Authoritarianism and Support for Trump and Clinton in the 2016 Primaries

Trent Ollerenshaw
Ph.D. Candidate, Duke University
Department of Political Science
trent.ollerenshaw@duke.edu
425-830-3478
@Trent_Oll
Mailing Address: 140 Science Drive, 208 Gross Hall, Campus Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708

Abstract

Research in the wake of the contentious 2016 presidential primaries contends both Democrats and Republicans were internally divided along psychological lines. Specifically, MacWilliams (2016) finds authoritarian personality was strongly related to Trump support among Republican primary voters, and Wronski et al. (2018) finds authoritarianism was strongly related to support for Clinton among Democratic primary voters. In this paper, I reassess the relationships between authoritarianism and 2016 primary candidate preferences for both Republicans and Democrats. I analyze two new large, probability-based surveys and generate random effects estimates using these surveys and the two national surveys made available by Wronski et al. (2018). Overall, I find authoritarianism was moderately associated with support for Clinton over Sanders among Democrats, but weakly associated with support for Trump among Republicans. My findings indicate authoritarianism may have played a more limited role in shaping Americans' candidate preferences in the 2016 presidential primary elections than past studies have suggested.

Political psychologists have long been interested in how authoritarianism shapes political behavior in the U.S. (Adorno et al. 1950; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). In two recent accounts, MacWilliams (2016) and Wronski et al. (2018) extend this line of inquiry to intra-party contexts by evaluating how authoritarianism was associated with Americans' candidate preferences in the 2016 presidential primaries. MacWilliams (2016) argues authoritarianism was associated with support for Donald Trump over other Republican candidates in 2016, while Wronski et al. (2018) finds that authoritarianism was associated with support for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders among Democrats, but insignificantly related with support for Trump among Republicans. While these studies diverge somewhat on whether authoritarianism spurred support for Trump among Republicans, they agree authoritarianism played an important role structuring Americans' intra-partisan political behavior during the 2016 primaries.

In this paper, I reexamine the relationships between authoritarianism and partisans' 2016 primary candidate preferences. I conduct additional tests of the hypotheses that authoritarianism was associated with greater support for Trump and Clinton among their parties' respective primary voters using two large, probability-based surveys. I twice find that authoritarianism was neither significantly associated with support for Trump among Republican primary voters, nor support for Clinton among Democratic primary voters (though just barely shy of significance in one case). And while random effects estimates pooling across the four available national samples between this study and Wronski et al. (2018) suggest authoritarianism was moderately associated with support for Clinton among Democratic primary voters (Wronski et al. 2018), authoritarianism seems to have been very weakly associated with Trump support for Republicans (MacWilliams 2016). My findings indicate authoritarianism played a more limited role shaping Americans' candidate preferences in the 2016 primaries than past studies have suggested.

Authoritarianism and Candidate Preferences in the 2016 Primaries

I begin by reviewing two published studies that have examined how authoritarianism, measured with self-reported childrearing values, was associated with candidate preferences in the 2016 US primaries: MacWilliams (2016) and Wronski et al. (2018).[1] MacWilliams evaluates the relationship between authoritarianism and support for Trump and other Republican primary candidates using a survey of 540 likely Republican voters fielded in December 2015. Although reproduction data for MacWilliams (2016) is not publicly available, in Table 1 and Figure 1, I directly reproduce MacWilliams' (2016) results pertaining to authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences. Referencing the results in this table and figure, MacWilliams concludes authoritarianism was significantly associated with support for Trump, but not support for other Republican primary candidates. From Figure 1, the estimated marginal effect of authoritarianism on Trump support is an approximately 0.30-point change in predicted probability.

Wronski et al. (2018) similarly examine how authoritarianism shaped preferences in the 2016 primary. Although their article focuses on the Democratic contest between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, Wronski et al. also analyze the Republican primary in appendices. Wronski et al. analyze two national surveys: the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and a 2017 YouGov survey.[2] Using Wronski et al.'s publicly available reproduction materials, I reproduce their analyses in Table 2 and Figure 2 with linear probability models.[3] These analyses show authoritarianism was significantly related with support for Clinton over Sanders among

---

[1] See Engelhardt et al. (2021) for a review of the childrearing values approach for measuring authoritarianism. Other studies (Bizumic and Duckitt 2018; Ludeke, Klitgaard, and Vitriol 2018) have examined the relationships between candidate preferences and measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer 1981). While childrearing values measures and RWA are closely related, RWA measures often explicitly tap political attitudes, which risks making them tautological for explaining political behavior (Engelhardt et al. 2021; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005).
[2] Wronski et al.'s YouGov survey was fielded in 2017, but YouGov provided them with respondents' primary vote choice captured in 2016.
[3] Wronski et al. (2018) originally reported results from logistic regression models, but the results are near-identical when linear probability models are used. See Appendix F for a replication of my analyses with logistic models.

Democratic primary voters, with estimated effects of 0.35- and 0.25-points measured as changes in predicted probability in the CCES and YouGov, respectively. Testing the association between authoritarianism and support for Trump over Cruz, however, the CCES and YouGov samples show non-significant, but positive, effects of 0.10- and 0.20-points, respectively. Wronski et al. thus conclude authoritarianism was associated with Democrats', but perhaps not Republicans', candidate preferences in the 2016 primaries.

In this paper, I reevaluate the associations of authoritarianism and support for Trump and Clinton in the 2016 primaries. Why might these relationships warrant further assessment? First and foremost, MacWilliams (2016) and Wronski et al. (2018) reach different conclusions about how authoritarianism was associated with Republicans' preferences in the 2016 primaries. Widely publicized media claims following MacWilliams (2016) suggest there was something psychologically distinct about Trump's 2016 primary supporters relative to standard Republican identifiers, and that Trump was uniquely attractive to these individuals among many Republican candidates. These popular accounts often imply psychological authoritarians are something of a lurking danger in the mass polity, and that 2016 was an example of this voting bloc collectively rearing its head.[4] Yet my reproductions of Wronski et al. (2018) suggest that non-authoritarian Republicans supported Trump's primary campaign at rates similar to authoritarians; thus, it is unclear whether the credit (or blame) for Trump's success in the 2016 primary can be mostly attributed to psychologically authoritarian Republicans.

Second, there are potential issues with the samples analyzed by Wronski et al. (2018) and MacWilliams (2016). The national samples analyzed in Wronski et al. are quite small: whereas MacWilliams' December 2015 survey includes 540 likely Republican primary voters, Wronski et

---

[4] Claims to this effect have been published in Newsweek, Vox, Politico, and The Atlantic.

al.'s CCES includes 260 Democratic and 145 Republican primary voters after listwise deletion, and their YouGov survey includes 195 Democratic and 119 Republican primary voters. These samples are concerning because samples with fewer than approximately 250 observations often generate unreliable correlational estimates (Schönbrodt and Perugini 2013). Further, perhaps due to their small samples, Wronski et al. exclude Kasich and Rubio voters, who comprise 14 and 11 percent of the Republican primary electorate, from their study. Analyses of large samples would be beneficial towards reducing sampling error, increasing statistical power (Arel-Bundock et al. 2022), and allowing supporters of many major Republican primary candidates to be analyzed. Another potential concern with Wronski et al. and MacWilliams' samples is that they are drawn from opt-in web panels. The generalizability of estimates derived from non-probability panels is the subject of ongoing debate, with some studies finding discrepancies to favor probability-based approaches (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Meng 2018; Yeager et al. 2011) and others finding approximately similar results across recruitment methods (Berrens et al. 2003; Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner 2015; Vitriol, Larsen, and Ludeke 2019). Verifying that the associations identified by Wronski et al. (2018) and MacWilliams (2016) also emerge in probability-based samples would bolster these studies' claims.

