

UN-Interested Suppliers

The Effects of Peacekeeping Mandates on Troop Contributions

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Motivation



Figure 1: UNMISS



Figure 2: UNISFA

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- Both to develop the new state of South Sudan
 - UNMISS: 2,000 Indian Troops
 - UNISFA: 2 Indian Troops

Research Question



Figure 3: Peacekeepers in Mali

- Why do troop contributing countries differ in their contribution levels across missions?

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- Why do troop contributing countries differ in their contribution levels across missions?
- Combination of two factors
 - Mandate Tasks
 - Conflict Environment

Mission Formation

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- International → Foreign aid, HR “whitewashing”, kudos
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■ Lack of mission specific factors

Defining Risk

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- Risk of war, terrorist attacks, and post-war mental decomposition (Fortna 2008, Hansen et al. 2020, Forbes et al. 2016)
- Risk → Likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury

Table 1: Table of Task Risk

Risky	Less Risky
Monitor Peace Agreements Subtasks: Buffer Monitor and Liaise War Parties	Promote Good Offices (Subtask of Monitor Peace Agreements)
Monitor Human Rights Subtask: Monitor the Refugee Situation	Monitor the Weapons Trade, Monitor Weapons Embargo, Inspect Cargo (Subtasks of Monitor Borders)
Protect Human Rights Subtasks: Protect Children, Protect Women, Protect Civilians	Monitor Use of Natural Resources
Protect UN Personnel (Ensure Security) Assist in Demining Monitor Borders Chapter VII Authorization	Monitor Elections Provide Security During the Electoral Period Assist with Election Implementation Build Government Capacity Subtask: Implement Government Policies Preserve Cultural and Historical Sites
Assist with Security Sector Reform Subtasks: Assist Police Reform, Monitor the Police, Conduct Joint Patrols with Police	Assist in the Implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIP)
Monitor Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Assist with Justice Sector Reform
Help Implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Promote National Reconciliation Subtask: Pursue Justice for War Criminals Disseminate Info About the Mission to the Public Promote Freedom of the Press

Table adapted from tasks coded in Lloyd (2021).

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- “Wars of choice” (Osinga and Lindley-French 2010)

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- Risky tasks in context of all assigned tasks
- H1: As the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate increases, the number of troops contributed will decrease.

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 - States avoid potential costs (Downs et al. 1996), but missions move to the danger (Phayal and Prins 2020)
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 - Dangerous conditions make risky mandates worse
- H2: As the level of conflict danger in the mission environment increases, the negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of troops contributed will increase.

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- Controls
 - Conflict: Conflict outcome and duration (Kreutz 2010), UN Mission Change, "Re-hatting" (Koops et al. 2015)
 - Host: GDP per capita, geographic size, democracy (UN Statistics Division 2021, World Bank 2021, Coppedge et al 2021)
 - Contributors: GDP per capita, democracy, # contributors, troop quality, total monthly contributions (UN Statistics Division 2021, Coppedge et al 2021, Singer et al 1972)
 - Dyad: Same continent, bilateral trade, S-scores (Barbieri et al 2009, Chiba et al 2015)

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 - Dyad: Same continent, bilateral trade, S-scores (Barbieri et al 2009, Chiba et al 2015)
- Model: Negative binomial regression, SE's clustered on contributor, lagged IVs, lagged DV
- Alternative Specifications: 30 contributors, meta-analysis of 10 samples, same continent and MPs (Crescenzi et al. 2011), ZINB, include observer missions

Endogeneity




Figure 4: DAG of Endogeneity

Testing H1

Effect of Risk Ratio on Troop Contributions




Figure 5: Effect of Risk Ratio on Troop Contributions, 95% CIs

Testing H2

Effect of Risk Ratio and Battle Deaths on Troop Contributions




Figure 6: Effect of Risk Ratio and Battle Deaths on Troop Contributions, 95% CIs

Disaggregating Risk Ratio




Figure 7: Coefficients of Tasks Conditional on Battle Deaths

Conclusions



Figure 8: Peacekeeper Receives Medal

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- States are deterred by mandate risk.
- Further deterred by conflict conditions.
- “Risky” tasks differ in direction.

