

Project analysis and improvements



stronaszkoly-api-testing.zip

Archiwum zip

Analyze this project, suggest improvement, fixes and find bugs. Please give me a long rapport. What I want is for you to check if something is wrong, something should be streamlined, something should be redesigned, changed, or you see some things that should be deleted / not used or other things that disrupt this project and will greatly benefit it. Just look at this whole code and analyze everything and give all around suggestions.

Prośba o GPT-5 Pro

Reasoned for 20m 37s

Below is a comprehensive engineering review of your project (**stronaszkoly-api-testing**). I've focused on correctness, security, maintainability, and developer experience. Where possible, I point to concrete files/lines, highlight specific bugs, and include suggested code changes you can apply immediately.

Executive summary (top action items)

P0 – Fix now

1. Session token generation is not cryptographically strong

`v1/login` creates session tokens with `Math.random()` → replace with `crypto.randomBytes`.

2. Rate limiters defined but not used on v1

`loginLimiter` and `refreshLimiter` exist but are not attached to `/v1` routes.

3. Leaky auth surface (password in URL)

`v1/login` accepts `username/password` via query params. Remove this path.

4. CORS too permissive with credentials

`cors({ origin: true, credentials: true })` reflects any `Origin` and allows cookies. Lock this down via allow-list.

5. No CSRF protection on cookie-based mutating endpoints

Introduce a CSRF defense (double-submit or SameSite=None + token).

6. Approval links never expire in enforcement

You store `expiresAt` but don't enforce it in `GET/POST /v1/approvals/:token`.

7. Admin-level writes not restricted

`/v1/overrides` write is protected by `requireAuth` but not by admin check.

8. File persistence is non-atomic

`data.json` and `overrides.json` are updated with plain `writeFileSync` (risk of corruption). Switch to atomic writes.

9. Jobs invoke pip install on every run

`/v1/jobs/*-scrape` installs dependencies each time. Add caching/venv or containerize.

10. Monolithic server file (~48 kB)

Split `server/server.js` into routers: auth, timetable, attendance, approvals, jobs, overrides, legacy.

P1 – Next 1-2 sprints

- Unify and de-duplicate API docs (you have *two* Swagger UIs: Express `/docs` and static `/public/docs/index.html`).
- Restrict/relocate Python scripts and generated data out of `/public` (avoid serving internals by default).
- Add body size limits (`express.json({ limit: '64kb' })`) and per-route rate limits (jobs, approvals).
- Align OpenAPI with the actual v1 routes; validate requests server-side (e.g., `zod/express-zod-api`).
- Add E2E tests (Playwright is installed) and unit tests for reducers and server routes (Jest/Vitest + Supertest).

P2 – Later

- Replace the file-store with SQLite (e.g., `better-sqlite3`) or Postgres for robustness & concurrency.
- Move to typed backend (TypeScript) for the server.
- Create a small admin UI for overrides/backups/jobs with explicit permissions.

Architecture & repo layout

- **Front-end:** Vite + React 19 (lazy routes), nice UI primitives, and a solid `src/features` structure.
- **Server:** Express (ESM) with Helmet, cookie sessions, bearer auth (API keys), attendance state, timetable reader/writer, scraping jobs, “remote approvals”, and OpenAPI draft served via Swagger UI.
- **Public assets:** Also store Python scrapers and generated JSON in `/public`, which may be served by Vite in dev.

Suggestion: Treat `/public` as truly public (only static assets required by the browser). Move scrapers and internal JSON (except those intentionally downloaded by the client) to `/tools` or `/data`.

Security review

1) Session tokens (critical)

Where: `server/server.js`, in `v1.post('/login', ...)`

Issue: Tokens are built with `Math.random().toString(36)` concatenations (predictable).

Fix:

```
diff
```

```
- const token = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2) + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2);
+ const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
```

2) Rate limiting not wired for v1 (critical)

Where: `server/server.js` defines `loginLimiter` / `refreshLimiter` but never uses them.

