

Multi-Party Cross-Chain Asset Transfers

Abstract—With the growing interest in blockchain technology, researchers and developers in different industries are shifting their attention to blockchain interoperability mechanisms. Existing mechanisms usually encompass asset exchanges, asset transfers, and general data transfers. However, most of the solutions based on these mechanisms only work for pairs of permissionless blockchains, falling short in use cases that require more complex business relationships. Also, contrary to existing legacy systems, there is little standardization for cross-domain communication, which multiple players in industry and academia are exploring. We present the *Multi-Party Secure Asset Transfer Protocol* (MP-SATP), a resilient multi-party asset transfer protocol built on top of the *Secure Asset Transfer Protocol* (SATP), which is being developed by the *Internet Engineering Task Force* (IETF).

Furthermore, we enhance SATP's crash recovery mechanism to improve the reliability and performance of our solution. Using MP-SATP, we explain how to perform N-to-N resilient asset transfers in permissioned environments by decoupling them into multiple 1-to-1 asset transfers. Our results show that the latency of the protocol is driven by the latency of the slowest 1-to-1 session and that the use of backup gateways avoids the overhead caused by rollbacks. As shown by our use case, enterprise-grade environments such as supply-chain management systems can immediately leverage our solution to perform atomic multi-party asset transfers.

Index Terms—asset transfer, cross-chain, interoperability, multi-party, SATP

I. INTRODUCTION

Interest in blockchain technology has risen since the appearance of Bitcoin [1] in 2008. Since then, many other cryptocurrencies and crypto-related projects have been created, mainly in permissionless (public) networks. In recent years, we have seen a shift of attention to permissioned (or private) blockchains, where companies spread across multiple industries have been adopting the technology [2]. Finance, healthcare, copyrights, and supply chain are some examples [3], [4].

A blockchain can be defined as an immutable distributed ledger, composed of a sequence of blocks that are cryptographically dependent on one another through cryptographic hash functions, in a way that if there is a change in one block, all the succeeding ones are invalidated. Blockchains can differ in multiple aspects, the most obvious being their security, privacy, and scalability guarantees [5], [6].

To fully unlock the potential of a service provided to clients, it is necessary to design a blockchain solution that can adapt to the unique requirements of each industry [7]. What may be deemed necessary in one industry may not hold the same significance in another, making the concept of a single blockchain governing the entire world impractical. Therefore, it becomes essential to incorporate interoperability mechanisms that facilitate cross-blockchain (or just cross-chain) communication, providing the foundational elements

for seamless interaction and collaboration between different blockchain networks.

Blockchain Interoperability protocols fill this gap, allowing a source chain to change the state of a target chain through cross-chain transactions [2]. Several studies [2], [8], [9] categorize the different interoperability modes into *asset exchanges*, where assets in different blockchains are swapped between parties, such as atomic swaps [10]; *asset transfers*, where an asset is locked or burned (deleted) in the source chain and a representation is minted (created) in the target one [11]; and *data transfers*, where data is copied across blockchains, for instance, through the use of oracles [12].

When it comes to asset transfers, we identify and address two gaps in the literature. First, the majority of interoperability solutions focus on cross-chain communication between two parties at most. Although some cross-chain communication protocols concentrate on 1-to-1 transfers, others that involve multi-party interactions are limited to asset exchanges through atomic swap protocols [10], [13], [14]. Second, we observe a lack of research on interoperability within permissioned networks. The prevailing solutions are predominantly designed for permissionless networks, assuming that the parties involved can access each other's internal state. In permissioned networks, unless explicit authorization is given to all parties before the protocol, such protocols are deemed impractical. Permissioned blockchains are being explored in the context of enterprises, and typically operate with decreased decentralization and employ consensus mechanisms that offer instant finality. Moving from permissionless to permissioned blockchains radically changes the underlying trust assumptions and architectural design of cross-chain protocols. Notably, use cases like Delivery vs Payment [15] or Central Bank Digital Currencies [16] are built on permissioned networks, highlighting the importance of addressing interoperability challenges in this context.

We motivate the need for multi-party asset transfers using an example based on supply-chain management systems, which is further explored as a supply-chain use case in Section V. In this scenario, multiple business relationships are established within the supply chain network. For example, a supplier may have individual agreements with various wholesalers, offering different pricing based on the products or volume of units purchased. Additionally, wholesalers can form partnerships with each other to devise tailored business strategies or collaborate on product creation. In detail, consider a scenario with two wholesalers and two producers. Each wholesaler initiates cross-chain transactions with their respective producer to facilitate payment for the goods shipped the other way around. Furthermore, the wholesalers rely on each other to

assemble a final product, as different components (from both) are required.

