Heroes and Villains

MIKE ALSFORD

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published in 2006 by
Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd
1 Spencer Court
140–142 Wandsworth High Street
London SW18 4JJ

Published in USA by
Baylor University Press
One Bear Place #97363
Waco, TX 76798
Texas, USA

Designed and produced by Sandie Boccacci
Phototypeset in 11/12pt Bembo
Cover design by Judy Linard

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Alsford, Mike
Heroes and villains / Mike Alsford.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-932792-92-8 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Heroes in mass media. 2.Villains in mass media. 3. Mass media—
Moral and ethical aspects.
I. Title.
P96.H46A46 2006
302.2308—dc22

2006032549

Printed and bound in Great Britain

For Lauren and Amy
who tend to bring out the hero in me.

Huge thanks to
Grace and 'The Ginger Twins' Sarah and Claire
for reading over the manuscript
'just one more time please!'
You all went above and beyond,
you rock!

Contents

yet. They were still under construction.

DANTE: So?

RANDAL: A construction job of that magnitude would require a helluva lot more manpower than the Imperial army had to offer. I'll bet there were independent contractors working on that thing: plumbers, aluminum siders, roofers.

DANTE: Not just Imperials, is what you're getting at.

RANDAL: Exactly. In order to get it built quickly and quietly they'd hire anybody who could do the job. Do you think the average storm trooper knows how to install a toilet main? All they know is killing and white uniforms.

DANTE: All right, so even if independent contractors are working on the Death Star, why are you uneasy with its destruction?

RANDAL: All those innocent contractors hired to do a job were killed – casualties of a war they had nothing to do with. (*notices Dante's confusion*) All right, look – you're a roofer, and some juicy government contract comes your way; you got the wife and kids and the two-storey in suburbia – this is a government contract, which means all sorts of benefits. All of a sudden these left-wing militants blast you with lasers and wipe out everyone within a three-mile radius. You didn't ask for that. You have no personal politics. You're just trying to scrape out a living.[39]

The point is that the possession of power – either in the form of knowledge or physical force – is in some respects a trivial matter compared with the issue of its legitimate application. As we said at the very beginning of this chapter, each one of us can be said to possess power by virtue of our very existence, it is what we do with it, or choose not to do with it, that renders us either heroic or villainous.

4
Villains, Monsters and Evil Masterminds

While this is something we might not like to acknowledge too freely or with too much enthusiasm the image of the villain – at least at some levels – is not unattractive to us. The 'dark side of the Force' is, undoubtedly, very seductive. The person who operates according to their own rules, who refuses to conform or be limited by convention or taboo has a strength and presence that it is hard to ignore and in some ways is hard not to admire.

Freedom is something that we tend to value very highly whether it be political freedom or freedom of expression or freedom of choice, as a species we do not like to be caged or constrained. In theological circles, for example, the importance of free will and self-determination has become central to at least one explanation for the existence of sin and evil in the world. The so-called free will defence broadly argues that even God could not enforce good behaviour upon human beings without compromising their very humanity. Immanuel Kant argues that ethical judgements are the product of the free exercise of the will and that any external motivation – such as the desire for happiness or self-interest or even altruism – renders the resulting action ethically invalid. Existentialist thinkers as diverse as Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre have identified the essence of authentic human existence with our ability to make free choices, to be self-determining even if those choices inevitably commit us to a certain and more limiting path.

Radical individualism, autonomy and villainy

I think it a fair observation to make that villains generally seek to be a law unto themselves. They usually have as their primary goal power over others, world domination, control of the entire universe or, in some really ambitious instances, godhood.

Without exception this seems to be the case with the wide array of James Bond villains, for example, as they plot to impose their will upon the world through scientific means, economic means, military means and even by way of the manipulation of the media. Most science fiction villains such as the Daleks and Cybermen from *Doctor Who*, the Borg from *Star Trek*, the Replicators from *Stargate*, and so on, have a single guiding intelligence, and an insatiable drive to bring the rest of the universe under the control of that intelligence. The villain is not content with the social construction of reality, with a complex world constructed out of the interplay of diverse forces and opinions, Rather, the villain seeks to simplify the world, to recast it in to a single image where the only law is the law of their own individual, autonomous will. This, of course, is part of the reason why the Nazis, for example, make such excellent stock villains for film, novel and video game even today. We shall return to this point later.

It should concern us greatly when, for example, political leaders institute foreign and domestic policy founded upon nothing more than their own will and confidence in their own intuitive values without reference to a wider community.

In an article published in *The New York Times Magazine* towards the end of 2004 Ron Suskind made some alarming observations on the policy-making processes of President George W. Bush:

> The president has demanded unquestioning faith from his followers, his staff, his senior aides and his kindred in the Republican Party. Once he makes a decision – often swiftly, based on a creed or moral position – he expects complete faith in its rightness.
>
> The disdainful smirks and grimaces that many viewers were surprised to see in the first presidential debate are familiar expressions to those in the administration or in Congress who have simply asked the president to explain his positions. Since 9/11, those requests have grown scarce; Bush's intolerance of doubters has, if anything, increased, and few dare to question him now. A writ of infallibility – a premise beneath the powerful Bushian certainty that has, in many ways, moved mountains – is not just for public consumption: it has guided the inner life of the White House. As Whitman told me on the day in May 2003 that she announced her resignation as administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency: 'In meetings, I'd ask if there were any facts to support our case. And for that, I was accused of disloyalty!'[1]

This tendency to base policy decisions upon 'gut feelings' and the intuitions of an individual leader has, alarmingly, prompted some to apply the highly emotive term *'Führer principle'* to Bush's style of government, we shall return to this phenomenon later in this chapter.[2]

Individualism is very much a nineteenth century word. This should come as little surprise to us as it has often been observed that the philosophy of that age does little justice to the possibility of our knowledge of other selves. Indeed, when Descartes argued that the starting point for epistemological certainty was the *Cogito* – the 'I Think' – and Kant went on to develop this notion by stating that all knowledge of the world is only ever a representation for the mind, the reality of other selves became problematic. If, as Kant's Critical Philosophy maintains, we never truly engage with *the thing in itself* but rather only with an image of that thing as it is constructed by our minds, then the other, whoever and whatever that might be, becomes something that we create in a very real sense. It is precisely our individual will that establishes the world as we perceive it to be. We impose the creative, ordering capacity of our rational will – the *Cogito* – over the chaos of sense experiences and, in godlike manner, bring forth an ordered world, in our image – surely the goal of all would be tyrants and dictators?

