The Anatomy of a Threat Hunting Hypothesis

Introduction

- Director, Global Cyber Defense @ Marsh McLennan
- Done a lot of blue team work and led a lot of blue team work
- SecKC, BSidesKC CFP Board, #FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK
- MS in Cybersecurity Policy @ Georgia Tech
- Trying to escape computers by running long distances in the woods

What's on the agenda?

01
Introduction
*You are here

02
Hypothesis Diagramming

03
Impact Multipliers

04
Resources

A human-driven process to identify artifacts associated with a **previously undetected** intrusion or breach that was not identified by existing security controls.

—Joe Slowik

02

Hypothesis Diagramming

Welcome back to elementary school!

Building Better Hypotheses

- You deserve better hypotheses that work for you, not that you have to work for
- Bad inputs means bad outputs
- Too little freedom, bad time
- Too much freedom, bad time
- Find the four constant elements of a strong hypothesis:
  - Target
  - Technique
  - Payload/Action on Objective
  - Attacker Type (optional)

What Makes a Target?

- The system, application, person, or victim of malicious behavior
- Sets the tone of severity:
  - CEO’s inbox vs CISO’s inbox
  - Windows 7 host vs Windows 2016 server
  - Production finance application vs development web application
- Shortcut the scope of logs you should be searching

What Makes Technique?

- The malicious behavior you want to find
- Traditionally the hypothesis origin element
- MITRE ATT&CK provides cheat codes
  - T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer
  - Moving malicious files between compromised hosts via SMB

What Makes a Payload?

- AKA Action on Objective
- The big **WHY**
- Your management only cares about this because it means impact
  - Make them care
- Malware > Credential Theft
- Exfiltration > Data Extortion
- DDoS > Lost Business
- Highlight what success looks like

What About Attacker Type?

- Check your program maturity first
- Focus on techniques and scale
- Threat actors can garner rapid support from leadership
  - But it can also result in false findings and goose chases



Good Hypothesis

PowerShell is being leveraged on endpoints to execute malware in memory

Better Hypothesis

Attackers are compiling exploits locally on servers/clients to use, and using basic naming schema, like “exploit.exe.”

Best Hypothesis

WSL (the Windows Subsystem for Linux) is being used for malicious scripting purposes and cross compatibility malware execution by malicious insiders.

Diagram It - Good Hypothesis

Target

PowerShell is being leveraged on endpoints to execute malware in memory

Technique

Payload

Diagram It - Better Hypothesis



Diagram It - Best Hypothesis

Technique

Payload

WSL (Windows Subsystem for Linux) is being used for malicious scripting purposes and cross compatibility malware execution.

We cannot see it because WSL is a new feature with Windows Desktop.

Target

Diagram It - Best^2 Hypothesis

03

Impact Multipliers

Make It Matter



Industry

The type of business you do, the customers your serve, the suppliers you rely on

Geolocation

Global, national, regional



Technology Stack

What make your business go



Crown Jewels

Very important people, assets, applications, or processes

Trends

What you are seeing from a detection and response perspective

You’re Not Alone

- Consider the threats facing your industry
  - Learn from other people’s incidents
- Consider your key partnerships
- Consider your key clients
- Supply chain is real and should inform your hunts

Where's Waldo?

- Physical location matters as much as workforce distribution
- An organization solely operating in Illinois doesn't need to look at threats only impacting Ukrainian organizations
  - Be aware, but don't overcommit

What's Inside?

- Hunt against things you have
- If you have GSuite, don't focus on Exchange exploit outputs
- Partner with the business to highlight key strategy items
    - Moving to cloud? Would be a shame if someone found how bad everything really way and provided ample evidence

King of the Castle

- Known your high risk, high value items
  - People
  - Assets
  - Applications
  - Data
  - Processes

- Nothing gets you more resources like saying you identified a targeted attack against the CFO

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- Where there is smoke, there is fire
- Talk to your reactive teams more
- Improve the posture of the firm one hunt at a time
  - Also maybe help your fellow SOC and IR folks get some sleep and generate some good karma

Someone created a local admin account on an endpoint

Psexec.exe is being used for lateral movement post compromise



Powershell is being used for second stage downloads

03

Resources

Other Hunt Content

MITRE ATT&CK™

The ThreatHunting Project

ThreatHunting
Open Threat Research

Questions?

https://github.com/triw0lf/anatomy-of-a-threat-hunt

https://laurenproehl.com

https://twitter.com/jotunvillur