

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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The Longshot bias in market data: Evidence from Counter-Strike: Global Offensive

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In this paper I investigate whether or not behavioral models of behavior under uncertainty explain market level sales of lotteries. I extend a homogeneous model of logit demand in the a characteristic space to several functional forms of the valuation function for a lottery. The data come from online sales of lotteries in a complete market for video game cosmetics. These lotteries contain many low probability and high value contents. I find that the behavioral model of cumulative prospect theory does no better at explaining variation in the market shares than a rational model. I find that the rational model does do better at describing equilibrium between the prices of the contents and the prices of the lotteries that contain these contents.

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1 Introduction

Many structural models for individuals behavior have lost popularity among applied economists because of strict assumptions of rationality on behavior. In this paper I examine a relaxation of this behavior and investigate whether or not it can be used to explain behavior better than other rational models. I hope to shed light on a question of whether a class of behavioral models, cumulative prospect theory, is helpful in considering selling mechanisms that utilize randomness. I use field data from a collection of markets for lotteries as well as secondary markets for each of their contents to determine valuations, and build a model of risk preferences from this. I seek to answer the question of whether or not this model provides additional predictive and explanatory power in examining behavior of individuals buying lotteries. I aim to analyze which components of this model of behavior are most important in these lotteries being valued so much above their expected value.

The question of interest is whether or not Cumulative Prospect theory is able to better explain decision making in low-risk lotteries than Expected Utility theory, and if so, what mechanism allows for this better explanation. In particular, the robustness of the parameters in terms of their out-of-sample fit is also of interest, as different researcher's calibrations of the model have found quite different results.

In essence, I have a field experiment and wish to determine from this data whether or not cumulative prospect theory can explain individual's behavior better than traditional "rational" models of consumer behavior. This is an ideal setting for such a project as these lotteries combine many elements that behavioral economists would term "irrational". These lotteries feature many high value but extremely low (order of 10^{-5}) probability outcomes, the potential market is mainly teenagers, and the cost of participation is low (\$2.50-4.00). In such a setting, one would expect a large gain from predictive power employing a behavioral model of risk.

If there are indeed large gains to be had from considering this behavioral model over the expected utility framework, it may be that many behavioral notions of irrationality, such as bidding behavior in auctions can be explained. To generalize these results from small-scale lotteries to distinct fields such as auctions, there must be some notion of robustness of the parameter estimates, and I intend to investigate whether or not these parameters are dependent on the structure of the lottery, or are primitives in the purest sense.

This question is relevant to the larger field of Industrial Organization because it is able to bring the question of preference heterogeneity previously studied by Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) among others in horse betting. We are able to abstract ourselves from the concerns of belief heterogeneity suggested by Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2014) due to the specific structure of the market, and thus are able to isolate the effects of only preferences. I extend this notion to market data. Previously the literature had been focuses on contracts, whether in betting markets or in financial markets.

While the data is focused on sales in online markets for video game items, this randomization mechanism is not limited to this industry. Randomization mechanisms are popular ways of selling collectible items and trading cards in both virtual and actual markets. This same type of mechanism is also present in less-fringe markets such as children cereal collectibles and toys in fast-food kids meal. Markets where the consumers are believed to be "irrational" in some sense, often through sales to children, feature this mechanism most often. I attempt

to study this focusing on market data where valuations for each of the contents as well as the lottery are represented from a market. However these results can be extended to any type of market where randomization is the primary selling mechanism.

2 Literature Review

Barberis (2013) presents a broad review of where Prospect theory has been applied, as well as its problems with its application, particularly in the choice of a reference point, which appears to be very significant, but there is little guidance on what to choose beyond possibly the expected value of the lottery. Applications of the model, originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) exist mostly in finance and insurance. I intend to extend this body to look at the behavior of non-expert individuals in a market scenario. I believe that this area has not had many applications, likely because of the rarity of quality data outside of these fields.

The literature on Cumulative Prospect theory, the main structure of this model is primarily focused on experimental data. The literature began with the paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that suffered from problems relating to stochastic dominance, and was updated in 1992 with their paper on cumulative prospect theory.

Gonzalez and Wu (1999) give a discussion on the interpretation and development of the probability weighting function used in cumulative prospect theory as well as several forms and their ensuing interpretations. The different parameters are identified with respect to psychological phenomena found relevant to the decision making process. Thus “identification” in the reduced-form sense of interpretation of the parameters become much more possible, as there are many dimensions of the model.

