

# Spec-Up-T KERIsuite Glossary


Create technical specifications in markdown. Based on the original Spec-Up,  
extended with Terminology tooling

---

# Contents

---

Status  
Copyright Notice  
Terms of Use  
Introduction  
Linking to this Glossary  
Referenced Glossaries  
    Interlinked glossary summary  
Terms and Definitions  
Powered By Spec-Up-T



– There are 332 terms –

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR

STUVWX

0 matches

▲

▼

## # KERI Suite Glossary

**Specification Status:** Public Review Draft 01 (PR1)

### Latest Draft:

- [Github Repository ↗](#)
- [Submit/View Issues ↗](#)
- [Discussions ↗](#)

### Editors:

- [Samuel Smith ↗, Gen ↗](#)
- [Drummond Reed ↗, Gen ↗](#)
- [Henk van Cann ↗](#)

### Contributors:

- [Kor Dwarshuis](#) ↗

## Participate:

- [GitHub repo](#) ↗
  - [Commit history](#) ↗
- 

## # Status

This is the first public review draft of the KERI Main Glossary. It is also the first version published using the [Spec-Up-T specification editing utility](#) ↗ based on [Spec-Up specification editing utility](#) ↗ developed by the [Decentralized Identity Foundation](#) ↗.

## # Copyright Notice

| TBW Sam, please check to what extend you want to copy ToIP's terms |

This specification is subject to the **OWF Contributor License Agreement 1.0 - Copyright** available at <https://www.openwebfoundation.org/the-agreements/the-owf-1-0-agreements-granted-claims/owf-contributor-license-agreement-1-0-copyright> ↗.

These terms are inherited from the [KERI Suite Working Group](#) ↗ at the Trust over IP (ToIP) Foundation. [Working Group Charter](#) ↗

## # Terms of Use

These materials are made available under and are subject to the [OWF CLA 1.0 - Copyright & Patent license](#) ↗. Any source code is made available under the [Apache 2.0 license](#) ↗.

THESE MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED "AS IS." The Trust Over IP Foundation, established as the Joint Development Foundation Projects, LLC, Trust Over IP Foundation Series ("ToIP"), and its members and contributors (each of ToIP, its members and contributors, a "ToIP Party") expressly disclaim any warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to the materials. The entire risk as to implementing or otherwise using the materials is assumed by the implementer and user.

IN NO EVENT WILL ANY ToIP PARTY BE LIABLE TO ANY OTHER PARTY FOR LOST PROFITS OR ANY FORM OF INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY CHARACTER FROM ANY CAUSES OF ACTION OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO THESE MATERIALS, ANY DELIVERABLE OR THE ToIP GOVERNING AGREEMENT, WHETHER BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE, AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

## # Introduction

The KERI Main Glossary is a deliverable of the ToIP KERI Suite Working Group. Its purpose is to promote shared understanding of terms and concepts across the many different working groups, communities, enterprises, and ecosystems who are collaborating to develop and deploy decentralized digital trust infrastructure.

Contributions and feedback are encouraged from any stakeholder in this area of terminology.

## # Linking to this Glossary

This glossary is designed to be both human and machine readable. All terms are listed alphabetically; acronyms are listed separately and linked to the fully expanded terms. Document authors can link directly to any term using standard web links and anchors following this syntax:

`https://weboftrust.github.io/kerisuite-glossary#term:xxxx`

Where `xxxxx` is the term as it appears in the glossary, with any spaces are replaced by en-dashes (hyphens). For example, a link to the term `self-certifying identifier` would be:

`https://weboftrust.github.io/kerisuite-glossary#self-certifying-identifier`

A specification document written using the [Trustoverip](#)'s open source [Spec-Up-T environment](#) documented in the [Spec-Up-T manual](#), originally based on [Decentralized Identity Foundation](#)'s open source [Spec-Up editor](#).

The tool may create special external references to terms in this glossary using the Spec-Up `xref` and the `tref` tags following this syntax:

`[ [xref: glossary, xxxx] ] and [ [tref: glossary, xxxx] ]`

Note: we've put spaces between brackets to be able to present this literally; remove the spaces in use.

Where `glossary` is the text label the document author assigns to the URL of a Web-accessible glossary, and `xxxxx` is the term as it appears in that glossary, with any spaces are replaced by en-dashes (hyphens). For example, a Spec-Up external reference to the term `self-certifying identifier` using the label `toip` for this glossary would look like this:

`[[xref: toip, self-certifying-identifier]]`

An item borrowed from an other glossary might look like this:

[[xref: vlei, 00R]]

## # Referenced Glossaries

These glossaries have been interlinked using `tref` and `xref` tags. We show both test and production environments. The `specs.json` is for proficient users to inspect the production settings.

### # Interlinked glossary summary

↗ ↗

Glossary	TEST repo	Live TEST Glossary	Productio n repo	Live PRODUCTION Glossary	Specs.json PROD
KERIsuite	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">WebofTrus t</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗
vLEI	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗				
ToIP Main	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">ToIP</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗
ToIP General IT	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">ToIP</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗

The following glossaries were used as sources for some of the definitions in the ToIP General Glossary. All source glossaries are cited in the definitions of each term.

Short Name	Source Glossary	URL
Wikipedia	Wikipedia	<a href="https://www.wikipedia.org/">https://www.wikipedia.org/</a> ↗
eSSIF-Lab	eSSIF-Lab Glossary	<a href="https://essif-lab.github.io/framework/docs/essifLab-glossary/">https://essif-lab.github.io/framework/docs/essifLab-glossary/</a> ↗
NIST-CSRC	NIST Computer Security Resource Center Glossary	<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/">https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/</a> ↗

Short Name	Source Glossary	URL
W3C DID	W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) 1.0	<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/#terminology">https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/#terminology</a> ↗
W3C VC	W3C VC Data Model 1.1	<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#terminology">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#terminology</a> ↗

## # Terms and Definitions

---

## # KERI Suite Glossary

**Specification Status:** Public Review Draft 01 (PR1)

**Latest Draft:**

- [Github Repository](#) ↗
- [Submit/View Issues](#) ↗
- [Discussions](#) ↗

**Editors:**

- [Samuel Smith](#) ↗, [Gen](#) ↗
- [Drummond Reed](#) ↗, [Gen](#) ↗
- [Henk van Cann](#) ↗

**Contributors:**

- [Kor Dwarshuis](#) ↗

**Participate:**

- [GitHub repo](#) ↗
  - [Commit history](#) ↗
- 

## # # Status

This is the first public review draft of the KERI Main Glossary. It is also the first version published using the [Spec-Up-T specification editing utility](#) ↗ based on [Spec-Up specification editing utility](#) ↗ developed by the [Decentralized Identity Foundation](#) ↗.

## # # Copyright Notice

| TBW Sam, please check to what extend you want to copy ToIP's terms |

This specification is subject to the **OWF Contributor License Agreement 1.0 - Copyright** available at <https://www.openwebfoundation.org/the-agreements/the-owf-1-0-agreements-granted-claims/owf-contributor-license-agreement-1-0-copyright>.

These terms are inherited from the [KERI Suite Working Group](#) at the Trust over IP (ToIP) Foundation. [Working Group Charter](#)

## # # Terms of Use

These materials are made available under and are subject to the [OWF CLA 1.0 - Copyright & Patent license](#). Any source code is made available under the [Apache 2.0 license](#).

THESE MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED "AS IS." The Trust Over IP Foundation, established as the Joint Development Foundation Projects, LLC, Trust Over IP Foundation Series ("ToIP"), and its members and contributors (each of ToIP, its members and contributors, a "ToIP Party") expressly disclaim any warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to the materials. The entire risk as to implementing or otherwise using the materials is assumed by the implementer and user.

IN NO EVENT WILL ANY ToIP PARTY BE LIABLE TO ANY OTHER PARTY FOR LOST PROFITS OR ANY FORM OF INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY CHARACTER FROM ANY CAUSES OF ACTION OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO THESE MATERIALS, ANY DELIVERABLE OR THE ToIP GOVERNING AGREEMENT, WHETHER BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

## # # Introduction

The KERI Main Glossary is a deliverable of the ToIP KERI Suite Working Group. Its purpose is to promote shared understanding of terms and concepts across the many different working groups, communities, enterprises, and ecosystems who are collaborating to develop and deploy decentralized digital trust infrastructure.

Contributions and feedback are encouraged from any stakeholder in this area of terminology.

## # # Linking to this Glossary

This glossary is designed to be both human and machine readable. All terms are listed alphabetically; acronyms are listed separately and linked to the fully expanded terms. Document authors can link directly to any term using standard web links and anchors following this syntax:

<https://weboftrust.github.io/kerisuite-glossary#term:xxxxx>

Where `xxxxx` is the term as it appears in the glossary, with any spaces replaced by en-dashes (hyphens). For example, a link to the term `self-certifying identifier` would be:

<https://weboftrust.github.io/kerisuite-glossary#self-certifying-identifier>

A specification document written using the [Trustoverip](#)'s open source [Spec-Up-T environment](#) documented in the [Spec-Up-T manual](#), originally based on [Decentralized Identity Foundation](#)'s open source [Spec-Up editor](#).

The tool may create special external references to terms in this glossary using the Spec-Up `xref` and the `tref` tags following this syntax:

[ [xref: glossary, xxxx] ] and [ [tref: glossary, xxxx] ]

Note: we've put spaces between brackets to be able to present this literally; remove the spaces in use.

Where `glossary` is the text label the document author assigns to the URL of a Web-accessible glossary, and `xxxxx` is the term as it appears in that glossary, with any spaces are replaced by en-dashes (hyphens). For example, a Spec-Up external reference to the term `self-certifying identifier` using the label `toip` for this glossary would look like this:

[[xref: toip, self-certifying-identifier]]

An item borrowed from an other glossary might look like this:

[[xref: vlei, 00R]]

## # # Referenced Glossaries

These glossaries have been interlinked using `tref` and `xref` tags. We show both test and production environments. The `specs.json` is for proficient users to inspect the production settings.

## # # Interlinked glossary summary



Glossary	TEST repo	Live TEST Glossary	Production repo	Live PRODUCTION Glossary	Specs.json PROD
KERIsuite	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">WebofTrust</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗
vLEI	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗				
ToIP Main	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">ToIP</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗
ToIP General IT	<a href="#">HenkvanC ann</a> ↗	<a href="#">TEST</a> ↗	<a href="#">ToIP</a> ↗	<a href="#">PRODUCTION</a> ↗	<a href="#">Specs.json</a> ↗

The following glossaries were used as sources for some of the definitions in the ToIP General Glossary. All source glossaries are cited in the definitions of each term.

Short Name	Source Glossary	URL
Wikipedia	Wikipedia	<a href="https://www.wikipedia.org/">https://www.wikipedia.org/</a> ↗
eSSIF-Lab	eSSIF-Lab Glossary	<a href="https://essif-lab.github.io/framework/docs/essifLab-glossary">https://essif-lab.github.io/framework/docs/essifLab-glossary</a> ↗
NIST-CSRC	NIST Computer Security Resource Center Glossary	<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/">https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/</a> ↗
W3C DID	W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) 1.0	<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/#terminology">https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/#terminology</a> ↗
W3C VC	W3C VC Data Model 1.1	<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#terminology">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#terminology</a> ↗

## # # Terms and Definitions

# abandoned-identifier ✎  17

An [AID](#) is abandoned when either the [inception-event](#) or a subsequent [rotation-event](#) rotates to an empty next key digest list (which means the next threshold must also be 0).

## # access-controlled-interaction ↗ 17 ▲

Access controlled actions like submitting a report. If you already have that report then load balancer needs a mechanism to drop repeated requests.

