## Proactive Computer Security Stack Vulnerabilities

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## Disclaimer

I played DEFCON CTF Quals all weekend.
I may not make any sense.

History Stack Basics Calling Convention Overwriting Values

Local variables and flow control values (return addresses) are stored on the stack.

If one local variable is a buffer, and we can trick the program to write outside this buffer, we might be able to take control of the process.

In the 1980s some clever people figured out that buffer overflows were security vulnerabilities.

In 1988 the first automated mass-exploitation of a stack buffer overflow happened.

During the 1990s there was a growing interest in this class of bugs, culminating in November 1996 with Aleph1's article "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit."

Developers keep making vulnerable software, even today, and attackers keep exploiting these vulnerabilities.

History
Stack Basics
Calling Conventions
Overwriting Values

## Quick brush up

On Intel 80386 the stack grows "down" – from higher addresses to lower.

The stack pointer (ESP) points to the last value pushed onto the stack.

The base pointer (EBP) is usually used as a reference ("base address") when accessing arguments and local variables in a function.

The most common calling convention is **cdecl**.

Arguments are passed to functions on the stack. They are pushed right to left.

The stack is cleaned up by the caller.

```
This C code:

myfunc(1, 2, 3);
```

May generate this assembly code:

```
push 3
push 2
push 1
call myfunc
add esp, 12
```

```
This C code:
```

May generate this assembly code:

$$\mathsf{ESP} o \ldots$$

May generate this assembly code:

May generate this assembly code:

ESP 
$$\rightarrow$$
03 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00

May generate this assembly code:

May generate this assembly code:

May generate this assembly code:

```
This C code:

myfunc(1, 2, 3);
```

May generate this assembly code:

```
push 3 push 2 push 1 push 1 call myfunc add esp, 12 ESP 	o \dots
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
    int x, y;
    . . .
       push ebp
       mov ebp, esp
       sub esp, 8
       mov esp, ebp
       pop ebp
       ret
                                                         FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
      int x, y;
\mathsf{EIP} 	o \mathsf{push} \; \mathsf{ebp}
         mov ebp, esp
          sub esp, 8
         mov esp, ebp
          pop ebp
          ret
                                                                      FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
      . . .
        push ebp
\mathsf{EIP} 	o 	exttt{mov ebp, esp}
         sub esp, 8
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
                                                                 FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
      int x, y;
          push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{sub} \; \mathsf{esp}, 8
          mov esp, ebp
          pop ebp
          ret
                                                                      FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
        push ebp
        mov ebp, esp
        sub esp, 8
\mathsf{EIP} \to \dots
                                   EBP
        mov esp, ebp
        pop ebp
        ret
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
        push ebp
        mov ebp, esp
        sub esp, 8
\mathsf{EIP} \to \dots
                                   EBP
        mov esp, ebp
        pop ebp
        ret
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
        push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 8
\mathsf{EIP} 	o 	exttt{mov esp, ebp}
                                    EBP
        pop ebp
         ret
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 8
         mov esp, ebp
\mathsf{EIP} 	o \mathsf{pop} ebp
         ret
                                                                 FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
     int x, y;
     . . .
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 8
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{ret}
                                                                  FableTech
```

```
void myfunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
    int x, y;
    . . .
       push ebp
       mov ebp, esp
       sub esp, 8
       mov esp, ebp
       pop ebp
       ret
                                                         FableTech
```

```
int x, y;
            03 00 00 00 | [EBP+0x10] = third argument
                                     [EBP+0x0C] = second argument
                                     [EBP+0x08] = first argument
EBP → DD CC BB AA return address saved EBP

XX XX XX XX XX [EBP-0x04] = first local variable YY YY YY YY [EBP-0x08] = second local variable . . . .
```

History Stack Basics Calling Conventions Overwriting Values

```
char buf[8];
```

```
char buf[8];
```

• What is the lowest legal index into buf?

```
char buf[8];
```

- What is the lowest legal index into buf?
- What is the highest legal index into buf?

```
char buf[8];
```

