

# The Engagement Trap: How Social Media Recommendation Algorithms Shape Society

Survey Paper

## Abstract

Social media recommendation algorithms drive 70–95% of content consumption across major platforms while systematically amplifying divisive content, harming teen mental health, and accelerating misinformation spread. This survey synthesizes evidence from peer-reviewed research, internal company documents, congressional investigations, and technical papers to reveal how engagement optimization—the core objective function powering billions in advertising revenue—creates predictable societal harms that platforms knew about but failed to adequately address. The evidence demonstrates that Facebook’s internal research showed Instagram made body image worse for one in three teen girls, YouTube’s algorithm drove vulnerable users into extremist content rabbit holes within days, and TikTok’s system recommended suicide content within 2.6 minutes to accounts registered as 13-year-olds. Across platforms, sophisticated machine learning architectures optimized exclusively for engagement metrics create systematic amplification of content that keeps users scrolling but damages individuals and democratic discourse.

## 1 Introduction

Social media recommendation algorithms drive **70–95% of content consumption** across major platforms while systematically amplifying divisive content, harming teen mental health, and accelerating misinformation spread ([University of Washington, 2023](#); [Covington et al., 2016](#)). This survey synthesizes evidence from peer-reviewed research, internal company documents, congressional investigations, and technical papers to reveal how engagement optimization—the core objective function powering billions in advertising revenue—creates predictable societal harms that platforms knew about but failed to adequately address.

The evidence is stark: Facebook’s internal research showed Instagram made body image worse for **one in three teen girls** ([Haugen, 2021a](#)), yet the company concealed these

findings. YouTube’s algorithm drove vulnerable users into extremist content **rabbit holes within days** (Ribeiro et al., 2020). TikTok’s system recommended **suicide content within 2.6 minutes** to accounts registered as 13-year-olds (Center for Countering Digital Hate, 2022). Twitter’s open-sourced code revealed replies weighted **75 times more than likes**, incentivizing confrontation (Twitter/X Engineering, 2023). Across platforms, the pattern repeats: sophisticated machine learning architectures optimized exclusively for engagement metrics create systematic amplification of content that keeps users scrolling but damages individuals and democratic discourse.

This survey examines five platforms—Instagram, TikTok, X/Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook—documenting both their technical architectures and their documented societal impacts. The technical sophistication is impressive: Meta’s Two Towers neural networks, YouTube’s 48-million-parameter ranking models, TikTok’s real-time learning systems. Yet this same sophistication enables harm at unprecedented scale. Understanding these systems is essential for data scientists who will build tomorrow’s recommendation engines and must grapple with the tension between technical optimization and human flourishing.

## 2 Technical Architectures Reveal Shared Optimization Toward Engagement

The five platforms employ remarkably similar technical approaches despite surface-level differences. All use multi-stage recommendation pipelines that narrow millions of candidates to dozens of displayed items through increasingly sophisticated filtering. The architectural pattern is consistent: candidate generation using collaborative filtering or embedding-based retrieval, followed by neural network ranking with hundreds or thousands of features, then final heuristics for diversity and policy compliance.

### 2.1 Meta’s Systems

**Meta’s systems** (Facebook and Instagram) represent the most mature implementation. Facebook’s News Feed uses over 100 prediction models operating in parallel, combining outputs through weighted linear aggregation (Meta Engineering, 2021). The system predicts likelihoods for engagement actions—likes, comments, shares, watch time—then ranks content by composite relevance scores. Instagram deploys three distinct algorithms: Feed prioritizes followed accounts, Reels uses Two Towers neural networks with multi-stage ranking (retrieval, first-stage ranking, second-stage ranking, re-ranking), and Explore employs the largest system serving hundreds of millions daily (Instagram, 2023).

The technical innovation centers on Meta’s Deep Learning Recommendation Model (DLRM), which handles both categorical sparse features through embedding tables and numerical dense features, enabling predictions at scale (Naumov et al., 2019). By 2024, Meta shifted toward sequence learning architectures that model user engagement sequences rather than individual events, with hourly fine-tuning for real-time adaptation (Meta AI, 2024).

## 2.2 YouTube’s Architecture

**YouTube’s architecture** follows the canonical two-stage design documented in the influential 2016 RecSys paper “Deep Neural Networks for YouTube Recommendations” (Covington et al., 2016). Candidate generation reduces millions of videos to hundreds using deep neural networks for collaborative filtering, formulating the problem as extreme multiclass classification. The ranking stage evaluates candidates with a separate neural network optimizing for expected watch time rather than click-through rate, explicitly avoiding clickbait amplification. Features include user history, video freshness, device context, and critically, the source that nominated each video.

The 2019 follow-up introduced multi-objective optimization using Multi-Gate Mixture-of-Experts (MMoE) architecture, balancing engagement metrics (clicks, watch time) with satisfaction signals (likes, dismissals, survey responses) (Zhao et al., 2019). This system drives **70% of all YouTube views**—approximately 1 billion hours daily (YouTube, 2019).

