Chapter 5 Mandate Risk and the Movement of Peacekeepers

> "If the Untied Nations and T/PCCs [troop and police contributing countries] do not change their mindset, take risks and show a willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm's way... To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, the United Nations needs to be strong and not fear to use force when necessary. Some T/PCCs and leadership remain risk-averse when it comes to using force, but they have failed to understand projecting strength is more secure for uniformed and civilian personnel."
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> - Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017)

In 2017, Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz published his report, *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers*, in response to heightened peacekeeping fatalities. In his report, Santos Cruz indicted troop-contributing countries and United Nations peacekeeping leadership for being unwilling to project force against combatants. For example, from 2010 - 2014, United Nations peacekeepers failed to respond to roughly 400 of 500 attacks that led to at least 2,282 civilians deaths. The United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services noted that these cases of inaction were likely due to troop caveats, limitations placed on contributed troops by their home state (The Economist, 2021), thereby limiting the ability of force commanders to deploy troops.

In contrast to some missions suffering from inaction, other missions experience non-commanded peacekeeper action. In 2014, 45 Fijian soldiers from the Untied Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were captured by al-Qaeda militants during the group's conflict against Syrian government forces in the Golan Heights. A nearby Filipino troop contingent was instructed by the force commander to hold their fire to avoid a violent engagement that would endanger the hostage Fijian peacekeepers. Instead of following orders, the Filipino contingent called their commanding officer in Manila where the officer ordered the troops to hold their ground and not surrender. After three days of violent engagement,

the Filipino troops successfully deterred the rebel militants and escaped. The 45 Fijians were released two weeks later (Charbonneau and Mogato, 2014).

While some force commanders are unable or unwilling to use force against combatants, others are more willing to maintain deployments in the face of danger. In 2009, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) stationed 196 peacekeepers in Muhjiriya, Sudan in the midst of rebel group occupation. The Government of Sudan requested for the mission to redeploy to another location before government forces began a major offensive to retake the city. The force commander rejected the request and remained in the city to protect the 30,000 residents. Even in the midst of government-rebel conflict, peacekeepers protected the 3,000 civilians that camped near the mission's base from further suffering from the costs of conflict (Holt et al., 2009).

These examples demonstrate that peacekeeping force commanders, the actor of interest in this chapter, consider when and how to use force in defense of their mandates. While force commanders may be reluctant to use force in some contexts, they are still motivated to deploy troops in other situations. This puzzle regarding force commanders' decisions to deploy troops motivates the following question: *Why do force commanders send robust troop deployments to some mission locations and not others?*

I argue that force commanders face a dilemma regarding the deployment of troops to locations within the host state. Force commanders maintain their appointments with the United Nations for performing well during mandate implementation. To successfully defend the mandate, force commanders need to deploy large troop contingents to deter violence; however, caveats placed by troop contributing countries and threats of non-compliance by lower-ranking officers reduce the size of troop deployments due to the level of risk associated with the mission. To test the implications of the theory, I leverage the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset and the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset (Lloyd, 2021a). This allows me to find that force commanders respond to pressure exerted upon them by the United Nations when considering acts of conflict violence,

such as battle deaths, one-sided violence, and rebel perpetrated one-sided violence. However, the mandate risk as well as mandate risk in conjunction with conflict violence reduces the size of peacekeeping deployments. Furthermore, the force reducing effects of risky mandates only subside once the violence in the cell has subsided. Last, counter to expectations, force commanders are able to learn these limitations over time to effectively deploy troops, even in the face of risky mandates.

The results of this chapter continue to support the narrative of the negative effects of risky mission mandates. The previous chapter noted that potential contributing countries are deterred from contributing to missions that have increasingly risky mandates, especially when the conflict environment is increasingly difficult. This chapter builds on these findings by observing how force commanders are also deterred from deploying troops to mission host locations as a result of mission mandates *and* conflict conditions. While force commanders effectively respond to pressure from the United Nations, they are also pressured to reduce the size of troop deployments as a result of troop contributing states and junior officers.

5.1 The Role of the Force Commander

The United Nations maintains a chain of command detailing the hierarchy and general responsibilities of mission decision makers. Figure 5.1 provides a visual depiction of this chain of command. After the Security Council formally establishes a peacekeeping operation by passing a resolution, the responsibility of the mission is delegated from the Security Council to the head of the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General (on Foreign Relations, 2021). The Secretary-General then appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who oversees all military, police, and civilian components of the mission (Oksamytna et al., 2021). The Special Representative functions as the Head of Mission to ensure that the mission follows the political and strategic guidelines set by the Secretary-General. The Head of Mission is advised by the Mission Leadership Team that is normally constituted by the Chief of Staff, the Head of the Police Component, the Director of Missions Support, and other

Figure 5.1: Peacekeeping Operation Authority Structure



Figure Adopted from Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2019)

smaller component heads. In addition to these other offices, the Mission Leadership Team includes the Head of the Military Component called the Force Commander (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019).

While the selection process and role of the force commander is not explicitly stated by the United Nations, other United Nations documents provide insight into the appointment process. After mission formation, United Nations member-states provide candidates that are interviewed by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for the role of the mission force commander (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2021). While many of these potential force commanders maintain advanced military rank and experience, they also seem to be selected for political reasons. Many force commanders tend to come from member-state who are active in the international community, have previously supplied a force commander for the mission, are geographically close to the mission host state, and contribute large quantities of troops (Oksamytna et al., 2021). Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, admitted that mission military officers are often decided by major troop-contributing countries, which sometimes led to the selection of lesser quality commanders (Guéhenno, 2015, 226).

Once on mission, force commanders exert command over troop movements and the use of force while on mission. Force commanders are responsible for gathering information on the level of training for the contributed units and to fill in training gaps to develop an effective fighting force (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999). This training includes information on the rules of engagement that detail scenarios when peacekeepers can use force (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). This information is also provided in writing to lower-ranking officers to detail when their troops may use force in violent situations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2017). In addition to authorizing the use of force, force commanders have the authority to assign tasks to units and deploy them throughout the mission host. Should the units defy their orders, force commanders are authorized to discipline and punish their troops. This authorization also extends to cases of units following the order of their national officers as this leads to the undermining of force commander authority. In these cases, the United Nations will take action against the member-state to support the authority of the force commander (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019).

5.2 Force Commander Benefits

The office of force commander supplies the benefits of political opportunity, prestige, and the ability to shape United Nations military police to those selected for the job. According to Villa and Passos (2022), force commanders develop political skills necessary for political advancement. First, force commanders become adept in political articulation and negotiations due to consistent communication with the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, and rebel groups. For example, three force commanders from African missions[1] met with the United Nations Security Council to discuss the need to rapidly establish a secure environment for peacebuilding and peacekeeper protection (S/PV.8251, 2018). Second, force commanders gain hands-on experience in conflict management, mediation, and nonviolent political action containment, such as through the allowance and

protection of nonviolent protests (Belgioioso et al., 2021). Third, force commanders build international reputations that create opportunities to exert political influence in domestic arenas. For example, twenty high-ranking Brazilian peacekeepers, many of who acted as force commander, maintained political positions such as Defense Minister, Army Commander, and Vice President of Brazil (Villa and Passos, 2022).[2] As a result of their skills experience, force commanders develop successful political careers after leaving their post.