The work on the application of Cumulative Prospect Theory within industrial organization has been limited, likely due to poor data. One area where the data has been rich has been horse betting, and Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) applies cumulative prospect theory in a non-parametric setting to this data to explain the long-shot bias present there. There are also lots of applications in financial markets where there is better data, one such example is Benartzi and Thaler (1995). Sydnor (2010) presents an application of prospect theory to real-world data. He uses data on homeowner’s choices on deductibles for home-insurance policies as a measure of moderate financial risks. The main body of the paper focuses on the standard expected utility framework, but it is extended to cumulative prospect theory in a discussion. There is however no empirical work with prospect theory on the data, as there is substantial heterogeneity within the data.

Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue, and C. Teitelbaum (2012) form a structural model based on a discrete choice model, and non-parametrically estimate the utility function as evidence for the existence of probability weights in insurance choices. This can be explained by cumulative prospect theory’s decision weighting scheme. Much of the literature on experiments in this field also shows that the results are sensitive to the experimental conditions, Plott and Zeiler (2005)

Barberis (2013) discuss the use of preference for lottery-payoffs for encouraging behaviors, which is relevant to my market. However the literature is underdeveloped, likely due to its legal nature in the United States.

This paper builds on some literature in the Industrial Organization Field that is based around applying behavioral models to structural estimation. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) examine whether or not traditional models of auction behavior can explain auction bidding behavior compared to adaptive models of learning and quantal response equilibrium. However, rather than examining experimental data to draw conclusions, I intend to use field data. Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2014) examines the long shot bias in financial data again, but uses belief heterogeneity rather than preference heterogeneity.

The demand estimation framework that I intend to employ is the discrete-choice demand framework introduced by McFadden (1971). This paper was extended to demand estimation with a shock in Berry (1994) that is the model I intend to emulate for my discrete choice estimation. Heterogeneity was introduced into this framework in the seminal paper by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) that develops the multinomial logit demand system that is common in demand estimation today. This alleviates some of the theoretical problems that are created by the structure of the discrete choice estimation, namely independence of irrelevant alternatives.

There is a focus on using Discrete choice models with prospect theory that has appeared in the Travel Behavior Literature. Such as Li and Hensher (2011) and de Palma, Picard, and Waddell (2007). This literature, inspired by de Palma, Ben-Akiva, Brownstone, Holt, Magnac, McFadden, Moffatt, Picard, Train, Wakker, and Walker (2008), uses different behavioral models of individual behavior under lotteries directly in the utility specification of discrete choice. The paper discusses the different function forms and choices made by the researched in choosing the behavioral model to estimate choices. The emphasis on the behavioral models, is on improving prediction rather than better explanatory power for the model. In particular, all of these exercises use simulated data or laboratory experiments to evaluate consumer's decision making, rather than estimating parameters from market choices that are observed. These problems manifest themselves in a lack of a measure of willingness to pay as well and reference point, making estimation of the parameters difficult when it is even attempted. This existing literature on transport fails to address individual specific heterogeneity as well.

3 Data

The Data come from the *Steam Community Market*, a system of continuous double auctions that operates as a competitive market. Individuals place buy and sell orders which are then matched according to the seller's price. The lotteries of interest are sold on the market, and each of their contents are sold individually as well. Since this structure of a market converges quickly to a competitive equilibrium, we have high quality data on the equilibrium price and quantity of not only the lottery, but for each of its contents. The specific data examined are market transaction history for all items sold on the *Steam Community Market* for Counter-Strike: Global Offensive.

Counter-Strike Global Offensive is a strategic first-person shooter video game played online. Each team has specific guns that they are able to purchase at the start of every round. The in-game cost, game balance, and equilibrium strategy all contribute to the popularity of each weapon. Players may choose to purchase purely cosmetic "skins" for their

weapons which change the appearance of their weapon when they buy it. These skins are sold in lotteries called weapon crates which are given randomly to players in-game. The drop rates are unknown, and believed to change often. Upon receiving a weapon crate, a player may elect to spend \$2.50 to open it, or sell it on the community market.


These crates display which weapon skins they may contain, and the probability of obtaining each item within the crate is public knowledge, as required by Chinese Law. That is, the contents of the crate follow a known distribution, and can therefore be estimated under theories of risk. The contents of the crate can then be held onto, or sold at market.

