the leadership system and create a more active whip system. Trent Lott, the minority whip from 1980 to 1988, was a key player in this process. Under his active leadership, the Republican whip system evolved into an effective machine that rivals the Democrats in its ability to disseminate information, count heads, and build coalitions. He also integrated the whip system with the rest of the leadership through weekly whip meetings and good communication with Michel (personal interview). Recently, the Research Committee has become more important through the leadership of Jerry Lewis, Mickey Edwards, and Duncan Hunter. Most important, policy task forces, mimicking the Democratic counterpart, are now run from the Research Committee office.

A summary, albeit somewhat crude, measure of these various trends toward greater internal complexity is the allocation of resources to the leadership. The Reports of the Clerk of the House and the Reports of the Secretary of the Senate are the best available documents, but information is incomplete. As Polsby noted, "Reliable figures, past or present, on personnel assigned to the House are impossible to come by" (1968, 158). For example, through the 1960s, the minority party in the House had no separate authorization for its Conference, Policy Committee, or Research Committee, but it did shift funds from individual members' staff allotments (Jones 1970, 177). Bearing these limi-

tations in mind, the Clerk's Reports show that funds allocated to the leadership have increased greatly: from $47,825 in 1955, to $482,850 in 1968, to $2,343,225 in 1974, to $6,755,468 in 1986. This 141-fold increase is dramatically larger than the 21-fold increase in total legislative branch appropriations (both in nominal dollars), the tripling in the size of personal staff, and the 6-fold increase in the size of committee staff over this same period.[16]

Internal complexity in Senate leadership. Leadership is not as internally complex in the Senate as in the House, primarily because the Senate's smaller size makes institutions less necessary. The Senate is not easier to lead than the house; to the contrary, the highly fragmented and individualized nature of the body makes leading the Senate like "trying to push a wet noodle," according to a frustrated Howard Baker (Granat 1984, 3024). Cognizant of the difficulty of pushing wet noodles, the Senate has steadily increased its appropriations to the leadership: from $79,172 in 1956, to $388,064 in 1966, to $750,318 in 1974, to approximately $7 million in 1986. This 88-fold increase outpaced the growth in legislative branch appropriations reported above, the doubling of personal staff, and the tripling of committee staff during the same period. Thus, by this most simple indicator, Senate leadership has become more institutionalized.

Other measures of complexity—the division of labor, integration, and regular patterns of communication—reveal a mixed picture of institutionalization in Senate leadership. The division of labor appears to be more institutionalized in the Republican leadership because their secondary party positions—the chairs of the Republican Conference, the Policy Committee, and the Committee on Committees—are all held by different people. By contrast, the Democratic floor leader had also been chair of the Democratic Conference, the Policy Committee, and the Steering Committee through the 100th Congress. Two factors caution against drawing any conclusion from these divisions of labor. First, the Democrats dispersed power in the 101st Congress by making Daniel Inouye chair of the Steering Committee and Tom Daschle cochair of the Policy Committee. Second, the lesser party positions have never been well integrated into the leadership in either party. Only the Republican policy chair and the Democratic conference secretary have ever assumed any importance (Peabody 1976, 332–33).

The number two leader in the Senate, the whip (or assistant leader, as the Republicans call him), gained a more prominent place on the leadership ladder but has generally not played a central role in leadership activities. The relatively weak position of the Republican whip is

highlighted by the fact that Assistant Leader Alan Simpson is not authorized to conduct a whip count. That order must come from Minority Leader Dole. The previous Republican whip, Ted Stevens, also played a limited role in floor activity. One aide said that Baker was afraid to leave the Senate in Stevens's control because "he might get into fisticuffs with Metzenbaum or into some godawful parliamentary situation. He was always fighting with Metzenbaum."[17] Until recently, Cranston has not fared much better. According to two aides in the Republican Senate leadership, Alan Cranston's reputation as an integral player in the Democratic leadership[18] is exaggerated. One said, "Byrd likes to build him up in public, but Cranston is not the one who makes things run on the other side of the aisle. We never worked much with him, I'll tell you that much. Byrd runs the show." Integration is also a problem with the Democrats; Byrd and Cranston have never worked closely. Richard Cohen says, "There is not nearly so close a working relationship between Byrd and Minority Whip Alan Cranston of California, who has preferred to maintain his independence from Byrd and has been given few responsibilities. Their aides do not meet on an organized basis" (Cohen 1982, 1547).