Finally, I argue MacWilliams (2016) does not provide sufficient evidence to sustain the claim that authoritarianism was associated with support for Trump in the 2016 primaries, but not other primary candidates. MacWilliams (2016) claims that "Trump supporters are also distinct in their attitudes from the followers of the other Republican candidates." MacWilliams reports the association of authoritarianism with Trump support (which is positive and significant), but does not report comparable coefficients for the other four Republican candidates. Instead, as shown in Table 1, MacWilliams (2016) presents models for these other candidates while interacting

authoritarianism and terrorism threat. Without further information about the unconditional (or "main") effects of authoritarianism, which is unavailable, it is impossible to conduct significance tests on the difference in the coefficients for authoritarianism across the five candidates. Notably, Figure 1 also shows a positive association between authoritarianism and support for Cruz, which would be consistent with Wronski et al.'s (2018) analyses. However, whether Trump and Cruz supporters significantly differ in authoritarianism in MacWilliams (2016) is unknown. As it stands, I argue MacWilliams' claim that authoritarianism was associated with support for Trump, but not other Republican primary candidates, is insufficiently supported by the reported analyses.

Data and Methodology

In this paper, I reassess the relationships between authoritarianism and voting behavior in the 2016 primaries. I leverage two large, probability-based surveys: the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series and a Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) poll fielded on the AmeriSpeak panel. In Table 3, I outline key details regarding these surveys compared to those of Wronski et al. (2018) and MacWilliams (2016). Since the PRRI was fielded amidst the 2016 primaries, I limit my main analyses of the PRRI by excluding respondents who reported not voting if their state's primary had already occurred and those who reported no intention to vote if their state's primary was forthcoming.[5] Usefully, both the ANES and PRRI boast larger samples than those analyzed by Wronski et al. and MacWilliams. I weight my analyses of the PRRI and ANES, and account for the ANES's complex sampling design when calculating standard errors. Further details about the sampling methodologies of these surveys are available in Appendix A.

---

[5] In Appendix E, I also analyze a less restrictive PRRI sample including all partisans and a more restrictive sample of voters who report having already voted or "Always" voting in primaries if their state's primary was forthcoming. Across all three sample subsets, my results are substantively similar.

I model Democrats' primary preferences using linear probability models with a variable that takes values of 0 (Sanders) and 1 (Clinton). I model Republicans' primary preferences using multinomial probit regression with a dependent variable that takes values of 1 (Trump), 2 (Cruz) and 3 (Kasich) in the PRRI, plus 4 (Rubio) in the ANES.[6] I also use all four estimates from Wronski et al.'s CCES and YouGov surveys, the ANES, and the PRRI survey in random effects models to estimate authoritarianism's overall associations with Clinton and Trump support.[7] To facilitate random effects modeling of the Republican primary, I collapse the dependent variables into binary Trump/non-Trump outcomes and estimate these associations using linear probability models. However, the random effects estimates should be interpreted with caution, and always alongside the estimates from individual surveys, because these models aggregate over potentially important differences in the surveys' recruitment methodology, timing, and analytic modeling.

I assess authoritarianism with the standard four-item childrearing values measure, which is the same authoritarianism measure used by Wronski et al. (2018) and MacWilliams (2016). I use the same set of controls as Wronski et al.'s CCES model[8]: age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, marriage, church attendance, southern residency, partisan identity, ideology, and union membership (which is not available in the PRRI survey). The covariates in this model differ from those used in MacWilliams (2016) to analyze the Republican primary, most importantly in that MacWilliams controls for terrorism threat but not partisan identity strength. However, in

---

[6] Marco Rubio dropped out two weeks before the PRRI survey was fielded.

[7] The random effects estimates are derived using *Meta-Essentials*, available in the reproduction files (Suurmond, van Rhee, and Hak 2017). I unfortunately do not have the necessary information to include MacWilliams' (2016) study in these models.

[8] Several covariates in Wronski et al.'s YouGov model are not on the ANES or PRRI surveys; therefore, I replicate their CCES model. In the random effects model, I drop the three additional YouGov covariates (need for closure, racial resentment, and social dominance) so that the YouGov analysis mirrors those for the other three surveys (except for the missing PRRI union membership covariate).

Appendix C, I show that my key findings are not substantively changed when using

MacWilliams' alternative model to analyze the Republican primary.

Results

I begin by examining the 2016 Democratic primary. In Table 4, I regress Democrats'

candidate preferences (PRRI) or vote choice recall (ANES) on authoritarianism and the controls

such that positive coefficients indicate associations with support for Clinton over Sanders. I find

authoritarianism is positively, though non-significantly, associated with Clinton support in both

samples (p_{ANES}=0.30, p_{PRRI}=0.06). As shown in Figure 3, the predicted probabilities of support

for Clinton increase by 0.08- and 0.12-points in the ANES and PRRI, respectively, as functions

of authoritarianism.[9] In the random effects model including estimates from the ANES, PRRI,

CCES, and YouGov surveys, I estimate a 0.11-point association between authoritarianism and

Clinton support among Democrats (p=0.01). Although authoritarianism was associated with

Clinton support in the 2016 primaries, tests using large, probability-based samples show that the

strength of this association was approximately one-third to half the size estimated by Wronski et

al. (2018).

Next, in Table 5, I provide results for the multinomial probit regressions of Republicans'

primary candidate preferences. Here, positive coefficients indicate a variable is associated with

support for non-Trump candidates over Trump, the baseline category. I perform significance

tests using the average marginal effects of authoritarianism, and show the predicted probabilities

of support across candidates as functions of authoritarianism in Figure 4.[10] In the ANES, from its

minimum to maximum values, authoritarianism is associated with 0.12-points greater support for

---

[9] In Appendix G, I analyze the ANES by mode and find authoritarianism has a 0.22 association with Clinton support in the face-to-face sample (n=196), but only a 0.04 association in the online sample (n=535).

[10] The predicted values in Figure 4 hold union, male, and south to zero, married and white to one, and all continuous covariates to their sample means.

Trump (p=0.16), 0.00-points less support for Cruz (p=0.98), 0.02-points greater support for Rubio (p=0.74), and 0.13-points less support for Kasich (p=0.01). In the PRRI, authoritarianism is associated with 0.02-points greater support for Trump (p=0.76), 0.03-points greater support for Cruz (p=0.73), and 0.05-points less support for Kasich (p=0.41). Results from linear probability models are similar; the associations of authoritarianism with Trump support are 0.13-points (p_{ANES}=0.14) and 0.04-points (p_{PRRI}=0.67). In the random effects model, I estimate a 0.05-point association between authoritarianism and Trump support that, although statistically significant (p=0.01), is much weaker than the approximately 0.30-point association in MacWilliams (2016).