3.1 Market

The market that these weapons can be sold at is the *Steam Community Market* which is run by Valve, the same company that makes Counter-Strike: Global Offensive. The market is a continuous time double-auction. Sellers may place sell orders, and buyers buy orders, and the market functions by matching the buyers and sellers, always selling at the seller's price. This is known to converge quickly to a competitive market, and will be treated as such for this project. Cripps and Swinkels (2004) There are two complications however, there is a 15% tax placed on the market by Valve, which is taken from the seller's earnings. This is complicated by the discrete nature of the selling, and the tax always rounds up in favor of Valve. That is, an item selling for \$0.03 would return \$.02 to Valve rather than 15%. This will not be a large factor in my model as I am primarily interested in calculating demand.


For the past 30 days, there is data on hourly median market price as well as quantity sold. For the remaining time that an item has been at market, there is data for daily median price and quantity sold. The data also contain active buy and sell orders at the time of its mining: (March 31st 2018). No history for these buy and sell orders is available.

From this data, the expected value of the lottery under various forms of utility functions can be calculated, as the prices of all of the contents are given in equilibrium with the prices of the lotteries themselves. A graph of the expected values against the prices of opening the lotteries is given below, using the number of contents of each of the lotteries as the temperature.



This graph demonstrates the clustered nature of these boxes, indicating that there is not a large amount of price variation overall. It also motivates the use of characteristic space models as the different lotteries appear to be quite clustered together with their own data points.

This graph suggests that there may be a link between the size of the lottery and the number of losses, and this is investigated in the next graph.



Here we can see that although a large expected loss means that there are many contents of the lottery, the converse is not represented in the data.

3.2 Characteristics

Since the model used will be in the characteristic space rather than the product space, I am especially interested in characteristics of the different weapons in the game. I shall ignore the characteristics that will be used to determine the market for the weapon, detailed in Assumption 1 in the model section. Unique to each weapon is a float value, between 0 and 1, which indicates the wear on the weapon. Wear does not change with use, and is determined when a weapon is un-boxed. This float is distributed uniformly, but based on its value, places the weapon into different brackets for sale. We will consider all weapons in a particular bracket as homogeneous. The contents of the crate are divided into several tiers based on their rarity from being obtained in a box. All of the statistics of a particular item that can be unboxed are summarized in the tables below.

Independent of wear, each item also has a 10% chance of being StatTrak™, where the gun includes a tracker that counts the number of kills a player has with this weapon. This number is reset on sale, so it can be treated simply as a binary indicator.

Conditioned on the rarity, there are still many variants of the contents available, and there is substantial heterogeneity in the amount of contents in each of these brackets. The largest amount of heterogeneity is in the Gold tier. Several of these lotteries have in excess of a hundred possible contents, reaching a maximum of 228 items in the gold tier. This leads to an extremely large amount of items with extremely low probabilities of being unboxed. This provides a distinction between two groups of lotteries, ones with many rare items, and the others where they are distributed evenly among the brackets.

Tab. 1: Condition Probabilities

Float	Condition
0.00 - 0.07	Factory New
0.07 - 0.15	Minimal Wear
0.15 - 0.38	Field-Tested
0.38 - 0.45	Well-Worn
0.45 - 1.00	Battle-Scarred

Tab. 2: Rarity Probabilities

Probability	Rarity
.0026	Special (Gold)
.0064	Covert (Red)
.032	Classified (Pink)
.1598	Restricted (Purple)
.7992	Mil-spec (Blue)

Tab. 3: Lottery Details

Case	Values		Number of Contents				
	$\mathbb{E}[V]$	Price	#Blue	#Purple	#Pink	#Red	#Gold
Operation Wildfire	0.89891	2.5307	26	18	14	9	50
Operation Breakout	0.77011	2.5305	24	15	12	10	56
Falchion Case	0.95072	2.5323	27	24	11	9	59
Shadow Case	0.85299	2.5349	29	17	14	10	59
Huntsman Weapon Case	0.95531	3.3181	25	17	12	8	62
Spectrum Case	0.98146	2.53	34	23	15	9	68
Chroma 2 Case	1.0058	2.53	25	13	13	9	81
Chroma 3 Case	0.66099	2.53	30	19	11	10	81
Chroma Case	0.83215	2.55	23	20	10	4	81
Glove Case	0.84301	2.53	27	26	9	12	89
Operation Hydra	1.5465	4.0827	25	20	14	9	89
Gamma 2 Case	0.68335	2.53	31	22	13	7	128
Gamma Case	0.80717	2.53	31	21	11	10	128
CS:GO Weapon	4.4611	9.3248	7	6	7	2	228
eSports 2013 Case	3.2708	10.354	8	13	7	2	228
eSports 2013 Winter	1.5687	2.6441	18	9	11	3	228
eSports 2014 Summer	1.4136	2.7414	21	19	16	9	228
Operation Bravo	4.3567	12.628	26	15	9	6	228
Operation Phoenix	0.85507	2.5416	15	12	9	7	228
Operation Vanguard	1.038	2.5928	17	13	12	10	228
Revolver Case	1.1045	2.53	24	25	12	9	228
Winter Offensive	1.299	3.5079	14	14	12	6	228