- What is the lowest legal index into buf?
- What is the highest legal index into buf?
- What happens if we write outside of that range?

```
/* Very bad code */
char buf[8];
memset(buf, 'A', 8);
```

```
/* Very bad code */
char buf[8];
memset(buf, 'A', 8);
/* Bad code */
#define SIZE 8
char buf[SIZE];
memset(buf, 'A', SIZE);
```

```
/* Very bad code */
char buf[8];
memset(buf, 'A', 8);
/* Bad code */
#define STZE 8
char buf[SIZE];
memset(buf, 'A', SIZE);
/* Good code */
char buf[8];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
```

```
/* This is bad */
void myfunc(char *buf)
{
    memset(buf, 'A', 8);
}
char buf[8];
myfunc(buf);
```

```
/* This will not work */
void myfunc(char buf[8])
{
    memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
}
char buf[8];
myfunc(buf);
```

```
/* And nor will this */
typedef char buffer[8];
void myfunc(buffer buf)
{
    memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
}
buffer buf:
myfunc(buf);
```

```
/* This will work */
struct buffer {
    char b[8];
};
void myfunc(struct buffer *buf)
{
    memset(buf->b, 'A', sizeof(buf->b));
}
struct buffer buf;
myfunc(&buf);
```

```
/* And so will this */
void myfunc(char *buf, size_t size)
{
    memset(buf, 'A', size);
}
char buf[8];
myfunc(buf, sizeof(buf));
```

```
/* Is this safe? */
int i;
char buf[16];
sprintf(buf, "%d", i);
```

```
/* Is this safe? */
int i;
char buf[16]:
sprintf(buf, "%d", i);
/* No, but this is */
int i;
char buf[16];
if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", i) >= sizeof(buf)) {
    /* abort */
```

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History Stack Basics Calling Conventions Overwriting Values

## Question

What does snprintf return?

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## Question

What does snprintf return?

Is this correct?

snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", i) >= sizeof(buf)

History Stack Basics Calling Conventions Overwriting Values

```
$ man snprintf
...
```

The functions snprintf() and vsnprintf() do not write more than 'size' bytes (including the terminating null byte ('\0')). If the output was truncated due to this limit, then the return value is the number of characters (excluding the terminating null byte) which would have been written to the final string if enough space had been available. Thus, a return value of 'size' or more means that the output was truncated.

. . .

```
int x;

char b[8];

...

EIP \rightarrow b[0] = 0x41; EBP \rightarrow 88 88 FF BF

b[1] = 0x41; XX XX XX XX

b[7] = 0x41; BB BB BB BB

b[8] = 0x41; ...
```

```
int x;

char b[8];

...

b[0] = 0x41;

EIP \rightarrow b[1] = 0x41;

...

b[7] = 0x41;

b[8] = 0x41;

...
```

```
int x; char b[8]; ... DD CC BB AA  
b[0] = 0x41; EBP \rightarrow 88 88 FF BF  
xx xx xx xx xx  
b[1] = 0x41; BB BB BB BB  
b[7] = 0x41; 41 BB BB  
b[8] = 0x41; ...
```

```
int x;

char b[8];

...

b[0] = 0x41;

b[1] = 0x41;

...

EIP \rightarrow b[7] = 0x41;

b[8] = 0x41;

...
```

```
int x;
char b[8];
...
b[0] = 0x41;
b[1] = 0x41;
...
b[7] = 0x41;
b[8] = 0x41;

EBP 

EBP 

DD CC BB AA
88 88 FF BF
41 XX XX XX
41 41 41 41
41 41 41
41 41 41
...
EIP 

EIP 

...
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...
EBP →
uid = 0x99;
EIP → strcpy(buffer,
"AAAAAAAAAAA");
"ABB BB BB
...
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...
EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF
uid = 0x99;
EIP → strcpy(buffer,
"AAAAAAAAAAA");
"AAAAAAAAAAA");
...
UD CC BB AA
88 88 FF BF
99 00 00 00
BB BB BB BB
41 41 BB BB
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA"); BB BB BB

... H1 41 41 BB
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... EBP → 99 00 00 00

41 BB BB BB

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... UD CC BB AA

88 88 FF BF

99 00 00 00

41 41 BB BB

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41 BB

41 41 41 41 ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41

... ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41 ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41

... ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41

... ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 00 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAAAA");

EIP → ... EBP → 100 CC BB AA

00 88 FF BF

41 41 41 41

41 41 41 41

41 41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...
EBP →
uid = 0x99;
EIP → strcpy(buffer,
"AAAAAAAAA");
BB BB BB BB
...
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...
EBP →
uid = 0x99;
EIP → strcpy(buffer,
"AAAAAAAAA");
...
BBP →
BB BB BB
BB BB
BB
A1 41 41 BB
...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAA");

... 41 BB BB BB

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 BB BB

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41

41 41 41

41 41 41
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAAA");

EIP → ... EBP → 41 00 00 00

41 41 41 41

41 41 41 41
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...

DD CC BB AA

88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,
 "AAAAAAAA");

HB BB BB

1...
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];
...
EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF
uid = 0x99;
EIP → strcpy(buffer,
"AAAAAAAA");
"AAAAAAAA");
"AAAAAAAA");
...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → BR 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAA");

... 41 41 41 BB

41 41 41 41 ...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

strcpy(buffer,

"AAAAAAAA");

EIP → ... EBP → ...
```

```
int uid;
char buffer[8];

EIP → ... EBP → 88 88 FF BF
uid = 0x99;
strcpy(buffer,
"aaaaaaaabbbbccccAAAAA");
BB BB BB BB
...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"aaaaaaaabbbbccccAAAA"); 61 61 61 61

...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 88 88 FF BF

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"aaaaaaaabbbbccccAAAA");

... 61 61 61

61 61 61 61

...
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 63 63 63 63

uid = 0x99;

EIP → strcpy(buffer,

"aaaaaaaabbbbccccAAAA");

... 61 61 61

61 61 61 61
```

```
int uid;

char buffer[8];

... EBP → 63 63 63 63

uid = 0x99;

strcpy(buffer,

"aaaaaaaabbbbccccAAAA");

EIP → ... 61 61 61

...
```

Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP Return Addresses Mitigations Format String Vulnerabilities


Classic Return Address Overwrite Windows Structured Exception Handling Off-by-One Into EBP Coffee Break


```
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x41414141 in ?? () (gdb)
```


# Windows Structured Exception Handling


When an exception occurs in Windows, a linked list of exception handlers is walked, in an attempt to find one that will handle the exception.


The list elements – SEH frames – are normally stored on the stack. If an attacker can overwrite an SEH frame and later cause an exception, she can control EIP.






















## Off-by-One Into EBP


If an attacker can control (some bits of) EBP, she can "slide" the stack frame around, so the return address is read from a position on the stack the attacker controls.


A buffer overflow in a function might allow an attacker to overwrite (part of) the *saved EBP*. This value is restored before returning, giving the attacker control of the stack frame of the *calling function*, rather than the vulnerable function itself.




```
f0:
push 0x11223344
 call f1
 mov esp, ebp
 pop ebp
 ret
f1:
 push ebp
 mov ebp, esp
 sub esp, 0x100
 ; overflow
 mov esp, ebp
 pop ebp
 ret
```









f0: push 0x11223344 call f1 mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret f1:  $\mathsf{EIP} \to$ push ebp mov ebp, esp sub esp, 0x100 ; overflow mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret FableTech




f0: push 0x11223344 call f1 mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret f1: push ebp  $\mathsf{EIP} \to$ mov ebp, esp sub esp, 0x100 ; overflow mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret FableTech




f0: push 0x11223344 call f1 mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret f1: push ebp mov ebp, esp  $\mathsf{EIP} \to$ sub esp, 0x100 ; overflow mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret FableTech




```
f0:
         push 0x11223344
         call f1
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
        f1:
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 0x100
\mathsf{EIP} \to
          ; overflow
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
                          FableTech
```




f0: push 0x11223344 call f1 mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret f1: push ebp mov ebp, esp sub esp, 0x100 ; overflow  $\mathsf{EIP} \to$ mov esp, ebp pop ebp ret FableTech





```
f0:
         push 0x11223344
         call f1
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
        f1:
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 0x100
          ; overflow
         mov esp, ebp
\mathsf{EIP} \to
         pop ebp
         ret
                          FableTech
```




```
f0:
          push 0x11223344
          call f1
          mov esp, ebp
          pop ebp
          ret
        f1:
         push ebp
          mov ebp, esp
          sub esp, 0x100
          ; overflow
          mov esp, ebp
          pop ebp
\mathsf{EIP} \to
          ret
                          FableTech
```







```
f0:
         push 0x11223344
         call f1
         mov esp, ebp
\mathsf{EIP} \to
         pop ebp
         ret
        f1:
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 0x100
          ; overflow
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
```



```
f0:
         push 0x11223344
         call f1
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
\mathsf{EIP} \to
         ret
        f1:
         push ebp
         mov ebp, esp
         sub esp, 0x100
          ; overflow
         mov esp, ebp
         pop ebp
         ret
```

Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP Return Addresses Mitigations Format String Vulnerabilities

Classic Return Address Overwrite Windows Structured Exception Handling Off-by-One Into EBP Coffee Break

## Coffee Break

Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP **Return Addresses** Mitigations Format String Vulnerabilities

Return to Buffer Return to Library Return to Main Binary

We control EIP. What should we set it to, in order to get our shellcode executed?

Directly returning to the buffer used to be *the* way to do it. The stack was at 0xC0000000 and down.

Environment variables are also placed on the stack, and used to be a good location to store shellcode, at least in local exploits.

That was before ASLR. Today the stack is moved around, and we need to guess the address of our buffer, reducing the reliability of the exploit.

Code sections in libraries are useful return addresses. If you know the address of a library, you can misuse the opcodes there, to pass control to your shellcode.

Often you have a register pointing at — or close to — your stack buffer. ESP always points close to the buffer.

If you can find a JMP <reg> or CALL <reg> you can use that to change EIP, and run your shellcode; Even if you don't know the absolute address.

If you can not find all the code you need in one place, you need to build it from tiny code sequences from different places in the library. This is called **return chaining** or **Return Oriented Programming**.

With a big overflow – where you can write far up the stack – you can build a number of fake stack frames. Each frame will have a return address of the next piece of code (called **gadgets**) that you want executed.

; vulnerable function EIP  $\rightarrow$  080484A9 ret

; second ROP gadget 080486D7 call eax

; vulnerable function 080484A9 ret

; first ROP gadget ... D7 86 04 08 08048528 pop esi ESP 
$$\rightarrow$$
 08048529 ret

; second ROP gadget 080486D7 call eax

; vulnerable function 080484A9 ret

; first ROP gadget ... D7 86 04 08 EIP 
$$\rightarrow$$
 08048528 pop esi ESP  $\rightarrow$  41 41 41 41 08048529 ret

; second ROP gadget 080486D7 call eax

```
; vulnerable function 080484A9 ret
```

; first ROP gadget ... D7 86 04 08 08048528 pop esi EIP 
$$\rightarrow$$
 08048529 ret

; second ROP gadget 080486D7 call eax

```
; vulnerable function 080484A9 ret
```

; first ROP gadget ESP 
$$\rightarrow$$
 ... 08048526 mov eax, edx 08048529 pop esi 08048529 ret

; second ROP gadget EIP 
$$\rightarrow$$
 080486D7 call eax

If you need to jump to the address stored in EAX, there is more than one instruction that will do the trick.

Instructions like PUSHA and POPA are useful for setting or exchanging register values.

The C2 version of RET will add a word-value to ESP after removing the return address from the stack. This is useful if there is a pointer to the shellcode higher on the stack.

Remember: Unaligned code is still code — just not what the compiler had in mind.

One man's

BB 11 50 41 C3 mov ebx, 0xC3415011

is another man's

50 push eax
41 inc ecx
C3 ret

Return to Buffer Return to Library Return to Main Binary

In fact, text strings and icons are made of opcodes. Sometimes they are made of very useful opcodes. Be creative.

Return to Buffer Return to Library Return to Main Binary

The problem with return-to-library is ASLR. You have *no* idea where a library is mapped.

Another problem is reliability across system upgrades. Which version of *libc* is installed on the host?

Most programs must be loaded at a specific base address to function properly.

This is changing, but there is still time. . .

Most programs must be loaded at a specific base address to function properly.

This is changing, but there is still time. . .

We can do the same return-chaining tricks here, as we did with libraries, but we know the base address. This is highly reliable.

Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP **Return Addresses** Mitigations Format String Vulnerabilities

Return to Buffer Return to Library Return to Main Binary

We will go into more detail about ROP later in the course.

Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies

Even if programmers keep writing vulnerable code, the operating system and compiler vendors can help make these bugs unexploitable.

If attackers don't know where sections are placed in memory, they can't *reliably* use them.

It was popularized in 2001 by the PaX team and their Linux patch. It was later implemented in OpenBSD and Microsoft Windows.

Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP Return Addresses **Mitigations** Format String Vulnerabilities

Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies



Stack Buffer Overflows Controlling EIP Return Addresses **Mitigations** Format String Vulnerabilities

Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies



Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies

If the attacker places the shellcode on the stack, and the stack memory pages are not marked as executable, it won't execute.


If the attacker places the shellcode on the stack, and the stack memory pages are not marked as executable, it won't execute.


On Intel 80386 any page which is marked as readable is implicitly also executable.

If the attacker places the shellcode on the stack, and the stack memory pages are not marked as executable, it won't execute.

On Intel 80386 any page which is marked as readable is implicitly also executable.

One solution is to limit the **CS** so it doesn't overlap the stack.





Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies

But the heap, program data, and (some) library data is still left executable.

AMD64 allows pages to be mapped non-executable, even for 32 bit processes.

If a magic value is placed in memory next to a buffer, and that buffer is overflowed, the magic value is overwritten. When the value in memory does not match the magic value, the program is aborted.

Stack cookies were implemented in GCC in 1997 and in Microsoft Visual Studio in 2003.

#### Stack cookies are often referred to as stack canaries.



 $\mathsf{EBP} \to$ 

There are three kinds of stack cookies:

- Terminator cookie
- Random cookie
- XOR cookie

DD CC BB AA 88 88 FF BF ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ

There are three kinds of stack cookies:

Terminator cookie

Random cookie

XOR cookie

 $\mathsf{EBP} \to$ 

• • •								
03	00	00	00					
02	00	00	00					
01	00	00	00					
DD	CC	ВВ	AA					
88	88	FF	BF					
00	00	00	00					
YY	YY	YY	YY					
ZZ	ZZ	ZZ	ZZ					

Terminator

There are three kinds of stack cookies:

Terminator cookie

Random cookie

XOR cookie

 $\mathsf{EBP} \to$ 


• • •								
03	00	00	00					
02	00	00	00					
01	00	00	00					
DD	CC	ВВ	AA					
88	88	FF	BF					
7D	ВО	18	A2					
YY	YY	YY	YY					
ZZ	ZZ	ZZ	ZZ					

Random

 $\mathsf{EBP} \to$ 

There are three kinds of stack cookies:

- Terminator cookie
- Random cookie
- XOR cookie



XOR

```
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
                                               third argument
mov eax, [gs:0x14]
                                               second argument
mov [ebp-0x4], eax
                                               first argument
xor eax, eax
                                               return address
                                               saved EBP
mov edx, [ebp-0x4]
                                               stack cookie
xor edx, [gs:0x14]
                                               first local variable
ie +5
                                               second local variable
call __stack_chk_fail
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
```

ret

```
$ ./demo
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./demo terminated
====== Backtrace: ======
/lib32/libc.so.6(__fortify_fail+0x48)[0xf7744018]
/lib32/libc.so.6(__fortify_fail+0x0)[0xf7743fd0]
./demo[0x804848c]
/lib32/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x90)[0xf7677b00]
===== Memory map: ======
08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 00:12 9691032 /tmp/demo
08049000-0804a000 r--p 00000000 00:12 9691032 /tmp/demo
0804a000-0804b000 rw-p 00001000 00:12 9691032 /tmp/demo
f77e0000-f77e1000 rw-p 0001c000 08:01 131196
                                              /lib32...
ffcd6000-ffceb000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                              [stack]
Aborted
                                                    FableTech
```

Address Space Layout Randomization Non-executable Stack and Heap Stack Cookies

This is quite effective, but some functions are still exploitable. Sometimes pointers – or other important data – can be overwritten without destroying the stack cookie, or the data is used before the stack cookie is checked.

History Basic Format Strings Exploitation

The printf() family of functions require a format string as an argument. If we control this string, we control the target process.

History
Basic Format String
Exploitation

The first format string exploit was published by Tymm Twillman in 1999.