## 2.3 TikTok’s Algorithm

**TikTok’s algorithm** achieves exceptional personalization through granular implicit feedback. Wall Street Journal investigations using 100 automated accounts revealed that TikTok requires only one critical signal: **watch time down to the second**, including hesitation and rewatches (Wells et al., 2021). This implicit feedback operates at massive scale with minimal user friction. ByteDance’s technical advantage comes from their Monolith system, presented at the 2022 ACM RecSys conference, which enables **real-time model updates** through collisionless embedding tables rather than batch processing (Liu et al., 2022).

The system employs computer vision for visual analysis, natural language processing for text and audio, and metadata extraction for hashtags and sounds. Internal documents obtained by The New York Times revealed four optimization objectives: immediate user value (engagement), long-term user value (retention), creator value, and platform value (Griffith, 2021). University of Washington research analyzing 9.2 million recommendations found that **90–95% of TikTok views come from algorithmic recommendations**,

exceeding even YouTube’s already-high 70% ([University of Washington, 2023](#)).

## 2.4 Twitter/X’s System

**Twitter/X’s system** became partially transparent when the company open-sourced its recommendation code in March 2023 ([Twitter/X Engineering, 2023](#)). The three-stage pipeline starts with candidate sourcing of approximately 1,500 tweets: roughly 50% from accounts users follow (ranked using RealGraph logistic regression predicting engagement likelihood) and 50% from out-of-network sources. Out-of-network candidates come from social graph analysis (tweets engaged with by people you follow) and SimClusters embedding space—a custom matrix factorization creating 145,000 virtual communities ranging from friend groups to massive interest clusters.

A 48-million-parameter neural network based on MaskNet architecture then ranks candidates using the engagement weighting formula:

$$\text{Score} = 0.5 \times P(\text{Like}) + 1.0 \times P(\text{Retweet}) + 13.5 \times P(\text{Reply}) + 75.0 \times P(\text{Reply engagement}) \quad (1)$$

minus penalties for reports and blocks ([Twitter/X Engineering, 2023](#)). This formula reveals the algorithm’s priorities: **conversational replies weighted 75 times more heavily than likes**, creating incentives for provocative content that generates responses. Final heuristics enforce author diversity and content balance. Under Elon Musk’s ownership, documented manipulations included a 1,000x boost for Musk’s personal tweets and algorithmic changes benefiting large accounts ([Lima, 2023](#)).

## 2.5 Shared Technical Patterns

The **shared technical pattern** across platforms illuminates why similar societal impacts emerge. All five systems optimize primarily for engagement metrics—watch time, likes, shares, comments, replies. All employ personalization that creates feedback loops: users shown content matching past behavior, which shapes future behavior, which shapes future recommendations. All use embeddings and neural networks that identify latent patterns human designers never specified. All face the cold start problem for new users and content, typically defaulting to high-engagement populist content. All struggle with the explore-exploit tradeoff, though University of Washington research found TikTok’s first 1,000 videos contained 30–50% “exploitation” (predicted from history) versus “exploration” (novel content) ([University of Washington, 2023](#)).

The technical sophistication enables personalization at scale, but the objective func-

tions—engagement, retention, advertiser value—contain no terms for user wellbeing, information quality, or societal health.

## 3 Mental Health Impacts Fall Hardest on Adolescent Girls

The evidence connecting algorithmic social media to declining adolescent mental health, particularly among girls, has reached critical mass. Between 2004 and 2019, teen depression rates nearly doubled according to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, with **one in four U.S. teen girls experiencing clinical depression by 2019** ([Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2019](#)). The timing coincides precisely with smartphone proliferation and the algorithmic curation of social media feeds.

### 3.1 Facebook’s Internal Research

Facebook’s internal research, revealed through the Frances Haugen whistleblower disclosures, provided the smoking gun ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). A 2019 internal slide presentation stated plainly: **“We make body image issues worse for one in three teen girls.”** The research found 32% of teen girls said Instagram made them feel worse about their bodies when already struggling with body image issues. Among teens reporting suicidal thoughts, **13% of British teens and 6% of American teens traced these thoughts to Instagram.**

Critically, Facebook documented that the platform led users from “healthy recipes” to “anorexia content” in short timeframes through algorithmic recommendations—the system actively created pathways to harmful content rather than passively hosting it ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). External research corroborated these findings: a UK study by McAllister and colleagues found 29% of girls spending 3+ hours daily on social media engaged in self-harm, rising to 31% at 5+ hours daily ([McAllister et al., 2019](#)). Digital media was consistently associated with self-harm and depression in girls, rarely in boys.

### 3.2 Mechanisms of Harm

The mechanisms driving these harms are well-documented. **Social comparison culture** creates constant exposure to idealized, filtered images. Harvard research on body image found Instagram use directly correlates with adverse mental health outcomes in women, operating through upward social comparison and appearance anxiety ([Fardouly and Vartanian, 2015](#)). The algorithmic amplification specifically targets appearance-related content because it generates high engagement. **Digital status-seeking** through likes and comments creates variable reward schedules similar to slot machines. Meta’s internal research acknowledged

the “digital status” problem where teens feel pressure to present idealized lives ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). **Echo chambers around eating disorders and self-harm** form as algorithms connect users interested in weight loss, body modification, or self-harm content, creating communities that normalize dangerous behaviors.

