Trusty Squire

Empower agents with auth and payments.

MCP tools to automate auth and pay — your keys and card never leave the vault.

Trusty Squire is an MCP server that lets Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Goose, and other coding agents sign up, provision, and purchase on your behalf. It opens a real browser, works through signup, sign-in, setup, and checkout flows one step at a time, clears the bot-detection and email-verification steps that make operator tools stall, and hands the job back to a person only when one is actually required. That covers wiring up OAuth and API keys for the app you're building as much as it covers paying a checkout, sending a gift, or booking something — the same operator primitives drive all of it.

Provider secrets and payment cards are write-only: the agent's credential tools return references and authenticated results, never stored plaintext. The raw secret never needs to enter the agent's context, so it can't be pasted into a commit, leaked in a log, or read back out over chat. Backend access is a host-scoped, rate-limited, independently revocable grant, so a leaked token is killed without rotating the provider key — and you connect Google or GitHub yourself in a real browser, so the agent never types your password. Full threat model below.

One prompt

Add Google OAuth to this app in one prompt: create the OAuth client, save the client secret, and wire it in without putting the raw key in chat, code, or .env.

Your coding agent plans the job. Trusty Squire operates the website, stores the generated key, and can issue your backend a scoped grant. The backend calls the provider through Trusty Squire, which injects the provider key on the server side.

Other useful asks:

• “Set up Stripe payments for this app and keep the API key out of this conversation.”
• “Create a Render API key for deployment automation and keep it out of this conversation.”
• “Pay this checkout with my saved work card and ask me to approve it on my phone.”
• “Send a gift to my friend without sharing their address with me.”
• “Book this dinner reservation for me.”
• “That app grant leaked. Revoke it without rotating the provider key.”

For supported card checkouts, save a card in the Vault from a passkey-capable device or let your first operate_pay approval link collect one just in time. When no card is specified, Trusty Squire uses the only saved card, starts the add-card ceremony if none exists, or asks you to choose when several exist. The new card is encrypted in your browser with a passkey-derived key and bound to that purchase before approval; if you add it but do not approve in time, it remains saved for a faster retry.

Recognized Visa, Mastercard, Amex, Discover, Diners Club, and JCB cards show their network mark in the Vault while keeping the full bank/network label. Open a card row to see its masked number; reveal runs the passkey ceremony in your browser before showing the number, name, expiry, and billing address. The CVV is never shown, even after reveal. The Activity page also records card additions and removals, payments, and app-grant changes without storing a PAN or CVV.

operate_pay requires a non-empty item and reason (calls that omit either receive a validation error). On a single-page checkout it prefers a machine-read checkout total, sends you a short-lived approval link, and submits only after you approve the purchase. A clean visible labeled total wins; when none is readable, strict schema.org Order/Invoice.totalPaymentDue structured data can supply the amount and currency. If neither source exposes a total, caller-supplied amount_cents and currency become the authoritative approval amount; an omitted merchant name falls back to the checkout URL's hostname. Product and offer prices never qualify as machine-read checkout totals. An unambiguous ISO currency on the page remains authoritative. A notation that cannot identify one ISO currency by itself, such as a shared currency symbol or an FX-preview selector, falls through to the currency already selected or approved for the purchase instead of refusing the checkout. Any live amount or currency drift still fails closed; the authoritative binding contract lives in the security model. Approval, 3-D Secure, Activity, and notification amounts use the currency's minor-unit precision (for example, whole yen for JPY and two decimals for USD). The anonymous approval page shows the merchant, checkout origin, amount and currency, item, and reason directly from the short-lived server record before one passkey ceremony authorizes those canonical payment values. You also see the requesting MCP client (for example, Hermes) and the bound card's label plus last four digits (or its label alone for a legacy card) before clicking Approve payment to relay the operator-sealed final authorization. Before submitting that authorization, you can instead choose Deny payment; a denial closes that approval attempt and prevents any later operator confirmation. When the pre-submission checkout can be machine-read, the payment is refused if its merchant, origin, amount, or currency has changed since approval. If that resume read cannot recover a total, Trusty Squire reuses the original mandate-bound checkout values. Card entry requires the PAN, expiry, and CVV fields; cardholder name and other explicitly labeled billing fields are filled best-effort, so a missing name field does not abort the payment. Sealing and cleanup touch only those selected payment controls; merchant shipping address and country controls remain untouched. If the checkout has a selected merchant-saved card alongside the newly filled card, Trusty Squire selects the sole unambiguous new-card radio and verifies both that choice and the filled fields again immediately before submission; ambiguous choices, selected saved-card options, and failed verification are refused with payment_card_selection_ambiguous. A charge is treated as dispatched only after the browser observes a concrete charge/order request, a terminal merchant outcome, or genuine 3-D Secure evidence; native form validation alone does not claim a dispatch. A submit is reported as payment_submitted only after the checkout reaches a new merchant order-confirmation URL with a substantive order or receipt identity. The browser completes 3-D Secure natively, including out-of-band bank-app challenges — Trusty Squire never manipulates or intercepts the challenge; it uses read-only checks while polling for that same order-confirmation signal. At that last observable boundary, a mismatch between the released card and issuer, network, or last-four evidence rendered by the 3-D Secure issuer/app is returned as a structured warning with kind: "payment_instrument_mismatch" and expected-versus-observed evidence. The warning persists through resumable operate_payment_status calls; it neither changes the payment status nor cancels, approves, or modifies the challenge, so the cardholder retains the decision whether to continue. A dispatched attempt with no confirmed merchant outcome and no genuine 3-D Secure evidence remains payment_outcome_unknown, including across resumable status checks; Trusty Squire never relabels that uncertainty as 3-D Secure. A detected challenge that remains unresolved on timeout stays payment_3ds_required with needs_user.wall: "3ds", handing control back for user completion. Neither status is success or permits blind resubmission: manually check the merchant's order state before any retry.