The desire to recreate the world in one's own image is a powerful motif in the characterisation of the villain. Characters such as Saruman from *The Lord of the Rings*, Magneto from the

X-Men and the White Witch from C.S. Lewis's Narnia novels all seek to establish what might be called a new world order. Each one wishes to structure a world that is a reflection of their own individual value system, to use force to create a world that is essentially an extension of their own will.

As early on as the mid-1820s the followers of the social scientist Claude Henri de Saint-Simon were using the term *individualisme* in this way. The Saint-Simonians heavily criticised what they recognised as the Enlightenment's glorification of the individual and expressed deep concern at the atomisation of the social order which they saw as the beginnings of anarchy.

> They used 'individualisme' to refer to the pernicious and 'negative' ideas underlying the evils of the modern critical epoch, where 'disorder, atheism, individualism and egoism' they contrasted with the prospect of 'order, religion, association and devotion'. The 'philosophers of the eighteenth Century' – men such as Helvetius, with his doctrine of 'enlightened self-interest'", Locke, Reid, Condillac, Kant and the 'atheist d'Holbach, the deist Voltaire and Rousseau' – all these 'defenders of individualism' refused to 'go back to a source higher than individual conscience'. They 'considered the individual as the centre' and 'preached egoism', providing an ideological justification for the prevailing anarchy, especially in the economic and political spheres. The 'doctrine of individualism' with its two 'sad deities ... two creatures of reason – conscience and public opinion' led to 'one political result: opposition to any attempt at organisation from a centre of direction for the moral interests of mankind, to hatred of power'.[3]

Largely as a result of Saint-Simonian ideas, *individualisme* became widely used in the nineteenth century and in France, even to the present day, carries a pejorative connotation. L. Moulin points out this pejorative sense of the word when he speaks of its 'tinge of "hubris", of "demesure"' which 'does not exist in English'.[4]

In America, of course, individualism was fast becoming a national ideal. By 1839 an article had appeared in the United States Magazine and Democratic Review which extolled individualism as a positive national value. It argued that the course of civilisation ...

> is the progress of man from a state of savage individualism to that of an individualism more elevated, moral and refined ... The peculiar duty of this country has been to exemplify and embody a civilization in which the rights, freedom and mental and moral growth of individual men should be made the highest end of all social restrictions and laws.[5]

By the end of the civil war individualism had come to occupy an important place in the American vocabulary. Ralph Waldo Emerson, for example, saw the road to perfection as involving a society of self-determined individuals 'No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it.'[6]

It was Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), the aristocratic expert on America, who was to develop one of the most influential and critical understandings of individualism. For him individualism was the natural outworking of democracy,

> involving the apathetic withdrawal of individuals from public life into a private sphere and their isolation from one another, with a consequent weakening of social bonds.

De Tocqueville saw individualism as:

> a deliberate and peaceful sentiment which disposed each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and friends ... it originates as much in deficiencies of mind as in perversity of heart.[7]

The ultimate end of this process, beginning with the dissolution of public life, was 'pure egoism'. As far back as the early nineteenth century De Tocqueville observed a phenomenon that has only comparatively recently received systematic treatment by modern sociologists: that is, that with increasing social mobility, social continuity begins to collapse, traditions to be lost. Individuals 'become accustomed to considering themselves always in isolation, they freely imagine that their destiny is

entirely in their own hands.' The curse of a democratic system, says De Tocqueville, is that it

> not only makes each man forget his forefathers, but it conceals from him his descendants and separates him from his contemporaries; it ceaselessly throws him back on himself alone and threatens finally to confine him entirely in the solitude of his own heart.[8]

Although it is clear that De Tocqueville's ulterior motive was a concern for the status of the aristocracy, his critique of individualism still stands. His observations on the end results of social mobility and the loss of tradition and corporate responsibility have been born out by history and the examinations of the social scientists. His great fear that the individual may finally be confined to 'the solitude of his own heart' indicates that the spectre of solipsism is always found to be the true spirit of individualism. Thus, unlike in both Britain and America, in mainstream French thinking for example, *individualism* signifies social, ethical and political isolation of individual persons and their dislocation from social accountability and solidarity. In his New Year's Eve broadcast of 1968 General de Gaulle used the term in its characteristic French sense when he pointed out that:

> At the same time, it is necessary that we surmount the moral malaise which – above all among us by reason of our individualism – is inherent in modern mechanical and materialistic civilisation. Otherwise, the fanatics of destruction, the doctrinaires of negation, the specialists in demagogy, will once more have a good opportunity to exploit bitterness in order to provoke agitation, while their sterility, which they have the derisory insolence to call revolution, can lead to nothing else than the dissolution of everything into nothingness, or else to the loss of everything under the grinding oppression of totalitarianism.[9]

Clearly the dissolution of social cohesion and the atomisation of community into its component parts has long been regarded as one of the most reliable tools of the villain and the tyrant. The old adage *divide and conquer* recognises the fact that it is easier to

impose one's will upon a disaggregated group of individuals than it is to impose it over a group with strong social bonds. In Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* we are told that,

> in nothing is the power of the Dark Lord more clearly shown than in the estrangement that divides all those who still oppose him.[10]

In C. S. Lewis's *The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe* we are told of the White Witch who has bred fear and distrust in Narnia, 'The whole wood is full of her spies. Even some of the trees are on her side'.[11] Indeed, the totalitarian oppression of Narnia under the rule of the Witch is hardly dissimilar to that found Orwell's bleaker and more adult-orientated *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In this later novel the fear of being spied upon by neighbours and even family help to prevent social bonds from forming making it that much easier for Big Brother to impose his will upon isolated individuals. In a chilling example of the villain's drive to break down the ties that bind humanity together O'Brien has Winston, Orwell's hapless representative of the human spirit, placed in Room 101. In this place a person is confronted by his or her greatest fear – in Winston's case it is rats let loose on his face via a specially designed mask. As the cage begins to open Winston gives up his final act of rebellion against Big Brother, his emotional connection with his lover Julia:

> The mask was closing on his face. The wire brushed his cheek. And then – no, it was not relief, only hope, a tiny fragment of hope. Too late, perhaps too late. But he had suddenly understood that in the whole world there was just one person to whom he could transfer his punishment – one body that he could thrust between himself and the rats. And he was shouting frantically, over and over.
>
> 'Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not to me! Julia I don't care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! Julia! Not me!'

