

DS 574: Algorithmic Mechanism Design — Fall 2023

Instructor: Prof. Kira Goldner

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Office Hours: Tuesday 3:00-4:00PM and by appointment

Office Location: CCDS 1339, 665 Commonwealth Ave

Lectures: Tuesday and Thursday 1:30-3:15PM, CCDS 1424*

Teaching Fellow: Peiran Xiao

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Office Hours: Thursday 3:00-4:00PM

OH Location: CCDS 13th Floor

*This course will almost always take place 1:30-2:45PM. However, sometimes we may have longer classes and not have classes on other weeks. The total lecture time will amount to as if the class were always 1:30-2:45PM. See the lecture schedule on the course website for details. If we end at 3:15PM on some Tuesdays, then my office hours will be 3:30-4:30PM those days.

Course Description: This course is an introduction to the interdisciplinary area of Algorithmic Mechanism Design: where computational perspectives are applied to economic problems, and economic techniques are brought to problems from computer science. We will explore a broad range of topics at the frontier of new research, starting with some of the fundamentals, such as welfare-maximizing auctions and types of Nash Equilibria. Throughout the semester, the class will also learn about prevalent topics such as (1) Data Science & Incentives, (2) Mechanism Design for Social Good, and (3) optimization and robustness in mechanism design.

The course is aimed at graduate students but will be accessible to motivated advanced undergraduate or masters students with the appropriate background.

Prerequisites: DS 122, DS 320, and MA 581 or equivalent or instructor's consent. (Essentially, mathematical maturity, proof writing, knowing what a random variable is and how to compute its moments, linear programming may be helpful.)

Course website: <https://www.kiragoldner.com/teaching/DS574/>. There will also be a Piazza website for the course: <https://piazza.com/bu/fall12023/ds574> (access code "AMD"), and Gradescope: <https://www.gradescope.com/courses/532743> (entry code ZZV4DV).

BU CDS PhD Core: This course satisfies Mathematical Foundations or Optimization Algorithms in the Methodology Core, as well as Theoretical Foundations or DS for Social & Behavioral Sciences in the Subject Core.

BU CS PhD Algorithms & Theory Depth Requirement: This course not yet approved but slated to be approved for the Computer Science Algorithms & Theory Depth Requirement.

BU Hub: This course satisfies **Social Inquiry I**.

Social Inquiry I: This course uses tools and concepts from economics such as game theory, behavioral economics, welfare, equilibrium, and much more in order to reason about how to allocate resources to individuals and how they will behave in response, both in interacting with the algorithm and in interacting with each other. These models in economics and particularly behavioral economics are also built on top of foundations in psychology.

Feedback on Learning Outcomes: Students will complete problem sets that require them to solve mechanism design problems, reasoning about the designer, the individuals, and how they all interact. The problem sets will also incorporate different economic theories and the ethical implications behind them. Students must be creative about their solutions. They will be encouraged to work collaboratively in small teams to learn from one another. They will receive prompt grading with feedback on their solutions, and thus on their creativity, and how to iterate from there. During lectures, students will complete in-class exercises on mechanism design problems. In-class exercises will include opportunities to observe ideas from other students as well as to hear feedback from other students and from the instructor. The mechanism design for social good problem formulation and the final project allow opportunities for students to experiment with creativity and iterate on it, as well as to make ethical choices based on what they have learned in the course.

Books and Other Course Materials: There are no required books. There will be suggested readings from various textbooks and lecture notes suggested along with the course.

Assignments and Grading:

- Problem sets: 45% in total.
- Mechanism Design for Social Good problem formulation: 15%.
- Final project: 35%.
- Class participation—in class and via piazza: 5%.

Homework (45%):

- Expect to spend at least 10 hours per assignment on homework.
- **Late policy:** You may use up to 4 late days throughout the semester, but not more than 2 days on a given assignment. For each instance, you may only use an integer number of late days. Outside of this policy, no late submissions will be accepted.
- Your written assignments must be prepared with LaTeX, not handwritten.

- You must hand in your homework via Gradescope, which will be due at 11:59pm on the day assigned.
- **Regrade requests:** Regrade requests must be submitted within 7 days of receiving the graded assignment and only via Gradescope. You must also submit an explanation detailing which problems were graded incorrectly and an argument that the submitted solution is indeed correct. Regrades may only be requested if it is believed that a correct answer was marked as incorrect, not because insufficient partial credit was given to an incorrect or partially correct solution. If you request a regrade, you accept that the entire assignment/exam will be regraded, not just the problem(s) believed to be graded incorrectly.

Homework Collaboration Policy:

- For many people, algorithmic problem-solving is a collaborative endeavor. As such, you may work with up to two other classmates on the bi-monthly homeworks for the course. However, the assignments you hand in must be written up by yourself and represent your own thoughts and work. In particular, you may discuss ideas with your classmates in person, but as a rough rule, nobody should leave the room with anything written down. If you really understand the discussion, you should be able to reconstruct it on your own. As a hard rule, you must write up your arguments and problem sets individually. You may not use the internet or other references other than the course materials, unless told otherwise.
- You must write your collaborators' names on the top of your assignment. Crediting one's peers is an important habit. If you do not work with collaborators, list "Collaborators: None."
- Finally, make sure you adhere to BU's academic conduct policy, which I take very seriously: <https://www.bu.edu/academics/policies/academic-conduct-code/>.

Mechanism Design for Social Good Problem Formulation (15%): Students will choose a social good domain and will formulate a mechanism design question in this area. You must defend why this is an important problem within this domain using domain-related sources, and will defend why this is an important problem for mechanism design to solve using what we have learned in the course. You will also identify an ideal domain expert with whom you would hope to collaborate if you were to pursue this project.

Final Project (35%): You will choose a research question that we have not covered in class to investigate. You will either learn to what extent it has been solved (by reading a research paper or lecture notes) or will attempt to do original research on it. You will then present what you have learned to the class.

Reasonable Accommodations: If you are a student with a disability or believe you might have a disability that requires accommodation, please contact the Office for Disability Services (ODS) at (617) 353-3658 or access@bu.edu to coordinate any reasonable accommodation requests. ODS is located at 25 Buick Street on the 3rd floor.

Tentative List of Topics:

- Mechanism Design Basics:
 - Incentive Compatibility and the Payment Identity
 - Myerson's Lemma
 - Virtual Welfare
 - Maximizing Welfare via VCG
 - Ascending Auctions
 - Walrasian Equilibrium
- LP Duality:
 - Basics of formulating LPs
 - Duality theory
 - For WE tractability
 - To find approximate mechanisms
- Mechanism Design for Social Good
 - Health Insurance Markets
 - Kidney Exchange
 - The Research to Practice Pipeline
 - Carbon Auctions
- Robustness:
 - Prior-independent mechanisms and the single-sample mechanism
 - Prior-free mechanisms and benchmark design
 - Sample Complexity
 - Behavioral economics and mechanism design
 - Interdependent valuations
 - Prophet Inequalities
- New frontiers in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
 - Bilateral trade and gains from trade
 - Dynamic mechanism design
 - Menu complexity
- As time permits: Data Science & Mechanism Design:
 - Data markets
 - Privacy in games

- Admissions
- Crowdsourcing
- Stable matching and dating apps
- Recommendation and reputation systems
- Contracts