

EXPLORING PASSWORD-AUTHENTICATED KEY-EXCHANGE ALGORITHMS

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ABSTRACT

Exploring Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Algorithms

Sam Leonard, Supervisor: Professor Bernardo Magri

Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange (PAKE) algorithms are a niche kind of cryptography where parties seek to establish a strong shared key, from a low entropy secret such as a password. This makes it particularly attractive to some domains, such as Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT). However many PAKE algorithms are unsuitable for Internet of Things (IOT) applications, due to their heavy computational requirements. Augmented Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (AuCPace) is a new PAKE protocol which aims to make PAKEs accessible to IIOT by utilising Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Verifier based PAKEs (V-PAKEs) and a novel augmented approach. This project aims to provide an approachable and developer-focused implementation of AuCPace in Rust and to contribute this implementation back to RustCrypto to promote wider adoption of PAKE algorithms.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank everyone at absolutely wonderful supervisor, RustCrypto, Crypto Hack and my CTF Team (0rganizers). Without your help none of this would have been possible.

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CONTEXT

1.1 Background on PAKEs

1.1.1 What problem do PAKEs solve?

In the modern day when you login to a website a [Transport Layer Security \(TLS\)](#) encrypted channel is established, over which your password is sent in plaintext. The server then computes some hash of your password, sometimes with a salt or some other additional data. This hash is then compared with whatever is stored in the server's database for your account, and access is granted based on whether the hash matched. This approach is fundamentally flawed, allowing the plaintext password to leave your device gives attackers many more opportunities at which they can steal your password. Be that from compromising the [TLS](#) channel via a downgrade attack or by malware on the server intercepting your password as the server processes it.

[PAKEs](#) solve this problem in a fundamentally different way, and they have many benefits because of this. Namely with [PAKEs](#) your password never leaves your device, it is used to calculate a secret key which is shared with the server. Another property of how [PAKEs](#) are constructed is that you and the server are both "authenticated" with each other once you acquire the shared key. This is in contrast with the approach of [TLS](#) + certificates, where only the server is authenticated.




Figure 1.1: An illustration of the difference traditional password based authentication and [PAKEs](#)

1.1.2 What is a PAKE?

PAKEs are interactive, two party cryptographic protocols where each party shares knowledge of a password (a low entropy secret) and seeks to obtain a strong shared key e.g. for use later with a symmetric cipher. Critically an eavesdropper who can listen in to all messages of the key negotiation cannot learn enough information to bruteforce the password. Another way of phrasing this is that brute force attacks on the key must be "online".

There are two main types of **PAKE** algorithm - **Augmented PAKEs** and **Balanced PAKEs**.

- **Balanced PAKEs** are **PAKEs** where both parties share knowledge of the same secret password.
- **Augmented PAKEs** are **PAKEs** where one party has the password and the other has a "verifier" which is computed via a one-way function from the secret password.




Figure 1.2: An illustration of the difference between **PAKEs** and traditional password-based authentication

1.1.3 A brief history of PAKE algorithms

The first **PAKE** algorithm was Bellovin and Merritt's **Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE)** scheme [BM92]. It works using a mix of **Symmetric Cryptography** and **Asymmetric Cryptography** to perform a key exchange. This comes with many challenges and subtle mistakes that are easy to make; primarily for the security of the system whatever is encrypted by the shared secret key(P) must be indistinguishable from random data. Otherwise an attacker can determine whether their guess at a trial decryption is valid. The **Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)** variant of **EKE** has this issue - the **RSA** parameter e is what is encrypted and sent in the first message. For **RSA** all valid values of e are odd, so this would prevent it being used. This is solved by adding 1 to e with a 50% chance. Figure 1.3 shows this protocol in full. While many of the initial variants on **EKE** have been shown to flawed/vulnerable, later variants have made it into real world use, such as in **Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)** [Vol+04] where it is available as **EAP-EKE** [She+11]. In appendix A you can find a Python implementation of this scheme.

An Aside on Notation

- \leftarrow : Assignment - $x \leftarrow 5$ means x is assigned a value of 5.
- $\leftarrow \$$: Sampling from a given set - $x \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{R}$ means to choose x at random from the set of real numbers.

Table 1.1: **EKE** shared parameters

Shared Parameter	Secret	Explanation
P	yes	the shared password

EKE-RSA

Alice		Bob
$Ea \leftarrow (e, n)$		
$b \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}$	$\xrightarrow{A, P(e + b), n}$	$Ea \leftarrow (e, n)$
$challenge_A \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n$	$\xleftarrow{P(Ea(R))}$	$R \leftarrow \$ \text{Keyspace}$
	$\xrightarrow{R(challenge_A)}$	$challenge_B \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n$
verify $challenge_A$	$\xleftarrow{R(challenge_A, challenge_B)}$	
	$\xrightarrow{R(challenge_B)}$	verify $challenge_B$

Figure 1.3: Implementing **EKE** using **RSA**

SPAKE

SPAKE1 and SPAKE2 are [Balanced PAKEs](#)’ which were introduced slightly later on by Michel Abdalla and David Pointcheval [AP05] as variations on [EKE](#). They are very similar so we will just explore SPAKE2 as we are more interested in [online](#) algorithms. [Simple PAKE \(SPAKE\)](#) differs from EKE in the following ways:

1. The encryption function is replaced by a simple one-time pad.
2. The [Asymmetric Cryptography](#) is provided by [Diffie-Hellman \(DH\)](#)
3. There is no explicit mutual authentication phase where challenges are exchanged. This has the advantage of reducing the number of messages that need to be sent.

Table 1.2: SPAKE shared parameters

Shared Parameter	Secret	Explanation
pw	yes	the shared password encoded as an element of \mathbb{Z}_p
\mathbb{G}	no	the mathematical group in which we will perform all operations
g	no	the generator of \mathbb{G}
p	no	the safe prime which defines the finite field for all operations in \mathbb{G}
M	no	an element in \mathbb{G} associated with user A
N	no	an element in \mathbb{G} associated with user B
H	no	a secure hash function

SPAKE2




Figure 1.4: SPAKE2 Protocol

SRP

Finally we will look at [Secure Remote Password \(SRP\)](#) an [Augmented PAKE](#) first published in 1998, unlike [SPAKE2](#) it is not a modification of [EKE](#). [SRP](#) has gone through many revisions, at time of writing [SRP6a](#) is the latest version. [SRP](#) is likely the most used [PAKE](#) protocol in the world due to it's use in Apple's iCloud Keychain [[Sec21](#)] and it's availability as a [TLS](#) ciphersuite [[Wu+07](#)]. However it is quite weird for what it does and there is no security proof for it [[Gre18](#)]. An implementation of the protocol in Python can be found in [appendix B](#).