## # ACDC ↗ 17 ▲

[authentic-chained-data-container](#)

## # ADC ↗ 17 ▲

[authentic-data-container](#)

## # AID ↗ 17 ▲

[autonomic-identifier](#)

## # ambient-verifiability ↗ 17 ▲

Verifiable by anyone, anywhere, at anytime. Although this seems a general term, it was first used in the context of KERI by Sam Smith.

## # ample ↗ 17 ▲

The minimum required number of participants in an event to have a [supermajority](#) so that one and only one agreement or consensus on an event may be reached. This is a critical part of the [KAACE](#) agreement algorithm (consensus) in KERI for establishing consensus between witnesses on the key state of a KERI identifier.

## # APC ↗ 17 ▲

[authentic-provenance-chain](#)

## # authentic-chained-data-container ↗ 17 ▲

a directed acyclic graph with properties to provide a verifiable chain of [proof-of-authorship](#). See the full [specification](#) ↗

## # authentic-data-container ✎ 17 ▲

A mechanism for conveying data that allows the [authenticity](#) of its content to be proved.

## # authentic-provenance-chain ✎ 17 ▲

Interlinked [presentation-exchange](#) of evidence that allow data to be tracked back to its origin in an objectively [verifiable](#) way.

## # authoritative ✎ 17 ▲

Established control [authority](#) over an identifier, that has received attestations to it, e.g. control over the identifier has been verified to its root-of-trust. So the (control over the) identifier is 'authoritative' because it can be considered accurate, renowned, honourable and / or respected.

## # authorized-vlei-representative ✎ 17 ▲

Also 'AVR'. This a representative of a Legal Entity that are authorized by the [DAR](#) of a Legal Entity to request issuance and revocation of:

## # autonomic-identifier ✎ 17 ▲

a self-managing cryptonymous identifier that must be self-certifying (self-authenticating) and must be encoded in CESR as a qualified Cryptographic primitive.

## # autonomic-trust-basis ✎ 17 ▲

When we use an [AID](#) as the [root-of-trust](#) we form a so-called *autonomic trust basis*. This is diagrammed as follows:

## # AVR ✎ 17 ▲

[authorized-vlei-representative](#)

## # backer ✎ 17 ▲

an alternative to a traditional KERI based [Witness](#) ↗ commonly using Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to store the [KEL](#) ↗ for an identifier.

# BADA ✎ 17 ▲

[best-available-data-acceptance-mechanism](#)

# base-media-type ✎ 17 ▲

credential plus ld plus json.

# bespoke-credential ✎ 17 ▲

It's an [issuance-event](#) of the disclosure or presentation of other ACDCs. *Bespoke* means *Custom* or *tailor made*.

# best-available-data-acceptance-mechanism ✎ 17 ▲

The BADA security model provides a degree of [replay-attack](#) protection. The attribute originator (issuer, author, source) is provided by an attached signature couple or quadruple. A single reply could have multiple originators. When used as an [authorization](#) the reply attributes may include the identifier of the authorizer and the logic for processing the associated route may require a matching attachment.

# bexter ✎ 17 ▲

The class variable length text that is used in CESR and preserves the round-trip transposability using Base64 URL safe-only encoding even though the text variable length.

# bis ✎ 17 ▲

bis = backed vc issue, registry-backed transaction event log credential issuance

# bivalent ✎ 17 ▲

A nested set of layered delegations in a [delegation](#) tree, wraps each layer with compromise recovery protection of the next higher layer. This maintains the security of the root layer for compromise recovery all the way out to the leaves in spite of the leaves using less secure key management methods.

## # blind-oobi

A blind [OOBI](#) means that you have some mechanisms in place for verifying the [AID](#) instead of via the OOBI itself. A blind OOBI is essentially a [URL](#). It's called "blind" because the witness is not in the OOBI itself. You have other ways of verifying the AID supplied.

## # blinded-revocation-registry

The current state of a [transaction-event-log](#) (TEL) **may be hidden or blinded** such that *the only way for a potential verifier of the state to observe that state is when the controller of a designated AID discloses it at the time of presentation.*

## # bran

A cryptographic string used as a primary input, a seed, for creating key material for and [autonomic-identifier](#).

## # brv

brv = backed vc revoke, registry-backed transaction event log credential revocation

## # cesr-proof-signatures

CESR Proof Signatures is an extension to the Composable Event Streaming Representation [CESR] that provides transposable cryptographic signature attachments on self-addressing data [SAD](#). Any SAD, such as an Authentic Chained Data Container (ACDC) Verifiable Credential [ACDC], for example, may be signed with a CESR Proof Signature and streamed along with any other CESR content. In addition, a signed SAD can be embedded inside another SAD, and the CESR proof signature attachment can be transposed across envelope boundaries and streamed without losing any cryptographic integrity.

## # CESR-version

the CESR Version is provided by a special Count Code that specifies the Version of all the CESR code tables in a given Stream or Stream section.

## # CESR

[composable-event-streaming-representation](#)

## # cesride

is concerned with parsing CESR primitives.

## # chain-link-confidential-disclosure

contractual restrictions and liability imposed on a recipient of a disclosed [ACDC](#) that contractually link the obligations to protect the disclosure of the information contained within the ACDC to all subsequent recipients as the information moves downstream. The Chain-link Confidential Disclosure provides a mechanism for protecting against un-permissioned exploitation of the data disclosed via an ACDC.

## # chain-link-confidentiality

Chains together a sequence of [disclosee](#) which may also include a set of constraints on data usage by both second and third parties expressed in legal language such that the constraints apply to all recipients of the disclosed data thus the phrase "chain link" confidentiality. Each Disclosee in the sequence in turn is the [discloser](#) to the next Disclosee.

## # cigar

An [unindexed-signature](#).

## # CLC

[chain-link-confidentiality](#)

## # code-table-selector

the first character in the text code of [composable-event-streaming-representation](#) that determines which [code-table](#) to use, either a default code table or a code table selector character when not the default code table. Thus the 1 character text code table must do double duty. It must provide selectors for the different text code tables and also provide type codes for the most popular primitives that have a pad size of 1 that appear in the default code table.

## # cold-start-stream-parsing

After a reboot (or cold start), a stream processor looks for framing information to know how to parse groups of elements in the stream.

## # compact-disclosure / 17



a disclosure of an ACDC that discloses only the SAID(s) of some or all of its field maps. Both Partial and Selective Disclosure rely on Compact Disclosure.

## # compact-variant / 17



Either a [most-compact](#) version of an ACDC or the [fully-compact](#) version of an ACDC. An [issuer](#) commitment via a signature to any variant of ACDC (compact, full, etc) makes a cryptographic commitment to the top-level section fields shared by all variants of that ACDC because the value of a [top-level-section](#) is either the [SAD](#) or the [SAID](#) of the SAD of the associated section.

## # composability / 17



short for text-binary concatenation composability. An encoding has Composability when any set of Self-Framing concatenated Primitives expressed in either the Text domain or Binary domain may be converted as a group to the other Domain and back again without loss.

## # composable-event-streaming-representation / 17



Also called 'CESR'. This compact encoding scheme fully supports both textual and binary streaming applications of attached crypto material of all types. This approach includes [composability](#) in both the textual and binary streaming domains. The [primitive](#) may be the minimum possible but still composable size.

## # composable / 17



[composability](#)

## # configuration-traits / 17



a list of specially defined strings representing a configuration of a KEL. See [#configuration-traits-field](#).

## # contingent-disclosure / 17



Contingent disclosure is a privacy-preserving mechanism where only specific information or attributes are disclosed under defined conditions. It enables the selective sharing of data

such that only the required information is revealed to a relying party, without exposing other unrelated or sensitive details. [chain-link-confidentiality](#) is a form of contingent disclosure.

## # contractually-protected-disclosure ↗

a discloser of an ACDC that leverages a Graduated Disclosure so that contractual protections can be put into place to minimize the leakage of information that can be correlated. A Contractually Protected Disclosure partially or selectively reveals the information contained within the ACDC in the initial interaction with the recipient and discloses further information only after the recipient agrees to the terms established by the discloser. More information may be progressively revealed as the recipient agrees to additional terms.

## # controller ↗

an entity that can cryptographically prove the control authority over an AID and make changes on the associated KEL. A controller of a multi-sig AID may consist of multiple controlling entities.

## # cooperative-delegation ↗

The way KERI addresses the [security-cost-performance-architecture-trade-off](#) is via [delegation](#) of identifier prefixes. Delegation includes a delegator and a delegate. For this reason we may call this a cooperative delegation. This is a somewhat **novel form of delegation**.

## # correlation ↗

In our scope this is an identifier used to indicate that external parties have observed how wallet contents are related.

## # count-code ↗

[group-framing-code](#)

## # credential ↗

Evidence of authority, status, rights, entitlement to privileges, or the like.

## # current-threshold ↗

represents the number or fractional weights of signatures from the given set of current keys required to be attached to a [Message](#) ↗ for the [Message](#) ↗ to be considered fully signed.

## # custodial-agent ✎ 17

An [agent](#) owned by an individual who has granted [signing-authority](#) to a custodian who is usually also the host of the running agent software. Using [partial-rotation](#) to facilitate custodial key management the owner of the identifier retains [rotation-authority](#) and thus the ability to "fire" the custodian at any time without requiring the cooperation of the custodian.

## # custodial-rotation ✎ 17

Rotation is based on control authority that is split between two key sets. The first for signing authority and the second (pre-rotated) for rotation authority, the associated thresholds and key list can be structured so that a designated custodial agent can hold signing authority, while the original controller can hold exclusive rotation authority.

## # dead-attack ✎ 17

an attack on an [establishment-event](#) that occurs after the Key-state for that event has become stale because a later establishment event has rotated the sets of signing and pre-rotated keys to new sets.

## # decentralized-identity ✎ 17

KERI's definition of decentralization (centralization) is about *control* not *spatial distribution*. In our definition *decentralized* is not necessarily the same as *distributed*. By distributed we mean that activity happens at more than one site. Thus decentralization is about *control* and distribution is about *place*. To elaborate, when we refer to decentralized infrastructure we mean infrastructure under decentralized (centralized) control no matter its spatial distribution. Thus *decentralized infrastructure* is infrastructure sourced or controlled by more than one [entity](#).

## # DEL ✎ 17

[duplicitous-event-log](#)

## # delegated-identifier ✎ 17

Matches the act of [delegation](#) with the appropriate digital twin. Consequently when applied recursively, delegation may be used to compose arbitrarily complex trees of hierarchical (delegative) key management event streams. This is a most powerful capability that may provide an essential building block for a generic universal decentralized key management infrastructure ([DKMI](#)) that is also compatible with the demand of generic event streaming applications.

## # derivation-code ↗ 17 ▲

To properly extract and use the [public-key-infrastructure](#) embedded in a [self-certifying-identifier](#) we need to know the cryptographic *signing scheme* used by the [key-pair](#). KERI includes this very compactly in the identifier, by replacing the pad character (a character used to fill a void to able to always end up with a fixed length public key) with a special character that encodes the derivation process. We call this the *derivation code*.

## # designated-aliases ↗ 17 ▲

An AID controller can designate aliases which are AID controlled identifiers such as a did:keri, did:webs, etc. The [AID](#) controller issues a designated aliases attestation (no issuee) that lists the identifiers and manages the status through a registry anchored to their KEL. See the [designated aliases docs](#) ↗

## # designated-authorized-representative ↗ 17 ▲

Also 'DAR'. These are representatives of a Legal Entity that are authorized by the Legal Entity to act officially on behalf of the Legal Entity. DARs can authorize:

## # diger ↗ 17 ▲

A *primitive* that represents a [digest](#). It has the ability to [verify](#) that an input hashes to its raw value.