In this scenario, one must address a potential issue where one party may refuse to pay its producer while the other has already completed its transfer. This situation can lead to one party paying for goods that will be unutilized due to the lack of cooperation of the other wholesaler. In this complex supply chain network, consisting of multiple interconnected subnetworks or blockchains, there is a need to enable multi-party blockchain interoperability, where atomicity is mandatory, i.e., guaranteeing that no party can refuse to proceed when the others go through with the transaction.

In response to the identified gaps in the literature, we present a novel solution called *Multi-Party Secure Asset Transfer Protocol* (MP-SATP). MP-SATP is specifically designed for permissioned networks and facilitates the transfer of multiple assets among N parties. Building on the SATP protocol, an ongoing work within the SATP working group at the IETF, MP-SATP operates as a gateway-based protocol. Its primary objective is to enable atomic, fair, and consistent cross-chain asset transfers between participating ledgers. The gateway-based architecture is being actively explored by prominent players in academia and industry [17]–[19], and by standards-focused corporations such as IETF [20] and ISO [21], and other financial corporations such as nazarov2020bridging [22].

One notable contribution of MP-SATP is its emphasis on cross-chain standardization, as it paves the way toward establishing immediate and consistent interoperation among diverse blockchains. This addresses a critical requirement in the current landscape, where interoperability solutions are tailored for specific ledgers or use cases. To the best of our knowledge, MP-SATP represents the first multi-party blockchain interoperability solution dedicated to asset transfers between permissioned networks while also focusing on cross-chain standardization. To further enhance the resilience of our proposed solution, we introduce a new primary-backup mode that enhances the gateway crash recovery procedure. This additional feature ensures a more robust and reliable system in the face of gateway failures, thereby increasing the overall resiliency of MP-SATP.

This paper is structured in the following way. The background knowledge necessary to understand this paper is presented in Section II. We present MP-SATP in Section III, and the primary-backup mode of SATP in Section IV. A use case using promissory notes is presented next in Section V. Section VI presents the implementation and evaluation details. Lastly, we present the Related Work and draw our conclusions in Sections VII and VIII.

II. BACKGROUND

This section introduces the building blocks for MP-SATP. We walk through some of the most important blockchain interoperability concepts, the gateway-based architecture for interoperability; and finally SATP and its crash recovery mechanism.




Fig. 1. Gateway-based architecture for blockchain interoperability. (1) Gateways have read and write access to a network; (2) Client applications can request gateways to perform asset transfers; (3) Gateways initiate sessions with other gateways to run a gateway-to-gateway protocol, such as SATP.

A. Cross-Chain Asset Transfers

Solutions that perform cross-chain asset transfers follow roughly the same scheme: an asset is locked or burnt in the source chain, and either some asset is unlocked in the target chain, or a representation of the original one is minted there. The difference between locking and burning is tied to the concept of temporary or permanent transfers. In a permanent transfer, the asset is permanently deleted in the source chain, whereas in a temporary transfer, it remains locked until it is transferred back. We represent a cross-chain transfer of an asset a between party \mathcal{A} and party \mathcal{B} as $\mathcal{A} \xrightarrow{a} \mathcal{B}$.

In this paper, we consider the case of permanent asset transfers, where an asset is burnt in the source chain, and a representation is created in the target one, i.e., with no obligation of being brought back to the original one.

B. Gateway-Based Blockchain Interoperability

Hardjono et al. [23] proposed a singular perspective when thinking about interoperability architectures. The authors apply the same fundamental goals and architecture as in the early days of the Internet. At the time, the solution proposed to scale up and interconnect different networks was to implement *border gateway routers*. These routers provided entry points to each network. Mapping the concept to blockchains, a gateway-based architecture assumes one or more gateways deployed in front of each network that mediates traffic to/from each blockchain the same way routers forward data packets between networks. Gateways can thus be considered facilitators for performing cross-chain transactions. They are owned and operated by registered entities that bear legal responsibility and adhere to regulatory compliance requirements relevant to the transferred assets. As trusted entities, gateways are well-suited for implementation within permissioned environments, where strict control and accountability are essential. The importance of guaranteeing these properties has also been stated by the Bank of International Settlements [24], [25].

Figure 1 depicts the gateway architecture. There are three different APIs defined for a gateway: (1) a DLT-specific API to interact with the ledger it has access to; (2) a client-specific API to receive requests from client applications; and (3) one that is reached by other gateways, to initiate gateway-to-gateway interactions. As an example, SATP is a gateway-to-gateway protocol. Note that the execution of the gateway-to-gateway protocol is always initiated by client applications.

C. Secure Asset Transfer Protocol (SATP)

The SATP [26] is being worked on at the IETF. It appears as the “*first cross-chain communication protocol handling multiple digital asset cross-border transactions by leveraging asset profiles (the schema of an asset) and the notion of gateways.*” [27]. One of the goals of SATP is to enable communication across different domains – distributed ledgers, databases, or legacy systems.