In addition to domestic opportunities, force commanders' skills and experiences make them assets to the United Nations' bureaucratic arm of military operations. International organizations effectively gather information and enforce policy when assisted by experienced local or grass-roots actors (Murdie and Davis, 2012; Tallberg et al., 2014). As a result, the United Nations is increasingly interested in hiring former force commanders as they provide valuable first-hand experience of successful and unsuccessful modes of mandate implementation (See S/PV.8251, 2018; dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). For example, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye of Senegal served as the force commander for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) from 2005 - 2010.[3] After serving as force commander, Lieutenant General Gaye served as the Assistant Secretary-General and the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations from 2010 - 2013 that allowed him to advise the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and all peacekeeping operations with military components (United Nations, 2022a). After this appointment, Lieutenant General Gaye was selected as the Special Representative to the Secretary General and Head of Mission over the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for the Central African Republic (BINUCA) (SG/A/1415, 2013).[4] This example demonstrates how force commanders can leverage this

[1]These force commanders included Major General Jean-Paul Deconinck from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Lieutenant General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and Lieutenant General Lonard Ngondi from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (S/PV.8251, 2018).

[2]General Hamilton Mourão was a military observer in the United Nations Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM III) from 1995 - 1997 and serves as the Vice President of Brazil as of 2019 (Villa and Passos, 2022).

experience for a successful career after their military service.

Military officers who become force commanders resign from high-ranking domestic and international military positions to lead a peacekeeping operation's military component. Major General Nirmal Kumar Thapa of Nepal was selected as the Head of Mission and Force Commander for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 2022. Previously, Major General Thapa served as the General Officer and Joint Coordinator at the Secretariat of the National Security Council of Nepal and as the Director-General of Military Operations of the Nepali Army (SG/A/2132, 2022). As another example, Lieutenant General Cornelis Johannes Matthijssen of the Netherlands resigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans for The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Joint Force Command to accept the post of force commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2021 (SG/A/2077, 2021). Both officers resigned from high-ranking military offices, domestically and internationally, for the opportunity to advance their career through the office of force commander.

During their deployment, force commanders have the opportunity to act as informal policy makers through the development of procedural precedence. Force commanders are responsible for ensuring that all subordinate officers and peacekeepers are familiar with the rules regarding the use of force (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2017); however, these rules often create contradictory statements when compared to mission mandates. For example, the United Nations Secretariat defines civilian protection as human security promotion, while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations defines it as saving human lives from physical violence. These differences create confusion among peacekeepers regarding civilian protection (Phayal and Prins, 2020), and it presents an opportunity for force commanders to selectively use force to match their ideals or those of

[3]Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye began as the force commander of United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and remained force commander after the mission transitioned to MONUSCO.

[4]Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye was later forced out of this role in 2015 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in response to sexual abuse allegations against the United Nations peacekeepers operating in the Central African Republic.

their home state (Harig and Jenne, 2022). For example, Chinese delegations to the United Nations have criticized the use of force on mission leading to policy development for peacekeeper safety and the promotion of troop caveats (Fung, 2022). This coincides with China's deployment of over 2,000 troops, where thirteen occupy posts such as force commander and deputy force commander (The State Council Information Office, 2020), granting the state control over procedural precedence for the use of force. With this in mind, the office of force commander provides individuals opportunities for career advancement and informal policy development.

5.3 Pressure of the Position

Force commanders have the opportunity to build successful political careers, but opportunities for advancement are undermined by poor mission performance. As previously noted, the Secretary-General has the authority to appoint individuals to the role of force commanders. As a result, force commanders must uphold "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity," as governed by the United Nations charter concerning Secretary-General appointments (United Nations, 1945). In other words, force commanders are hired and fired based on merit. The United Nations maintains the responsibility to protect, meaning the United Nations is expected to intervene when a sovereign government is unable or unwilling to establish peace and protect its citizens (Thakur, 2016). Force commanders who are unable to maintain strong performance records by protecting civilians or limiting battle deaths are observed to be unable to met this standard, leading to their resignation or replacement (Lundgren et al., 2021). These pressures are further magnified since force commanders must lead missions that are sent into the harshest conflicts characterized by high deaths tolls and uneasy moments of peace (Fortna, 2004, 2008). The pressure to perform matched with intervention into the most difficult conflicts puts high levels of stress on force commanders who desire to remain in office and receive later benefits.

Many force commanders have met untimely ends to their tenure due to the pressure

associated with the position.[5] In October 2008, Lieutenant General Vincente Diaz de Villegas of Spain resigned as force commander after less than two months for "personal reasons." During his tenure as force commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the mission oversaw the collapse of a newly minted peace deal, rebel destruction of two United Nations armored vehicles from rockets, escalated violence by the warring parties, and riots near the mission base that led to one civilian death (Balakrishnan, 2008). In January 2006, General Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar of Brazil committed suicide while acting as force commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as Haiti experienced the forced removal of the Haitian president from office, delayed elections, an average kidnapping rate of 12 people a day in December 2005, and the death of 10 United Nations soldiers and police officers (Thompson, 2006). In addition, Lieutenant General (Reitred) Roméo Dallaire was the force commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the genocide of Tutsis in 1994.[6] The former commander made multiple failed attempts at suicide and continues to suffer from post traumatic stress disorder as a result of his never-ending mental images of the tragedy he was powerless to stop (Bethune, 2016). These force commanders serve as examples of the pressures that force commanders endure when the costs of poor mission performance become increasingly high.

5.4 The Force Commander's Dilemma

While on mission, force commanders face pressure to perform from at least three different groups: the United Nations, contributing states, and lower ranking officers. Figure 5.2 presents a visual of the dilemma that force commanders face when making decisions regarding the size of troop deployments through three paths. In Path 2, Force commanders

[5]Lundgren et al. (2021) find that the median tenure of a force commander is a little under two years.

[6]Lieutenant General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire attempted to alert the United Nations of the impending genocide with the "Genocide Fax" where he detailed the conditions of the mass unrest. The United Nations was alerted, but failed to act, leading to partial responsibility for the genocide. See Gourevitch (1998) for more information on the "Genocide Fax."

Figure 5.2: Limitations on the Force Commander



Note: Thicker lines represent "more" while thinner line represent "less."

are pressured by the United Nations to deploy robust troop contingents and deter conflict violence. In Path 1, force commanders are limited by troop caveats that limit the number of troops that can be deployed in the host state. Last, Path 3 visualizes that force commanders are also restricted by lower-ranking officers threats to defy orders thereby reducing the number of troops a commander will deploy. Below, I explain the three actors that apply contrasting pressure through their respective paths on force commanders decisions regarding troop deployments.

5.4.1 United Nations Pressure

The United Nations is empowered with the responsibility to protect generating its desire to limit the negative effects of conflict. The responsibility to protect refers to a sovereign state's duty to protect its population and provide for their general welfare; however, should a state be unable or unwilling to ensure the safety and welfare of its citizens, the international community is called to enforce this responsibility. After the tragedy in Rwanda, the United Nations adopted Resolution A/RES/60/1 in 2005 that outlined the international community's empowerment of the United Nations to enforce the responsibility to protect

through Chapter VI and VII of the United Nations Charter (Thakur, 2016). Since 2005, the United Nations Security Council has cited the responsibility to protect in more than 80 resolutions concerning the limitation of armed conflict and human rights abuses (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2022). For example, the mandate for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) includes provisions concerning the protection of civilians that are rooted in the responsibility to protect due to the public outcry for intervention an behalf of civilians. Due to its reliance on the legitimacy conferred upon it by member-states (Binder and Heupel, 2015), the United Nations desires to limit the effects of conflict through the use of peacekeeping operations.