Discussion

Before concluding, it is worth directly addressing the major limitations of my analysis. I use cross-sectional survey data to estimate the effects of authoritarianism on primary candidate preferences. As such, I cannot empirically discern the direction(s) of causality that generate correlations between authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences. A foundational assumption of political psychology is that personality occurs causally prior to political behavior. However, this assumption is now seen as increasingly untenable. In recent studies, Bakker et al. (2021) find political attitudes and identities affect personality traits, and Luttig (2021) similarly finds Trump support causes Republicans to report higher levels of authoritarianism (but see also Engelhardt et al. 2021 who find authoritarianism is exogenous to political attitudes/identities). The estimated effects of authoritarianism on primary candidate preferences in this study risk being biased by reverse causal influences, so they should be viewed as strictly associational.

A second issue is that it is difficult to handle partisan identity strength and ideology with a regression-based design. Partisan identity and ideology causally follow from authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Luttig 2017), so controlling for these variables risks attenuating

8

the estimated effect of authoritarianism. However, if authoritarianism is endogenous to partisan identity and ideology, and partisan identity and ideology cause primary candidate preferences, excluding these variables risks *confounding* authoritarianism's relationship with primary candidate preferences. In supplemental analyses (Appendix D), I drop these covariates and find the random effects estimated association of authoritarianism with support for Clinton increases modestly from 0.11- to 0.17-points, while the association with Trump support actually decreases from 0.05- to 0.04-points.

Conclusion

Prior research contends that psychological authoritarianism divided American partisans during the 2016 presidential primaries, spurring support for Hillary Clinton among Democrats (Wronski et al. 2018) and support for Donald Trump among Republicans (MacWilliams 2016). Towards confirming how authoritarianism was related to primary candidate preferences in 2016, I examined two new large, probability-based surveys. I twice failed to find authoritarianism was significantly associated with support for Clinton among Democrats or support for Trump among Republicans in the 2016 primaries. Using a random effects model to pair my analyses with two reproduced from Wronski et al. (2018), I found a moderate association between authoritarianism and support for Clinton among Democratic primary voters. However, I also found MacWilliams' (2016) claim that authoritarianism was strongly associated with support for Trump among 2016 Republican primary voters to be considerably overstated.

That I find authoritarianism had weaker effects than past studies is perhaps not especially surprising; social scientific replication studies generally find smaller effects than original studies (Camerer et al. 2018). Ideally, however, we would know what *caused* these discrepancies. In my

view, four factors could explain these discrepancies: differences in (1) sample size; (2) survey timing; (3) survey recruitment; and/or (4) modeling decisions.

Sample size is very likely one reason why I find smaller effects than other studies. The typical political science study is underpowered and, therefore, noisy (Arel-Bundock et al. 2022); there is an inverse relationship between sample size and effect size in published social science research (Gerber, Green, and Nickerson 2001; Kühberger, Fritz, and Scherndl 2014); and the publication of large effects when analyzing small samples is more or less mechanical when publication biases favor significant findings because only large effects can attain significance in small samples (Esarey and Wu 2016; Loken and Gelman 2017). Large, out-of-sample tests are useful in this regard because they reduce noise and offer opportunities for mean reversion to emerge. In addition, the surveys' timings likely affected the estimated associations between authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences. Studies assessing these associations have used surveys spanning 2015-2017, and there is no guarantee these associations were stable over time. Specifically, although authoritarianism seems to have been weakly associated with Trump support during the primaries and afterwards in vote choice recalls, authoritarianism could have been more strongly associated with Trump support immediately *before* the primary's onset when MacWilliams' study was fielded. Finally, further discrepancies could be caused by differences in sample recruitment. Since the goal of this inquiry is to identify the effects of authoritarianism on primary candidate preferences in the electorate, generalizability to this population is important. Claims of generalizability are typically seen as more credible when analyzing probability-based surveys like the ANES and PRRI, even though non-probability surveys can also be informative.

Although differences in survey size, timing, and recruitment strike me as plausible causes of discrepancies between my estimates and those of prior studies, I do not believe differences in

modeling decisions adequately explain these discrepancies. The main regression model I use is admittedly different from the one MacWilliams (2016) used to examine the Republican primary; however, I also find weaker associations using MacWilliams' preferred model (Appendix C). My estimates also remain relatively weaker when controls for partisan identity strength and ideology are dropped (Appendix D), using different likely voter screens (Appendix E), and using logistic regressions (Appendix F). Across multiple model specifications and samples, authoritarianism is moderately associated with Clinton primary support and weakly associated with Trump primary support.

This study makes several important contributions. My analyses add to an emerging line of scholarly inquiry concerned by the *intra*-partisan consequences of psychological differences (MacWilliams 2016; Wronski et al. 2018; Luttig 2017). Although I find authoritarianism likely mattered less in shaping 2016 primary preferences than extant research suggests, this does not necessarily mean psychological traits are unimportant for intra-partisan contexts; rather, I hope my findings prompt further inquiry into whether and how psychological differences manifest in intra-party divisions. However, this study does show the claim that authoritarianism "provided the fuel for Trump's [primary] campaign" is overstated (MacWilliams 2016). To be clear, this is not to say Trump was not authoritarian himself—his dehumanizing rhetoric, nativist appeals, and calls for political opponents to be jailed suggest otherwise (Jardina and Piston 2021). But despite Trump's authoritarian proclivities, the distribution of his primary support in authoritarianism was similar to other Republican candidates. My findings thus support accounts that argue other social and economic transformations better explain Trump's electoral success than psychological authoritarianism (Gordon 2016). As such, it would not be surprising if authoritarian *and* non-authoritarian Republicans rally behind Trump's recently announced 2024 campaign.

References

Adorno, Theodor W. et al. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York City, NY: Harper & Brothers.

Altemeyer, Bob. 1981. *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.

Arel-Bundock, Vincent et al. 2022. "Quantitative Political Science Research Is Greatly Underpowered." https://osf.io/7vy2f/ (July 12, 2022).

Bakker, Bert N., Yphtach Lelkes, and Ariel Malka. 2021. "Reconsidering the Link Between Self-Reported Personality Traits and Political Preferences." *American Political Science Review*: 1–17.

Berrens, Robert P. et al. 2003. "The Advent of Internet Surveys for Political Research: A Comparison of Telephone and Internet Samples." *Political Analysis* 11(1): 1–22.

Bizumic, Boris, and John Duckitt. 2018. "Investigating Right Wing Authoritarianism With a Very Short Authoritarianism Scale." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 6(1): 129–50.

Camerer, Colin F. et al. 2018. "Evaluating the Replicability of Social Science Experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015." *Nature Human Behaviour* 2(9): 637–44.

Clifford, Scott, Ryan M Jewell, and Philip D Waggoner. 2015. "Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?" *Research & Politics* 2(4): 2053168015622072.