### 3.3 TikTok’s Rapid Radicalization

TikTok’s algorithm demonstrates these patterns with frightening speed. The Center for Countering Digital Hate created accounts registered as 13-year-olds interested in body image and mental health ([Center for Countering Digital Hate, 2022](#)). The system recommended **suicide content within 2.6 minutes** and **eating disorder content within 8 minutes**. Accounts with vulnerability signals (username: “loseweight”) received **12 times more self-harm and suicide content** than standard accounts. The study identified 56 hashtags hosting eating disorder videos with 13.2 billion cumulative views. Sample recommended content included videos with captions like “Making everyone think your [sic] fine so that you can attempt in private” (386,900 likes).

Wall Street Journal investigations using automated bot accounts found similar patterns ([Wells, 2021](#)). A bot called “kentucky\_96” programmed to watch depression content **watched one 35-second sad video twice** (3 minutes total usage). Within 33 minutes and 224 videos, the feed became a “deluge of depressive content” with **93% of videos about depression and mental health struggles**. The algorithm rapidly identified user vulnerability and optimized content to maintain engagement through that vulnerability.

Amnesty International research found TikTok accounts encountered sadness content **within 5 minutes** of scrolling, mental health content dominated feeds **within 15–20 minutes**, and two of three accounts received videos expressing suicidal thoughts **within 45 minutes** ([Amnesty International, 2023](#)).

### 3.4 Neurobiological Mechanisms

The neurobiological mechanisms resemble substance addiction. Social media activates dopamine pathways through unpredictable rewards (likes, comments, shares). Frequent notifications and infinite scroll create compulsive usage patterns. Brain imaging studies show changes in prefrontal cortex and amygdala activity similar to behavioral addictions ([Montag et al., 2019](#)). A University of Chicago study found social media can be **more addictive than cigarettes and alcohol** for some users ([Hofmann et al., 2012](#)).

Adolescents are particularly vulnerable due to ongoing brain development—their prefrontal cortex (responsible for impulse control and long-term thinking) is still maturing while

their reward circuitry (sensitive to social feedback) is hyperactive. The platforms exploit this developmental vulnerability at scale.

A 2024 systematic review in *Perspectives on Psychological Science* by Metzler and Garcia synthesized the evidence, concluding that algorithms contribute to depression, anxiety, loneliness, and body dissatisfaction through mechanisms including unhealthy social comparisons, addiction patterns, sleep disruption, and cyberbullying exposure ([Metzler and Garcia, 2024](#)). Critically, the review found algorithms **reinforce existing social drivers** rather than creating problems de novo—they amplify human tendencies toward comparison and status-seeking to pathological levels. The dose-response relationship appears linear: PMC research documented a **13% increase in depression incidence per hour of social media use** ([Riehm et al., 2019](#)).

## 4 Political Polarization Follows Asymmetric Patterns

The relationship between recommendation algorithms and political polarization is more nuanced than early “filter bubble” theories suggested, but substantial evidence shows algorithms amplify ideological segregation and reduce cross-cutting exposure, with significant asymmetries between political communities.

### 4.1 Facebook’s Internal Acknowledgment

Facebook’s internal research acknowledged the problem explicitly. A 2018 internal document stated: “**Our algorithms exploit the human brain’s attraction to divisiveness**” ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). Another study found **64% of extremist group joins came from Facebook’s recommendation tools** rather than user searches. European politicians complained they felt forced to post more extreme content to be heard under algorithmic amplification. The system created perverse incentives: moderate, nuanced content received less distribution while inflammatory content reached larger audiences.

### 4.2 Experimental Evidence

Yet controlled experiments complicate simple causation. A *Nature* study by Nyhan and colleagues exposed 23,377 Facebook users to reduced like-minded content (one-third less) for three months ([Nyhan et al., 2023](#)). The intervention had **no measurable effect on polarization, ideological extremity, or belief in false claims**. This suggests that while algorithms create echo chambers in content exposure, changing algorithms alone doesn’t immediately change attitudes. The research highlights that social media constitutes a rel-

atively small part of most people’s information diets, and self-selection plays a larger role than algorithmic pushing for most users.

However, the study also confirmed that the median Facebook user sees **50% or more content from politically like-minded sources**, documenting the segregated information environment even if short-term attitude change proves difficult ([Nyhan et al., 2023](#)).

### 4.3 Asymmetric Polarization

Twitter research reveals **asymmetric polarization** between ideological communities. A COVID-19 study analyzing 232,000 U.S. users found the right-leaning echo chamber “by far more densely connected and isolated from the rest” of the network ([Bak-Coleman et al., 2021](#)). **80% of far-right users’ audience was also right-leaning** versus only 40% for far-left users. Random walk analysis showed 80% probability that walks starting in right-leaning communities would end in right-leaning communities, demonstrating strong clustering. Conservative users showed higher clustering coefficients while left-leaning users maintained more diverse network connections. Neutral users served as critical bridges between communities but rarely engaged with far-right content.