From its responsibility to protect, the United Nations, through Path 2, instructs force commanders to deploy troops to project the mission's power and reduce the negative externalities of conflict. The United Nations standard for mission success is defined by force commander's ability to accomplish their mandated tasks, especially those related to conflict management and civilian protection. To accomplish these tasks, force commanders and their subordinate officers are instructed to deploy robust troop contingents to violent locations as shows of force. Robust troop deployments are deterrent signals of mission resolve that demonstrates the United Nations' desire to generate and protect peace within the host state (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). Deployments function as sunk cost signals due to the costs required to mobilize peacekeepers from their local patrol stations or from mission and sector headquarters (Fearon, 1997; Quek, 2021). The presence of large peacekeeping deployments are successful at limiting battle deaths, civilian targeting, and the duration of conflict (Hultman et al., 2014, 2013, 2016), demonstrating how large deployments are conductive to mission success. The pressure provided by the United Nations to deploy troops paired with incentives to stay in office as force commander motivates the deployment of large troop contingents.

By not protecting the mandate, force commanders are at risk of being removed from their commands. Force commanders are evaluated by the United Nations on their abilities to

implement their mandates through the deterrence of further violence (Lundgren et al., 2021), making poor performance grounds for removal. For example, Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki was appointed as the force commander for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in May 2016 after spending three years as the Deputy Army Chief of Staff-Command and Control for Kenya Army forces (SG/A/1658, 2016). In November 2016, the UNMISS force commander was disgracefully removed from command after a report demonstrated the mission's inability to protect civilians that Secretary-General Ki-Moon called a "chaotic and ineffective response." During attacks in the capital city, peacekeepers abandoned their posts, ignored humanitarian and civilian requests for protection, and allowed looting of the mission compound. In addition, peacekeepers permitted gross acts of sexual assault near the mission compound while peacekeepers watched from compound windows. The force commander was blamed for improper troop preparation and command, leading to his removal from his post (Quinn, 2016). With this in mind, force commanders are incentivized by the United Nations to send troops to enforce their mandate and maintain the United Nations' image as a protector due to the credible United Nations threat of removal for poor performance.

5.4.2 Contributing State Pressure

Second, contributing states pressure force commanders through Path 1 by maintaining control over their troops on mission. In contrast to the United Nations that favors larger troop deployments, contributing states apply pressure to limit force commanders' opportunities to deploy a large contingents. States contribute troops to missions in exchange for troop reimbursements, coup proofing, and United Nations leadership considerations (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Hesse, 2015; Oksamytna et al., 2021). However, states incur heavy costs associated with losing contributed troops, such as material costs from soldier investments and audience costs from fatalities in a war of choice (Bove, 2011; Oestman, 2021). To avoid the costs of losing troops while still receiving contribution benefits, states impose troop caveats.

Troop caveats are restrictions that states place on their troops that limit deployment locations and the use of force by their peacekeepers while on mission (Novosseloff, 2016). These limits are informally set when states negotiates with the United Nations while creating the Memoranda of Understanding. Troop caveats are not written or recorded into a database[7] for force commanders, creating issues when the commander intends to deploy troops. Since many of these caveats are secret, force commanders are only made aware of these limits when ordered troops overtly refuse to follow their orders.

Former force commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz wrote in a report that troop contributing states are risk-averse and unwilling to allow their troops to use force on mission. He wrote that troop-contributing countries do not initially realize that troops "can die in this country... by enemy attack" and that fatalities are "not what they're expecting in peacekeeping" when countries make contributions (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017, 10). The United Nations flag and blue helmet has changed from a sign of peace to a blue target, as warring parties recognize that troops are unable or unwilling to engage in combat to deter violent advances. Troop caveats limit information and skill exchange passed between units as some of the most trained and equipped troops are unable to use force. As a result, only the worst troops can be sent on deployments, leading to poor combat performance (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). Due to caveats, force commanders are left with only a few poorly trained troops to engage warring parties, demotivating force commanders to deploy troops to conflict locations.

Over time, force commanders and the United Nations have become increasingly aware of the commonality and limitations imposed by troop caveats. In 2015, the United Nations Security Council held a meeting regarding how troop caveats limit a mission's ability to protect civilians. The Head of Mission and Force Commander for the United Nations

[7]Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group believes that a caveat database does not exist since these records would "add humiliating precision to the accusations of dereliction of duty traded between different national contingents in the same operation" (Economist, 2021).

Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) detailed the mission's inability to create a mission presence on the Syrian-controlled side of the ceasefire line due to caveats in response to the dangerous conditions stemming from the Syrian Civil War. As a result, the mission was unable to send officers to major mission cities, such as Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. Representatives from Angola and the United States emphasized that caveats undermined the mission chain of command as contributed troops limit the actions of higher-ranked force commanders. Other representatives noted that caveats are due to increasing peacekeeper fatalities and warned that increased caveats will limit the mission's ability to protect civilians, leading to more civilian and peacekeeper fatalities (S/PV.7464, 2015). As a result of troop caveats, force commanders are increasingly hamstrung in their abilities to send large deployments to violent locations, applying counteracting pressure to the United Nations' desire to send robust deployments.

5.4.3 Lower-Ranking Officer Pressure

The last actor that applies negative pressure to force commanders leading to smaller deployments through Path 3 are junior-officers that threaten non-compliance. Military structures have clear chains of command to facilitate the flow of orders and enforcement (Mattila et al., 2017), which, as seen in Figure 5.1, also applies to peacekeeping missions. Drawing from the military relations literature, the force commander acts as the principal while lower-ranking officers act as agents since the officers must carry out force commander orders. These orders range from orders to patrol mission sectors to engaging with warring parties to protect civilians (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). However, lower-ranking officers have opportunities to defy their orders through national commander orders and caveats when confronted with dangerous conditions, creating agency drift (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012; Charbonneau and Mogato, 2014).

Officers are trained to minimize unit fatalities (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b), meaning officers are unlikely to intervene in dangerous conditions that threaten

the lives of their troops (French, 2009). Peacekeeping contingents contain units with high social group heterogeneity and low unit cohesion that fosters desertion and responsibility shirking (McLauchlin, 2015). This suggests that peacekeeping operations are likely to observe order defiance when conditions become increasingly dangerous. These dynamics are common in missions such as in the case of Juba in South Sudan when peacekeepers were reported to have deserted during the conflict at a United Nations base. The United Nations ordered the peacekeepers at the base to intervene and protect civilians and humanitarian workers, but no peacekeepers were reported to have left the safety of the base (Burke, 2016). To avoid non-compliance, force commanders are unlikely to send units to dangerous situations and avoid undermining their authority (Nassif, 2015), demonstrating the pressure on force commanders to avoid sending robust deployments to dangerous situations.

Force commanders must balance officer preferences on mission to avoid peacekeeper mutinies. In September 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) experienced a military mutiny by about 150 Chadian troops. After fighting against the Tuareg militants in Northern Mali in April 2013, Chadian troops remained stationed in Tessalit to enforce a peace deal signed in June 2013. Once the ceasefire was broken and conflict resumed, the soldiers deserted in protest of their pay and long length of service in Tessalit. The Chadian troops experienced 10 Chadian peacekeeper deaths by two attacks in September 2013. In November of the same year, 38 Chadian peacekeepers once again abandoned their posts in protest of poor conditions rooted in the slow transportation of food and water as these soldier monitored the dangerous and dry conditions of Northern Mali, which also hosted continued violence between rebel and government forces (Reuters Staff, 2013; Knodell, 2014). With this in mind, force commanders must consider the preferences of lower-officers and their troops to avoid non-compliance and peacekeeper mutinies, pushing the commanders to send smaller deployments.