4 Model

4.1 Discrete Choice Demand

Let us believe that individuals have a valuation for loot boxes characterized by some function $V(\cdot)$. Following a discrete choice framework for demand estimation, I assume that the utility of a consumer i for loot box j in time t is given by:

$$u_{ijt} = V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) + \xi_{jt} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad \epsilon_{ij} \sim \text{Gumbel}$$

Where p_{jt} is the price, x_{jt} are the covariates, ξ_{jt} is some demand shock common to all consumers (this can be rationalized as unobserved benefits), ϵ_{ij} is a type-1 extreme value shock unique to the consumer and good, and θ is the vector of parameters for the valuation function

The demand for this good then is given by the probability that it has the maximum utility. This can be computed using the properties of the Type-1 extreme value distribution. The maximum follows a logistic distribution, and the probability is given by:

$$\Pr(i \rightarrow j) = \frac{\exp(V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) + \xi_{jt})}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{F}} \exp(V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) + \xi_{kt})}$$

In this sense, demand is non-random, and the Econometrician observes the price of the box, the covariates of the box, as well as the equilibrium quantity q_{jt} . Following the structure of Berry (1994) we consider an outside option that has some market share. The outside option is simply not partaking in any of the lotteries, and thus the valuation of this is normalized to 0. Therefore the probability that an individual chooses the outside good is given by: $\Pr(i \rightarrow 0) = \frac{1}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{F}} \exp(V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) + \xi_k)}$. Dividing each demand equation by the outside option and taking logs yields us:

$$\log s_{jt} - \log s_{0t} = V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) + \xi_{jt}$$

Since ξ_{jt} is unobserved by the econometrician, it takes the form of the unobserved error in the demand estimation procedure. However, it is sometimes endogenous to price as price is formed by the intersection of both supply and demand shocks. We need valid instruments for the estimation of this demand.

4.2 Instruments

Endogeneity occurs in this model via the simultaneity of supply and demand. Valid instruments for the price therefore must be supply shifters that do not affect the demand. Supply can be thought of as the players who have received a loot box randomly and wish to sell it. To simplify the dynamics of the problem, upon receiving the item individuals decide to sell it or not, so the supply of these loot boxes is heavily dependent on active players in that day and the previous day.

I assume that demand is a function of the long-run average number of players, or the amount of “active players” over the period of the month. This number is different from the daily players that play each day, as relatively few people are able to play each day for many

reasons. However, loot boxes are given randomly to each player who plays in a day. We wish to use this fact to construct instruments for the demand. Suppose the true number of active players is N . Then daily players is $N + \epsilon_t$, i.e. some shock that determines daily player-base. We wish to use this shock ϵ_t as a cost-shifter that does not affect demand. If we estimate N by the average of all players over a significant time period, we can instrument demand using the daily deviations from this average. We instrument for price with the deviations of the current day of sale as well as the previous day's deviation from the mean.

Supply can be thought of as upward sloping with an active price floor at a price of .03 which is often binding. In the set of transactions where the price floor is binding, there is no concern of simultaneity, and therefore price is exogenously determined by the existence of the price floor. Since we use multiple instruments for price in the endogenous case, the remaining instruments will be made zero for the exogenous price case.

Demand can then be estimated off of the condition that:

$$\mathbb{E}[Z_t(\xi_{tj})] = 0 \quad \mathbb{E}[p_{jt}\xi_{jt}] = 0 \quad \text{When } p = \$0.03$$

These two conditions can be combined into a set of instruments, with $K + 1$ columns, where K is the columns of Z . For the elements where $\mathbb{E}[Z_t\xi_{jt}] = 0$, the final column is zero, and for other the remaining elements, the first K columns are zero.

Also present in the data is active buy orders, these are orders that there is not yet supply to fulfill. However it is a dominant strategy for place your valuation as the bid. Therefore there is no concerns about shading, and we may treat these orders as true valuations. In the case of these estimates, we should find that demand shock is equal to zero, and uncorrelated with the valuation, or that $\mathbb{E}[p_{jt}\xi_{jt}] = 0$. I note that the same choice and discrete choice framework holds for those that post unfulfilled buy orders, so there is no different model for valuations under the unfulfilled order framework. This gives us instruments to identify price effects for each of the possible cases of the data, as the only change between these orders is the price of the actual lottery, the reward remains constant.