The new majority leader, George Mitchell, has vowed to change all this. He says, "I want to try to get the whip and chief deputy whip involved and have them undertake meaningful assignments . . . . I've said I do not intend to be a one-man band, and I've meant it" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 3 December 1988, 3423). The whip systems have shown some signs of increased internal complexity since the 1960s, especially on the Democratic side. In 1966, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appointed four assistant whips, and Minority Leader Hugh Scott in 1969–70 nominated six regional whips (Oleszek 1985, 9–11). By 1981, the Democrats had eight regional whips and a chief deputy whip. Today there is another layer of four regional deputy whips in the system, with an assistant deputy whip under each of them. As was noted above, by 1979 almost 40% of Republicans were in the whip system (16 of 41), but the following year all assistant whip positions were abolished. Whip notices, which alert members to pending floor action and the timing of votes, have been used more frequently in recent years, expanding the visibility and importance of the office.

Another area in which patterns of behavior have become more institutionalized is the negotiation of complex unanimous consent agreements. With their increased use in the 1960s, Steven Smith and Marcus Flathman note in this issue of *LSQ*, that senators began to demand a more institutionalized mechanism for receiving advance notice of unanimous consent requests. The informal procedure for informing

the leadership of holds (objections to unanimous consent agreements) became institutionalized by Byrd's practice of circulating objection forms. This practice made scheduling easier and routinized the procedure for accommodating senators' desires.

Universalistic Practices

The tendency in institutionalized organizations to replace discretionary behavior with universalistic rules and norms undermines strong leadership. The seniority system (the main evidence of universalism in Polsby's account) constrains leaders' ability to promote sympathetic members to committee chairs, and the routinization of committee assignments precludes the aggressive use of assignments as a tool. Only rarely may leaders provide a prize assignment as a favor, strip a member of their assignments (e.g., Phil Gramm in 1982), or deny an assignment (Loomis 1984). The most important norm limiting the power of leadership is that of allowing members to "vote their district," even when their vote conflicts with the interests of the party.

On a very mundane level, some universalistic or regularized patterns of behavior are evident: weekly leadership meetings, strengthened channels of communication, and a strategy of inclusiveness on important policy concerns. On the other hand, leadership naturally tends to resist universalistic practices, because strong leadership inherently involves the strategic and discretionary uses of power. Members obviously resist discretionary uses of power, so a compromise has been struck. Leaders maintain some discretionary power and adopt some universalistic practices, but both tend to support individual members' goals as the means to a collective goal of institutional maintenance.

The current use of party money in congressional elections is a good example: the collective goal is to maintain or expand the party's base in Congress, but the goal is achieved by supporting individual members' campaigns. A discretionary use of funds based on levels of party support would not be supported by the rank and file. Examples of discretionary uses of power that serve members' needs are the aggressive use of modified rules in the Rules Committee, the use of complex unanimous consent agreements in the Senate, Robert Byrd's masterful use of parliamentary tactics, and strategic use of multireferrals in the House and Senate.[19] In all of these instances, the commonly assumed tradeoff between individual and collective interests is avoided. Members' interests are served, but the leadership is permitted to set the ground rules and make important decisions.

Consequences of the Institutionalization of Leadership

Though Polsby does not examine the point in detail, he argues that "along with the more obvious effects of institutionalization, the process has also served to increase the power of the House within the political system" (1968, 166). It is not so clear that the institutionalization of leadership has increased the power of leaders in Congress.[20] Powerful leadership is typically defined as the ability to pass a legislative agenda, an ability which is primarily shaped by external conditions (the presidency and the party system) and internal conditions (the partisan split in the legislature and the personal skills of the leaders). Powerful leaders have been those who have exerted personal control, independent of constraining institutions. Therefore, institutionalization may seem marginally significant or even inimical to effective leadership. However, given the modern context of individualism and a weak party system, the institutionalization of leadership reveals that leadership is adaptive and can make the best of a difficult situation. Individual leaders are not as dominant in an institutionalized system, since the division of labor disperses authority, but the leadership team gains capacity to lead.

