

Running To or Away From the Violence?

The Effects of Peacekeeping Mandates on Troop Contributions

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December 7, 2021

Motivation



Figure 1: UNMISET



Figure 2: UNMIS

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 - UNMISET: 99 troops.
 - UNMIS: 37 troops.

Research Question



Figure 3: Peacekeepers in Mali

- Why do troop contributing countries choose to contribute to some missions and not others?

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- Why do troop contributing countries choose to contribute to some missions and not others?
- Combination of Two Factors
 - Mandate Tasks
 - Conflict Environment

Mandates and Risk

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- Troops for Money

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- Risk of War, Terrorist Attacks, and Post-War Mental Decomposition (Fortna 2008, Hansen et al. 2020, Forbes et al. 2016)
- Risk → Likelihood of Peacekeeper Death or Injury

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- Domestic → Reimbursements, Coup-Proofing, and Regime Type (Gaibulloev et al. 2015, Kathman and Melin 2017, and Duursma and Gledhill 2019).
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- UN Burden Sharing (Coleman 2020).
- Collective Action Problems of Contribution (Olson 1965, Boncheck and Shepsle 1997).
- Reimbursements Cannot Offset All Costs (Bove 2011).

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■ Lack of Attention on the Mandate and Conflict.

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- Risk-Averse Contributors (Bove 2011, Page and Stevis 2016, Iwanami 2014).
 - Reimbursements Unlikely to Motivate All States (Razza 2020).

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 - States Avoid Potential Costs (Downs et al. 1996), but Missions Move to the Danger (Phayal and Prins 2020).
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- Missions Move to the Risk, but States Fear Losing Troops (Bove 2011).
 - H3: Compared to mandates with less risky tasks, mandates with risky tasks will receive decreased contributions. This reduction in contributions will increase as the contributor's cost per soldier increases.

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- DV: Count of Troop Contributions (Perry and Smith 2013).
- IV: Risk Ratio (Lloyd 2021), Battle Deaths (Sundberg and Melander 2013), Troop Quality (Singer et al 1972).
- Controls: Conflict Outcome (Kreutz 2010), Conflict Duration, GDP per Capita (UN Statistics Division, 2021), Democracy (Coppedge et al 2021), Contributors, S-Scores (Chiba et al 2015), Bilateral Trade (Barbieri et al 2009), Same Continent, Lagged DV.
- Model: Negative Binomial Regression, SE's Clustered on Contributor, Lagged IVs.

Testing H1




Figure 4: Effect of Risk Ratio on Troop Contributions

Testing H2




Figure 5: Effect of Risk Ratio and Battle Deaths on Troop Contributions

Testing H3




Figure 6: Troop Quality

Figure 7: Squared Troop Quality

Disaggregating Risk Ratio




Figure 8: Main Tasks

Figure 9: Subtasks

Conclusions

- Support H1
- Support H2
- Mixed Evidence of H3
- “Risky” Tasks Differ in Direction

Thank You

- Questions or Comments?

Main Model Output

Table 1: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.523** (0.387)	-1.160** (0.411)	-2.275** (0.451)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	-0.0000172 (0.0779)	1.783** (0.453)	0.00147 (0.0786)
Troop Quality _{t-1} (Millions)	0.000486 (0.00163)	0.000441 (0.00160)	-0.0126** (0.00346)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-2.332** (0.587)	
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Troop Quality _{t-1}			0.0163** (0.00436)
Constant	2.193** (0.469)	1.862** (0.481)	2.865** (0.529)
Inalpha	1.903** (0.0743)	1.900** (0.0741)	1.898** (0.0744)
Observations	75373	75373	75373

Standard errors in parentheses. Controls omitted.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

30 Potential Contributors

Table 2: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with 30 Potential Contributors

	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5	(6) Model 6
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.669** (0.482)	-1.234* (0.498)	-2.409** (0.535)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0566 (0.0978)	2.364** (0.477)	0.0520 (0.0978)
Troop Quality _{t-1} (Millions)	0.00165 (0.00188)	0.00154 (0.00185)	-0.0119** (0.00354)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-3.036** (0.598)	
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Troop Quality _{t-1}			0.0172** (0.00487)
Constant	1.019* (0.499)	0.621 (0.511)	1.700** (0.574)
Inalpha	2.371** (0.0800)	2.367** (0.0797)	2.367** (0.0802)
Observations	114145	114145	114145

Standard errors in parentheses. Controls omitted.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 30 potential contributor random sample.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Squared Troop Quality

Table 3: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with Squared Troop Quality

	(7) Model 7
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-2.745** (0.511)
Troop Quality _{t-1}	-0.0199** (0.00721)
Battle Deaths _{t-1}	-0.00167 (0.0780)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Troop Quality _{t-1}	0.0344** (0.0115)
Quality Squared _{t-1}	0.0000385 (0.0000282)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Quality Squared _{t-1}	-0.0000698 (0.0000451)
Constant	3.067** (0.544)
Inalpha	1.890** (0.0742)
Observations	75373

Standard errors in parentheses. Controls omitted.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Bold indicates joint significance at $p < 0.01$

With Observer Missions

Table 4: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with Observer Missions

	(8) Model 8	(9) Model 9	(10) Model 10
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.790** (0.414)	-1.490** (0.433)	-2.511** (0.468)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0531 (0.0818)	1.667** (0.427)	0.0534 (0.0821)
Troop Quality _{t-1} (Millions)	0.000687 (0.00168)	0.000626 (0.00165)	-0.0120** (0.00328)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-2.081** (0.532)	
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Troop Quality _{t-1}			0.0159** (0.00424)
Constant	2.046** (0.482)	1.781** (0.490)	2.690** (0.542)
Inalpha	1.997** (0.0742)	1.995** (0.0739)	1.993** (0.0743)
Observations	84926	84926	84926

Standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. Inclusion of Observer Missions

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

All Battle Deaths

Table 5: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions without Battle Death Restrictions

	(11) Model 11	(12) Model 12	(13) Model 13
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.537** (0.378)	-1.533** (0.379)	-2.191** (0.432)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.000204 (0.000394)	0.0277** (0.00956)	0.000270 (0.000463)
Troop Quality _{t-1} (Millions)	0.000302 (0.00158)	0.000303 (0.00158)	-0.0113** (0.00347)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-0.0278** (0.00952)	
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Troop Quality _{t-1}			0.0145** (0.00433)
Constant	2.220** (0.468)	2.201** (0.471)	2.809** (0.522)
Inalpha	1.890** (0.0733)	1.889** (0.0733)	1.886** (0.0735)
Observations	82051	82051	82051

Standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. No battle death restriction.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$