On meeting Julia again after his ordeal they confess to each other:

> 'I betrayed you,' she said baldly.
>
> 'I betrayed you,' he said.

'Sometimes,' she said, 'they threaten you with something – something you can't stand up to, can't even think about. And then you say, "Don't do it to me, do it to somebody else, do it to So-and-so." ... You want it to happen to the other person. You don't give a damn what they suffer. All you care about is yourself.'

'All you care about is yourself,' he echoed.

'And after that, you don't feel the same towards the other person any longer.'

No,' he said, 'you don't feel the same.'[12]

The concept of individualism denounced in France, by De Gaulle for example, was certainly not confined to that culture alone. In Germany it was taken up by the economist Friedrich List who used it in much the same manner as did the Saint-Simonians. In his major work, *The National System of Political Economy*, written in Paris, List emphasises the organic nature of society, condemning classical economics for its tendency to abstract itself from its social context. Indeed he went on to criticise its encouragement of *laissez-faire*, *materialismus*, *particularismus*, and what he saw to be more damning than all of these, *individualismus*, which he recognised as being the altar upon which the welfare of the national community was sacrificed to the quest for individual wealth.

However, given the French influence via List, the term 'individualism' did in fact have a particularly German meaning and one which contributed to the darkest moment of that country's history. *Individualitat* carried with it the notion of individual uniqueness and originality as opposed to the Enlightenment ideal which was regarded as qualitative and abstract. It was a romantic conception which shunned all sterile categories. By the 1840s the German liberal Karl Bruggemann compared the essentially negative French understanding, as found in List, with the positive German ideal which spoke of the individual as free in matters of morals and epistemology – a view that would find a more enduring and influential voice in the philosopher Nietzsche. Thus, this new German individualism had to do with uniqueness and difference as opposed to atomisation, which characterised its Enlightenment understanding.

In his essay 'The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics', Ernst Troeltsch drew a distinction between West-European and German thought. The former he saw as exhibiting 'an eternal, rational and divinely ordained system of Order', the latter as 'individual, living and perpetually new incarnations of an historically creative Mind'. He therefore went on to conclude that:

> Those who believe in an eternal and divine Law of Nature, the Equality of man and a sense of Unity pervading mankind, and who find the essence of Humanity in these things, cannot but regard the German doctrine as a curious mixture of mysticism and brutality.

On the other hand, those who regard history as a process which produces ever new and 'unique individualities'

> are bound to consider the West-European world of ideas as a World of cold rationalism and equalitarian atomism, a world of superficiality and Pharisaism.[13]

This Romantic conception of personal and qualitative individuality very soon developed into a form of nationalism where the uniqueness of a particular people, an individual nation or state, was brought to the fore.

This aspect of the development of individualism is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, it illustrates how mass movements or nationalistic fervour, while often appearing to take the form of community are in actual fact nothing more than a form of extended individualism. Secondly, one can already see enshrined in this attitude of qualitative individualism coupled with a heightened sense of racial uniqueness the framework around which Nazi Germany would construct itself. It is here, at the point of a nation's confidence in its cultural uniqueness and self-sufficiency, that folk sentiment meets with the intellectual ideas of its thinkers and leaders. Hitler's appropriation of Nietzsche's Superman was not, contrary to popular belief, the motivation behind his eugenics programme. Hitler was not primarily concerned with the creation of a new biological species, but rather with the creation of a new culture, an extension of the German

cultural ideal. Ernst Nolte points out that

> 'To create' means for Nietzsche primarily to give 'meaning' and define values. The superman not only provides peoples and times with their tables and values: he creates 'meaning' for the earth as a whole and for all aeons to come. 'He who defines values and controls the will of millennia by controlling the most superior natures, is the super man.'[14]

Nietzsche speaks of the need to escape from what he calls the 'morality of custom', a slavish acquiescence to the status quo and standards of behaviour established and enforced by the pressure of consensus and the weight of tradition. In *The Gay Science* he writes:

> With morality the individual is led into being a function of the herd and to ascribing value to himself only as a function ... Morality is the herd instinct in the individual.[15]

By contrast, the true autonomous individual is the superman, the one who establishes value for himself without reference to external influences:

> the sovereign individual, something which resembles only itself, which has broken loose again from the morality of custom – the autonomous individual beyond morality (for 'autonomous' and 'moral' are mutually exclusive terms) – in short, the human being who possesses his own independent and enduring will, who is entitled to make promises – and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has finally been achieved and given living embodiment in him: a real consciousness of power and freedom, a feeling of completion for human beings generally.[16]

Nietzsche clearly wishes to valorise the anonymous individual, and sees in it the most heroic manifestation of humanity – a humanity free to revel in self-definition and to exercise *the will to power*. This image of the Superman he places in contrast to the ideals of both Christianity and the Enlightenment which he regards as enslaving traditions that impose damaging restraints upon human freedom.

Once again we would have to say that the unlimited freedom that Nietzsche preaches is the true destiny of humanity – the end of the process linking animal to Superman – and it is not without its appeal. Freedom is, as we have said, one of our most cherished ideals and yet, it is generally recognised that for a society to function properly certain freedoms have to be sacrificed for the sake of the greater good.

Back in the seventeenth century John Locke made a similar point as he sought to develop the notion of a social contract, a socio-political tool for maintaining social cohesion in the face of the natural freedom of humanity. Locke argues that in their natural state all human beings find themselves in

> a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
>
> A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection.[17]

He goes on to argue that this natural freedom is only curtailed out of respect for the freedom of others:

> all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do

> so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.[18]

It seems to me that at the very heart of the notion of the villain is a refusal to submit to the social contract – for whatever reason – and a wilful attempt at exploiting the fact that the rest of society chooses to be bound by it. The simple fact of the matter is that, for the most part, villains do not play by the rules.

