

UN-Interested Suppliers

The Effects of Peacekeeping Mandates on Troop Contributions

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Motivation



Figure 1: UNMISS



Figure 2: UNISFA

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 - UNMISS: 13,254 current troops.
 - UNMISS: 3,234 current troops.

Research Question



Figure 3: Peacekeepers in Mali

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- Why do troop contributing countries choose to contribute to some missions and not others?
- Combination of two factors
 - Mandate Tasks
 - Conflict Environment

Mission Formation

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- Domestic → Reimbursements, coup network, regime type (Gaibulloev et al. 2015, Kathman and Melin 2017, Duursam and Gledhill 2019)
- International → Foreign aid, HR “whitewashing”, troop training (Boutton and D’Orazio 2020, Levin 2020, Kathman and Melin 2017)

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- What about mission risk and conditions?

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- Risk of war, terrorist attacks, and post-war, mental decomposition (Fortna 2008, Hansen et al. 2020, Forbes et al. 2016)
- Risk → Likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury

Table 1: Table of Task Risk

Risky	Less Risky
Monitor Peace Agreements Subtasks: Buffer Monitor and Liaise War Parties	Promote Good Offices (Subtask of Monitor Peace Agreements)
Monitor Human Rights Subtask: Monitor the Refugee Situation	Monitor the Weapons Trade, Monitor Weapons Embargo, Inspect Cargo (Subtasks of Monitor Borders)
Protect Human Rights Subtasks: Protect Children, Protect Women, Protect Civilians	Monitor Use of Natural Resources
Protect UN Personnel (Ensure Security) Asssist in Demining Monitor Borders Chapter VII Authorization	Monitor Elections Provide Security During the Electoral Period Assist with Election Implementation Build Government Capacity Subtask: Implement Government Policies Preserve Cultural and Historical Sites
Asssit with Security Sector Reform Subtasks: Assist Police Reform, Monitor the Police, Condui Joint Patrols with Police Monitor Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Assit in the Implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) Assist with Justice Sector Reform Promote National Reconciliation Subtask: Pursue Justice for War Criminals Disseminate Info About the Mission to the Public Promote Freedom of the Press
Help Implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	

Table adapted from tasks coded in Lloyd (2021).

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- Risk-averse contributors (Bove 2011, Page and Stevis 2016, Iwanami 2014)
- “Wars of choice” (Osinga and Lindley-French 2010)

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- Risky tasks in context of all assigned tasks.
- H1: As the number of risky tasks increase, the number of troops contributed will decrease.

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- Tasks communicate action, but conflict communicates danger
 - States aid potential costs (Downs et al. 1996), but missions move to the danger (Phayal and Prins 2020)
 - Fear of losing troops (Bove 2011)
- H2: As the number of risky tasks increase, the number of troops contributed will decrease. This reduction in contributions will further increase as the mission environment becomes increasingly dangerous.

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- Controls
 - Conflict: Conflict outcome and duration (Kreutz 2010)
 - Host: GDP per capita, geographic size, democracy (UN Statistics Division 2021, World Bank 2021, Coppedge et al 2021)
 - Contributors: GDP per capita, democracy, # contributors, troop quality (UN Statistics Division 2021, Coppedge et al 2021, Singer et al 1972)
 - Dyad: Same continent, bilateral trade, S-scores (Barbieri et al 2009, Chiba et al 2015)

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- Model: Negative binomial regression, SE's clustered on contributor, lagged IVs, lagged DV
- Alternatives: 30 contributors, meta-analysis of 10 samples, same continent and MPs (Crescenzi et al. 2011)

Endogeneity




Figure 4: DAG of Endogeneity

Testing H1




Figure 5: Effect of Risk Ratio on Troop Contributions

Testing H2




Figure 6: Effect of Risk Ratio and Battle Deaths on Troop Contributions

Table 2: Meta Analysis of 10 Random Samples

	(1) 15	(2) 30	(3) 15 with Interaction	(4) 30 with Interaction
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.608 [-1.831, -1.386]	-1.757 [-2.031, -1.483]	-1.438 [-1.684, -1.193]	-1.555 [-1.852, -1.259]
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)			0.867 [0.590, 1.145]	1.230 [0.930, 1.530]
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}			-1.051 [-1.413, -0.690]	-1.440 [-1.817, -1.062]

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.

Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.

Read as overall effect size across all 10 random samples.

Disaggregating Risk Ratio




Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Tasks Conditional on Battle Deaths

Conclusions



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- States are deterred by mandate risk.
- Further deterred by conflict conditions.
- “Risky” tasks differ in strength.



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- States are deterred by mandate risk.
- Further deterred by conflict conditions.
- “Risky” tasks differ in strength.
- Future work
 - Mandates and one-sided violence
 - Risk and peacekeeper movement

Thank You

- Questions or Comments?

Distribution of DV




Figure 8: Histogram of Troops




Figure 9: Histogram of Troops, No 0's

Main Model Output

Table 3: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.606 ** (0.356)	-1.433 ** (0.393)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0393 (0.0779)	0.878 * (0.447)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-1.067 † (0.583)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	2.258 ** (0.475)	2.107 ** (0.481)
Inalpha	1.854 ** (0.0743)	1.854 ** (0.0743)
Observations	72292	72292

Standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Two tailed test.

Testing H2 Pt. 2




Figure 10: Predicted Values of Contributions

All Battle Deaths

Table 4: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions without Battle Death Restrictions

	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.587** (0.343)	-1.567** (0.342)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.000247 (0.000397)	0.0217* (0.00876)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-0.0217* (0.00871)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	2.268** (0.474)	2.242** (0.477)
Inalpha	1.843** (0.0735)	1.842** (0.0735)
Observations	78848	78848

Standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. No battle death restriction.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

With Observer Missions

Table 5: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with Observer Missions

	(5) Model 5	(6) Model 6
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.192** (0.409)	-1.035* (0.439)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0352 (0.0886)	1.015* (0.421)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-1.238* (0.531)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	1.624** (0.485)	1.496** (0.487)
Inalpha	2.012** (0.0749)	2.012** (0.0748)
Observations	84842	84842

Standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. Inclusion of Observer Missions

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

30 Potential Contributors

Table 6: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with 30 Potential Contributors

	(7) Model 7	(8) Model 8
Risk Ratio	-1.763** (0.441)	-1.558** (0.477)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0900 (0.0971)	1.241* (0.483)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-1.458* (0.607)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	1.097* (0.507)	0.914† (0.517)
Inalpha	2.322** (0.0806)	2.321** (0.0805)
Observations	108357	108357

Standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is troop counts. 30 potential contributor random sample.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Testing H2




Figure 11: Effect of Risk Ratio and Battle Deaths on Troop Contributions

Disaggregating Risk Ratio Pt. 1




Figure 12: Plot 1

Disaggregating Risk Ratio Pt. 2




Figure 13: Plot 2

Disaggregating Risk Ratio Pt. 3




Figure 14: Plot 3