The institutionalization of leadership has also had an impact on the composition of leadership. A leadership structure that is well bounded and promotes from within is more likely to recruit ambitious, high-quality members than one that is open to outside challenges, because the thankless tasks of party whipping or floor coverage may have some payoff. A Howard Baker or a Robert Dole who is elected majority leader without "serving time" in a lower leadership position undermines members' incentive to sacrifice other options for a position that has no power and little prestige. Internally complex institutions will also be better able to recruit better members for low-level leadership positions because the tasks will be more meaningful and better defined. Ripley supports this conclusion: "These 36 men and women have made a commitment of time—which members of the House must necessarily hoard—to work for their respective parties within the House. Unless they felt that party work was worth doing, a sufficient number of commitments, of a desirable caliber, might not be forthcoming" (1964, 575). A top Senate leadership aide concurred: "The lack of clearly delineated lines to higher office undermined the attractiveness of assistant whip position [in the Republican system]. In the most highly developed whip system, that of the Democrats in the House, there is an expectation that you get a bit of a leg up in moving up the leadership system.

This is clearly an incentive that didn't exist in our whip system, and this influences the type of member who is looking to serve in that position."

Well-bounded systems are also more likely to produce members who have shown their commitment to the party and to institutional maintenance. Speaker Jim Wright argues that leadership ladders produce "people who understand the institution and the problems, and who have seen Congress grapple with things, succeed and fail" (Calmes 1987, 6). Valuable skills are gained by serving an apprenticeship in the leadership. Furthermore, the automatic escalator avoids potentially divisive leadership contests. Though he expresses some reservations about the escalator, Peabody acknowledges that "it allows the House to get on with business" (Calmes 1987, 6). From an organizational standpoint, smooth leadership transitions are preferable to palace coups.

A Theory of Leadership Institutionalization

This paper has shown that leadership in the House is highly institutionalized on all dimensions. Both parties have established patterns of succession and autonomy in campaign finance. House Democrats now have membership on demand in the Speaker's task forces (Loomis 1988), a Rules Committee that services committee chairs (Smith and Bach 1988), an ever expanding whip system, and flexible scheduling. House Republicans obviously do not play a central role in many of these leadership tasks, but they too have expanded their whip system and have an inclusive leadership style. Both parties in the House now have institutions that outlive the tenure of any single member.

The picture of the Senate is mixed. Senate Democrats have developed some boundedness in leadership careers and have increased autonomy in campaign finances, but personal leadership has limited the development of complex and durable institutions. Republican leadership in the Senate is the least institutionalized among the four legislative parties. In this concluding section, I will explain why leadership systems develop at different paces in the two chambers and offer a more general theory of leadership institutionalization.

The large size of the House creates logistical problems for leadership in coalition building and communication. The decentralization of the House over the last two decades renders a Rayburn-style approach to these tasks impossible, so the leadership has adapted accordingly. The Senate, on the other hand, can survive with personalized leadership; indeed, members expect it. If the past is the best indicator, personal leadership is more effective than institutionalized leadership in the Senate. The three most effective Republican leaders in the post-

World-War-II period—Dirksen, Baker, and Dole—and the best Democratic leader, Lyndon Johnson, all had highly personalized leadership styles. Existing leadership institutions were largely ignored, and new institutions were established to meet their needs. Elaborate institutional structures only get in the way in the Senate. As one aide put it, "Senators want direct access to the top. They don't want to deal with some regional whip."

A theory of institutionalization must do more than explain interchamber differences; it must explain why institutions develop. Four sets of factors must be considered: the stability in the partisan control of the chamber, external conditions, member goals, and the skills of individual leaders, primarily their ability to utilize existing institutions.

