Appendix: Evaluating The Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions

Trym Nohr Fjørtoft

19 December 2016

Contents

Appendix to Chapter 4

About the INGO linkages data

The number of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in a state is often correlated with better human rights practices. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) argue that "government ratification of international law does not improve human rights practices alone, but a country's linkage to international civil society (through INGO memberships) can and does influence governments to change their human rights practices for the better" (2005, 1386; see also Neumayer 2005; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). The authors argue that INGOs affect states by way of norm diffusion, leveraging human rights norms as a lobbying tool to pressure national governments. Simmons (2009) argues that INGOs operate "through citizens via mobilization dynamics" (see also Cole and Ramirez 2013).[1]

I follow Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) and define INGO linkages as the total number of INGOs citizens of a given state have membership in. The supplementary materials of Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) provides data from the years 1981–1999, collected from the Yearbook of International Organizations.[2] I have extended their data with numbers from

[1] Furthermore, Kim (2013) finds that INGOs have systematic positive effects on NHRI adoption.
[2] Collected from the Union of International Associations (http://www.uia.org/website.htm).

the years 2000–2014. The original article does not inform about the specific coding rules employed. This can potentially make the combined data susceptible to a form of inter-coder bias, as there are many possible subsets of international NGOs in the original yearbooks. Through a manual cross-check between Hafner-Burton and Tsutsuis' data and the original yearbook from a randomly selected year (volume 35, 1998), it quickly became evident that the authors have used the total number of NGOs of types A-D for their indicator (Union of International Associations 1999).[3] Using this classification, I gather data for the years 2000–2014 from the online version of the Yearbook of International Organizations. Comparing the new data with the preexisting data shows that the two sets are consistent.

Judicial independence

Powell (2009) find support for the argument that states' violations of human rights are linked to the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary. But as with many other concept of interest for this thesis, judicial independence is not directly observable. We need to choose an indicator. For instance, Powell and Staton (2009) test several indicators of judicial effectiveness, and their results vary somewhat dependent on which indicator is used. One of their measures is the CIRI "Independence of the Judiciary" indicator. Lupu (2013) also uses this operationalization when he tests his argument about independence of the courts. On the other hand, Simmons (2009) uses a *Rule of Law* index from the World Bank as a proxy for judicial independence. She does however admit that it is a noisy and probably too wide indicator for the concept she wants to capture (2009, 220–21). Furthermore, it covers only the years from 1996 onwards. It does not seem reasonable to drop all years before 1996 just to include this already suboptimal indicator. A third option would be to use the International Country Risk Guide's *Law and Order* measure. This is another one of the measures tested by Powell and Staton (2009). While it is well known and used by several scholars (2009, 160), it is not freely available.

A more promising alternative is to use a latent-variable approach as presented by Linzer and Staton (2015). The authors compute a measure of *de facto* judicial independence based on a range of available indicators (including the aforementioned CIRI). They combine eight observed variables to measure the theoretical concept of judicial independence through a "bounded graded response IRT model" (2015, 232). Bounded, because the authors assume that judicial independence has a theoretical minimum and maximum level, which they set at 0 and 1. Additionally, they assume that the the latent variable is time-dependent. Specifically, within country k, the latent variable x in year t has a "normal, but bounded, prior distribution that is centered at the previous value of the latent variable in year $t-1$" (2015, 233). This gives the following prior distribution:

$$x_{kt} \sim N(x_{k(t-1)}, \sigma_k^2)\mathcal{I}(0,1). \tag{1}$$

σ_k^2 is a separate variance parameter for each country, allowing some countries to have more temporal variation in x_{kt} than others. This ensures that actual shocks or changes in a country's level of judicial independence is not "averaged out" with countries that are more stable. I will not go into more specifics of the computation here. The point is that we end up with a interval-scaled variable that ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates complete judicial independence. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of values across all units.



Figure A 1: Kernel density estimate of Linzer and Staton (2015) judicial independence

[3] I compared randomly selected numbers from the hard-copy yearbook and the corresponding Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui data, and they were in all cases exactly equal.



Figure A 2: Univariate distributions, all variables

Summary of data sources

Table A 1: Summary of all variables with sources

	Variable	Source	Notes
Dependent vars	Physical integrity	Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014)	*
	Civil liberties	Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014)	*
	Women's political rights	Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014)	*
	Women's economic rights	Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014)	*
Explanatory vars	NHRI adoption	Conrad et al. (2013)	
	Accreditaiton status	Conrad et al. (2013)	
	Complaints procedure	Conrad et al. (2013)	
	Punishment capacity	Conrad et al. (2013)	
Controls	ICCPR ratification	OHCHR (2016)	
	CEDAW ratification	OHCHR (2016)	
	Democracy (Polity)	Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2014)	*
	Democracy (Cheibub & Gandhi)	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)	* (Used as robustness check)
	Inter-state conflict	Themner and Wallensteen (2014)	*
	Internal Conflict	Themner and Wallensteen (2014)	*
	GDP/capita	World Bank (2015)	*
	INGO linkages	Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), and Yearbook of International Organizations (2000-2014)	
	Trade, % of GDP	World Bank (2015)	*
	Population	World Bank (2015)	*
	Regime durability	Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2014)	*
	Judicial independence	Linzer and Staton (2015)	
			* These variables are drawn from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al. 2016)

Appendix to Chapter 5

A- and B accreditation grouped

Table A 2: Accreditation status grouped as A and B

	Dependent variable:
	ciri_int.lead
ab_accred	0.056
	(0.069)
iccprrat	−0.041
	(0.079)
p_polity2	0.018*
	(0.009)
leadinterstateconflict	0.155
	(0.136)
leadinternalconflict	−1.024***
	(0.075)
loggdp	−0.202
	(0.132)
logingo	−0.257***
	(0.067)
wdi_trade	0.002*
	(0.001)
logpop	−0.498**
	(0.235)
p_durable	0.003
	(0.003)
LJI	1.716***
	(0.367)
ciri_physint	0.436***
	(0.015)
Observations	3,380
R^2	0.345
Adjusted R^2	0.327
F Statistic	140.891*** (df = 12; 3204)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Dropped "no complaints" variable

Table A 3: Models without 'No Complaints'-dummy, women's political and economic rights

