Policy or Partisanship: Replicating Results From An Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Brexit

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4/28/2021

Acknowledgements

I'd like to thank Professor Jeff Gill, Le Bao, and the course staff of Gov 52 for their unwavering support as I've pursued this project – my immense gratitude to all of you.

Question for Le: How do I include footnotes in R Markdown?

I. Introduction: Overview of Original Paper

This replication examines the paper "Policy or Partisanship: Replicating Results From An Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Brexit." In the paper, the authors aim to explore one key question: "are voters motivated by policy preferences, or partisan identities?" The authors answer the question in the context of the UK's political system, exploiting the UK's Brexit referendum – which caused an abrupt change in the British Conservative Party's stance on leaving the European Union, and via a vote "so narrow that it was more or less a coin flip." The authors' methodology is relatively simple: they employ an uninterrupted time-series design, examining panel survey data from the British Election Study to compare referendum attitudes and party affiliation in the data immediately before and after the referendum ("Wave 8" and "Wave 9" data, respectively). Given the brief gap between the 2 waves, and their ability to identify/eliminate potential confounders (e.g. a change in the Labour Party's stance on Brexit), they assume their identification strategy is sound. They ultimately fit and run several linear regression models that find that voters are most motivated by policy: following Brexit, "Europhilic" (citizens that supported remaining in the EU) Conservatives disaffiliated from the Conservative party; indeed, the less Euroskeptic a Conservative was pre-referendum, the more likely they were to disaffiliate. The "policy story" holds when examining prereferendum non-Conservatives; here, the authors determine that the more Euroskeptic pre-referendum non-Conservatives were, the more likely they were to switch to the Conservative Party.

The authors also explore various related questions, such as whether the intensity of pre-referendum Conservatives' partisanship influenced to what degree they followed their party as it adopted a new position; they ultimately find that the positive relationship between Conservatives' perception of their party's position on Brexit and their position on Brexit is strongest for the most partisan Conservatives. The authors also look at whether newly minted Conservative voters also updated their stances on other policy issues to further align themselves with the Conservative party; looking specifically at the issue of redistribution, they find that this is indeed the case. The authors' other results/conclusions are discussed in detail in the next section.

In the next section, I replicate the authors' main results (6 tables and 2 figures), providing my analyses/interpretation. Then, in the third section, I consider ways to extend the authors' work, in this case, by employing another regression method particularly suited to analyses with binary outcomes (such as switching parties) – logistic regression.

II. Replicated Results and Discussion

Table 1: Euroskepticism and Defection from the Conservatives

		$Dependent\ variable:$	
	Defect from Conservatives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pre-Referendum Euroskepticism	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism	, ,	0.011* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)
Age			-0.001*** (0.0002)
Female			-0.007 (0.007)
White			-0.058** (0.019)
Scotland			0.002 (0.012)
Wales		*	0.021 (0.014)
Pre-Referendum Euroskepticism:Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism		-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001^* (0.001) 0.181^{***}
Constant	0.101*** (0.011)	0.084*** (0.011)	0.181*** (0.023)
Observations	7,330	6,476	6,216
\mathbb{R}^2	0.001	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.005
Residual Std. Error F Statistic	0.272 (df = 7328) $3.912^* \text{ (df} = 1; 7328)$	0.261 (df = 6472) $2.709^* \text{ (df} = 3; 6472)$	0.258 (df = 6207) $4.554^{***} \text{ (df} = 8; 6207)$
Note:		*p<0.	05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2: Euroskepticism and Joining the Conservatives

		$Dependent\ variable:$	
	Joined Conservatives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pre-Referendum Euroskepticism	0.007*** (0.0005)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism	(* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Age		(* * * *)	0.0004*** (0.0001)
Female			-0.002 (0.003)
White			-0.008 (0.007)
Scotland			-0.017*** (0.005)
Wales			$-0.01\dot{2}$ (0.006)
${\bf Pre-Referendum~Euroskepticism:} {\bf Perceived~Change~in~Conservative~Euroskepticism}$		0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001**** (0.0002)
Constant	-0.001 (0.003)	0.00004 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.009)
Observations	18,517	15,139	14,554
\mathbb{R}^2	0.012	0.015	0.017
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.015	0.017
Residual Std. Error F Statistic	0.198 (df = 18515) $216.857^{***} \text{ (df} = 1; 18515)$	0.204 (df = 15135) $78.431^{***} \text{ (df} = 3; 15135)$	0.202 (df = 14545) $31.854^{***} \text{ (df} = 8; 14545)$

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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Warning: Removed 6083 rows containing missing values (geom_point).

Table 3: Individual Shifts in Euroskepticism

	Dependent variable:			
	Change in Personal Euroskepticism:			
	Moderate Conservatives	Very Strong Conservatives		
Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism	0.139***	0.220***		
	(0.011)	(0.020)		
Female	-0.055	-0.109		
	(0.054)	(0.113)		
Age	0.006***	0.004		
	(0.002)	(0.004)		
White	0.094	-0.186		
	(0.154)	(0.300)		
Scotland	0.131	0.099		
	(0.096)	(0.192)		
Wales	0.017	-0.324		
	(0.111)	(0.245)		
Constant	-1.161^{***}	-0.573		
	(0.178)	(0.340)		
Observations	5,000	1,180		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.038	0.101		
Adjusted R ²	0.036	0.097		
Residual Std. Error	1.882 (df = 4993)	1.883 (df = 1173)		
F Statistic	32.559***(df = 6; 4993)	22.025^{***} (df = 6; 1173)		

