

THE POLLS—TRENDS: THE ASYMMETRIC POLARIZATION OF IMMIGRATION OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES

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Trent Ollerenshaw
Ph.D. Candidate
Duke University
Department of Political Science
trent.ollerenshaw@duke.edu
425-830-3478
140 Science Dr, Durham, NC 27708

Ashley Jardina
Associate Professor
George Mason University
Schar School of Policy and Government
ajardina@gmu.edu
3351 Fairfax Drive Van Metre Hall, Arlington, VA 22201

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we analyze trends in Americans' immigration attitudes and policy preferences nationally and across partisan and racial/ethnic groups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans shared similarly negative attitudes toward immigrants and high levels of support for restrictionist immigration policies. Beginning in the 2010s and continuing through the early 2020s, however, Democrats' aggregate immigration opinions liberalized considerably. Trends towards more liberal immigration preferences are especially pronounced for white Democrats post-2016, though they are also seen among Hispanic and Black Democrats. Opinion regarding immigration among Republicans, however, remained mostly stable over this period, growing more conservative on some dimensions (e.g., border security) but more liberal on others (e.g., amnesty). Immigration opinion in the US has liberalized during the twenty-first century; however, this one-sided liberalization has left Democrats and Republicans more divided on immigration than at any point since national surveys began consistently measuring immigration opinion in the late-20th century.

AUTHOR NOTE

TRENT OLLERENSHAW is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA. ASHLEY JARDINA is an associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA. The authors thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on the manuscript. The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest. *Address correspondence to Trent Ollerenshaw, Duke University, Department of Political Science, 140 Science Dr, Durham, NC 27708, USA; email: trent.ollerenshaw@duke.edu

A substantial literature in political science suggests public opinion towards immigration fluctuates in response to political, economic, and social circumstances (Hopkins 2010, 2011; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). In the past decade, the United States has experienced shifting economic conditions, demographic change, and elite-level partisan polarization—all of which could influence public opinion on immigration. Moreover, a growing body of work suggests the changing racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. and national attention to immigration have raised the salience of the issue (Valentino et al. 2013; Pérez 2016; Enns and Jardina 2021) and left many Americans feeling threatened, potentially affecting their attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Jardina 2019a, 2019b).

In light of these recent phenomena, this paper updates prior *Public Opinion Quarterly* Poll Trends tracing U.S. immigration opinion (Lapinski et al. 1997; Segovia and Defever 2010; Muste 2013; see also Schildkraut 2013). In addition to analyses of aggregate opinion trends, we disaggregate trends for whites, Blacks, and Hispanics because prior work finds these groups' immigration attitudes can be distinct (Brader et al. 2010; Nteta 2013; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Carter 2019). Further, given elite partisan polarization on immigration and the growing clarity of the parties' positions (Jeong et al. 2011; Egan 2013), we disaggregate trends by party.

Across multiple sources of national survey data (1988-2022), several findings emerge. First, aggregate U.S. immigration opinion has liberalized, especially since 2016. Second, immigration opinion has asymmetrically polarized; liberalization is concentrated among Democrats, whereas Republicans have maintained their stark, longstanding opposition to immigration. Third, the most marked shifts are among white Democrats. White Democrats' increasingly liberal views on immigration have narrowed the opinion divide between their group and Blacks and Hispanics, although whites on average remain more anti-immigrant than either group. Overall, our analyses

demonstrate that the landscape of U.S. immigration opinion changed dramatically in the twenty-first century.

Data

We trace U.S. immigration opinion with four sources: the American National Election Study (ANES), the Cooperative Election Study (CES), the General Social Survey (GSS), and Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) surveys. Altogether, these surveys include 11 immigration items, including attitudes towards immigrant “stock” and preferences towards immigration “flow” and border security (Margalit and Solodoch 2022). Each item is outlined in Table 1. We code each item such that higher values indicate pro-immigrant/pro-immigration responses. The GSS item replicates an ANES item; we provide this replication in Supplementary Material 2.

We detail the sampling methodologies of each dataset in Supplementary Material 1 but offer several notes here. First, the CES estimates are precise given very large samples, but can be biased by non-sampling errors due to non-probability sampling (Meng 2018). Second, our analyses pool every PRRI survey fielded in the same year for visual clarity; Supplementary Material 3 disaggregates these estimates. Third, the interview modes vary across surveys; we discuss the possible consequences of mode effects in Supplementary Material 4. Fourth, we do not break out partisan trends among Blacks and sometimes Hispanics due to small samples. In most years, more than 80 percent of Blacks surveyed identify as Democrats. Thus, trends for Blacks are near-identical to those for Black Democrats. Fifth, our partisan groups usually include partisan-leaning independents, except when analyzing PRRI surveys, which inconsistently ask independents their partisan leanings. Finally, our analyses employ cross-sectional data so we cannot address whether observed trends are caused by attitude change, partisan sorting, or cohort replacement.

Category	Item	Source	Years	Figure
<i>Attitudes Towards Immigrants</i>	“Illegal Aliens/Immigrants” Feeling Thermometer Rating	ANES	1988-2020	Figure 1
	Effects of Immigration on American Jobs	ANES	2004-2020	Figure 2
	Immigrants Strengthen vs. Threaten the U.S.	PRRI	2010-2021	Figure 3
<i>Immigration Levels</i>	Increase Immigration Levels	ANES	1992-2000	Figure 4
	Increase Immigration Levels	GSS	1994-2021	Supplementary Material 2
	Banning Refugee Admissions	PRRI	2016-2021	Figure 5
<i>Undocumented Immigrants’ Legal Status</i>	Amnesty Programs	CES	2007-2022	Figure 6
	Path to Citizenship for DREAMers	PRRI	2010-2021	Figure 7
<i>Border Control</i>	Federal Spending on Border Security	ANES	2000-2020	Figure 8
	Increase Border Patrols	CES	2007-2022	Figure 9
	Build Border Wall	PRRI	2016-2021	Figure 10

Table 1—Data Sources and Survey Items. Data sources are the American National Election Study Time Series (ANES), the General Social Survey (GSS), the Cooperative Election Study (CES), and the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). All immigration items are coded such that larger values correspond to pro-immigrant/immigration views and smaller values correspond to anti-immigrant/immigration views.

Attitudes Toward Immigrants

We begin by examining attitudes toward immigrants with three items: mean 0-100 ratings of “illegal aliens/immigrants” (Figure 1), agreement that immigrants are not at all likely to take jobs from Americans (Figure 2), and agreement that immigrants strengthen, rather than threaten, the U.S. (Figure 3).¹ Looking first at Figure 1, we find that since 1988, Americans’ average ratings of “illegal aliens/immigrants” have grown warmer.² Disaggregating by partisanship reveals that these warming

¹ The values plotted in each figure are provided in Supplementary Material 2.

² We use the terms “illegal aliens/immigrants” to reflect the survey question-wording.




Figure 1—Mean Feeling Thermometer Ratings for “Illegal Aliens/Immigrants” (ANES). Points are groups’ mean warmth ratings of “illegal aliens” (1988-1994) and “illegal immigrants” (2004-2020) on 0-100 feeling thermometer scales with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

trends emerged only among Democrats and were particularly pronounced in 2016 and 2020.

Republicans’ evaluations of “illegal aliens/immigrants” have remained persistently chilly. These asymmetric trends have produced considerable polarization in attitudes towards “illegal aliens/immigrants”; the partisan divide in evaluations expanded from 8 points in 1988 to 28 points in 2020. When disaggregating by race and partisanship, we see that white Democrats, Blacks, and Hispanic Democrats have all reported increasingly positive feelings. By 2020, Blacks’ views hovered near the neutral point of the scale, white Democrats views were slightly more positive, and Hispanic Democrats had the most favorable evaluations. White Republicans have remained consistently negative in their views, while Hispanic Republicans have remained neutral.