In Tim Burton's 1996 film *Mars Attacks!* the Martian villains constantly flout Earth conventions by opening fire on peace delegations, government officials attempting to negotiate and even a dove of peace released in their honour. In one scene we see a group of Martians pursuing some fleeing humans and while firing on them with their ray guns you hear them calling out 'Don't run, we are your friends!'

Much has been made of the so-called *Führer principle* as a description of the way in which all authority was vested in the person of Adolf Hitler during the dominance of National Socialism in the Germany of the 1930s and 1940s. In spite of our general perceptions of totalitarian Nazi Germany being run as a well oiled machine the truth of the matter seems rather more chaotic. The *Führer principle* related to the demand for absolute obedience to the authority of one's superior – principally Adolf Hitler himself. One's duty to the Führer superceded any other claim that might be made on one by morality, religion, tradition and even the state itself. It was perfectly possible for a person within the Nazi party to circumvent all 'official channels' by appealing directly to their Führer. It is precisely for this reason that at the Nuremberg trials so many Nazi war criminals felt it appropriate to deploy the 'we were only following orders' defence.[19]

In his book giving an account of the origins and development of Hitler's 'SS' Heinz Hohne makes this important observation:

> With the advent of the Nazis the State came under the control of a Party which, though apparently monolithic, was in fact the most contradictory in the history of German party politics. Held together only by the charismatic leadership of Hitler, a peculiar collection of factions and splinter groups milled around.[20]

In 1938 Hitler informed a hundred and fifty thousand Nazi party officials in Nuremberg that they were the German people. As Nolte points out:

> the ruling elite of the Nordic race nucleus rose up in varying degrees, while this elite was in turn ruled absolutely by the Führer, whose 'will was the constitution'.[21]

For the person or culture that regards themselves as completely autonomous in matters of epistemology and ethics there are no controls save that of the individual will. The complete disaffiliation from the rest of humanity epistemically through the 'I think', ethically by way of the 'self-valuating will' and socially through a process of privatization make all things possible. Consider for a moment the future of Eastern Europe as outlined in *Hitler's Table Talk*:

> Underlying everything is the total disfranchisement of the subjugated. They have no claims of any kind, except an early death. They are forbidden to learn to read and write; to concern themselves with history or politics is a crime worthy of death. Any communication whatever going beyond the confines of the village is strictly prohibited.[22]

This point of view is summed up succinctly by one of the Doctor's Dalek adversaries: 'There is only one form of life that matters – Dalek life! Obey your orders'.[23]

Similarly, Harry Potter's arch enemy Lord Voldemort, inspires his puppet Quirrell: 'A foolish young man I was then, full of ridiculous ideas about good and evil. Lord Voldemort showed me how wrong I was. There is no good and evil, there is only power, and those too weak to seek it.'[24]

One of the most striking examples of this notion of the villain as autonomous individual motivated simply by the desire for power over others is found in the character of Davros, the creator of the Daleks. In a now classic confrontation between himself and the Doctor, the Doctor poses an ethical question intended to

prompt Davros into reconsidering his design for the Daleks:

> DOCTOR: 'Davros, if you had created a virus in your laboratory. Something contagious and infectious that killed on contact. A virus that would destroy all other forms of life ... would you allow its use?'
> DAVROS: 'It is an interesting conjecture.'
> DOCTOR: 'Would you do it?'
> DAVROS: 'The only living thing ... the microscopic organism ... reigning supreme ... A fascinating idea.'
> DOCTOR: 'But would you do it?'
> DAVROS: 'Yes. Yes. To hold in my hand, a capsule that contained such power. To know that life and death on such a scale was my choice. To know that the tiny pressure on my thumb, enough to break the glass, would end everything. Yes. I would do it. That power would set me up above the gods. And through the Daleks I shall have that power!'[25]

William Shakespeare was also well aware of the villainous capacities of the individual who saw themselves as in some qualitative way separate from the rest of humanity. In the character of Macbeth we see a man, a loyal hero of the crown, quickly descend into radical egoism fuelled by the promise of achievement, personal glory and invulnerability. The play seems to rotate around the notion of the unnatural and the monstrous, the inversion of values; the opening act introduces this theme when the three witches are heard to chant 'Fair is foul and foul is fair'. By Act Four we have Macbeth consenting to any atrocity if it will secure him the information necessary for his continued advancement:

> I conjure you, by that which you profess,
> Howe'er you come to know it, answer me:
> Though you untie the winds and let them fight
> Against the churches; though the yesty waves
> Confound and swallow navigation up;
> Though bladed corn be lodged and trees blown down;
> Though castles topple on their warders' heads;
> Though palaces and pyramids do slope
> Their heads to their foundations; though the treasure
> Of nature's germens tumble all together,
> Even till destruction sicken; answer me
> To what I ask you.[26]

However, the ultimate dislocation of Macbeth from his humanity has not yet come, it is only when he has received the assurance that 'none of woman born shall harm Macbeth' is he free from the final constraint, fear of reprisal. No longer having to concern himself with personal safety Macbeth is free to indulge in any whim or bloody deed, as we see when he has Macduff's family slaughtered. In Roman Polanski's 1971 film version of the play the final Act brings out all the confidence and autonomous disdain for lesser men that Macbeth clearly feels as he strides among his enemies proclaiming

> ... swords I smile at, weapons laugh to scorn,
> Brandish'd by man that is of woman born.

His invulnerability, real or imagined, places him beyond accountability or harm, he is the Superman. Only when the charm is broken is he finally destroyed.