In the years after that, a lot of format string vulnerabilities were discovered.

Format strings are used to describe how printf() must format its output.

A percent character (%) begins a format sequence. Any other character is copied to the output.

# No Formatting

```
printf("AAAA");
```

AAAA

### Decimal Number

```
printf("%d", 123);
```

123

### Decimal Number

```
printf("%5d", 123);
```

\_\_123

### Decimal Number

```
printf("%05d", 123);
```

00123

### Hexadecimal Number

```
printf("%x", 123);
```

7b

## Hexadecimal Number

```
printf("%08x", 123);
```

0000007b

### String

```
printf("AAAA_%s_BBBB", "hello,_world");
```

AAAA\_hello,\_world\_BBBB

History Basic Format Strings Exploitation

```
Length
```

```
int i;
printf("AAAA%nBBBB", &i);
```

**AAAABBBB** 

# More Arguments

printf("AAAA\_%d\_BBBB\_4%d", 123, 456);

AAAA\_123\_BBBB\_456

## Swapping Arguments

```
printf("AAAAL%2$dLBBBBL%1$d", 123, 456);
```

AAAA\_456\_BBBB\_123

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);
EIP → ...

push 3

push 2

push 1

push 0x080484F0

call printf
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);

... ESP → ...

EIP → push 3
    push 2
    push 1
    push 0x080484F0
    call printf
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);

...

push 3

EIP → push 2

push 1

push 0x080484F0

call printf
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);

...

push 3

push 2

EIP → push 1

push 0x080484F0

call printf
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);

...

push 3

push 2

push 1

ESP → Dush 0x080484F0

call printf

...

03 00 00 00

02 00 00 00

01 00 00 00
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);

...

push 3

push 2

push 1

push 0x080484F0

EIP → call printf

...

03 00 00 00

02 00 00 00

01 00 00 00

F0 84 04 08
```

```
printf("%d %d %d", 1, 2, 3);
```

• • •					
push 3		03	00	00	00
push 2		02	00	00	00
push 1		01	00	00	00
push 0x080484F0		FO	84	04	80
call printf	$ESP \to$	1A	84	04	80

```
printf("%d %s %d", 1, "hello", 3);
```

```
push 3
push 0x080484F9
push 1
push 0x080484F0
call printf

Call print
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
\mathsf{EIP} \to \dots
                                                             \begin{array}{c|c} \mathsf{EBP} \to & \dots \\ \mathsf{ESP} \to & \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \end{array}
            mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
             push 3
             mov eax, [ebp-4]
             push eax
             push 1
             push 0x080484F0
             call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
 printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                                                      \begin{array}{c|c} \mathsf{EBP} \to & \dots \\ \mathsf{ESP} \to & \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \ \mathsf{XX} \end{array}
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{mov} \; [\mathsf{ebp}\text{-}4], \; \mathsf{0x}41414141
               push 3
               mov eax, [ebp-4]
               push eax
               push 1
               push 0x080484F0
               call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
        mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
EIP \rightarrow push 3
        mov eax, [ebp-4]
        push eax
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
        call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                           EBP \rightarrow | ... | 41 41 41 41 | 03 00 00 00
         mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
         push 3
\mathsf{EIP} 	o 	exttt{mov eax, [ebp-4]}
         push eax
         push 1
         push 0x080484F0
         call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                              EBP \rightarrow | ... | 41 41 41 41 | 03 00 00 00
          mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
          push 3
          mov eax, [ebp-4]
\mathsf{EIP} 	o \mathsf{push} \; \mathsf{eax}
          push 1
          push 0x080484F0
          call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                                 EBP \rightarrow ... 41 41 41 41 03 00 00 00 ESP \rightarrow 41 41 41 41
          mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
          push 3
          mov eax, [ebp-4]
          push eax
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{push} \ 1
          push 0x080484F0
          call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                                   EBP \rightarrow