Engelhardt, Andrew M., Stanley Feldman, and Marc J. Hetherington. 2021. "Advancing the Measurement of Authoritarianism." *Political Behavior*.

Esarey, Justin, and Ahra Wu. 2016. "Measuring the Effects of Publication Bias in Political Science." *Research & Politics* 3(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016665856.

Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 24(1): 41–74.

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and David Nickerson. 2001. "Testing for Publication Bias in Political Science." *Political Analysis* 9(4): 385–92.

Gordon, Peter E. 2016. "The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump." *boundary 2*. https://www.boundary2.org/2016/06/peter-gordon-the-authoritarian-personality-revisited-reading-adorno-in-the-age-of-trump/ (October 19, 2022).

Hetherington, Marc J, and Jonathan D Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Jardina, Ashley, and Spencer Piston. 2021. "The Effects of Dehumanizing Attitudes about Black
People on Whites' Voting Decisions." *British Journal of Political Science*: 1–23.

Kühberger, Anton, Astrid Fritz, and Thomas Scherndl. 2014. "Publication Bias in Psychology: A
Diagnosis Based on the Correlation between Effect Size and Sample Size." *PLOS ONE*
9(9): e105825.

Loken, Eric, and Andrew Gelman. 2017. "Measurement Error and the Replication Crisis."
Science 355(6325): 584–85.

Ludeke, Steven G., Camilla N. Klitgaard, and Joseph Vitriol. 2018. "Comprehensively-Measured
Authoritarianism Does Predict Vote Choice: The Importance of Authoritarianism's
Facets, Ideological Sorting, and the Particular Candidate." *Personality and Individual
Differences* 123: 209–16.

Luttig, Matthew D. 2017. "Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the
Origins of Partisan Extremism." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 81(4): 866–95.

Luttig, Matthew D. 2021. "Reconsidering the Relationship between Authoritarianism and
Republican Support in 2016 and Beyond." *The Journal of Politics* 83(2): 783–87.

MacWilliams, Matthew C. 2016. "Who Decides When The Party Doesn't? Authoritarian Voters
and the Rise of Donald Trump." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 49(4): 716–21.

Malhotra, Neil, and Jon A. Krosnick. 2007. "The Effect of Survey Mode and Sampling on
Inferences about Political Attitudes and Behavior: Comparing the 2000 and 2004 ANES
to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples." *Political Analysis* 15(3): 286–323.

Meng, Xiao-Li. 2018. "Statistical Paradises and Paradoxes in Big Data (I): Law of Large
Populations, Big Data Paradox, and the 2016 US Presidential Election." *The Annals of
Applied Statistics* 12(2): 685–726.

Schönbrodt, Felix D., and Marco Perugini. 2013. "At What Sample Size Do Correlations
Stabilize?" *Journal of Research in Personality* 47(5): 609–12.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suurmond, Robert, Henk van Rhee, and Tony Hak. 2017. "Introduction, Comparison, and
Validation of Meta-Essentials: A Free and Simple Tool for Meta-Analysis." *Research
Synthesis Methods* 8(4): 537–53.

Vitriol, Joseph A., Erik Gahner Larsen, and Steven G. Ludeke. 2019. "The Generalizability of
Personality Effects in Politics." *European Journal of Personality* 33(6): 631–41.

Wronski, Julie et al. 2018. "A Tale of Two Democrats: How Authoritarianism Divides the
Democratic Party." *The Journal of Politics* 80(4): 1384–88.

Yeager, David S. et al. 2011. "Comparing the Accuracy of RDD Telephone Surveys and Internet Surveys Conducted with Probability and Non-Probability Samples." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75(4): 709–47.

	Trump	Trump	Cruz	Carson	Rubio	Bush
Authoritarianism	0.273	0.347	0.357	-0.028	0.091	-0.060
	(0.084)	(0.160)	(0.226)	(0.256)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Terror Threat	0.150	0.212	0.367	-0.064	-0.074	-0.075
	(0.053)	(0.124)	(0.171)	(0.199)	(0.167)	(0.164)
Authoritarianism*Terror		-0.604	-4.008	1.486	-0.049	0.193
		(1.099)	(1.637)	(1.714)	(1.624)	(1.542)
Gender	-0.126	-0.126	-0.276	0.089	-0.480	0.443
	(0.200)	0.200	(0.291)	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.307)
Education	-0.415	-0.423	-0.075	-0.731	0.543	0.040
	(0.381)	0.381	(0.554)	(0.625)	(0.594)	(0.581)
Age	-0.013	-0.009	-1.616	1.956	0.183	-1.575
	(0.433)	0.433	(0.636)	(0.702)	(0.677)	(0.672)
Evangelicalism	0.025	0.035	0.447	-0.326	-0.024	-0.506
	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.308)	(0.338)	(0.341)	(0.361)
Ideology	0.053	0.052	0.239	0.070	0.031	-0.275
	(0.214)	(0.061)	(0.102)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.093)
Church Attendance	-0.387	-0.385	0.062	0.947	-0.528	-0.054
	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.303)	(0.324)	(0.355)	(0.345)
Race	0.253	0.253	-0.087	0.234	-0.392	0.644
	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.370)	(0.407)	(0.342)	(0.343)
Income	-0.066	-0.058	-0.251	0.753	0.588	0.682
	(0.437)	(0.437)	(0.616)	(0.725)	(0.659)	(0.664)
Constant	-1.917	-2.161	-3.175	-4.278	1.800	0.278
	(0.619)	(0.765)	(1.100)	(1.218)	(1.048)	(1.000)
Observations	540	540	540	540	540	540

Table 1—Associations of 2016 Republican Primary Candidate Preferences Reproduced from MacWilliams (2016). Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only "likely Republican primary voters." Source: MacWilliams 2016, University of Massachusetts Amherst Political Science Department December 2015 National Survey.

Figure 1—Associations of Authoritarianism to Support for Republican Primary Candidates Reproduced from MacWilliams (2016). Points are predicted probabilities of support for five Republican candidates with 95 percent confidence intervals as functions of authoritarianism. Sample includes only "likely Republican primary voters." Source: MacWilliams 2016, University of Massachusetts Amherst Political Science Department December 2015 National Survey.

Figure 2—Associations of Authoritarianism to Support for Clinton and Trump in 2016 Primary Reproduced from Wronski et al. (2018). Points are predicted probabilities of support for Clinton over Sanders among Democrats (blue) and Trump over Cruz among Republicans (red) with 95 percent confidence intervals as functions of authoritarianism. Partisan groups include independent leaners. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, YouGov 2017, CCES 2016.