Fix:

```
diff
```

```
- v1.post('/login', (req, res) => {
+ v1.post('/login', loginLimiter, (req, res) => {
- v1.post('/refresh', requireAuth, async (req, res) => {
+ v1.post('/refresh', requireAuth, refreshLimiter, async (req, res) => {
```

3) Credentials via query string (critical)

Where: `v1.post('/login' ...)` accepts `username/password` from `req.query`.

Risk: Secrets may be logged/intercepted; caches and proxies may store them.

Fix: Remove query path entirely; only allow JSON body.

```
diff
```

```
- const qUser = req.query && typeof req.query.username === 'string' ? req.query.username : undefined;
- const qPass = req.query && typeof req.query.password === 'string' ? req.query.password : undefined;
- const userIn = String(username ?? qUser ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();
- const passIn = String(password ?? qPass ?? '');
+ const userIn = String(username ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();
+ const passIn = String(password ?? '');
```

4) CORS configuration (high)

Where: `app.use(cors({ origin: true, credentials: true }))`

Risk: With credentials enabled, reflecting arbitrary origins is dangerous.

Fix: Gate by env allow-list.

```
diff
```

```
- app.use(cors({ origin: true, credentials: true }));
+ const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = (process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS || '')
+   .split(',')
+   .map(s => s.trim())
+   .filter(Boolean);
+ app.use(cors({
+   origin: (origin, cb) => {
+     if (!origin) return cb(null, true);
+     if (ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) return cb(null, true);
+     return cb(new Error('Not allowed by CORS'), false);
+   },
+   credentials: true
+ }));
```

5) CSRF on cookie-based writes (high)

Where: Any mutating route when authenticating via cookie (`requireAuth`).

Fix: Add a CSRF token strategy:

- Send `Set-Cookie: csrf=<random>; SameSite=Lax; Secure`
- Require header `X-CSRF-Token` to match cookie value on `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE`.
- Alternatively, prefer Bearer tokens for all mutating calls in browsers.

6) Approval token expiry not enforced (high)

Where: `/v1/approvals/:token` (GET and POST)

Issue: `expiresAt` is returned but never validated.

Fix:

```
diff

const item = db.approvals.find(a => a.tokenHash === tokenHash);
if (!item) return problem(...not_found...);
+ if (Date.now() > item.expiresAt) {
+   item.status = 'expired';
+   saveDb(db);
+   return problem(res, 410, 'approvals.expired', 'Gone', 'Token expired');
+ }
```

7) Admin-only operations (high)

Where: `/v1/overrides`

Issue: Anyone logged-in can `PUT /v1/overrides`.

Fix:

```
diff

- v1.put('/overrides', requireAuth, (req, res) => {
+ v1.put('/overrides', requireAuth, (req, res) => {
+   if (req.userId !== 'admin') return problem(res, 403, 'auth.forbidden', 'Forbidden', 'Tylko
administrator');
...

```

✓ Admin checks already exist for `/v1/jobs/*` and `/v1/timetable/*`, which is good.

8) Body size limits & general hardening (medium)

- Add `app.use(express.json({ limit: '64kb' }))`
- Consider `compression()` for docs and larger JSONs.
- Always validate request shapes (`zod`) and fail fast with consistent RFC7807 responses.

API design & correctness

- **Legacy /api vs /v1**

You have a catch-all legacy handler and still a few live `/api/*` routes (`/api/attendance/summary`,

`/api/apikeys*`). This is coherent with the comments, but confusing.

Suggestion:

- Keep the legacy catch-all.
- Remove the remaining live legacy endpoints, or mark them deprecated in logs and plan removal.

• Inconsistent “resource vs envelope” responses

Some endpoints return `{ ok: true, data }`, others return the raw map (e.g., `/v1/teachers`). That's acceptable if documented, but make the convention explicit (e.g., “Simple dictionary resources return bare objects; everything else returns `{ data }`”).