## # dip ↗ 17 ▲

dip = delcept, delegated inception

## # direct-mode ↗ 17 ▲

Two primary trust modalities motivated the KERI design, One of these is the *direct* (one-to-one) mode, in which the identity controller establishes control via verified signatures of the

controlling key-pair. The direct mode doesn't use witnesses nor [key-event-receipt-logs](#), but has direct (albeit intermittent) network contact with the validator.

### # disclosee ↗ 17

a role of an entity that is a recipient to which an ACDC is disclosed. A Disclosee may or may not be the Issuee of the disclosed ACDC.

### # discloser ↗ 17

a role of an entity that discloses an [authentic-chained-data-container](#). A Discloser may or may not be the Issuer of the disclosed ACDC.

### # dnd ↗ 17

Do Not Delegate is a flag/attribute for an AID, and this is default set to "you can delegate."

### # domain ↗ 17

a representation of a [primitive](#) either Text (T), Binary (B) or Raw binary ®.

### # drt ↗ 17

drt = delgate, delegated rotation

### # dual-indexed-codes ↗ 17

a context-specific coding scheme, for the common use case of thresholded multi-signature schemes in [CESR](#).

### # dual-text-binary-encoding-format ↗ 17

An encoding format that allows for both text and binary encoding format, which is fully interchangeable. The [composability](#) property enables the round trip conversion en-masse of concatenated primitives between the text domain and binary domain while maintaining the separability of individual primitives.

### # duplicitous-event-log ↗ 17

This is a record of inconsistent event messages produced by a given controller or witness with respect to a given [key-event-receipt-log](#). The duplicitous events are indexed to the corresponding event in a KERL.

### # duplicity-detection / 17 ▲

A mechanism to detect [duplicity](#) in cryptographically secured event logs.

### # duplicity / 17 ▲

the existence of more than one version of a Verifiable [key-event-log](#) for a given [AID](#).

### # ECR / 17 ▲

[engagement-context-role](#)

### # edge / 17 ▲

a top-level field map within an ACDC that provides edges that connect to other ACDCs, forming a labeled property graph (LPG).

### # end-role / 17 ▲

An end role is an authorization for one [AID](#) to serve in a role for another [AID](#).

### # engagement-context-role / 17 ▲

A person that represents the [legal-entity](#) in a functional or in another context role and is issued an ECR [vlei-credential](#).

### # escrow-state / 17 ▲

The current state of all the temporary storage locations (what events are waiting for what other information) that KERI protocol needs to keep track of, due to its fully asynchronous nature.

### # establishment-event / 17 ▲

a [key-event](#) that establishes or changes the key state which includes the current set of authoritative keypairs (key state) for an [AID](#).

# exn ↗ 17 ▲

exn = exchange

# exp ↗ 17 ▲

exp = expose, sealed data exposition

# field-map ↗ 17 ▲

A traditional **key:value** pair renamed to avoid confusing with the cryptographic use of the term 'key'.

# first-seen ↗ 17 ▲

refers to the first instance of a [message](#) received by any [witness](#) or [watcher](#). The first-seen event is always seen, and can never be unseen. It forms the basis for [duplicity](#) detection in KERI-based systems.

# frame-code ↗ 17 ▲

[framing-code](#)

# framing-code ↗ 17 ▲

a code that delineates a number of characters or bytes, as appropriate, that can be extracted atomically from a [stream](#).

# full-disclosure ↗ 17 ▲

a disclosure of an ACDC that discloses the full details of some or all of its field maps. In the context of [selective-disclosure](#), Full Disclosure means detailed disclosure of the selectively disclosed attributes, not the detailed disclosure of all selectively disclosable attributes. In the context of [partial-disclosure](#), Full Disclosure means detailed disclosure of the field map that was so far only partially disclosed.

## # fully-compact ↗ 17

The most compact form of an [ACDC](#). This is the only signed variant of an ACDC and this signature is anchored in a [transaction-event-log](#) (TEL) for the ACDC.

## # fully-expanded ↗ 17

The most user-friendly version of an [ACDC](#) credential. It doesn't need to be signed and typically is not signed since the most compact version which is signed can be computed from this form and then the signature can be looked up in the [TEL](#) of the ACDC in question.

## # GAR ↗ 17

[gleif-authorized-representative](#)

## # ghost-credential ↗ 17

Is a valid credential within in a 90 days grace period (the revocation transaction time frame before it's booked to revocation registry).

## # gleif-authorized-representative ↗ 17

A representative of GLEIF authorized to perform the identity verifications requirements needed to issue the [QVI vLEI](#) Credential.

## # GLEIS ↗ 17

Global Legal Entity Identifier System

## # graduated-disclosure ↗ 17

a disclosure of an [ACDC](#) that does not reveal its entire content in the initial interaction with the recipient and, instead, partially or selectively reveals only the information contained within the ACDC necessary to further a transaction with the recipient. A Graduated disclosure may involve multiple steps where more information is progressively revealed as the recipient satisfies the conditions set by the [discloser](#). [compact-disclosure](#), [partial-disclosure](#), [selective-disclosure](#), and [full-disclosure](#) are all Graduated disclosure mechanisms.

## # graph-fragment ↗ 17

An ACDC is a verifiable data structure and *part of a graph*, consisting of a node property and one or two edge properties.

## # group-code ↗ 17 ▲

[group-framing-code](#)

## # group-framing-code ↗ 17 ▲

special Framing Codes that can be specified to support groups of Primitives which make them pipelinable. Self-framing grouping using Count Codes is one of the primary advantages of composable encoding.

## # hab ↗ 17 ▲

A Hab is a keystore for one identifier. The Python implementation in [keripy](#), also used by [keria](#) uses [LMDB](#) ↗ to store key material and all other data.

## # habery ↗ 17 ▲

'Hab' comes from 'Habitat'. It's a place where multi-sigs and AIDs are linked. Habery manages a collection of [hab](#). A Hab is a data structure (a Python object).

## # hierarchical-composition ↗ 17 ▲

Encoding protocol that is composable in a hierarchy and enables [pipelining](#) (multiplexing and de-multiplexing) of complex streams in either text or compact binary. This allows management at scale for high-bandwidth applications.

## # icp ↗ 17 ▲

icp = incept, inception

## # inception-event ↗ 17 ▲

an [establishment-event](#) that provides the incepting information needed to derive an AID and establish its initial Key state.

## # inception

The operation of creating an AID by binding it to the initial set of authoritative keypairs and any other associated information. This operation is made verifiable and duplicity evident upon acceptance as the inception event that begins the AID's KEL.

## # indexed-signature

Also called *siger*. An indexed signature attachment is used when signing anything with a multi-key autonomic identifier. The index is included as part of the attachment, so a verifier knows which of the multiple public keys was used to generate a specific signature.

## # indirect-mode

Two primary trust modalities motivated the KERI design, One of these is the *indirect* (one-to-many) mode, which depends on witnessed key event receipt logs (KERL) as a secondary root-of-trust for validating events. This gives rise to the acronym KERI for key event receipt infrastructure.

## # inquisitor

In the ACDC context it's a general term for someone (in a validating role) that launches an inquiry at some KERI [witness](#).

## # integrity

~In KERI's "security first" approach Authenticity includes *technical integrity* of data involved. This includes:

## # interaction-event

Non-establishment Event that anchors external data to the key-state as established by the most recent prior establishment event.

## # interactive-authentication-design

A group of approaches having an interactive mechanism that requires a set of requests and responses or challenge responses with challenge response replies for secure authentication.

## # interceptor

a [keria](#) class that allows to push events that are happening inside the cloud agent to other backend processes.

## # interleaved-serialization ↗ 17

Serializations of different types interleaved in an overarching format

## # IPEX ↗ 17

### [issuance-and-presentation-exchange-protocol](#)

#### # iss ↗ 17

iss = vc issue, verifiable credential issuance

## # issuance-and-presentation-exchange-protocol ↗ 17

provides a uniform mechanism for the issuance and presentation of ACDCs in a securely attributable manner.

## # issuance-event ↗ 17

The initial transaction event log event anchored to the issuing AID's key event log that represents the issuance of an ACDC credential.

## # issuance-exchange ↗ 17

A special case of a [presentation-exchange](#) where the [discloser](#) is the [issuer](#) of the origin (Primary) ACDC of the [directed-acyclic-graph](#) formed by the set of chained [authenticated-chained-data-container](#)s so disclosed.

## # issuee ↗ 17

a role of an entity to which the claims of an ACDC are asserted.

## # issuer ↗ 17

a role of an entity that asserts claims and creates an ACDC from these claims.

# ixn ✎ 17 ▲

[JSON](#) field name (attribute) for Interaction Event; its content (value) contains a hash pointer. All [transaction-event-log](#) events are anchored in a [key-event-log](#) in either ixn ([interaction-event](#)) or rot ([rotation-events](#)). This is the foundation enabling a verifiable credential protocol to be built on top of KERI.

# judge ✎ 17 ▲

A judge is an entity or component that examines the entries of one or more [key-event-receipt-log](#) and DELs of a given identifier to validate that the event history is from a non-[duplicity](#) controller and has been witnessed by a sufficient number of non-duplicitous [witness](#) such that it may be trusted or conversely not-trusted by a [validator](#).

# juror ✎ 17 ▲

A juror has the basic task of performing [duplicity](#) detection on events and event receipts.

# jury ✎ 17 ▲

The jury is the set of entities or components acting as [juror](#).

# KA2CE ✎ 17 ▲

[keri-agreement-algorithm-for-control-establishment](#)

# KAACE ✎ 17 ▲

[keri-agreement-algorithm-for-control-establishment](#)

# KAPI ✎ 17 ▲

Application programmer interfaces (APIs) for the various components in the KERI ecosystem such as Controllers, Agents, Witnesses, Watchers, Registrars etc need by which they can share information. The unique properties of the KERI protocol require APIs that preserve those properties. We call the set of APIs the KERI API.

# KAWA ✎ 17 ▲

[keri's-algorithm-for-witness-agreement](#)

## # keep

Is KERI's and ACDC's user interface that uses the keripy agent for its backend. It uses the REST API exposed from the keripy agent.

## # KEL

A Key Event Log.

## # keri-agreement-algorithm-for-control-establishment

Agreement on an event in a key event log [KEL](#) means each [witness](#) has observed the exact version of the event and each witness' [receipt](#) has been received by every other witness.

## # keri-command-line-interface

Command line tool used to create identifiers, manage keys, query for KELs and participate in delegated identifiers or multi-signature group identifiers. It also includes operations for running witnesses, watchers and cloud agents to establish a cloud presence for any identifier.

## # keri-event-stream

A stream of verifiable KERI data, consisting of the [key-event-log](#) and other data such as a [transaction-event-log](#). This data is a CESR event stream (TODO: link to IANA application/cesr media type) and may be serialized in a file using [composable-event-streaming-representation](#) encoding. We refer to these *CESR stream resources* as KERI event streams to simplify the vocabulary.

## # keri-improvement-doc

These docs are modular so teams of contributors can independently work and create PRs of individual KIDs; KIDs answer the question "how we do it". We add commentary to the individual KIDs that elaborate on the why. It has been split from the how to not bother implementors with the why.

## # keri-ox

The RUST programming-language implementation of the [KERI](#) protocol.