	Democratic Primary		Republican Primary	
	CCES	*YouGov*	*CCES*	*YouGov*
Authoritarianism	0.352	0.254	0.098	0.198
	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.161)	(0.150)
Party Identity Strength	0.190	0.274	0.006	-0.040
	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.110)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.176	0.474	-0.595	-0.708
	(0.111)	(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.212)
Church Attendance	0.059	0.064	-0.123	-0.149
	(0.096)	(0.145)	(0.115)	(0.152)
Male	-0.060	-0.065	-0.027	0.162
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.089)
White	-0.079	-0.118	-0.122	0.047
	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Education	-0.121	-0.030	-0.344	0.176
	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.167)	(0.197)
Income	0.588	0.190	0.194	-0.212
	(0.167)	(0.191)	(0.228)	(0.286)
Union	-0.045	-0.168	-0.140	-0.019
	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Married	-0.043	0.036	-0.055	-0.023
	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.098)
Age	0.040	0.029	0.017	0.026
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.031)
South	0.079	0.052	0.005	-0.073
	(0.060)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.104)
Need for Closure		-0.106		-0.076
		(0.185)		(0.243)
Social Dominance		-0.202		-0.104
		(0.203)		(0.280)
Racial Resentment		0.028		0.153
		(0.145)		(0.244)
Constant	0.026	0.148	1.384	0.932
	(0.142)	(0.188)	(0.245)	(0.369)
Observations	260	195	145	119
R-Squared	0.221	0.267	0.152	0.159

Table 2—Associations of 2016 Democratic Primary Candidate Preferences Reproduced from Wronski et al. (2018). Entries are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Partisan groups include independent leaners. Comparisons are Clinton over Sanders for Democrats and Trump over Cruz for Republicans. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, YouGov 2017, CCES 2016.

Published Surveys	December 2015 Survey		2016 CCES		2017 YouGov	
Dependent Variable	Candidate Preferences		Vote Choice Recall		Vote Choice Recall	
Field Dates	12/10/2015–12/15/2015		09/28/2016–12/14/2016		09/29/2017–10/10/2017	
Sampling Design	Non-Probability, Online		Non-Probability, Online		Non-Probability, Online	
Partisan Subsample	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Authoritarianism (Mean)	-	-	0.48	0.62	0.41	0.61
Supports: Hillary Clinton	-	-	63%	-	56%	-
Supports: Bernie Sanders	-	-	37%	-	44%	-
Supports: Donald Trump	-	-	-	74%	-	64%
Supports: Ted Cruz	-	-	-	26%	-	36%
Supports: John Kasich	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supports: Marco Rubio	-	-	-	-	-	-
Observations	-	540	260	145	195	119

New Surveys	2016 PRRI (AmeriSpeak Panel)		2016 ANES Time Series	
Dependent Variable	Candidate Preferences		Vote Choice Recall	
Field Dates	04/04/2016–05/02/2016		09/07/2016–01/08/2017	
Sampling Design	Probability-Based, Online and Telephone		Probability-Based, Online and Face-to-Face	
Partisan Subsample	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Authoritarianism (Mean)	0.56	0.71	0.45	0.60
Supports: Hillary Clinton	55%	-	63%	-
Supports: Bernie Sanders	45%	-	37%	-
Supports: Donald Trump	-	44%	-	52%
Supports: Ted Cruz	-	34%	-	23%
Supports: John Kasich	-	22%	-	13%
Supports: Marco Rubio	-	-	-	11%
Observations	911	651	731	594

Table 3—Sample Descriptions. PRRI and ANES data are weighted. Sample sizes after listwise deletion listed. Source: MacWilliams 2016, University of Massachusetts Amherst Political Science Department December 2015 National Survey, Wronski et al. 2018, YouGov 2017, CCES 2016, 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

	2016 PRRI	2016 ANES
Authoritarianism	0.124	0.077
	(0.065)	(0.074)
Party Identity Strength	0.185	0.309
	(0.047)	(0.051)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.247	0.462
	(0.098)	(0.100)
Church Attendance	-0.022	0.009
	(0.067)	(0.049)
Male	-0.032	-0.051
	(0.043)	(0.037)
White	-0.041	-0.106
	(0.045)	(0.043)
Education	-0.118	0.163
	(0.071)	(0.129)
Income	0.017	0.038
	(0.093)	(0.078)
Married	0.108	0.064
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Age	0.521	0.022
	(0.097)	(0.043)
South	0.081	0.572
	(0.043)	(0.085)
Union		0.077
		(0.041)
Constant	0.101	-0.127
	(0.095)	(0.129)
Observations	911	731
R-squared	0.154	0.278

Table 4—Associations of 2016 Democratic Primary Candidate Preferences. Entries are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Figure 3—Predicted Probability of Clinton Vote in 2016 Democratic Primary. Points are predicted probabilities of support for Clinton over Sanders with 95 percent confidence intervals as a function of authoritarianism. Sample includes only Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

	2016 PRRI		2016 ANES		
	Cruz	*Kasich*	*Cruz*	*Kasich*	*Rubio*
Authoritarianism	0.023	-0.248	-0.199	-1.088	-0.136
	(0.338)	(0.353)	(0.388)	(0.422)	(0.371)
Party Identity Strength	-0.205	-0.070	-0.002	-0.940	-0.654
	(0.203)	(0.213)	(0.254)	(0.285)	(0.254)
Ideology (Conservative)	2.599	0.034	2.577	-1.276	0.745
	(0.522)	(0.457)	(0.736)	(0.816)	(0.549)
Church Attendance	0.723	0.403	0.792	0.388	0.430
	(0.321)	(0.311)	(0.252)	(0.285)	(0.256)
Male	-0.232	-0.069	-0.356	-0.044	-0.426
	(0.190)	(0.206)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.226)
White	-0.447	0.183	-0.470	0.350	-0.055
	(0.241)	(0.296)	(0.300)	(0.394)	(0.377)
Education	0.294	1.165	0.862	3.948	2.088
	(0.345)	(0.431)	(0.731)	(0.956)	(0.868)
Income	-0.472	1.311	0.492	0.538	1.217
	(0.438)	(0.425)	(0.395)	(0.409)	(0.529)
Married	0.095	-0.192	-0.306	0.161	-0.219
	(0.208)	(0.235)	(0.229)	(0.284)	(0.254)
Age	-1.485	-0.012	-0.884	-0.409	0.059
	(0.462)	(0.496)	(0.430)	(0.518)	(0.486)
South	-0.140	-0.421	0.380	-0.753	0.768
	(0.188)	(0.214)	(0.187)	(0.238)	(0.218)
Union			-0.974	-0.471	-0.902
			(0.344)	(0.379)	(0.462)
Constant	-1.107	-1.957	-2.630	-2.300	-3.539
	(0.524)	(0.585)	(0.876)	(1.047)	(1.000)
Observations	651	651	594	594	594

Table 5—Multinomial Probit Regression of 2016 Republican Primary Candidate Preferences. Entries are multinomial probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Trump is the baseline category of comparison. Sample includes only Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Figure 4—Predicted Probabilities of Candidate Preferences in 2016 Republican Primary.
Points are predicted probabilities of support for each candidate with 95 percent confidence intervals as functions of authoritarianism. Sample includes only Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Appendix Material for "Authoritarianism and Support for Trump and Clinton in the 2016 Primaries"

Trent Ollerenshaw
PhD Candidate
Duke University
Department of Political Science
trent.ollerenshaw@duke.edu

Appendix A: ANES and PRRI Sample Descriptions

American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series

Funding/Sponsor: Since 1977, the ANES has been funded by the National Science Foundation as a collaborative effort between Stanford University and the University of Michigan.
Survey Modes: Face-to-face, online.
Response Rates (AAPOR RR1): 50 percent (face-to-face), 44 percent (online).
Target Population: The target population of the ANES is non-institutional, voting-eligible U.S. citizens. The ANES face-to-face sample excludes respondents from Hawaii and Alaska due to constraints conducting in-person interviews in the two non-contiguous states. Respondents from these two states are included in the online sample, however.
Weighting and Design Effects: The 2016 ANES uses a stratified random sampling approach. Respondents have an unequal probability of selection into the ANES. To accurately represent the target population, I apply sampling weight V160102, which is the post-election survey weight. In addition, I apply stratum variable V160201 and cluster variable V160202 so that standard errors reflect the additional sampling error introduced by the complex sampling design.
Reference:
American National Election Studies. 2016. *ANES 2016 Time Series* [dataset and documentation].
    September 4, 2019 version. www.electionstudies.org.

