

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

DELIBERATION ON SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, FREEZE DATE: 5TH JAN, 1980.

BACKGROUND GUIDE

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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

GREETINGS DELEGATES,

WE ARE DELIGHTED TO WELCOME YOU TO THE HISTORIC SECURITY COUNCIL (HSC) AT TFSMUN 2025, WHERE WE ARE COMMITTED TO ENSURING A SMOOTH AND EFFICIENT COMMITTEE FLOW DURING THE TWO DAYS OF CONFERENCE.

AS THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, WE ARE EXCITED TO SEE YOU REPRESENT YOUR RESPECTIVE NATIONS AND WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP RESOLUTIONS AND FORM A CONSENSUS ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT THAT WE WILL BE DELIBERATING UPON.

AS A DELEGATE, YOU'LL BE PUTTING YOUR NEGOTIATION PROWESS, DIPLOMACY, CRITICAL THINKING ABILITIES, AND KNOWLEDGE OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS TO THE ULTIMATE TEST. ALONGSIDE THAT, YOU'LL HAVE YOUR HANDS FULL TACKLING MODERATED CAUCUSES DURING FORMAL SESSIONS TO HANDLING THE REST OF THE COMMITTEE DURING THE CHAOTIC UNMODERATED CAUCUSES.

IN ORDER TO PROVIDE YOU A SOLID GRASP OF THE AGENDA AND TO HELP YOU GET STARTED ON YOUR CONFERENCE RESEARCH, WE HAVE PUT TOGETHER THIS BACKGROUND GUIDE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU DO NOT USE THIS BACKGROUND GUIDE AS YOUR ONLY SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE'S RESEARCH. IT IS ADVISED THAT YOU USE THIS BACKGROUND GUIDE TO GAIN A FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING BEFORE EXPANDING YOUR KNOWLEDGE ON YOUR OWN THROUGH INDEPENDENT STUDY, WHICH WILL BE HELPFUL DURING THE CONFERENCE.

DELEGATES, PLEASE NOTE THAT IF YOU EVER FEEL OVERWHELMED WHILE READING THIS BACKGROUND GUIDE, PLEASE DON'T WORRY AND CONTACT YOUR CHAIRPERSON WHO WILL GLADLY HELP YOU IN UNDERSTANDING IN THESE MUN TERM EASILY. WE'LL ALSO BE HAVING AN ROP ONLINE MEETING SOMETIME BEFORE THE MUN TO HELP YOU DELEGATES WITH PREPARATIONS SO THAT YOUR QUERIES CAN BE RESOLVED

GOODLUCK, AND GODSPEED.

WARM REGARDS.

KAVIN GANESH R, CHAIRPERSON (CONTACT: 9361002092) TEJAS HARI, CHAIRPERSON (CONTACT: 9113088634)

WHAT IS THE UNSC?



THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, ARGUABLY ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL, AND INFLUENTIAL COMMITTEES IN THE UNITED NATIONS, IS TASKED WITH THE "PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" UNDER ARTICLE 24 (1) OF THE UN CHARTER. THE UNSC HAS 15 MEMBERS. WITH FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND 10 NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. EACH MEMBER HAS ONE VOTE. AND ALL MEMBER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE COUNCIL'S DECISIONS THROUGH ITS ABILITY TO LEGALLY BIND. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AIMS TO PEACEFULLY RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER VI OF THE UN CHARTER. WHICH AUTHORIZES THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CALL ON PARTIES TO SEEK SOLUTIONS VIA NEGOTIATION, ARBITRATION, OR OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS. FAILING THAT, CHAPTER VII EMPOWERS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE MORE ASSERTIVE ACTIONS, SUCH AS IMPOSING SANCTIONS OR **AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE "TO MAINTAIN OR RESTORE** INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY."

ROLL CALL

AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH SESSION AND UPON THE MOTION TO BEGIN ROLL CALL, CHAIRPERSONS SHALL CALL IN AN ALPHABETICAL ORDER ON ALL MEMBER STATES IN ORDER TO STATE THEIR STATUS OF ATTENDANCE. MEMBER STATES MAY REPLY "PRESENT" OR "PRESENT AND VOTING". REPRESENTATIVES STATING JUST "PRESENT AND VOTING" SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY VOTE ON ANY SUBSTANTIAL VOTING PROCEDURE, AND A DELEGATE WHO VOTES "PRESENT" MAY ABSTAIN FROM VOTING.