Figure 2 depicts the percent agreeing over time that immigrants are “not at all likely” to take Americans’ jobs. In the early 2000s, all partisan and racial/ethnic groups reported overwhelmingly pessimistic views. In 2004, for example, only 18% of Hispanic Democrats—the most optimistic group—agreed immigrants were not at all likely to take jobs. Since 2004, however, while Republican opinion has held steady (although there has been some slight increase in agreement among Hispanic Republicans), white and Hispanic Democrats have become more optimistic; in 2020, over 50% agreed that immigrants were unlikely to take jobs. Black Americans, who may experience more labor market competition with immigrants, have taken more positive but still tempered views: in 2020, 34% agreed immigrants are unlikely to take jobs, up from 6% in 2004. The more positive shift




Figure 2—Agreement that Immigrants are “Not at all likely” to Take Americans’ Jobs (ANES). Points are the proportion of each group who respond “Not at all likely” when asked “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here – extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

among these groups has contributed to a notable partisan divide on this matter: the gap in opinion between parties grew from 1 point in 2004 to 37 points in 2020.

Last, in Figure 3, we examine trends in agreement that immigrants strengthen rather than threaten the U.S. In 2010, Democrats were 20 points more likely than Republicans to agree that immigrants strengthen the country. Over the following decade, the partisan gap skyrocketed. By 2021, Democrats were 51 points more likely than Republicans to endorse the view that immigrants strengthen America. Partisan polarization has become particularly intense among whites; in 2021, 86% of white Democrats endorsed the view that immigrants strengthen the U.S. compared to 26% of white Republicans. Black Americans have also moved modestly in a pro-immigrant direction on




Figure 3—Agreement that Immigrants Strengthen, Not Threaten, U.S. (PRRI). Points are the proportion of each group who select the second statement when asked which comes closest to their views: “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values” or “The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.” With 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

this item, while trends were stable among Hispanics.³ Overall, we find Americans have polarized such that Democrats consistently offer considerably more favorable attitudes towards immigrants than Republicans.

Immigration Levels

We next trace opinion on the sentiment perhaps at the core of the immigration debate—whether immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. In Figure 4, we plot the shares of Americans who support increasing immigration. During the 1990s and early 2000s,




Figure 4—Support for Increasing Immigration (ANES). Points are the proportion of each group who respond “Increased” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now?” (2000) or “Increased [a lot/a little]” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

³ Sample size limits partisan disaggregation for Hispanics with this item.

Americans of all racial/ethnic groups were remarkably similar in their overwhelming opposition to increasing immigration. In 2016, however, a notable partisan gap emerged as support for increasing immigration ticked up among white Democrats and declined among white Republicans. Between 2016 and 2020, Blacks and Hispanic Democrats also became more supportive. By 2020, opinion was starkly polarized, with Democratic support for increasing immigration doubling in four years to 47%, compared to 11% for Republicans. Partisan polarization on increasing immigration is more pronounced among whites (42 points) than Hispanics (28 points).

Beyond more general immigration preferences, the 2016 election and President Trump's 2017 executive order banning refugees from seven Muslim-majority countries drew national attention to refugee admissions. In Figure 5, we plot opposition to banning refugee admissions. Every year between 2016 and 2021, approximately 60% of the public opposed this ban. Opinion has remained steady across groups, but sharply polarized; since 2016, opposition among Democrats has ranged 72-81%, while opposition among Republicans has been much lower, ranging 34-45%. Majorities of every racial/ethnic group oppose refugee bans, but disaggregated by party, we find only majorities of white and Hispanic Democrats consistently oppose a ban.




Figure 5—Opposition to a Ban on Refugee Admissions (PRRI). Points are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Oppose” or “Oppose” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the U.S.?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Undocumented Immigrants’ Legal Status

Next, we analyze preferences regarding policies that would grant legal status to (some) undocumented immigrants: amnesty programs and a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children (i.e., “DREAMers”). In Figure 6, we plot support for amnesty. In 2007, opinion towards amnesty was moderately polarized by party (48% of Democrats supported amnesty compared to 22% of Republicans) and by race/ethnicity (31% of whites, 45% of Blacks, and 56% of Hispanics supported amnesty). Since 2007, national support for amnesty has increased significantly, but the shift is especially pronounced for Democrats. In 2022, 88% of all Democrats, including 90% of white Democrats, 78% of Blacks, and 88% of Hispanic Democrats

supported amnesty. Republicans have become moderately more supportive over time, with 44% of all Republicans, 42% white Republicans, and 58% of Hispanic Republicans supporting amnesty in 2022.




Figure 6—Support for Amnesty Programs for Law-Abiding Illegal Immigrants (CES). Points are the proportion of each group who respond “Support” when asked “What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following?... Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Cooperative Election Study.

In Figure 7, we plot support for establishing a path to citizenship for DREAMers. Consistent with prior research (Matos 2021), we find majorities of Americans supported a path to citizenship for DREAMers each year surveyed between 2011 and 2021. Support increased between 2011 and 2017 across partisan and racial/ethnic groups, but sharply declined in 2018 among Republicans (including both white and Hispanic Republicans). In contrast, in 2018 and beyond,

white Democrats' support for establishing a path to citizenship for DREAMers continued to rise, peaking at 81% in 2021, while support among Hispanic Democrats and Black Americans remained stable. Due to increasing support for a path to citizenship among Democrats and declining support among Republicans, the partisan divide on this proposal doubled from 17 points to 34 points between 2011 and 2021.




Figure 7—Support for a Path to Citizenship for DREAMers (PRRI). Points are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Favor” or “Favor” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally as children to obtain citizenship if they join the military or complete four years of college?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Border Control

Finally, we turn to public opinion regarding border control. In Figure 8, we plot opposition to increased federal border security spending. Between 2000 and 2008, a minority of Americans opposed increased spending. During this time, there was modest partisan polarization among whites

and Hispanics (for Hispanics, partisan differences are difficult to quantify with small samples). By 2020, however, there was a dramatic change in opinion among Democrats: 81% of Democrats opposed increasing border security spending. By contrast, in 2020, only 27% of Republicans did not support increasing border security spending. Partisan polarization in 2020 was especially pronounced among whites: 86% of white Democrats opposed increased spending—more than Blacks (66%) and Hispanic Democrats (80%).




Figure 8—Opposition to Increasing Federal Spending on Border Security (ANES). Points are the proportion of each group who do not respond “Increased” when asked “Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept the same?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

In Figure 9, we examine trends in opposition to increasing U.S.-Mexico border patrols (2007-2022). Over this period, modest minorities of Americans opposed increasing patrols. We observe slight increases in opposition in 2017 and 2020, but declines in 2019, 2021, and 2022. It is

difficult to know whether we are picking up “real” opinion change since 2017, or if shifts are caused by measurement artifacts (i.e., potential anchoring caused by the changing number and nature of CES immigration items); nevertheless, comparisons across partisan and racial/ethnic groups on this item remain fruitful. In 2007, Democrats were 23 points more opposed to increasing border patrols than Republicans. By 2022, this partisan divide had grown to 42 points. Even in recent years, whites are more supportive of border patrols than Hispanics and Blacks, due primarily to the overwhelming support for the policy among white Republicans. White Democrats, by contrast, offer some of the greatest opposition to border patrols across groups.




Figure 9—Opposition to Increasing U.S.-Mexico Border Patrols (CES). Points are the proportion of each group who respond “Oppose” when asked “What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following?... Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Cooperative Election Study.

