

# **Highly-Valued Peacekeepers**

The Effects of Individual Values and Context on the Preference for Peacekeepers

## **Online Appendix**

February 14, 2023

## Appendix A

Table A1: States Included in the Sample

Model	States in Sample	States with a UN PKO	States with a Regional PKO
1	Algeria (2002), South Africa (2001), Zimbabwe (2001) Uganda (2001), Tanzania (2001)	No PKO variable in model	No Regional PKO variable in model
2	Ethiopia (2007), Ghana (2007), Mali (2007), Morocco (2007), Rwanda (2007), South Africa (2006), Egypt (2008), Burkina Faso (2007), Zambia (2007)	Ethiopia (2000 - 2008), Morocco (1991 - Current), Rwanda (1993 - 1996), Egypt (1956 - 1967)	Mali (1986), Morocco (1963), Rwanda (1991 - 1994), Egypt (1982), Burkina Faso (1986)

## Appendix B

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics for Model 2

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Prefer UN	4,812	0.442	0.497	0	1
Volunteer in HR Group	4,812	0.0605	0.238	0	1
Confidence in the UN	4,812	2.693	1.049	1	4
Male	4,812	0.556	0.497	0	1
Age	4,812	35.93	13.81	15	98
Married	4,812	0.483	0.500	0	1
Education	4,812	4.373	2.053	0	8
Employed	4,812	0.563	0.496	0	1
Income	4,812	4.022	2.355	1	10

Table B2: Descriptive Statistics for Model 3

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Prefer UN	8,214	0.450	0.497	0	1
In/Active Membership of HR Group	8,214	0.318	0.619	0	2
Confidence in the UN	8,214	2.631	0.975	1	4
Experienced a PKO	8,214	0.240	0.427	0	1
Experienced a Regional PKO	8,214	0.285	0.451	0	1
Male	8,214	0.527	0.499	0	1
Age	8,214	34.30	14.06	16	95
Married	8,214	0.447	0.497	0	1
Education	8,214	3.399	2.401	0	8
Employed	8,214	0.501	0.500	0	1
Income	8,214	4.939	2.213	1	10
Personal Security	8,214	4.929	1.178	1	6

## Appendix C

Effect of Confidence and HR Volunteer Status on UN Preference




Figure C1: Margins plot with 95% confidence intervals. It includes all levels of confidence in the UN.

## Appendix D

Table D1: Effect of UN Confidence, HR Valuations, and PKO Experience on Preference

	Model 2
Inactive Member	0.422 (0.263)
Active Member	0.457* (0.231)
Not Very Much	0.197 (0.234)
Quite a Lot	0.510* (0.249)
A Great Deal	0.585** (0.205)
Inactive Member $\times$ Not Very Much	-0.704** (0.108)
Inactive Member $\times$ Quite a Lot	-0.426 (0.293)
Inactive Member $\times$ A Great Deal	-0.151 (0.265)
Active Member $\times$ Not Very Much	-0.426* (0.203)
Active Member $\times$ Quite a Lot	-0.562** (0.101)
Active Member $\times$ A Great Deal	0.081 (0.096)
PKO	0.877* (0.371)
Inactive Member $\times$ PKO	-1.048 (0.672)
Active Member $\times$ PKO	-0.715 (0.936)
Not Very Much $\times$ PKO	-0.867** (0.245)
Quite a Lot $\times$ PKO	-1.417** (0.235)
A Great Deal $\times$ PKO	-1.208** (0.317)

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Table D1

	Model 2
Inactive Member $\times$ Not Very Much $\times$ PKO	1.538** (0.260)
Inactive Member $\times$ Quite a Lot $\times$ PKO	0.800* (0.401)
Inactive Member $\times$ A Great Deal $\times$ PKO	0.603 (0.681)
Active Member $\times$ Not Very Much $\times$ PKO	-0.009 (0.377)
Active Member $\times$ Quite a Lot $\times$ PKO	0.271** (0.067)
Active Member $\times$ A Great Deal $\times$ PKO	-0.470 (0.973)
Regional PKO	-0.413 <sup>+</sup> (0.214)
Male	0.162* (0.070)
Age	-0.007** (0.001)
Married	-0.015 (0.072)
Education	-0.026 (0.031)
Employed	0.156 (0.121)
Income	0.024 (0.022)
Personal Security	0.106* (0.049)
Constant	-0.945* (0.397)
State Fixed Effects	No
Observations	8214
Log Likelihood	-5507.766

State clustered standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable is preference of UN peacekeeping.

“Not a Member,” “None at All,” and “Never Experienced a PKO” are the omitted groups.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Two-tailed test.

## Appendix E

### Effect of Confidence, Membership, and PKO Experience on UN Preference




Figure E1: Marginal effect plot with 95% confidence intervals. It includes all levels of confidence in the UN.