Table 1.3: [SRP](#) parameters

Parameter	Secret	Explanation
v	yes	the verifier stored by the server: $v = g^{H(s,I,P)}$
P	yes	the user's password
I	no	the user's name
g	no	the generator of \mathbb{G}
p	no	the safe prime which defines the finite field for all operations in \mathbb{G}
H	no	a secure hash function

SRP

Alice		Bob
$a \leftarrow \$ \{1 \dots n - 1\}$	\xrightarrow{I}	$s, v \leftarrow \text{lookup}(I)$
$x \leftarrow H(s, I, P)$	\xleftarrow{s}	$b \leftarrow \$ \{1 \dots n - 1\}$
$A \leftarrow g^a$	\xrightarrow{A}	$B \leftarrow 3v + g^b$
$u \leftarrow H(A, B)$	\xleftarrow{B}	$u \leftarrow H(A, B)$
$S \leftarrow (B - 3g^x)^{a+ux}$		$S \leftarrow (Av^u)^b$
$M_1 \leftarrow H(A, B, S)$	$\xrightarrow{M_1}$	verify M_1
verify M_2	$\xleftarrow{M_2}$	$M_2 \leftarrow H(A, M_1, S)$
$K \leftarrow H(s)$		$K \leftarrow H(S)$

Figure 1.5: SRP-6 Protocol

1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Many modern Cryptographic protocols make use of a mathematical object known as an elliptic curve. First proposed in 1985 independently by Neal Koblitz [Kob87] and Victor S. Miller [Mil86]. Elliptic curves are attractive to cryptographers as they maintain a very high level of strength at smaller key sizes, this allows for protocols to consume less bandwidth, less memory and execute faster [KMV00]. To illustrate just how great the size savings are - [National Institute of Standards and Technology \(NIST\)](#) suggests that an elliptic curve key of just 256 bits provides the same level of security as an [RSA](#) key of 3072 bits [ST20a].

1.2.1 But what actually is an elliptic curve?

With regards to Cryptography elliptic curves tend to come in one of two forms:

- Short Weierstraß Form: $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
- Montgomery Form: $by^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + x$




Figure 1.6: Elliptic curves over \mathbb{R} , Adapted from TikZ for Cryptographers [Jea16]

Weierstraß form is special as it is the general case for all elliptic curves, meaning all elliptic curves can be expressed as a Weierstraß curve. This property means that it is commonly used for expressing various curves. Montgomery form isn't quite as flexible, however it is favourable because it leads to significantly faster multiplication and addition operations via Montgomery's ladder [BL17].

1.2.2 How do we do Cryptography with curves?

To perform Cryptography with elliptic curves we need to define an "Abelian Group" to work in. An [Abelian Group](#) is a group whose group operation is also commutative, for

example the addition operator over the integers: $(+, \mathbb{Z})$ is an [Abelian Group](#). [Abelian Groups](#) form the basis of many modern Cryptographic algorithms, a [DH](#) key exchange can be performed in any [Abelian Group](#) for instance.

Our [Abelian Group](#) is built on the idea of "adding" points on the curve. To add two points, we find the line which passes through our two points and we continue along that line until we hit our curve again. We then reflect this point in the x -axis to get our result. What if we want to add our point to itself? Now there isn't a unique line through one point, however we are making the rules so in this case we will take the tangent to the curve at that point and then we can treat it the same as before. What if our line doesn't intersect with the curve? In this case we define a new point called the "neutral element" - \mathcal{O} . It is also called the point at infinity as it can be considered to be the single point at the end of every vertical line at infinity. Figure 1.7 illustrates all of these rules and edge cases.




Figure 1.7: Elliptic Curve Group Operations, reproduced from TikZ for Cryptographers [Jea16]

However it's not quite that simple for us. We cannot use \mathbb{R} as computers only have finite resources we need a finite set to work in. Instead we define our operations over a [Finite Field](#), we will use the [Finite Field](#) of the integers mod a prime, denoted \mathbb{Z}_p for some prime p . Lets take a look at what our finite fields look like in a small finite field - \mathbb{Z}_{89} .




Figure 1.8: Elliptic curves over \mathbb{Z}_{89} , Adapted from TikZ for Cryptographers [Jea16]

This now looks very different to when we were looking at them in \mathbb{R} , however it shows very clearly what the elements of our set look like. They are points in the 2d coordinate plane with a symmetry around $p/2$. This might not feel intuitive but it is actually exactly what we should expect to happen, in our finite field when we negate our point's y coordinate, instead of flipping it around the y-axis, our points get wrapped around $y = p$. Hence our new point is the same distance from $y = p$ as our first point was with $y = 0$, this is where our symmetry arises.

1.2.3 Where can Elliptic Curve Cryptography go wrong?

There are many attacks against various aspects of Elliptic Curves, in general they fall into the following categories:

- Attacks against the [Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem \(ECDLP\)](#) security of the curve:
 - The rho method [\[Pol78\]](#)
 - Transfer Security [\[MVO91; Sem98\]](#)
 - CM Field Discriminants [\[BL\]](#)
 - Curve Rigidity [\[BL13\]](#)
- Attacks against the concrete implementation of [ECC](#):
 - Ladders required for safe and fast point-scalar multiplication [\[BL\]](#)
 - Twist Security [\[LL97; BMM00\]](#)
 - Completeness [\[IT02\]](#)
 - Indistinguishability [\[Ber+13\]](#)

All of these attacks individually can weaken or even break the security of a given cryptosystem if not accounted for. However choosing the right curve is a good step in the right direction and can mitigate many of the attacks listed above.

1.3 Modern PAKEs

Recently many novel [PAKEs](#) algorithms have been published, this is partly due to a request from the [Internet Engineering Task Force \(IETF\)](#) for the [Internet Research Task Force \(IRTF\)](#) [Crypto Forum Research Group \(CFRG\)](#) to carry out a selection process to choose a [PAKE](#) for usage in [IETF](#) protocols. That process concluded in 2020 with [Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment \(CPace\)](#) and [OPAQUE](#) being chosen as the recommended [Balanced PAKE](#) and [Augmented PAKE](#) respectively [\[Cha20\]](#).

Some time has passed since this process and we now have some new [PAKEs](#) with various interesting properties that are worth taking a look at.

1.3.1 CHIP+CRISP

Introduced in 2020 by Cremers et al., CHIP and CRISP are two protocol compilers which instantiate what the authors call an [identity-binding PAKE \(iPAKE\)](#) [Cre+20]. [iPAKEs](#) are designed to mitigate the threat of compromising the local storage of a device. While in the case of [Augmented PAKEs](#) this is considered for the server side, [Balanced PAKEs](#) often require both parties to have knowledge of the plaintext password. Examples of this include SPAKE-2 [AP05] and WPA3's DragonFly/SAE [Har08], both of which require the server and client to have knowledge of the plaintext password. CHIP+CRISP solves this problem by binding the password to an arbitrary bit-string called the identity, this can be anything, e.g. "server", "router", "jonathandata0". CHIP and CRISP are both protocol compilers, this means that they aren't themselves protocols but they sit on top of another protocol in order to give that sub-protocol the aforementioned properties, by protecting the underlying data they exchange.