In Figure 10, we examine public opinion towards arguably the most controversial immigration issue of the twenty-first century: building a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2016, 59% of Americans opposed building a border wall. Opinion was also more sharply polarized than other immigration issues: 80% of Democrats, but 31% of Republicans, opposed building the wall. Opinion polarized further between 2016 and 2021; by 2021, Democratic opposition was 81%, while Republican opposition was just 15%—a 66-point divide. Polarization in 2021 is even more pronounced among whites; there is a 75-point partisan gap among whites compared to a 48-point gap among Hispanics.⁴




Figure 10—Opposition to Building a U.S.-Mexico Border Wall (PRRI). Points are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Oppose” or “Oppose” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

⁴ Though not directly comparable to the PRRI, in the 2007 CES, 84% of Democrats and 52% of Republicans opposed building a border wall. Republicans appear to have been less supportive of this policy before Trump’s 2016 campaign.

Conclusion

Examining public opinion towards immigrants and immigration over three and a half decades, we observe that immigration views have become markedly polarized along partisan lines. Republicans have maintained their longstanding anti-immigrant orientation over this period, and on some issues, like border restrictions, became even more conservative. Democrats, in contrast, who were also quite anti-immigrant during the 1990s and early 2000s, became much more supportive of immigrants and immigration, especially after 2016.

Partisan polarization has influenced immigration opinion across racial/ethnic lines. We note important differences in immigration attitudes between white, Black, and Hispanic Americans, but when we disaggregate by party within these groups, it is clear that white Democrats, Hispanic Democrats, and Blacks are more similar in their views than their Republican counterparts, who have maintained much more conservative views over the examined period (including Hispanic Republicans who generally hold conservative immigration attitudes). Interestingly, in many cases, white Democrats' liberalization in immigration opinion has outpaced liberalization among Blacks and Hispanic Democrats.

At the beginning of the time trends we examine, Americans were remarkably negative in their immigration views. We draw attention to the fact that while aggregate immigration opinion in the U.S. has become notably more liberal, especially since 2016, the change has not been so significant that we would characterize Americans today as remarkably pro-immigrant. Instead, opinion is mixed. White Democrats, Blacks, and Hispanics tend agree that immigrants strengthen the U.S., and support amnesty and paths to citizenship for DREAMers. Most also oppose banning refugee admissions, and they overwhelmingly oppose building a border wall. But even while their views are not as conservative as Republicans, many Democrats, regardless of race and partisanship,

do not view “illegal immigrants” favorably, express some ambivalence about the likelihood that immigrants threaten Americans’ jobs, and are not especially inclined towards increasing immigration.

Why has American immigration opinion liberalized and polarized? Americans could be adopting immigration attitudes consistent with in-party elites as immigration becomes salient (Lenz 2012; Enns and Jardina 2021). Notably, liberalization in immigration opinion among Democrats was concentrated during Trump’s presidency, mirroring trends in racial attitudes (Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022). Alternatively, immigration attitudes could be stable at the individual-level (Kustov, Laaker, and Reller 2021), but polarizing due to partisan sorting (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

While the recent liberalization in Democrats’ immigration attitudes is an important development, its political consequences may be muted for several reasons. First, Democratic identification has declined among whites for the last three decades, meaning trends toward liberalization among white Democrats are occurring among an increasingly narrow slice of the electorate. Second, the views of Americans opposed to immigration may be more politically consequential since they are likely to view the issue as more important and with greater conviction than pro-immigrant Americans (Kustov 2022). Finally, Democrats’ vocal opposition to anti-immigrant policies has been rare under the Biden administration, which has actually maintained some of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies (Kumar 2021). Unless Democrats prioritize immigration as an important issue, anti-immigrant segments of the electorate will likely continue to disproportionately influence American immigration policy.

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**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR “THE POLLS—TRENDS: THE ASYMMETRIC
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Trent Ollerenshaw
Ph.D. Candidate
Duke University
Department of Political Science
trent.ollerenshaw@duke.edu

Ashley Jardina
Associate Professor
George Mason University
Schar School of Policy and Government

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Supplementary Material 1—Data Descriptions and Question Wordings

American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series

Funding/Sponsor: The ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File is a merged file containing all cross-section cases and variables for questions which have been asked in at least three Time Series studies conducted since 1948 through 2020. We use the November 18, 2021 version of the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File. Since 1977, the ANES has been funded by the National Science Foundation as a collaborative effort between Stanford University and the University of Michigan.

Target Population: The target population of the ANES is non-institutional, voting-eligible U.S. citizens. Prior to 2016, the ANES excluded respondents from Hawaii and Alaska from the target population due to the constraints of conducting in-person interviews in the non-contiguous states. Respondents from these two states are only included in the online samples fielded in 2016 and 2020. We subset by partisanship using variable VCF0301, and we include independents who lean towards one party or the other in their respective partisan groups.

Weighting: The ANES uses a stratified random sampling approach. Respondents have an unequal probability of selection into the ANES. To accurately represent the target population, we utilize the provided sampling weight variable VCF0009z.

Immigration Questions:

1. VCF0233. “How would you rate: Illegal (1992,1994: aliens/2004-2020: immigrants)?” [00-96. Degrees as coded 97. 97-100 Degrees]
2. VCF9223. “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here— extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?” [1. Extremely likely 2. Very likely 3. Somewhat likely 4. Not at all likely]
3. VCF0879. “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be (1992,1994: increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?) (1996,1998: increased a lot, increased a little, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?) (2004-2020: increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?)” [1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Same as now 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot 8. DK]

Reference:

American National Election Studies. 2021. *ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File* [dataset and documentation]. November 18, 2021 version. www.electionstudies.org

Table 1A. ANES Time Series Survey Modes and Response Rates

Year	Mode	Response Rate (RR1)
1988	Face-to-face	70.5
1992	Face-to-face, telephone	74.0
1994	Face-to-face	72.1
1996	Face-to-face, telephone	59.8
1998	Face-to-face, telephone	63.8
2000	Face-to-face, telephone	60.5
2004	Telephone	55.8
2008	Face-to-face	66.1
2012	Face-to-face	59.5
2016	Face-to-face, internet	38.0
2020	Face-to-face, internet	50.0

Table 1B. ANES Time Series Group Sample Sizes

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
1988	2,040	954	829	
1992	2,485	1,228	927	
1994	1,795	838	751	
1996	1,714	895	654	
1998	1,281	656	468	
2000	1,807	888	680	
2004	1,212	591	483	
2008	2,322	1,365	653	
2012	5,914	3,103	1,995	
2016	4,270	1,939	1,729	
2020	8,280	3,836	3,441	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
1988	1,539	602	740	
1992	1,895	841	811	
1994	1,381	561	663	
1996	1,323	620	583	
1998	954	425	410	
2000	1,350	586	583	
2004	848	355	409	
2008	1,138	496	497	
2012	3,518	1,388	1,634	
2016	3,038	1,178	1,473	
2020	5,963	2,430	2,925	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
1988	259	170	101	42
1992	310	219	125	62
1994	195	146	83	40
1996	191	149	99	34
1998	144	142	89	33
2000	198	140	77	43
2004	176	112	57	39
2008	560	523	325	113
2012	1,027	1,009	626	216
2016	397	450	261	103
2020	726	762	424	209

Cooperative Election Study (CES)

Funding/Sponsor: The CES (formerly the Cooperative Congressional Election Study or CCES) is a set of cross-sectional surveys fielded via YouGov every year since 2006. The CES is collaboratively funded by research teams who receive team-specific content and contribute to the publicly-available Common Content CES samples (Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013).

Target Population: The target population of the CES is U.S. adults. The CES includes non-citizens who we exclude from our sample. We subset by partisanship using variable “pid7”, and we include independents who lean towards one party or the other in their respective partisan groups.