A PNAS study with surprising findings exposed 1,652 Twitter users to opposing political views through bot accounts ([Bail et al., 2018](#)). **Republicans who followed a liberal Twitter bot became substantially more conservative post-treatment**, while Democrats showed slight liberalization. This challenges the assumption that exposure reduces polarization and suggests echo chambers may be psychologically protective for some users.

### 4.4 Algorithmic Amplification Bias

Twitter’s algorithmic amplification shows documented political bias. A 2022 PNAS study by Huszár and colleagues analyzed 6.2 million news articles and found right-leaning content received **more algorithmic amplification than left-leaning content** in most countries studied ([Huszár et al., 2022](#)). Under Elon Musk’s ownership, computational analysis identified a “structural break” coinciding with Musk’s Trump endorsement, with **increased visibility for Republican commentators thereafter** ([Urman and Makhortykh, 2024](#)). The algorithm modification benefiting large accounts (switching from absolute block counts to percentile-based metrics) systematically advantaged Musk and other high-follower users. Code revelations showed a special label “author\_is\_elon” with dedicated tracking of Musk’s personal Twitter experience ([Twitter/X Engineering, 2023](#)).

## 4.5 YouTube Radicalization Pathways

YouTube's radicalization pathways show mixed evidence depending on methodology. Sock puppet studies find concerning patterns: UC Davis research using 100,000 fake accounts found right-leaning users fed a steady diet of conservative content with a “loop effect” trapping users in ideologically narrow consumption ([Haroon et al., 2022](#)). **Right-wing radicalization was roughly twice as severe as left-wing**. Tech Transparency Project investigations showed militia movement videos leading to extremist content on weapon building and tactical skills ([Tech Transparency Project, 2020](#)). Institute for Strategic Dialogue research found the algorithm serves right-wing extremist videos regardless of user interest or age, with 13-year-old profiles receiving more Andrew Tate content than 30-year-old profiles ([Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023](#)).

However, real user studies show different patterns. University of Pennsylvania Computational Social Science Lab analyzed 87,988 real users' viewing data and concluded: “**On average, relying exclusively on recommender results in less partisan consumption**” than user-initiated searches and direct URL entries ([HosseiniMardi et al., 2021](#)). They found 55% of far-right video views preceded by external URLs, homepage, or searches—not recommendations. A 2025 PNAS study using YouTube-like interfaces with 130,000+ recommendations found limited filter bubble and rabbit hole effects on political views, with participants choosing videos aligning with existing beliefs regardless of algorithm suggestions ([González-Bailón et al., 2025](#)).

The synthesis of evidence suggests algorithms create the infrastructure for polarization—segregated information spaces, amplification of extreme content, incentives for provocation—but user preferences and self-selection drive much of the actual consumption. The **asymmetric pattern** across ideologies is crucial: right-leaning communities show greater insularity, homogeneity, and algorithmic radicalization, while left-leaning communities maintain more diverse information exposure. This asymmetry has profound implications for democratic discourse, as it suggests one part of the political spectrum experiences more severe filter bubble effects.

## 5 Misinformation Spreads Through Coordinated Networks

Social media recommendation algorithms have fundamentally reshaped information ecosystems, creating conditions where misinformation spreads faster and farther than accurate information. Research across platforms documents how engagement optimization, coordinated manipulation, and network effects combine to amplify false content.

## 5.1 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Facebook's role in the **2016 U.S. presidential election** provides the canonical case study. The top 20 fake news stories generated **8.7 million Facebook engagements** versus 7.3 million for the top 20 real news stories in the final three months ([Silverman, 2016](#)). Fake news was **70% more likely to be retweeted than truth** according to MIT research ([Vosoughi et al., 2018](#)). Facebook drove this consumption: **40% of visits to fake news sites came from social media** (versus 10% for real news sites), and greater Facebook use correlated with more fake news consumption ([Guess et al., 2020](#)). Of identified fake news favoring candidates, Trump-favorable content received 30 million shares compared to 8 million for Clinton-favorable content. However, causal impact remains contested—only 27% of voting-age adults visited fake news sites, and fake news comprised a small share of overall information diets ([Guess et al., 2020](#)).

The **Russian Internet Research Agency** exploited Facebook's architecture during 2016. A 50,000-strong army of bots promoted conspiracy theories, the Internet Research Agency operated coordinated troll networks, and Russian GRU agents used DCLeaks to publish hacked DNC emails ([Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019](#)). Facebook's recommendation systems amplified this content through authentic user sharing. The platform was slow to acknowledge the problem, initially dismissing foreign interference concerns. Senate Intelligence Committee investigations documented extensive coordination between Russian accounts and domestic activists, showing how foreign manipulation could exploit organic American political divisions ([Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019](#)).

## 5.2 COVID-19 Misinformation

**COVID-19 misinformation** tested platforms' ability to contain health misinformation at scale. YouTube showed the highest prevalence: **27.5% of most-viewed COVID videos contained misinformation** according to a BMJ study, with over 62 million views on misleading content ([Li et al., 2020](#)). Content types included conspiracy theories (5G, Bill Gates, man-made virus), false cures and treatments, vaccine misinformation, and pandemic minimization. Oxford/Southampton research found **YouTube was the information source most strongly associated with belief in conspiracy theories** in the UK, and YouTube use predicted vaccine hesitancy ([Freeman et al., 2020](#)).