1.3.2 KHAPE

[Key-Hiding Asymmetric PAKE \(KHAPE\)](#) [GJK21] is an [Augmented PAKE](#) from the designers of [OPAQUE](#), introduced in 2021 it is a variant of [OPAQUE](#) which doesn't rely on the use of an [Oblivious Pseudo Random Function \(OPRF\)](#) to get [Augmented PAKE](#) security. Instead the [OPRF](#) is used to add precomputation resistance, this is also known as a "strong" [PAKE](#). The advantage of this is that should the [OPRF](#) be compromised the protocol remains secure, and only loses the "strong" part of it's security. Similarly to CHIP+CRISP, [KHAPE](#) is not itself a protocol but a compiler from any [Authenticated Key-Exchange \(AKE\)](#) to an [Augmented PAKE](#). In the paper they detail the concrete implementation [KHAPE-HMQV](#), which extends the HMQV Authenticated [DH Protocol](#) from an [AKE](#) to a [Augmented PAKE](#).

1.3.3 AuCPace

Although [AuCPace](#) [HL18] didn't quite make the cut for [IETF](#) standardisation it is still a very interesting [PAKE](#) and well worth a look. Designed specifically for use in [IIOT](#) applications, [AuCPace](#) is an [Augmented PAKE](#) protocol intended for use in situations where traditional [Public-Key-Infrastructure \(PKI\)](#) simply isn't available. The protocol is modelled around a powerful [human machine interface \(HMI\)](#) client device and a weak server device, as this setup is common in [IIOT](#) applications, e.g. one PC being used to configure many sensors/actuators. Efficiency is at the core of this protocol, it is taken into consideration at every level, from the high-level protocol design to the low-level arithmetic. A unique bonus of this protocol as well is it takes into account the real-world issue of patents and aims to provide a practical protocol which is free from patents so as to promote the widest possible adoption of the protocol.

1.4 Choosing a PAKE to implement

There were a number of factors to consider when choosing which [PAKE](#) to implement:

- How widely applicable is the protocol?
- Are there patents covering the protocol?
- How many existing implementations are there?
- How good are existing solutions (solutions that aren't the given protocol)?
- Is there potential to contribute an implementation back to an open source project?

After a conversation with the RustCrypto core team on Zulip, it was agreed that an implementation of any of these protocols would be readily accepted into their collection of [PAKEs](#) – <https://github.com/RustCrypto/PAKEs>. I will talk more about RustCrypto and who they are in section 1.6. For now I will omit considerations about open source contribution.

Table 1.4: Modern [PAKE](#) Protocol Comparison

Protocol	Applicability	Implementations	Existing Solutions	Patented
CHIP+CRISP	WiFi	C++ reference impl	Pre-Shared Key (PSK)	Yes (IB-KA)
KHAPE	Replacing PKI	Educational Rust impl	OPAQUE	Yes (HMQV)
AuCPace	IIOT	C reference impl + Go impl	hard coding the key	No

[AuCPace](#) is the only [PAKE](#) in the list where there is a completely inadequate current solution. [AuCPace](#) also targets a rapidly growing area, the combined risk of these factors means that [AuCPace](#) is uniquely positioned to make a large difference to the security of the [IIOT](#) landscape. Additionally it is the only one which is not under patent of any kind. It is for these reasons that I have chosen to create an implementation of [AuCPace](#) and to contribute it back to the open source community via RustCrypto.

1.5 AuCPace in detail

Now that we have chosen to implement [AuCPace](#) it is worth going over the protocol itself to understand better what implementing it will entail. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 contain protocol diagrams reproduced from [HL18]. There are four phases to the protocol some of which can be made optional or can be adjusted based on the sub-variant of the protocol in use.

1. Sub-Session ID (SSID) Agreement

- server and client each generate a [nonce](#) and send it to the other party
- each receives the other's [nonce](#) and calculates the [SSID](#)

2. [AuCPace](#) Augmentation Layer

- the server generates a new ephemeral [DH](#) key
- the server receives the client's username, looks up the verifier and salt.
- the server then sends across the group \mathcal{J} , the public key X , the salt and the parameters for the PBKDF - σ
- both then compute the [Password Related String \(PRS\)](#), the client aborts here if the server's public key X is invalid

3. [CPace](#) substep

- both compute g' and G from the hash of $ssid||PRS||CI$
- both generate an ephemeral private key y and then compute the public key $Y = G^{y \cdot c_{\mathcal{J}}}$
- public keys are then exchanged
- the shared point K is then computed
- if either public key is invalid both parties abort here
- $sk1$ is then computed as the hash of the [SSID](#) and K

4. Explicit mutual authentication

- both compute authenticators T_a, T_b
- each party sends a different
- if either authenticator is invalid the protocol is aborted
- finally the shared key sk is computed

There are three different configurations which can be adjusted to make tradeoffs between security, speed and storage:

- full vs partial augmentation
- implicit authentication vs explicit mutual authentication
- with pre-computation attack resistance ("strong [AuCPace](#)") vs without ([AuCPace](#))

Store password operation for [AuCPace](#)




Figure 1.9: [AuCPace](#) protocol for password configuration.





Figure 1.10: AuCPace Protocol

All of these options lead to 8 different sub-protocols. What's special about these sub-protocols is how little they change the overall protocol. Below are protocol diagrams illustrating what changes with each configuration change, and a table showing the high level tradeoffs that are made by picking each protocol variant.

Store password operation for AuCPace



AuCPace Augmentation Layer





Figure 1.11: Differences in Partial Augmentation

Store password operation for strong AuCPace



strong AuCPace Augmentation Layer




Figure 1.12: Differences in Strong AuCPace

implicit auth CPace substep




Figure 1.13: Differences in Implicit Authentication

Table 1.5: Configuration tradeoffs

Configuration	Advantage	Disadvantage
partial augmentation	removes an expensive exponentiation operation for the server, halving the computational complexity for the server	an attacker can impersonate the client by compromising a server
strong AuCPace	pre-computation attack resistance	increases the computational requirements for both the client and server
implicit authentication	saves a round of messages and 2 hash computations.	the protocol downgrades to weak perfect forward secrecy [Kra05]

1.6 Who are RustCrypto?

RustCrypto is a GitHub Organisation / online community who are dedicated to implementing fast and secure Cryptography in pure rust. Pure rust in this context means that all of the code is in rust and there are no [Foreign Function Interface \(FFI\)](#) bindings to other (normally C) libraries which implement the functionality (see [fig. 1.15](#)). RustCrypto have implemented many Cryptographic primitives and also have an existing repository for [PAKE](#) algorithms. Using RustCrypto's libraries provides a good foundation for building any protocol as well as opening up opportunities to open source the implementation back to them. A number of major companies also use RustCrypto's code to secure their applications, e.g. 1Password who use RustCrypto for their Password Manager. The decision to use Rust will be discussed further in [section 2.1](#).