5.4.4 Protecting Civilians or Troops

Military officers are trained to accomplish directives, such as engaging the enemy or protecting civilians, in expectation of losing troops (Wong et al., 2003). Rooted in a lack of intervention in response to civilian deaths in Rwanda, the United Nations has encouraged member-states to develop military training that includes the protection of civilians (Gordon, 2013). For example, the United States Military Academy (West Point) and the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps trains their officers on the importance of civilian protection (Bell, 2022), which is observed by the United States' preference to protect civilians at the risk of losing troops during its conflict against the Taliban (Flaherty and Burns, 2010). As further reinforcement, handbooks developed by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations explain that troops must prioritize the protection of civilians at the risk of losing troops (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b,a). Due to their training, force commanders are willing to risk the lives of their troops for the sake of protecting civilians.

Even though force commanders and their officers are expected to protect civilians, they must also weigh these considerations in light of force protection principles. Military officers are responsible for the safety of their troops, meaning they must weigh potential outcomes of violent engagement in light of the potential costs of troop fatalities (Geiss, 2012). By losing troops, officers reduce their available resources while also signaling trends towards defeat and incompetence (Weisiger, 2016; Sudduth, 2021). Troop fatalities are unavoidable products of conflict, but officers prefer to protect their troops instead of civilians. In a survey of the Australian Army, senior officers expressed that they would protect a civilian in exchange for losing a soldier; however, officers are more inclined to avoid risks to their units and not intervene on behalf of civilians (Bell and Terry, 2021). The need for force protection is increasingly salient in peacekeeping operations as missions experience both troop shortfalls and contributors that withdraw troops in reaction to peacekeeper fatalities (Passmore et al., 2018; Levin, 2021). As a result, force commanders are willing to accept low levels of risk and deploy peacekeepers, but as risk increases, force commanders are less willing to send large

contingents to protect civilians.

In an interview with PassBlue, Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre, former force commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), noted that troop deployments are contingent on his ability to protect peacekeepers. Lieutenant General Gyllensporre lead MINUMSA, the "world's deadliest peacekeeping mission," from 2018 - 2021 where he presided over forty peacekeeper fatalities with many due to combat. The former force commander explained that the United Nations prioritized the protection of civilians through the authorization of the use of force; however, the former commander admitted that he chose to not intervene and protect civilians on multiple occasions due to dangerous conditions. He highlighted that he is not only responsible to the United Nations, but also to the soldiers, troop contributing countries, and the solders' families (Hoije, 2022). This interview by the former force commander exemplifies the trade-off between mandate implementation and force protection that drives the force commander's dilemma.

5.5 Effect of Mandate Risk and Observable Implications

The force commander's dilemma models pressures that force commanders face from the United Nations, troop contributing countries, and lower-officers when making decisions regarding the size of troop deployments. Two factors that drive the trade-off force commanders must make are conflict conditions and the level of mandate risk. Referring again to Figure 5.2, the level of conflict danger dictates whether, such as battle deaths or the presence of one-sided violence, functions through Path 2 while the level of mandate risk operates through Paths 1 and 3. The level of conflict danger captures the effect of Path 2 on the decision calculus of force commanders. The Untied Nations prefers force commanders to engage with dangerous events to enforce the institutions responsibility to protect through the presence of peacekeepers (Thakur, 2016). As the level of conflict danger increases, force commanders will deploy increasingly robust troop deployments as a sunk cost mechanism

to deter violence (Fearon, 1997; Quek, 2021). This leads to the first hypothesis to test for Path 2:

H1: As the conflict violence in a cell increases, the number of troops sent to the location will increase.

Even though the previous hypothesis has been investigated (See Phayal, 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019), the current literature is limited in its ability to explain the roughly 400 failed peacekeeper responses to warring party violence. The level of mission mandate risk captures the pressure exerted on force commanders by troop contributors and lower-ranking officers as mandates dictate how peacekeepers must operate in dangerous situations. Mandate risk signals the likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury when peacekeepers attempt to implement tasks. For example, mission mandates with tasks that require buffer zone monitoring carry more risk compared to monitoring free and fair elections. While each task communicates the level of danger associated with an action, tasks are viewed in the aggregate of the entire mandate. Mandates that contain more tasks that require the use of force are more risky compared to mandates with mandates with less risky tasks, such as government policy assistance and quick impact project deployment. When the level of mandate risk increases, peacekeepers engage in increasingly risky actions to implement the mandate that put them in danger.

Even though the United Nations pressures force commanders of high risk missions to send more troops to violent locations, pressure from contributing states and lower-ranked officers to send fewer troops becomes more acute as mandate risk increases. While conflict conditions manipulate the strength of Path 2, Paths 1 and 3 are dictated by the level of mission mandate risk. Functioning through Path 1, troop caveats limit the ability of contributed troops to move to violent locations and use force as caveats are imposed to protect contributed troops (Novosseloff, 2016). Increasingly risky mandates create conditions that active troop caveats; thereby reducing the amount of available troops for force commanders to deploy. In addition, risky mandates signal the likelihood of troop fatalities pushing

the force commander to follow principles of force protection instead of civilian protection. Furthermore, high mandate risk signals to lower-ranking officers the potential for danger that troop must face upon deployment leading to possible non-compliance (French, 2009; McLauchlin, 2015), creating increased pressure on the force commander through Path 3. As a result of the negative pressures stemming from mandate risk, increased levels of mandate risk decreases the number of troops deployed in the host state. This leads to the second hypothesis to test for the combined effects of Paths 1 and 3:

H2: As the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate increases, the number of troops sent to a location will decrease.

While mission mandates and battle deaths are expected to exert unique effects, the force commander's dilemma notes the interaction between United Nations pressure and pressure from contributing states and lower-ranking officers. Pressure from the United Nations through Path 2, captured by conflict conditions, motivates force commanders to deploy robust contingents. However, the pressure from contributing countries and officers tempers this effect as the level of mandate risk increases, activating Paths 1 and 3. Force commanders are aware that troop fatalities decrease contributions (Bove, 2011; Oestman, 2021) driving their decision to avoid situations that increase the likelihood of peacekeeper fatalities. As a result, missions with high levels of mandate risk avoid robust deployments to locations with high conflict danger. Even though force commanders are incentivized to deploy troops to create a record of high performance (Lundgren et al., 2021), increasingly dangerous locations and high mandate risk increases the priority for force protection (Bell and Terry, 2021). Instead of increasing deployments, Path 2 reduces deployments when coupled with the effects of Paths 1 and 3. This leads to the third hypothesis:

H3: The negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of troops sent to a location will intensify as the level of conflict violence increases.

Furthermore, force commanders are more willing and able to send larger deployments to violent locations once the conflict subsides. To prevent conflict violence, peacekeepers

must be able to quickly deploy to the location, as seen by peacekeeper clustering around transportation networks (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Force commanders need to quickly deploy troops to coerce warring parties to stop fighting. As the the fighting dwindles, force commanders are unlikely to deploy large contingents as there is no conflict to prevent. However, the level of mandate risk prevents rapid troops deployments. Troop caveats are active in situations that require the use of force and lower-ranking officers may defy orders to intervene in difficult situations (Novosseloff, 2016; Nassif, 2015). To balance the preferences of the Untied Nations, contributing states, and lower-ranking officers, force commanders with risky mandates deploy smaller contingents as the violence subsides (Ruggeri et al., 2018). By deploying after the violence dwindles, force commanders appear interested in implementing the mandate while also avoiding caveats and non-compliance. Furthermore, increasing time since the last violent action allows the effects of Paths 1 and 3 to wane allowing for Path 2 to increase troop deployments. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: The negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of troops sent to a location will weaken as the time after violence in a location increases.