	Dependent variable:	
	leadwop_red	leadwec_red
	(1)	(2)
y>=1	-1.513^{**}	-6.163^{***}
	(0.739)	(0.606)
y>=2	-9.260^{***}	-11.172^{***}
	(0.768)	(0.643)
comp	0.406^{**}	-0.066
	(0.159)	(0.116)
cedawrat	0.565^{***}	-0.085
	(0.203)	(0.165)
p_polity2	-0.0002	0.018
	(0.020)	(0.016)
logingo	0.003	0.078
	(0.135)	(0.115)
leadinterstateconflict	-0.358	0.111
	(0.406)	(0.355)
leadinternalconflict	-0.019	-0.319^{*}
	(0.198)	(0.167)
loggdp	-0.093	0.109
	(0.078)	(0.066)
wdi_trade	-0.001	0.003^{*}
	(0.002)	(0.002)
logpop	-0.033	-0.053
	(0.072)	(0.057)
p_durable	-0.003	0.005^{**}
	(0.003)	(0.002)
LJI	1.104^{*}	0.957^{**}
	(0.585)	(0.432)
wop_red	4.674^{***}	
	(0.130)	
wec_red		2.711^{***}
		(0.098)
nineties	0.131	-0.190
	(0.184)	(0.146)
naughts	0.759^{***}	-0.137
	(0.220)	(0.163)
tens	1.209^{***}	-0.321
	(0.396)	(0.286)
west	1.371^{***}	1.174^{***}
	(0.274)	(0.213)
Observations	3,380	3,380
R^2	0.776	0.649
χ^2 (df = 16)	$3{,}107.602^{***}$	$2{,}456.776^{***}$
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Time lags

Table A 4: Physical integrity rights, time-lags

	Dependent variable:								
	ciri_physint	ciri_int.lead							
	$t-0$	$t-1$	$t-2$	$t-3$	$t-4$	$t-5$	$t-6$	$t-7$	$t-8$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
nhri	0.118*	0.099							
	(0.068)	(0.067)							
nhri1			0.097						
			(0.066)						
nhri2				0.041					
				(0.061)					
nhri3					0.027				
					(0.058)				
nhri4						0.020			
						(0.056)			
nhri5							−0.032		
							(0.055)		
nhri6								−0.039	
								(0.054)	
nhri7									−0.011
									(0.053)
iccprrat	−0.094	−0.111	−0.110	−0.109	−0.109	−0.109	−0.105	−0.105	−0.107
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
p_polity2	0.023**	0.019**	0.019**	0.020**	0.020**	0.020**	0.020**	0.020**	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
interstateconflict	0.125								
	(0.139)								
internalconflict	−1.030***								
	(0.078)								
leadinterstateconflict		0.150	0.151	0.154	0.153	0.154	0.158	0.157	0.156
		(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)
leadinternalconflict		−1.004***	−1.004***	−1.004***	−1.004***	−1.003***	−1.006***	−1.007***	−1.005***
		(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
loggdp	0.022	−0.226	−0.225	−0.215	−0.213	−0.211	−0.201	−0.202	−0.205
	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
logingo	−0.425***	−0.241**	−0.241**	−0.233**	−0.232*	−0.232*	−0.247**	−0.250**	−0.241**
	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
wdi_trade	0.003***	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
logpop	0.001	−0.465*	−0.467*	−0.451*	−0.448*	−0.446*	−0.458*	−0.463*	−0.454*
	(0.252)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)
p_durable	0.005*	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LJI	1.744***	1.699***	1.689***	1.683***	1.683***	1.681***	1.666***	1.666***	1.672***
	(0.387)	(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.381)	(0.381)	(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.380)
phys.lag	0.416***								
	(0.016)								
ciri_physint		0.423***	0.423***	0.424***	0.424***	0.424***	0.424***	0.424***	0.424***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Observations	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239
R^2	0.335	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325
Adjusted R^2	0.317	0.308	0.308	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 5: Civil liberties, time-lags

	Dependent variable:								
	ciri_empinx_new	ciri_civ.lead							
	$t-0$	$t-1$	$t-2$	$t-3$	$t-4$	$t-5$	$t-6$	$t-7$	$t-8$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
nhri	−0.203**	−0.159*							
	(0.082)	(0.082)							
nhri1			−0.118						
			(0.081)						
nhri2				−0.104					
				(0.075)					
nhri3					−0.063				
					(0.072)				
nhri4						−0.154**			
						(0.069)			
nhri5							−0.046		
							(0.068)		
nhri6								−0.006	
								(0.067)	
nhri7									0.001
									(0.066)
iccprrat	0.156	0.178*	0.175*	0.175*	0.175*	0.180*	0.175*	0.173*	0.172*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
p_polity2	0.097***	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**	0.029**	0.028**	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
interstateconflict	0.156	−0.252	−0.250	−0.252	−0.253	−0.239	−0.252	−0.256	−0.257
	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)
internalconflict	−0.345***	−0.224**	−0.222**	−0.220**	−0.219**	−0.223**	−0.221**	−0.218**	−0.217**
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
loggdp	−0.119	−0.324*	−0.334*	−0.332*	−0.340*	−0.322*	−0.348**	−0.354**	−0.355**
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.176)
logingo	−0.197	0.014	0.013	−0.002	−0.004	−0.034	−0.005	0.007	0.010
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)
wdi_trade	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
logpop	−1.172***	−0.931***	−0.935***	−0.950***	−0.958***	−0.984***	−0.966***	−0.954***	−0.951***
	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.309)
p_durable	−0.017***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LJI	1.892***	2.856***	2.873***	2.869***	2.868***	2.845***	2.872***	2.879***	2.880***
	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.469)
civ.lag	0.519***								
	(0.014)								
ciri_empinx_new		0.537***	0.538***	0.538***	0.538***	0.537***	0.538***	0.539***	0.539***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239
R^2	0.495	0.464	0.464	0.464	0.464	0.465	0.464	0.464	0.464
Adjusted R^2	0.468	0.439	0.439	0.439	0.439	0.439	0.439	0.439	0.439

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 6: Women's political rights, time-lags