In SATP, clients instantiate gateway-to-gateway interactions to perform asset transfers. Considering a source gateway \mathcal{G}_S , and a recipient gateway \mathcal{G}_R , an SATP session can be represented as $\mathcal{G}_S \xrightarrow{\text{satp}} \mathcal{G}_R$.

There are four phases in the protocol:

- 0) **Identity and Asset Verification Flow**: gateways mutually verify their identities and the identities of their owners, ensuring that both gateways are valid (if gateways use trusted hardware this can be performed through attestation techniques);
- 1) **Transfer Initiation Flow**: gateways exchange the communication terms and rules, making verifications regarding their jurisdictions and the asset that is being transferred;
- 2) **Lock-Evidence Verification Flow**: the asset being transferred is locked (i.e., escrowed by the gateway), and a piece of evidence is presented to the other party;
- 3) **Commitment Establishment Flow**: the involved gateways commit the changes and terminate the asset transfer. The commitment corresponds to the deletion of the asset in the source blockchain, and the creation of a representation in the target blockchain.

Note that all communication is done through a trusted communication channel using, for example, TLS.

D. SATP Crash Recovery Protocol

HERMES [27] proposed the crash recovery mechanism that allows any party running SATP to recover from a crash when exchanging messages to guarantee consistency across both blockchains. This mechanism leverages logs generated before and after each sent and received message. However, it is important to note that it focuses solely on crash failures and does not address Byzantine behavior, which involves malicious deviations from expected protocol execution.

According to the authors, when a crash occurs, the Recovery Procedure must be triggered by the recovered gateway or a backup one. Therefore, there are two possibilities when a gateway crashes: 1) *self-healing*: the crashed gateway recovers and re-establishes communication with the counter-party gateway; or 2) *primary-backup*: a backup gateway resumes the execution of the protocol if the crashed gateway does not recover within a bounded time δ_t . The existing specification only mentions the necessity of such procedures, not proposing any concrete solution. In Section IV, we address this gap.

On the other hand, if there is no response from a gateway or its backup within δ_{rollback} , s.t. $\delta_t < \delta_{\text{rollback}}$, there must be a rollback to ensure termination in a consistent state. A rollback

is equivalent to issuing transactions with a contrary effect to the ones already issued [27]. When the crashed gateway or its backup is finally alive, it runs the Recovery Procedure, in which it learns the rollback performed by the other gateway. A rollback is triggered as well to guarantee consistency.

III. MP-SATP: MULTI-PARTY CROSS-CHAIN ASSET TRANSFERS

This section presents the building blocks for MP-SATP, a multi-party asset transfer protocol built on top of SATP. MP-SATP performs N-to-N transfers of assets through their decomposition in coordinated 1-to-1 SATP transfers.

A. General Assumptions

We present the general assumptions of MP-SATP:

- Gateways abide by regulatory compliance concerning the assets being transferred, being suitable for permissioned environments. In case of disputes, third-party audit entities can request asset transfer evidence.
- The underlying blockchains are *live* and *safe* – i.e., any valid transaction broadcast will eventually be added to the blockchain, and every correct node will eventually converge to a single truth.
- For a successful transfer, all clients involved in a multi-party asset transfer have previously agreed on transferring their assets, and authorize the respective gateway to act on their behalf. This is done through a shared transfer context.
- We bound the latency of any message by δ_t . This means that if no message is received within δ_t , it is assumed that a gateway has crashed.

B. Notation

Here we define the notation used to model our protocol. Furthermore, hereafter the concepts are presented based on an example, which is depicted in Figure 2. Let us consider a set of clients $\mathcal{C} = \{C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4\}$ that want to engage in a multi-party asset transfer. Each client C_i has a wallet in blockchain \mathcal{B}_i , thus, we consider blockchain $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$, and \mathcal{B}_4 . For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we only consider two transfers between elements of \mathcal{C} , $C_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} C_2$ and $C_3 \xrightarrow{a_2} C_4$; these represent the transfer of asset a_1 from C_1 to C_2 , and the transfer of asset a_2 from C_3 to C_4 . The goal is to ensure the atomicity of both transfers – i.e., either both succeed or both fail.

We also leverage gateways as entry points for the underlying blockchains, therefore, we denote as \mathcal{G}_i a gateway with read and write access to \mathcal{B}_i , that will be reached by C_i to initiate cross-chain transfers. There may be multiple gateways connected to the same network, which are used to parallelize cross-chain transactions and can also serve as backups to one another. We represent a backup gateway for \mathcal{G}_1 as \mathcal{G}'_1 (not represented in Figure 2).