Facebook showed similar patterns, with whistleblower documents revealing employee concerns about inadequate COVID misinformation handling ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). Studies found Facebook “failing” to tackle COVID misinformation from prominent anti-vaccine groups, with World Doctors Alliance pages growing despite policy violations ([Avaaz, 2020](#)).

### 5.3 2020 Election Misinformation

The **2020 election** saw misinformation and legitimate election fraud claims converge. Harvard Kennedy School research analyzing 67 million tweets found a “small but dense cluster of conservative users pushes misinformation” while a large heterogeneous majority advocated for masks and mail-in voting ([Faris et al., 2020](#)). PMC research documented Trump’s role in amplifying misinformation through **895 COVID-19 and election misinformation stories** with maximum similarity to his tweets ([Evanega et al., 2020](#)).

Internal Facebook documents showed that six days after the election, **10% of all U.S. political content views were fraud claims** ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). Facebook employees warned about “Stop the Steal” coordination exploiting platform tools (super inviters, suggested groups), but changes came “too little, too late.”

### 5.4 Mechanisms of Amplification

The mechanisms enabling misinformation spread are well-documented. **Coordinated inauthentic behavior** (CIB) research by Cinelli and colleagues found coordinated accounts occupy higher positions in information cascades (closer to root), spread messages faster, involve more users, and create cascades with distinctive patterns—larger size, more edges, greater height, sparser follow graphs ([Cinelli et al., 2021](#)). A 2024 arXiv study detected cross-platform coordination (Twitter, Facebook, Telegram) during the U.S. election with Russian-affiliated media systematically promoted and substantial coordinated activity driving “highly partisan, low-credibility, and conspiratorial content” ([Sharma et al., 2024](#)).

**Algorithmic amplification** magnifies misinformation’s reach. A 2023 study analyzing 2.7 million posts found that low-credibility tweets with high engagement from influential users received amplification, particularly high-toxicity tweets with right-leaning bias ([Mosleh et al., 2023](#)). Low-credibility tweets from verified accounts were amplified more than from unverified accounts, giving false authority to misinformation. Facebook’s internal research showed engagement optimization increased the reach of election lies because false claims generated strong reactions (the “angry” reaction boosted posts 5x more than likes) ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). The system is functionally incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood—it optimizes for engagement, and false information is often more engaging than mundane truth.

### 5.5 YouTube’s Algorithm Engineer Speaks

**Guillaume Chaslot**, former YouTube algorithm engineer and founder of AlgoTransparency.org, documented how YouTube’s AI “boosts alternative facts” ([Chaslot, 2017](#)). His 2017 research

found the algorithm heavily recommended Pizzagate, flat earth theories, and false Michelle Obama claims. During the 2016 election, **80% of recommended videos were favorable to Trump**. Chaslot raised concerns internally but was told the focus was watch time, not quality. His outside research demonstrated that watch time optimization favors engaging conspiracies over accuracy.

## 5.6 Platform Policy Reversals

Platform responses have been inadequate. YouTube introduced election misinformation policies in December 2020, removing “tens of thousands” of videos, but reversed course in June 2023, stopping removal of 2020 election denial content claiming the policy “could curtail political speech without reducing violence risk” ([YouTube, 2023b](#)). Twitter under Musk **removed COVID-19 misinformation policy** in November 2022 and **reversed policies against amplifying state-controlled media** from Russia, China, and Iran in April 2023 ([Twitter/X, 2023b](#)). Mass reinstatement of previously banned accounts under “general amnesty” and gutting of trust and safety teams reduced content moderation capacity. Hate speech rates tripled post-acquisition according to Anti-Defamation League data ([Anti-Defamation League, 2023](#)).

The research documents systematic failure to contain misinformation not from lack of technical capability but from misaligned incentives. Misinformation generates engagement through novelty, emotional intensity, and moral outrage. Accurate information is often boring by comparison. As one former Facebook operations manager stated: **“False information makes companies more money than truth. Truth is boring”** ([Wong, 2021](#)).

## 6 Radicalization and Extremism Receive Algorithmic Amplification

Social media platforms repeatedly claimed their recommendation systems promote authoritative content while reducing extreme material. Internal documents, investigative journalism, and academic research reveal the opposite: algorithms systematically amplify extremist content because extremism generates engagement.

## 6.1 Facebook’s “Carol’s Journey to QAnon”

Facebook’s “Carol’s Journey to QAnon” experiment provided damning evidence ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). In 2019, researchers created a fake conservative user profile for “Carol Smith.” Within **two days**, Facebook recommended QAnon conspiracy groups despite Carol expressing no interest in conspiracies. Her feed quickly became a “barrage of extreme, conspiratorial, and graphic content.” The report titled “Carol’s Journey to QAnon” was presented to Facebook leadership, documenting how the platform’s own tools rapidly radicalized users. An internal 2016 study found **64% of extremist group joins came from Facebook’s recommendation tools**. Internal presentations acknowledged: “**Our algorithms exploit the human brain’s attraction to divisiveness**” ([Haugen, 2021a](#)).