operate_pay surfaces the approval link before its bounded server-side wait. It may wait up to one minute for approval, denial, or expiry; if it returns approval_pending first, call operate_pay again with the same arguments. That call resumes the same approval and one-passkey boundary instead of creating a new link. operate_payment_status is a non-charging alternative for inspecting the pre-charge approval and is the continuation tool for an already-submitted unknown or 3-D Secure outcome. Its wait_seconds accepts 0-60 (default 0) to bound-wait instead of taking an instant peek. Denial or expiry is terminal for that session's attempt: repeated calls return the same result and never mint a replacement approval. Close the session and start a fresh one before making a genuinely new payment attempt.

Every payment response includes its session_id. Pass that same ID to every follow-up payment call. Omitting session_id remains compatible only while this MCP process has exactly one session; it never selects a newest or arbitrary checkout.

Some split checkouts collect the card before the final order-confirmation step. On the card-entry page, operate_pay { phase: "fill_card" } first reads the live total. A subtotal qualifies as that payable amount only when the same order summary says shipping is free; recommendation and related-product prices are excluded. If that page exposes no total, caller-supplied amount_cents and currency take precedence as the approval amount. If they are omitted, Trusty Squire may use the most recent real total observed earlier in the same browser session, such as the cart subtotal, only when the checkout origin still matches. One phone approval binds that amount and releases the card; Trusty Squire fills the card without submitting and its role in the purchase ends there. It fills only the merchant's own HTTPS frames or recognized payment-provider frames. The card stays in the page as sealed, observation-masked fields while the agent advances to the review step and places the order. Verify the live final total against the approved amount_cents/currency yourself before placing the order; Trusty Squire no longer re-reads the total or submits anything. For click and js_click, a control whose label looks like pay/place-order may fire only once for that approval. A second recognized attempt is refused and requires a fresh operate_pay approval in a new session. Non-charge-labeled clicks, key presses, and oauth_click remain ungated. After a recognized click dispatches, Trusty Squire best-effort records a secret-free payment_place_order_attempted Activity event bound to the approval, optional mandate, approved amount/currency, merchant, and opaque card reference. This records an attempt, not a verified charge outcome.

operate_pay { phase: "confirm" } just releases the session's pending-fill lock and reports the approved terms back — it makes no browser or provider call, records no audit event itself, and never charges. It can be called any time after the fill — it does not need to happen before you place the order, and it never reads a total or verifies an amount. If a payment gets stuck or a card is declined, recover with operate_finish and start a fresh session; operate_pay does not support refilling a different card mid-session.