PRRI-Brookings 2016 Immigration Survey

Funding/Sponsor: Public Religion Research Institute, Brookings Institute, The Carnegie Corporation of New York. Fielded on NORC (University of Chicago) AmeriSpeak panel.
Survey Modes: Online, telephone for panelists without internet access.
Response Rates: Not listed.
Target Population: The target population is non-institutional, U.S. citizens in all 50 states and D.C.
Weighting: The 2016 PRRI uses two-stage probability-based random sampling. Respondents have an unequal probability of selection into the panel and survey. To accurately represent the target population, I apply the provided sampling weight.
Reference:
2016 PRRI/Brookings Immigration Survey: https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PRRI-Brookings-2016-Immigration-survey-report.pdf

Appendix B: Question Wordings and Measure Constructions

Measure Construction

2016 Democratic Primary: A dichotomous variable that takes value of 0 (Bernie Sanders) or 1 (Hillary Clinton). Respondents in the ANES were asked "In the Presidential primary or caucus, who did you vote for?" if they indicated in a previous question they had voted in a presidential primary/caucus. Respondents in the PRRI who self-identified as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents were asked "Which of the following Democratic candidates would you most like to see as the Democratic Party's 2016 nominee for president?"

2016 Republican Primary: A multinomial variable taking value of 1 (Donald Trump), 2 (Ted Cruz), and 3 (John Kasich) in the PRRI, plus 4 (Marco Rubio) in the ANES. Respondents in the ANES were asked "In the Presidential primary or caucus, who did you vote for?" if they indicated in a previous question they had voted in a presidential primary/caucus. Respondents in the PRRI who self-identified as Republicans or Republican-leaning independents were asked "Which of the following Republican candidates would you most like to see as the Republican Party's 2016 nominee for president?" This variable is, at times, collapsed into a binary 0 (non-Trump supporter) or 1 (Trump supporter) variable.

PRRI "Potential Primary Voter": The PRRI sample was subset to potential primary voters. These individuals responded either "Yes" or "My state has not held a primary election/caucus yet" to the question "And thinking about this year, have you participated in a primary election or caucus in your state?" In addition, they did not respond "Never" to the question "And how often would you say you vote in primary elections--that is, the elections in which a party selects their nominee to run in a general election?"

Age: Age is a continuous variable for the age of respondents in years, recoded from 0 to 1.

Authoritarianism: Authoritarianism is a continuous variable measured using four childrearing values items, scaled from 0 (low authoritarianism) to 1 (high authoritarianism). Respondents are prompted in the ANES: "Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have." Respondents are prompted in the PRRI: "Although, there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. For each pair, choose which one you think is more important for a child to have." The trait pairs are Independence vs. **Respect for Elders**, Curiosity vs. **Good Manners**, **Obedience** vs. Self-Reliance, and Considerate vs. **Well-Behaved** (with authoritarian responses indicated in bold). Respondents in the ANES are able to volunteer "Both" and "Neither" responses, which are

coded as 0.5 when calculating the average number of authoritarian traits selected, though these response options are not prompted and therefore relatively rare.

Church Attendance: Respondents in the ANES are asked "Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?" In the PRRI, respondents are similarly asked "Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?" Church attendance is a continuous variable ranging from 0 ("never") to 1 ("more than once a week").

Education: Education is a continuous variable ranging from 0 (low education) to 1 (high education). In the ANES, education is measured using a seven-category scale that includes the following categories: 0-8 grades (no high school degree), 9-12 grades (no high school degree), 12 grades (high school degree), 13+ grades (no college degree), junior or community college degree, bachelor's degree, and advanced degree. In the PRRI, education is a four-category scale that includes the following categories: Less than high school, high school, some college, and Bachelor's degree or higher.

Ideology: Ideology is a continuous variable taking values between 0 (extremely/very liberal) to 1 (extremely/very conservative). In the ANES, ideology is measured with eight categories: extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate/middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, and haven't thought much about this. The last category is recoded to the scale midpoint (0.5). In the PRRI, ideology is measured with six categories: very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative, and don't know. The last category is recoded to the scale midpoint (0.5).

Income: Household income is a continuous variable measured with 28 categories on the ANES ranging from 0 (under $5,000) to 1 ($250,000 or more). Respondents refusing to offer their income have their income imputed from age, gender, race, education, marital status, and union membership. In the PRRI, income has 18 categories ranging from 0 (less than $5,000) to 1 ($200,000 or more). Respondents have their income recorded as part of the AmeriSpeak panel, so imputations for missing responses are a moot issue on the PRRI.

Married: Married is a dichotomous variable taking values of 0 (non-married) or 1 (married).

Male: Male is a dichotomous variable taking values of 0 (female/other) or 1 (male).

Party Identity Strength: In the ANES, party identity strength is a continuous variable that takes the values of 0 (Democratic-leaning Independent), 0.5 (Weak Democrat), or 1 (Strong Democrat) for Democrats and values of 0 (Republican-leaning Independent), 0.5 (Weak Republican), or 1 (Strong Republican) for Republicans. In the PRRI, due to the lack of a follow-up party identity

3

strength item for outright partisans, party identity strength is a dichotomous variable that takes the values of 0 (Democratic-leaning Independent) or 1 (Democrat) for Democrats and values of 0 (Republican-leaning Independent) or 1 (Republican) for Republicans.

South: South is a dichotomous variable taking values of 0 (non-southern residency) or 1 (southern residency) indicating whether the respondent lives in one of the states designated as belonging in the American South as defined by the U.S. Census.

Union: Union is a dichotomous variable taking values of 0 (non-union household) or 1 (union household). The ANES asked respondents "Do you or anyone else in this household belong to a labor union or to an employee association similar to a union?" Union membership was not asked in the PRRI survey.

White: White is a dichotomous variable capturing respondents race/ethnicity that takes the values of 0 (mixed race, non-white, and/or Hispanic) or 1 (non-mixed, non-Hispanic, white).