Weighting: The CES uses non-probability sampling. Respondents have an unequal (and unknown) probability of selection into the CES. To more accurately represent the target population, the CES recommends using their provided weights are derived via matching and post-stratification weighting. In addition, not all respondents to the CES are included in the final dataset (i.e., they are pruned).

Immigration Questions (Variable Labels Change Each Year)

1. “What do you think Congress and the President should do about immigration? Select all that apply. ‘Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.’” [1. Yes 2. No]
2. “What do you think Congress and the President should do about immigration? Select all that apply. ‘Increase the number of border patrol on the US-Mexican border.’” [1. Yes 2. No]
3. “What do you think Congress and the President should do about immigration? Select all that apply. ‘Build a wall between the US and Mexico.’” [1. Yes 2. No]

Reference: See <https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/> for codebooks associated with each year of the CES.

Table 1C. CES Survey Modes

Year	Mode	Response Rate (R1)*
2007	Internet	Not Provided
2010	Internet	40.4
2011	Internet	Not Provided
2012	Internet	33.4
2013	Internet	Not Provided
2014	Internet	53.3
2015	Internet	Not Provided
2016	Internet	41.2
2017	Internet	Not Provided
2018	Internet	30.0
2019	Internet	Not Provided
2020	Internet	61.2
2021	Internet	Not Provided
2022	Internet	Not Provided

*Note: the response rates for non-probability panels are more like *participation rates* because non-probability panels lack a true sampling frame.

Table 1D. CES Group Sample Sizes

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans
2007	9,914	4,328	4,759
2010	54,857	24,122	23,425
2011	19,874	9,216	7,295
2012	53,843	24,910	20,439
2013	16,117	7,387	5,254
2014	55,197	25,218	18,877
2015	14,250	6,681	4,878
2016	63,232	30,421	20,628
2017	17,707	8,383	5,704
2018	58,866	27,092	21,544
2019	17,579	8,141	6,397
2020	59,990	28,899	20,226
2021	25,201	12,218	8,055
2022	59,376	28,931	20,198
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans
2007	8,305	3,461	4,169
2010	41,217	15,779	20,332
2011	15,101	6,335	6,276

2012	39,203	15,418	17,776	
2013	11,986	4,829	4,577	
2014	39,881	15,791	16,260	
2015	10,050	4,022	4,191	
2016	44,374	18,330	17,504	
2017	11,582	4,744	4,626	
2018	43,577	17,869	18,666	
2019	12,254	5,002	5,330	
2020	42,852	18,653	17,049	
2021	16,412	7,110	6,453	
2022	40,005	17,526	16,315	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2007	554	497	276	181
2010	6,316	5,391	2,668	1,709
2011	1,895	1,665	849	467
2012	6,527	5,353	2,977	1,350
2013	1,733	1,567	834	366
2014	6,676	5,349	2,817	1,255
2015	1,650	1,729	950	366
2016	7,560	7,030	3,948	1,630
2017	2,072	2,977	1,598	664
2018	5,373	6,512	3,481	1,635
2019	1,877	2,317	1,190	625
2020	6,629	6,608	3,446	1,655
2021	3,075	3,820	1,973	912
2022	7,639	7,579	3,942	2,044

General Social Survey (GSS)

Funding/Sponsor: The GSS is a merged file containing all cases from 1972 to 2021. The GSS is funded by the National Science Foundation and fielded by NORC at the University of Chicago.

Target Population: The target population of the GSS is non-institutional U.S. adults. The GSS does include non-citizens. Since 2008, they have asked a question that identifies respondents as U.S. citizens. Prior to 2008, however, there is no way to differentiate between naturalized U.S. citizens and non-citizens. For this reason, so our trends use a comparable target population over time, we drop all respondents who were not born as U.S. citizens. Our GSS trends do not, unfortunately, cover naturalized U.S. citizens for this reason. The GSS “race” variable did not differentiate between white Hispanics and non-Hispanics prior to 2000; thus, we unfortunately can only subset Hispanics post-2000. We subset partisanship with variable “partyid”, and we include independents who lean towards one party or the other in their respective partisan groups.

Weighting: The GSS uses a stratified random sampling approach. To accurately represent the target population, we utilize the provided sampling weight variable “wtssall” for all years before 2021 and “wtssnrps” for 2021 (because the 2021 GSS cross-section had to be appended to the time series file).

Immigration Questions:

1. (letin: 1994, 2000): “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?” [1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Same as now 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot] (letin1: 1996, 2004, 2014): “Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... [1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Remain the same as it is 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot] (letin: 2004-2021): “Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be...” [1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Remain the same as it is 4. Reduced a little 5. Reduced a lot]

Reference:

Davern, Michael; Bautista, Rene; Freese, Jeremy; Morgan, Stephen L.; and Tom W. Smith. General Social Survey 2021 Cross-section. [Machine-readable data file]. Principal Investigator, Michael Davern; Co-Principal Investigators, Rene Bautista, Jeremy Freese, Stephen L. Morgan, and Tom W. Smith. NORC ed. Chicago, 2021. 1 datafile (68,846 cases) and 1 codebook (506 pages).

Smith, Tom W., Davern, Michael, Freese, Jeremy, and Morgan, Stephen L., General Social Surveys, 1972-2018 [machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, Smith, Tom W.; Co-Principal Investigators, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese and Stephen L. Morgan; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago: NORC, 2019.

Table 1E. GSS Survey Modes and Response Rates

Year	Mode	Response Rate (RR1)
1994	Face-to-face	77.8
1996	Face-to-face	76.1
2000	Face-to-face	70.0
2004	Face-to-face, telephone	70.4
2006	Face-to-face, telephone	71.2
2008	Face-to-face, telephone	70.4
2010	Face-to-face, telephone	70.3
2012	Face-to-face, telephone	71.4
2014	Face-to-face, telephone	60.2
2016	Face-to-face, telephone	61.3
2018	Face-to-face, telephone	59.5
2021	Internet, telephone	17.4 (RR3)

Table 1F. GSS Group Sample Sizes

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans
1994	2,749	1,307	1,042
1996	2,655	1,213	994
2000	2,537	1,116	880
2004	2,539	1,098	991
2006	2,575	1,132	933
2008	1,758	860	605
2010	1,795	828	607
2012	1,700	797	558
2014	2,184	985	721
2016	2,507	1,158	865
2018	2,045	894	726
2021	3,516	1,588	1,144
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans
1994	2,338	989	1,000
1996	2,198	872	954
2000	1,989	754	816
2004	1,979	730	913
2006	2,008	746	868
2008	1,366	557	571
2010	1,355	533	546
2012	1,247	492	495
2014	1,589	597	650
2016	1,805	708	767
2018	1,440	515	638
2021	2,624	1,107	991
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	
1994	354	-	
1996	387	-	
2000	391	120	
2004	338	167	
2006	376	143	
2008	252	104	
2010	271	119	
2012	265	139	
2014	339	206	
2016	429	200	
2018	340	200	
2021	335	323	

Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI)

Funding/Sponsor: PRRI is a nonpartisan, independent research organization that conducts polls on a variety of topics related to America’s changing cultural, religious, and political landscape. Some of its surveys are co-sponsored with other research organizations, such as the Brookings Institution.

Target Population: The target population of PRRI surveys is non-institutional U.S. adults. PRRI surveys likely do include non-citizen residents of the U.S., though citizenship status is unfortunately not asked in their surveys. Our PRRI trends thus cover non-naturalized U.S. residents. Because not all PRRI surveys ask a follow-up question to independents about whether they lean towards one party or the other, the PRRI trends do *not* include independent leaners in any partisan group (even when a survey did ask this follow-up question).

Weighting: All PRRI surveys are probability-based samples (using random-digit dialing or address-based sampling). As such, all PRRI estimates must use the post-stratification weights provided with each survey to be representative of the target population.