Figure 1.14: RustCrypto's Github Organisation page




Figure 1.15: Pure Rust library (`num+astro-float`) vs Rust wrapper library (`rug`)

DESIGN

2.1 Why Rust?

[AuCPace](#) explicitly targets [IIOT](#) in it's design. Rust is rapidly becoming a popular choice for [IOT](#) and embedded software applications. This is due to it's focus on memory safety, developer experience and it's strong embedded ecosystem. Libraries like Embassy and RTIC allow the user to program high level logic and use powerful abstractions to interact with the hardware through Rust objects, while still compiling down to small efficient binaries. Embassy is especially impressive as they have implemented a async executor so that multitasking in embedded applications can be performed with the same async/await framework that programmers are familiar with. A short Embassy examples is shown in listing 1. Tools such as `probe-rs` allow developers to maintain the same workflow they would when working on a normal rust binary, by implementing a `cargo` runner which flashes the binary to the embedded device then using [Real-Time-Transfer \(RTT\)](#) to receive debug messages from the device. Those debug messages can be setup automatically using libraries such as `defmt_rtt` which use [RTT](#) to send a compressed representation of the debug message to be formatted later on using a technique called deferred formatting, allowing for debug messages to take up a fraction of the size of the original message. Together this makes rust a compelling choice for writing embedded code.

Listing 1: Embassy async/await example

```
use defmt::info;
use embassy::executor::Spawner;
use embassy::time::{Duration, Timer};
use embassy_nrf::gpio::{AnyPin, Input, Level, Output, OutputDrive, Pin,
    ↪ Pull};
use embassy_nrf::Peripherals;

// Declare async tasks
#[embassy::task]
async fn blink(pin: AnyPin) {
    let mut led = Output::new(pin, Level::Low, OutputDrive::Standard);

    loop {
```

```

        // Timekeeping is globally available, no need to mess with hardware
        ↪ timers.
        led.set_high();
        Timer::after(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
        led.set_low();
        Timer::after(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
    }
}

// Main is itself an async task as well.
#[embassy::main]
async fn main(spawner: Spawner, p: Peripherals) {
    // Spawned tasks run in the background, concurrently.
    spawner.spawn(blink(p.P0_13.degrade())).unwrap();

    let mut button = Input::new(p.P0_11, Pull::Up);
    loop {
        // Asynchronously wait for GPIO events, allowing other tasks
        // to run, or the core to sleep.
        button.wait_for_low().await;
        info!("Button pressed!");
        button.wait_for_high().await;
        info!("Button released!");
    }
}

```

Rust is also very well suited for implementing cryptographic software. It's lifetimes system and compile time safety guarantees make it ideal for building security focused software. Rust was recently added to NIST's list of "Safer Languages" which it recommends for writing safety focussed programs in [ST23].

As well as this many algorithms, formats and primitives are implemented, and freely available as crates for anyone to use. Rust's trait system also lends itself well to this, it is possible to use implement a trait representing an elliptic curve and then an algorithm can be written to be agnostic about the curve that it is using for instance. This allows library writers to easily write generic code to give user's of the libraries as much flexibility and choice around how they implement their program. This is especially important for systems which might need to interact with legacy systems or that need to provide a certain level of security for Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) standards like FIPS-140-2 [ST20b].

2.2 Planning the library

Before implementing AuCPace it was necessary to plan ahead what libraries to use. Without planning it would be easy to end up in a situation where different libraries aren't compatible with each other, or have become superseded by another library as this information is not readily available on crates.io (crates.io is the package repository for all public rust packages).

2.2.1 What primitives do we need to implement AuCPace?

AuCPace has many parameters which can be changed to drastically change how the protocol works, this is by design to allow customisability for each user's needs, however it can be quite confusing to navigate. As such it is worthwhile to look at the parameters are and thus what primitives we will need. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are partially reproduced from [HL18] just in significantly fewer words.

Table 2.1: AuCPace Parameters

parameter	explanation
PBKDF_σ	A Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) parameterised by σ . The parameters of the PBKDF are algorithm specific, but usually would include settings such as the memory consumption of the algorithm, the hash used or the iteration count (number of times to perform the hash).
$\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{J}, c_{\mathcal{J}}, B$	A (hyper-)elliptic curve \mathcal{C} with a group \mathcal{J} with co-factor $c_{\mathcal{J}}$ and a DH protocol operating on both, \mathcal{C} and it's quadratic twist \mathcal{C}' . B denotes the DH base point in \mathcal{J} .
Map2Point	A function mapping a string s to a point from a cryptographically large subgroup \mathcal{J}_m of \mathcal{C} . The inverse map Map2Point^{-1} is also required.
$H_0 \dots H_5$	A set of 6 distinct hash functions.

Table 2.2: Selected parameters of the reference implementation – AuCPace25519

parameter	explanation
PBKDF_σ	Script [Per16] an optimally memory-hard [Alw+17] PBKDF, parameterised with a memory usage of 32Mb.
$\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{J}, c_{\mathcal{J}}, B$	Curve25519 [Ber06] a Montgomery form elliptic curve, with excellent speed properties. X25519 an x-coordinate-only DH protocol.
Map2Point	The Elligator2 map introduced by Bernstein et al. in [Ber+13].
$H_0 \dots H_5$	The SHA512 hash function where the index is prepended as a little-endian four-byte word.

So in summary we need the following primitives:

- a PBKDF
- an elliptic curve, a group on the curve, a DH protocol operating on the group
- a mapping from strings to curve points
- a hash function

2.2.2 What rust libraries actually exist for cryptography?

There are many sites online which act as collections of rust packages that you can search by topic to find similar or related packages. The Rust Cryptography Interest Group (RCIG) maintain a list of Rust's Cryptographic libraries at <https://cryptography.rs/>, this proved to be a great help while researching libraries.

For the required primitives the following Rust crates were identified as potential candidates:

- The PBKDF:
 - `argon2` - RustCrypto's Argon2 implementation
 - `pbkdf2` - RustCrypto's PBKDF2 implementation
 - `scrypt` - RustCrypto's Scrypt implementation
 - `rust-bcrypt` - a pure Rust Bcrypt implementation
 - `rust-argon2` - a pure Rust Argon2 implementation
 - `password-hash` - trait to allow implementations to be generic over the password hashing algorithm used
- The elliptic curve:
 - `curve25519-dalek` - Dalek Cryptography's implementation of Curve25519 and Ristretto255 [Val+19]
 - `elliptic-curve` - traits for operating over a generic elliptic curve, part of RustCrypto
 - `elliptic-curves` - RustCrypto's meta-repo holding implementations for the following curves: brainpoolP256r1/t1, brainpoolP384r1/t1, Secp256k1, P-224, P-256, P-384, 1P-52
- The Map2Point function:
 - `curve25519-dalek` - includes `RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes` which implements Ristretto flavoured Elligator2
 - `elliptic-curve` - includes `MapToCurve` which implements the hash-to-curve operation for NIST P-256 and Secp256k1
- The hash function:
 - `digest` - a trait for operating generically over hash functions, from RustCrypto
 - `hashes` - RustCrypto's meta-repo holding implementations for the following hashes: Ascon, BLAKE2, KangarooTwelve, SHA2, SHA3, Tiger, Whirlpool, and several more.

2.2.3 Picking crates for the required primitives

Where possible the implementation should match the reference implementation. These choices are what the designers have determined as secure presets so they are good choices should a suitable crate exist.

Choosing the PBKDF

Instead of picking a PBKDF up front, the `PasswordHasher` trait from `password-hash` allows us to be generic over the PBKDF when implementing the library. Allowing users of the library to pick from either Argon2, Scrypt or PBKDF2 at their discretion, or to implement their own algorithm and supply an implementation of `PasswordHasher` for it.