## # keri-request-authentication-method

All requests from a web client must use KRAM (KERI Request Authentication Method) for replay attack protection. The method is essentially based on each request body needing to include a date time string field in ISO-8601 format that must be within an acceptable time window relative to the server's date time. See the [KRAM Github repo](#)

## # keri-suite-search-engine

KERISSE is the Docusaurus [self-education site](#) of Web-of-Trust GitHub repo with Typesense search facilities. Because of its focus on well-verses developers in the field of [SSI](#) and the support of their journey to understand the structure of the code and how things work in the [keri-suite](#) it's more a search engine that drills down on documentation.

## # keri-suite

The *KERI suite* is the set of inter-related developments (KERI, ACDC, OOBI, CESR, IPEX, etc) under the Web-of -Trust user on Github

## # KERI

[key-event-receipt-infrastructure](#)

## # keri's-algorithm-for-witness-agreement

a type of Byzantine Fault Tolerant ([byzantine-fault-tolerance](#)) algorithm.

## # KERIA-agent

An [agent](#) in [keria](#) terms, is an instance of a keystore ([hab](#)) that runs in a given instance of the KERIA agent server.

## # KERIA

KERI Agent in the cloud. The KERIA service will expose 3 separate HTTP endpoints on 3 separate network interfaces.

## # keride

is a *Rust* programming language library for [key-event-receipt-infrastructure](#). Among its features

### # keridemlia ↗

It is a contraction of [key-event-receipt-infrastructure](#) and [Kademlia](#) ↗. It's the distributed database of Witness IP-addresses based on a [distributed-hash-table](#). It also does the CNAME - stuff that [domain-name](#) Services (DNS) offers for KERI: the mapping between an identifier and it's controller AID stored in the KEL to its current witness AID and the witness AID to the IP address.

### # kerific ↗

*kerific* is a front plugin or extension that currently only works for Chrome and Brave. It matches words in any text on the web that is parseable for *kerific* and offers buttons to various glossaries and definitions in the [self-sovereign-identity](#) field.

### # KERIMask ↗

A wallet similar to *MetaMask*, the manifestation will be a browser extension and it will connect to KERIA servers in order for a person to control AIDs from their browser.

### # keripy ↗

The Python programming-language implementation of the [KERI](#) protocol.

### # KERISSE ↗

[keri-suite-search-engine](#)

### # KERL ↗

[key-event-receipt-log](#)

### # kever ↗

Kever is a key event verifier.

### # key-event-log ↗

a Verifiable data structure that is a backward and forward chained, signed, append-only log of key events for an AID. The first entry in a KEL must be the one and only Inception event of that AID.

## # key-event-message

Message whose body is a key event and whose attachments may include signatures on its body.

## # key-event-receipt-infrastructure

or the KERI protocol, is an identity system-based secure overlay for the Internet.

## # key-event-receipt-log

a key event receipt log is a [kel](#) that also includes all the consistent key event receipt [messages](#) created by the associated set of witnesses. See annex [key-event-receipt-log](#).

## # key-event-receipt

message whose body references a Key event and whose attachments must include one or more signatures on that Key event.

## # key-event

See the more general TrustoverIP concept of key-event: [key-event](#)

## # KID

[keri-improvement-doc](#)

## # kli

[keri-command-line-interface](#)

## # KRAM

[keri-request-authentication-method](#)

## # ksn / 17 ▲

ksn = state, key state notice

## # ledger-backer / 17 ▲

A [witness](#) in KERI that is ledger-registered. It's a type of [backer](#) that proof its authenticity by a signing key anchored to the public key of a data item on a (public) blockchain.

## # legal-entity-engagement-context-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework /

17

A document that details the requirements for [vlei-role-credential](#) **issued to** representatives of a Legal Entity *in other than official roles* but in functional or other context of engagement.

## # legal-entity-official-organizational-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework /

17

A document that details the requirements for [vlei-role-credential](#) **issued to** official representatives of a Legal Entity.

## # legal-entity-vlei-credential-governance-framework / 17 ▲

A *document* that details the requirements for vLEI Credential **issued by** a [qualified-vlei-issuer](#) to a [legal-entity](#).

## # listed-identifier / 17 ▲

Is a list in an [authentic-chained-data-container](#) of authorised did:webs identifier + method; the list appears in the metadata of the did:webs DID-doc.

## # live-attack / 17 ▲

an attack that compromises either the current signing keys used to sign non-establishment events or the current pre-rotated keys needed to sign a subsequent establishment event. See (Security Properties of Prerotation)[#live-attacks].

## # locked-state / 17 ▲

The default status a KERI data store is in once it has been created using a [passcode](#); it is by default encrypted.

## # management-TEL ↗ 17 ▲

[management-transaction-event-log](#)

## # management-transaction-event-log ↗ 17 ▲

A 'management [transaction-event-log](#)' will signal the creation of the *Virtual Credential Registry VCR* and track the list of *Registrars* that will act as [backer](#) for the individual transaction event logs (TELs) for each [virtual-credential](#) (VC).

## # moobi ↗ 17 ▲

Multi [OOBI](#) would allow to share a bunch of different end-points (oobis) all at once. A way for a single store to share multiple endpoints for that store.

## # most-compact ↗ 17 ▲

An [ACDC](#) that, for a given level of disclosure, is as compact as it can be, which means

## # multi-valent ↗ 17 ▲

A [delegator](#) may have multiple [delegate](#), thereby enabling elastic horizontal scalability. Multiple delegates from a single delegator. Furthermore, each delegate may act as a delegator for its own delegates to form a *nested delegation tree*.

## # naive-conversion ↗ 17 ▲

Non-CESR Base64 conversion. How people are used to using the Base64 encode and decode. Without [pre-padding](#) etc all the stuff CESR does to ensure aligns on 24 bit boundaries so [CESR](#) never uses the '=' pad character. But naive [base64](#) will pad if the length is not 24 bit aligned.

## # ndigs ↗ 17 ▲

Digests of public keys, not keys themselves. The reason to use ndigs is to prove control over public keys or to hide keys. It's used in Keripy and consists of a list of qualified base64

digests of public rotation key derivations.

## # nested-cooperative-delegated-identifiers

In KERI delegations are cooperative, this means that both the delegator and delegate must contribute to a delegation. The delegator creates a cryptographic commitment in either a rotation or interaction event via a seal in a delegated establishment event. The delegate creates a cryptographic commitment in its establishment event via a seal to the delegating event.

## # next-threshold

represents the number or fractional weights of signatures from the given set of next keys required to be attached to a [Message](#) for the [Message](#) to be considered fully signed.

## # non-establishment-event

a Key event that does not change the current Key state for an AID. Typically, the purpose of a Non-establishment event is to anchor external data to a given Key state as established by the most recent prior Establishment event for an AID.

## # non-interactive-authentication-design

A group of approaches having non-interactive mechanisms that pose unique problems because they do not allow a challenge response reply handshake. A request is submitted that is self-authenticating without additional interaction.

## # official-organizational-role

Also 'OOR'. A person that represents the Legal Entity in an official organizational role and is issued an OOR vLEI Credential.

## # OOBI

[out-of-band-introduction](#)

## # opcode

Opcodes are meant to provide stream processing instructions that are more general and flexible than simply concatenated primitives or groups of primitives.

## # operator ↗ 17 ▲

an optional field map in the Edge section that enables expression of the edge logic on edge subgraph as either a unary operator on the edge itself or an m-ary operator on the edge group.

## # out-of-band-introduction ↗ 17 ▲

Out-of-band Introductions (OOBIs) are discovery and validation of IP resources for [key-event-receipt-infrastructure](#) autonomic identifiers. **Discovery via URI, trust via KERI.**

## # parside ↗ 17 ▲

is a bunch of generators. Responsible for pulling out a stream of bits from a CESR stream and parse it.

## # partial-disclosure ↗ 17 ▲

a disclosure of an ACDC that partially discloses its field maps using Compact Disclosure. The Compact Disclosure provides a cryptographically equivalent commitment to the yet-to-be-disclosed content, and the later exchange of the uncompacted content is verifiable to an earlier Partial Disclosure. Unlike Selective disclosure, a partially disclosable field becomes correlatable to its encompassing block after its Full Disclosure.

## # partial-pre-rotation ↗ 17 ▲

[partial-rotation](#)

## # partial-rotation ↗ 17 ▲

The pre-rotation mechanism supports partial pre-rotation or **more exactly partial rotation of pre-rotated keypairs**. It's a rotation operation on a set of pre-rotated keys that may keep some keys in reserve (i.e unexposed) while exposing others as needed.

## # pathing ↗ 17 ▲

It was designed to sign portions of a credential aimed at complex cases like

## # percolated-discovery ↗ 17 ▲

a discovery mechanism for information associated with an AID or a SAID, which is based on Invasion Percolation Theory. Once an entity has discovered such information, it may in turn share what it discovers with other entities. Since the information so discovered is end-verifiable, the percolation mechanism and percolating intermediaries do not need to be trusted.

#### # percolated-information-discovery

In the [OOBI](#) protocol, a discovery mechanism for the [KERI](#) and the [ACDC](#) protocols is provided by a bootstrap that enables Percolated Information Discovery (PID), which is based on Invasion Percolation Theory.

#### # PID

[percolated-information-discovery](#)

#### # pre-rotation

Cryptographic commitment to next rotated key set in previous rotation or [inception-event](#).

#### # prefix

A prefix that is composed of a basic Base-64 (URL safe) derivation code pre-pended to Base-64 encoding of a basic public digital signing key.

#### # presentation-exchange

An exchange that provides disclosure of one or more [authentic-chained-data-containers](#) between a Discloser and a Disclosee.

#### # primary-root-of-trust

In KERI a [root-of-trust](#) that is cryptographically verifiable all the way to its current controlling key pair in a PKI.

#### # proem

A “proem” is an introductory statement, preamble, or preface. It sets the stage for the content that follows, often providing context, framing the discussion, or outlining the

purpose and scope of the material.

## # promiscuous-mode

It is the mode a [watcher](#) runs in. A watcher uses the same code as a [witness](#). However a watcher does so "lacking standards of selection; acting without careful judgment; indiscriminate". Or "Showing little forethought or critical judgment; casual."

## # proof-of-authorship

Proof that somebody or something has originally created certain content. It's about *data's* inception. Whereas [proof-of-authority](#) is about *rights* attached to this data.

## # provenanced

The act of verifying [authenticity](#) or quality of documented history or origin of something.

## # PTEL

[public-transaction-event-log](#)

## # public-transaction-event-log

is a public hash-linked data structure of transactions that can be used to track state anchored to a [key-event-log](#).

## # public-verifiable-credential-registry

is a form of a [Verifiable Data Registry](#)  that tracks the issuance/revocation state of credentials issued by the controller of the [key-event-log](#). Two types of TELs will be used for this purpose: [management-transaction-event-log](#) and [virtual-credential-transaction-event-log](#).

## # qry

qry = query

## # quadlet

a group of 4 characters in the T domain and equivalently in triplets of 3 bytes each in the B domain used to define variable size.

### # qualified-vlei-issuer-vlei-credential-governance-framework

A document that details the requirements to enable this Credential to be [issued by GLEIF to qualified-vlei-issuer](#) which allows the Qualified vLEI Issuers to issue, verify and revoke [legal-entity-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#), [legal-entity-official-organizational-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#), and [legal-entity-engagement-context-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#).

### # qualified-vlei-issuer

The contracting party to the vLEI Issuer Qualification Agreement that has been qualified by GLEIF as a Qualified vLEI Issuer.

### # qualified

When qualified, a cryptographic primitive includes a prepended derivation code (as a [proem](#)), that indicates the cryptographic algorithm or suite used for that derivation.

### # qvi-authorized-representative

A designated representative of a [QVI](#) authorized, to conduct QVI operations with GLEIF and [legal-entity](#). Also referring to a person in the role of a QAR.