Force commanders are also more attentive to United Nations pressure early in their placement since they are unaware of the caveats and feelings of non-compliance upon arrival. Force commanders are hand picked by the Secretariat, based on merit and political considerations (United Nations, 1945; Oksamytna et al., 2021), to maximize mission success. Organizations replace poorly performing military leaders to generate increases in performance (Reiter and Wagstaff, 2018; Lundgren et al., 2021). Force commanders that are selected to lead a mission are more likely to cooperate with the United Nations and send larger deployments to violent locations since new agents are more attentive upon their initial placement. However, new force commanders learn mission limitations over time (Powell, 2004), decreasing the United Nations' influence in favor of contributing states and lower-ranking officers (Lo et al., 2008). In addition, mandate risk moderates this relationship. With increased mandate risk, force commanders are confronted with more situations of activated caveats

increasing the speed of the learning process. In addition, higher mandate risk creates more instances of potential non-compliance, turning the force commander's attention from the United Nations to the pressure of the mission. This leads to the last set of hypotheses:

H5: As the tenure of a force commander increases, the number of troops sent to a location will decrease.

H6: The negative effect of force commander tenure on the number of troops sent to a location will intensify as the proportion of risky tasks in mandate increases.

United Nations force commanders find themselves stuck between the United Nations, troop contributing states, and their junior officers. Counter-acting pressures by these actors create a trade-off between mandate implementation and force protection due to mandate risk and conflict conditions. Force commanders are motivated by the United Nations to deploy troops to locations of violence to support peace. In contrast, high risk mandates generate pressure on commanders from contributing states and junior officers that reduce deployment sizes. The negative pressure on force commanders from risky mandates becomes increasingly acute when conflict conditions make implementation increasingly difficult leading to reduced troop deployments. To manage the pressures associated with risky mandates, force commanders will deploy to conflict locations once the violence dies down to satisfy United Nations pressure while also utilizing troops when their caveats no longer apply. Overtime, force commanders become familiar with this trade-off that hamstrings their ability to deploy leading to reduced deployment sizes, which becomes increasingly strong in the presence of a risky mandate.

5.6 Research Design

5.6.1 The Sample

This chapter utilizes geo-spatial data to capture fine-grained dynamics of troop movements within the mission host state. The sample is drawn from the Geocoded Peacekeeping



Figure 5.3: Example Map

Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset v.2.1 compiled by Cil et al. (2020) making the unit of analysis the grid-cell-month. The dataset utilizes United Nations mission deployment maps, United Nations Secretary-General mission progress reports, and the Dag Hammarskjold Library Cartographic Section peacekeeping mission deployment maps to locate peacekeeping units from all peacekeeping operations from 1994 - 2020. However, due to data limitations, the temporal span only includes all peacekeeping operations from 1994 - 2014. Figure 5.3 provides a visualization of average troop deployments and battle deaths in Sudan Sudan. To avoid capturing different troop movement dynamics, as well as missions without the potential to deploy militarized troops, I exclude observer missions from the sample.[7] Furthermore, I limit the sample to observations with two-hundred or fewer battle deaths as grid-cell-months with more than two-hundred battle deaths are extreme observations and have the potential to exhibit high leverage on model estimates. This exclusion produces relatively conservative estimates.[8]

Due to excess zeros in the dataset, I limit the sample to all grid-cell-months that receive troops and twenty-five percent of mission grid-cell-months that did not receive troop in the cell adjusting the unit of analysis to the potential-grid-cell-month. By including every grid cell in the sample, the number of zeros will be heavily inflated since not every grid-cell will ever receive troops deployments. Mitigate this issue, I employ endogenous stratified sampling (King and Zeng, 2001). Due to the lack of literature to guide the selection, I chose a twenty-five percent sampling of grid-cell months that did not receive troop deployments.[9]

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5.6.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this chapter is the number of troops deployed to a potential-grid-cell-month. This data comes from the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset v.2.1 compiled by Cil et al. (2020). As noted above, I exclude observer missions and observations with more than two-hundred battle deaths. The dataset includes the movements of militarized troops since these actors are the forces deployed in defense of the mandate. A histogram of the dependent variable, with and without zeros, can be found in Figure 5.4.[10] Due to the over dispersion of the dependent variable, I employ the negative binomial estimator.

5.6.3 Independent Variables

Similar to the previous chapter, I capture the level of risk associated with peacekeeping mandates by utilizing the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset. I calculate a risk ratio index of the number of risky tasks in a mandate divided by the total

[7]The results are robust to the inclusion of observer missions. They can be found in Appendix 1.

[8]The results are generally robust to removing death restrictions. For Hypothesis 1, battle deaths and total one-sided violence become negative, but substantively insignificant after removing death restrictions. They can be found in Appendix 1.

[9]The results are robust to using a 50% of non-deployment cells. They can be found in Appendix 1. In addition, Appendix 1 provides a Meta-Analysis of the 25% and 50% non-zero cells with 10 randomization samples.

[10]The dependent variable distribution is based on Model 1.



(a) Histogram of Troops

(b) Histogram of Troops, No 0's

Figure 5.4: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics

number of tasks given in the mandate making the variable constrained from [0,1].[11] This reflects the inherent risk to troop death or injury of the mission that force commanders must take into account making decisions regarding troop deployments.

To capture the level of danger in the conflict zone, I include counts of battled deaths, one-sided violence, rebel one-sided violence, and government one-sided violence from the UCDP Geo-Referenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). I aggregate the events recorded in the database into a monthly summation of the total number of deaths for each grid-cell. Battle deaths includes the death of combatants as well as one-sided violence and this is further disaggregated into counts of deaths due to one-sided violence being a motivating factor of peacekeeper action (Ex. Hultman et al., 2013; Fjelde et al., 2019). Each measure of conflict zone danger is subject to the exclusion of observations with counts above two-hundred.

The models also include a variable to capture a cell's time since the most recent act

[11]The risk ratio measure does not place tasks on a continuum of risk as it is difficult to imply an inherent ordering and distance between each task in terms of risk. For example, I am able to distinguish that Chapter VII enforcement is more risky than the promotion of press freedom, but it is difficult to measure the difference in risk level between buffer zone monitoring and Chapter VII enforcement. As a result, a proportion of risky tasks that constitute the mandate is the best alternative to capturing mandate risk.

of conflict danger. Noting how peacekeeping operation are slow to deploy to locations that have experienced an act of conflict danger (Ruggeri et al., 2018), I create a variable that counts the months since the most recent act of conflict danger in the cell. In models that measure one type of death toll, I include a time count in months since the last incident of death. For example, in models where the measure of conflict zone danger is captured by battle deaths, the model will also include a counter of months since the last battle death in the grid-cell.

Last, the models include the duration of a force commander's tenure on mission. Jenne (2022) captures the appointment of all peacekeeping mission leaders. While the dataset contains information on all mission senior officials, I limit the individuals to only those who are listed as the mission's force commander. The force commander duration variable is captured as the number of months the individual served as force commander.