It would seem that while we must certainly acknowledge the importance of individual identity over those who would see it subsumed within a greater whole – the state or a mob or some other amorphous collective – the danger of overstating individuality must not be overlooked. To define ourselves in isolation from others, to see our humanity as residing purely and simply in our autonomous self somehow disconnected from the rest of the world is, in my view, a dangerous thing. History has shown us that villainous and inhuman acts are considerably easier to justify when a person, culture or race understands itself as being unrelated to the rest of humanity. This is surely the message contained within the Hebrew traditional story about the first murderer, Cain, who upon being confronted by God concerning the death of his brother Able replied 'Am I my brother's keeper?' Enlightenment resourced western culture has, as we have outlined above, tended to operate with a reductionist view of human being as isolated individual: the 'I' found in Descartes 'I think therefore I am'. With this in mind we in the West need to be particularly aware of our tendency towards isolation.[27]

The beast within

It has become something of a commonplace, certainly post Freud, to suggest that the evil that we do issues not out of any rational or conscious desire to do wrong, but rather is the expression of some hidden 'beast within', a lawless predatory creature that wills to do all the reckless wickedness that civilization, society, religion and ethics are designed to keep submerged and suppressed.

The nineteenth century anthropologist and criminologist Cesare Lombroso, for example, argued that criminals were a throwback to a less evolved and thus more primitive humanity. Such individuals, he maintained, manifested a range of 'brutish' characteristics which involved a low forehead, large jaws and a tendency to stoop and thus appear smaller. Hence the use of the term 'upright' to indicate both moral and physical superiority.[28] We can see this clearly in H. G. Wells's portrayal of the brutish Morlocks in his famous science fiction novel *The Time Machine*.

Classically the notion of 'the beast' carries with it a sense of the feral, the untamed and the dangerous. One of the best examples of this in literature is Robert Louis Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* where saintly and repressed Victorian medic Dr Jekyll discovers a formula which transforms him into his bestial dark side Mr Hyde, a brutal self-indulgent man completely outside conventional ethics and civilization.[29]

The Marvel comic character *The Incredible Hulk*, created in 1962, explores similar ground. Although the Hulk is, for the most part, never portrayed as a villain but rather as a misunderstood and persecuted creature – in the style of Frankenstein's creation – writer Stan Lee clearly borrows from the Jekyll and Hyde story as well. The notion of the physically unassuming and morally upright scientist Bruce Banner being transformed by gamma radiation into a physically powerful but intellectually challenged beast is a close parallel to Stevenson's story.

As is so often the case with persistent western cultural perspectives classical Greek thought can be seen as playing a significant role in the development of the ideas and themes associated with beastliness. One of the principle questions that concerned Greek thinkers and writers and continues to concern

us now is 'Why do I do bad things?' which of course easily gets recast as 'Who can I blame for my bad behaviour?'

For early, pre-Platonic, Greek thinkers the answer was easy – the gods are responsible. For the most part the gods were regarded as a fickle bunch who interfered in the lives and indeed the psyches of humanity at the drop of a hat. It was perfectly acceptable to argue therefore that aberrant behaviour was not actually our responsibility and that we were being manipulated by higher powers, in other words – the devil made me do it! This is a very strong motif in *The Lord of the Rings*, for example, where both Sauron, Saruman and the Ring itself are seen as exerting a powerful seductive force over the minds of even the most noble of heroes such as Boromir.

> 'I am a true man, neither thief or tracker. I need your Ring: that you know now; but I give you my word that I do not desire to keep it ... You can say I was too strong and took it by force. For I am too strong for you, Halfling,' he cried; and suddenly he sprang over the stone and leaped at Frodo. His fair and pleasant face was hideously changed; a raging fire was in his eyes.[30]

This attitude was not limited to the Greeks, in the Hebrew scriptures the earliest example of 'trying to get off the hook' can be found when God confronts Adam and Eve with their wrong-doing and asks for an explanation – Adam blames Eve and indirectly God and then Eve blames the Serpent who is both a beast and a supernatural figure:

> The Man said 'The woman you put here with me – she gave me some fruit from the tree and I ate it' ... The woman said 'The serpent deceived me, and I ate.[31]

However, as the gods became more noble and less malicious, largely as the result of their rehabilitation through Plato, a new scapegoat had to be found – the so-called 'beast within'.

Plato argues that the human being, as essentially a rational soul, can be subverted by the physical world, the world of matter, the world of the animal. This is a recurring theme throughout western thinking, that a tension exists between humanity as

spirit/consciousness and humanity as mere animal flesh. The spirit – the true seat of human identity – is governed by rational principles and the rule of the will while the flesh is dominated by its lusts and passions.

It is telling that whenever Plato talks about evil then animal imagery is not far away. What he has in mind is not any particular animal but a monstrous hybrid that stalks us and seeks to subvert the pure rationality of our soul.[32] The beasts that lurk within us, says Plato:

> bestir themselves in dreams, when the gentler part of the soul slumbers, and the control of Reason is withdrawn. Then the wild Beast in us, full-fed with meat and drink, becomes rampant and shakes off sleep to go in quest of what will gratify its own instincts. As you know, it will cast off all shame and prudence at such moments and stick at nothing. In phantasy it will not shrink from intercourse with mother or anyone else. Man, god or brute, or from forbidden food or any deed of blood. It will go to any lengths of shamelessness and folly.[33]

This rather bleak perspective on human nature, whether out of fear or the desire for control over the masses, has been extraordinarily influential throughout Western cultural history. The notion that only reason, backed-up by the human will, prevents the beast from surfacing can be found in a variety of places.

The early Christian tradition via Augustine borrows heavily from Plato and so we should not be surprised to find this attitude to human 'beastliness' echoed in his work. Even though Augustine does not denigrate the physical as Plato does he certainly sees it as subordinate to the spiritual. The transmission of original sin from one generation to the next is understood by Augustine to take place during the sex act when reason is off its guard. Human wickedness, maintains Augustine, issues out of the wrong prioritising of flesh over spirit.

Later in the eighteenth century the philosopher Immanuel Kant made a similar point when he argued that 'Sexuality exposes man to the danger of equality with the beasts'.[34]

In fact this is the corner stone of Kantian ethics, that we are

creatures of animal instinct and rational will and it is only the exercise of will which prevents our flesh from dominating us, it is only the capacity for 'will' that renders us capable of doing our duty. This is a view that we find occurring throughout the nineteenth century in philosophers and theologians alike. Nineteenth century liberal theologians such as Ritschl and Harnack put great emphasis upon the will as the source of ethical motivation and thus spirituality.

For Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889) The whole point of religion was not to provide us with knowledge of god – directly or indirectly – but to overcome the dualism at the heart of human existence. The human being is a being in contradiction, a divided being that exists both as *animal* – part of the natural world – and *spiritual* – a personal being possessing a will. It is the will which permits us to overcome our animal nature and to achieve a specific destiny. This is the example of Christ.

Of course the notion of the will as something that might free us from the lawless animal side of our nature is seen in a somewhat different way in the work of Nietzsche who argues that it is precisely the will which frees the lawless animal within:

> What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call Lord and God? 'Thou-Shalt' is the great dragon called. But the spirit of the Lion saith, 'I will' ...
>
> My brethren, wherefore is there need of the Lion in the spirit? Why sufficeth not the beast of burden, which renounceth and is reverent?
>
> To create new values – that even the lion cannot yet accomplish but to create itself freedom, for new creating – that can the might of the lion do.
>
> To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty: for that, my brethren, there is need of the lion.[35]

The animal image is seen here as the free spirit, a being of strength that can break free of convention and traditional morality and value. The reference to duty at the end of the last quote is a clear attack on the Kantian categorical imperative. Thus, the beast in Nietzsche is something to embrace, providing us with liberating power, while in Plato and others it is something to be

feared as it compromises and undermines the rationally informed will.

Fairy tales such as *Little Red Riding Hood*, and tales of werewolves in general have, as their subtext, the notion of an uncontrolled inner demon which can only be contained by reason, the will and convention. Often the notion of the submerged 'beast' is associated with sexual excess and rapaciousness. There are no werewolf films that I am aware of that don't ooze sexual tension from every pore![36]

In the classic 1941 film *The Wolf Man* we encounter the rational engineer Larry Talbot transformed into a rapacious, murdering beast against his will and to his deep distress. Larry is portrayed as a victim, as someone to be pitied because the evil he committed was not his responsibility. As the Gypsy wise woman Maleva notes in the poem that has become synonymous with this film:

> Even a man who's pure in heart and says his prayers by night may become a wolf when the wolfbane blooms and the autumn moon is bright.

However, while the idea of our animal side has become a convenient scapegoat for all our most basic thoughts and desires, it has been strongly argued by the likes of Mary Midgley and others that this point of view is unhelpful and inaccurate both with regard to humanity and animals. It seems demonstrably the case that animals are by no means 'beastly'. Wolves in particular are clearly very social creatures. Midgley points out that far from being sexually promiscuous and rapacious most animals have rather limited sexual appetites as they have a 'mating season'. It is human beings who are obsessed with the sex act.

It has long been recognised that humanity is one of the very few species that prays on itself and makes war – certainly on the scale that we do and with our endless inventiveness. Animals, far from being lawless chaotic creatures such as Mr Hyde, seem to be creatures of order and society.

Thus it would seem that Freud's Id, the lawless subconscious, may very well be all ours. We cannot take comfort in a cosy dualism which sets our pure real, spiritual self off against the alien animal which is somehow not us but some primal force seeking to subvert us. If we cannot say 'the devil made me do it', and we cannot blame some beast within over which we have no control, then who or what do we blame? Are we only ever as good as the laws and conventions that constrain us? Do we merely fear getting caught? What villainy are we as human beings – body and soul – capable of and why?

For the most part I think we would like to believe that the evil beast-like aspect of our character is nothing more than an aberration, a left over remnant of a more primitive stage in our development. The whole language of 'beastliness' rests, in part, on this belief. The notion that there is an equal sided struggle taking place for our soul – as we see with Jekyll and Hyde – and that either aspect might gain dominance at a moment's notice is not one we would happily entertain. The prevailing belief, it would seem, is that it is the civilized, rational side of our character that is in control, that is dominant.

This conflict between the light and the dark side is made particularly prominent in the *Star Wars* series of films. In *The Return of the Jedi* (1982) Luke confronts the evil Emperor who has already corrupted his father transforming him from the Jedi knight Anakin Skywalker into Sith lord Darth Vader. The Emperor sees the struggle going on inside Luke:

> You want this, don't you? *(gestures to Luke's lightsaber)* The hate is swelling in you now. Take your Jedi weapon. Use it. I am unarmed. Strike me down with it. Give in to your anger. With each passing moment, you make yourself more my servant.

In the classic 1956 science fiction film *Forbidden Planet*, the invisible monster that goes on a savage killing spree is finally identified as the primitive unconscious of the man of science Professor Morbius. While awake Morbius is a rational man of peace who appears to be able to keep his temper in check. However, as soon as Morbius sleeps his subconscious 'beast within', empowered by an ancient alien device, is set loose to do all those things that the conscious Morbius perhaps only ever dreamt of in his darkest nightmares. It is at this point that

Morbius finally understands what it was that killed off the enlightened civilization of the Krell thousands of years earlier:

> like you the Krell forgot one deadly danger. Their own subconscious hate and lust for destruction ... And so those mindless beasts of the subconscious had access to a machine that could *never* be shut down. The secret devil of every soul on the planet all set free at once to loot and maim and take revenge, Morbius! And kill!

As the creature comes ever closer, breaking down all barriers before it in its desire to punish Morbius's daughter for abandoning him for the young starship captain Adams, the professor cries out in anguish:

> My evil self is at that door and I have no power to stop him!

I wonder how many times we have thought precisely that? That we are in the grip of something that we cannot control and that is intent upon doing us and other harm?

In many ways Western civilization has had this belief in the need to control the wild and the primitive at its very core: In its colonial policies – we feel we have the right and duty to police more 'primitive' cultures – in its attitude to child rearing – children are understood as undeveloped primitive creatures of instinct and ego, particularly so in Victorian times – and in our attitude to animals – particularly as witnessed in the phenomenon of the Zoo where animals are chained and caged.

Primitive savage beasts must be and indeed can be controlled by the exercise of will and reason. When the beast does emerge it is generally seen as slipping free during a weak moment, as with Professor Morbius, when reason is no longer fully in charge.

Francisco Goya's famous late eighteenth-century etching *The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters* can be seen as reflecting this notion, that only conscious reason holds back the demons and monsters that lurk within the heart of humanity.[37]

In the Jekyll and Hyde story while Dr Jekyll appears to be controlling the beast, experimenting under scientific conditions and utilising a formula that was the product of his reason, eventually the bestial Hyde manages to free himself without Jekyll's aid.