### # rct

rct = receipt

### # read-update-nullify

Read, update, nullify are a set of actions you (or a server) can take on data. "Read" means to view it, "update" means to change it, and "nullify" means to invalidate it, but not "Delete" it. Mind you, there's also no "Create".

### # receipt-log

ordered record of all key event receipts for a given set of witnesses.

## # receipt

event message or reference with one or more witness signatures.

## # reconciliation

Reconciliation is the process in which you decide to accept a fork of the [key-event-log](#) or not.

## # redundant-credential

Multiple credentials issued by the same issuer (e.g. a [QVI](#)). They do not have anything to do with each other. They are independently valid.

## # registrar

identifiers that serve as backers for each [transaction-event-log](#) (TEL) under its provenance. This list of Registrars can be rotated with events specific to a certain type of TEL. In this way, a Registrar is analogous to a Backer in KERI KELs and Registrar lists are analogous to Backer lists in KERI KELs.

## # registration-interaction

Setup/Registration interaction, new AID and authorization to establish access control. You present a ([vLEI](#)) credential. You don't want that captured and misused. Narrowing the scope to a certain role (e.g. Document Submitter) is a pre-registration via [delegation](#) authority.

## # reputation

Consistent behaviour over time on the basis of which anyone else makes near-future decisions.

## # reserve-rotation

One important use case for [partial-rotation](#) is to enable pre-rotated key pairs designated in one [establishment-event](#) **to be held in reserve and not exposed** at the next (immediately subsequent) establishment event.

## # rev

rev = vc revoke, verifiable credential revocation

## # revocation-event ↗ 17 ▲

An event that revokes [control-authority](#) over an [identifier](#). From that point in time the authoritative key-pairs at hand are not valid anymore.

## # RID ↗ 17 ▲

### [root-autonomic-identifier](#)

## # root-autonomic-identifier ↗ 17 ▲

An entity may provide the [root-of-trust](#) for some ecosystem (with delegation) via its root [AID](#). Let's call this the *RID* for "root AID". The RID must be protected using the highest level of [security](#) in its [key-management](#).

## # rot ↗ 17 ▲

[JSON](#) field name (attribute) for Rotation Event; its content (value) contains a hash pointer. All [transaction-event-log](#) events are anchored in a [key-event-log](#) in either ixn ([interaction-event](#)) or [rot](#) ([rotation-events](#)). This is the foundation enabling a verifiable credential protocol to be built on top of KERI.

## # rotation-authority ↗ 17 ▲

The (exclusive) right to rotate the authoritative key pair and establish changed control authority.

## # rotation-event ↗ 17 ▲

an Establishment Event that provides the information needed to change the Key state, which includes a change to the set of [authoritative](#) keypairs for an AID.

## # rotation ↗ 17 ▲

The operation of revoking and replacing the set of [authoritative key-pair](#) for an [AID](#). This operation is made verifiable and [duplicity](#) evident upon acceptance as a rotation event that is appended to the AID's [KEL](#).

# rpy ✓ 17 ▲

rpy = reply

# rules ✓ 17 ▲

a top-level field map within an ACDC that provides a legal language as a [Ricardian Contract](#) ☐, which is both human and machine-readable and referenceable by a cryptographic digest.

# run-off-the-crud ✓ 17 ▲

*RUN off the [CRUD](#)* is an alternative to the traditional [CRUD](#) approach to defining basic operations on resources in data management systems (e.g., databases, APIs). RUN stands for Read, Update, Nullify and bears a nuanced approach to deletion.

# RUN ✓ 17 ▲

The acronym for the new peer-to-peer end-verifiable monotonic update policy is RUN (**R**ead, **U**pdate, **N**ullify).

# SAD ✓ 17 ▲

[self-addressing-data](#)

# SAID ✓ 17 ▲

[self-addressing-identifier](#)

# sally ✓ 17 ▲

is an implementation of a verification service and acting as a reporting server. It is purpose-built software for the vLEI ecosystem to allow participants in the vLEI ecosystem present credentials, so the [GLEIF](#) Reporting API can show what [vLEI](#) are; issued to [legal-entity](#).

# salter ✓ 17 ▲

A primitive that represents a [seed](#). It has the ability to generate new [signers](#).

# salty-nonce-blinding-factor ✓ 17 ▲

For ease of sharing a secret and hiding information with this secret of Blindable State TELs we use a SaltyNonce Blinding Factor. You'd like to hide the state of certain credentials to some verifiers in the future, while keeping the state verifiable for others.

## # schema

the [said](#) of a JSON schema that is used to issue and verify an ACDC.

## # SCID

[self-certifying-identifier](#)

## # secondary-root-of-trust

In KERI its a [root-of-trust](#) that, for its secure attribution, depends on another verifiable data structure (VDS) which MUST be a [primary-root-of-trust](#).

## # secure-asset-transfer-protocol

An IETF protocol (and working group) in the making (as of mid 2022) for moving assets between blockchains.

## # secure-private-authentic-confidentiality

ToIP Trust Spanning Layer Group realized we do have a secure authentication layer (KERI) but we don't have a secure confidentiality and privacy mechanism. Sam Smith proposes SPAC paper to define this.

## # security-cost-performance-architecture-trade-off

The degree of protection offered by a key management infrastructure usually forces a trade-off between security, cost, and performance.

## # security

'secure' is free from or not exposed to danger or harm; safe. For [identifiers](#) security typically means secure from *exploit* or *compromise*. More specifically an identifier is secure with respect to an entity if there is a mechanism by which that entity may prove it has [controller](#) over the identifier.

## # selective-disclosure / 17



a disclosure of an ACDC that selectively discloses its attributes using Compact Disclosure. The set of selectively disclosable attributes is provided as an array of blinded blocks where each attribute in the set has its own dedicated blinded block. Unlike Partial Disclosure, the selectively disclosed fields are not correlatable to the so far undisclosed but selectively disclosable fields in the same encompassing block.

## # self-addressed-data / 17



a representation of data content from which a SAID is derived. The SAID is both cryptographically bound to (content-addressable) and encapsulated by (self-referential) its SAD [said](#).

## # self-addressing-data / 17



an identifier that is content-addressable and self-referential. A SAID is uniquely and cryptographically bound to a serialization of data that includes the SAID as a component in that serialization [said](#).

## # self-addressing-identifier / 17



any identifier that is deterministically generated out of the content, or a digest of the content.

## # self-certifying-identifier / 17



a type of Cryptonym that is uniquely cryptographically derived from the public key of an asymmetric signing keypair (public, private).

## # self-framing / 17



a textual or binary encoding that begins with type, size, and value so that a parser knows how many characters (when textual) or bytes (when binary) to extract from the stream for a given element without parsing the rest of the characters or bytes in the element is Self-Framing.

## # server-sent-event / 17



Mailbox notifications; a streaming service for the agent U/I, to get notifications from the KERI system itself.

# siger ✓ 17



[indexed-signature](#)

# signer ✓ 17



A primitive that represents a private key. It has the ability to create Sigers and Cigars (signatures).

# signify-keria-request-authentication-protocol ✓ 17



SKRAP is a client to the KERIA server. Mobile clients will be using SKRAP to connect to KERI AIDs via [agents](#) in the new, multi-tenant Mark II Agent server, [keria](#).

# signify ✓ 17



Signify is a web client [key-event](#) signing - and key pair creation app that minimizes the use of [KERI](#) on the client.

# signing-authority ✓ 17



The authority to sign on behalf of the controller of the authoritative key pair. Often in situation where delegation has taken place, e.g. a custodial agent. These are limited rights because [rotation-authority](#) is not included.

# simple-keri-for-web-auth ✓ 17



A [KERI](#) implementation that sacrifices performance or other non-security feature for usability. In general a narrow application of KERI may not require all the features of KERI but those features that it does support must still be secure.

# SKRAP ✓ 17



[signify-keria-request-authentication-protocol](#)

# SKWA ✓ 17



[simple-keri-for-web-auth](#)

## # sniffable

A stream is *sniffable* as soon as it starts with a group code or field map; in fact this is how our parser ([parside](#)) works. and detects if the CESR stream contains a datablock.

## # sniffer

The *sniffer* is part of [parside](#) and detects if the CESR stream contains CESR binary, CESR Text, JSON, CBOR, MGPK.

## # solicited-issuance

The issuance of a Legal Entity vLEI Credentials, [OOR](#) vLEI Credentials and [ECR](#) vLEI Credentials upon receipt by the [QAR](#) of a Fully Signed issuance request from the [AVR](#)(s) of the [legal-entity](#).

## # SPAC

[secure-private-authentic-confidentiality](#)

## # spurn

To *reject*. In KERI, "spurn" refers to a cryptographic or protocol-based act of rejecting an invalid or untrusted event. This rejection is deliberate and purposeful, ensuring the system's integrity by disregarding information that does not meet the necessary validation criteria. The verb 'spurn' is first used in the [IPEX](#) specification.

## # ssi-system

The SSI Infrastructure consists of the technological components that are deployed all over the world for the purpose of providing, requesting and obtaining data for the purpose of negotiating and/or executing electronic [transactions](#).

## # stable

Refers to the state of cryptographic verifiability across a network or system. It generally implies that a particular identifier, event, or data set is consistent, fully verified, and cannot be contested within KERI.

## # stale-event

A stale key event is an outdated or irrelevant (key) event involving an [stale-key](#) that may compromise security.

#### # stale-key ↪ 17

A stale key is an outdated or expired encryption key that should no longer be used for securing data

#### # stream ↪ 17

a [CESR](#) Stream is any set of concatenated Primitives, concatenated groups of Primitives, or hierarchically composed groups of [primitives](#).

#### # streamer ↪ 17

A convenience class for supporting stream parsing, including nested (tunneled, encrypted) [CESR](#) streams. Streams can be a mixture/combination of different [primitive](#), including other streams. A stream is a concatenation of primitives.

#### # strip-parameter ↪ 17

tells us what part of the [CESR](#) stream will be parsed by which code.

#### # targeted-acdc ↪ 17

an ACDC with the presence of the Issuee field in the attribute or attribute aggregate sections.

#### # TEL ↪ 17

[transaction-event-log](#)

#### # text-binary-concatenation-composability ↪ 17

An encoding has *composability* when any set of [self-framing](#) concatenated primitives expressed in either the text domain or binary domain may be converted as a group to the other domain and back again without loss.

## # tholder

t-holder object that supports fractionally-weighted [signing-threshold](#)

## # threshold-of-accountable-duplicity

The threshold of accountable duplicity (TOAD) is a threshold number **M** that the controller declares to accept accountability for an event when any subset **M** of the **N** witnesses confirm that event. The threshold **M** indicates the minimum number of confirming witnesses the controller deems sufficient given some number **F** of potentially faulty witnesses, given that **M**  $\geq N - F$ . This enables a controller to provide itself with any degree of protection it deems necessary given this accountability.

## # threshold-signature-scheme

or TSS; is a type of digital signature protocol used by [Mutli-party Computation \(MPC\)](#) ↗ wallets to authorize transactions or key state changes.

## # TOAD

[threshold-of-accountable-duplicity](#)

## # top-level-section

The fields of an ACDC in [compact-variant](#). The value of a top level section field is either the SAD or the SAID of the SAD of the associated section.

## # transaction-event-log

The set of transactions that determine registry state form a log called a Transaction Event Log (TEL). The TEL provides a cryptographic proof of registry state by reference to the corresponding controlling [key-event-log](#). Any validator may therefore cryptographically verify the [authoritative](#) of the [registry](#).

## # transfer-off-ledger

The act of transferring control authority over an identifier from a ledger (or blockchain) to the native verifiable KERI data structure Key Event Log.