5.6.4 Controls

I include various control variables to remove potential confound effects. The controls can be divided into the groups of host, distance, and mission-specific variables. The host control variable group captures factors specific to the mission host state. To capture population centers, I include data on average night light emissions to proxy for population levels in a given grid-cell (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program). I also include a measure of the longest streak of consecutive months in the given year that the cell experienced a drought (Guttman, 1999; McKee et al., 1993) as another proxy for population, but also local grievances since droughts undermine local food security. In addition, to capture treacherous terrain in the grid-cell, I include a measure that captures the proportion of the grid-cell covered by mountains (Blyth, 2002).

The second group of control variables captures various distances to various informative features in the host state. First, I measure the distance of the grid-cell to the closest deployment of peacekeepers in hundreds of kilometers since cells with units nearby may

require fewer troops since others are in the vicinity. The variable captures the distance to the nearest peacekeeping unit within the last three months. This means a grid-cell in October 2000 could be matched with a unit from October 2000, September 2000, or August 2000 depending on which unit was the closest to the grid-cell. Second, I include a distance measure of the grid-cell to the border of the host state in hundreds of kilometers since units are deployed to locations near the border (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). The third distance is the distance in hundreds of kilometers of the grid-cell to the capital since cells close to the capital are likely to have fewer troops due to government exclusion of peacekeeping presence (Fjelde et al., 2019). Distances to the border and the capital are supplied by Weidmann et al. (2010). The last distance is the travel time in days from the grid-cell to the nearest major city.[12] Since many peacekeepers are stationed near major population centers (Townsen and Reeder, 2014), cells that are farther from urban centers are less likely to receive a deployment. This information is provided by Uchida and Nelson (2009).

The last group of control variables are related to mission-specific geographic factors found in the Geo-PKO dataset. The models include a binary variable to capture if there is a troop contributing country headquarters, a mission sector headquarters, or a mission headquarters in a cell. The excluded group no headquarters.[13] This variable is included since any type of headquarters is a major gathering place of multiple peacekeeping units. The model also includes a binary indicator of whether the cell is located in a zone of confidence, also known as a buffer zone. Due to the need of peacekeepers to enforce warring party separation, these cells in the zone will naturally have larger deployments. The excluded category is a cell not in the zone of confidence. Last, I include a count of the number of troops in a neighboring cell since cells with nearby troops likely need fewer troops to deter violence. This variable is in thousands of troops and natural log transformed since this variable is highly correlated with a lagged dependent variable. Last, I include a measure of average troop quality. I use Singer et al. (1972) to calculate a state's military spending

[12] A major city is required to have more than 50,000 inhabitants (Uchida and Nelson, 2009).

per troop. The then estimate the average troop quality in thousands of dollars within each deployed unit.

5.6.5 Method

As previously, noted, the over dispersion of the dependent variable demands the use of the negative binomial estimator. To combat heteroskedasticity and temporal auto-correlation, I cluster the error term on the mission and include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor. In addition, I lag each independent variable by one month, except for the variables that count time since the last act of conflict danger. To protect against spatial auto-correlation, the number of neighboring troops is included, as seen in the previous paragraph. I use queen's continuity to sum the total number of peacekeepers in the neighboring cells.

5.7 Results

5.7.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2

After explaining the empirical design, I now explain the results of the estimated models. Hypothesis 1 retests the current literature by evaluating if increases in conflict violence in a cell will increase the number of peacekeepers sent to a cell. Models 1-4 in Table 5.1 presents the evidence of this hypothesis. The measures of conflict danger as battle deaths, total one-sided violence, and rebel one sided violence are each positive statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, providing evidence in support of hypothesis 1 that peacekeeping operations respond to violence during the course of the mission. However, the coefficient of government one-sided violence is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. This finding is unique since Fjelde et al. (2019) find no relationship between government one-sided violence and

[13]While the variable indicates whether the cell contains a troop contributing country, mission sector, or missions headquarters in the cell, a Wald test indicates that the coefficients of each category are equal. As a result, I collapse the categories into a binary indicator of whether or not the cell contains any type of headquarters.

peacekeeping deployments. In addition, Phayal and Prins (2020) observe that peacekeepers only respond to government one-sided violence when conditioned on government-rebel clashes. The results in Model 4 build on these findings by demonstrating a statistically significant relationship that commanders reduce deployments when the government engages in one-sided violence.

To asses practical significance, Figure 5.5 provides various graphs of predicted troop accounts given counts of conflict danger. To capture an average case, all other variables are held at their central tendencies. The small multiples representing battle deaths, all one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence display a positive trend across the counts of conflict danger. For battle deaths, a shift from the minimum to the maximum value is associated with an increase from about 0.08 troops to about 1.29 troop making this a 150% increase in counts. For all one-sided violence, a min-to-max shift is associated with a increase from 0.08 troops to about 3.1 troops, which is a 377% increase. In the case of rebel one-sided violence, a min-to-max shift is associated with an increase from 0.08 troops to about 4.9 troops, which is a 602% increase. Last, a min-to-max shift for government one-sided violence is associated with a decrease from about 0.08 troops to 0.008 troops making this a 90% decrease. The combination of statistical significance and graphical evidence, while somewhat weak, provides support for hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 states that as the proportion of risky tasks in a mandate increases, the count of troops in a cell will decrease. Looking to Models 1-4 in Table 5.1, I find general support for the hypothesis. For all measures of conflict violence, the measure of risk ratio is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. To assess practical significance, Figure 5.6 provides predicted counts given levels of risk ratio. These graphs report predicted values for Models 1-4 with all other variables held at their central tendencies. For each measure of conflict violence, a min-to-max shift from a risk ratio of 0.4 to 1 represents a decrease from about 2 troops to 0.008 troops, which is about a 250% decrease. Once again, the combination of statistical significance and predicted values provides support for hypothesis

Table 5.1: Risk Ratio on Troops in Cell

	(1) Battle Deaths	(2) Total OSV	(3) Rebels OSV	(4) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.651**	-8.457**	-9.218**	-9.115**
	(1.837)	(1.744)	(1.754)	(1.871)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.014**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.018**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.011†
				(0.007)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027**	0.025**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.074	-0.041	-0.145	-0.416
	(0.608)	(0.634)	(0.698)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.306	0.298	0.375	0.045
	(0.746)	(0.710)	(0.799)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.605**	-0.631**	-0.654**	-0.664**
	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.133)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.146**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.310**	-12.538**	-12.787**	-13.397**
	(1.400)	(1.447)	(1.443)	(1.522)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.029	-0.022	0.828	0.101
	(0.420)	(0.420)	(1.071)	(0.442)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.053*	-1.316**	-1.583**	-1.389**
	(0.424)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.428)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.852**	1.908**	1.946**	1.774**
	(0.545)	(0.512)	(0.532)	(0.493)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.661**	12.762**	13.360**	13.349**
	(1.736)	(1.700)	(1.725)	(1.923)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.099**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.5: Predicted Troop Contributions for H1

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is 14 troops.

2.