Before an initial single-page or fill_card call, Trusty Squire follows the actual visible card-number field and hands the checkout back when that field is hosted by PayPal or Braintree. A separate PayPal express button does not block fillable merchant or Shopify PCI card fields. Trusty Squire does not sign in to PayPal or use vaulted PayPal credentials. After any submit that has not yet reached a confirmed order, Trusty Squire waits 180 seconds by default for native completion, including out-of-band bank-app approval. A linked Telegram chat receives a challenge-specific nudge only after 3-D Secure is detected. Standard cross-processor 3-D Secure signals and recognized CardinalCommerce or Stripe challenge frames classify the first case only when the containing frame is visibly rendered. Hidden 3-D Secure Method pre-authentication and captcha-hosted frames never count as 3-D Secure, and an ordinary Shopify PCI card-field host alone does not either. It reports a visible decline and hands an unresolved outcome back on timeout, noting whether the Telegram nudge actually went out. three_ds_wait_seconds accepts whole seconds from 0 to 600; set it to 0 on operate_pay to skip the notification and waiting and receive the handoff immediately.

Connect Telegram under Vault Settings to receive secret-free alerts for credential, card, payment, and app-grant lifecycle changes. Routine credential retrieval and proxy access stay in Activity instead of sending a push for every request.

Install

npx @trusty-squire/mcp connect

connect signs you in with Google or GitHub, detects your coding agent, and merges the squire MCP server into its existing configuration. On a machine with a user-visible desktop, sign-in opens a local Chrome window. On a headless Linux server, including an SSH/TTY session with an inherited virtual display, interactive login starts a login-scoped Xvfb and noVNC stack and prints a URL you can open on another device. The default quick tunnel and every local helper are torn down when that login completes, times out, fails, or is interrupted. Operators may instead set both TS_LOGIN_PUBLIC_HOSTNAME and TS_LOGIN_LOCAL_PORT to reuse an externally managed named tunnel; Trusty Squire still tears down its per-login display and local listener, but never creates or stops that external tunnel. If that tunnel's fixed local port is busy, login reports it and uses a one-off quick tunnel for that sign-in instead. Restart the agent and ask for the finished website outcome. Trusty Squire is free to start.

To choose a target explicitly:

npx @trusty-squire/mcp connect --target=codex

Supported targets: claude-code, cursor, codex, opencode, goose, cline, continue, and hermes.

The isolated operate_* browser runtime currently requires Linux and a local Chrome connection; remote CDP, macOS, and Windows operator sessions are not supported in this migration stage.

What happens

1. Your coding agent names the website and the outcome it needs: an account, authenticated setup, app publishing, a purchase, a gift, or a booking.
2. Trusty Squire works through the service flow one step at a time. Every task opens its own fresh browser profile and restores the snapshot's non-Google signed-in state, so independent sessions can run concurrently without opening the canonical login profile. Google state is restored inside the serialized oauth_login or legacy oauth_click boundary; sanctioned Gmail verification uses a separate temporary identity browser.
3. If the flow produces an API key or client secret, Trusty Squire captures it into the vault without returning the raw value through its credential tools.
4. The agent can make an authenticated request, create a host-scoped app grant, or use a saved card for a supported checkout after you approve the purchase.
5. Eligible successful flows can become signed registry skills, so later runs can replay verified steps instead of rediscovering every click.

If a site requires phone verification, a hard CAPTCHA, an unresolved 3-D Secure challenge, an unsupported payment method, or another human decision, the run hands control back and tells you. It does not guess or pretend the task completed.

Supported services

Discovery pages are generated only for services with an active skill in the Trusty Squire registry. The first five detailed pages cover Braintrust, Cerebras, Clerk, DeepInfra, and Zilliz Cloud. Each sample has explicit signup evidence in its active registry record and a provider request checked against official API documentation. The service hub also lists every active registry entry; the remaining detail pages stay unpublished until their workflow and unique content pass review.

Browse the active service catalog. Maintainers can detect registry drift before merging with:

pnpm seo:verify-services

The registry controls which service pages exist. An external list is never used to claim support.

Keep provider keys out of agent context

Ask the agent to create a scoped backend grant:

Grant this backend access to Clerk through Trusty Squire with a limit of 100 requests per hour.

Before minting the grant, make api.clerk.com the credential's primary allowed host in the Vault. The egress proxy refuses every other upstream host. This explicit policy step is required when the signup host and provider API host differ.

The agent calls the real MCP tool with the service and requested limit:

grant_app_access({
  service: "clerk",
  rate_limit_per_hour: 100
})

Rate limits are opt-in. Omitting rate_limit_per_hour creates an unlimited grant; host scoping, auditing, and revocation still apply. When a grant reaches an explicit hourly limit, the proxy returns 429 rate_limited with scope: "grant", Retry-After, and window/reset metadata.