HOW TO RAISE IT: THE DELEGATE OF [PORTFOLIO] RAISES A MOTION TO BEGIN A ROLL CALL. NOTE: VOTING STANCE CAN BE CHANGED FROM "PRESENT" TO "PRESENT AND VOTING" THE NEXT TIME ROLL CALL IS BEING DONE IN THE NEXT SESSION/DAY. HOWEVER, IT CAN'T BE CHANGED FROM "PRESENT AND VOTING" TO "PRESENT".

GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST (GSL)

PROCEDURALLY, AFTER A ROLL CALL, INITIALLY IN THE SESSION, YOU START WITH THE GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST WHERE DELEGATES WILL BE RECOGNISED TO GIVE A 90 SECOND (THE TIME LIMIT CAN BE ALTERED BY A MOTION TO CHANGE THE SPEAKER'S TIME) SPEECH ENTAILING THE DELEGATE'S STANCE, AND WHAT THEY PROPOSE TO DO FOR THE REST OF THE COMMITTEE SESSION, AND SOMETIMES IF TIME PERMITS, AN INITIAL SOLUTION MAY BE BRIEFED ABOUT TOO.

FURTHERMORE, IF THREE CONSECUTIVE MOTION'S FAIL, THE COMMITTEE WILL PROCEDURALLY BE REVERTING BACK TO THE GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST DUE TO THE COMMITTEE'S LACK OF CLARITY ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE FLOW OF DEBATE. MOREOVER, THE DELEGATES, IF PERMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, CAN SPEAK IN THE GSL INNUMERABLE TIMES.

HOW TO RAISE IT: THE DELEGATE OF [PORTFOLIO] RAISES A MOTION TO ESTABLISH THE GENERAL SPEAKERS' LIST.

NOTE: THE GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST IS NON-EXHAUSTIVE, THUS THERE IS NO ENDING TO THE LIST AND SPEAKERS CAN ALWAYS BE RECOGNISED UNDER THE EXECUTIVE BOARD'S DISCRETION.

MOTIONS

MODERATED CAUCUS

A MODERATED CAUCUS IS AIMED TO FACILITATE AND ACCELERATE THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGENDA DEEMED AS ESSENTIAL AND CRITICAL FOR THE TOPIC ON AGENDA, THROUGH DISCUSSION ON A SPECIFIC TOPIC UNDER THE AGENDA AND WHEN THE COMMITTEE IS IN FORMAL SESSION. THE MOTION FOR THE MODERATED CAUCUS CAN BE INTRODUCED BY ANY OF THE DELEGATES ONCE THE FLOOR IS OPEN FOR POINTS AND MOTIONS, USUALLY THREE MOTIONS WILL BE RECOGNISED BEFORE VOTING UPON THEM. THE DELEGATE SHALL SPECIFY THE TOTAL TIME OF THE MOTION, INDIVIDUAL SPEAKER'S TIME FOR EACH OF THE DELEGATES (NOT EXCEEDING THE SPEAKER'S TIME SET FOR THE GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST) AND THE PURPOSE OF THE MOTION.

HOW TO RAISE IT: THE DELEGATE OF [PORTFOLIO] RAISES A MOTION TO MOVE INTO A MODERATED CAUCUS ON "TOPIC" FOR THE TIME PERIOD OF" X" MINUTES ALLOTTING "X" MINUTE PER SPEAKER.

NOTE: THE TOTAL TIME FOR A MODERATED CAUCUS CAN'T EXCEED 20 MINUTES.
AS A MODERATED CAUCUS IS LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF DELEGATES RECOGNISED TO SPEAK, A
DELEGATE WHO IS NOT RECOGNISED MAY SEND IN A SUBSTANTIVE CHIT (WHICH WILL BE EXPLAINED LATER).

UNMODERATED CAUCUS

AN UNMODERATED CAUCUS IS AN INFORMAL FORM OF DEBATE, DURING WHICH DELEGATES ARE ABLE TO FREELY DISCUSS ALL ISSUES WITH OTHER DELEGATES, LOBBY FOR THEIR INTERESTS, RESOLVE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TOPIC ON THE AGENDA, MAKE BLOCS AND CREATE WORKING PAPERS AND RESOLUTIONS. HERE, DELEGATES ARE ALLOWED TO MOVE AROUND THE VENUE, AND TALK TO ANY DELEGATE. HOWEVER, IT IS USUALLY UNDER AN EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER'S SUPERVISION.

