AI Prompts - Week 9, Enacting Perception

`June 2024`
`PSYC 3025 Cognitive Science`
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Here are our AI Prompts for Week 9, Mindware Chapter 10, "Enacting Perceptual Experience".

Reminder on how the AI Chat Logs will be Graded:

- Ask every questions under the "This week's prompts" header.
- Ask follow up questions to at least 5 of the prompts I've provided you
- Ask a series (3+) of follow-up questions to at least one of the prompts

Always feel free to reach out if you have questions!

This weeks prompts:

- Explain Alva Noë's theory of "enacted perception." How is perception, from his perspective, like painting? What does it mean for perception to be active, as opposed to passive?
- What does Alva Noë's enactive perception theory say about qualia? Define the traditional perspective of qualia, and explain how Noë's theory is different.
- What is the "tactile-visual sensory substitution" phenomenon? How does Alva Noë's enactive perception theory account for sensory substitution?
- What are the consequences of Alva Noë's enactivist theory on conscious experience? What does it mean for the "physical base for conscious experience is in some way essentially extended"? How does this relate to Andy Clark's theory of the "extended mind"?
- Based on Alva Noë's enactivist perspective, where does perception "occur"? Is it in the head (brain), or somewhere else?
- Explain the "sensorimotor hypersensitivity" critique of Alva Noë's enactivist perspective. What is "sensory motor chauvinism," as termed by Andy Clark? What does sensory motor chauvinism say about the perceptual experience of other animals, like dogs or ants?
- Explain how a scientist who subscribes to Alva Noë's enactivist theory must reject "neural sufficiency." How do Hurley and Noë argue that a "characteristic extended dynamic" makes up the sufficient foundation for perceptual experience?

- Describe how Alva Noë's enactivist perspective uses sensory motor information as the building blocks of our perceptual experience (phenomenology). He argues that our perceptual experience is "present only in potential" and that it is "virtual all the way in." These two points are confusing to me, can you explain it clearly?
- How do Hurley and Noë argue that phenomenological experiences require time evolved processes that include a complex and dynamic combination of neural firings, body, and world states? Can you clearly explain to me the importance of "extraneural" information, and how that is critical to their theory? How does this go against the theory of "neural internalism"?

  > A good follow up question to the prompt above: Can you give me an example of a perceptual experience that might include "extraneural information"?

- Can you describe the experiments in Sensory Substitution conducted by Paul Bach-y-Rita and colleagues?