Choosing the Curve and Map2Point operation

Although the `elliptic-curves` repo implements many different elliptic curves, it doesn't implement Curve25519¹, and the `hash2curve` Application Programming Interface (API) for NIST P-256 uses the `Optimized Simplified Shallue-van de Woestijne-Ulas` (OSSWU) map [WB19], which is known to be less efficient than the Elligator2 map defined for Montgomery curves [Ber+13]. There have also been questions about whether the coefficients used in NIST's suite of curves have been deliberately tampered with [BL13].

Another issue to consider when picking a curve and group is the problem of cofactor handling. To avoid mishandling group cofactors `AuCPace` shows everywhere a cofactor multiplication is necessary, failing to perform one of these multiplications would be a serious bug. However we can eliminate the need for handling cofactors altogether by using a prime order group, that is a group with a prime number of elements in it. `Ristretto255` [Val+19] is one such group built on top of Curve25519. The `curve25519-dalek` crate implements `Ristretto255` as well as the `Ristretto` flavoured Elligator2 map [Ber+13] which implements the required `Map2Point` operation.

Choosing the hash function

The hash function is another parameter that is easy to be generic over, thanks to the `digest` crate. This allows users to pick from the plethora of hashes implemented by `RustCrypto/hashes`, enabling them to choose whichever hash function is best suited for their application.

2.3 Initial designs for the structure of the library

Rust is very flexible in regards to how you wish to structure a library, there are many patterns that are known to work well in Rust and as such have become Rust idioms. Rust is fairly unique among programming languages as it offers very little in the way of inheritance, unlike classes in Java or C++, Rust's structs cannot inherit from each other. Instead if you want to implement some functionality on top of another type you must in some way store a value of that type. As such wrapper structs are common in Rust, the most common use of these would be the iterator adapters. The `Iterator` trait from the standard library has many methods for providing common operations which are agnostic to what is being iterated over, e.g. `Iterator::filter`, `Iterator::map` and `Iterator::rev`. Each of these methods returns a specialised struct which contains the initial iterator, specifically `std::iter::Filter`, `std::iter::Map` and `std::iter::Rev` for the aforementioned methods. These structs are all *owning*, the concept of Ownership is central to Rust, it forms the basis for how the borrow checker works and is the main mechanism by which Rust can guarantee memory safety. In general owned types are always easier to work with than borrowed ones, you don't have to keep track of lifetimes and in general life is easier. The main use-case for references is for when you have some value that you either cannot copy, (e.g. a `Mutex`), or really don't want to copy (e.g. 10Gb worth of data).

¹there is currently a push to have it included in the crate, though it is still early on and the implementation is not fit for use

This preference for Owned values leads to one slightly messy but easy to implement pattern whereby one struct is used to implement all of the functionality and all of the state is bundled in this one struct. While easy to implement this approach does have some drawbacks, some of the state might only be needed for one operation then it is worthless, however having everything in one struct means that the space is still allocated whether you need it or not. Being aware of this is especially pertinent as the amount of state required gets larger.

2.3.1 There are other PAKEs implemented in Rust, how are they designed?

RustCrypto have implemented two PAKEs - SRP and SPAKE2. SPAKE2 is the simpler of the two protocols so lets analyse it first.

Exploring RustCrypto's SPAKE2 implementation

A diagram of the SPAKE2 protocol can be found in fig. 1.4. The core of the implementation is the following struct:

Listing 2: SPAKE2 Struct

```
/// SPAKE2 algorithm.
#[derive(Eq, PartialEq)]
pub struct Spake2<G: Group> {
    //where &G::Scalar: Neg {
    side: Side,
    xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
    password_vec: Vec<u8>,
    id_a: Vec<u8>,
    id_b: Vec<u8>,
    id_s: Vec<u8>,
    msg1: Vec<u8>,
    password_scalar: G::Scalar,
}
```

It contains an owned copy of every piece of data needed to run the entire protocol, although there are quite a few members here, SPAKE2 effectively requires it as the final key SK_B is calculated as $H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, Kb)$, in addition this is a very simple protocol at only one message each way. This means that there isn't as much overhead for keeping lots of data around.

The API exposed by the struct is also very simple, there are number of `start_` methods which begin the protocol and generate initial values from the Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG), all of these methods return a tuple (`<state>`, `<message>`). The message can then be sent to the other party and when the response is received there is a single `finish` method which takes in this response and produces a `Result<Vec<u8>>`², this contains the shared key if everything went well and an error otherwise.

²Rust's Result type is used to return a value or an error, the type system forces handling this value and the code will panic if a value is expected and an error occurs. It is very similar to Haskell's Maybe type

In summary it is implemented as one large struct with many helper methods for all the different ways to start the protocol.

Exploring RustCrypto's SRP implementation

A diagram of the SRP protocol can be found in fig. 1.5.

As SRP is an [Augmented PAKE](#) it is implemented with a separate `Client` and `Server` struct as seen below.

Listing 3: SRP Server Struct

```
/// SRP server state
pub struct SrpServer<'a, D: Digest> {
    params: &'a SrpGroup,
    d: PhantomData<D>,
}
```

Listing 4: SRP Client Struct

```
/// SRP client state before handshake with the server.
pub struct SrpClient<'a, D: Digest> {
    params: &'a SrpGroup,
    d: PhantomData<D>,
}
```

IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 Overview of RustCrypto and Dalek Cryptography

TESTING

4.1 Creating Test Vectors

REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Achievements

5.2 Reflection

5.3 Future Work

GLOSSARY

Abelian Group A group whose operator is also commutative. e.g. Addition over \mathbb{Z} . .
[13](#), [14](#)

AES Advanced Encryption Scheme. [37](#)

AKE Authenticated Key-Exchange. [16](#)

API Application Programming Interface. [29](#), [30](#)

Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography is where the the sender and receiver each have two keys - a public key which can be freely shared, and a private key which must be kept secret. Common examples of this are the RSA scheme and the various DH flavours. [10](#), [11](#)

AuCPace Augmented Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment.
[4](#), [16](#), [17](#), [18](#), [19](#), [22](#), [25](#), [26](#), [27](#), [29](#), [47](#)

Augmented PAKE A Balanced PAKE is one in which both parties share knowledge the same secret. This is in contrast to other schemes such as Verifier-based/Augmented PAKEs. . [9](#), [12](#), [15](#), [16](#), [31](#), [36](#)

Balanced PAKE A Balanced PAKE is one in which both parties share knowledge the same secret. This is in contrast to other schemes such as Verifier-based/Augmented PAKEs. . [9](#), [11](#), [15](#), [16](#)

CFRG Crypto Forum Research Group. [15](#), [36](#)

CPace Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment. [15](#), [18](#)

CSPRNG Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator. [30](#)

DH Diffie-Hellman. [11](#), [14](#), [16](#), [18](#), [27](#), [44](#)

EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol. [10](#)

ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [4](#), [15](#)

ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. [15](#)

EKE Encrypted Key Exchange. [10](#), [11](#), [12](#)

FFI Foreign Function Interface. [23](#)