41 41 41 41

03 00 00 00

41 41 41 41

01 00 00 00
          mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
           push 3
           mov eax, [ebp-4]
           push eax
          push 1
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{push} \ \mathsf{0x080484F0}
           call printf
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                     mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
        push 3
        mov eax, [ebp-4]
        push eax
        push 1
       push 0x080484F0
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{call} \; \mathsf{printf}
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                               mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
      push 3
      mov eax, [ebp-4]
      push eax
      push 1
      push 0x080484F0
      call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
\mathsf{EIP} \to \dots
        push 3
        lea eax, [ebp-4]
        push eax
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
        call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
EIP \rightarrow push 3
        lea eax, [ebp-4]
        push eax
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
        call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
                                        push 3
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{lea}\; \mathsf{eax}, [\mathsf{ebp}\text{-}4]
        push eax
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
        call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
                                      push 3
        lea eax, [ebp-4]
\mathsf{EIP} 	o \mathsf{push} \; \mathsf{eax}
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
        call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
                                  push 3
       lea eax, [ebp-4]
       push eax
\mathsf{EIP} 	o \mathsf{push} \ 1
       push 0x080484F0
       call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
                                push 3
       lea eax, [ebp-4]
       push eax
      push 1
EIP \rightarrow push 0x080484F0
       call printf
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
                                      push 3
        lea eax, [ebp-4]
        push eax
        push 1
        push 0x080484F0
\mathsf{EIP} \to \mathsf{call} \; \mathsf{printf}
```

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
```

	$EBP \to$				
push 3	$EAX \to$	XX	XX	XX	XX
lea eax, [ebp-4]		03	00	00	00
push eax		88	${\tt CF}$	FF	BF
push 1		01	00	00	00
push 0x080484F0		FO	84	04	80
call printf	$ESP \to$	1A	84	04	80

```
int i;
printf("%d %n %d", 1, &i, 3);
```

	$EBP \to$	
push 3	$EAX \to$	02 00 00 00
lea eax, [ebp-4]		03 00 00 00
push eax		88 CF FF BF
push 1		01 00 00 00
push 0x080484F0		F0 84 04 08
call printf	$ESP \to$	1A 84 04 08

Exploitation of a format string vulnerability requires two things:

- A format string controlled by the attacker
- A pointer, somewhere up the stack, to something the attacker wants to overwrite

An attacker can control a format string, if the programmer used printf() to print a string:

```
printf(str);
```

Another case is when the programmer used sprintf() or snprintf() to copy a string:

```
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
```

```
int i = 0x41414141;
printf("%d %d %d %d", 1, i, 3);
                                                       EBP \rightarrow

41 41 41 41

03 00 00 00

41 41 41 41

01 00 00 00

F0 84 04 08

ESP \rightarrow

1A 84 04 08
  mov [ebp-4], 0x41414141
  push 3
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  push eax
  push 1
  push 0x080484F0
  call printf
```

```
str = "":
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  BB BB BB BB
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                  10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA";
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  BB BB BB BB
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA";
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  41 BB BB BB
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA";
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  41 41 BB BB
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA";
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  41 41 41 BB
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA";
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
                                                  BB BB BB BB
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  41 41 41 41
                                                  XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                  C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                                  BB BB BB BB
                                                  BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                                  41 41 41 41
                                                 XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                                  YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                                  ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                                 C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                                 10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                                 72 25 FF BF
1A 84 04 08
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n";
char buf[16];
                                               BB BB BB BB
                                               BB BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n";
char buf[16];
                                               BB BB BB BB
                                               20 BB BB BB
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n";
char buf[16];
                                               BB BB BB BB
                                               20 20 BB BB
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               BB BB BB BB
                                               20 20 20 BB
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               BB BB BB BB
                                               20 20 20 20
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               20 BB BB BB
                                               20 20 20 20
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               20 20 BB BB
                                               20 20 20 20
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               20 20 20 BB
                                               20 20 20 20
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

```
str = "AAAA%1111638590x%4$n":
char buf[16];
                                               20 20 20 20
                                               20 20 20 20
int x, y, z;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
                                               41 41 41 41
                                               XX XX XX XX
   mov eax, [ebp+8]
                                               YY YY YY YY
   push eax
                                               ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ
   push 16
                                               C4 D3 FF BF
   lea eax, [ebp-16]
                                               10 00 00 00
   push eax
                                               72 25 FF BF
   call snprintf
```

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                                               20 20 20 20
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   lea eax, [ebp-16]
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   call snprintf
```

History Basic Format Strings Exploitation

## That's it. Have fun!