5.7.2 Hypothesis 3 and 4

Hypothesis 3 states that as the level of conflict violence increase, the negative effect of risk ratio on troop counts in a cell will become stronger. Models 5-8 in Table 5.2 provides bleak evidence for this hypothesis. First, the constituent term of risk ratio has a negative and statistically significant effect a $p < 0.01$ across each model, meaning that risk ratio is associated with a reduction in the count of troops in a cell when each measure of conflict danger is equal to zero. Second, for Models 5-7, the constituent terms for conflict danger are positive and statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This suggests that the effect of battle deaths, total one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence has an indiscernible

Table 5.2: Risk Ratio and Death Interactions

	(5) Battle Deaths	(6) Total OSV	(7) Rebels OSV	(8) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.660**	-8.455**	-9.217**	-9.117**
	(1.843)	(1.747)	(1.756)	(1.871)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	-0.037			
	(0.060)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.061			
	(0.076)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.062		
		(0.076)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$		-0.051		
		(0.090)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.067	
			(0.085)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$			-0.055	
			(0.100)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				0.762
				(0.567)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$				-1.180
				(0.828)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027**	0.025**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.068	-0.043	-0.147	-0.416
	(0.609)	(0.636)	(0.699)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.310	0.297	0.374	0.043
	(0.746)	(0.710)	(0.800)	(0.734)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.606**	-0.631**	-0.653**	-0.664**
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.133)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.145**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.314**	-12.536**	-12.786**	-13.398**
	(1.399)	(1.446)	(1.442)	(1.522)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.030	-0.022	0.828	0.106
	(0.422)	(0.420)	(1.071)	(0.441)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.053*	-1.316**	-1.583**	-1.394**
	(0.424)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.429)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.852**	1.908**	1.946**	1.776**
	(0.545)	(0.512)	(0.532)	(0.493)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.667**	12.760**	13.359**	13.353**
	(1.740)	(1.702)	(1.726)	(1.923)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.098**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.6: Predicted Troop Contributions for H2

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is 14 troops.

effect on troop counts in a cell when risk ratio is equal to zero, but a mandate with zero risk is not present in the dataset.[13] In contrast, Model 8's constituent term of government one-sided violence is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.10$ meaning the effect of government one-sided violence is negative and significant when risk ratio is equal to zero.

To fully assess the significance of an interaction term, Figure 5.7 provides graphs of the marginal effect of risk ratio on the count of troops in a cell conditional upon the level of conflict danger. The graph represents Models 5-8 with all other variables held at their central tendencies. Looking to the small multiples, each graph demonstrates little support for hypothesis 3. While the effect of risk ratio on troops counts is negative and statistically

[13]While the measure of mandate risk is theoretically bound between [0, 1], the measure is only observed to be between [0.4, 1] making a value of zero impossible when assessing the significance of conflict danger variables.

significant for battle deaths, all one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence until a count of about 60 deaths, the effect becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero as the count of conflict danger continues to increase. For battle deaths, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is about a 0.7 troop reduction until is becomes indistinguishable from 0 at 50 battle deaths. All one-sided violence begins with a marginal effect of risk ratio on troops in a cell at about a 0.5 reduction in troops that increases to about 5.8 less troops until insignificance at 90 one-sided violence-related deaths. For rebel-caused one-sided violence, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts begins at a reduction of 0.7 troops when rebel one-sided violence is zero that increases to about 5.9 less troops at a value 70 deaths when it reaches statistical insignificance. Last, government one-sided violence begins with a negative effect of 0.7 less troops at zero deaths, but this effect approaches zero as deaths increase suggesting that force commanders prefer to leave the government alone as government produced violence increases. Due to the lack of data in categories greater than about 80 deaths, the confidence intervals in each plot become large leading to statistical insignificance. When considering the presence of more data at lower levels of conflict danger, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is negative and statistically significant leading to marginal support in favor of hypothesis 3.

Looking to hypothesis 4, I expect the negative effect of risk ratio on troop counts in a cell will decrease as the time since the last violence action increases. Models 9-12 in Table 5.3 provide initial evidence to the hypothesis. First, the constituent term of risk ratio is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ across all models. This signifies that risk ratio reduces the number of troop sent to a cell when months since last violent action is 0. Second, the constituent term of time since last conflict action is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ meaning that time since last violent action in a cell reduces the number of troops in a cell when risk ratio is 0, which is an unobserved result in this sample. This means that cells with more recent violent action will receive more troops than those with more time since the last violent action. Last, each interaction between risk ratio and time since last violent action is positive and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ meaning

Table 5.3: Risk Ratio and Time Since Violent Aciton Interactions

	(9) Battle Deaths	(10) Total OSV	(11) Rebels OSV	(12) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-14.265**	-15.148**	-16.189**	-14.583**
	(1.811)	(1.954)	(1.928)	(2.305)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.070**			
	(0.018)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since Death	0.057*			
	(0.022)			
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.016**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.078**		
		(0.018)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Total		0.067**		
		(0.023)		
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.017**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.078**	
			(0.016)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.068**	
			(0.021)	
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.065**
				(0.019)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Gov				0.054*
				(0.025)
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.017**
				(0.007)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.023**	0.022**	0.022**	0.022*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.106†	0.120†	0.194*	0.112†
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.415	-0.396	-0.519	-0.636
	(0.781)	(0.801)	(0.832)	(0.640)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	-0.104	-0.156	-0.133	-0.326
	(0.662)	(0.655)	(0.698)	(0.669)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.087**	-0.087**	-0.085**	-0.095**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.595**	-0.614**	-0.650**	-0.658**
	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.138)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.148**	-0.145**	-0.136**	-0.104†
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-13.353**	-13.750**	-14.173**	-14.477**
	(1.257)	(1.280)	(1.254)	(1.397)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.282	0.245	0.517	0.340
	(0.639)	(0.682)	(0.974)	(0.665)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.545**	-1.909**	-2.017**	-1.846**
	(0.472)	(0.493)	(0.545)	(0.509)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.843**	1.877**	1.939**	1.747**
	(0.569)	(0.531)	(0.540)	(0.501)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.020*	0.028**	0.025*	0.027**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	17.371**	18.311**	19.133**	17.845**
	(1.459)	(1.539)	(1.601)	(1.817)
lnalpha	5.061**	5.056**	5.074**	5.089**
	(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.393)	(0.391)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.7: Predicted Troop Contributions for H3

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 5 - 8.

that when both mandate risk and time since the last violent action increase, the number of troops in a cell will increase. In practical terms, mission with high risk mandates will send more troops to a conflict location when the violence has sufficiently subsided. This finding provides initial support for hypothesis 4.

Due to the nature of interaction terms, to fully assess statistical significance, interactive relationships require graphical assessment. Figure 5.8 provides the small multiples required to assess significance for Models 9-12. Each figure assess the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts in a cell conditional upon the number of months since the last act of conflict danger. For both battle deaths and government one-sided violence, when time is equal to zero, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts is equal to about a reduction in 10 troops. When time reaches 160 months for battle deaths government one-sided violence, the

effect of risk ratio on troop counts becomes indistinguishable from zero. For all one-sided violence and rebel one-sided violence, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troops counts is a reduction of about 12.5 troops when time is equal to zero. As all one-sided violence approaches 150 months and rebel one-sided violence approaches 170 months, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is indistinguishable from zero. These results demonstrate that peacekeeping mandates effectively deter troop deployments by force commanders during recent violence. To demonstrate their commitment to United Nations values, force commanders instead deploy troops to these locations after the conflict has subsided, which is about 12 and a half years according to the model. This evidence provides strong support for hypothesis 4 that the negative effect of mandate risk becomes weak as time since last violent action increases.



Figure 5.8: Predicted Troop Contributions for H4

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 9 - 12. Average troop count is about 15 troops.