## 6.2 January 6 Capitol Attack

Facebook’s role in the **January 6 Capitol attack** followed this pattern. Internal documents showed that by treating each Stop the Steal violation individually rather than as a coordinated movement, Facebook proved ineffective at containment ([Haugen, 2021a](#)). Employees noted: “Almost all of the fastest growing FB Groups were Stop the Steal.” Six days after the 2020 election, 10% of all U.S. political content views were fraud claims. Facebook knew engagement optimization increased reach of election lies but made changes too late. Platform tools designed for community building—super inviters, suggested groups—were exploited to organize an attack on democratic institutions.

## 6.3 Myanmar Genocide

The **Myanmar genocide** represents social media’s most catastrophic failure. In Myanmar, “Facebook IS the internet” for most users—a monopoly position. The UN Fact-Finding Mission determined Facebook played a “**significant**” and “**determining**” role in the genocide of Rohingya Muslims ([United Nations, 2018](#)). The platform was used to “enable and spread” hate speech and misinformation, portraying Rohingya as threats to the Buddhist nation. Civil society warned Facebook repeatedly from 2013–2017 of impending genocide. The platform’s role was compared to radios in the Rwandan genocide.

Facebook’s specific failures in Myanmar were systematic. A 2016 internal study showed 64% of extremist group joins came from recommendations. Military sock puppet accounts seeded hate through fake entertainment and wellness pages. **70% of video views** for a key anti-Rohingya hate figure came from algorithmic “chaining” (auto-play suggestions) ([Mozur, 2018](#)). Facebook failed to remove these accounts until exposed by third-party report-

ing in 2018. A 2022 Amnesty Report found Facebook’s algorithm **continued to amplify hate despite improvements** ([Amnesty International, 2022](#)). Even after safety enhancements, 2021 testing showed Facebook still approved ads containing Rohingya hate speech. The combination of monopoly position, algorithmic amplification, and inadequate content moderation enabled ethnic cleansing.

## 6.4 YouTube Radicalization

YouTube’s radicalization pathways show platform-specific patterns. UC Davis research using 100,000 sock puppet accounts found **right-leaning users fed steady diets of conservative content** with a “loop effect” trapping users in ideologically narrow consumption ([Haroon et al., 2022](#)). Institute for Strategic Dialogue research found the algorithm serves right-wing extremist videos **regardless of user interest or age**, with 13-year-old profiles receiving more Andrew Tate content than adults ([Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023](#)). Tech Transparency Project showed militia movement video viewers directed to extremist content on weapon building and tactical skills ([Tech Transparency Project, 2020](#)).

## 6.5 Mechanisms of Algorithmic Radicalization

The **mechanism** is straightforward: recommendation algorithms optimize for watch time and engagement. Extreme content—conspiracy theories, outrage, moral violations, tribal signaling—generates strong engagement. The algorithm learns to serve more extreme content. University of Washington research tracking TikTok users found the system identifies user interests then progressively intensifies content within that domain ([University of Washington, 2023](#)). Guillaume Chaslot documented how YouTube’s algorithm connected moderate political content to progressively more extreme content, with later recommended videos averaging fewer views (more niche) than initial videos ([Chaslot, 2017](#)). This pattern suggests algorithmic drift toward increasingly extreme material as the system optimizes for engagement within ever-narrowing content spaces.

Academic research documents **inadvertent exposure** as a critical mechanism. Users don’t seek extreme content initially—they encounter it through recommendations. A study by Whittaker, Looney, and Reed experimentally confirmed YouTube’s algorithm amplifies far-right content after user interaction with mainstream conservative content ([Whittaker et al., 2021](#)). Algorithmic radicalization differs from traditional radicalization because it’s driven by engagement optimization rather than deliberate recruiting. The platforms inadvertently create **radicalization infrastructure** by connecting potential recruits to extremist content and to other radicalized users.

## 6.6 Real-World Violence

Real-world consequences include documented violence. Austrian authorities thwarted a 2023 LGBTQ+ attack plot inspired by jihadist TikTok content ([BBC News, 2023](#)). Academic research linked anti-refugee Facebook posts to crimes in German municipalities ([Müller and Schwarz, 2021](#)). Facebook’s algorithm contributed to Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict (2020–2022) by amplifying ethnic hatred ([Hao and Stocking, 2021](#)). The platforms’ global reach means algorithmic failures export violence to vulnerable societies lacking strong democratic institutions or independent media.

Platform defenses typically cite the small percentage of policy-violating content (YouTube’s “violative view rate” of 0.16–0.18%, meaning 16–18 views per 10,000 from policy-violating content) ([YouTube, 2023a](#)). But this metric obscures the problem. **Borderline content**—material that doesn’t violate policies but promotes extreme ideologies—receives massive amplification. YouTube’s goal to keep borderline content below 0.5% of views still means millions of users exposed daily. Facebook’s removal of 24 million pieces of COVID misinformation sounds impressive until one considers it represents a tiny fraction of misinformation spread, most of which doesn’t violate specific policies ([Haugen, 2021a](#)).