The rest of the covariates are the last known prices of the contents of the loot boxes. We shall takes these prices as exogenous as they were determined by the supply and demand of the item in previous time periods. In this sense we are completely abstracting the problems from dynamic choices regarding optimal opening of boxes or strategies in continuous time double auctions.

We may combine all of these into a vector x_{jt} along with a constant term and our condition becomes one of $\mathbb{E}[x_{jt}\xi_{jt}] = 0$. This provides us with $k + 3$ moments per data point, when there are k contents, and there are 3 parameters of interest to estimate. We are extremely over-identified, allowing for the possibility of more complicated functional forms such as splines as extensions.

4.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory

Cumulative Prospect Theory includes several important concepts not observe in classical decision making under risk. It incorporates reference dependence, which implies that people view things in the context of losses and gains rather than changes to their overall wealth. This is attractive for computational reasons. It also utilizes loss aversion, the notion that

losses are relatively more costly than gains. The model also incorporates diminishing sensitivity, the notion that valuations are concave in losses and convex in gains. The final concept is probability weighting, the notion that consumers act as if they were facing different probabilities than what they encounter.


We now examine the structure of the Valuation function $V(x_j, p_j; \theta)$. Denote the probabilities of each of the contents of the lotteries by π_i and their values as x_i . We now re-index these by a permutation s_i such that $x_{s_1} < x_{s_2} < \dots < x_{s_n}$. The cumulative probability Π_i can be written as $\sum_{i=1}^K \pi_{s_i}$. From these objects we can construct the value function for the lottery.

We note that the price of opening a case is two-fold, first the case must be bought at the market for its price, and then the price of the key, denoted p_{key} must also be paid to open the case. The time required to open the case is trivial, and will not be considered. However, it is not the price that is weighted, but the price relative to some reference point. There is little theoretical guidance on what value this reference point should be, so multiple variations will be explored. Gains are defined as contents which, after the reference point is subtracted are still positive. Gains are treated differently than losses, let the parameterization of these gains and losses be defined as:

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} x^\alpha & x \geq 0 \\ -\lambda(-x)^\alpha & x < 0 \end{cases}$$

In this sense, α captures the risk-loving or risk-averse nature of the consumer, while λ captures their level of loss-aversion.

This valuation function for different levels of α, λ is shown below.




In cumulative prospect theory, the cumulative mass (distribution) function is weighted such that individuals overweight the tail probabilities. This is especially important in this model, as there are many high valued rare items. If this is the case, a severely distorted

distribution could lead to individuals systematically overvaluing lotteries despite even being risk-averse. Colloquially, it is believed that this concept is what allows for this type of randomization to flourish in a market that is primarily populated by young people.

$$w(P) = \frac{\gamma P^\delta}{\gamma P^\delta + (1 - P)^\delta}$$

Following the intuition provided by Gonzalez and Wu (1999), δ captures the notion of diminishing sensitivity, and γ captures attractiveness. Diminishing sensitivity captures how individuals discriminate cumulative probabilities away from the endpoints, i.e. the curvature of the weighting function. Attractiveness indexes how over or under-weighted certain levels of cumulative probability are treated. It can be viewed as how attractive a 50 – 50 bet would be to a risk-neutral individual. It captures the elevation of the probability weighting function.

A graph of different values of γ, δ and their affects on the different weighting is shown.



For some item that is within the contents of the box, a consumer's valuation is transformed by the function:

$$F(x_i) = [w(\Pi_{s_i}) - w(\Pi_{s_i-1})] v(x_i - R_i)$$

The valuation for the lottery can then be written as the sum of this transformation for all of the contents of the lottery:

$$V(x, \pi, p_j) = \sum_{i=1}^N F(x_i)$$

4.4 Constant Relative Risk Aversion

Contrasting the behavioral aspects of this procedure is the use of a Von-Neumann Morgenstern Utility function. However wealth level is not observed, so following with the trends in the IO literature, we use a Constant Coefficient of relative risk-aversion utility function to capture an element of risk-aversion or risk-loving in the individual.