• Optimistic concurrency

`PATCH /v1/attendance/entries` expects `ifMatch` (string) against `entry._v`. That's good, but the read endpoint does not expose an `ETag` header and uses a `body` field for `ifMatch`.

Suggestion: Return `version` in each entry and use `If-Match` header (standard) or explicitly document body-level concurrency tokens to avoid confusion.

• Rate-limit headers

`setRateHeaders` sets static values. Either remove them or populate from the actual limiter instance to avoid misleading clients.

• OpenAPI

The `public/openapi.v1.draft.yaml` is a solid start, but it likely diverges from the actual server behavior (e.g., approvals expiry, body shapes).

Suggestion:

- Add examples for each route.
- Run Spectral (`npm run docs:lint`) in CI.
- Consider generating types for the minimal client (`public/api-client.v1.ts`) from the OpenAPI source.

Data & persistence

• Atomic writes

`saveDb()` and `saveOverrides()` write synchronously to JSON. A process crash mid-write can corrupt the file.

Fix (example):

```
js

import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { renameSync } from 'node:fs';
function writeFileAtomic(path, data) {
  const tmp = path + '.' + process.pid + '.tmp';
  writeFileSync(tmp, data, 'utf8');
  renameSync(tmp, path);
}
function saveDb(db) {
  writeFileAtomic(dbPath, JSON.stringify(db, null, 2));
}
function saveOverrides(data) {
```

```
    writeFileAtomic(overridesPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2));
}
```

(You can also use a small dependency like `write-file-atomic`.)

- **Use a database**

For multi-user attendance, approvals, API keys, and jobs, move to SQLite or Postgres. This unlocks better concurrency, transactions, and queries.

Background jobs & scraping

- **Repeated pip install**

Both `/v1/jobs/timetable-scrape` and `/v1/jobs/articles-scrape` run `pip install -r requirements.txt` before each run.

Improvements:

- Bake scrapers into a Docker image with pinned wheels.
- Or create a persistent venv directory (e.g., `server/.venv`) and install once; then only run scripts.
- Add execution timeouts and memory caps; capture logs for job diagnosis.

- **Job persistence**

`JOBs` is an in-memory Map and is lost on restart. If you care about durability, persist basic job metadata to the DB.

- **Relocate scripts**

Move `public/scrapers.py`, `public/article_scrapers.py`, `public/requirements.txt` into a `tools/` folder (or a separate service). Keep only the generated artifacts (`timetable_data.json`, `articles.json`) in a non-served directory and expose them via routes.

Front-end observations

- **Good:** Lazy-loaded routes, clean modular components (e.g., news/cards/badges), reducers and hooks split per feature, Zod schemas on the client for runtime validation.

- **Tailwind via CDN**

You include Tailwind CDN in `index.html`, but you also ship custom CSS. Using CDN means no purge/minification and larger CSS in production.

Suggestion: Install Tailwind locally and compile via Vite so unused classes are purged. If you prefer not to, consider removing the CDN and rely on your own CSS + small utility classes.

- **Type duplication**

You have schedule types under both `src/types/schedule.ts` and Zod schemas in `src/lib/api.ts`. Prefer a **single source of truth**: define Zod schemas and export their TypeScript types with `z.infer<...>`, or centralize shared types in `/src/types` and reference them.

- **Docs view duplication**

`src/Docs.tsx` iframes `/docs/index.html` (from `/public/docs`), while the server also mounts `/docs` via `swagger-ui-express`. Pick one approach to avoid confusion.

- **News / article loading**

`useArticles` fetches `/articles.json`. That's fine for a first cut. Consider pagination (or incremental rendering) if the file grows large.

- **A11y**

Lucide icons are decorative—ensure buttons/links have appropriate `aria-labels` for actions (close dialogs, open article, next/prev, etc.). In `NewsSection` the item is a `<button>` with rich content—make sure it's keyboard focusable and has clear focus rings (you already have Tailwind classes that help).

Testing & CI

- **Playwright is in devDependencies** but there are no tests.