## # trust-domain

A trust domain is the ecosystem of interactions that rely on a trust basis. A trust basis binds controllers, identifiers, and key-pairs. *For example the Facebook ecosystem of social interactions is a trust domain that relies on Facebook's identity system of usernames and passwords as its trust basis.*

#### # trust-spanning-protocol ↗ 17

Protocol using [verifiable-identifiers](#) that signs every single message on the internet and makes them verifiable.

#### # TSP ↗ 17

[trust-spanning-protocol](#)

#### # univalent ↗ 17

In identifier systems, univalent means having a unique and non-ambiguous identifier for each entity or resource. This means that there is a *one-to-one correspondence* between the identifiers and the entities, and that no two different entities share the same identifier.

#### # unpermissioned-correlation ↗ 17

a correlation established between two or more disclosed ACDCs whereby the discloser of the ACDCs does not permit the disclosee to establish such a correlation.

#### # unsolicited-issuance ↗ 17

Issuance of a Legal Entity vLEI Credential upon notice by a [QAR](#) to the [AVR\(s\)](#) of the Legal Entity that a Legal Entity vLEI Credential has been solicited on the [legal-entity](#)'s behalf.

#### # untargeted-acdc ↗ 17

an ACDC without the presence of the Issuee field in the attribute or attribute aggregate sections.

#### # vcp ↗ 17

vcp = vdr incept, verifiable data registry inception

# VCTEL ✓ 17

[virtual-credential-transaction-event-log](#)

# vdr ✓ 17

[verifiable-data-registry](#)

# verfer ✓ 17

A primitive that represents a public key. It has the ability to [verify](#) signatures on data.

# verifiable-credential ✓ 17

Verifiable credentials (VCs) are an [open standard](#) for digital credentials. They can represent information found in physical credentials, such as a passport or license, as well as new things that have no physical equivalent, such as ownership of a bank account.

# verifiable-legal-entity-identifier ✓ 17

Verifiable credentials are issued by authorized validation agents ([QVI](#)) under the governance of [GLEIF](#), who delegate tasks to these agents. They provide cryptographic proof that the information about a legal entity, as linked to its Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), is verifiably authentic, accurate, and up-to-date.

# verifiable ✓ 17

a condition of a KEL: being internally consistent with the integrity of its backward and forward chaining digest and authenticity of its non-repudiable signatures.

# verification ✓ 17

An action an [agent](#) (of a principal) performs to determine the [authenticity](#) of a claim or other digital object using a cryptographic key.

# verify ✓ 17

The act, by or on behalf of a [party](#), of determining whether that data is [authenticity](#) (i.e. originates from the party that authored it), timely (i.e. has not expired), and conforms to other specifications that apply to its structure.

## # version-code

tells you which set of tables to load, it tells the table state. It's a unique code. what version of the table is going to load.

## # version-string

the first field in any top-level KERI field map in which it appears.

## # version

an instance of a KEL for an AID in which at least one event is unique between two instances of the [kel](#).

## # virtual-credential-transaction-event-log

will track the issued or revoked state of each virtual credential (VC) and will contain a reference to its corresponding *management transaction event log (management TEL)*.

## # vrt

vrt = vdr rotate, verifiable data registry rotation

## # watcher

an *entity* or *component* that keeps a copy of a [kerl](#) for an identifier but that is not designated by the *controller* of the identifier as one of its witnesses. See annex [watcher](#).

## # weight-of-weights

There are 2 levels in the multi-sign weighted thresholds of [multisig](#) in [KERI](#) because the solution only needs to focus on *tightly cooperating teams*.

## # weight

an optional field map in the Edge section that provides edge weight property that enables directed weighted edges and operators that use weights.

## # well-known-witnesses

Witness identifier creation by using *salts* to initialize their key stores so that you can predict what identifiers will be created. For testing purposes only!

## # witness ↎ 17 ▲

a witness is an entity or component designated (trusted) by the controller of an identifier. The primary role of a witness is to verify, sign, and keep events associated with an identifier. A witness is the controller of its own self-referential identifier which may or may not be the same as the identifier to which it is a witness. See also [keri's-algorithm-for-witness-agreement](#).

## # xip ↎ 17 ▲

A XIP message allows a transaction set to be a mini peer to peer exchange to become a verifiable data structure. It makes the transaction become duplicity evident.

## # agent ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	910006489e6ae5ebd79ca096682e2ec8fac5bc65

An [actor](#) that is executing an [action](#) on behalf of a [party](#) (called the [principal](#) of that [actor](#)). In the context of decentralized digital trust infrastructure, the term “agent” is most frequently used to mean a [digital agent](#).

Source: [eSSIF-Lab](#) ↗.

See also: [wallet](#).

Note: In a ToIP context, an agent is frequently assumed to have privileged access to the [wallet](#)(s) of its principal. In market parlance, a mobile app performing the [actions](#) of an agent is often simply called a [wallet](#) or a [digital wallet](#).

## # attribute ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a>
Commit hash	910006489e6ae5ebd79ca096682e2ec8fac5bc65

An identifiable set of data that describes an [entity](#), which is the [subject](#) of the attribute.

See also: [property](#).

Supporting definitions:

[eSSIF-Lab](#): [Data](#) that represents a characteristic that a [party](#) (the [owner](#) of the [attribute](#)) has attributed to an [entity](#) (which is the [subject](#) of that attribute).

Note: An [identifier](#) is an attribute that uniquely identifies an [entity](#) within some context.

## # attributional-trust ↗ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a>
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # contextual-linkability ↗ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a>
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # control-authority ↗ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # delegation ↗ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	910006489e6ae5ebd79ca096682e2ec8fac5bc65

The act of a [first party](#) [authorizing](#) a [second party](#) to perform a set of [actions](#) for or on behalf of the [first party](#). Delegation may be performed by the first party (the [delegator](#)) issuing a [delegation credential](#) that gives a certain set of [capabilities](#) to the [second party](#) (the [delegatee](#)).

## # discovery ↗ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # identity-assurance ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # legitimized-human-meaningful-identifier ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # non-repudiable ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # non-transferable-identifier ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗

Property	Value
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # persistent-identifier ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # reputational-trust ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # secure-attribution ↎ 17 ▲

Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # self-sovereign-identity ↗ 17



Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # SSI ↗ 17



Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	910006489e6ae5ebd79ca096682e2ec8fac5bc65

See: [self-sovereign identity](#).

Note: In some contexts, such as academic papers or industry conferences, this acronym has started to replace the term it represents.

## # transferable-identifier ↗ 17



Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

## # verifiable-identifier ↗ 17



Property	Value
Owner	henkvancann
Repo	<a href="#">ctwg-main-glossary</a> ↗
Commit hash	not found

This term was not found in the external repository.

# **transferable** ↲ 17 ▲

# **DAR** ↲ 17 ▲

# **OOR** ↲ 17 ▲

# **QAR** ↲ 17 ▲

# **QVI** ↲ 17 ▲

# **vlei credential** ↲ 17 ▲

# **vlei-ecosystem-governance-framework** ↲ 17 ▲

# **vlei-role-credential** ↲ 17 ▲

# **vLEI** ↲ 17 ▲

# **agency** ↲ 17 ▲

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # ledger-backer ✎

A [witness](#) in KERI that is ledger-registered. It's a type of [backer](#) that proves its authenticity by a signing key anchored to the public key of a data item on a (public) blockchain.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # legal-entity-engagement-context-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework ✎

A document that details the requirements for [vlei-role-credential](#) issued to representatives of a Legal Entity *in other than official roles* but in functional or other context of engagement.

[Source](#) ↗: Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # legal-entity-official-organizational-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework ✎



A document that details the requirements for [vlei-role-credential](#) issued to official representatives of a Legal Entity.

[Source](#) ↗: Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # legal-entity-vlei-credential-governance-framework ✎

A document that details the requirements for vLEI Credential issued by a [qualified-vlei-issuer](#) to a [legal-entity](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # legitimized-human-meaningful-identifier ✎

Is a list in an [authentic-chained-data-container](#) of authorised did:webs identifier + method; the list appears in the metadata of the did:webs DID-doc.

Source: paraphrased Samuel Smith, Zoom meeting *KERI dev* Thursday Nov 9 2023

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # live-attack ✎

an attack that compromises either the current signing keys used to sign non-establishment events or the current pre-rotated keys needed to sign a subsequent establishment event. See (Security Properties of Prerotation)[#live-attacks].

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # locked-state ✎

The default status a KERI data store is in once it has been created using a [passcode](#); it is by default encrypted.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # management-TEL ✎

[management-transaction-event-log](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # management-transaction-event-log ✎

A 'management [transaction-event-log](#)' will signal the creation of the *Virtual Credential Registry VCR* and track the list of *Registrars* that will act as [backer](#) for the individual transaction event logs (TELs) for each [virtual-credential](#) (VC).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # moobi ✎

Multi [OOBI](#) would allow to share a bunch of different end-points (oobis) all at once. A way for a single store to share multiple endpoints for that store.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # most-compact ✎

An [ACDC](#) that, for a given level of disclosure, is as compact as it can be, which means

- it has the [SAIDs](#) for each section that are not disclosed
- it has expanded sections that are disclosed

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # multi-valent ✎

A [delegator](#) may have multiple [delegate](#), thereby enabling elastic horizontal scalability. Multiple delegates from a single delegator. Furthermore, each delegate may act as a delegator for its own delegates to form a *nested delegation tree*.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # naive-conversion ↗

Non-CESR Base64 conversion. How people are used to using the Base64 encode and decode. Without [pre-padding](#) etc all the stuff CESR does to ensure aligns on 24 bit boundaries so [CESR](#) never uses the '=' pad character. But naive [base64](#) will pad if the length is not 24 bit aligned.

Source: Samuel Smith in [issue 34](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # ndigs ↗

Digests of public keys, not keys themselves. The reason to use ndigs is to prove control over public keys or to hide keys. It's used in Keripy and consists of a list of qualified base64 digests of public rotation key derivations.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # nested-cooperative-delegated-identifiers ↗

In KERI delegations are cooperative, this means that both the delegator and delegate must contribute to a delegation. The delegator creates a cryptographic commitment in either a rotation or interaction event via a seal in a delegated establishment event. The delegate creates a cryptographic commitment in its establishment event via a seal to the delegating event.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # next-threshold ↗

represents the number or fractional weights of signatures from the given set of next keys required to be attached to a [Message](#) ↗ for the [Message](#) ↗ to be considered fully signed.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # non-establishment-event ↗

a Key event that does not change the current Key state for an AID. Typically, the purpose of a Non-establishment event is to anchor external data to a given Key state as established by the most recent prior Establishment event for an AID.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # non-interactive-authentication-design ↗

A group of approaches having non-interactive mechanisms that pose unique problems because they do not allow a challenge response reply handshake. A request is submitted that is self-authenticating without additional interaction.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # non-repudiable / 17

## # non-transferable-identifier / 17

## # official-organizational-role / 17

Also 'OOR'. A person that represents the Legal Entity in an official organizational role and is issued an OOR vLEI Credential.

Source ↗ Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # opcode / 17

Opcodes are meant to provide stream processing instructions that are more general and flexible than simply concatenated primitives or groups of primitives.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # operator / 17

an optional field map in the Edge section that enables expression of the edge logic on edge subgraph as either a unary operator on the edge itself or an m-ary operator on the edge group.

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # out-of-band-introduction / 17

Out-of-band Introductions (OOBIs) are discovery and validation of IP resources for [key-event-receipt-infrastructure](#) autonomic identifiers. **Discovery via URI, trust via KERI.**

The simplest form of a KERI Oobi is a namespaced string, a tuple, a mapping, a structured message, or structured attachment that contains both a KERI AID and a URL. The Oobi associates the URL with the AID.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # parside / 17

is a bunch of generators. Responsible for pulling out a stream of bits from a CESR stream and parse it.

