**SMART CONTRACTS AUDITS KYC CERTIFICATIONS** 

WEB3 DAPPS DEVELOPMENT **BUSSINES ANALYSIS** 

# IS SECURING THE FUTURE IS TRUSTCODEX

## **SMART CONTRACT AUDIT** SQUIRTLE POKEMON

Final version - 28 June 2023



**AUDIT PASSED** 





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## Disclaimer

Please be aware that these evaluations should not be regarded as an endorsement or critique of any particular project or team, nor do they provide any guarantees regarding the security of said project. Additionally, these assessments should not be considered indicative of the economic value or viability of any product, service, or asset created by a team. It is important to note that Trustcodex does not conduct testing or auditing of integrations with external contracts or services.

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The primary objective of Trustcodex assessments is to assist customers in enhancing the quality of their code, while concurrently minimizing the inherent risks associated with cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology. However, it is crucial to understand that each company and individual is ultimately responsible for conducting their own due diligence and maintaining the ongoing security of their technology. Trustcodex does not guarantee the security or functionality of the analyzed technology.

The assessments are exclusively created for clients and are published with their explicit consent. The scope of the review is limited to the Solidity code, which is still in the developmental phase and susceptible to unidentified risks and vulnerabilities. It is important to clarify that the review does not extend beyond Solidity to encompass the compiler layer or any other areas that may pose potential security risks.

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#### 1. Audit overview

#### 1.1. Methodology

Our team of experienced testers and smart contract developers carried out a line-by-line review, meticulously documenting any problems encountered. During the evaluation process, utmost care is exercised to examine the repository for security concerns, code excellence, and compliance with specifications and established practices.

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- Preparation: Attain a thorough comprehension of the smart contract's purpose, functionality, and requirements, encompassing its intended use case, business logic, and security prerequisites.
- **Documentation Review:** Scrutinize the smart contract documentation to ensure its accuracy in describing the contract's functionality and accessibility to all relevant parties.
- Code Review: Conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the smart contract's code, encompassing its logic, data structures, and security measures, utilizing a combination of automated and manual methods.
- Functionality Testing: Verify the smart contract's functionality by subjecting it to various scenarios to ensure its intended operation and appropriate handling of edge cases.
- **Security Assessment**: Assess the smart contract's security measures, including its resilience against attacks, while identifying any potential vulnerabilities such as unhandled exceptions, reentrancy issues, and contract denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
- Performance Optimization: Analyze the smart contract's performance metrics, including gas usage and execution time, and provide recommendations for enhancing efficiency and reducing costs.
- Reporting: Prepare a comprehensive report documenting the findings and recommendations, including a detailed description of any identified security vulnerabilities and suggested remedial measures.

## 1.2. Vulnerability & Risk level

Risk Level is determined by assessing the likelihood of a specific sourcethreat exploiting a vulnerability and evaluating the potential impact of such an event on the organization or system. The calculation of Risk Level follows the guidelines of CVSS version 3.0.

|  | LEVEL         | VULNERABILITY  | ACTIONS   |
|--|---------------|--|---|
|  | CRITICAL      | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.      | Immediate action to reduce risk level.                              |
| Comment of the last of the las | HIGH          | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.           |
|  | MEDIUM        | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.                                    | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.           |
|  | LOW           | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on scenarios for the use of the contract and is subjective.                        | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| - Control 10   | INFORMATIONAL | A vulnerability that has informational character but is not affecting any of the code.   | An observation that does<br>not determine a level of<br>risk        |

## 2. Scope of work

The purpose of this audit is to conduct a thorough assessment of the code and functionality of a smart contract in order to detect any potential security weaknesses, enhance performance, and verify that the contract functions as intended.

The project team has provided us with the necessary files, such as those on Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, etc., which require testing. Our focus will be on evaluating the overall performance of the provided contracts and identifying any vulnerabilities or discrepancies in owner privileges that could potentially impact users interacting with these contracts.

| Version | Date     | Scope               |
|---------|----------|---------------------|
| 1.0     | 24.06.23 | First audit release |

### 2.1. Project description

Name: SQUIRTLE POKEMON

Website: <a href="https://squirtlepokemon.com/">https://squirtlepokemon.com/</a>

Twitter: https://twitter.com/Squitleweb3nft

Telegram: N/A

**KYC:** Project has not doxed with Trustcodex

Network: Binance Smart Chain

Contract v1.0:

https://bscscan.com/token/0xe5bc71a670bd0b2476bf412a183e94043 89b2672

#### Logo:



#### Description:

A blockchain project that brings a fresh, vibrant, and exciting experience to the world of the metaverse. It is a unique digital playground where your favorite Pokémon toys come to life, breathing with vitality and exploring the vast world of the metaverse.

#### 2.2. Assessed contracts

#### **Tested Contract Files**

The audit encompassed the following files listed below, along with their corresponding SHA-1Hash. It has come to our attention that one of the files has been altered, intentionally or unintentionally, subsequent to the security review, resulting in a different SHA-1Hash.