Finite Field A Finite Field is a finite set with an associated addition and multiplication operator, where the operators satisfy the field axioms. Namely they are: Associative, Commutative, Distributive, they have inverses and identity elements. [14](#)

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards. [26](#)

HMI human machine interface. [16](#)

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force. [15](#), [16](#)

IIOT Industrial Internet of Things. [4](#), [16](#), [17](#), [25](#)

IOT Internet of Things. [4](#), [25](#)

iPAKE identity-binding PAKE. [16](#)

IRTF Internet Research Task Force. [15](#)

KHAPE Key-Hiding Asymmetric PAKE. [16](#), [17](#)

MCU Microcontroller. [47](#)

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology. [13](#), [26](#), [29](#)

nonce number used only once – A cryptographic term which relates to an ephemeral secret value, an example would be an Initialisation Vector for AES-CBC mode encryption. . [17](#)

Online Cryptography Online cryptography is where interactions with the cryptosystem are only possible via real-time interactions with the server. Primarily this is to prevent offline computation. [9](#), [11](#)

OPAQUE An Asymmetric PAKE Protocol Secure Against Pre-Computation Attacks. [Augmented PAKE](#) Winner of the [CFRG](#) PAKE selection process. The name is a play on words from OPAKE, where O is [OPRF](#). [15](#), [16](#), [17](#)

OPRF Oblivious Pseudo Random Function. [16](#), [36](#)

OSSWU Optimized Simplified Shallue-van de Woestijne-Ulas. [29](#)

PAKE Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange. [4](#), [8](#), [9](#), [10](#), [12](#), [15](#), [16](#), [17](#), [23](#), [30](#)

PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function. [27](#), [28](#)

PKI Public-Key-Infrastructure. [16](#), [17](#)

PRS Password Related String. [18](#)

PSK Pre-Shared Key. [17](#)

RCIG Rust Cryptography Interest Group. [27](#)

RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. [10](#), [13](#)

RTT Real-Time-Transfer. [25](#)

Safe Prime A number $2n + 1$ is a Safe Prime if n is prime, it is the effectively the other part of a Sophie Germain prime. . [11](#), [12](#)

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm. [27](#)

SPAKE Simple PAKE. [11](#), [12](#), [30](#)

SRP Secure Remote Password. [12](#), [30](#), [31](#), [44](#)

SSID Sub-Session ID. [17](#), [18](#)

Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography is where the both the sender and receiver share the same secret key. It is normally computationally more efficient, the most common such scheme is [Advanced Encryption Scheme \(AES\)](#). [10](#)

TLS Transport Layer Security. [8](#), [12](#)

Verifier A representation of the user's password put through some one-way function. This could be as simple as just storing a hash of the password, though for most PAKEs the verifier is an element of whatever group we are working in. An example can be seen on page [12](#). [9](#), [12](#)

V-PAKE Verifier based PAKE. [4](#)

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PYTHON IMPLEMENTATION OF EKE

While researching Bellovin and Merritt's EKE scheme[BM92], I created a full implementation of the scheme in Python. The full code can be found at https://github.com/tritoke/eke_python. The core negotiation functions for the client and server have been included below:

Listing 1: Client Negotiate

```
negotiate(self):
    # generate random public key Ea
    Ea = RSA.gen()

    # instantiate AES with the password
    P = AES.new(self.password.ljust(16).encode(), AES.MODE_ECB)

    # send a negotiate command
    self.send_json(
        action="negotiate",
        username=self.username,
        enc_pub_key=b64e(P.encrypt(Ea.encode_public_key())),
        modulus=Ea.n
    )

    # receive and decrypt R
    self.recv_json()
    key =
        ↪ 12b(Ea.decrypt(b2l(P.decrypt(b64d(self.data["enc_secret_key"]))))))
    R = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)

    # send first challenge
    challengeA = randbytes(16)
    self.send_json(challenge_a=b64e(R.encrypt(challengeA)))

    # receive challenge response
    self.recv_json()
    challenge_response = R.decrypt(b64d(self.data["challenge_response"]))
```

```

assert challenge_response[:16] == challengeA, "Challenge A failed."

challengeB = challenge_response[16:]

# response with challengeB
self.send_json(challenge_b=b64e(R.encrypt(challengeB)))

# receive success message
self.recv_json()
assert self.data["success"], self.data.get("message",
    ↪ "ChallengeB failed.")

# store the shared key
self.R = R

```

Listing 2: Server Negotiate

```

handle_eke_negotiate_key(self):
# decrypt Ea using P
P = AES.new(self.database[self.data["username"]].ljust(16).encode(),
    ↪ AES.MODE_ECB)
e = b2l(P.decrypt(b64d(self.data["enc_pub_key"])))

# e is always odd, but we add 1 with 50% probability
if e % 2 == 0:
    e -= 1

# generate secret key R
R = randbytes(16)
Ea = RSA.from_pub_key(e, self.data["modulus"])
self.send_json(enc_secret_key=b64e(P.encrypt(12b(Ea.encrypt(b2l(R))))))
x = b64e(P.encrypt(12b(Ea.encrypt(b2l(R))))))

# transform R into a cipher instance
R = AES.new(R, AES.MODE_ECB)

# receive encrypted challengeA and generate challengeB
self.recv_json()
challengeA = R.decrypt(b64d(self.data["challenge_a"]))
challengeB = randbytes(16)

# send challengeA + challengeB
self.send_json(challenge_response=b64e(R.encrypt(challengeA+challengeB,
    ↪ )))

# receive challengeB back again
self.recv_json()

```

```
success = R.decrypt(b64d(self.data["challenge_b"])) == challengeB  
self.send_json(success=success)  
self.R = R
```

PYTHON IMPLEMENTATION OF SRP

While conducting my initial research on PAKEs I came across [SRP](#) [Wu00]. SRP is the first protocol I looked at which took the approach of encoding values as DH group elements. To understand this approach better I chose to create a toy implementation. The full code can be found at https://github.com/tritoke/srp_python. The core negotiation functions for the client and server have been included below:

Listing 3: Client Negotiate

```
negotiate(self):
# send a negotiate command
self.send_json(action="negotiate", username=self.username)

# receive the salt back from the server
self.recv_json()
s = int(self.data["salt"])
x = H(s, H(f"{self.username}:{self.password}"))

# generate an ephemeral key pair and send the public key to the server
a = strong_rand(KEYSIZE_BITS)
A = pow(g, a, N)
self.send_json(user_public_ephemeral_key=A)

# receive the servers public ephemeral key back
self.recv_json()
B = self.data["server_public_ephemeral_key"]

# calculate u and S
u = H(A, B)
S = pow((B - 3 * pow(g, x, N)), a + u * x, N)

# calculate M1
M1 = H(A, B, S)
self.send_json(verification_message=M1)

# receive M2
```

```

self.recv_json()
M2 = self.data["verification_message"]

if M2 != H(A, M1, S):
    print("Failed to agree on shared key.")

K = H(S)

return K