Partisan Stability

Democrats have controlled the House since 1954. This stability promotes the institutionalization in both parties, as uncertainty about the future control of the chamber is reduced. This assertion runs counter to existing theory, according to which increasing frustration in the minority party could break down leadership institutions (Peabody 1976). The more volatile nature of partisan control and the size of party margins in the Senate make it more difficult to establish durable institutions.

External Conditions

Two factors are central here: the party of the president and the nature of the party system. First, the president has some impact on the institutionalization of leadership. If the president is relatively popular, the leaders' job of passing his agenda is aided by lobbying from the president and pressure from public opinion. Therefore, the need for strong leadership institutions may be more acute for the party that does not control the presidency. A more important factor is the weak party system, which requires each member of Congress to operate as an independent entrepreneur (Cooper and Brady 1981a). When members' electoral fortunes are only loosely tied to the party, the task of leadership is greatly complicated. Without control over the ultimate sanction, the party is unable to prevent each member from paddling his or her own political canoe in the legislature.

Member Goals

Members place individual and collective demands on the leadership. They want to vote as they wish, to go home when they wish, and to help form the legislative agenda when they have strong policy interests. Collectively, they want leadership that can mobilize coalitions to pass important legislation. Most aspects of today's service-based leadership meet these needs. The only component of institutionalized leadership that does not fit this picture is the leadership ladder, which forces members to sacrifice future career options.

Members are willing to support the ladder if the leadership is satisfying their current needs and if there is a reasonable expectation that collective goals will be met. Forming these expectations is not easy—information about the future behavior of candidates is at a premium in any election. Well-developed leadership institutions reduce information costs by allowing the rank and file to gain a clear picture of the leadership style of the candidate who is attempting to climb the ladder. In these cases, promoting from within becomes the low-risk alternative. Past leadership behavior allows members to make judgments about an "insider" candidate that may not be possible for an insurgent who has not served in the leadership. Edward Madigan's strong showing in the recent House Republican whip's race supports this observation. This decision context helps create leadership ladders.

Utilization

The skills and desires of individual leaders have a significant impact on the shape of leadership institutions; their actions determine whether institutions endure or fade away. When institutions become durable and highly complex, they develop a life of their own, but the process of evolution is highly unstable. Whether leaders maintain and develop existing institutions also has an impact on the emergence of leadership ladders. This link between durability, internal complexity, and the boundedness of leadership can be presented as a hypothesis: leaders are promoted if they maintain and develop their previous position. If a leader is ineffective in using the current office, it is not likely to become a springboard for higher office. Though a systematic test of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, anecdotal evidence supports the idea. Tip O'Neill, Tony Coelho, and Dick Cheney in the House and Robert Byrd, Lyndon Johnson, Robert Taft, and George Mitchell in the Senate all met this condition and climbed the leadership ladder. Ted Kennedy, Russell Long, Ted Stevens, and John McFall did

not, and they were bumped off (though in McFall's case, personal scandal played a dominant role). Those who fall between these two extremes, such as Mansfield and Griffin in the Senate and Fred Halleck and Carl Albert in the House, may or may not succeed or remain in office. In these cases, members who have already assumed a place on the career ladder will benefit from the institution building of his or her predecessors and be elected to the next rung on the ladder. If there is no ladder, other factors that are traditionally referred to—such as ideological diversity within the party, electoral losses, and personality—will predominate.

The theory describes tensions between individual and collective goals in Congress and the importance of external conditions: representatives pursuing individual goals, without a strong party system as an anchor, will continually press toward service-oriented, weak leadership. At the same time, leadership must be allowed to play an integrative role, to prevent legislative paralysis. If a balance is struck, institutionalized leadership can serve both individual and collective needs—a recipe for institutional stability. If a compromise is not reached, institutional drift, or even chaos, may reign.

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NOTES

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1. The defeated candidate for Speaker has been recognized as the minority leader since 1883; the majority leader has been a distinct office since 1899 (prior to that, the Ways and Means Committee chair was considered the floor leader). The Republicans elected their first whip in 1897, the Democrats elected theirs in 1900 (Ripley 1967, 24–38).