Sam Smith suggested for Parside to not iterate stuff, only parse chunks delimited by the [count-code](#). (Source Cesride: meeting Feb 2 2023)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # partial-disclosure ↗

a disclosure of an ACDC that partially discloses its field maps using Compact Disclosure. The Compact Disclosure provides a cryptographically equivalent commitment to the yet-to-be-disclosed content, and the later exchange of the uncompacted content is verifiable to an earlier Partial Disclosure. Unlike Selective disclosure, a partially disclosable field becomes correlatable to its encompassing block after its Full Disclosure.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # partial-pre-rotation ↗

[partial-rotation](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # partial-rotation ↗

The pre-rotation mechanism supports partial pre-rotation or **more exactly partial rotation of pre-rotated keypairs**. It's a rotation operation on a set of pre-rotated keys that may keep some keys in reserve (i.e unexposed) while exposing others as needed.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # pathing ↗

It was designed to sign portions of a credential aimed at complex cases like

- a credential embedded in another credential
- multiple signers, only signing portions of a credential (partial signing)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # percolated-discovery ↗

a discovery mechanism for information associated with an AID or a SAID, which is based on Invasion Percolation Theory. Once an entity has discovered such information, it may in turn share what it discovers with other entities. Since the information so discovered is end-verifiable, the percolation mechanism and percolating intermediaries do not need to be trusted.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

[percolated-information-discovery](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # percolated-information-discovery / 17

In the [OOBI](#) protocol, a discovery mechanism for the [KERI](#) and the [ACDC](#) protocols is provided by a bootstrap that enables Percolated Information Discovery (PID), which is based on Invasion Percolation Theory.

After related information for discovery and verification is bootstrapped from the OOBI, subsequent authorization is non-interactive, thus making it highly scalable. This provides what we call zero-trust percolated discovery or speedy percolated discovery.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # persistent-identifier / 17

### # pre-rotation / 17

Cryptographic commitment to next rotated key set in previous rotation or [inception-event](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # prefix / 17

A prefix that is composed of a basic Base-64 (URL safe) derivation code pre-pended to Base-64 encoding of a basic public digital signing key.

Including the derivation code in the prefix binds the derivation process along with the public key to the resultant identifier.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # presentation-exchange / 17

An exchange that provides disclosure of one or more [authentic-chained-data-containers](#) between a Discloser and a Disclosee.

A presentation exchange is the process by which [authenticity](#) information may be exchanged between two parties, namely, the [discloser](#) and [disclosee](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # primary-root-of-trust / 17

In KERI a [root-of-trust](#) that is cryptographically verifiable all the way to its current controlling key pair in a PKI.

The characteristic *primary* is one-on-one related to the [entropy](#) used for the creation of (the seed of) the private keys.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # proem ✎

A “proem” is an introductory statement, preamble, or preface. It sets the stage for the content that follows, often providing context, framing the discussion, or outlining the purpose and scope of the material.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # promiscuous-mode ✎

It is the mode a [watcher](#) runs in. A watcher uses the same code as a [witness](#). However a watcher does so “lacking standards of selection; acting without careful judgment; indiscriminate”. Or “Showing little forethought or critical judgment; casual.”

[Source](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # proof-of-authorship ✎

Proof that somebody or something has originally created certain content. It's about *data*'s inception. Whereas [proof-of-authority](#) is about *rights* attached to this data.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # provenanced ✎

The act of verifying [authenticity](#) or quality of documented history or origin of something.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # public-transaction-event-log ✎

is a public hash-linked data structure of transactions that can be used to track state anchored to a [key-event-log](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # public-verifiable-credential-registry ✎

is a form of a [Verifiable Data Registry](#) ↗ that tracks the issuance/revocation state of credentials issued by the controller of the [key-event-log](#). Two types of TELs will be used for this purpose: [management-transaction-event-log](#) and [virtual-credential-transaction-event-log](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # qry ✎

qry = query

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # quadlet ✎ 17

a group of 4 characters in the T domain and equivalently in triplets of 3 bytes each in the B domain used to define variable size.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # qualified-vlei-issuer-vlei-credential-governance-framework ✎ 17

A document that details the requirements to enable this Credential to be [issued by GLEIF](#) to [qualified-vlei-issuer](#) which allows the Qualified vLEI Issuers to issue, verify and revoke [legal-entity-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#), [legal-entity-official-organizational-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#), and [legal-entity-engagement-context-role-vlei-credential-governance-framework](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # qualified-vlei-issuer ✎ 17

The contracting party to the vLEI Issuer Qualification Agreement that has been qualified by GLEIF as a Qualified vLEI Issuer.

[Source](#) ↗: Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # qualified ✎ 17

When qualified, a cryptographic primitive includes a prepended derivation code (as a [proem](#)), that indicates the cryptographic algorithm or suite used for that derivation.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # qvi-authorized-representative ✎ 17

A designated representative of a [QVI](#) authorized, to conduct QVI operations with GLEIF and [legal-entity](#). Also referring to a person in the role of a QAR.

Paraphrased by @henkvancann from [source](#) ↗ Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # rct ✎ 17

rct = receipt

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # read-update-nullify ✎ 17

Read, update, nullify are a set of actions you (or a server) can take on data. "Read" means to view it, "update" means to change it, and "nullify" means to invalidate it, but not "Delete" it. Mind you, there's also no "Create".

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # receipt-log ✎ 17

ordered record of all key event receipts for a given set of witnesses.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # receipt ✎ 17

event message or reference with one or more witness signatures.

See Also:

[key-event-receipt](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # reconciliation ✎ 17

Reconciliation is the process in which you decide to accept a fork of the [key-event-log](#) or not.

Source: Samuel Smith, Zoom meeting Jan 2 2024.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # redundant-credential ✎ 17

Multiple credentials issued by the same issuer (e.g. a [QVI](#)). They do not have anything to do with each other. They are independently valid.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # registrar ✎ 17

identifiers that serve as backers for each [transaction-event-log](#) (TEL) under its provenance. This list of Registrars can be rotated with events specific to a certain type of TEL. In this way, a Registrar is analogous to a Backer in KERI KELs and Registrar lists are analogous to Backer lists in KERI KELs.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # registration-interaction ✎ 17

Setup/Registration interaction, new AID and authorization to establish access control. You present a ([vLEI](#)) credential. You don't want that captured and misused. Narrowing the scope to a certain role (e.g. Document Submitter) is a pre-registration via [delegation](#) authority.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # reputation

Consistent behaviour over time on the basis of which anyone else makes near-future decisions.

Source: Samuel Smith at IIW37.

Also see TrustoverIP definition: [reputation](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#)

## # reputational-trust

### # reserve-rotation

One important use case for [partial-rotation](#) is to enable pre-rotated key pairs designated in one [establishment-event](#) to be held in reserve and not exposed at the next (immediately subsequent) establishment event.

Source [IETF-KERI draft 2022](#) by Samuel Smith.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#)

## # rev

rev = vc revoke, verifiable credential revocation

More in [extended KERI glossary](#)

## # revocation-event

An event that revokes [control-authority](#) over an [identifier](#). From that point in time the authoritative key-pairs at hand are not valid anymore.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#)

## # root-autonomic-identifier

An entity may provide the [root-of-trust](#) for some ecosystem (with delegation )via its root [AID](#). Let's call this the *RID* for "root AID". The RID must be protected using the highest level of [security](#) in its [key-management](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#)

## # rot

[JSON](#) field name (attribute) for Rotation Event; its content (value) contains a hash pointer. All [transaction-event-log](#) events are anchored in a [key-event-log](#) in either ixn ([interaction-event](#)) or [rot](#) ([rotation-events](#)). This is the foundation enabling a verifiable credential protocol to be built on top of KERI.

[Source ↗](#) Kent Bull 2023

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # rotation-authority ✓

The (exclusive) right to rotate the authoritative key pair and establish changed control authority.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # rotation-event ✓

an Establishment Event that provides the information needed to change the Key state, which includes a change to the set of [authoritative](#) keypairs for an AID.

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # rotation ✓

The operation of revoking and replacing the set of [authoritative key-pair](#) for an [AID](#). This operation is made verifiable and [duplicity](#) evident upon acceptance as a rotation event that is appended to the AID's [KEL](#).

Source [Sam Smith](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # rpy ✓

rpy = reply

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # rules ✓

a top-level field map within an ACDC that provides a legal language as a [Ricardian Contract](#) ↗, which is both human and machine-readable and referenceable by a cryptographic digest.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # run-off-the-crud ✓

*RUN off the [CRUD](#)* is an alternative to the traditional [CRUD](#) approach to defining basic operations on resources in data management systems (e.g., databases, APIs). RUN stands for Read, Update, Nullify and bears a nuanced approach to deletion.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # sally ✓

is an implementation of a verification service and acting as a reporting server. It is purpose-built software for the vLEI ecosystem to allow participants in the vLEI ecosystem present credentials, so the [GLEIF](#) Reporting API can show what [vLEI](#) are; issued to [legal-entity](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # salter ✎ 17

A primitive that represents a [seed](#). It has the ability to generate new [signers](#).

[Source](#) ↗ by Jason Colburne

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # salty-nonce-blinding-factor ✎ 17

For ease of sharing a secret and hiding information with this secret of Blindable State TELs we use a Salty Nonce Blinding Factor. You'd like to hide the state of certain credentials to some verifiers in the future, while keeping the state verifiable for others.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # schema ✎ 17

the [said](#) of a JSON schema that is used to issue and verify an ACDC.

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # secondary-root-of-trust ✎ 17

In KERI its a [root-of-trust](#) that, for its secure attribution, depends on another verifiable data structure (VDS) which MUST be a [primary-root-of-trust](#).

By its nature and cryptographic anchoring via [seal](#) to a primary root-of-trust, a secondary root-of-trust still has a high level of trustability and can be automatically verified.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # secure-asset-transfer-protocol ✎ 17

An IETF protocol (and working group) in the making (as of mid 2022) for moving assets between blockchains.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # secure-attribution ✎ 17

### # secure-private-authentic-confidentiality ✎ 17

ToIP Trust Spanning Layer Group realized we do have a secure authentication layer (KERI) but we don't have a secure confidentiality and privacy mechanism. Sam Smith proposes SPAC paper to define this.

Related:

<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22-cohen.pdf> ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # security-cost-performance-architecture-trade-off ✎ 17

The degree of protection offered by a key management infrastructure usually forces a trade-off between security, cost, and performance.

Typically, key generation happens relatively infrequently compared to event signing. But highly secure key generation may not support highly performant signing. This creates an architecture trade-off problem.

Paraphrased from source [Universal Identifier Theory](#) ↗ by Samuel Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # security ✎ 17

'secure' is free from or not exposed to danger or harm; safe. For [identifier](#)s security typically means secure from [exploit](#) or [compromise](#). More specifically an identifier is secure with respect to an entity if there is a mechanism by which that entity may prove it has [controller](#) over the identifier.

Also see TrustoverIP [security-policy](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # selective-disclosure ✎ 17

a disclosure of an ACDC that selectively discloses its attributes using Compact Disclosure. The set of selectively disclosable attributes is provided as an array of blinded blocks where each attribute in the set has its own dedicated blinded block. Unlike Partial Disclosure, the selectively disclosed fields are not correlatable to the so far undisclosed but selectively disclosable fields in the same encompassing block.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-addressed-data ✎ 17

a representation of data content from which a SAID is derived. The SAID is both cryptographically bound to (content-addressable) and encapsulated by (self-referential) its SAD [said](#).