Fig. 2. Example of multi-party asset transfers between clients (C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4) through the respective gateways. Asset a_1 is initially owned by C_1 and a_2 by C_3

C. System Model

As mentioned in Section III-A, clients are assumed to agree on the assets being transferred off-chain (e.g., match orders in an off-chain forum), building a graph $\mathcal{D}_1 = (\mathcal{V}_1, \mathcal{E}_1)$, where \mathcal{V}_1 is a finite set of vertexes, and \mathcal{E}_1 is a finite set of edges between elements of \mathcal{V}_1 . \mathcal{V}_1 is the set of parties (clients \mathcal{C}) involved in the multi-party cross-chain asset transfer. Additionally, \mathcal{E}_1 is the list of cross-chain asset transfers between elements of \mathcal{V}_1 . Each cross-chain transfer is a tuple (C_S, C_R, a) , where C_S is the source client, C_R is the recipient client, and a is the profile of the asset being transferred. In Figure 2, $\mathcal{E}_1 = \{(C_1, C_2, a_1), (C_3, C_4, a_2)\}$.

The communication between clients, and consequently, between blockchains must be enabled through an interoperability mechanism [8]. In this solution, we leverage gateways as this component. Given that gateways run a gateway-to-gateway protocol, a mapping between each client and their respective gateways must exist. Therefore, in the gateway layer, the graph \mathcal{D}_1 must be translated into a graph $\mathcal{D}_2 = (\mathcal{V}_2, \mathcal{E}_2)$ where \mathcal{V}_2 is the set of gateways that represent each client, and \mathcal{E}_2 is the previous list of cross-chain asset transfers concatenated with the respective gateways. This time, each cross-chain transfer is a tuple (C_S, C_R, G_S, G_R, a) , where C_S is the source client, C_R is the recipient client, G_S is the source gateway, G_R is the recipient gateway, and a is the profile of the asset being transferred. In the given example, one would have $\mathcal{E}_2 = \{(C_1, C_2, G_1, G_2, a_1), (C_3, C_4, G_3, G_4, a_2)\}$.

Note that the assets being transferred in a single multi-party cross-chain asset transfer session can be heterogeneous; they might concern different fungible or even non-fungible assets.

D. MP-SATP Session Context

We have previously stated that clients authorize their gateways to act on their behalf for that specific asset transfer. This is done leveraging the concept of a session context ctx . It is calculated by hashing (through a cryptographic hash function \mathcal{H}) the concatenation of the graph \mathcal{D}_2 , with the current timestamp ts , which avoids replay attacks. This context is then sent by each C_i to the corresponding G_i along with the graph \mathcal{D}_2 .

$$ctx = \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{V}_2 \parallel \mathcal{E}_2 \parallel ts)$$




Fig. 3. MP-SATP session initiated by a client C_i . In this example, we consider $G_1 \xrightarrow{satp} G_2$ and $G_3 \xrightarrow{satp} G_4$, where G_4 was elected as the coordinator.

E. Protocol

MP-SATP is illustrated in Figure 3. Any client can initiate the protocol within its local gateway. In the above example, we assume that client C_4 initiates MP-SATP by sending a request to G_4 . This particular gateway is referred to as the *coordinator* throughout the protocol. To initiate the transfer, the coordinator sends an *mp-satp-init* message containing the relevant context (ctx) to all the gateways involved in the asset transfer.

The protocol is further divided into two phases, assimilating with two-phase commit protocols: the *prepare* and *completion* phases. For clarity, we divide the *completion* phase into the *commit* and *rollback* phases according to the result of the *prepare* phase. Note that in the worst-case scenario, every client application requests its local gateway to initiate MP-SATP, however, the *prepare* phase guarantees that only one can be run successfully.

1) **Prepare Phase:** The coordinator is responsible for initiating an MP-SATP session with every source gateway G_S in the asset transfers list \mathcal{E}_2 , through a *mp-satp-prepare* message. In Figure 2, G_4 sends a *mp-satp-prepare* to G_1 and G_3 , the source gateways in each cross-chain asset transfer. This first message includes the data necessary for each gateway to start its SATP 1-to-1 session with the corresponding counterparty gateway. This assimilates to the message sent by clients in a normal SATP 1-to-1 session when initiating a gateway-to-gateway interaction. Hence, after receiving the message, G_1 and G_3 initiate an SATP session with G_2 and G_4 , respectively. This can be translated into $G_1 \xrightarrow{satp} G_3$ and $G_2 \xrightarrow{satp} G_4$. At this point, we are under the assumptions of SATP and its crash recovery mechanism, i.e., if there is a crash in one gateway the crash recovery procedure is executed, or in the worst case scenario the rollback. These gateways run SATP only until the end of phase 2, the Lock-Evidence Verification Flow. Every a_i in \mathcal{E}_2 should be locked in the corresponding source blockchains, which marks the end of the *prepare* phase. To indicate their readiness to proceed to the next phase, each source gateway in every SATP session acknowledges

the coordinator, which gathers a set of *mp-satp-prepare-ack* responses with a boolean indicating the success or failure of the initial stage. If every gateway responds positively, the *commit phase* is initiated, otherwise, the *rollback phase*.