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

Figure 8: Peacekeeper Receives Medal

- States are deterred by mandate risk.
- Further deterred by conflict conditions.
- “Risky” tasks differ in direction.
- Future work
 - Higher risk, more “whitewashed”
 - More risk, more foreign aid needed

Thank You

- Please reach out!
- trey.wood@uky.edu

Distribution of DV



Distribution of IV




Figure 11: Distribution of IV iwth Example Missions

Main Model Output

Table 2: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.439** (0.457)	-1.646** (0.373)	-1.460** (0.406)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	-0.0124 (0.0941)	-0.0588 (0.0784)	0.883* (0.419)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}			-1.198* (0.537)
Controls?	NO	YES	YES
Constant	3.321** (0.376)	2.201** (0.487)	2.030** (0.493)
Inalpha	1.997** (0.0801)	1.841** (0.0739)	1.841** (0.0739)
Observations	79107	72292	72292

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Meta Analysis of 10 Random Samples

	(1) 15	(2) 30	(3) 15 with Interaction	(4) 30 with Interaction
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.648 [-1.882, -1.415]	-1.724 [-2.014, -1.435]	-1.464 [-1.718, -1.210]	-1.497 [-1.805, -1.189]
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)			0.867 [0.616, 1.136]	1.303 [0.991, 1.615]
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}			-1.186 [-1.518, -0.853]	-1.693 [-2.074, -1.312]

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.

Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.

Read as overall effect size across all 10 random samples.

All Battle Deaths

Table 4: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions without Battle Death Restrictions

	(1) Model 4	(2) Model 5
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.640** (0.360)	-1.623** (0.360)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-0.0202* (0.00866)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.000171 (0.000342)	0.0201* (0.00871)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	2.215** (0.486)	2.189** (0.489)
Inalpha	1.831** (0.0732)	1.831** (0.0731)
Observations	78848	78848

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. No battle death restriction.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

With Observer Missions

Table 5: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with Observer Missions

	(1) Model 6	(2) Model 7
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.151** (0.425)	-0.919* (0.444)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	-0.0588 (0.0929)	1.402** (0.409)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-1.850** (0.498)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	1.435** (0.504)	1.249* (0.501)
Inalpha	1.989** (0.0741)	1.988** (0.0741)
Observations	84842	84842

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample. Inclusion of observer missions.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

30 Potential Contributors

Table 6: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with 30 Potential Contributors

	(1) Model 8	(2) Model 9
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-1.731 ** (0.466)	-1.501 ** (0.496)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	-0.0385 (0.105)	1.311 ** (0.500)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-1.708 ** (0.610)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	0.924 † (0.523)	0.709 (0.531)
Inalpha	2.297 ** (0.0804)	2.296 ** (0.0803)
Observations	108357	108357

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. 30 potential contributor random sample.

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Same Continent, Major Powers Sample

Table 7: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions with Same Continent and Major Power Sample

	(1) Model 10	(2) Model 11
Risk Ratio _{t-1}	-2.171** (0.498)	-2.125** (0.525)
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.0705 (0.118)	0.411 (0.605)
Risk Ratio _{t-1} X Battle Deaths _{t-1}		-0.435 (0.767)
Controls?	YES	YES
Constant	2.889** (0.604)	2.848** (0.629)
Inalpha	2.419** (0.0986)	2.419** (0.0986)
Observations	125249	125249

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Dependent variable is troop counts. Same continent and major power sample.

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Conflict Dynamics and Risk

Table 8: Predicting Mandate Risk with Conflict Dynamics

	(1) Model 12	(2) Model 13
Battle Deaths _{t-1} (Hundreds)	0.000718 (0.281)	0.0929 (0.125)
Conflict Termination _{t-1}		0.812† (0.420)
Low Activity _{t-1}		0.472 (0.351)
Conflict Duration _{t-1} (Logged)		-0.453* (0.187)
Previous UN Mission _{t-1}		0.332 (0.357)
Re-hatted _{t-1}		-0.170 (0.327)
Host GDP per Capita _{t-1} (Thousands)		0.315** (0.0583)
Host Size _{t-1} (Million Sq. Km)		0.0654 (0.200)
Host Democracy _{t-1}		-1.868* (0.919)
Constant	1.399** (0.301)	1.539** (0.532)
Observations	2824	2796

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is risk ratio. Standard errors clustered by the mission.



Zero Inflated Models

Table 9: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions, Zero Inflated Models

	(1) Model 14	(2) Model 15
Risk Ratio	-1.593** (0.515)	-1.355* (0.532)
Battle Deaths (Hundreds)	-0.0565 (0.106)	1.164* (0.491)
Risk Ratio × Battle Deaths (Hundreds)		-1.548* (0.602)
Controls for Count?	YES	YES
Controls for Inflation?	YES	YES
Inalpha	3.193** (0.0928)	3.193** (0.0928)
Observations	473552	473552

Contributing state clustered standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variables is troop counts. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression.

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