	Dependent variable:								
	as.factor(wop_red)	leadwop_red							
	$t-0$	$t-1$	$t-2$	$t-3$	$t-4$	$t-5$	$t-6$	$t-7$	$t-8$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
y>=1	−6.014***	−1.404*	−1.402*	−1.502**	−1.558**	−1.615**	−1.626**	−1.648**	−1.718**
	(0.776)	(0.767)	(0.766)	(0.764)	(0.763)	(0.764)	(0.764)	(0.765)	(0.768)
y>=2	−13.649***	−9.133***	−9.133***	−9.225***	−9.279***	−9.355***	−9.351***	−9.369***	−9.447***
	(0.821)	(0.795)	(0.795)	(0.794)	(0.794)	(0.796)	(0.796)	(0.797)	(0.800)
nhri	0.385**	0.381**							
	(0.164)	(0.168)							
nhri1			0.394**						
			(0.170)						
nhri2				0.288*					
				(0.157)					
nhri3					0.243				
					(0.150)				
nhri4						0.370**			
						(0.146)			
nhri5							0.252*		
							(0.144)		
nhri6								0.229	
								(0.144)	
nhri7									0.310**
									(0.145)
cedawrat	0.513**	0.615***	0.618***	0.645***	0.652***	0.672***	0.656***	0.650***	0.656***
	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.214)
p_polity2	−0.005	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.004	−0.002	−0.002	−0.004
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
logingo	0.072	0.017	0.020	0.059	0.076	0.080	0.091	0.096	0.101
	(0.179)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.179)
interstateconflict	−0.381								
	(0.407)								
internalconflict	0.081								
	(0.197)								
leadinterstateconflict		−0.444	−0.441	−0.453	−0.469	−0.457	−0.462	−0.466	−0.459
		(0.413)	(0.415)	(0.414)	(0.413)	(0.411)	(0.412)	(0.413)	(0.413)
leadinternalconflict		−0.003	−0.004	−0.012	−0.016	−0.008	−0.014	−0.015	−0.014
		(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)
loggdp	−0.048	−0.108	−0.109	−0.124	−0.131	−0.135	−0.137	−0.139	−0.143
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
wdi_trade	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
logpop	−0.091	−0.050	−0.051	−0.058	−0.061	−0.064	−0.064	−0.065	−0.066
	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
p_durable	0.001	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LJI	0.720	1.270**	1.267**	1.265**	1.270**	1.308**	1.287**	1.285**	1.315**
	(0.592)	(0.606)	(0.605)	(0.605)	(0.605)	(0.606)	(0.606)	(0.606)	(0.607)
wop.lag	4.483***								
	(0.131)								
wop_red		4.676***	4.675***	4.692***	4.702***	4.711***	4.709***	4.712***	4.715***
		(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)
wop_red=2		−0.083	−0.082	−0.103	−0.114	−0.120	−0.120	−0.123	−0.124
		(0.279)	(0.279)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.278)
nineties	0.131	0.125	0.130	0.169	0.191	0.230	0.241	0.257	0.306
	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.197)
naughts	0.736***	0.765***	0.761***	0.813***	0.844***	0.849***	0.896***	0.923***	0.962***
	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.224)
tens	1.034***	1.194***	1.184***	1.237***	1.267***	1.253***	1.309***	1.331***	1.353***
	(0.393)	(0.398)	(0.399)	(0.397)	(0.396)	(0.395)	(0.394)	(0.393)	(0.394)
west	1.161***	1.371***	1.363***	1.378***	1.386***	1.369***	1.390***	1.396***	1.392***
	(0.278)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.280)
Observations	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239
R^2	0.768	0.771	0.772	0.771	0.771	0.772	0.771	0.771	0.771

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 7: Women's economic rights, time-lags

	Dependent variable:								
	wec_red	leadwec_red							
	$t-0$	$t-1$	$t-2$	$t-3$	$t-4$	$t-5$	$t-6$	$t-7$	$t-8$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
y>=1	−3.556***	−3.632***	−3.629***	−3.633***	−3.644***	−3.651***	−3.684***	−3.681***	−3.678***
	(0.610)	(0.623)	(0.624)	(0.624)	(0.624)	(0.625)	(0.625)	(0.626)	(0.626)
y>=2	−8.589***	−8.641***	−8.638***	−8.644***	−8.656***	−8.661***	−8.698***	−8.692***	−8.688***
	(0.640)	(0.652)	(0.653)	(0.653)	(0.653)	(0.653)	(0.654)	(0.655)	(0.655)
nhri	−0.006	−0.057							
	(0.124)	(0.126)							
nhri1			0.001						
			(0.126)						
nhri2				0.093					
				(0.119)					
nhri3					0.109				
					(0.114)				
nhri4						0.092			
						(0.112)			
nhri5							0.176		
							(0.110)		
nhri6								0.135	
								(0.109)	
nhri7									0.104
									(0.110)
cedawrat	0.129	−0.040	−0.042	−0.039	−0.034	−0.031	−0.025	−0.030	−0.033
	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
p_polity2	0.001	0.014	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
logingo	0.237	0.197	0.183	0.164	0.165	0.170	0.163	0.169	0.174
	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
interstateconflict	0.161								
	(0.359)								
internalconflict	−0.302*								
	(0.169)								
leadinterstateconflict		0.169	0.174	0.183	0.182	0.182	0.190	0.184	0.180
		(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.360)
leadinternalconflict		−0.364**	−0.360**	−0.357**	−0.357**	−0.357**	−0.355**	−0.356**	−0.358**
		(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)
loggdp	0.050	0.055	0.060	0.065	0.064	0.062	0.063	0.061	0.060
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
wdi_trade	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
logpop	−0.110*	−0.086	−0.083	−0.078	−0.079	−0.080	−0.080	−0.081	−0.081
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
p_durable	0.006**	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
LJI	1.190***	0.974**	1.000**	1.042**	1.051**	1.044**	1.080**	1.061**	1.045**
	(0.446)	(0.454)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.452)
weclag_red	2.670***								
	(0.101)								
wec_red		2.840***	2.841***	2.845***	2.845***	2.844***	2.847***	2.843***	2.843***
		(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
wec_red=2		−0.538**	−0.544**	−0.557**	−0.560**	−0.559**	−0.567**	−0.559**	−0.556**
		(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)
nineties	−0.430***	−0.186	−0.196	−0.206	−0.198	−0.189	−0.164	−0.159	−0.158
	(0.150)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.158)
naughts	−0.416**	−0.118	−0.141	−0.173	−0.170	−0.158	−0.152	−0.134	−0.125
	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.167)
tens	0.124	−0.248	−0.274	−0.312	−0.312	−0.300	−0.307	−0.289	−0.275
	(0.280)	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.291)
west	1.091***	1.174***	1.161***	1.139***	1.136***	1.140***	1.125***	1.137***	1.143***
	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)
Observations	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239	3,239
R^2	0.643	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657	0.657

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure A 3: Time lags with A-status coefficient vs NHRI coefficient, Women's economic rights

Robustness checks and model diagnostics

Various robustness checks

In table 8, the NHRI variable is no longer dichotomous, but instead counts the years since the state established an NHRI. I also test models with a squared cumulative NHRI term added.