2) **Commit Phase:** If MP-SATP reaches the *commit phase*, every SATP session is ready to commit. Committing in a SATP session corresponds to deleting the locked asset in the source chain, and creating a representation of that asset in the target one. Therefore, the coordinator sends a *mp-satp-commit* message to every client gateway in \mathcal{E}_2 . In each SATP session, the third (and last) phase is run. After the completion, a final *mp-satp-commit-ack* message is sent to the coordinator stating the success of the cross-chain transfer. Upon receiving a success message from every 1-to-1 SATP session, the coordinator can return to the client.

Note that the only reason why we need the first *mp-satp-init* message is for the recipient gateways (i.e., \mathcal{G}_2) to have knowledge of the initiation of the transfer and accept incoming SATP transfers according to the context provided by the client.

3) **Rollback Phase:** When MP-SATP reaches the *rollback phase*, at least one SATP session is not ready to commit. The coordinator sends a *mp-satp-rollback* message, which initiates the rollback in each SATP session. This includes issuing transactions that have the inverse effect of those that have previously been issued (e.g., if the asset was previously locked in the source blockchain, a transaction unlocking it must be issued to guarantee a consistent state across blockchains).

The communication between the coordinator gateway and every other gateway is done through the exchange of MP-SATP messages, whose format is specified in the following box.

MP-SATP Message Format

- 1) **Version:** MP-SATP protocol version;
- 2) **Message Type:** message schema (e.g., *urn:ietf:mp-satp:msgtype:mp-satp-prepare*);
- 3) **Context ID:** unique MP-SATP session identifier;
- 4) **MP-SATP Phase:** the current phase of the protocol (init, prepare, commit, rollback);
- 5) **Sequence Number:** an increasing counter that uniquely represents a message from a session;
- 6) **Coordinator Gateway ID:** the public key of the coordinator;
- 7) **Recipient Gateway ID:** the public key of the gateway interacting with the coordinator;
- 8) **Payload:** any necessary payload, including the profiles of the assets subject to transfer;
- 9) **Message Hash:** the cryptographic hash of this message;
- 10) **Signature:** the signature of this message;

IV. ENHANCING SATP CRASH RECOVERY

Given that our protocol is built on top of SATP, we also propose an enhancement to its crash recovery mechanism, directly impacting the guarantees of our solution. HERMES [27]

proposed a crash fault-tolerant protocol for SATP. The authors of the paper assume that any gateway recovers from crashes within a defined bound of time, but in case of severe malfunctions (e.g., hardware failure), it might not be possible to recover within the defined amount of time, compromising atomicity. We remove the assumption that no gateway will ever crash indefinitely, and introduce backup gateways that are capable of resuming the execution of protocol on behalf of the crashed. Hence, we propose an extension to the existing protocol, where the main goal is to define *how a backup gateway can build trust with the counterparty's gateway to resume the execution of the protocol*.

A. Data Replication

To guarantee that a gateway can resume the execution of a SATP session, it needs to be up-to-date with the latest logs. The log storage infrastructure can be either centralized (e.g., locally or in the cloud) or decentralized (e.g., an IPFS network). Either way, given the possibility of dealing with private information, data must not be stored in cloud providers or IPFS networks unencrypted. To avoid the leakage of this information, we leverage a primary-secondary scheme in which the primary gateway replicates log entries to all the backup gateways, and only the hashes of the logs are published to these platforms for integrity checks and eventual auditabilities.

B. Protocol Description

To demonstrate the solution, we assume only one SATP session, given by $\mathcal{G}_1 \xrightarrow{\text{satp}} \mathcal{G}_3$. The proposed enhancement is based on X.509 certificates, therefore, we consider that every gateway has a valid X.509 certificate that was issued by its owner – the entity legally responsible for the gateway. Moreover, in the *extensions* field of the certificate, there is a list containing the hash of the authorized backup gateways. Assuming \mathcal{G}'_1 and \mathcal{G}''_1 backup gateways for \mathcal{G}_1 , the *extensions* field of \mathcal{G}_1 's X.509 certificate is given by $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{G}_1} = [\mathcal{H}(\text{Cert}(\mathcal{G}'_1)), \mathcal{H}(\text{Cert}(\mathcal{G}''_1))]$, where $\mathcal{H}(m)$ represents the cryptographic hash of m , and $\text{Cert}(\mathcal{G})$ represents the X.509 certificate for gateway \mathcal{G} .