Continuing with the quasilinear utility observed above, the individual has utility of his current wealth if he elects not to buy the lottery, and if he chooses to buy lottery j , his utility is given by:

$$U_{ij} = W_i - \beta p_j + \sum_{k=1}^{N_j} p_k \frac{x_k^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha}$$

The use of the CRRA utility function allows the wealth of the individual to not be present in his valuation of the lottery, so that wealth only appears linearly in the utility function. As a result, when looking at the maximum between many lotteries, we can remove wealth from the equation. I posit that the utility of an individual that chooses lottery j at time t can be given by:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{N_j} p_k \frac{x_k^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} - \beta p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt}$$

Where ϵ_{jt} is a type-1 extreme value distribution, and ξ_{jt} are the unobserved characteristics of the lottery. Thus this model follows Berry (1994), but infers a different valuation function for the lottery using a CRRA utility function and subtracting some level of wealth. This allows for the same estimation strategy to be used for the rational case as the behavioral model.

5 Estimation

5.1 Estimation

In all formulations of the model, it can be written as:

$$\xi_{jt} = \log s_{jt} - \log s_{0t} - \beta' C_j - V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta)$$

Where C_j are the observed characteristics of the lottery, ξ_{jt} are the unobserved characteristics of the model, s are the market shares at a given time, and θ are the model parameters.

Estimation of this model proceeds using the least-squares orthogonality conditions of $\mathbb{E}[\xi_j Z_j] = 0$. Since I have made no distributional assumptions on ξ_{jt} I shall conduct this estimation using the generalized method of moments. The matrix of Z_j is constructed from the exogenous prices of the contents of the lotteries, but also from the price instruments, and the exogenous active buy order price terms.

Consider a matrix of exogenous variables Z_j defined as above, we wish to estimate the parameters of V based on the condition that this matrix is orthogonal to ξ . This could be

accomplished using either Nonlinear Least-Squares or Generalized Method of Moments, I shall employ the latter.

All of the orthogonality conditions combine to:

$$\mathbb{E} [Z'_{jt}\xi_{jt}] = 0$$

The estimation procedure can be written as:

$$\min_{\xi_{j,t}, \xi_{j,t}, \beta_{0,\theta}} \sum_{j,t} \xi'_{j,t} \Omega \xi_{j,t} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{subject to: } \xi_{j,t} = \log s_{jt} - \log s_{0t} - \beta' C_j - V(x_{jt}, p_{jt}; \theta) \quad (2)$$

$$\xi_{j,t} = \xi_{j,t} Z_{j,t} \quad (3)$$

Note that C_j contains a constant term that incorporates the expected value of ξ and the normalization utility of the outside option. We will not interpret it as meaningful Economically. For the weighting matrix Ω , we follow the standard of using the two-stage least-squares weighting matrix $Z'Z^{-1}$. From this estimate, I construct the two-stage estimator of the ideal weighting matrix. The model is estimated again using the two-stage weighting matrix, and point estimates as well as estimates of the standard errors.

I examine four different variations of the behavioral model. I consider two different reference points, one of which is taken as simply the price that a consumer pays, where gains are taken as any return that is strictly above threshold, and losses below. The other reference point is taken to be the price plus the expected value of the loot box. This captures the notion that gains are not merely gaining money, but relative to the expectations of the individuals opening them. This notion cannot be made more precise with market data, but there is room for expanding it with more precise market-level data.

The other variants of the model arise from the characteristic vector C_j , we examine the model when it only contains a single intercept, and when it contains a separate intercept for each of the different lotteries. This difference in the characteristics captures the different characteristics of the lotteries that may account for the heavy clustering present in the data. Since individual heterogeneity is not present in this model, a large characteristic space is not as computationally demanding as in the heterogeneous case.

Estimation is done using the programming language Julia, using the software Julia for Mathematical Optimization. The Solver KNITRO is employed, and the model estimation for ≈ 1200 data points took between four and eight hours for each specification.

5.2 Results

The results for the four different variants of the cumulative prospect theory model and the CRRA model are displayed below. The measure of \bar{R}^2 used is $1 - \frac{\mathbb{V}(\xi)}{\mathbb{V}(Y)}$. This captures the percent of the variation of the model that we are able to explain. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis.