Response Rates: Despite using probability-based sampling, PRRI rarely reports response rates for their surveys.

Immigration Questions:

1. “Would you say that, in general, the growing number of newcomers from other countries:” [1. Threatens traditional American customs and values 2. Strengthens American society]
2. “How much do you favor or oppose each of the following?... Building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico.” [1. Strongly favor 2. Somewhat favor 3. Somewhat oppose 4. Strongly oppose]
3. “How much do you favor or oppose each of the following?... Passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the U.S.” [1. Strongly favor 2. Somewhat favor 3. Somewhat oppose 4. Strongly oppose]
4. “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing immigrants who came to the US illegally as children to obtain citizenship if they join the military or complete 4 years of college?” [1. Strongly favor 2. Somewhat favor 3. Somewhat oppose 4. Strongly oppose]

Reference:

See the “Data Vault” on www.prri.org for more information about each individual survey we use. In general, PRRI provides a methodological disclosure at the end of each survey topline document. The sampling methodologies of these surveys have varied slightly over time in ways that are difficult to summarize succinctly.

Table 1G. PRRI Survey Names, Dates, and Modes

Survey Name	Month/Year	Mode
Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey	March 2010	Telephone
Millennials, Religion & Gay and Lesbian Issues Survey	July 2011	Telephone
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	Telephone
June 2012 Survey	June 2012	Telephone
Race, Class, and Culture Survey	August 2012	Telephone
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	Telephone
April 2013 Survey	April 2013	Telephone
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	Telephone
February 2015 Survey	February 2015	Telephone
June 2015 Survey	June 2015	Telephone
August 2015 Survey	August 2015	Telephone
December 2015 Survey	December 2015	Telephone
2016 Immigration Survey	April 2016	Internet, Telephone
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	Internet, Telephone
August 2017 Survey	August 2017	Telephone
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	Telephone
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	Internet, Telephone
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	Internet
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	Internet, Telephone
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	Internet, Telephone
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	Internet

Table 1H. PRRI Group Sample Sizes

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
2010	1,201	504	516	
2011	5,450	2,518	2,270	
2012	3,523	1,462	1,388	
2013	13,003	5,439	4,605	
2014	7,943	3,332	3,051	
2015	8,054	3,279	2,492	
2016	11,707	4,716	3,458	
2017	9,529	3,266	2,969	
2018	5,631	2,482	1,952	
2019	2,527	1,338	975	
2020	2,538	892	656	
2021	2,508	813	737	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
2010	956	368	460	
2011	4,067	1,641	1,981	
2012	2,597	950	1,182	
2013	9,368	3,297	4,007	
2014	5,713	1,963	2,681	
2015	5,594	1,937	2,133	
2016	7,947	2,733	2,950	
2017	6,291	1,814	2,364	
2018	3,802	1,395	1,592	
2019	1,646	734	785	
2020	1,618	456	521	
2021	1,780	463	638	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2010	77	74	40	21
2011	450	454	282	100
2012	343	294	129	87
2013	1,294	1,333	707	277
2014	882	734	370	153
2015	869	855	381	150
2016	1,254	1,413	662	229
2017	1,019	1,268	502	268
2018	613	741	427	166
2019	283	374	246	96
2020	305	435	172	92
2021	229	293	127	51

Note: These sample sizes merge multiple surveys in a calendar year. Further, not all immigration items are asked on all surveys in a given year. The sample size available for any estimate thus may differ from what is listed here.

Supplementary Material 2—Tables of Results

Table 2A. Mean Feeling Thermometer Ratings of “Illegal Immigrants” (ANES)

Year	National		Democrats	Republicans
1988	0.367		0.409	0.330
1992	0.372		0.395	0.339
1994	0.332		0.385	0.280
2004	0.417		0.468	0.361
2008	0.404		0.468	0.323
2012	0.391		0.474	0.296
2016	0.430		0.538	0.305
2020	0.494		0.626	0.347
Year	Whites		White Democrats	White Republicans
1988	0.333		0.366	0.314
1992	0.343		0.363	0.323
1994	0.293		0.335	0.262
2004	0.381		0.430	0.340
2008	0.360		0.425	0.304
2012	0.340		0.414	0.283
2016	0.384		0.504	0.288
2020	0.448		0.615	0.327
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
1988	0.436	0.592	0.635	0.529
1992	0.449	0.548	0.537	0.581
1994	0.463	0.502	0.516	0.463
2004	0.472	0.581	0.654	0.498
2008	0.499	0.596	0.631	0.505
2012	0.523	0.579	0.635	0.442
2016	0.538	0.612	0.681	0.431
2020	0.577	0.651	0.724	0.486

Note: Table entries are groups’ mean warmth ratings of “illegal aliens” (1988-1994) and “illegal immigrants” (2004-2020) on 0-100 feeling thermometer scales. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

Table 2B. Agreement that Immigrants “Not at All Likely” to Take American Jobs (ANES)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
2004	14.0%	14.2%	13.6%	
2008	13.7%	16.1%	10.9%	
2012	17.3%	23.1%	11.2%	
2016	23.6%	34.0%	11.9%	
2020	35.0%	52.8%	16.0%	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
2004	15.0%	17.1%	13.8%	
2008	12.4%	16.0%	10.0%	
2012	15.2%	22.2%	10.4%	
2016	20.2%	34.6%	9.7%	
2020	32.1%	57.2%	14.4%	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2004	5.7%	16.3%	17.8%	12.1%
2008	10.3%	25.1%	27.4%	16.3%
2012	19.1%	27.6%	33.8%	15.5%
2016	24.3%	40.6%	43.1%	35.3%
2020	33.8%	48.4%	61.3%	25.8%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who respond “Not at all likely” when asked “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here – extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?”. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

Table 2C. Agreement that Immigrants Strengthen, not Threaten, American Society (PRRI)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans
2010	50.7%	61.1%	40.8%
2011	55.6%	65.2%	45.3%
2013	57.8%	68.1%	45.5%
2014	51.6%	65.0%	35.6%
2015	57.8%	69.1%	40.9%
2016	48.7%	67.3%	23.7%
2018	61.6%	79.0%	37.4%
2019	59.8%	77.5%	34.7%
2021	58.3%	79.4%	28.0%
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans
2010	46.9%	58.1%	39.5%
2011	53.9%	65.7%	44.3%
2013	53.7%	67.8%	44.0%
2014	48.8%	71.3%	32.6%
2015	52.8%	69.1%	38.8%
2016	44.1%	71.5%	21.0%
2018	56.1%	78.5%	34.0%
2019	53.1%	77.2%	31.3%
2021	53.4%	86.1%	25.5%
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	
2010	58.6%	76.7%	
2011	53.7%	66.3%	
2013	64.1%	69.6%	
2014	58.8%	59.7%	
2015	60.1%	73.9%	
2016	49.9%	58.0%	
2018	65.5%	74.3%	
2019	66.3%	75.9%	
2021	73.7%	64.5%	

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select the second statement when asked which comes closest to their views: “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values” or “The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Table 2D. Support for Increasing Immigration (ANES)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
1992	8.0%	10.2%	5.7%	
1994	5.2%	5.5%	5.8%	
1996	5.5%	5.7%	4.9%	
1998	10.8%	11.6%	10.3%	
2000	8.8%	9.8%	6.8%	
2004	9.6%	12.3%	7.8%	
2008	14.1%	16.1%	12.8%	
2012	13.8%	17.7%	9.9%	
2016	15.9%	24.4%	6.6%	
2020	29.2%	46.5%	11.3%	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
1992	7.0%	8.9%	5.4%	
1994	4.9%	5.8%	5.1%	
1996	4.6%	4.3%	4.6%	
1998	8.8%	9.1%	8.7%	
2000	7.3%	8.8%	6.7%	
2004	7.6%	11.5%	5.1%	
2008	13.3%	16.9%	11.7%	
2012	12.8%	17.4%	9.6%	
2016	15.1%	27.1%	5.9%	
2020	27.1%	52.6%	10.1%	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
1992	12.6%	9.2%	11.7%	6.2%
1994	5.8%	6.2%	6.4%	8.2%
1996	8.8%	8.9%	10.7%	7.1%
1998	12.8%	20.5%	21.6%	23.5%
2000	11.9%	12.4%	15.6%	2.1%
2004	10.9%	16.3%	18.4%	19.6%
2008	13.0%	21.8%	20.6%	25.2%
2012	14.6%	19.9%	25.4%	10.7%
2016	17.0%	19.5%	22.8%	10.6%
2020	30.7%	35.7%	45.8%	17.6%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who respond “Increased” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now?” (2000) or “Increased [a lot/a little]” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.