#### V1.0


| File name            | SHA-1Hash                                |  |
|----------------------|--|--|
| SquirtelPokemoon.sol | 164daff747962beb9bf36b94173814d600697e80 |  |

#### Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

#### Imported packages:

| Dependency / import Path   | Count |
|--|-------|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol                    | 1     |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol | 1     |

#### Inheritance graph



## 3. Findings

Throughout the review process, our team of highly skilled pentesters and smart contract developers conducted a comprehensive evaluation, which encompassed an overall project analysis. Great care was taken to assess the repository for security issues, code standard, and conformity to specifications and industry norms. A meticulous line-by-line examination was carried out, wherein any identified issues were recorded in detail.

## 3.1.Token

#### 3.1.1. Distribution

- Burned supply
- Liquidity
- Marketing
- CEX listing
- TEAM

#### 3.1.2. Liquidity status

The current audit block reveals a lack of liquidity for the token. If the liquidity becomes accessible, it opens the door for the notorious act referred to as a 'rug pull' by token developers.

As investors purchase tokens from the exchange, the liquidity pool gradually accumulates an increasing number of coins with established value, such as ETH, BNB, or Tether. At that point, developers can withdraw the liquidity from the exchange, convert it into cash, and make off with the funds.

To instill confidence in investors and prevent the token developers from absconding with the liquidity funds, the liquidity is secured by renouncing ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a predetermined duration. These tokens are sent to a time-lock smart contract, effectively preventing developers from reclaiming the liquidity pool funds. This practice has become a standard procedure followed by all token developers, and it serves as a clear distinction between a legitimate coin and a fraudulent one.

Furthermore, the team can enhance safety measures by permanently removing LP shares through burning, ensuring an even higher level of security (time lock without limit).

#### 3.1.3. Privileges and roles

#### Correct implementation of Token standard

| Function     | Description   | Exist | Status |
|--------------|---|-------|--------|
| Total supply | Provides information about the total token supply                           | YES   | 口口     |
| BalanceOf    | Provides account balance of the owner's account                             | YES   | 口口     |
| Transfer     | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address   | YES   | 台      |
| TransferFrom | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address | YES   | 口      |
| Арргоvе      | Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account | YES   | 凸      |
| Allowance    | Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner                  | YES   | 凸      |

#### Is contract an upgradeable

| Description          | Sta | tus |
|----------------------|-----|-----|
| Upgradeable contract | NO  | 凸   |

Owner cannot deploy a new version of the contract changing any setting providing the owners new privileges.

#### Deployer can interact with the contract

| Function          | Description              | Exist | Status      |
|-------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------------|
| RenounceOwnership | Owner renounce ownership | YES   | $\triangle$ |

The contract ownership is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

#### Deployer can mint any new tokens

| Function | Description       | Exist | Status    |
|----------|-------------------|-------|-----------|
| Mint     | Deployer can mint | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy. The project has a total supply and owners cannot mint any more than the max supply.

#### Deployer can burn or lock user funds

| Function | Description                  | Exist | Status    |
|----------|------------------------------|-------|-----------|
| Lock     | Deployer can lock user funds | NO    | $\otimes$ |
| Burn     | Deployer can burn funds      | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners cannot manually burn LP funds or lock user funds.

#### Deployer can pause the contract

| Function | Description        | Exist | Status    |
|----------|--------------------|-------|-----------|
| Pause    | Deployer can pause | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners cannot stop or pause trading. Investors can trade at any given time if owner disable swap

#### Deployer can change fees in the contract

| Function | Description            | Exist | Status    |
|----------|------------------------|-------|-----------|
| editFee  | Deployer can edit fees | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners have not the ability to set fees.

#### Deployer can blacklist addresses in the contract

| Function  | Description            | Exist | Status    |
|-----------|------------------------|-------|-----------|
| blacklist | Deployer can blacklist | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners of do not have a blacklist function their contract. The contract does not allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions. Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.

#### Deployer can whitelist addresses in the contract

| Function  | Description            | Exist | Status    |
|-----------|------------------------|-------|-----------|
| whitelist | Deployer can whitelist | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners do not have a whitelist function their contract. The contract does not allow owners to transfer their tokens without any fee or max tx requirements. Token owner normally is whitelisted to avoid paying fees or being blocked by other functions.

#### Deployer can set Max transfer in the contract

| Function | Description                   | Exist | Status    |
|----------|-------------------------------|-------|-----------|
| МахТх    | Deployer can set max transfer | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners cannot set max tx amount. The team do allow investors to swap, transfer or sell more than max tx amount.

#### Deployer can set Maxwallet in the contract

| Function  | Description                | Exist | Status    |
|-----------|----------------------------|-------|-----------|
| Maxwallet | Deployer can set maxwallet | NO    | $\otimes$ |

The project owners cannot set max wallet amount. The team do allow investors to hold more than certain tokens to avoid centralization. Nevertheless, same user can have several max wallets.