The research synthesis reveals that radicalization isn’t an unfortunate bug but an **inevitable consequence of engagement optimization**. Extreme content keeps users watching. The algorithm learns this pattern and serves more extreme content. Users who engage become identified as members of communities interested in extreme content, receiving more recommendations. Echo chambers form as the algorithm connects like-minded users. The feedback loop continues until external intervention breaks the cycle.

## 7 Regulatory Responses Struggle with Complexity

Governments worldwide have attempted to address algorithmic harms through legislation, investigation, and regulation. These efforts reveal both the growing consensus that algorithmic systems require oversight and the difficulties of regulating opaque, constantly evolving technical systems controlled by resistant corporations.

### 7.1 EU Digital Services Act

The **EU Digital Services Act** (DSA) represents the most comprehensive regulatory framework ([European Union, 2022](#)). Entering force in November 2022 with full application in February 2024, the DSA applies to platforms with 45 million or more EU users (Very Large Online Platforms/Search Engines). Key provisions mandate that platforms explain recom-

mender system parameters to users, offer non-profiling feed alternatives, provide statements of reasons for content moderation decisions, and conduct risk assessments for systemic harms. Enforcement includes fines up to **6% of global annual turnover**. The European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT) was established to audit compliance and provide vetted researchers with data access.

However, implementation has been rocky. Amnesty International research found that despite DSA requirements since 2023, **TikTok continued exposing vulnerable users to self-harm and suicidal ideation content**, more than doubling depressive content for watch histories including such videos ([Amnesty International, 2023](#)). The platforms' technical claims about safety improvements have not been borne out by independent testing. The lack of transparency into actual ranking mechanisms (versus high-level descriptions) limits accountability.

## 7.2 U.S. Congressional Hearings

**U.S. Congressional hearings** have documented algorithmic harms without producing federal legislation. The April 27, 2021 Senate Judiciary hearing on “Algorithms and Amplification” featured testimony from Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube executives alongside experts Tristan Harris and Joan Donovan ([U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 2021](#)). YouTube’s Alexandra Veitch cited a “borderline content views” goal below 0.5% and violative view rate of 0.16–0.18% (down 70% from 2017) but could not commit to releasing data on policy-violating recommendations. Senators expressed concerns about echo chambers, inflammatory content promotion, lack of transparency, and need for algorithmic fairness.

The **October 2021 Frances Haugen testimony** proved most impactful ([Haugen, 2021b](#)). The Facebook whistleblower presented tens of thousands of internal documents showing the company knew Instagram harms teenage girls, the algorithm increases polarization and hate speech, the company contributed to January 6, and leadership misled investors about progress on hate speech and misinformation. Haugen’s testimony: **“Facebook has not earned our blind trust”** and **“The company intentionally hides vital information from the public.”** She compared Facebook to Big Tobacco and called for regulatory oversight of algorithms and a federal agency to oversee social media. The testimony led to multiple state attorney general investigations, renewed calls for Section 230 reform, and Congressional hearings on children’s online safety.

The **January 31, 2024 Senate Judiciary hearing** brought Meta, TikTok, Snap, X, and Discord CEOs before Congress on child safety ([U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 2024](#)). Senators characterized it as a “seat belt moment” for child protection, with testimony

about child sexual exploitation and the business model that “amplify[ies] things that disturb kids, because they get more hits.” Yet no federal legislation has passed. Proposed bills include the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA), COPPA 2.0, and various Section 230 reform proposals, but political gridlock and free speech concerns have prevented enactment.

### 7.3 FTC Enforcement

The **FTC’s \$170 million COPPA fine** against YouTube in 2019 represents the most significant U.S. enforcement action ([Federal Trade Commission, 2019](#)). YouTube collected personal information (cookies, IP addresses, viewing history) from children under 13 without parental consent, tracking child-directed channels for targeted behavioral advertising and earning nearly \$50 million from the practice. Evidence showed YouTube marketed itself as the “#1 website regularly visited by kids” and told Mattel that “YouTube is today’s leader in reaching children age 6–11.” The settlement included \$136 million to FTC and \$34 million to New York AG. Legally significant, this was the first major COPPA case holding a platform liable for third-party content based on “actual knowledge” that it collected data from child-directed channels.

### 7.4 Platform Resistance

**Platform resistance** to regulation takes multiple forms. TikTok’s March 2023 congressional testimony by CEO Shou Zi Chew proved disastrous ([Chew, 2023](#)), with the CEO unable to credibly address data security concerns, child safety issues, or algorithmic transparency. He claimed no Chinese government access to U.S. data while admitting Beijing-based employees could still access data until “Project Texas” completion. On algorithm transparency, Chew cited Citizen Lab findings that were immediately contradicted by Citizen Lab’s director, who tweeted that their analysis “was explicit about having no visibility into what happened to user data once it was collected.” The hearing strengthened bipartisan support for potential ban or forced sale.

Meta’s response to Frances Haugen exemplified corporate deflection ([Zuckerberg, 2021](#)). The company claimed Haugen “did not work on child safety or Instagram” (though she worked on Civic Integrity, which addressed algorithmic amplification). Meta said documents were “stolen” and CEO Mark Zuckerberg posted a 1,316-word rebuttal arguing the idea that profit is prioritized over safety is “deeply illogical.” Meta announced policy changes critics deemed insufficient. The company has consistently resisted independent researcher access to data, citing privacy concerns, though researchers note that privacy-preserving access is technically feasible and the platforms themselves use this data routinely.