```

Listing 4: Server Negotiate

```

handle_srp_negotiate_key(self):
# receive the username I from the client
# lookup data in database
user = self.data["username"]
I = b2l(user.encode())

if (db_record := self.database.get(user)) is None:
    self.send_json(success=False,
        ↪ message=f"Failed to find user in DB.")
    return

s = db_record["salt"]
v = db_record["verifier"]

# send s to the client
self.send_json(salt=s)

# receive A from the user
self.recv_json()
A = self.data["user_public_ephemeral_key"]

# calculate B
b = strong_rand(KEYSIZE_BITS)
B = 3 * v + pow(g, b, N)

# send B to the client
self.send_json(server_public_ephemeral_key=B)

# calculate u and S
u = H(A, B)
S = pow(A * pow(v, u, N), b, N)

# receive M1 from the client
self.recv_json()
M1 = self.data["verification_message"]

```

```

# verify M1
if M1 != H(A, B, S):
    self.send_json(success=False,
        ↪ message=f"Failed to agree shared key.")
    return

# calculate M2
M2 = H(A, M1, S)
self.send_json(verification_message=M2)

# calculate key
K = H(S)

# log the derived key - not part of the protocol
print(f"Derived K={K:X}")

# encrypt our final message to the client using our shared key
key = 12b(K)
nonce = get_random_bytes(16)

cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
ct, mac = cipher.encrypt_and_digest(f_
    ↪ "Successfully agreed shared key for {user}.".encode())

# notify the client of the success
self.send_json(success=True, nonce=b64e(nonce), enc_message=b64e(ct),
    ↪ tag=b64e(mac))

```

EMBEDDED RUST APPLICATION IMPLEMENTING AuCPace

The client code uses my Rust library to implement the client side of [AuCPace](#). The server code uses my Rust library to implement the server side of [AuCPace](#) for an Nucleo-64 (STM32F401RE) [Microcontroller \(MCU\)](#).

Listing 5: Client Negotiate

```
fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let args = Args::try_parse()?;

    // setup the logger
    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
        .with_ansi(true)
        .with_max_level(args.log_level)
        .with_writer(io::stderr)
        .init();

    debug!("args={args:?}");

    // list the ports if the user asks for it
    if args.list_ports {
        let mut ports = serialport::available_ports()?;
        ports.retain(|port| matches!(port.port_type,
→ SerialPortType::UsbPort(_)));
        println!("Found the following USB ports:");
        for port in ports {
            println!("{}", port.port_name);
        }

        return Ok(());
    }

    // open the serial port connection
    let port_name = args
```

```

        .port
        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Must supply a USB port.))?";
let serial = Mutex::new({
    serialport::new(port_name, USART_BAUD)
        .timeout(Duration::from_millis(500))
        .open()?
});
let mut receiver = MsgReceiver::new(&serial);
info!("Opened serial port connection.");

// start the client
let mut base_client = Client::new(rand_core::OsRng);
let mut bytes_sent = 0;

let user = args.username.as_str();
let pass = args.password.as_str();
if !args.skip_register {
    #[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
    let message = base_client
        .register_alloc(user.as_bytes(), pass,
→ Params::recommended(), Scrypt)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow!(e))?;

    #[cfg(feature = "strong")]
    let message = base_client
        .register_alloc_strong(user.as_bytes(), pass,
→ Params::recommended(), Scrypt)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow!(e))?;

    bytes_sent += send!(serial, message);
    info!(
        "Registered as {user}:{pass} for {}",
        if cfg!(feature = "strong") {
            "Strong AuCPace"
        } else {
            "AuCPace"
        }
    );
}

info!("Starting AuCPace");
let start = Instant::now();
// ===== SSID Establishment =====
#[cfg(feature = "static_ssid")]
let client = {
    let client =
→ base_client.begin_prestablished_ssid(SSID).unwrap();

```



```

        info!("Began from static SSID={:02X?}", SSID);
        client
    };

#[cfg(not(feature = "static_ssid"))]
let client = {
    let (client, message) = base_client.begin();
    bytes_sent += send!(serial, message);

    let server_message = recv!(receiver);
    let client = if let ServerMessage::Nonce(server_nonce) =
↪ server_message {
        client.agree_ssid(server_nonce)
    } else {
        panic!("Received invalid server message {:?}",
↪ server_message);
    };
    info!("Agreed on SSID");
    client
};

// ===== Augmentation Layer =====
#[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
let (client, message) = {
    info!("Sending message: Username");
    client.start_augmentation(user.as_bytes(), pass.as_bytes())
};
#[cfg(feature = "strong")]
let (client, message) = {
    info!("Sending message: Strong Username");
    client.start_augmentation_strong(user.as_bytes(),
↪ pass.as_bytes(), &mut rand_core::OsRng)
};
bytes_sent += send!(serial, message);

let mut server_message = recv!(receiver);
#[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
let client = if let ServerMessage::AugmentationInfo {
    x_pub,
    salt,
    pbkdf_params,
    ..
} = server_message
{
    info!("Received Augmentation info");
    let params = parse_params(pbkdf_params)?;
    client

```

```

        .generate_cpace_alloc(x_pub, &salt, params, Script)
        .expect("Failed to generate CPace step data")
    } else {
        panic!("Received invalid server message {:?}", server_message);
    };

#[cfg(feature = "strong")]
let client = if let ServerMessage::StrongAugmentationInfo {
    x_pub,
    blinded_salt,
    pbkdf_params,
    ..
} = server_message
{
    info!("Received Strong Augmentation info");
    let params = parse_params(pbkdf_params)?;
    client
        .generate_cpace_alloc(x_pub, blinded_salt, params, Script)
        .expect("Failed to generate CPace step data")
} else {
    panic!("Received invalid server message {:?}", server_message);
};

// ===== CPace substep =====
let ci = "Server-USART2-Client-SerialPort";
let (client, message) = client.generate_public_key(ci, &mut
→ rand_core::OsRng);
bytes_sent += send!(serial, message);
info!("Sent PublicKey");

server_message = recv!(receiver);
let ServerMessage::PublicKey(server_pubkey) = server_message else {
    panic!("Received invalid server message {:?}", server_message);
};
let key = if cfg!(feature = "implicit") {
    client.implicit_auth(server_pubkey)
} else {
    let (client, message) =
→ client.receive_server_pubkey(server_pubkey);

    // ===== Explicit Mutual Auth =====
    bytes_sent += send!(serial, message);
    info!("Sent Authenticator");

    server_message = recv!(receiver);
    if let ServerMessage::Authenticator(server_authenticator) =
→ server_message {

```

```

        client
            .receive_server_authenticator(server_authenticator)
            .expect("Failed Explicit Mutual Authentication")
    } else {
        panic!("Received invalid server message {:?}",
↪ server_message);
    }
};

info!("Derived final key: {:02X?}", key.as_slice());
info!("Total bytes sent: {}", bytes_sent);
info!(
    "Derived final key in {}ms",
    Instant::now().duration_since(start).as_millis()
);

Ok(())
}