2. Since this article was written, Dick Cheney became Secretary of Defense and Newt Gingrich was elected by a narrow 87–85 margin over Edward Madigan. This election appears to undermine my arguments that Republican leadership in the House has become more durable and, as I argue below, more well-bounded. As a self-proclaimed "bomb thrower," Gingrich clearly intends to change the whip's duties, changes which would violate the second condition of durability. His lack of experience in lower leadership positions also violates the newly emerging boundedness of Republican leadership, which had observed rigid leadership ladders in the 1980s.

However, three factors reveal the highly idiosyncratic nature of this move. First, many Republicans believed they needed a strong spokesman to exploit the oppor-

tunities presented by Speaker Jim Wright's difficulties. As the initiator of the Wright investigation, Gingrich was the logical choice. Second, the Republicans had just gone through a leadership shuffle following Whip Trent Lott's election to the Senate. The newly elected conference chair, Jerry Lewis (CA), was urged by Bob Michel and others not to run, in order to minimize intraparty strife. "If he had, it would have set off another competition to succeed him and likely a chain reaction of lower-level leadership races. 'We would have spent the next two months rearranging the chairs of our leadership and not moving forward on our programs,' Lewis said" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 18 March 1989, 563). Many insiders indicated to me that Lewis would have won had he run. Finally, some Republicans were not willing to vote for Madigan because of a regional imbalance (he and Michel are both from Illinois). That Madigan lost by only two votes is strong testimony to the institutionalization of leadership among House Republicans.

3. In July 1988, I conducted interviews with 12 top-level staffers and former staffers in the House and Senate leadership. Ten interviews were conducted in person and two over the phone; they ranged in length from 25 to 55 minutes. Unattributed quotes used in this article are from these interviews.

4. The whip system was reinstituted briefly in 1987 when the Republicans were back in the minority. A leadership aide said that each senator who volunteered (nine in all) became a regional whip. Once again, their duty was primarily floor coverage, but the system did not work because the regional whips were never there when Whip Alan Simpson needed them. The aide said, "When I would call the senators' offices to get them onto the floor for their four hour shift, their administrative assistant would often say, 'Oh, I didn't know he was a regional whip.' They didn't take the job too seriously."

5. Leadership in the nineteenth-century House was permeable, unstable, and transitory. There was no identifiable leadership ladder, and prospective leaders did not serve long apprenticeships, to say nothing about training in lower leadership positions.

6. Development is not always linear. A leadership system may show signs of reaching the third stage only to sink back to the second (as with the Senate Republicans in the mid–1970s). For example, leadership positions become less desired as a party moves from being relatively competitive in the institution to being a small minority. On the other hand, the value of minority leadership increases when the president is of the same party.

7. With the expanded size of the whip system, only a small percentage of those who serve in the system win top positions. Of the 122 Democrats and 70 Republicans who served in the leadership from 1973 to 1988, fewer than a dozen held the positions of whip, floor leader, or Speaker.

8. The move from regional whip to at-large whip is clearly a step up the leadership ladder. In the past decade, 10 have made the move in this direction and only 1 has made the opposite move.

9. In 1987, Dick Cheney moved without opposition from the number four (Policy Committee chair) to the number three position (Conference Committee chair), and Jerry Lewis, the "insider" candidate, moved from the number five position (Research Committee chair) to the number four position. The two top contenders for the Research Committee chair were ladder climbers from the whip system: Steve Bartlett of Texas, who had moved up from regional whip to deputy whip, and the winner, Mickey Edwards, who had moved up from regional whip to head regional whip of the Western and Plains states. The "new stability" was supported again in the leadership shuffle following Whip Lott's election to the Senate in 1988. Michel and Cheney were unopposed for the top two spots and Lewis and Edwards both moved up one notch (in the race for conference chair, Lewis

defeated Lynn Martin, the former vice-chair of the conference, 85–82; Edwards was unopposed for Policy Committee chair (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 December 1988, 3474–75).