HOW TO RAISE IT: THE DELEGATE OF [PORTFOLIO] RAISES A MOTION TO MOVE INTO AN UNMODERATED CAUCUS FOR THE TIME PERIOD OF "X" MINUTES.

NOTE: THE TOTAL TIME PERIOD FOR AN UNMODERATED CAUCUS CAN'T BE FOR MORE THAN 30 MINUTES, HOWEVER, ANOTHER MOTION MAY BE RAISED TO EXTEND THE UNMODERATED CAUCUS.

YIELDS

DURING A GSL, IF A DELEGATE HAS ANY REMAINING TIME, THEY CAN YIELD THIS TIME IN ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- 1. YIELD TO QUESTIONS: THE E.B. OR THE DELEGATES NOW HAVE THE PERMISSION TO ASK QUESTIONS DIRECTLY TO THE DELEGATE AFTER HIS/HER GSL SPEECH
- 2. YIELD TO COMMENTS: REMARKS THAT CAN BE MADE SHALL BE EXPRESSED BY THE EB AND OTHER DELEGATES
- 3. YIELD TO ANOTHER DELEGATE: WHEN THERE IS ANOTHER DELEGATE WHO YOU WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE REST OF YOUR SPEECH TIME TO, WITH THEIR PERMISSION

POINTS:

1) POINT OF PARLIAMENTARY ENQUIRY: THIS POINT IS RAISED BY A DELEGATE TO CLARIFY ANYTHING REGARDING THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OR TO KNOW THE STATUS OF THE COMMITTEE. SUCH POINTS MAY NOT INTERRUPT SPEAKERS AND CAN BE INTRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE FLOOR IS OPEN FOR POINTS. HOW TO RAISE IT?: THE DELEGATE OF "YOUR ALLOCATED COUNTRY" RAISES A POINT OF A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY.

EXAMPLE: POINT OF PARLIAMENTARY ENQUIRY, THE DELEGATE OF INDIA WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHO THE NEXT SPEAKER ON THE LIST IS?

2) POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE: A DELEGATE MAY RAISE THE POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE IN CASE OF WHICHEVER KIND OF PERSONAL DISCOMFORT WHICH PREVENTS HIM FROM FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATE. SUCH THINGS CAN BE FOR EXAMPLE AUDIBILITY OF OTHER SPEAKERS, SWITCHING OF AIR CONDITIONING ETC. A POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE CAN INTERRUPT A SPEAKER ONLY IN THE CASE OF BAD AUDIBILITY.

HOW TO RAISE IT?: THE DELEGATE OF "YOUR ALLOCATED COUNTRY" RAISES A POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE

3) POINT OF INFORMATION: THIS POINT CAN BE RAISED WHEN THE SPEAKER YIELD'S TIME TO POIS /QUESTIONS AND IS USUALLY TO ASK A QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE GIVEN SPEECH. THEREFORE, POIS CAN ONLY BE ASKED DURING THE GENERAL SPEAKER'S LIST.

4) POINT OF ORDER: THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF POINT OF ORDERS; FACTUAL INACCURACY, AND LOGICAL FALLACY:

- 1. POINT OF ORDER, FACTUAL INACCURACY: USED WHEN THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE SPEECH THAT IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM SOURCES THAT ARE CONSIDERED VALID. I.E. DELHI IS NOT THE CAPITAL OF THE USA; IT IS THE CAPITAL OF INDIA.
- 2. POINT OF ORDER, LOGICAL FALLACY: USED WHEN SOMETHING IN THE SPEECH DOESN'T LOGICALLY MAKE SENSE, OR WHEN THE DELEGATE IS CONTRADICTING THEMSELF.

THESE POINTS MUST BE FRAMED IN A VERY SPECIFIC MANNER, IF NOT, THEY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED: HOW TO RAISE: "POINT OF ORDER, TYPE OF POO, THE DELEGATE MENTIONED VERBATIM, HOWEVER "X".

NOTE: POOS USUALLY USUALLY CARRY A GOOD WEIGHTAGE, THUS IT SHOULD BE RAISED IN THE ABOVE MANNER STRICTLY WITH THE EXACT VERBATIM. MOREOVER, POOS ARE ONLY ACCEPTED DURING MODERATED CAUCUSES.