Table 9 employs a linear time trend as a control for time dependency instead of year- or decade dummies.

Table 10 shows a specification of the main models where the Polity democracy variable is replaced by the dichotomous democracy measure by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).

Table A 8: NHRI coded as years since adoption, linear and squared models.

	Dependent variable:							
	ciri_int.lead		ciri_civ.lead		leadwop_red		leadwec_red	
	panel linear		*panel linear*		*logistic*		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
y>=1					−1.374*	−1.294	−6.141***	−6.150***
					(0.804)	(0.804)	(0.770)	(0.773)
y>=2					−9.128***	−9.087***	−11.157***	−11.168***
					(0.869)	(0.872)	(0.819)	(0.823)
cum.nhri	−0.002	0.00000	−0.012	−0.025	0.036***	0.096***	0.013	−0.016
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.022)
nhri2		−0.0001		0.001		−0.003**		0.001
		(0.0004)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
iccprrat	−0.043	−0.044	0.144	0.149				
	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.125)				
cedawrat					0.600***	0.582***	−0.084	−0.072
					(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.175)
p_polity2	0.017	0.017	0.029*	0.030*	0.001	−0.003	0.014	0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
leadinterstateconflict	0.157	0.156	0.195	0.198	−0.345	−0.336	0.134	0.136
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.364)	(0.359)	(0.425)	(0.425)
leadinternalconflict	−1.029***	−1.029***	−0.362***	−0.362***	0.004	0.007	−0.307*	−0.310*
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.181)	(0.178)
loggdp	−0.200	−0.205	−0.264	−0.229	−0.100	−0.095	0.122	0.118
	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.095)
logingo	−0.265***	−0.266***	−0.130	−0.122	−0.009	−0.033	0.038	0.055
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.169)	(0.169)
wdi_trade	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	−0.001	−0.001	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
logpop	−0.518*	−0.527*	−0.917**	−0.863**	−0.034	−0.035	−0.045	−0.048
	(0.307)	(0.315)	(0.414)	(0.416)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.081)
p_durable	0.003	0.003	−0.017***	−0.018***	−0.003	−0.003	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LJI	1.715***	1.716***	2.851***	2.847***	1.158*	1.198**	1.022*	0.982
	(0.516)	(0.517)	(0.582)	(0.585)	(0.603)	(0.597)	(0.612)	(0.610)
ciri_physint	0.436***	0.436***						
	(0.026)	(0.026)						
ciri_empinx_new			0.547***	0.546***				
			(0.018)	(0.019)				
wop_red					4.668***	4.660***		
					(0.181)	(0.179)		
wec_red							2.709***	2.703***
							(0.149)	(0.149)
nineties					0.112	0.089	−0.226	−0.210
					(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.164)	(0.163)
naughts					0.662***	0.638***	−0.247	−0.232
					(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.191)	(0.191)
tens					0.989**	1.042***	−0.486	−0.516
					(0.397)	(0.398)	(0.311)	(0.320)
west					1.288***	1.347***	1.121***	1.109***
					(0.357)	(0.355)	(0.315)	(0.318)
Observations	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380
R^2	0.345	0.345	0.491	0.491	0.776	0.777	0.649	0.649
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.327	0.465	0.465				

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All independent variables except the conflict variables and decade-dummies measured in $t-1$

Table A 9: Main models with linear time trends

	Dependent variable:							
	ciri_int.lead		ciri_civ.lead		leadwop_red		leadwec_red	
	panel linear		*panel linear*		*logistic*		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
y>=1					−1.696**	−1.515*	−6.202***	−6.091***
					(0.798)	(0.799)	(0.763)	(0.768)
y>=2					−9.415***	−9.248***	−11.219***	−11.123***
					(0.863)	(0.862)	(0.812)	(0.818)
nhri	0.076		−0.211**		0.371**		−0.024	
	(0.083)		(0.095)		(0.178)		(0.136)	
astatus		0.073		−0.220**		0.602**		0.437***
		(0.076)		(0.100)		(0.238)		(0.168)
bstatus		0.094		−0.422*		0.614**		0.011
		(0.109)		(0.229)		(0.308)		(0.217)
cstatus		−0.203		−0.724*		−0.059		0.056
		(0.251)		(0.396)		(0.156)		(0.311)
iccprrat	−0.039	−0.037	0.151	0.141				
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.129)	(0.128)				
cedawrat					0.436**	0.506***	−0.119	−0.065
					(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.171)	(0.169)
p_polity2	0.018	0.019	0.028*	0.029*	0.0002	0.002	0.016	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
leadinterstateconflict	0.146	0.150	0.427**	0.423**	−0.351	−0.340	0.083	0.105
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.204)	(0.207)	(0.372)	(0.374)	(0.437)	(0.429)
leadinternalconflict	−1.050***	−1.049***	−0.362***	−0.362***	0.006	−0.004	−0.314*	−0.313*
	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.192)	(0.189)	(0.179)	(0.181)
loggdp	−0.170	−0.170	−0.475**	−0.465**	−0.090	−0.090	0.110	0.120
	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.094)
logingo	−0.261***	−0.247***	−0.081	−0.123	−0.001	0.006	0.085	0.071
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.173)
wdi_trade	0.002**	0.002**	0.001	0.001	−0.002	−0.002	0.003*	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
logpop	−0.499*	−0.463	−0.708*	−0.780*	−0.038	−0.052	−0.056	−0.063
	(0.303)	(0.306)	(0.425)	(0.415)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.081)
p_durable	0.002	0.002	−0.018***	−0.017***	−0.003	−0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LJI	1.599***	1.593***	3.303***	3.225***	1.096*	1.118*	0.946	1.043*
	(0.539)	(0.539)	(0.591)	(0.583)	(0.592)	(0.584)	(0.605)	(0.614)
ciri_physint	0.431***	0.431***						
	(0.026)	(0.026)						
ciri_empinx_new			0.544***	0.540***				
			(0.020)	(0.019)				
wop_red					4.665***	4.675***		
					(0.179)	(0.182)		
wec_red							2.712***	2.696***
							(0.147)	(0.146)
yearcount	−0.008	−0.009	0.007	0.011	0.043***	0.038***	−0.006	−0.016*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
west					1.329***	1.360***	1.174***	1.121***
					(0.347)	(0.352)	(0.318)	(0.316)
Observations	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380	3,380
R^2	0.354	0.354	0.504	0.505	0.775	0.776	0.648	0.650
Adjusted R^2	0.338	0.338	0.482	0.483				