10. Although there is almost no difference in the length of time that members hold the top leadership positions in the House and in the Senate, there is large difference in the average length of apprenticeship for House and Senate leaders. Since 1900, House Democrats have served an average of 25.9 years before being elected Speaker and 18.9 years before being elected floor leader; for the Republicans, the averages were 22.4 and 16.8 years for those top two positions. The apprenticeship in the Senate is approximately half as long: Democrats had served an average of 9.2 years before being elected floor leader and 6.5 years before being elected whip; Republicans, 14.7 and 5.9 years.

11. The stability of the Democratic whip system changed in the 100th Congress, with only three whips carried over from the 99th Congress and five new whips appointed. The dramatic difference in the tenure of Democratic and Republican whips can be explained by the practice in the Republican system of assigning all freshman senators to the whip system.

12. Nonetheless, the two top contenders for majority leader in the 101st Congress, Inouye and Mitchell, were third and fourth in the leadership hierarchy in the 100th Congress, respectively. At lower levels there is some indication of an escalator; for example, Inouye moved to the number three position, secretary of the conference, after serving several terms as an assistant whip. Byrd moved from conference secretary to whip and, in 1989, Alan Dixon was elected chief deputy whip after serving in the whip system since 1981.

13. Baker was a surprise winner over Griffin in 1976; he did not even announce his campaign until a day and a half before the election, according to one aide. Stevens, on the other hand, was not expected to win. An aide said, "We were as surprised as hell that he did as well as he did." Dole won the final tally 28–25 on the fourth ballot in a tight five-way race (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 1 December 1984, 3025).

14. This information comes from an internal document of the Federal Election Commission that my research assistant, Patrick Sellers, acquired through great persistence. The dollar figures reported here were tabulated from the FEC's figures for PAC receipts, disbursements, and cash on hand.

15. Of the total receipts from 1984 to 1988, 56.1% were from Dole's, Kemp's, and Gephardt's PACs; most of this money probably went for their presidential campaigns rather than congressional leadership activities. On the other hand, support for colleagues' campaigns by aspiring leaders is understated by the data on leadership PACs reported here. Some aspiring leaders do not establish separate PACs for these purposes. For example, in his campaign for chair of the Policy Committee in 1987, Duncan Hunter contributed $60,000 from his own campaign funds and campaigned for at least 20 members, activity that would not be reported in this FEC data (Hook 1987, 962; also see Sorauf 1988, 174–81).

16. Data collected by the author for the leadership; other figures from Tables 5–9, 5–2, and 5–5 in Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1987. I am not entirely confident that the figures in the Clerk's Report and the Secretary's Report cover all the money appropriated to the leadership. For example, appropriations for the minority and majority leaders in the Senate appear to have been included in the conference monies before 1973, at which point they become a separate line item. The accounting is further complicated by changes from annual to biannual to quarterly reporting.

17. The aide pointed out that Stevens's more important role was behind the scenes, especially in negotiations with the Republican committee chairs and the Demo-

cratic minority. He said, "Stevens is one of, if not the only, person who can talk to Robert C. Byrd and get him to understand something that he doesn't want to understand or cut a deal with him." He also played a central role in improving communication with the Republican party in the House.

18. Robert Byrd called Cranston the "best nose counter in the Senate" (*Wall Street Journal* 15 March 1977); also see Byrd's favorable comments in the *Congressional Record* S4496 (May 2, 1980), and Robert Lindsay's piece, "Dark Horse from California," in the *New York Times Magazine*, 4 December 1983.

19. As Roger Davidson demonstrates in his article in this issue of *LSQ*, Senate leadership is far less likely to initiate multiple referrals and is more likely to ratify agreements already reached by committee chairs. On the other hand, the practice increased the powers of leadership in the House by "strengthening their role in centralizing and coordinating the House's workload." In both instances, a balance is struck between member and collective interests.

20. Others have also contested this assertion as it relates to the House as a whole (Cooper and Brady 1981a; Schmidhauser 1973).

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