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001





Table 4: Joining the Conservatives and Opposition to Redistribution

	Dependent variable:			
	Change in Opposition to Redistribution			
	Overall	Non-UKIP	UKIP	
Joined Conservatives	0.542***	0.605***	0.042	
	(0.133)	(0.158)	(0.285)	
White	0.179	0.155	0.360	
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.528)	
Age	-0.001	-0.003	0.008	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	
Female	-0.009	0.0001	0.003	
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.191)	
Scotland	-0.162^*	-0.109	-0.472	
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.468)	
Wales	-0.051	-0.112	0.536	
	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.312)	
Constant	-0.161	-0.094	-0.518	
	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.631)	
Observations	9,065	8,086	979	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.003	0.003	0.007	
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.002	0.001	
Residual Std. Error	2.477 (df = 9058)	2.415 (df = 8079)	2.906 (df = 972)	
F Statistic	$4.155^{***} (df = 6; 9058)$	$3.804^{***} (df = 6; 8079)$	$1.090 \ (df = 6; 972)$	

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001






Table 5: Euroskepticism and Defecting from Conservatives

(1) -0.029*** (0.003)	Defected from Conservatives (2) -0.031*** (0.003)	(3) -0.026***
-0.029***	-0.031***	
		-0.026***
(0.003)	(0.003)	
, ,		(0.003)
	0.009	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)
		-0.004***
		(0.001)
		0.023
		(0.015)
		-0.020
		(0.041)
		-0.053*
		(0.026)
		0.024
	0.004	(0.027)
		-0.001
0.950***	(0.001)	(0.001) 0.608***
		(0.053)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,	` '
*	*	1,902
	0.059	0.096
0.047	0.058	0.092
0.332 (df = 2140)	0.321 (df = 1898)	0.315 (df = 1893)
105.620*** (df = 1; 2140)	39.927^{***} (df = 3; 1898)	25.150**** (df = 8; 1893)
		$\begin{array}{cccc} & & -0.001 \\ 0.358^{***} & & (0.001) \\ 0.362^{***} & 0.362^{***} \\ (0.023) & & (0.028) \\ 2.142 & 1.902 \\ 0.047 & 0.059 \\ 0.047 & 0.058 \\ 0.332 & (df = 2140) & 0.321 & (df = 1898) \\ \end{array}$

III. Proposed Extension

Note that our dependent variable is binary (switching -- Yes or No).

What if we re-created Table 1 using logistic regression?

Table 6: Euroskepticism and Switching Vote to Conservatives

		Dependent variable:	
	Switched to Conservatives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2015 Euroskepticism	0.047*** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.002)	0.047*** (0.002)
Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism	(* * * *)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
m Age		,	0.002*** (0.0004)
Female			-0.015 (0.012)
White			0.061* (0.028)
Scotland			0.010 (0.015)
Wales			-0.034 (0.020)
Interaction		0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Constant	-0.068*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.012)	-0.228*** (0.035)
Observations	4,388	3,758	3,758
\mathbb{R}^2	0.164	0.203	0.210
Adjusted R ²	0.164	0.202	0.208
Residual Std. Error F Statistic	0.367 (df = 4386) $861.685^{***} (df = 1; 4386)$	0.364 (df = 3754) $318.651^{***} \text{ (df} = 3; 3754)$	0.363 (df = 3749) $124.664^{****} \text{ (df} = 8; 3749)$

```
# Let's look at the null and residual deviance for our last model:
pchisq(3209.2 - 3176.4, 6215 - 6207, lower = FALSE)
```

[1] 6.691329e-05

Table 7: Euroskepticism and Defection from the Conservatives (Logistic)

		Dependent variable	:
	Defect from Conservatives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pre-Referendum Euroskepticism	-0.033* (0.017)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.005 (0.021)
Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism	(0.011)	0.140* (0.058)	0.129* (0.062)
Age		(0.000)	-0.013*** [*]
Female			-0.109 (0.101)
Vhite			-0.619** (0.214)
cotland			0.036 (0.178)
Vales			0.292 (0.192)
re-Referendum Euroskepticism:Perceived Change in Conservative Euroskepticism		-0.017^* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)
Constant	-2.170*** (0.139)	-2.415*** (0.165)	-1.260*** (0.293)
Observations	7,330	6,476	6,216
og Likelihood Akaike Inf. Crit.	-2,052.692 $4,109.383$	-1,699.461 $3,406.922$	-1,588.20 $3,194.406$

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

```
# We're definitely in the tail, which suggests that our model is statistically
# different from the mean model. That's good!

# Let's look at the odds ratios:
exp(table1reg_logistic$coefficients[])
```

```
(Intercept) EUIntegrationSelf8
0.1142154 0.9672463
```

```
# Question for Le: How should I interpret/consider the logistic regression
# approach -- in particular, how should I compare it to the "regular" lm
# approach utilized in the paper?
# Initial attempt at interpretation of Table 1 logistic regressions:
# Here, for each model, we calculate the odds ratio of the various coefficients; the odds
# ratio represents: P/1-P (or the probability of leaving the Conservatives/the
# probability of not leaving the Conservatives). With that said, if the value of
# an odds ratio is > 1, then the ratio suggests the predictor is associated with
# an increase in the probability of leaving the Conservatives. The magnitude of
# that effect can be directly compared via the numbers, with adjustment for
\# variation via multiplication by the standard deviation.
# Let's consider the most simple regression/model:
# The odds ratio for EUIntegrationSelf8 is 0.9672463; this suggests that a one-unit increase
# in pre-referendum Euroskepticism is associated with a decrease in the
# probability of defection from the Conservatives (as we would predict, given
# that the Conservatives adopt an anti-integration view post-referendum).
```

IV. Bibliography