As mentioned in Section III-A, if \mathcal{G}_1 does not send any message for δ_t , \mathcal{G}'_1 assumes the crash of \mathcal{G}_1 . To avoid rollbacks, \mathcal{G}'_1 contacts \mathcal{G}_3 before δ_{rollback} to resume the execution of the open SATP session. The main issue here is how \mathcal{G}_3 knows that \mathcal{G}'_1 is authorized to replace \mathcal{G}_1 and resume the execution of the protocol. The solution proposed is based on three validations conducted by \mathcal{G}_3 :

- 1) The certificate of \mathcal{G}'_1 must be valid – checked by running a certification path validation algorithm [28], which includes validating all the intermediate certificates up to a trusted root.
- 2) the parent certificate of both \mathcal{G}_1 and \mathcal{G}'_1 certificates is the same. In other words, both certificates must have been issued by the same institution, which proves they belong to the same legal entity.
- 3) \mathcal{G}'_1 's certificate hash belongs to the list specified in \mathcal{G}_1 's certificate extensions, which indicates a set of gateways that are eligible to be the backup gateway in the case of

a crash – i.e., $\mathcal{H}(\text{Cert}(\mathcal{G}'_1)) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{G}_1}$. This is set by each entity when issuing a certificate for a gateway.

V. USE CASE: USING PROMISSORY NOTES

We present a supply chain use case that would benefit from the implementation of our proposals, where multiple parties engage in a multi-party asset transfer.

A promissory note can be defined as a promise “*made by one or more persons to another, engaging to pay a certain sum of money subject to certain requirements as to the promise*” [29]. Replacement bills or notes issued by central banks can be substituted and must be signed by the promisor [30]. Recent advances in the financial industry have focused on the digitalization of promissory notes and their integration into blockchains, given that paper promissory notes are hard to track and require hand signatures [31], [32]. Furthermore, the concept of promissory notes or similar financial instruments in the interoperability of the blockchain-based on gateways was already proposed by [15], [27], [32].

As we have been remarking through this paper, gateway-based interoperability solutions fit in the permissioned environment of enterprise solutions. Gateways are identified entities within an organization and comply with the existing regulations/legal frameworks imposed by the organization’s home jurisdiction, making them suitable for this use case. We, therefore, present an example where a gateway-to-gateway protocol provides the building blocks for inter-jurisdiction asset transfers.

We leverage the example provided by [27] and extend it to realize an N-to-N atomic cross-jurisdiction asset transfer, using MP-SATP. The base example consists of two entities, a Producer (P) that sells goods to a Wholesaler (W). P issues an invoice for value V to W, which should be paid in a maximum of 90 days. Since P might not want to wait 90 days for the payment, it can request a promissory note stating that W will pay V to P in 90 days. This promissory note can now be sold by P to a third party.

Gateways can facilitate the transfer of promissory notes between different jurisdictions while abiding by the regulations on each end. Given this base illustration, we extend it to demonstrate MP-SATP in a similar supply chain example, as depicted in Figure 4. Two wholesalers – W_1 and W_2 – form a consortium that, among other products sold individually, sells products in partnership. W_1 and W_2 depend on the products sold by two producers – P_1 and P_2 – respectively.

When P_1 sells goods to W_1 , P_1 issues an invoice for value V_1 , and requests a promissory note PN_1 stating the debt. The same happens between P_2 and W_2 , with respect to a value V_2 .

Given that W_1 and W_2 depend on one another to sell their final products, W_1 might not want to go into debt (buying and issuing a PN_1 to P_1) unless W_2 also buys the necessary amount of goods from P_2 . We can therefore represent this problem as two independent asset transfers that need to be performed atomically: $W_1 \xrightarrow{PN_1} P_1$, and $W_2 \xrightarrow{PN_2} P_2$.

Considering \mathcal{G}_{P1} as P_1 ’s gateway, \mathcal{G}_{P2} as P_2 ’s gateway, \mathcal{G}_{W1} as W_1 ’s gateway, and \mathcal{G}_{W2} as W_2 ’s gateway, we can




Fig. 4. Producer 1, Producer 2, Wholesaler 1, and Wholesaler 2 engaging in a multiparty asset transfer using MP-SATP.

leverage MP-SATP to perform multi-party cross-jurisdiction asset transfers $\mathcal{G}_{W1} \xrightarrow{satp} \mathcal{G}_{P1}$ and $\mathcal{G}_{W2} \xrightarrow{satp} \mathcal{G}_{P2}$, atomically.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We implement MP-SATP in Hyperledger Cacti [33] in the form of a business logic plugin. We also develop the core SATP plugin and its crash recovery mechanism, given that our work is dependent on them. The total implementation reaches approximately 30k lines (including tests) of code and is expected to be merged into the main code base of the project shortly. Furthermore, we present an initial evaluation of our proposals, including the overall latency of MP-SATP with asset transfers between Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Besu networks. Finally, we show the performance gained through our primary-backup solution.

A. Hyperledger Cacti

Cacti is a project under the Hyperledger ecosystem. It allows users to make an adaptable and secure integration of different blockchains and provides a pluggable architecture that enables the execution of ledger operations across as many blockchains as needed. It leverages ledger connectors that serve as APIs to the underlying ledgers. One major advantage of using Cacti is that it is capable of handling the integration of both public and private blockchains. At the date of writing, the project has more than 2.5 million lines of code, 273 stars, and 230 forks on GitHub.