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All independent variables except the conflict variables and yearcount measured in $t-1$

Table A 10: Cheibub and Gandhi Democracy control

	Dependent variable:							
	ciri_int.lead		ciri_civ.lead		leadwop_red		leadwec_red	
	panel linear		*panel linear*		*logistic*		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
nhri	0.078		−0.211**		0.370**		−0.034	
	(0.068)		(0.084)		(0.180)		(0.149)	
astatus		0.032		−0.050		0.450*		0.394**
		(0.080)		(0.098)		(0.255)		(0.173)
bstatus		0.139		−0.487***		0.549		−0.172
		(0.139)		(0.171)		(0.349)		(0.269)
cstatus		−0.107		−0.178		0.198		−1.519***
		(0.313)		(0.385)		(0.154)		(0.555)
iccprrat	−0.013	−0.012	0.165	0.165				
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.102)	(0.102)				
cedawrat					0.551***	0.593***	−0.063	−0.031
					(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.170)	(0.171)
chga_demo	0.109	0.117	0.012	0.003	−0.453**	−0.401*	0.165	0.157
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.215)	(0.208)	(0.191)	(0.189)
leadinterstateconflict	0.145	0.149	0.130	0.121	−0.292	−0.296	0.091	0.108
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.371)	(0.377)	(0.439)	(0.434)
leadinternalconflict	−1.073***	−1.075***	−0.369***	−0.358***	0.088	0.076	−0.293	−0.293
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.184)	(0.186)
loggdp	−0.184	−0.169	−0.325*	−0.368**	−0.052	−0.054	0.112	0.121
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.094)
logingo	−0.254***	−0.242***	−0.134	−0.163*	−0.038	−0.026	0.058	0.055
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.172)	(0.177)
wdi_trade	0.002*	0.002*	0.001	0.001	−0.002	−0.002	0.003*	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
logpop	−0.329	−0.290	−1.071***	−1.176***	−0.048	−0.056	−0.052	−0.058
	(0.262)	(0.263)	(0.325)	(0.327)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.085)
p_durable	0.0004	0.0002	−0.022***	−0.021***	−0.003	−0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
LJI	1.968***	1.962***	3.948***	3.926***	1.633***	1.629***	1.090**	1.091**
	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.418)	(0.419)	(0.455)	(0.454)	(0.478)	(0.481)
ciri_physint	0.428***	0.428***						
	(0.016)	(0.016)						
ciri_empinx_new			0.535***	0.535***				
			(0.015)	(0.015)				
wop_red					4.676***	4.691***		
					(0.181)	(0.183)		
wec_red							2.688***	2.671***
							(0.158)	(0.158)
yearcount					0.042***	0.040***	−0.010	−0.018*
					(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
west					1.312***	1.358***	1.203***	1.156***
					(0.354)	(0.356)	(0.323)	(0.322)
Observations	3,139	3,139	3,139	3,139	3,139	3,139	3,139	3,139
R^2	0.341	0.341	0.484	0.485	0.778	0.778	0.638	0.639
Adjusted R^2	0.322	0.321	0.457	0.457				

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All independent variables except the conflict variables and yearcount measured in $t-1$

Fixed Effects vs less conservative models

Table A 11: Pooled OLS vs fixed effects regression, physical integrity rights

	Dependent variable:		
		ciri_int.lead	
	Pooled OLS	Fixed Effects	Pooled, no $Y-1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)
nhri	0.026	0.062	0.102*
	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.058)
iccprrat	−0.100*	−0.045	−0.181**
	(0.054)	(0.079)	(0.072)
p_polity2	0.004	0.017*	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)
leadinternalconflict	−0.980***	−1.025***	−2.368***
	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.074)
loggdp	0.067***	−0.211	0.172***
	(0.023)	(0.133)	(0.031)
logingo	−0.095**	−0.264***	−0.245***
	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.054)
wdi_trade	−0.001	0.002*	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
logpop	−0.120***	−0.519**	−0.327***
	(0.021)	(0.234)	(0.028)
p_durable	0.0004	0.003	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
LJI	1.209***	1.740***	3.514***
	(0.170)	(0.367)	(0.217)
ciri_physint	0.630***	0.436***	
	(0.013)	(0.015)	
Constant	2.606***		6.825***
	(0.221)		(0.269)
Observations	3,380	3,380	3,380
R^2	0.759	0.345	0.580
Adjusted R^2	0.757	0.327	0.578
F Statistic	966.124*** (df = 11; 3368)	153.599*** (df = 11; 3205)	464.685*** (df = 10; 3369)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 12: Pooled OLS vs fixed effects regression, civil liberties

	Dependent variable:		
	ciri_civ.lead		
	Pooled OLS	Fixed Effects	Pooled, no $Y-1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)
nhri	−0.093*	−0.203**	−0.290***
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.090)
iccprrat	−0.087	0.159	−0.256**
	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.112)
p_polity2	0.054***	0.030**	0.307***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
leadinterstateconflict		0.203	
		(0.167)	
leadinternalconflict	−0.253***	−0.357***	−0.929***
	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.115)
loggdp	−0.011	−0.218	−0.038
	(0.029)	(0.164)	(0.047)
logingo	0.022	−0.117	0.094
	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.083)
wdi_trade	−0.003***	0.001	−0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
logpop	−0.108***	−0.821***	−0.473***
	(0.027)	(0.291)	(0.043)
p_durable	−0.002*	−0.018***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
LJI	1.014***	2.812***	3.917***
	(0.212)	(0.452)	(0.336)
ciri_empinx_new	0.791***	0.546***	
	(0.011)	(0.015)	
Constant	2.502***		11.341***
	(0.286)		(0.418)
Observations	3,380	3,380	3,380
R^2	0.870	0.491	0.663
Adjusted R^2	0.867	0.466	0.661
F Statistic	2,057.618*** (df = 11; 3368)	257.750*** (df = 12; 3204)	663.650*** (df = 10; 3369)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Country-level residual plots



Figure A 4: Country-level residuals over time, Physical integrity (by ISO3 numeric country code)



Figure A 5: Country-level residuals over time, Civil liberties (by ISO3 numeric country code)