Figure 2A—Support for Increasing Immigration (GSS). This figure replicates the ANES Time Series trend for “increasing immigration.” We opted to include this figure as supplemental because the GSS does not have large enough samples to break out trends among Hispanics by party, and did not have a consistent Hispanic identifier prior to 2000. Points are the proportion of each group who respond “Increased [a lot/a little]” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: General Social Survey.

Table 2E. Support for Increasing Immigration (GSS)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans
1994	5.7%	5.1%	5.2%
1996	7.1%	8.5%	5.7%
2000	7.6%	9.8%	5.3%
2004	8.2%	10.6%	5.6%
2006	8.9%	10.4%	7.6%
2008	10.2%	12.1%	7.6%
2010	11.7%	13.9%	8.2%
2012	11.2%	15.3%	5.8%
2014	12.6%	17.0%	7.2%
2016	15.7%	23.1%	6.7%
2018	22.1%	35.2%	10.1%
2021	23.6%	40.1%	7.8%
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans
1994	4.8%	3.9%	5.0%
1996	6.4%	8.1%	5.0%
2000	6.9%	10.7%	4.3%
2004	6.7%	8.5%	5.1%
2006	7.4%	9.7%	6.2%
2008	8.8%	11.6%	6.7%
2010	9.4%	12.1%	6.9%
2012	9.4%	14.3%	5.0%
2014	11.5%	17.4%	6.7%
2016	14.3%	25.4%	6.3%
2018	21.5%	40.4%	10.0%
2021	23.8%	46.6%	7.5%
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	
1994	11.7%	-	
1996	10.4%	-	
2000	8.0%	15.1%	
2004	11.5%	19.2%	
2006	12.7%	21.4%	
2008	16.9%	15.4%	
2010	17.0%	21.9%	
2012	19.0%	12.5%	
2014	14.8%	16.4%	
2016	19.1%	21.1%	
2018	24.5%	23.1%	
2021	23.4%	22.8%	

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who respond “Increased [a lot/a little]” when asked “Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: General Social Survey.

Table 2F. Opposition to Banning Refugee Admissions (PRRI)

Year	National		Democrats	Republicans
2016	55.7%		71.5%	36.1%
2017	61.8%		74.3%	40.8%
2018	62.1%		78.1%	39.2%
2019	64.6%		78.7%	44.8%
2020	63.2%		80.7%	37.3%
2021	60.1%		74.6%	34.1%
Year	Whites		White Democrats	White Republicans
2016	54.9%		75.4%	37.5%
2017	59.4%		74.8%	38.3%
2018	58.9%		77.9%	39.8%
2019	62.1%		82.8%	44.0%
2020	60.2%		85.1%	36.6%
2021	57.5%		81.1%	34.4%
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2016	61.4%	52.9%	66.5%	30.7%
2017	73.8%	60.4%	70.6%	54.0%
2018	69.5%	69.2%	82.4%	34.4%
2019	66.0%	71.3%	78.3%	53.7%
2020	68.7%	67.6%	81.1%	38.1%
2021	67.9%	62.1%	68.9%	21.4%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Oppose” or “Oppose” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the U.S.?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Table 2G. Support for Amnesty Programs for Illegal Immigrants (CES)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
2007	34.1%	47.6%	22.5%	
2010	39.2%	57.6%	20.4%	
2011	44.1%	60.0%	27.0%	
2012	47.2%	64.4%	25.7%	
2013	45.4%	63.0%	27.1%	
2014	46.7%	66.7%	27.2%	
2015	48.9%	68.1%	29.1%	
2016	54.1%	72.6%	34.9%	
2017	53.5%	75.1%	30.9%	
2019	64.0%	84.6%	41.1%	
2020	68.0%	88.6%	45.5%	
2021	64.5%	87.3%	39.1%	
2022	67.3%	88.4%	44.2%	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
2007	30.6%	44.6%	20.9%	
2010	35.6%	57.0%	19.3%	
2011	39.8%	58.3%	25.7%	
2012	41.8%	61.6%	24.1%	
2013	41.7%	62.7%	25.4%	
2014	42.0%	66.0%	25.5%	
2015	44.1%	68.5%	26.9%	
2016	50.3%	73.2%	33.7%	
2017	49.4%	76.4%	29.4%	
2019	60.6%	86.9%	39.9%	
2020	63.7%	89.8%	44.1%	
2021	59.6%	88.5%	36.5%	
2022	63.4%	90.2%	42.3%	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2007	45.3%	55.8%	69.6%	35.2%
2010	50.6%	57.3%	70.8%	36.0%
2011	57.1%	59.5%	71.4%	40.4%
2012	64.9%	65.0%	74.8%	43.6%
2013	56.4%	60.3%	72.0%	42.6%
2014	61.4%	61.6%	73.1%	42.5%
2015	60.2%	65.5%	77.0%	50.6%
2016	65.7%	67.9%	76.9%	50.5%
2017	64.9%	65.1%	78.4%	42.0%
2019	74.5%	71.5%	82.0%	50.4%
2020	78.3%	80.5%	91.0%	59.4%
2021	77.8%	75.4%	87.1%	52.7%
2022	77.7%	77.4%	87.8%	58.3%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who respond “Support” when asked “What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following?... Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Cooperative Election Study.

Table 2H. Support for Path to Citizenship for DREAMers (PRRI)

Year	National		Democrats		Republicans	
2011	49.9%		57.9%		40.8%	
2012	55.1%		64.8%		45.2%	
2013	57.3%		65.2%		48.0%	
2014	59.7%		67.2%		49.8%	
2015	62.7%		68.2%		53.0%	
2017	65.1%		73.5%		55.6%	
2018	57.9%		70.9%		42.4%	
2019	59.0%		68.6%		45.9%	
2020	60.9%		72.8%		45.3%	
2021	60.5%		75.0%		40.7%	
Year	Whites		White Democrats		White Republicans	
2011	49.5%		63.6%		38.3%	
2012	56.6%		71.7%		45.7%	
2013	60.0%		74.4%		48.5%	
2014	61.3%		80.0%		51.7%	
2015	66.7%		76.5%		57.5%	
2017	72.7%		85.5%		61.6%	
2018	58.7%		82.3%		40.4%	
2019	61.8%		79.1%		46.9%	
2020	65.8%		88.5%		43.3%	
2021	63.0%		87.0%		43.0%	
Year	Blacks		Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep	
2011	51.0%		65.7%	69.2%	60.9%	
2012	59.0%		67.9%	70.3%	63.5%	
2013	60.6%		67.6%	70.0%	61.3%	
2014	60.9%		72.5%	64.1%	64.6%	
2015	66.7%		74.0%	73.4%	62.6%	
2017	64.8%		71.1%	78.0%	65.2%	
2018	63.2%		65.5%	72.3%	47.7%	
2019	60.6%		68.7%	76.2%	46.1%	
2020	62.2%		65.3%	78.8%	47.9%	
2021	65.1%		70.1%	77.0%	53.4%	

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Favor” or “Favor” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally as children to obtain citizenship if they join the military or complete four years of college?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Table 2I. Opposition to Increasing Federal Spending on Border Security (ANES)

Year	National		Democrats	Republicans	
2000	46.0%		50.7%	42.5%	
2004	34.2%		41.5%	25.8%	
2008	41.4%		49.0%	30.3%	
2020	56.6%		81.0%	27.3%	
Year	Whites		White Democrats	White Republicans	
2000	44.0%		47.9%	41.7%	
2004	29.1%		32.8%	25.3%	
2008	37.9%		48.2%	28.2%	
2020	51.4%		86.4%	24.8%	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep	
2000	50.8%	51.8%	61.3%	48.1%	
2004	46.2%	48.5%	69.2%	23.0%	
2008	40.1%	62.2%	64.4%	52.8%	
2020	65.9%	70.3%	79.5%	44.0%	

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who do not respond “Increased” when asked “Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept the same?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: American National Election Study Time Series.