The result contains a host-scoped egress base_url and a token, not the Clerk secret key. The token is returned once through the MCP result and remains valid until revoked. That means the scoped grant token can enter agent context; it is not the provider key. Move it directly into backend-only deployment secret storage, never browser code, logs, or source control. If you need zero grant-token exposure to the model, use use_credential for agent-initiated requests instead. Trusty Squire removes the grant authorization at the boundary and injects the vaulted provider credential into the upstream request.

Security and threat model

• Provider credentials are encrypted in the vault and are write-only to agent credential tools. Those tools return references or authenticated results, not stored plaintext.
• The raw provider key is injected only into the outbound provider request. It does not need to land in chat, generated code, the consuming app, or the project's .env file.
• App grants are host-scoped, auditable, rate-limitable, and independently revocable. A leaked grant can be revoked without rotating the provider key.
• You connect Google or GitHub in a real browser. Trusty Squire does not ask the coding agent to type those passwords.
• Saved cards are encrypted in your browser with a passkey-derived key. For a single-page payment, your phone releases the card only after approving the exact purchase details shown on the approval page. On a split checkout, one amount-bound approval releases the card; Trusty Squire's role ends at the fill and the caller places the order and verifies the final total itself. The API temporarily relays only operator-sealed card ciphertext and its signed mandate. Trusty Squire's API and the coding-agent model never receive plaintext PAN or CVV. See the security model for the signed mandate's binding contract.
• Browser screenshots and diagnostics can contain whatever a website visibly rendered. Treat diagnostic artifacts as sensitive and do not ask an agent to re-observe a page after a secret is shown.
• Trusty Squire does not bypass phone verification, hard CAPTCHAs, 3-D Secure, payment authorization, or decisions that belong to a person. It stops for human input.

See the security model for the card and credential trust boundaries, and architecture for the system and data flows.

MCP tools

The default MCP registry exposes 20 tools. The essential operator surface is operate_start, operate_observe, operate_observe_query, operate_act, operate_pay, operate_payment_status, operate_finish, operate_recipe_run, and operate_recipe_save — every former standalone workflow/lifecycle/login tool name was dropped and its behavior folded into operate_act as a kind (or into operate_finish's outcome); no delegating aliases remain. Continue a pending pre-charge approval by re-calling operate_pay with the same arguments; use operate_payment_status(wait_seconds) as a non-charging alternative and for post-submit outcome checks. operate_screenshot(session_id, frame_index?, frame_url_contains?, full_page?) is a read-only debugging capture (page or one isolated frame, e.g. a cross-origin 3-D Secure/captcha challenge) returned as an actual MCP image. It refuses during an active card fill, when the requested capture still contains a sealed or card-shaped value, or when any included frame cannot be checked; capture-time pixel redaction remains a second safety fence. The maintainer-only list_extract_failures → get_extract_failure DOM-diagnostics pair is excluded from that surface; set TRUSTY_SQUIRE_DIAGNOSTICS=1 in the MCP server environment to opt into the 22-tool diagnostics profile.

Operate sessions default to Compact V2 observations: a screened format:"compact-v2" response with a finite stage, safe title/heading semantics, and opaque generation-bound controls in safe_table. Raw page text, URLs, DOM values, and snapshot files are not part of that format. Use operate_observe_query with task words or overflow.next_cursor to retrieve a named or paged control while matching stays inside the live browser. A browser action invalidates the current handles; on reobserve_required, observe again and select a new handle. Exact cursorless Google and GitHub queries briefly refresh controls that hydrate or gain labels after the initial observation, but still return only a current sealed handle. detail:"full" remains inside the V2 seal. Maintainers can select the legacy V1 el_table/snapshot contract with TRUSTY_SQUIRE_OBSERVE_V2=off, or exercise V2 without emitting it with shadow; the detailed wire and migration contract lives in DESIGN-observe-compact.md.