Twitter under Musk removed transparency features and restricted API access that enabled external research ([Twitter/X, 2023a](#)). The platform eliminated COVID-19 misinformation policies, reinstated previously banned accounts under “general amnesty,” gutted trust and safety teams, and fired ethical AI teams. The algorithm open-sourcing in March 2023, while initially praised for transparency, omitted trained models, training data, and most trust and safety classifiers—providing code structure without actual system behavior. Princeton Professor Arvind Narayanan noted this was “the first time a major social media platform has published its engagement calculation formula” but emphasized that “code transparency has inherent limitations” since behavior emerges from models trained on private data ([Narayanan, 2023](#)).

## 7.5 Regulatory Challenges

The regulatory challenges are formidable. Algorithms change constantly, making point-in-time audits of limited value. Black box machine learning models may produce discriminatory outcomes without explicit discriminatory code. Platforms control data access, limiting independent verification. Global operations mean regulatory fragmentation. Free speech concerns in the U.S. complicate content regulation. Technical complexity exceeds most policymakers’ expertise. Platform lobbying and campaign contributions create political resistance.

Yet momentum for regulation continues building. The 1,200+ families pursuing law-suits against TikTok for mental health harms could create liability pressure ([Multiple Plaintiffs, 2024](#)). Multiple state-level actions (device bans, attorney general investigations) may force federal response. EU’s DSA implementation could create global standards through Brussels Effect. Academic consensus on harms strengthens evidence base for regulation. Public opinion has shifted dramatically—Pew Research found 1 in 4 Twitter users unlikely to stay after Musk acquisition, suggesting user appetite for alternatives ([Pew Research Center, 2023](#)).

The path forward likely requires multiple approaches: algorithmic transparency mandates with independent auditing, age-appropriate design requirements, duty of care legal frameworks that don’t prescribe specific technical solutions, researcher data access with privacy protections, prohibition of certain high-risk AI systems, and executive accountability for knowing failures to address harms. The critical insight from regulatory efforts is that **self-regulation has failed**. Platforms had over a decade to address known harms and consistently prioritized growth and engagement over user safety. External oversight is necessary, and the technical community building these systems must engage with policy discussions to

ensure regulations are both effective and technically feasible.

## 8 The Path Forward Requires Objective Function Re-design

The evidence surveyed reveals a fundamental misalignment between social media platforms' optimization objectives and societal wellbeing. Engagement-based ranking creates predictable harms: mental health impacts, political polarization, misinformation amplification, radicalization pathways, and addiction patterns. These aren't implementation bugs but **inevitable consequences of optimizing exclusively for engagement, retention, and advertising revenue**.

The technical sophistication is remarkable—Meta's Two Towers neural networks processing billions of predictions daily, YouTube's multi-objective optimization balancing multiple signals, TikTok's real-time learning adapting within seconds, Twitter's 48-million-parameter ranking models. These systems represent world-class machine learning engineering. Yet they're aimed at the wrong target. As Stanford HAI research demonstrated, it's possible to rank content by democratic values like informative discourse, mutual respect, and shared understanding rather than engagement, with experiments showing **reduced partisan animosity without reduced engagement** ([Ovadya and Thorburn, 2023](#)). The technology can serve different masters; we've simply chosen the wrong ones.

The question for graduate data science students and future ML engineers is whether we'll continue building recommendation systems that optimize for metrics we can measure (clicks, watch time, shares) while ignoring outcomes we care about (wellbeing, information quality, democratic discourse). The recommendation systems powering modern social media are marvels of engineering applied to ignoble ends. **Recommendation algorithms are not neutral technical systems but tools that shape culture, politics, and individual psychology at scale**. Their design reflects choices about what matters, and current choices have produced catastrophic outcomes.

Technical solutions exist: multi-objective optimization including safety objectives, satisfaction metrics beyond engagement, circuit breakers preventing rabbit holes, friction for potentially harmful content, transparency into ranking factors, user control over recommendation parameters, diverse recommendation sets preventing filter bubbles, explore-exploit tradeoffs favoring information quality. But technical solutions require business model changes. **The advertising-based attention economy creates inexorable pressure toward engagement maximization**. As long as platforms profit from attention extraction,

they will build systems that extract attention, regardless of consequences.

The research synthesized here—from peer-reviewed papers, internal whistleblower documents, congressional investigations, and independent audits—provides overwhelming evidence that current recommendation systems harm individuals and society. Frances Haugen’s comparison to Big Tobacco is apt: companies knew their products caused harm through their own internal research, concealed evidence, and prioritized profit over safety. The question is whether the technical community will be complicit in the next decade of algorithmic harm or will use expertise to build systems aligned with human flourishing. Data scientists familiar with recommendation system architectures face a clear choice: optimize for engagement or optimize for wellbeing. The two objectives often conflict, and current systems have chosen engagement. The mounting evidence demands we choose differently.

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