Appendix C: 2016 Republican Primary Analysis with MacWilliams (2016) Model

In this appendix, I provide supplementary analyses that estimate the associations between authoritarianism and Republicans' primary candidate preferences using models that more closely approximate those in MacWilliams (2016). MacWilliams (2016) models Republicans' candidate preferences using the following variables: authoritarianism, terrorism threat, the interaction of authoritarianism and terrorism threat, gender, education, age, evangelicalism, ideology, church attendance, race, and income. MacWilliams also uses a logistic regression model instead of multinomial probit or linear probability models. It is possible to approximate this model with the ANES and PRRI, but not the YouGov and CCES surveys which do not include questions about terrorism threat. Note, however, that a lingering difference between the ANES and MacWilliams (2016) is that the ANES was fielded after the primaries and measures vote choice recalls rather than contemporaneous candidate preferences, unlike the PRRI survey and MacWilliams (2016). In addition, the question wording for the ANES terrorism threat item somewhat differs from that of the PRRI survey and MacWilliams (2016) (see below), which is also something to consider.

Do the associations between authoritarianism and Republicans' 2016 primary preferences differ when using MacWilliams' (2016) alternative model specification? In Figure C1, I plot the predicted probabilities of support for Trump over other Republican candidates in the ANES and PRRI as functions of authoritarianism using MacWilliams' (2016) model. I find authoritarianism is associated with average marginal increases in support for Trump of 0.16-points in the ANES (p=0.068) and 0.03-points in the PRRI survey (p=0.754). Had I examined the likely voter sample for the PRRI analysis (see Appendix 5), I would have found that the association was 0.01-point (p=0.965). For comparison, my main text estimates (with the model that approximates Wronski et al.'s when analyzing the CCES) were 0.12-points for the ANES and 0.02-points for the PRRI survey. Between the ANES and PRRI analyses, I find that authoritarianism was, at best, weakly associated with support for Trump among Republicans in the 2016 primary, and that this finding holds when using MacWilliams' (2016) alternative model. I find little evidence that differences between my results and those of MacWilliams (2016) are due to model specification differences.

Evangelical: A dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent identifies as an Evangelical Protestant and 0 otherwise.

Terrorism Threat: In the ANES, terrorism threat is a continuous variable ranging from 0 (not at all worried) to 1 (extremely worried) on a five-point scale to the question "How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?" In the PRRI, terrorism threat is a continuous variable ranging from 0 (not at all worried) to 1 (very worried) on a four-point scale to the question "And thinking about concerns that people may have, how worried are you that you or someone in your family will be a victim of terrorism?" In MacWilliams (2016), terrorism threat is a continuous variable ranging from 0 (not at all) to 1 (a lot) on a seven-point scale to the question "How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism?"

Figure C1—Predicted Probabilities of Trump Support in 2016 Republican Primary with MacWilliams (2016) Model. Points are predicted probabilities of support for Trump over other Republican primary candidates with 95 percent confidence intervals as a function of authoritarianism. Sample includes only Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the ANES. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Appendix D: Analyses without Party Identity Strength and Ideology Covariates

      In this appendix, I provide supplementary analyses for models estimating the associations between authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences without one or both of controls for partisan identity strength and ideology. Essentially, these variables are tricky because excluding party identity and ideology risks confounding the estimated association between authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences, while including them risks attenuating the mediating effects of authoritarianism via these variables. In Table D1, I logistically regress Democrats' candidate preferences on authoritarianism and a set of controls that either includes both, neither, or one or the other of ideology and partisan identity strength. In Table D2, I do the same for Republicans' primary candidate preferences (to make the presentation of these results clearer, I collapse the dependent variable so that it takes Trump/Non-Trump outcomes). Atop each table, I also show random effects estimates for each covariate model using linear probability models for the ANES, PRRI, CCES, and YouGov surveys. Note that I remove respondents for whom partisan identity strength or ideology are missing from all analyses so that comparisons across models are being made for the same sets of respondents.

      As can be seen from Table D1, dropping partisan identity strength and ideology generates larger estimates for authoritarianism's associations with support for Clinton. The random effects estimate of authoritarianism's effect on predicted support for Clinton is 0.112 points when both partisan identity strength and ideology are controlled, 0.158 when only partisan identity strength is controlled, 0.132 when only ideology is controlled, and 0.167 when neither partisan identity strength nor ideology is controlled. While these results would be consistent with the effects of authoritarianism being partly mediated via partisan identity strength and ideology, they could also be consistent with these variables confounding the association between authoritarianism and primary candidate preferences. Notably, across all four models, I estimate that the associations of authoritarianism in the ANES and PRRI are much weaker than those estimated by Wronski et al. (2018). Whether or not one wishes to control for partisan identity strength and/or ideology when estimating the effects of authoritarianism on Democrats' 2016 primary candidate preferences, the association uncovered is substantially smaller in large, probability-based surveys relative to those derived from Wronski et al.'s (2018) non-probability CCES and YouGov samples.

      As shown in Table D2, dropping partisan identity strength and ideology from the model makes very little difference when estimating the association between authoritarianism and 2016 Republican primary voters' candidate preferences. The estimated association of authoritarianism with Trump support ranges from 0.034 to 0.051 points; controlling for ideology leads to a larger estimated effect while controlling for partisan identity strength produces a slightly smaller effect. Although the associations become non-significant when not controlling for ideology, the effect size remains mostly unchanged. My conclusion from these analyses is that authoritarianism was, at most, very weakly associated with Trump support among Republicans in the 2016 primaries.

Controls for…	PID and IDEO	PID Only	IDEO Only	Neither
Random Effects Estimate	**0.112 (0.046)**	**0.158 (0.047)**	**0.132 (0.049)**	**0.167 (0.052)**
2016 ANES (N=731)				
Authoritarianism	0.077 (0.076)	0.170 (0.070)	0.116 (0.080)	0.181 (0.076)
Party Identity	0.309 (0.051)	0.269 (0.056)	-	-
Ideology	0.462 (0.100)	-	0.329 (0.101)	-
2016 PRRI (N=911)				
Authoritarianism	0.124 (0.065)	0.173 (0.063)	0.146 (0.068)	0.179 (0.066)
Party Identity	0.185 (0.047)	0.164 (0.047)	-	-
Ideology	0.247 (0.098)	-	0.173 (0.099)	-
2016 CCES (N=260)				
Authoritarianism	0.352 (0.091)	0.390 (0.088)	0.383 (0.091)	0.407 (0.088)
Party Identity	0.190 (0.083)	0.166 (0.084)	-	-
Ideology	0.176 (0.111)	-	0.119 (0.113)	-
2017 YouGov (N=195)				
Authoritarianism	0.226 (0.100)	0.321 (0.098)	0.278 (0.100)	0.357 (0.097)
Party Identity	0.276 (0.087)	0.243 (0.090)	-	-
Ideology	0.438 (0.152)	-	0.383 (0.155)	-

