
Linux Device Management

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whoami



Devices

- "everything is a file": mimic I/O model of regular files
- can have optimized I/O methods (splice(), sendmsg() etc.)
- there are different types of devices
- created with the mknod() syscall
 - o int mknod(const char *pathname, mode t mode, dev t dev);
 - o rough call chain is vfs_mknod() and then down to the fs specific method (e.g. ext4_mknod())
- Linux standard devices: /dev/{full,null,random,tty,urandom,zero}

devtmpfs

- pseudo filesystem
- mounted at /dev
- kernel maintained
- modprobe kvm_intel
 ls -al /dev/kvm
 rmmod kvm_intel
 ls -al /dev/kvm
 modprobe kvm_intel
 ls -al /dev/kvm



udev

- userspace part of device management
- implementations: systemd-udevd, eudevd, ueventd
- manages permissions, symlinks, persistent device naming

uevents

- interesting bits are located in lib/kobject_uevent.c
- int kobject_uevent_env(struct kobject *kobj, enum kobject_action action, char *envp_ext[])
- static int kobject_uevent_net_broadcast(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_uevent_env *env,const char *action_string, const char *devpath)
 - This function won't be present from 4.18 onwards.
- KEY=<value> messages separated by \0-bytes using the following schema:
 <action>@<devpath>\0ACTION=<action>\0DEVPATH=<devpath>\0SUBSYSTEM=<subsystem>\0...\0SEQNUM0=<sepand=

Netlink

- socket protocol
- NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
 - o unprivileged socket protocol, i.e. everyone can listen to uevent messages



Containers: A userspace fiction

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiFWBhmFyOM




Containers, Devices, (time-permitting also SR-IOV)

- container do allow for easy device passthrough but few problems:
 - devtmpfs is not namespaced
 - devtmpfs not mountable in non-init user namespaces
 - missing CAP MKNOD
 - user namespaces
- privileged actions for unprivileged containers https://lwn.net/Articles/756233/

Namespacing Devices

- kernel solution: *namespacing devtmpfs and kobjects*
- userspace solution: namespace uevents/uevent injection
- mails required just to agree on an initial design:



Uevent Injection

- Things we can already do:
 - device injection: devtmpfs from userspace
- Status Quo
 - missing isolation: uevents broadcast into all network namespaces
 - wrong credentials: uevents ignored by udev
- Status new
 - o <u>isolation</u>: by owning user namespace of the network namespace a uevent socket resides in
 - o <u>credentials: per user-namespace credentials</u>
 - o <u>injection: sending uevents from userspace</u>

Future Work

- namespacing devtmpfs: #controversial
- seccomp from userspace
- remove global locking
 - o global lock on list of list
 - o <u>partially done in</u>



Demo Time