5.7.3 Hypothesis 5 and 6

Hypothesis 5 explains that as the tenure of a force commander increases, the number of troops sent to a cell will decrease. Looking again at Models 1-4 in Table 5.1, the models do not provide support to hypothesis 5. In Models 1-4, the coefficient of force commander duration is associated with an increase in the number of troops in a cell and is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ while the coefficient in Model 4 is significant at $p < 0.10$. To further assess this relationship, Figure 5.9 provides predicted counts of troops within a cell across the values of force commander duration. Figure 5.9 presents the estimates for Models 1-4 with all other variables held at their central tendencies. For each small multiple, as a force commander increases their tenure, the number of troops within a cell also increases. For each plot, a min-to-max shift from a new force commander to a force commander with about 45 months of experience is associated with an increase from 0.05 to about 0.18 troops in a cell, which is about a 260% increase in the number of troops in a cell. Given this evidence, hypothesis 5 is rejected as increases in force commander tenure is associated with an increase in troop counts in a cell.

Hypothesis 6 states that as the mandate becomes increasingly more risky, the negative effect of force commander tenure on troops in a cell will increase. Models 13-16 in Table 5.4 assess this hypothesis, but the results do not provide initial support for the hypothesis. First, the constituent terms for risk ratio are negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. This suggests that when force commanders are brand new, the effect of risk ratio significantly reduces the count of troops deployed to a cell within the host state. Second the constituent term for force commander duration is positive and statistically insignificant at conventional levels, meaning that the effect of force commander tenure is indiscernible from zero when mandate risk is equal to zero, which is unobservable in this sample. Last, the interactions between mandate risk and force commander duration provide no initial support for hypothesis 6. For Model 13, the interaction of risk ratio and force commander duration is positive and statistically insignificant while the interaction is negative and insignificant in

Table 5.4: Risk Ratio and Force Commander Duration Interactions

	(13) Battle Deaths	(14) Total OSV	(15) Rebels OSV	(16) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.910**	-8.571**	-9.230**	-9.243**
	(1.507)	(1.360)	(1.311)	(1.434)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.013	0.019	0.024	0.018
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.017	0.008	0.001	0.009
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.014**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.018**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.011†
				(0.006)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.158*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.068)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.070	-0.038	-0.145	-0.415
	(0.612)	(0.634)	(0.697)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.304	0.296	0.375	0.044
	(0.745)	(0.710)	(0.802)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.608**	-0.632**	-0.654**	-0.665**
	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.127)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.146**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.346**	-12.555**	-12.789**	-13.414**
	(1.424)	(1.469)	(1.462)	(1.534)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.030	-0.021	0.829	0.104
	(0.426)	(0.420)	(1.052)	(0.439)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.080*	-1.328**	-1.584**	-1.402**
	(0.450)	(0.436)	(0.509)	(0.451)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.867**	1.913**	1.947**	1.780**
	(0.565)	(0.524)	(0.541)	(0.507)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.869**	12.854**	13.370**	13.452**
	(1.429)	(1.347)	(1.319)	(1.508)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.099**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.9: Predicted Troop Contributions for H5

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is about 14 troops.

Models 14-16. This evidence generally does not provide support in favor of hypothesis 6.

To assess the statistical significance of hypothesis 6, Figure 5.10 provides small multiples of Models 13-16 that visualize the marginal effect of force commander duration on troop counts in a cell conditional upon mandate risk. For each model, the marginal effect of risk ratio begins with a statistically significant and negative effect when the level of mandate risk is low. However, as the level of mandate risk increases, the mandate's negative effect becomes indistinguishable from zero. This signifies that mandates with relatively less risky mandates create a reducing effect on force commander duration regarding troop counts in a cell. However, as the mandate becomes increasingly risky, this reducing effect subsides. This may be a product of riskier mandates providing force commanders with the authorization required to send troops that are able to protect themselves through force should they center



Figure 5.10: Predicted Troop Contributions for H6

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals. Models 13 - 16.

into a violent encounter. By allowing the ability to use force, commanders are free to deploy units to locations knowing that they are free to protect themselves.

In addition, the control variables provide continued insight into the deployment of troops within a host state. The following conclusions are based on Model 1. Large contingents of troops center in urban locations in addition to those with more citizens, similar to the findings of (Fjelde et al., 2019). While cells that are close to troop deployments receive more troops, cells with more neighboring troops receive less troops, likely due to the deterrent ability of neighboring troops on warring parties. United Nations troops congregate near state borders to to limit the ability of warring parties to engage in border jumping (Townsen and Reeder, 2014; Beardsley, 2011). In line with expectations regarding the risk associated with specific tasks, force commanders prefer to send smaller deployments

of troops to monitor zones of confidence that separate warring parties. Last, when available, force commanders tend to deploy larger contingents of increasingly professionalized troops to provide a strong signal of deterrence.

5.8 Conclusion

United Nations force commanders balance competing pressures when making deployment decisions. The United Nations, through their responsibility to protect, pressures force commanders to deploy robust troop deployments to protect civilians from the negative effects of conflict. In contrast, troop contributing-state use of caveats and threats of non-compliance from junior officers incentivize force commanders to reduce their deployments. The utilization of geo-spatial data confirms expectations generated from the force commander's dilemma while also presenting interesting counter-expectations. Similar to the literature, increased level of conflict danger increase the size of troop deployments. Increasingly risky mandates reduce the size of troop deployments while also increasing the time it takes for deployments to travel to locations of past violence. Counter to expectations, long-tenured force commanders deploy larger continents as they are able to better navigate the pitfalls of counter-veiling pressures. Last, increasingly risky mandates remove any negative effects related to force commander tenure.

The conclusions of this chapter integrate findings from previous scholarly work while also challenging the results of others. The results from the initial models of Fjelde et al. (2019) and the main results of Phayal and Prins (2020) fall in line with the results of hypothesis 1. The force commander's dilemma integrates these findings as Path 2 expects the level of conflict violence, such as battle deaths and one-sided violence, to be associated with an increase in the number of troops deployed in a cell. In addition, Ruggeri et al. (2018) find that troops deploy to violent locations after a considerable amount of time has passed since the last violent act. The results of hypothesis 4 demonstrates that this effect may be exacerbated by risky mandates. However, the findings of Hultman et al. (2013, 2014) and

the main results of Fjelde et al. (2019) are called into question. These studies find that larger peacekeeping deployments are able to limit one-sided violence and battle deaths, but the results of this chapter demonstrate that large deployments to violent locations arrive once the level of violence has dwindled over time. This suggests that large peacekeeping deployments that reduce conflict violence may be the result of a dwindling level of conflict over time.

These results present numerous implications regarding how the Untied Nations should approach incentivizing force commanders. While battle deaths increase the size of peacekeeping deployments, the level of mandate risk deters force commanders from deploying robust contingents to enforce risky mandates. In addition, these risky mandates create incentives for force commanders to engage in "grand standing" by deploying troops once the violence has subsided. To avoid these undesired outcomes, the Untied Nations needs to increase the monitoring over force commander actions while also developing credible threats for force commander punishments to reduce the roughly 400 attacks that led to civilian deaths where peacekeepers did not intervene (Economist, 2021). Monitoring the behavior of force commanders, whether through United Nations staff or outside actions including non-governmental organizations, should incentivize commanders to deploy large troop contingents to avoid punishment (Kelley and Simmons, 2015). In addition, the United Nations must develop a credible threat to remove poor performing force commanders. Normally, poor performing force commanders are quietly asked to step down or find their contracts to be renewed at the end of their term (Lundgren et al., 2021). By maintaining a credible threat (Fearon, 1997), the United Nations can motivate commanders to deploy troops to violent locations.