We compute both in-sample and out-of-sample RMSE to capture any notions of overfitting, and report the J-statistic as well. The critical values for the J-statistic are as follows: Fixed Effects: 5% 314.6784, 1% 332.4796 No Fixed Effects: 5% 337.1254, 1% 355.5251

Tab. 4: Point Estimates

$\mathbb{E}[V] + \text{Price Reference Point}$			
α	0.56534 (2.03484)	λ	1.36844 (10.8477)
γ	1.0 (6.36280)	δ	1.0 (9.47887)
In Sample RMSE	1.23649	Out Sample RMSE	1.4337
\bar{R}^2	0.18880	J-Statistic	825.185
$\mathbb{E}[V] + \text{Price Reference Point and Fixed Effects}$			
α	0.79549 (4.6084)	λ	0.60091 (9.85376)
γ	1.0 (9.79014)	δ	1.0 (21.5814)
In Sample RMSE	1.08121	Out Sample RMSE	1.10642
\bar{R}^2	0.51688	J-Statistic	558.41
Price Reference Point			
α	0.47457 (5.4068)	λ	0.54667 (14.56967)
γ	1.0 (10.97014)	δ	1.0 (10.85583)
In Sample RMSE	1.52584	Out Sample RMSE	1.5258
\bar{R}^2	0.08117	J-Statistic	860.261
Price Reference Point and Fixed Effects			
α	0.8215 (7.6682)	λ	0.3152 (7.3252)
γ	1.0 (7.6753)	δ	1.0 (15.7306)
In Sample RMSE	1.01432	Out Sample RMSE	1.07900
\bar{R}^2	0.54053	J-Statistic	351.73
Rational - CRRA			
α	0.82589 (6093.657)	β	-0.32488 (0.28937)
In Sample RMSE	0.98513	Out Sample RMSE	1.10097
\bar{R}^2	0.52163	J-Statistic	570.394

We reject the Null that the model is correctly specified in all cases, though the fixed effect does come close. Although this is not troubling as the mode is incredibly over-identified, it suggests that there is variation in the prices that the consumers are not sensitive to under these specifications. This suggests that a more non-parametric approach may be able to better explain variations in the data. At the very least, there is some misspecification in the models employed.

We can see that there is relatively little of the variation in the quantities explained by simply the valuations, and without fixed effects we have a very small \bar{R}^2 level for the cumulative prospect theory. This may indicate that the prices that individuals are sensitive

to may not be the last posted price, but some other notion of price, possibly smoothed over time. Further work on this topic should focus on this aspect, as well as relaxing the assumptions of homogeneity for a more complex model.

The standard errors of each of the estimates that appear in the lottery functions are very high. This occurs because of the extremely over-identified model and the dense Jacobian used to calculate the standard errors. These errors do not reduce upon further iterations of the weighting matrix. Since each term in the behavioral model enters the valuation function in an extremely non-linear manner, the Jacobian is poorly approximated by a quadratic function, and thus standard errors constructed will be extremely high.

The estimate of the model using a CRRA utility function produces a curious result. I find a strong level of risk aversion. There is such a large standard error though that the possibility of risk neutrality or risk-loving nature cannot be ruled out. This basic utility function which is quite parsimonious allows for just as strong of a fit both in sample as out-of-sample as the model based on cumulative prospect theory.

None of the behavioral models suggest that probability weighting is being exhibited. In all formulations of the model, individuals simply slightly differently weigh losses and the convexity of gains. This suggests that the result that individuals do not use probability weighting is quite robust to model miss-specification. I note that I do place constraints on γ, δ such that they are bounded between 0 and 1, and limit δ to a slightly higher value than 0 purely for numerical reasons. This ensures that we would not see under-weighting of the probability weighting functions, and thus I only allow for over-weighting.

The concavity of the valuation function combining with the lack of probability weighting shows that risk-aversion is what is suggested by the cumulative prospect theory models as well. In fact, these specifications all report a negative valuation under cumulative prospect theory. In this framework, individuals are aware that they face a losing bet, but they obtain some fixed level of utility for participating in the lottery. This “fixed effect” drives purchases, and can only be interpreted as utility from the act of gambling, completely independent of the potential rewards.

While market equilibrium between the different cases was employed in the estimation of the model, the equilibrium between the prices of the contents of the cases and the prices of the cases was never used. This creates an interesting outside-moment condition where I can examine how each model fits this equilibrium condition. I consider the equilibrium condition as indifference between the valuation of the lottery and the price of the lottery. This is all encompassed in the valuation function for the cumulative prospect theory models, but are two separate terms in the rational model. In both I take the average over each data point and consider which is closer to zero. I consider both the case of market transactions only, and market transactions and buy orders for the behavioral model, and report the average over all data points for the rational.