B. Architecture

We present a simplified architecture of the solution in Figure 5. Cacti offers support for API Servers, that receive a list of plugins – a plugin registry – and expose the endpoints provided by those plugins. Communication between clients is performed off-chain. In this implementation, each gateway is represented by a business logic plugin (SATP plugin) that has multiple connections: 1) the local database to store logs generated by the execution of the protocol; 2) an IPFS connector to an IPFS network, which is used as decentralized log storage to guarantee availability and integrity of the logs; 3) ledger connectors that make possible the interaction with the underlying blockchains in the form of transactions. Each gateway has a different blockchain connector, providing interfaces for different blockchains.

We enhanced the SATP plugin and developed from scratch the MP-SATP plugin. The latter directly connects to the SATP




Fig. 5. MP-SATP and SATP Implementation architecture in Hyperledger Cacti. We represent in green our contributions. We leverage the Hyperledger Besu connector and the IPFS connector available in Cacti.

plugin that initiates 1-to-1 transfers. The MP-SATP plugin contains the logic for every stage of the protocol specified in Section III, and its algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 1. i stands for the index in the array \mathcal{E}_2 , and t for every asset transfer tuple. Recall from Section III-C that each asset transfer in \mathcal{E}_2 is represented as $(\mathcal{C}_S, \mathcal{C}_R, \mathcal{G}_S, \mathcal{G}_R, a)$.

Algorithm 1: MP-SATP algorithm

Input: \mathcal{E}_2
Result: True
 $numberTransfers \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_2.length();$
 $prepareResponses \leftarrow [0..numberTransfers];$
foreach $(i, t) \in \mathcal{E}_2$ **do**
 $prepareResponses[i] \leftarrow t.\mathcal{G}_S.initSATPAsync(t)$
 $wait();$ // wait for every response
for $i \leftarrow 0$ **to** $numberTransfers$ **do**
 if $prepareResponses[i] \neq true$ **then**
 foreach $t \in \mathcal{E}_2$ **do**
 $t.\mathcal{G}_S.rollbackSATPAsync(t);$
 $wait();$ // wait for every rollback
 return False;
 foreach $t \in \mathcal{E}_2$ **do**
 $t.\mathcal{G}_S.commitSATPAsync(t)$
 $wait();$ // wait for every commit
return True;

C. Testing Environment

All tests were run in a Google Cloud Compute Engine VM instance composed of 4 vCPUs, and 20 GB of memory, having a Boot Disk mounted using an Ubuntu 20.04 image, and a 100 GB SSD. As mentioned in Section VI, we leverage a Besu and a Fabric connector in Cacti. Hence, for testing purposes, we utilized the respective all-in-one Docker images available in Docker Hub. Every result presented in this section is the average of 100 independent runs.

D. MP-SATP Evaluation

We evaluate the protocol in two experiments using at most 10 different networks, given the constraints of running multiple blockchains in a single machine. We start by creating an MP-SATP session composed of 5 asset transfers




Fig. 6. (a) latency of running a single SATP session between Besu networks; (b) latency of running MP-SATP transferring 5 assets between Besu networks; (c) latency of running a single SATP session between a Fabric and a Besu network; (d) latency of running MP-SATP transferring 5 assets: 4 between Besu networks and 1 between a Fabric and a Besu network.

between Hyperledger Besu networks. Figure 6 (a) depicts the latency of one 1-to-1 SATP session between two different Besu networks; Figure 6 (b) depicts the latency of one MP-SATP session composed of 5 asset transfers between different Besu networks. The MP-SATP session has a slight overhead compared to the single 1-to-1 session, which is caused by the communication between the coordinator and every participant. The *prepare phase* in MP-SATP takes around one more second than phases 1 and 2 together in a single SATP session because the coordinator waits for all SATP sessions to return before sending the *mp-satp-commit* message. We hypothesize that the overall latency will always be tied to the latency of the slowest SATP session – i.e., with the highest latency.

In the second experiment, we replaced one of the 5 SATP transfers between Besu networks with an asset transfer between Fabric and Besu, to observe the change in the overall latency. Figure 6 (c) depicts the latency of one 1-to-1 SATP session between a Fabric and a Besu network. Transactions take longer to be confirmed in the Fabric network, which explains the difference to Figure 6 (a)). To confirm our previous hypothesis, we run MP-SATP where 4 transfers are still between Besu networks, and one is between a Fabric and a Besu network. Figure 6 (d) confirms our hypothesis.

These findings lead us to the predicted conclusion that the latency of such a protocol is strongly related to the confirmation times of the ledgers – i.e., the SATP session with the highest latency drives the total latency of an MP-SATP session. Formally, the latency of an MP-SATP session is given by $\max([Lat(\mathcal{E}_2^1), Lat(\mathcal{E}_2^2), \dots, Lat(\mathcal{E}_2^n)])$, where $Lat(\mathcal{E}_2^i)$ is the latency of the i^{th} cross-chain asset transfer in \mathcal{E}_2 .