Indeed, it seems to be a motif in literature and film that the beast always finds a way to escape and that it cannot be controlled, short of its destruction, once released. Classic monsters such as Dracula, Frankenstein and Mr Hyde are portrayed as being let loose upon society by well-meaning and apparently civilized individuals who consider themselves to be in some way *in control*.[38]

Bram Stoker's Count Dracula[39] is, effectively, contained within the environs of his ancestral castle, prevented from travelling vast distances for fear of being unable to find a suitable resting place while in transit. It is only with the advent of sophisticated transportation, and the good offices of his lawyer Jonathan Harker, that he is able to take up residence in England and prey upon its population.

> I shuddered as I bent over to touch him, and every sense in me revolted at the contact, but I had to search, or I was lost. The coming night might see my own body a banquet in a similar way to those horrid three. I felt all over the body, but no sign could I find of the key. Then I stopped and looked at the Count. There was a mocking smile on the bloated face which seemed to drive me mad. This was the being I was helping to transfer to London, where, perhaps, for centuries to come he might, amongst its teeming millions, satiate his lust for blood, and create a new and ever-widening circle of semi-demons to batten on the helpless.[40]

Dracula clearly understands himself to be apart from and superior to the rest of humanity by virtue of his status as an aristocrat as much as by his vampiric nature. Humanity is perceived by him to be little more than cattle, livestock to be herded and consumed. Once again we encounter the villain as disengaged, autonomous, rapacious and concerned only with the power to dominate and control. Of course when the blood hunger comes upon Dracula he, along with almost every vampire that has been portrayed after him, is helpless in its grip and becomes a creature of feral instinct.

In the immensely successful Marvel series of comics and films featuring the X-Men – a band of mutant heroes feared by society because of their differences and powers – the most popular character is that of Wolverine. Known variously by his personal name, Logan, and by the codename given to him by the military, Weapon X, Wolverine could be seen as a study in self-control. While undeniably one of the good guys, Wolverine is prone to bouts of berserker rage that often results in the death of his enemies and this normally through the savage use of his own claws. How Logan manages to fight on the side of good, as a hero, while at the same time seeking to maintain control over his murderous urges is an important factor in his popularity. The Wolverine is not a 'red white and blue' hero in the style of Superman or Captain America – heroes who stop short at murder and brutality – the Wolverine, like the Batman and the Punisher, possesses a barely suppressed rage. Indeed it is this rage that paradoxically provides all of these anti-heroes with the strength to fight as well as causing them to fear what they are capable of. In a story which has Wolverine's control over his savagery compromised he enters a house in which the whole family have been butchered:

> NEURI: Do not torture yourself
>
> LOGAN: I gotta do this ... for my own sanity. I've killed in battle, man to man ... but this is different. I always knew the danger of berserker rages ... what might happen if I completely lost control ... but they made me feel it ... enjoy it ...
>
> NEURI: But you did not do it ...
>
> LOGAN: But it felt like I did ... can't you understand? It's in my memory, it's part of me ... I'm gonna make 'em pay, gonna kill... kill ... [41]

In one of the Batman's conflicts with the considerably more powerful Superman he makes this interesting observation about why, even when under the malevolent control of another, Superman will not hurt him:

> If Clark wanted to, he could use his superspeed and squish me into the cement. But I know how he thinks. Even more than Kryptonite, he's got one big weakness. Deep down, Clark's essentially a good person ... and deep down. I'm not.[42]

The Christian theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that what Freud called the ego, the animal or 'beast within' should actually be viewed as determinative for human existence:

> all human beings are determined by the centrality of their ego. They individually experience themselves as the center of their world. Thus they experience space as in front and in back, right and left, with their vantage point at any given moment functioning as the center to which all is related. They experience time as past and future that are divided by the point which is their present, and are thus relative to them. And we experience everything else as being, like time and space, relative to our ego as to the center of our world ... It is not at all the case that egocentricity first makes its appearance in the area of moral behaviour; rather, it already determines the whole way in which we experience the world.[43]

The suggestion here is that we are – at an essential level – egocentric beasts, that this is our natural state and that it is so prior to any ethical interpretation of our behaviour. The fact that a small child might help itself to food or lash out when frustrated or make some hurtful comment to another may very well not be an expression of moral wrong doing but simply animal instinct. For the most part, as we mature, we gain increasing levels of control over our behaviour and the external expression of our inner thoughts and feelings. We do indeed seem to be able, in the main, to contain our impulses and desires and in spite of our awareness of the presence of a dark side within we seldom allow it to surface – at least not for very long. I say in the main because as we are well aware there are those who appear to give full rein to their desires and instincts in a Mr Hyde sort of way. However, it seems to me that this has more to do with the autonomous individualism we spoke of earlier than any 'beast within' forcing us to act against our will. As Joseph Conrad famously commented, 'The belief in a supernatural source of evil is not

necessary; men alone are quite capable of every wickedness.'[44]

The drive towards radical individualism, so characteristic of the post-enlightenment paradigm, has the potential, I believe, to generate villainy on a grand scale. The imposition of a single worldview or value system sourced from the mind of an autonomous individual free from the checks and balances of social or communal engagement is a dangerous thing indeed. It is, by the way, the suspicion with which postmodernism regards such grand narratives that, in my view, represents the most significant achievement of the movement. Its critique of *meta-narratives*, single all encompassing world views, is a timely reminder of the multifaceted complexity of human existence and the limits of our perceptual and epistemic horizons. At a time when globalisation and talk of a new world order are common political currency it is important that we remain alert to the dangers of the totalitarian imposition of a single will upon the whole of humanity.

True villainy has to do not with our passions or instincts nor even with the dark thoughts we all have from time to time. True villainy has to do with the desire to dominate, to subsume the other within the individual self and that without compunction. The villain would appear to lack empathy, the ability to feel for others, to see themselves as part of a larger whole. The villain uses the world and the people in it from a distance, as pure resource. It is little wonder that multinational corporations, bureaucracies and political parties of all kinds are often viewed with suspicion and cast in the role of the villain as they become increasingly disengaged from ordinary human lives. Faceless corporations and other powerful organisations appear to care little for the lives of actual human beings concerning themselves rather with abstractions, apparently for the sake of greater efficiency and objectivity.