Test of normal residuals

Figure A 6: Q-Q plots for normality of residuals, models 1 and 3

Test of proportional odds assumption

Table A 13: Likelihood ratio test of proportional odds, main model 5

	Df	logLik	AIC	LRT	Pr(>Chi)
<none>		-968.123	1,972.245		
nhri	1	-968.049	1,974.098	0.147	0.701
cedawrat	1	-967.393	1,972.785	1.460	0.227
logingo	1	-967.006	1,972.012	2.234	0.135
leadinternalconflict	1	-966.900	1,971.799	2.446	0.118
leadinterstateconflict	1	-967.942	1,973.884	0.361	0.548
loggdp	1	-968.080	1,974.159	0.086	0.769
wdi_trade	1	-967.589	1,973.178	1.068	0.301
logpop	1	-968.011	1,974.021	0.224	0.636
p_durable	1	-967.735	1,973.470	0.776	0.378
LJI	1	-967.850	1,973.700	0.545	0.460
wop_red	2	-963.534	1,967.068	9.177	0.010
nineties	1	-966.549	1,971.098	3.148	0.076
naughts	1	-965.737	1,969.475	4.771	0.029
tens	1	-967.896	1,973.793	0.453	0.501
west	1	-967.567	1,973.134	1.112	0.292

Table A 14: Likelihood ratio test of proportional odds, main model 6

	Df	logLik	AIC	LRT	Pr(>Chi)
<none>		-967.276	1,974.553		
astatus.new	1	-965.286	1,972.573	3.980	0.046
bstatus.new	1	-967.099	1,976.198	0.355	0.552
cstatus.new	1	-966.297	1,974.594	1.959	0.162
cedawrat	1	-966.764	1,975.528	1.025	0.311
logingo	1	-966.555	1,975.110	1.443	0.230
leadinternalconflict	1	-965.991	1,973.981	2.572	0.109
leadinterstateconflict	1	-967.104	1,976.208	0.345	0.557
loggdp	1	-967.258	1,976.516	0.037	0.848
wdi_trade	1	-966.689	1,975.379	1.174	0.279
logpop	1	-967.261	1,976.522	0.031	0.860
p_durable	1	-967.018	1,976.036	0.516	0.472
LJI	1	-966.993	1,975.987	0.566	0.452
wop_red	2	-962.702	1,969.403	9.150	0.010
nineties	1	-966.213	1,974.427	2.126	0.145
naughts	1	-965.916	1,973.832	2.721	0.099
tens	1	-967.107	1,976.214	0.339	0.560
west	1	-966.848	1,975.696	0.857	0.355

Table A 15: Likelihood ratio test of proportional odds, main model 7

	Df	logLik	AIC	LRT	Pr(>Chi)
<none>		-1,457.933	2,951.866		
nhri	1	-1,452.527	2,943.054	10.812	0.001
cedawrat	1	-1,456.437	2,950.873	2.993	0.084
logingo	1	-1,457.742	2,953.483	0.383	0.536
leadinternalconflict	1	-1,454.488	2,946.975	6.890	0.009
leadinterstateconflict	1	-1,457.824	2,953.648	0.218	0.641
loggdp	1	-1,456.659	2,951.318	2.547	0.110
wdi_trade	1	-1,457.932	2,953.865	0.001	0.976
logpop	1	-1,457.853	2,953.705	0.161	0.689
p_durable	1	-1,457.630	2,953.259	0.607	0.436
LJI	1	-1,457.413	2,952.826	1.039	0.308
wec_red	2	-1,457.771	2,955.541	0.325	0.850
nineties	1	-1,455.607	2,949.214	4.652	0.031
naughts	1	-1,449.174	2,936.348	17.517	0.00003
tens	1	-1,456.663	2,951.327	2.539	0.111
west	1	-1,453.583	2,945.165	8.700	0.003

Table A 16: Likelihood ratio test of proportional odds, main model 8

	Df	logLik	AIC	LRT	Pr(>Chi)
<none>		-1,453.407	2,946.815		
astatus.new	1	-1,445.167	2,932.335	16.480	0.00005
bstatus.new	1	-1,453.265	2,948.529	0.285	0.593
cstatus.new	1	-1,453.342	2,948.684	0.131	0.718
cedawrat	1	-1,452.135	2,946.271	2.544	0.111
logingo	1	-1,453.237	2,948.473	0.341	0.559
leadinternalconflict	1	-1,450.092	2,942.184	6.631	0.010
leadinterstateconflict	1	-1,453.314	2,948.629	0.186	0.666
loggdp	1	-1,451.963	2,945.926	2.889	0.089
wdi_trade	1	-1,453.393	2,948.786	0.028	0.866
logpop	1	-1,453.251	2,948.502	0.312	0.576
p_durable	1	-1,452.896	2,947.793	1.022	0.312
LJI	1	-1,452.814	2,947.628	1.186	0.276
wec_red	2	-1,453.287	2,950.575	0.240	0.887
nineties	1	-1,451.503	2,945.006	3.808	0.051
naughts	1	-1,445.954	2,933.908	14.906	0.0001
tens	1	-1,452.144	2,946.288	2.527	0.112
west	1	-1,448.967	2,939.933	8.881	0.003



Figure A 7: Proportional odds, model (5)



Figure A 8: Proportional odds, model (6)



Figure A 9: Proportional odds, model (7)



Figure A 10: Proportional odds, model (8)

Multinomial models

Listing 1 Multinomial logistic regression, Women's political rights

```
Pearson residuals:
                      Min       1Q   Median        3Q    Max
log(mu[,2]/mu[,1]) -43.96 -0.16492  0.19913  0.229663  3.737
log(mu[,3]/mu[,1]) -42.98 -0.08288 -0.03189 -0.005203 59.643

Coefficients:
                           Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept):1             -1.782883   0.890450  -2.002  0.04526 *
(Intercept):2            -10.637908   1.660194  -6.408 1.48e-10 ***
nhri:1                     0.644164   0.222592   2.894  0.00380 **
nhri:2                     0.620030   0.328777   1.886  0.05931 .
cedawrat:1                 0.612907   0.215449   2.845  0.00444 **
cedawrat:2                 1.600593   0.734501   2.179  0.02932 *
logingo:1                 -0.068920   0.146337  -0.471  0.63766
logingo:2                  0.665583   0.425130   1.566  0.11744
leadinternalconflict:1     0.172080   0.225445   0.763  0.44529
leadinternalconflict:2    -0.653587   0.582954  -1.121  0.26222
leadinterstateconflict:1  -0.248643   0.457086  -0.544  0.58646
leadinterstateconflict:2  -0.993663   1.155908  -0.860  0.38999
loggdp:1                  -0.043601   0.087838  -0.496  0.61962
loggdp:2                  -0.550805   0.220034  -2.503  0.01230 *
wdi_trade:1                0.001419   0.002725   0.521  0.60261
wdi_trade:2               -0.004051   0.004056  -0.999  0.31789
logpop:1                  -0.005556   0.084584  -0.066  0.94762
logpop:2                  -0.257614   0.176094  -1.463  0.14349
p_durable:1               -0.003993   0.004415  -0.905  0.36569
p_durable:2               -0.005159   0.005950  -0.867  0.38598
LJI:1                      0.988683   0.432197   2.288  0.02216 *
LJI:2                      2.536290   0.837655   3.028  0.00246 **
wop_red:1                  4.679909   0.164499  28.449  < 2e-16 ***
wop_red:2                  9.132541   0.274760  33.238  < 2e-16 ***
nineties:1                 0.036889   0.210852   0.175  0.86112
nineties:2                -0.024119   0.483750  -0.050  0.96024
naughts:1                  0.297882   0.272964   1.091  0.27515
naughts:2                  1.388169   0.520131   2.669  0.00761 **
tens:1                     0.524882   0.671919   0.781  0.43470
tens:2                     2.026803   0.883121   2.295  0.02173 *
west:1                     0.902891   0.439566   2.054  0.03997 *
west:2                     2.478936   0.593440   4.177 2.95e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
```