• Rejected tool calls return a JSON error envelope with a stable code and message. Malformed and unknown calls fail only that request; they do not stop the shared stdio process or discard its active in-memory operator session. server_unavailable includes retry.max_attempts: 1: retry once, and never kill or restart the shared operator process.
• operate_start, operate_observe, operate_observe_query, and operate_act open a website, inspect the current state, and perform one browser action at a time. Ordinary controls inside same- and cross-origin frames are included in observations (as finite frame facts in Compact V2 and frame_origin in V1); known captcha challenge frames stay behind the dedicated captcha flow. Same-registrable-domain frames are reachable, cross-domain frames must pass the same domain scope as goto/allow_host, opaque frames are refused, and type_secret never targets any cross-domain frame. Frame refs currently support click, js_click, type, type_secret, and select; upload, oauth_click, and oauth_login fail closed. If a visible control has no observed ref, explicitly selected V1 sessions let the four locator-capable actions (click, js_click, type, and type_secret) use a live text=…/css=… locator; that one-off fallback is not replayable. Compact V2 accepts only a handle from its current sealed action map. When a click or js_click opens a new tab or popup (target=_blank, a window.open control), the operator follows it the way a person would: the newly opened page becomes the active page, so the next operate_observe or operate_act reads it. This is how an emailed verification or magic link is followed. Do not try to extract the link's href instead — a single-use login token is sealed and is never returned as text; following the tab navigates the browser without exposing it. Payment is excluded: during a sealed card fill or a live place-order/3-D Secure approval the active page never changes. In a live operator session, in-page XHR/fetch calls to merchant API sibling subdomains are automatically in scope only when they share the registrable domain of a host trusted at session start. Calls outside the session scope fail promptly instead of hanging; page-load resources continue normally, and a mid-session allow_host does not seed sibling-domain widening. A small set of always-in-scope hosts (recognized payment-provider frames, OAuth/captcha providers, and 3-D Secure ACS/directory-server hosts) is exempt from that session-start-trust requirement — otherwise a checkout's own out-of-band 3DS challenge could never complete its own status poll. Every operator task uses the user's Chrome profile directly. Before it starts, the operator checks the live Google My Account identity; if the profile is signed out, it returns a clear login handoff before navigating to the service. To route only that browser session through a proxy, pass proxy to operate_start as an HTTP or HTTPS URL (credentials are optional), or as an unauthenticated SOCKS5 URL. The value is launch-only and sensitive: it is not returned in session status, action traces, or saved recipes. Omitting it uses direct egress. Under Compact V2, an expired, forged, wrong-generation, cross-page, or drifted @e: handle fails opaquely with reobserve_required; re-observe and choose a current handle. Under V1, DOM churn returns target_stale with the last observation generation, reobserve_required: true, best-effort label-keyed replacement_candidates, and retry_policy: "do_not_retry_old_ref". Malformed operate_act calls return error.code: "invalid_arguments" and an error.guidance repair object with the allowed kinds, missing fields, a valid example, and a safe alternative instead of only a validation string. For a provider login, pass the observed provider-button ref to the atomic oauth_login action. It retains the product tab across provider-owned popup redirects and closes, then returns the post-login product observation even if detail is none. Every oauth_login and legacy oauth_click is serialized from action start through completion and a short release cooldown; other session work remains parallel. The whole serialized action has a 30-second deadline. If Google does not complete in time, the call returns google_session re-login guidance and closes that operator session without replacing the saved identity; start a fresh session after reconnecting. oauth_click and oauth_settle remain for legacy replay compatibility. If an observation races that legacy transition, the response reports oauth.state: "in_progress" and directs the host to observe again.
• operate_act also owns eight consolidated workflow/lifecycle kinds — the entire operator surface beyond navigation, payment, finish, and recipe replay is reached through operate_act's kind:
  • select_many accepts an ordered label/ref-to-option map for coupled variant, shipping, or similar selectors. It applies selections sequentially, re-observes after every success, tolerates partial failure, and returns each field's selected or failed outcome plus a current observation.
  • cart_add is the retry-safe add-to-cart path. Give it the canonical product identity, selected-variant options hash, and a stable idempotency key; it post-verifies the exact cart line and returns added or already_in_cart, cart_delta (+1, 0, or unknown), and the canonical cart URL when observable, without clicking again for the same product and variant. Cart and checkout observations expose an informational, best-effort checkout_state with stage, product and variant identity, quantity, separately observed subtotal and shipping, payable total when known, canonical cart URL, and one next_action. The single and fill_card payment phases derive their authoritative approval amount independently of this state, preferring live checkout data according to the payment guide above.
  • extract captures a generated credential into a sealed slot or the vault.
  • solve_captcha drives the in-session captcha gate and returns the fail-fast needs_user handoff when it cannot be cleared.