For all that we may be rightly critical of his notion of the Superman Nietzsche does have a number of useful lessons to teach us, one of the most important I believe is enshrined in this famous warning:

> Anyone who fights with monsters should make sure that he does not in the process become a monster himself. And when you look for a long time into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.[45]

To collapse into villainy is not to be taken over by the 'beast within' but to have our connection with others compromised. This can happen gradually, even while apparently combating other forms of villainy and evil. As we noted in a previous chapter, the utilising of the methods and tools of the enemy – methods and tools designed to manipulate and dominate – is often enough to turn us into the very monsters we seek to combat. The Batman's refusal to take a life, Gandalf's refusal to use the Ring, Luke's refusal to make use of the power of the dark side of the Force, all of these stand as examples of the heroic rejection of the power to impose one's will upon another.

In the final analysis, and this may seem rather a banal thing to say after all that has gone before, the worst thing one might have to say about villains, both real and imagined, is that with respect to other human beings and the rest of the world – they simply do not care.

http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/
38. Cited G. Wills, *Saint Augustine*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999, p.103.
39. Smith, Kevin, *Clerks*, Miramax, 1994.

Chapter Four: Villains, monsters and evil masterminds

1. Suskind, R., *The New York Times Magazine*, 17 October 2004, p.44; cf. http://www.pastpeak.com/archives/2004/10/the_fuhrer_prin.htm for online extracts.
2. It was disconcerting to do an internet search for the Führer principle, so as to gather more information on Adolf Hitler, only to have Google throw up a significant number of sites relating to George W. Bush.
3. Lukes, S., *Individualism*, Blackwell, 1975, p.7.
4. Moulin, L., 'On the Evolution of the Meaning of the Word Individualism', *International Social Science Bulletin*, VII, p.185.
5. Cited S.Lukes, p.27.
6. Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 'Self-Reliance', in *Essays*, 1841 cf. http://www.emersoncentral.com/selfreliance.htm
7. De Tocqueville, Alexis, *De la Democratie en Amerique*, Book II, pt 11, pp.104–106; cf. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/ch2_02.htm
8. ibid.
9. *Le Monde*, 2 January, 1969.
10. Tolkien, J. R. R., *The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring*, George Allen & Unwin, 1969, Book II, Chapter Six 'Lothlorien', p.366.
11. Lewis, C. S., *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, Grafton, 2002, p.25.
12. Orwell, George, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Part 3, Chapters 5 and 6, 1949; cf: http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/1984/
13. Troeltsch, E., 'The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics' 1922, in O.Gierke, ed., *Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500–1800*, Beacon Press, 1957, p.204.
14. Nolte, E., *Three Faces of Facism*, Mentor, 1969, pp.554–5.
15. *The Gay Science* 116, cited in *A Nietzsche Reader*, Penguin, 1977, p.102.
16. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay: 'Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters', 2. cf. http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/genealogytofc.htm for online version.
17. John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*, Chapter 2.4, 1690; cf. http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm for online version.
18. ibid., Chapter 2.7.
19. Cf. Hermann Goering, for example, is recorded to have said at his trial, 'We had orders to obey the head of state. We weren't a band of criminals meeting in the woods in the dead of night to plan mass murders ... The four real conspirators are missing: The Führer, Himmler, Bormann, and Goebbels'.
    http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/meetthedefendants.html

20. Hohne, H., *The Order of the Death's Head* (English trans.), Pan, 1969, p.72.
21. Nolte, E. pp.520–21.
22. Trevor-Roper, H., ed. *Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944*, London, 1953.
23. *Doctor Who*, 'The Evil of the Daleks', episode 2, BBC, original broadcast May 1967.
24. Rowling, J. K., *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, Bloomsbury, 1997, p.211.
25. *Doctor Who*, 'Genesis of the Daleks', BBC, original broadcast April 1975.
26. Shakespeare, William, *Macbeth*, Penguin, 1994, Act 4, Scene 1; also http://library.thinkquest.org/2888
27. A similar point is made at the end of Chapter 2 of this book.
28. Lombroso, Cesare, *L'Uomo Delinquente* (Criminal Man), 1876.
29. Cf. Chapter 3.
30. Tolkien, *The Fellowship of the Ring*, Book II, Chapter 10, 'The Breaking of the Fellowship'.
31. Genesis 3:12–13, NIV Bible, Hodder & Stoughton, 1979
32. This is a motif that we see clearly portrayed in the 1956 science fiction film *Forbidden Planet*.
33. Plato, *The Republic*, 9.571c, Penguin Classics, 1974; cf. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/Republic.html
34. Kant, Immanual, *Lectures on Ethics*, Methuen, 1979, p.164.
35. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Algora Publishing, 2003, pt 1, 'The Three Metamorphoses'.
36. Cf. *The Wolfman* (1941), *Company of Wolves* (1984), *Cat People* (1942; 1982), *American Werewolf in London* (1981), *Ginger Snaps* (2000) and *Dog Soldiers* (2002) for example.
37. Cf. http://www.artchive.com/artchive/G/goya/goya_sleep_of_reason.jpg.html
    It should be noted that it has been argued that the etching could be interpreted as suggesting that reason itself is nothing but a dream.
38. In both the *Aliens* and *Jurassic Park* film franchises the theme of over-confidence in reason and its technological tools is very much in evidence.
39. Stoker, Bram, *Dracula*, 1897; cf. http://www.online-literature.com/stoker/dracula/
40. ibid., Chapter 4.
41. Davis, A. and Neary, P., *Wolverine: Bloodlust*, Marvel Comics, 1990.
42. Loeb, J., Lee, J., Williams, S., *Batman: Hush*, Vol. 1, DC Comics, 2003.
43. Pannenberg, Wolfhart, *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*, T&T Clark, 1985, pp.106–7.
44. Conrad, Joseph, *The Secret Agent*, 1907, Chapter 4; http://conrad.thefreelibrary.com
45. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 146, 1885; cf. http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/beyondgoodandevil_tofc.htm