Table 2J. Opposition to Increasing Patrols Along U.S.-Mexico Border (CES)

Year	National		Democrats	Republicans
2007	47.5%		60.0%	36.8%
2010	39.7%		53.6%	21.5%
2011	45.4%		57.5%	28.2%
2012	44.2%		58.7%	23.9%
2013	45.2%		60.9%	24.2%
2014	40.7%		56.2%	21.9%
2015	45.4%		61.0%	23.6%
2016	47.5%		64.3%	24.9%
2017	53.4%		73.8%	27.3%
2019	32.4%		52.7%	7.0%
2020	37.6%		62.6%	9.3%
2021	32.1%		52.2%	7.0%
2022	29.8%		48.7%	7.1%
Year	Whites	White Democrats		White Republicans
2007	44.6%	58.2%		35.3%
2010	35.6%	51.7%		20.2%
2011	41.1%	55.3%		26.6%
2012	40.6%	58.5%		22.5%
2013	41.6%	62.4%		22.6%
2014	37.0%	57.2%		20.4%
2015	40.6%	60.9%		21.5%
2016	43.0%	64.3%		23.6%
2017	47.9%	72.3%		25.6%
2019	28.3%	55.9%		5.1%
2020	33.3%	67.0%		7.6%
2021	28.2%	55.6%		5.6%
2022	26.6%	52.3%		5.5%
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2007	56.2%	63.3%	74.7%	45.2%
2010	52.4%	59.9%	69.4%	38.2%
2011	54.6%	64.0%	72.2%	42.0%
2012	54.0%	58.2%	67.2%	37.0%
2013	53.4%	62.0%	73.3%	38.9%
2014	50.2%	53.9%	63.0%	32.9%
2015	58.5%	59.5%	66.5%	38.5%
2016	59.3%	63.3%	71.9%	35.8%
2017	70.1%	65.9%	79.7%	36.3%
2019	41.6%	43.3%	52.9%	17.5%
2020	50.3%	47.6%	60.5%	19.1%
2021	39.2%	41.5%	53.7%	13.6%
2022	37.0%	38.3%	50.4%	16.0%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who respond “Oppose” when asked “What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following?... Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Cooperative Election Study.

Table 2K. Support for Building a U.S.-Mexico Border Wall (PRRI)

Year	National	Democrats	Republicans	
2016	58.6%	79.6%	31.4%	
2017	63.9%	88.1%	25.7%	
2018	61.0%	85.6%	26.7%	
2019	57.3%	83.7%	20.9%	
2020	58.0%	86.6%	14.9%	
2021	54.2%	81.2%	15.0%	
Year	Whites	White Democrats	White Republicans	
2016	52.5%	81.6%	27.6%	
2017	56.6%	86.7%	22.7%	
2018	52.8%	84.2%	23.2%	
2019	49.3%	85.6%	17.2%	
2020	51.2%	91.9%	11.9%	
2021	47.3%	86.6%	11.8%	
Year	Blacks	Hispanics	Hispanic Dem	Hispanic Rep
2016	73.8%	71.4%	81.9%	51.0%
2017	84.7%	76.4%	91.3%	46.1%
2018	78.4%	77.6%	90.5%	39.1%
2019	74.7%	73.5%	87.4%	36.5%
2020	75.9%	64.7%	88.1%	21.7%
2021	63.8%	71.1%	86.1%	37.7%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Oppose” or “Oppose” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Supplementary Material 3—PRRI Results by Survey

For the main analyses, we pooled a set of PRRI surveys by year for visual clarity and to increase our sample sizes for relatively small partisan/racial-ethnic groups who constitute a small share of any single sample. In this supplementary material, we disaggregate the PRRI results by individual surveys instead of pooled over years. We do not break out the results for Hispanics by partisan groups here since these are often very small samples in any single survey. Note that the results for preferences towards a policy banning refugee admissions came from six annual surveys fielded by PRRI between 2016 and 2021, so there is no pooling for those analyses.

Table 3A. Agreement that Immigrants Strengthen, Not Threaten, U.S. (PRRI)

Survey Name	Date	National	Democrats	Republicans
Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey	March 2010	50.7%	61.1%	40.8%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	55.6%	65.2%	45.3%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	57.1%	67.6%	45.4%
April 2013 Survey	April 2013	59.3%	70.0%	46.1%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	51.6%	65.0%	35.6%
June 2015 Survey	June 2015	61.0%	69.9%	46.1%
August 2015 Survey	August 2015	56.2%	66.9%	32.7%
December 2015 Survey	December 2015	56.7%	70.5%	43.7%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	48.7%	67.3%	23.7%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	61.6%	79.0%	37.4%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	59.8%	77.5%	34.7%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	58.3%	79.4%	28.0%
Survey Name	Date	Whites	White Dem	White Rep
Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey	March 2010	46.9%	58.1%	39.5%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	53.9%	65.7%	44.3%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	53.6%	68.2%	43.8%
April 2013 Survey	April 2013	53.8%	66.3%	44.7%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	48.8%	71.3%	32.6%

June 2015 Survey	June 2015	57.1%	68.8%	47.1%
August 2015 Survey	August 2015	49.5%	67.4%	31.5%
December 2015 Survey	December 2015	52.7%	70.7%	39.9%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	44.1%	71.5%	21.0%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	56.1%	78.5%	34.0%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	53.1%	77.2%	31.3%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	53.4%	86.1%	25.5%
Survey Name	Date	Blacks		Hispanics
Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey	March 2010	58.6%		76.7%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	53.7%		66.3%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	62.4%		67.0%
April 2013 Survey	April 2013	67.5%		75.0%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	58.8%		59.7%
June 2015 Survey	June 2015	63.6%		72.1%
August 2015 Survey	August 2015	62.7%		78.8%
December 2015 Survey	December 2015	52.9%		69.4%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	49.9%		58.0%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	65.5%		74.3%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	66.3%		75.9%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	73.7%		64.5%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select the second statement when asked which comes closest to their views: “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values” or “The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Table 3B. Support for Path to Citizenship for DREAMers