  • await_verification reads the user's own inbox for an email verification code/link by default, with sender-scoped search and sealed-OTP transfer through into_slot. Advanced configuration or grant_inbox_consent:false can opt out.
  • login_prepare_signup, login_store_signup, and login_load_saved own the sealed username/password lifecycle. login_prepare_signup seals the user's captured email and a generated password, login_store_signup vaults those slots with explicit login-host policy, and login_load_saved retrieves an allowed saved login through encrypted browser-fill into sealed session slots. Raw values never enter the tool result.
• Observed card controls are marked payment_field and interaction: "vaulted_card_only", with operate_pay { phase: "fill_card" } as the recommended action. Typing a Luhn-valid, card-number-shaped value manually through operate_act is refused with safe_alternative: "operate_pay" and the missing prerequisite verified_cart_total.
• operate_finish closes the session and optionally accepts a nested outcome. none only closes; credentials requires store and preserves credential extraction, vault storage, and auto-promotion; result requires summary or data. A result is eligible to save portable login state only when verify_recipe confirms it or data.confirmed is true; credential outcomes qualify only after unblocked extraction and vault storage. none, failed or unconfirmed outcomes, and payment-sensitive sessions preserve the prior saved snapshot. Finish first stops new calls and drains calls already using that session within a bounded terminal transition, then closes its browser and schedules private-profile removal. Sessions also close automatically after 10 minutes without an operation and begin terminal teardown at 30 minutes; only an active payment receives the short bounded close grace. Callers should finish promptly instead of treating an open browser as durable background state.
• operate_recipe_save saves a postcondition-verified local recipe under a closed task verb plus the service's registrable domain. It records stable target attributes and exact provenance for Squire-supplied values, not observed refs or plaintext secrets. Recipes that pass a share-eligibility check (no personal or secret-shaped literals) and a registrable-domain lock are also written live to the shared registry, making them immediately reusable by other installs without a promotion step. operate_recipe_run binds the replaying user's own values and replays those steps, preferring the local recipe and falling back to the shared one. A recipe cannot navigate outside the site it was recorded for; normal keyed replay refuses a violation before navigation and continues with cold driving. On one ordinary missed step, replay returns a local repair point and can continue in the same session. Older name-only recipes remain planning hints.
• list_payment_cards returns saved-card labels and opaque references; operate_pay accepts an explicit session_id and phase of "single" (the default, also implied by omitting phase), "fill_card", or "confirm". It can use a selected card, the only card on file, or a just-in-time add-card approval. The single-page flow fills the checkout and applies the post-submit outcome wait described above before handing back unresolved outcomes. Split checkouts use the fill_card then confirm flow described above. operate_payment_status follows the payment guide bounded-wait contract. It returns the session ID and includes it in every follow-up tool hint, so an approval or submitted outcome is always observed in its originating browser. Malformed calls return the same error.guidance repair fields as operate_act, including a safe resolution when card_ref and card_label conflict.
• list_credentials and use_credential find saved credentials and make authenticated API calls without returning raw values.
• edit_credential changes only an existing credential's non-secret name, allowed_hosts, or login_hosts; delete_credential soft-deletes one. Each first returns a Telegram/passkey approval link bound to the operation, exact credential reference, and edit before→after. Resume with only the returned approval_id. Neither tool can read or alter the secret value; use store_credential to rotate a secret.
• grant_app_access and revoke_app_access create and remove scoped backend access.
• audit_log reports credential activity without exposing credential values. It defaults to a shaped security ledger: lifecycle events and anomalies (non-2xx, 429, rejected calls) as rows, routine proxied egress collapsed into per credential/host/burst rollups with per-grant running totals. Pass a rollup's id as expand for its individual calls, or view: "raw" for the flat per-request stream.

One README for GitHub and npm

This root file is the canonical README. The npm pack lifecycle copies it into @trusty-squire/mcp byte-for-byte, then removes the generated package-local copy after packing. GitHub and npm therefore publish the same product explanation.

Development

git clone https://github.com/Trusty-Squire/trusty-squire.git
cd trusty-squire
./scripts/bootstrap.sh

After bootstrap, pnpm typecheck and pnpm test should pass. Stop local services with docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down; add -v to reset their data.

Requirements: Node 20.11.0 (.nvmrc), pnpm 8.15+, Docker, and Docker Compose.

Repository map:

trusty-squire/
├── apps/
│   ├── api/        Accounts, OAuth, machine tokens, proxy, inbox, vault, and billing
│   ├── mcp/        MCP server, browser operation tools, and credential tools
│   ├── registry/   Signed website skills and verification service
│   └── web/        Marketing site and vault UI
└── packages/
    ├── vault/         Encrypted credential storage and audit log
    ├── skill-schema/  Shared schema for replayable website skills
    └── recipe-schema/ Shared wire schema for operator replay recipes

Product and public-web changes should follow PRODUCT.md and DESIGN.md.

License

MIT © Trusty Squire