Add basic E2E coverage:

- Load Hub; open the news overlay; verify close on backdrop click.
- Auth flow (register → login → get `/v1/users/me` → logout).
- Attendance add/patch, including version conflict (`409`) path.

- **API unit tests:** Jest or Vitest + Supertest for each route (auth, attendance, timetable lookup, approvals).

- **Spectral lint:** Run `npm run docs:lint` in CI.

- **ESLint:** Already set; add `tsc --noEmit` to catch type issues.

Deployment & configuration

- **Vite proxy**

You proxy `/api` and `/v1` to `http://localhost:8787` (nice DX). For production, the Express server does not serve your built `dist`. Either:

- Serve `dist` with a static reverse proxy (Nginx), or
- Add `app.use(express.static('dist'))` and a catch-all `app.get('*', ...)` to serve SPA.

- **Allowed hosts**

`vite.config.ts` sets `allowedHosts` to `['.ngrok-free.app']`. Fine for dev; make it environment bound.

- **Environment variables**

Document and load via `dotenv` in dev: `ADMIN_USER`, `ADMIN_PASS`, `PORT`, `PYTHON_PATH`, `ALLOWED_ORIGINS`.

Concrete bug list & patches

1. **Session token not secure**

Fix: use `crypto.randomBytes` (see patch above).

2. **Rate-limit not applied**

Fix: attach `loginLimiter` & `refreshLimiter` to `/v1` (see patch above).

3. **Login accepts query params**

Fix: remove query param fallback (see patch above).

4. Approvals expiry not enforced

Fix: add `expiresAt` checks to `GET /v1/approvals/:token`.

5. Overrides write open to any authenticated user

Fix: require admin check for `PUT /v1/overrides`.

6. CORS reflection with credentials

Fix: add origin allow-list.

7. Atomic writes

Fix: implement atomic `saveDb/saveOverrides` as above.

8. Static rate-limit headers

Fix: either remove or wire to limiter state.

9. JSON body size unlimited

Fix: `app.use(express.json({ limit: '64kb' }))`.

10. Duplicate Swagger UIs

Fix: Keep one (prefer server-mounted for uniformity) and remove the other to avoid drift.

Streamlining & cleanups

- Remove legacy `/api/*` implementations that still exist (`apikeys/summary`) if not strictly needed. Keep the catch-all 410 to guide clients to `/v1`.
 - Move Python toolchain and generated content out of `/public` (e.g., to `/tools` & `/data`), and expose via API endpoints. This reduces accidental exposure and clarifies boundaries.
 - Split `server/server.js` into modules:
 - `routers/auth.js` (`/v1/users/me`, `/v1/login`, `/v1/logout`, `/v1/register`, `/v1/apikey*`)
 - `routers/attendance.js`
 - `routers/timetable.js`
 - `routers/approvals.js`
 - `routers/jobs.js`
 - `routers/overrides.js`
 - `routers/legacy.js`
 - Promote your Zod schemas to shared validation for server and client (build once, consume everywhere).
 - Introduce a small permissions helper (`isAdmin(req)`) and a scope matrix to centralize authorization decisions.
-

Nice touches already present

- Helmet, problem-details responses (RFC7807-like), `X-Request-ID` header, idempotency cache for POSTs, backups for timetable with rotation, attendance reducers with optimistic versioning, and a

thoughtful `resolveCanonicalId` for timetables (good UX for room/teacher aliases). The project is already well above “prototype” quality.

Closing checklist

- Patch auth token generation
- Attach rate-limiters to `/v1`
- Remove query login path
- Enforce approvals expiry
- Admin-restrict `PUT /v1/overrides`
- Tighten CORS; add CSRF for cookie flows
- Add body size limits
- Make writes atomic
- Choose one Swagger UI path
- Move scrapers & generated files out of `/public`
- Add tests (E2E + unit)
- Consider SQLite/Postgres for persistence
- Refactor server into routers

If you want, I can produce a set of ready-to-apply patch files (diffs) for the P0 items in a follow-up.