E. SATP's Crash Recovery Enhancement

To understand the importance of our contribution to SATP's crash recovery mechanism through the primary-backup mode, we analyze the worst-case scenario with and without our solution. The worst-case scenario is a crash happening at the end of SATP's last phase, which would require triggering the




Fig. 7. Latency of an SATP session having a source gateway crash. When our proposal is not implemented, both gateways rollback – i.e., every action is reverted. When using backup gateways, one resumes the execution of the protocol upon crash of the original one – i.e., the result is the asset being successfully transferred to the target chain.

rollback procedures. Firstly, we ran SATP without our solution. We simulated the crash of the source gateway and let the target gateway timeout, triggering the rollback procedure. We set it to 9 seconds – i.e., $\delta_{rollback} = 9sec$. When the crashed gateway recovers, it learns the rollback performed by the other gateway through the recovery procedure and rolls back as well.

In the second experiment we simulate the crash of the source gateway, however, this time we ensure there is a backup gateway that resumes the execution of the protocol right after $\delta_t = 5sec$ (before $\delta_{rollback}$). The backup gateway, up to date with the logs, only needs to run the recovery procedure and continue the execution of the protocol. Given that we simulate the crash in the last messages exchanged by gateways, as soon as the recovery procedure terminates, the protocol terminates as well. Without our proposal, the protocol terminates as it started (because all transactions were reverted) and takes, on average, around 46.3 seconds. With backup gateways, no rollback shall ever be triggered due to gateway crashes, and the asset is successfully transferred to the target chain taking, on average, 25 seconds. The results are depicted in Figure 7. Choosing the right parameters δ_t and $\delta_{rollback}$ is critical for the success of this proposal. The difference between timeouts ($\delta_{rollback} - \delta_t$) must be enough for a backup gateway to retrieve the stored logs, reconstruct the SATP session, and send the initial recovery message to the counterparty gateway, to avoid the latter to rollback.

VII. RELATED WORK

Polkadot [34] and Cosmos [35] enable the interconnection of different chains through the Cross-Chain Message Passing Protocol (XCMP) [36], and the Inter-Blockchain Communication protocol (IBC) [37], respectively. XCMP enables the interoperation with more than two heterogeneous blockchains. However, IBC can only interoperate with up to two heterogeneous blockchains. These solutions can only interoperate blockchains in the same ecosystem, limiting communication

with other solutions. Contrarily, MP-SATP is blockchain agnostic – it can interoperate any pair of networks.

Herlihy [10] proposed multi-party atomic cross-chain swaps using HTLCs; however, his scheme requires additional assumptions. The authors model a swap as a strongly connected directed acyclic graph: vertexes are parties, and arcs are asset transfers. The solution requires 1) a specific deployment order of smart contracts, 2) there can not be a cycle in the graph of transactions, and 3) it cannot guarantee that an honest party does not lose its assets in case of a temporary crash. MP-SATP guarantees the ACID properties. ACW³N [38] appears as a solution for some of these issues with the introduction of a witness network that stores the protocol state, changed once a multi-signature from all involved parties is submitted. Lilac [13] proposed a multi-party asset exchange scheme where assets can be locked in parallel. These solutions, contrary to MP-SATP, are not compatible with permissioned blockchains unless every party involved in the swap has been granted access to every network beforehand. Luo et al. [39] suggest an inter-blockchain architecture for routing management and transfer of messages between blockchains that requires a third-party blockchain. Wang et al. [14] also leverage 2PC to conduct transactions across N blockchains. However, if the coordinator crashes, atomicity is only guaranteed through the assumption that eventually a new coordinator will be elected. In the worst-case scenario, our protocol guarantees atomicity through the rollback of every state change. [14] presents a centralized component that performs actions in multiple blockchains based on a 2PC.

Some solutions also leverage Trusted Execution Environments [40]–[42] to perform cross-chain transactions, but they are limited to only two blockchains. These solutions provide more security guarantees in the relayers but lack scalability guarantees due to the physical restrictions imposed by the trusted hardware.

VIII. CONCLUSION

To address the multi-party asset transfer problem focused on permissioned environments, this paper proposes MP-SATP, a protocol based on a 2PC to ensure coordination between the various entities and built on top of the SATP. MP-SATP launches and coordinates multiple SATP sessions on multiple fungible or non-fungible assets agreed upon by the clients. We also improved the SATP crash recovery procedure, in the primary-backup mode. From the implementation and evaluation of our proposals, we show that MP-SATP guarantees atomicity and finality properties. Additionally, using gateways, one can guarantee the auditability of transfers of assets performed between gateways and compliance with legal frameworks. We also present a supply chain use case that would benefit from these new proposals as an application using protocols under standardization.

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