Survey Name	Date	National	Democrats	Republicans
Millennials, Religion & Gay and Lesbian Issues Survey	July 2011	47.0%	54.3%	38.9%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	53.5%	62.6%	43.1%
June 2012 Survey	June 2012	53.2%	68.1%	39.0%
Race, Class, and Culture Survey	August 2012	55.9%	64.0%	46.9%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	57.3%	65.2%	48.0%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	59.7%	67.2%	49.8%
February 2015 Survey	February 2015	61.0%	66.4%	53.2%
June 2015 Survey	June 2015	63.5%	69.1%	53.0%
August 2017 Survey	August 2017	63.3%	73.3%	54.1%
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	66.0%	73.7%	57.0%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	58.5%	70.7%	43.2%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	56.5%	71.6%	39.7%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	59.0%	68.6%	45.9%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	60.9%	72.8%	45.3%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	60.5%	75.0%	40.7%
Survey Name	Date	Whites	White Dem	White Rep
Millennials, Religion & Gay and Lesbian Issues Survey	July 2011	45.6%	59.2%	35.2%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	54.4%	69.2%	41.8%
June 2012 Survey	June 2012	50.3%	67.9%	35.2%
Race, Class, and Culture Survey	August 2012	59.2%	72.6%	48.7%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	60.0%	74.4%	48.5%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	61.3%	80.0%	51.7%
February 2015 Survey	February 2015	67.1%	78.3%	57.8%

June 2015 Survey	June 2015	66.6%	75.8%	57.4%
August 2017 Survey	August 2017	69.1%	85.1%	58.3%
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	74.4%	85.8%	64.6%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	61.4%	82.7%	42.2%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	52.4%	80.3%	34.7%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	61.8%	79.1%	46.9%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	65.8%	88.5%	43.3%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	63.0%	87.0%	43.0%
Survey Name	Date	Blacks		Hispanics
Millennials, Religion & Gay and Lesbian Issues Survey	July 2011	47.2%		63.6%
Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey	August 2011	55.6%		68.4%
June 2012 Survey	June 2012	64.9%		70.3%
Race, Class, and Culture Survey	August 2012	56.6%		66.9%
Religion, Values & Immigration Reform Survey	February 2013	60.6%		67.6%
2014 American Values Survey (Post-Election)	November 2014	60.9%		72.5%
February 2015 Survey	February 2015	68.7%		69.8%
June 2015 Survey	June 2015	65.9%		76.2%
August 2017 Survey	August 2017	69.4%		72.7%
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	62.5%		70.4%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	62.1%		63.9%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	65.9%		69.5%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	60.6%		68.7%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	62.2%		65.3%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	65.1%		70.1%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Favor” or “Favor” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally as children to obtain citizenship if they join the military or complete four years of college?” White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Table 3C. Support for Building a U.S.-Mexico Border Wall

Survey Name	Date	National	Democrats	Republicans
2016 Immigration Survey	April 2016	58.2%	77.9%	33.6%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	59.2%	81.7%	28.3%
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	63.9%	88.1%	25.7%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	66.7%	93.3%	30.8%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	58.8%	83.0%	25.1%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	57.3%	83.7%	20.9%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	58.0%	86.6%	14.9%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	54.2%	81.2%	15.0%
Survey Name	Date	Whites	White Dem	White Rep
2016 Immigration Survey	April 2016	52.7%	79.5%	30.6%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	52.3%	84.2%	23.7%
2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	56.6%	86.7%	22.7%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	58.3%	93.7%	28.6%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	50.7%	81.2%	21.0%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	49.3%	85.6%	17.2%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	51.2%	91.9%	11.9%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	47.3%	86.6%	11.8%
Survey Name	Date	Blacks		Hispanics
2016 Immigration Survey	April 2016	72.8%		68.4%
2016 American Values Survey	September 2016	75.2%		77.0%

2017 American Values Survey	October 2017	84.7%	76.4%
2018 American Values Survey	September 2018	89.0%	89.3%
Pluralism 2019 Survey	December 2018	74.3%	73.2%
2019 American Values Survey	August 2019	74.7%	73.5%
2020 American Values Survey	September 2020	75.9%	64.7%
2021 American Values Survey	September 2021	63.8%	71.1%

Note: Table entries are the proportion of each group who select “Strongly Oppose” or “Oppose” when asked “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico?” with 95 percent confidence intervals. White and Black groups do not include Hispanics. Partisan groups do not include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

Supplementary Material 4—Survey Mode and Measuring Immigration Opinion

The surveys we analyze often use mixed-mode interviewing, or use different modes over the course of their time series. The effects of survey mode on measuring public opinion regarding immigration has received relatively little attention; however, general work on mode effects is instructive on the potential consequences of survey mode for measuring public opinion in this domain. Mixed-mode surveys often employ a primary mode that is supplemented with a secondary mode for respondents who would not, or cannot, participate in the primary mode (e.g., households without internet being interviewed by phone). In these cases, we might not expect opinion to be equivalent across modes because the primary and secondary survey modes are meant to jointly, not individually, represent the population. This is true of the ANES Time Series every year except 2012 and 2016, the GSS, and all the PRRI surveys (while the CES exclusively uses online modes). On occasion, however, surveys have recruited parallel samples with different modes, each meant to be representative of the target population. This is true of the 2012 and 2016 ANES, which recruited parallel face-to-face and online samples. In these cases, absent differences in sample composition or measurement effects due to things like social desirability bias, acquiescence bias, and/or (in-)attentiveness, we would expect for immigration opinion to be approximately equivalent across modes (keeping random sampling error in mind as another possible reason for non-equivalence). The concern for measuring immigration opinion over time if non-equivalence emerged in these scenarios is that our observed trends are then confounded by mode effects due to differences in sample composition and/or measurement effects.

The trend has been toward greater reliance on online surveys in lieu of face-to-face or phone interviews. Are there differences in estimates of opinion regarding immigration in live versus online modes? In Figure 4A, we offer one test of this possibility using the 2012 and 2016 ANES and those years' immigration items—thermometer ratings of “illegal immigrants”, agreement that immigrants are “not at all likely” to take Americans' jobs, and support for increasing immigration. Figure 4 plots the sample means/proportions by year and by mode for the three immigration items in the national sample, with the face-to-face estimates represented in black and the online estimates in white.




Figure 4A—National Immigration Opinion by Survey Mode in the 2012/2016 ANES. Points are (for 2012 and 2016) mean feeling thermometer ratings of illegal immigrants on a 0 to 1 scale, proportions agreeing that immigrants are “not all likely” to take Americans' jobs, and proportions indicating support for increasing immigration. Positive values indicate pro-immigrant/immigration opinion for all three items. Data are weighted. Source: 2012 and 2016 ANES Time Series.

As shown in Figure 4A, we find just one significant difference in sample means/proportions across the six tests—the online sample in 2012 gave illegal immigrants, on average, a 3-point colder rating than the face-to-face sample. This difference does not reemerge in 2016, nor do we uncover substantively or significantly different estimates of immigration opinion on the two other items. We also tested these differences for whites, blacks, and Hispanics and did not find consistent differences by survey mode for any racial/ethnic group. Of course, our tests here cannot be taken to imply that survey mode is inconsequential for measuring immigration opinion; although differences in average immigration opinion mostly do not emerge in the 2012 and 2016 ANES Time Series, these nulls could emerge for any number of reasons because “mode effects” describe both differences in the sample composition and measurement effects due to a question having been asked in one mode vs. another—and these sampling and measurement effects need not point in the same direction. For example, if the online sample was more pro-immigrant due to its sample composition than the face-to-face sample (even after weighting), but respondents in the face-to-face mode offered more pro-immigrant opinions than they would have online due to social desirability pressures, these effects would offset and produce no difference in means/proportions taking the pro-immigrant position. A simple analysis of unadjusted means/proportions cannot be used to conclude there are no mode effects when measuring immigration opinion. However, these tests can give us a greater degree of confidence that, to whatever extent our results are confounded by mode effects due to differential sample composition and/or measurement bias, the aggregate of confounding has little overall effect on estimates of immigration opinion. Since the purpose of our paper is to describe aggregate trends in immigration opinion, these unadjusted analyses are adequate towards offering evidence that the trends we identify are not simply a byproduct of many surveys switching to online modes over time. However, additional research is necessary to identify to what extent, if any, mode is consequential in terms of both sample composition effects and measurement effects.