Tab. 5: Lottery Valuations

Case	Characteristics		Lottery Valuations		
	$\mathbb{E}[V]$	Price	CPT Valuation	Market Only	Rational
Operation Breakout	0.77011	2.5305	-0.40693	-0.40693	-0.0052805
Operation Wildfire	0.89891	2.5307	-0.32827	-0.32827	-0.0049704
Huntsman Weapon Case	0.95531	3.3181	-0.49249	-0.53162	-0.15657
Shadow Case	0.85299	2.5349	-0.35231	-0.3512	-0.0059236
Falchion Case	0.95072	2.5323	-0.36465	-0.36465	-0.0063908
Chroma Case	0.83215	2.55	-0.34827	-0.34559	-0.0095399
Chroma 2 Case	1.0058	2.53	-0.33199	-0.33199	-0.0048381
Spectrum Case	0.98146	2.53	-0.24042	-0.24042	-0.005158
Chroma 3 Case	0.66099	2.53	-0.38344	-0.38344	-0.0053253
Operation Hydra	1.5465	4.0827	-0.18677	-0.31092	-0.24581
Glove Case	0.84301	2.53	-0.31471	-0.31471	-0.0051815
Gamma 2 Case	0.68335	2.53	-0.34373	-0.34373	-0.0053237
Gamma Case	0.80717	2.53	-0.28795	-0.28795	-0.0052006
CS:GO Weapon	4.4611	9.3248	-0.20035	-0.63434	-1.5106
eSports 2013 Case	3.2708	10.354	-0.34529	-1.0796	-1.2112
eSports 2013 Winter	1.5687	2.6441	-0.081838	-0.058941	-0.037442
Operation Phoenix	0.85507	2.5416	-0.35965	-0.35737	-0.0089612
Winter Offensive	1.299	3.5079	-0.38325	-0.43248	-0.19626
Operation Vanguard	1.038	2.5928	-0.35491	-0.34876	-0.021628
Operation Bravo	4.3567	12.628	-0.74652	-1.2878	-2.3076
eSports 2014 Summer	1.4136	2.7414	-0.22718	-0.21321	-0.059558
Revolver Case	1.1045	2.53	-0.27059	-0.27059	-0.0046285

The rational model presents a much more compelling story. Although it provides risk-aversion, the high sensitivity to price allows for the valuations of the lotteries to be closer to zero than the cumulative prospect theory estimates. The average over all lotteries is -0.2647 compared to -0.33416 for the cumulative prospect theory. However the rational model appears to have several outliers that influence the mean heavily. If we consider the more robust median we get a median valuation estimate of -0.007676 for the rational case and -0.34451 for the behavioral model. Appealing to market equilibrium, we find that the rational model is actually predicting behavior better than the behavioral model. The outliers themselves occur for the lotteries for which there is a high price relative to the other lotteries, and the poor fit is likely explained by poor price instruments, which are more relevant in the CRRA model where price appears linearly.

Alternatives to explore this range from the models of Belief Heterogeneity utilized by Bajari, to adding preference heterogeneity and non-parametric fit, as used by others. Another alternative is changing how the price of the contents is computed, using averages over the past rather than simply the spot price on the day the lottery was sold. However many of these options are much more computationally intensive, and may require simplifications in other aspects of the model to be able to be computed.

6 Conclusion

Although there is high uncertainty in our estimates in any specification of the model, it is not clear that there is substantial information to be gained from application of the behavioral model of cumulative prospect theory to market level data. It appears that market shares are less determined by the valuations of the lotteries under any specification than other characteristics. That is, in this market individuals are less price sensitive than they are sensitive to the other characteristics present in the market. In fact, when examining which model better represents equilibrium between the contents and the lottery itself, the rational model predicts better than the behavioral model.

This suggests individuals are less price sensitive to their valuations when opening lotteries than they are to the price of being able to open the lottery, based on the computed price sensitivity from the rational case. It is difficult to determine price sensitivity for cumulative prospect theory, as the price is embedded in the model in a more complex notion, so determining a distribution is computationally taxing.

If a behavioral model is to be adopted, the reference point used appears to be quite sensitive to model misspecification. This makes utilization of this model in market situations less appealing, as unobserved characteristics will always be present in structural estimation from market data. This paper is unable to build intuition or guidance for the choice of an ideal reference point, as it is unclear from the results which reference point from the two examined is more informative.

Cumulative Prospect Theory has aided many researchers in the laboratory, but its use in the field has been limited due to many complexities in the data. This foray into market data suggests that its ability to explain deviations is limited compared to simple models of choice under uncertainty, and adds significant computational complexity that precludes more complicated models of heterogeneity. I find that it is not worthwhile when examining lotteries at the market level to use cumulative prospect theory, due to the large increases in computational power and lack of external validity in outside moment conditions.

7 Bibliography

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