Listing 2 Multinomial logistic regression, Women's economic rights

```
Pearson residuals:
                      Min      1Q   Median        3Q    Max
log(mu[,2]/mu[,1]) -5.996 -0.3490 -0.26189  0.392199  5.359
log(mu[,3]/mu[,1]) -5.341 -0.0614 -0.02258 -0.009291 43.897

Coefficients:
                           Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept):1             -1.328860   0.671063  -1.980  0.04768 *
(Intercept):2             -5.777708   1.824116  -3.167  0.00154 **
nhri:1                    -0.125258   0.138428  -0.905  0.36554
nhri:2                     0.309995   0.292796   1.059  0.28972
cedawrat:1                -0.054079   0.177886  -0.304  0.76112
cedawrat:2                -0.348559   0.455954  -0.764  0.44459
logingo:1                  0.161291   0.122790   1.314  0.18899
logingo:2                 -0.426147   0.317013  -1.344  0.17886
leadinternalconflict:1    -0.227285   0.173857  -1.307  0.19111
leadinternalconflict:2   -15.781008 764.624355  -0.021  0.98353
leadinterstateconflict:1   0.071127   0.401335   0.177  0.85933
leadinterstateconflict:2   0.172781   0.922050   0.187  0.85136
loggdp:1                   0.078392   0.068030   1.152  0.24919
loggdp:2                   0.321697   0.244424   1.316  0.18813
wdi_trade:1                0.003507   0.001765   1.987  0.04691 *
wdi_trade:2                0.004396   0.003465   1.269  0.20447
logpop:1                  -0.071552   0.062649  -1.142  0.25341
logpop:2                   0.074502   0.146060   0.510  0.61000
p_durable:1                0.004021   0.003162   1.272  0.20345
p_durable:2                0.006726   0.004403   1.528  0.12661
LJI:1                      1.173120   0.290898   4.033 5.51e-05 ***
LJI:2                      3.225937   1.026744   3.142  0.00168 **
wec_red.L:1                2.997522   0.526847   5.690 1.27e-08 ***
wec_red.L:2                5.526846   0.733796   7.532 5.00e-14 ***
wec_red.Q:1               -0.537871   0.311085  -1.729  0.08381 .
wec_red.Q:2               -0.315298   0.441450  -0.714  0.47508
nineties:1                -0.183790   0.165174  -1.113  0.26584
nineties:2                 0.130295   0.388372   0.335  0.73725
naughts:1                 -0.327222   0.186356  -1.756  0.07910 .
naughts:2                  0.778128   0.432017   1.801  0.07168 .
tens:1                    -0.566249   0.347850  -1.628  0.10356
tens:2                     0.656868   0.660217   0.995  0.31977
west:1                     1.553187   0.276268   5.622 1.89e-08 ***
west:2                     2.216789   0.512825   4.323 1.54e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
```

Listing 3 Multinomial logistic regression, Women's political rights, A-status

```
Pearson residuals:
                      Min       1Q   Median       3Q    Max
log(mu[,2]/mu[,1]) -47.42 -0.16283  0.20050  0.22484  4.157
log(mu[,3]/mu[,1]) -46.36 -0.08146 -0.03239 -0.00554 55.937

(Intercept):1             -2.034833   0.889067  -2.289  0.02210 *
(Intercept):2            -10.627865   1.672607  -6.354 2.10e-10 ***
astatus.new:1              0.128016   0.364323   0.351  0.72530
astatus.new:2              0.577121   0.445150   1.296  0.19482
cedawrat:1                 0.632836   0.216170   2.927  0.00342 **
cedawrat:2                 1.637738   0.731465   2.239  0.02516 *
logingo:1                 -0.010681   0.147470  -0.072  0.94226
logingo:2                  0.660799   0.418400   1.579  0.11426
leadinternalconflict:1     0.150050   0.223495   0.671  0.50198
leadinternalconflict:2    -0.635148   0.576358  -1.102  0.27046
leadinterstateconflict:1  -0.303726   0.456005  -0.666  0.50537
leadinterstateconflict:2  -1.009581   1.156597  -0.873  0.38272
loggdp:1                  -0.070420   0.087555  -0.804  0.42122
loggdp:2                  -0.544381   0.216496  -2.515  0.01192 *
wdi_trade:1                0.001468   0.002757   0.533  0.59437
wdi_trade:2               -0.003358   0.004045  -0.830  0.40644
logpop:1                   0.002855   0.085084   0.034  0.97324
logpop:2                  -0.257445   0.176811  -1.456  0.14538
p_durable:1               -0.005358   0.004347  -1.233  0.21772
p_durable:2               -0.006927   0.005968  -1.161  0.24574
LJI:1                      1.087244   0.432001   2.517  0.01184 *
LJI:2                      2.567687   0.839872   3.057  0.00223 **
wop_red:1                  4.726021   0.164106  28.799  < 2e-16 ***
wop_red:2                  9.165604   0.275237  33.301  < 2e-16 ***
nineties:1                 0.154194   0.207107   0.745  0.45657
nineties:2                 0.076541   0.480405   0.159  0.87341
naughts:1                  0.542744   0.271662   1.998  0.04573 *
naughts:2                  1.400822   0.531234   2.637  0.00837 **
tens:1                     0.750463   0.658181   1.140  0.25420
tens:2                     1.971141   0.884086   2.230  0.02578 *
west:1                     1.068417   0.437429   2.442  0.01459 *
west:2                     2.599974   0.594959   4.370 1.24e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Listing 4 Multinomial logistic regression, Women's economic rights, A-status