Table D1. Associations of Authoritarianism to Democrats' 2016 Primary Candidate Preferences. Top row of table entries are the random effects estimates of the association between authoritarianism and support for Clinton. Rows below are linear probability model coefficients for these associations in each survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Controls for…	PID and IDEO	PID Only	IDEO Only	Neither
Random Effects Estimate	**0.046** **(0.018)**	**0.051** **(0.018)**	**0.034** **(0.022)**	**0.038** **(0.023)**
2016 ANES (N=594)				
Authoritarianism	0.128 (0.087)	0.121 (0.090)	0.148 (0.086)	0.139 (0.088)
Party Identity	0.133 (0.056)	0.098 (0.054)	-	-
Ideology	-0.290 (0.154)	-	-0.186 (0.147)	-
2016 PRRI (N=651)				
Authoritarianism	0.036 (0.084)	-0.007 (0.086)	0.041 (0.084)	-0.003 (0.086)
Party Identity	0.045 (0.050)	0.035 (0.052)	-	-
Ideology	-0.448 (0.113)	-	-0.442 (0.114)	-
2016 CCES (N=145)				
Authoritarianism	0.098 (0.161)	0.064 (0.162)	0.099 (0.155)	0.046 (0.156)
Party Identity	0.006 (0.103)	-0.060 (0.105)	-	-
Ideology	-0.595 (0.165)	-	-0.592 (0.157)	-
2017 YouGov (N=119)				
Authoritarianism	0.195 (0.151)	0.210 (0.156)	0.197 (0.150)	0.213 (0.155)
Party Identity	-0.035 (0.110)	-0.063 (0.114)	-	-
Ideology	-0.664 (0.206)	-	-0.671 (0.207)	-

Table D2. Associations of Authoritarianism to Republicans' 2016 Primary Candidate Preferences. Top row of table entries are the random effects estimates of the association between authoritarianism and support for Trump. Rows below are linear probability model coefficients for these associations in each survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Appendix E: PRRI Results with Different Voter Subsets

In this appendix, I show that my analyses of the PRRI survey do not substantially change when using a different subset of voters than "potential primary voters." I examine two additional sample subsets that might be of interest: all partisans and likely primary voters. The all-partisans samples do not exclude non-voters or those who indicate they never vote in primaries. The likely primary voters sample consists of those who either already voted in their state's primary or have an upcoming primary and indicate they "always" vote in primary elections. In Tables E1 and E2, I compare the results for these two alternative sample subsets to the sample of potential primary voters for Democrats and Republicans, respectively. In these tables, I show the marginal effects of authoritarianism on candidate preferences using the same model as the main text on the potential voters samples, the likely voters samples, and the all partisans samples. In Table E1, we see that the estimated association of authoritarianism with Clinton support among potential voters is just slightly larger than that for likely voters or all Democrats. In Table E2, we see the estimated associations of authoritarianism with support for Trump are near-identical for potential voters, likely voters, and all Republicans. My findings in the PRRI survey are not being driven to a significant degree by my choice to use a sample of potential primary voters rather than a less restrictive sample of all partisans or a more restrictive sample of likely/confirmed primary voters.

	Potential Voters	**Likely Voters**	**All Democrats**
Authoritarianism	0.124	0.089	0.103
	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.056)
Observations	911	428	1,285

Table E1—Marginal Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Clinton over Sanders in 2016 Democratic Primary. Table entries are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

	Potential Voters	**Likely Voters**	**All Republicans**
Authoritarianism	0.036	0.050	0.047
	(0.084)	(0.125)	(0.071)
Observations	651	331	898

Table E2—Marginal Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Trump in 2016 Republican Primary. Table entries are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Source: 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Appendix F: Results with Logistic Regression Models

The decision to use linear probability models rather than logistic regression, like Wronski et al. (2018) and MacWilliams (2016) is inconsequential—see tables F1 and F2 for comparisons of the linear probability estimates to the average marginal effects in otherwise identical logistic models.

	Linear Probability	Logistic Regression (AME)
Random Effects Estimate	0.112 (0.046)	0.117 (0.049)
2016 ANES	0.077 (0.076)	0.069 (0.071)
2016 PRRI	0.124 (0.065)	0.119 (0.063)
2016 CCES	0.352 (0.091)	0.339 (0.084)
2017 YouGov	0.226 (0.100)	0.216 (0.094)

Table F1—Comparison of 2016 Democratic Primary Results with Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Models. Top row of table entries are the random effects estimates of the association between authoritarianism and support for Clinton. Rows below are coefficients in each survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

	Linear Probability	Logistic Regression (AME)
Random Effects Estimate	0.046 (0.018)	0.048 (0.019)
2016 ANES	0.128 (0.087)	0.126 (0.086)
2016 PRRI	0.036 (0.084)	0.037 (0.084)
2016 CCES	0.098 (0.161)	0.102 (0.147)
2017 YouGov	0.195 (0.151)	0.205 (0.140)

Table F2—Comparison of 2016 Republican Primary Results with Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Models. Top row of table entries are the random effects estimates of the association between authoritarianism and support for Trump. Rows below are coefficients in each survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors adjusted for the complex sampling design in the 2016 ANES. Source: Wronski et al. 2018, 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, 2016 ANES Time Series, 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (NORC AmeriSpeak Panel).

Appendix G: 2016 ANES Analyses by Survey Mode

The 2016 ANES includes a face-to-face mode and a self-administered online mode. As shown in Table G1, authoritarianism has a 0.224 association with Clinton support in the face-to-face mode and a 0.040 association in the online mode. Though the difference in authoritarianism coefficients across modes is insignificant (p=0.262), the weaker estimate overall for the ANES is driven primarily by the online sample. In contrast, the associations of authoritarianism to Trump support are near-identical across ANES survey modes. My thanks go out to Julie Wronski and an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to me the heterogeneity among Democratic primary voters.

	Democratic Primary Voters		Republican Primary Voters	
	Face-to-Face	*Online*	*Face-to-Face*	*Online*
Authoritarianism	0.224	0.040	0.100	0.103
	(0.140)	(0.085)	(0.200)	(0.093)
Party Identity Strength	0.353	0.297	-0.194	0.263
	(0.099)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.066)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.262	0.511	-0.108	-0.346
	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.268)	(0.171)
Church Attendance	0.200	-0.053	-0.033	-0.177
	(0.101)	(0.057)	(0.112)	(0.060)
Male	0.033	-0.082	0.203	0.037
	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.082)	(0.058)
White	-0.061	-0.124	0.204	-0.036
	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.112)	(0.085)
Education	0.242	0.104	-0.660	-0.548
	(0.214)	(0.159)	(0.325)	(0.181)
Income	0.177	0.014	-0.047	-0.185
	(0.125)	(0.099)	(0.141)	(0.102)
Married	-0.011	0.072	0.230	0.156
	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.107)	(0.077)
Age	0.042	0.007	-0.130	0.121
	(0.078)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.065)
South	0.439	0.610	0.410	0.082
	(0.149)	(0.099)	(0.166)	(0.116)
Union	0.022	0.091	-0.015	-0.102
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.052)
Constant	-0.325	-0.041	0.711	1.038
	(0.204)	(0.157)	(0.348)	(0.243)
Observations	196	535	163	431
R-squared	0.329	0.281	0.215	0.143

Table G1—Associations of Primary Candidate Preferences Across Modes. Entries are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Samples include partisan-leaning independents. Data are weighted. Standard errors are adjusted for the complex sampling design. Source: 2016 ANES Time Series.