## Legend

| Symbol      | Meaning       |
|-------------|---------------|
| r<br>S      | Passed        |
| $\triangle$ | Not passed    |
| $\otimes$   | Not available |

## Modifiers and public functions



## Privileges and modifiers comments

N/A

#### **SWC** check

The following table contains an overview of the SWC registry. Each row consists of an SWC identifier (ID), weakness title, CWE parent and list of related code samples. For further information regarding SCW ID or CEW relationships go to <a href="https://swcregistry.io/">https://swcregistry.io/</a>

| ID      | Title                                   | Relationships  | Status |
|---------|---|--|--------|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility             | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards  | 凸      |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow          | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation   | 凸      |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version               | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities   | 凸      |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma                         | CWE-664: Improper Control of a<br>Resource Through its Lifetime                                      | 凸      |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value             | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value  | 凸      |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal            | CWE-284: Improper Access Control   | 凸      |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction    | CWE-284: Improper Access Control   | 凸      |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy                              | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of<br>Behavioral Workflow  | 凸      |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility       | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards  | 凸      |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer           | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer   | 凸      |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation                        | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control<br>Flow Implementation   | 凸      |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity<br>Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function  | 凸      |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee        | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere                                    | 凸      |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call                    | CWE-703: Improper Check or<br>Handling of Exceptional Conditions                                     | 凸      |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence            | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | 凸      |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin         | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function  | 凸      |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time        | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere                                    | 凸      |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability                  | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature  | 凸      |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name              | CWE-665: Improper Initialization   | 凸      |

| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables                                  | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards                        | 凸      |
|---------|--|--|--------|
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness<br>from Chain Attributes        | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently<br>Random Values                        | 凸      |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against<br>Signature Replay Attacks     | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature              | 凸      |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature<br>Verification                   | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity                | 凸      |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation                                      | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller                 | 凸      |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage<br>Location                     | CWE-123: Write-what-where<br>Condition                                 | 凸      |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order                                | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order                                      | 凸      |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing                                  | CWE-691: Insufficient Control Flow<br>Management                       | 凸      |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function<br>Type Variable              | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level<br>Functionality                             | 凸      |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit                                   | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource<br>Consumption                          | 凸      |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error  | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator                                     | 凸      |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)          | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | 凸      |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables                               | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code  | 凸      |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance                                   | CWE-667: Improper Locking  | 凸      |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple<br>Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by<br>Capture-replay                    | r<br>S |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount                     | CWE-655: Improper Initialization                                       |        |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects                                       | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code  | 凸      |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-<br>Chain                      | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private<br>Variable via Public Method      | 凸      |

## Legend

| I | Symbol      | Meaning    |  |
|---|-------------|------------|--|
|   | 尽           | Passed     |  |
|   | $\triangle$ | Not passed |  |

## 4. Audit results

## 4.1. Critical issues

| LEVEL    | VULNERABILITY   | ACTIONS                                |
|----------|---|--|
| CRITICAL | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |

| Issue      | File | Line | Description              | Status   |
|------------|------|------|--------------------------|----------|
| <u>-</u> ( | -    | -    | NO CRITICAL ISSUES FOUND | <u> </u> |

## 4.2. High issues

| LEVEL | VULNERABILITY  | ACTIONS   |
|-------|--|---|
| HIGH  | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |

| Issue | File | Line | Description          | Status |
|-------|------|------|----------------------|--------|
| -     | -    | -    | NO HIGH ISSUES FOUND |        |

## 4.3. Medium issues

| LEVEL  | VULNERABILITY   | ACTIONS   |
|--------|---|---|
| MEDIUM | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |

| Issue | File | Line | Description            | Stauts |
|-------|------|------|------------------------|--------|
| -     | H a  | - [  | NO MEDIUM ISSUES FOUND | -      |

## 4.4. Low issues

| LEVEL | VULNERABILITY   | ACTIONS   |
|-------|---|---|
| LOW   | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on scenarios for the use of the contract and is subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |

| Issue | File    | Line | Description   | Status |
|-------|---------|------|---|--------|
| #1    | Main SC | ,    | It is recommended to add the constant version of solidity as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs | _      |

## 4.5. Informational issues

| LEVEL         | VULNERABILITY  | ACTIONS  |
|---------------|--|--|
| INFORMATIONAL | A vulnerability that has informational character but is not affecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

| Issue | File    | Line | Description  | Status |
|-------|---------|------|--|--------|
| #1    | Main SC | -    | If you started to comment on your code, also comment on all other functions, variables, etc. | -      |

#### V1.0 Issues Comments

We recommend you to use NatSpec Format form (<a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variable, functions etc. do.

#### 4.6. Audit Score

| Description          | Score  |  |
|----------------------|--------|--|
| Project score        | 85/100 |  |
| Code structure score | 87/100 |  |
| Auditor score        | 82/100 |  |
| SWC score            | 83/100 |  |

| Final score | 85/100 |
|-------------|--------|

To enhance the evaluation process and determine the value of the audit, a scoring system has been implemented on this page. The scoring system ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest achievable score. However, in order to attain a perfect score, the project must meet all the necessary criteria and provide all the required data for assessment.

It is important to note that the passing score has been established at 75 points. If a project fails to reach a score of 75% or higher, it will be deemed an automatic failure. Please refer to the following notes and final assessment for further details.