```

Listing 6: Server Negotiate

```

#[embassy_executor::main]
async fn main(_spawner: Spawner) -> ! {
    let mut rcc_config: embassy_stm32::rcc::Config =
↪ Default::default();
    rcc_config.sys_ck = Some(Hertz::mhz(32));
    let mut board_config: embassy_stm32::Config = Default::default();
    board_config.rcc = rcc_config;
    let p = embassy_stm32::init(board_config);
    info!("Initialised peripherals.");

    // configure USART2 which goes over the USB port on this board
    let config = Config::default();
    let irq = interrupt::take!(USART2);
    let (mut tx, rx) =
        Uart::new(p.USART2, p.PA3, p.PA2, irq, p.DMA1_CH6, p.DMA1_CH5,
↪ config).split();
    info!("Configured USART2.");

    // configure the RNG, kind of insecure but this is just a demo and
↪ I don't have real entropy
    let now = Instant::now().as_micros();
    let server_rng = ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(now);
    info!("Seeded RNG - seed = {}", now);

    // create our AuCPace server
    let mut base_server: AuCPaceServer<sha2::Sha512, _, K1> =
↪ AuCPaceServer::new(server_rng);

```

```

let mut database: SingleUserDatabase<100> =
→ SingleUserDatabase::default();
info!("Created the AuCPace Server and the Single User Database");

// create something to receive messages
let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
let mut receiver = MsgReceiver::new(rx);
let mut s: String<1024> = String::new();
info!("Receiver and buffers set up");

// wait for a user to register themselves
info!("Waiting for a registration packet.");
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "partial"), allow(unused))]
let user = loop {
    let msg = recv!(receiver, s);
    #[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
    if let ClientMessage::Registration {
        username,
        salt,
        params,
        verifier,
    } = msg
    {
        if username.len() > 100 {
→ error!("Attempted to register with a username thats too long.");
        } else {
            database.store_verifier(username, salt, None,
→ verifier, params);
            info!("Registered {a} for AuCPace", username);
            break username;
        }
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "strong")]
    if let ClientMessage::StrongRegistration {
        username,
        secret_exponent,
        params,
        verifier,
    } = msg
    {
        if username.len() > 100 {
→ error!("Attempted to register with a username thats too long.");
        } else {

```

```

        database.store_verifier_strong(username, None,
→ verifier, secret_exponent, params);
        info!("Registered {:a} for Strong AuCPace", username);
        break username;
    }
}

};

#[cfg(feature = "partial")]
{
    let (priv_key, pub_key) =
→ base_server.generate_long_term_keypair();
    // it is fine to unwrap here because we have already registered
    // a verifier for the user with store_verifier
    database
        .store_long_term_keypair(user, priv_key, pub_key)
        .unwrap();
    info!("Stored a long term keypair for {:a}", user);
}

loop {
    let mut time_taken = Duration::default();

    let start = Instant::now();
    let mut session_rng =
→ ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(start.as_micros());
    let mut bytes_sent = 0;
    time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(start);
    info!("Seeded Session RNG - seed = {}", start.as_micros());

    // now do a key-exchange
    info!("Beginning AuCPace protocol");

    // ===== SSID Establishment =====
    #[cfg(feature = "static_ssid")]
    let server = {
        let t0 = Instant::now();
        let server =
→ base_server.begin_prestablished_ssid(SSID).unwrap();
        time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);
        info!("Began from static SSID={:02X}", SSID);
        server
    };

    #[cfg(not(feature = "static_ssid"))]
    let server = {
        let t0 = Instant::now();

```

```

        let (server, message) = base_server.begin();
        time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);

        let client_message: ClientMessage<K1> = recv!(receiver, s);
        let t0 = Instant::now();
        let server = if let ClientMessage::Nonce(client_nonce) =
→ client_message {
            server.agree_ssid(client_nonce)
        } else {
            fmt_log!(
                ERROR,
                s,

→ "Received invalid client message {:?} - restarting negotiation",
                client_message
            );
            continue;
        };
        time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);
        info!("Received Client Nonce");

        // now that we have received the client nonce, send our
→ nonce back
        bytes_sent = send!(tx, buf, message);
        info!("Sent Nonce");

        server
    };

    // ===== Augmentation Layer =====
    let mut client_message = recv!(receiver, s);
    let t0 = Instant::now();
    #[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
    let (server, message) = if let
→ ClientMessage::Username(username) = client_message {
        #[cfg(not(feature = "partial"))]
        let ret = server.generate_client_info(username, &database,
→ &mut session_rng);
        #[cfg(feature = "partial")]
        let ret =
            server.generate_client_info_partial_aug(username,
→ &database, &mut session_rng);
        ret
    } else {
        fmt_log!(
            ERROR,
            s,

```

```

↪ "Received invalid client message {:?} - restarting negotiation",
    client_message
    );
    continue;
};

#[cfg(feature = "strong")]
let (server, message) = if let ClientMessage::StrongUsername {
↪ username, blinded } =
    client_message
    {
        #[cfg(not(feature = "partial"))]
        let ret =
            server.generate_client_info_strong(username, blinded,
↪ &database, &mut session_rng);
        #[cfg(feature = "partial")]
        let ret = server.generate_client_info_partial_strong(
            username,
            blinded,
            &database,
            &mut session_rng,
        );
        ret
    } else {
        fmt_log!(
            ERROR,
            s,
↪ "Received invalid client message {:?} - restarting negotiation",
            client_message
        );
        continue;
    };
time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);

bytes_sent += send!(tx, buf, message);
#[cfg(not(feature = "strong"))]
{
    info!("Received Client Username");
    info!("Sent AugmentationInfo");
}
#[cfg(feature = "strong")]
{
    info!("Received Client Username and Blinded Point");
    info!("Sent Strong Augmentation Info");
}

```

```

// ===== CPace substep =====
let t0 = Instant::now();
let ci = "Server-USART2-Client-SerialPort";
let (server, message) = server.generate_public_key(ci);
time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);
bytes_sent += send!(tx, buf, message);
info!("Sent PublicKey");

client_message = recv!(receiver, s);
let ClientMessage::PublicKey(client_pubkey) = client_message
↪ else {
    fmt_log!(
        ERROR,
        s,
        "Received invalid client message {:?}" ,
        client_message
    );
    continue;
};

let key = if cfg!(feature = "implicit") {
    server.implicit_auth(client_pubkey)
} else {
    let t0 = Instant::now();
    let server = server.receive_client_pubkey(client_pubkey);
    time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);
    info!("Received Client PublicKey");

    // ===== Explicit Mutual Authentication =====
    client_message = recv!(receiver, s);
    let t0 = Instant::now();
    let (key, message) = if let
↪ ClientMessage::Authenticator(ca) = client_message {
        match server.receive_client_authenticator(ca) {
            Ok(inner) => inner,
            Err(e) => {
                fmt_log!(
                    ERROR,
                    s,
                    "Client failed the Explicit Mutual Authentication check - {:?}"
↪ );
                continue;
            }
        }
    } else {

```



```

        fmt_log!(
            ERROR,
            s,
            "Received invalid client message {:?}" ,
            client_message
        );
        continue;
    };

    time_taken += Instant::now().duration_since(t0);
    bytes_sent += send!(tx, buf, message);

    info!("Sent Authenticator");

    key
};

info!("Derived final key: {:02X}", key.as_slice());
info!("Total bytes sent: {}", bytes_sent);
info!("Total computation time: {}ms", time_taken.as_millis());
}
}

```