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-addressing-data ✎

an identifier that is content-addressable and self-referential. A SAID is uniquely and cryptographically bound to a serialization of data that includes the SAID as a component in that serialization [said](#).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-addressing-identifier ✎

any identifier that is deterministically generated out of the content, or a digest of the content.

Source: Dr. S. Smtih

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-certifying-identifier ✎

a type of Cryptonym that is uniquely cryptographically derived from the public key of an asymmetric signing keypair (public, private).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

Also see the TrustoverIP scope definition: [self-certifying identifier](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-framing ✎

a textual or binary encoding that begins with type, size, and value so that a parser knows how many characters (when textual) or bytes (when binary) to extract from the stream for a given element without parsing the rest of the characters or bytes in the element is Self-Framing.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # self-sovereign-identity ✎

### # server-sent-event ✎

Mailbox notifications; a streaming service for the agent U/I, to get notifications from the KERI system itself.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# siger ✎ 17  
[indexed-signature](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# signer ✎ 17

A primitive that represents a private key. It has the ability to create Sigers and Cigars (signatures).

[Source](#) ↗ by Jason Colburne

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# signify-keria-request-authentication-protocol ✎ 17

SKRAP is a client to the KERIA server. Mobile clients will be using SKRAP to connect to KERI [AIDs](#) via [agents](#) in the new, multi-tenant Mark II Agent server, [keria](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# signify ✎ 17

Signify is a web client [key-event](#) signing - and key pair creation app that minimizes the use of [KERI](#) on the client.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# signing-authority ✎ 17

The authority to sign on behalf of the controller of the authoritative key pair. Often in situation where delegation has taken place, e.g. a custodial agent. These are limited rights because [rotation-authority](#) is not included.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# simple-keri-for-web-auth ✎ 17

A [KERI](#) implementation that sacrifices performance or other non-security feature for usability. In general a narrow application of KERI may not require all the features of KERI but those features that it does support must still be secure.

More on source [Github Repo SKWA](#) ↗.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

# sniffable ✎ 17

A stream is *sniffable* as soon as it starts with a group code or field map; in fact this is how our parser ([parside](#)) works. and detects if the CESR stream contains a certain datablock.

The datablock of CESR binary, CESR Text, JSON, CBOR, MGPK have an Object code or the Group code (binary or text) and it's always a recognizable and unique *three bit combination*.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # sniffer ✎

The *sniffer* is part of [parside](#) and detects if the CESR stream contains CESR binary, CESR Text, JSON, CBOR, MGPK.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # solicited-issuance ✎

The issuance of a Legal Entity vLEI Credentials, [OOR](#) vLEI Credentials and [ECR](#) vLEI Credentials upon receipt by the [QAR](#) of a Fully Signed issuance request from the [AVR](#)(s) of the [legal-entity](#).

[Source](#) ↗: Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # spurn ✎

To *reject*. In KERI, "spurn" refers to a cryptographic or protocol-based act of rejecting an invalid or untrusted event. This rejection is deliberate and purposeful, ensuring the system's integrity by disregarding information that does not meet the necessary validation criteria. The verb 'spurn' is first used in the [IPEX](#) specification.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # ssi-system ✎

The SSI Infrastructure consists of the technological components that are deployed all over the world for the purpose of providing, requesting and obtaining data for the purpose of negotiating and/or executing electronic [transactions](#) ↗.

Paraphrased by @henkvancann based on source [eSSIF-lab](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # stable ✎

Refers to the state of cryptographic verifiability across a network or system. It generally implies that a particular identifier, event, or data set is consistent, fully verified, and cannot be contested within KERI.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # stale-event ✎

A stale key event is an outdated or irrelevant (key) event involving an [stale-key](#) that may compromise security.

See also: [stale-key](#)

## # stale-key ✎

A stale key is an outdated or expired encryption key that should no longer be used for securing data

See also: [stale-event](#)

## # stream ✎

a [CESR](#) Stream is any set of concatenated Primitives, concatenated groups of Primitives, or hierarchically composed groups of [primitives](#).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # streamer ✎

A convenience class for supporting stream parsing, including nested (tunneled, encrypted) [CESR](#) streams. Streams can be a mixture/combination of different [primitive](#), including other streams. A stream is a concatenation of primitives.

Source: Kent Bull in chat Zoom meeting KERI Aug 6, 2024.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # strip-parameter ✎

tells us what part of the [CESR](#) stream will be parsed by which code.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # targeted-acdc ✎

an ACDC with the presence of the Issuee field in the attribute or attribute aggregate sections.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

[untargeted-acdc](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # text-binary-concatenation-composability ✎

An encoding has *composability* when any set of [self-framing](#) concatenated primitives expressed in either the text domain or binary domain may be converted as a group to the other domain and back again without loss.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # tholder ✎

t-holder object that supports fractionally-weighted [signing-threshold](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # threshold-of-accountable-duplicity ✎ 17

The threshold of accountable duplicity (TOAD) is a threshold number **M** that the controller declares to accept accountability for an event when any subset **M** of the **N** witnesses confirm that event. The threshold **M** indicates the minimum number of confirming witnesses the controller deems sufficient given some number **F** of potentially faulty witnesses, given that **M**  $\geq N - F$ . This enables a controller to provide itself with any degree of protection it deems necessary given this accountability.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # threshold-signature-scheme ✎ 17

or TSS; is a type of digital signature protocol used by [Mutli-party Computation \(MPC\)](#) ↗ wallets to authorize transactions or key state changes.

Source [Cryptoapis](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # top-level-section ✎ 17

The fields of an ACDC in [compact-variant](#). The value of a top level section field is either the SAD or the SAID of the SAD of the associated section.

An Issuer commitment via a signature to any variant of ACDC (compact, full, etc) makes a cryptographic commitment to the top-level section fields shared by all variants of that ACDC.

Paraphrased by @henkvancann based on [source](#) ↗.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # transaction-event-log ✎ 17

The set of transactions that determine registry state form a log called a Transaction Event Log (TEL). The TEL provides a cryptographic proof of registry state by reference to the corresponding controlling [key-event-log](#). Any validator may therefore cryptographically verify the [authoritative](#) of the [registry](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # transfer-off-ledger ✎ 17

The act of transferring control authority over an identifier from a ledger (or blockchain) to the native verifiable KERI data structure Key Event Log.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # transferable-identifier ✎ 17

## # transferable ✎

### # trust-domain ✎

A trust domain is the ecosystem of interactions that rely on a trust basis. A trust basis binds controllers, identifiers, and key-pairs. *For example the Facebook ecosystem of social interactions is a trust domain that relies on Facebook's identity system of usernames and passwords as its trust basis.*

([Source whitepaper ↗](#))

See also: [trust-domain ↗](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary ↗](#)

## # trust-spanning-protocol ✎

Protocol using [verifiable-identifier](#)s that signs every single message on the internet and makes them verifiable.

Also see TrustoverIP [toip-trust-spanning-protocol ↗](#)

## # univalent ✎

In identifier systems, univalent means having a unique and non-ambiguous identifier for each entity or resource. This means that there is a *one-to-one correspondence* between the identifiers and the entities, and that no two different entities share the same identifier.

Source: Bing chat, Sept 2023

More in [extended KERI glossary ↗](#)

## # unpermissioned-correlation ✎

a correlation established between two or more disclosed ACDCs whereby the discloser of the ACDCs does not permit the disclosee to establish such a correlation.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary ↗](#)

## # unsolicited-issuance ✎

Issuance of a Legal Entity vLEI Credential upon notice by a [QAR](#) to the [AVR](#)(s) of the Legal Entity that a Legal Entity vLEI Credential has been solicited on the [legal-entity](#)'s behalf.

[Source ↗](#): Draft vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework Glossary.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # untargeted-acdc ✎

an ACDC without the presence of the Issuee field in the attribute or attribute aggregate sections.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

## [targeted-acdc](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # vLEI ✎

## # vcp ✎

vcp = vdr incept, verifiable data registry inception

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # vdr ✎

## [verifiable-data-registry](#)

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # verfer ✎

A primitive that represents a public key. It has the ability to [verify](#) signatures on data.

[Source](#) ↗ by Jason Colburne

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # verifiable-credential ✎

Verifiable credentials (VCs) are an [open standard](#) ↗ for digital credentials. They can represent information found in physical credentials, such as a passport or license, as well as new things that have no physical equivalent, such as ownership of a bank account.

See also: [verifiable-credential](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

## # verifiable-identifier ✎

## # verifiable-legal-entity-identifier ✎

Verifiable credentials are issued by authorized validation agents ([QVI](#)) under the governance of [GLEIF](#), who delegate tasks to these agents. They provide cryptographic proof that the information about a legal entity, as linked to its Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), is verifiably authentic, accurate, and up-to-date.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # verifiable ✎ 17

a condition of a KEL: being internally consistent with the integrity of its backward and forward chaining digest and authenticity of its non-repudiable signatures.

Source: Dr. S. Smith

## Explanation

Able to cryptographically verify a certain data structure on its [inconsistency](#) and its [authenticity](#).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # verification ✎ 17

An action an [agent](#) (of a principal) performs to determine the [authenticity](#) of a claim or other digital object using a cryptographic key.

Source: ToIP glossary, Jan 2024.

See also [verification](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # verify ✎ 17

The act, by or on behalf of a [party](#), of determining whether that data is [authenticity](#) (i.e. originates from the party that authored it), timely (i.e. has not expired), and conforms to other specifications that apply to its structure.

[Source eSSIF-lab](#) ↗ in eSSIF-lab glossary

See also: [verification](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # version-code ✎ 17

tells you which set of tables to load, it tells the table state. It's a unique code. what version of the table is going to load.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # version-string ✎ 17

the first field in any top-level KERI field map in which it appears.

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

#### # **version** ↗

an instance of a KEL for an AID in which at least one event is unique between two instances of the [kel](#).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

#### # **virtual-credential-transaction-event-log** ↗

will track the issued or revoked state of each virtual credential (VC) and will contain a reference to its corresponding *management transaction event log* (*management TEL*).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

#### # **vlei credential** ↗

#### # **vlei-ecosystem-governance-framework** ↗

#### # **vlei-role-credential** ↗

#### # **VRT** ↗

VRT = vdr rotate, verifiable data registry rotation

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

#### # **watcher** ↗

an *entity* or *component* that keeps a copy of a [kerl](#) for an identifier but that is not designated by the *controller* of the identifier as one of its witnesses. See annex [watcher](#).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

#### # **weight-of-weights** ↗

There are 2 levels in the multi-sign weighted thresholds of [multisig](#) in KERI because the solution only needs to focus on *tightly cooperating teams*.

- An individual using split keys over devices
- A team of teams

All other use cases can be solved by other means in KERI (e.g. [delegation](#)).

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # weight ✎ 📅

an optional field map in the Edge section that provides edge weight property that enables directed weighted edges and operators that use weights.

Source: Dr. S.Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # well-known-witnesses ✎ 📅

Witness identifier creation by using salts to initialize their key stores so that you can predict what identifiers will be created. For testing purposes only!

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # witness ✎ 📅

a witness is an entity or component designated (trusted) by the controller of an identifier. The primary role of a witness is to verify, sign, and keep events associated with an identifier. A witness is the controller of its own self-referential identifier which may or may not be the same as the identifier to which it is a witness. See also [keri's-algorithm-for-witness-agreement](#).

Source: Dr. S. Smith

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗

### # xip ✎ 📅

A XIP message allows a transaction set to be a mini peer to peer exchange to become a verifiable data structure. It makes the transaction become duplicity evident.

Source [KERI meeting 2024-03-12](#) ↗

More in [extended KERI glossary](#) ↗