```
Pearson residuals:
                      Min       1Q   Median       3Q    Max
log(mu[,2]/mu[,1]) -47.42 -0.16283  0.20050  0.22484  4.157
log(mu[,3]/mu[,1]) -46.36 -0.08146 -0.03239 -0.00554 55.937

Coefficients:
                          Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept):1             -2.034833   0.889067  -2.289  0.02210 *
(Intercept):2            -10.627865   1.672607  -6.354 2.10e-10 ***
astatus.new:1              0.128016   0.364323   0.351  0.72530
astatus.new:2              0.577121   0.445150   1.296  0.19482
cedawrat:1                 0.632836   0.216170   2.927  0.00342 **
cedawrat:2                 1.637738   0.731465   2.239  0.02516 *
logingo:1                 -0.010681   0.147470  -0.072  0.94226
logingo:2                  0.660799   0.418400   1.579  0.11426
leadinternalconflict:1     0.150050   0.223495   0.671  0.50198
leadinternalconflict:2    -0.635148   0.576358  -1.102  0.27046
leadinterstateconflict:1  -0.303726   0.456005  -0.666  0.50537
leadinterstateconflict:2  -1.009581   1.156597  -0.873  0.38272
loggdp:1                  -0.070420   0.087555  -0.804  0.42122
loggdp:2                  -0.544381   0.216496  -2.515  0.01192 *
wdi_trade:1                0.001468   0.002757   0.533  0.59437
wdi_trade:2               -0.003358   0.004045  -0.830  0.40644
logpop:1                   0.002855   0.085084   0.034  0.97324
logpop:2                  -0.257445   0.176811  -1.456  0.14538
p_durable:1               -0.005358   0.004347  -1.233  0.21772
p_durable:2               -0.006927   0.005968  -1.161  0.24574
LJI:1                      1.087244   0.432001   2.517  0.01184 *
LJI:2                      2.567687   0.839872   3.057  0.00223 **
wop_red:1                  4.726021   0.164106  28.799  < 2e-16 ***
wop_red:2                  9.165604   0.275237  33.301  < 2e-16 ***
nineties:1                 0.154194   0.207107   0.745  0.45657
nineties:2                 0.076541   0.480405   0.159  0.87341
naughts:1                  0.542744   0.271662   1.998  0.04573 *
naughts:2                  1.400822   0.531234   2.637  0.00837 **
tens:1                     0.750463   0.658181   1.140  0.25420
tens:2                     1.971141   0.884086   2.230  0.02578 *
west:1                     1.068417   0.437429   2.442  0.01459 *
west:2                     2.599974   0.594959   4.370 1.24e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Separation plots



Figure A 11: Separation plot, model (6)



Figure A 12: Separation plot, model (7)



Figure A 13: Separation plot, model (8)

VIF tests

Table A 17: Variance Inflation Factor tests, main models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
nhri	1.024		1.025		1.301		1.484	
astatus.new		1.119		1.119		1.404		1.547
bstatus.new		1.099		1.101		1.145		1.160
cstatus.new		1.027		1.027		1.023		1.043
iccprrat	1.142	1.145	1.145	1.148				
cedawrat					1.406	1.415	1.534	1.540
p_polity2	2.444	2.450	2.559	2.563	3.828	3.822	3.999	3.969
leadinterstateconflict	1.004	1.003	1.004	1.003	1.043	1.044	1.051	1.051
leadinternalconflict	1.074	1.076	1.020	1.021	1.152	1.155	1.162	1.164
loggdp	1.487	1.479	1.491	1.484	3.584	3.574	3.391	3.371
logingo	1.097	1.113	1.094	1.111	4.016	3.978	4.579	4.513
wdi_trade	1.061	1.061	1.052	1.052	1.629	1.643	1.735	1.755
logpop	1.317	1.326	1.339	1.351	2.483	2.492	2.810	2.815
p_durable	1.545	1.540	1.562	1.557	1.731	1.763	1.435	1.448
LJI	2.269	2.278	2.271	2.279	5.972	6.002	5.260	5.253
ciri_physint	1.171	1.171						
ciri_empinx_new			1.409	1.410				
wop_red					1.021	1.021		
wec_red							1.057	1.059
nineties					1.848	1.807	2.000	1.937
naughts					2.541	2.678	2.781	2.954
tens					1.311	1.366	1.337	1.409
west					2.264	2.241	1.762	1.747

References to the Appendix

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." *Public Choice* 143 (1): 67–101. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2.

Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset."

Cole, Wade M., and F. O. Ramirez. 2013. "Conditional Decoupling: Assessing the Impact of National Human Rights Institutions, 1981 to 2004." *American Sociological Review* 78 (4): 702–25. doi:10.1177/0003122413492762.

Conrad, Courtenay R, Jaqueline H. R DeMerritt, Will H Moore, and Ryan M Welch. 2013. "The NHRI Data Project: Organizational Data User's Guide." http://nhridata.weebly.com.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises." *American Journal of Sociology* 110 (5): 1373–1411. doi:10.1086/428442.

Kim, Dongwook. 2013. "International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions." *International Organization* 67 (03): 505–39. doi:10.1017/S0020818313000131.

Linzer, Drew A, and Jeffrey K Staton. 2015. "A global measure of judicial independence, 1948–2012." *Journal of Law and Courts* 3 (2): 223–56.

Lupu, Yonatan. 2013. "Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements." *International Organization* 67 (03): 469–503. doi:10.1017/S002081831300012X.

Marshall, M. G., K. Jaggers, and T. R. Gurr. 2014. "Polity IV project, political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2014."

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (6): 925–53.

OHCHR. 2016. "Human Rights Indicators." http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Indicators/Pages/HRIndicatorsIndex.aspx.

Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2009. "Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (1): 149–74. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen C Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for human rights: international law in domestic politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko, and Richard Svensson. 2016. "The Quality of Government Dataset, version Jan16." University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.

Themner, L., and P. Wallensteen. 2014. "Armed conflicts, 1946-2013." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (4): 541–54. doi:10.1177/0022343314542076.

Union of International Associations. 1999. *Yearbook of International Organizations vol. 35*.

World Bank. 2015. "World development indicators." The World Bank Washington DC.