SUBSTANTIVE CHIT

SUBSTANTIVE CHITS CAN ONLY BE SENT BY DELEGATES WHEN THEY'RE NOT RECOGNISED TO SPEAK IN A MODERATED CAUCUS AND WANT TO CONVEY SOMETHING THAT IS IMPERATIVE AND HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED. THE FOLLOWING FORMAT SHALL BE USED:

SUBSTANTIVE CHIT:

TO: EXECUTIVE BOARD
FROM: DELEGATE OF [PORTFOLIO]
THESE POINTS MUST INCLUDE SUBSTANTIVE NATURE
AND SHOULD NOT BE A SPEECH

RIGHT TO REPLY

DELEGATES, WHOSE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL INTEGRITY OR SOVEREIGNTY HAS BEEN CONTESTED AND VIOLATED, MAY REQUIRE RIGHT OF REPLY. A CHIT ENTAILING WHY A DELEGATE WANTS TO RAISE A RIGHT TO REPLY MUST FIRSTLY BE SENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, AFTER WHICH, THE EXECUTIVE BOARD WILL CALL IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AND BOTH THE DELEGATES IN QUESTION WILL BE ALLOTTED A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF TIME TO JUSTIFY THEMSELVES. AFTER WHICH, A PROCEDURAL VOTING WILL BEGIN WHERE THE DELEGATE WHO LOSE'S THE RIGHT TO REPLY WILL BE GAGGED FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME MENTIONED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

A DRAFT RESOLUTION, OR REFERRED TO AS "RESOLUTION" ONCE THE COMMITTEE PASSES THE DOCUMENT, CONTAINS ALL THE SOLUTIONS THAT THE COMMITTEE WANTS TO INTRODUCE IN THE FORM OF A FORMAL DOCUMENT THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED AND PUT TO VOTE IN FRONT OF THE COMMITTEE. IF PASSED, THIS ACTS AS A SET OF SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THOSE WHO AGREE WITH IT ON THE ISSUE AT HAND. HOWEVER, AS YOU'LL BE WRITING A DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RESOLUTION WILL AUTOMATICALLY BECOME LEGALLY BINDING TO ALL UN MEMBERS UNDER THE THE UN CHARTER CHAPTER VII, ARTICLE 25 ONCE PASSED. THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW A STRICT AND RIGID SET OF RULES, AND FORMATTING IN ORDER TO BE PRESENTED.

SPONSORS

SPONSORS ARE THOSE WHO HAVE MAJORLY WRITTEN THE RESOLUTION, WHOSE COUNTRIES MUST AGREE WITH EVERY CLAUSE, AND WHO WOULD BE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS BASED ON THE RESOLUTION ONCE THEIR RESOLUTIONS ARE TABLED AND ARE BEING PRESENTED. THE NUMBER OF SPONSORS IS USUALLY KEPT BETWEEN 2 AND 4, THIS WILL BE INFORMED TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE DAY OF THE CONFERENCE. THE SPONSORS USUALLY WILL ALSO BE MARKED HIGHER DUE TO THEM CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESOLUTION THE MOST, AND THEIR LOBBYING OVER THE THREE DAYS.

SIGNATORIES

SIGNATORIES ARE THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE RESOLUTION DISCUSSED IN FRONT OF THE COMMITTEE. A SIGNATORY DOES NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH THE RESOLUTION, JUST WANTS TO SEE IT BE DEBATED. A DELEGATE CAN BE A SIGNATORY TO MORE THAN ONE RESOLUTION. RESOLUTIONS MUST HAVE AT LEAST 1/3RD OF THE COMMITTEE'S STRENGTH AS SIGNATORIES TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT THEM TO THE COMMITTEE.

AMENDMENTS

AN AMENDMENT TO A RESOLUTION IS IN THE FORM OF AN EDIT, ADDITION, OR DELETION TO THE RESOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE. THIS IS USUALLY SENT TO THE CHAIRS AFTER THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AND THROUGH A MOTION, THE COMMITTEE IS IN AN AMENDMENT SESSION. IF MORE THAN 1/3RD THE NUMBER OF A RESOLUTION'S TOTAL NUMBER OF OPERATIVE CLAUSES ARE ACCEPTED AS AMENDMENTS, THE RESOLUTION WILL BE SCRAPPED. WHEN AN AMENDMENT IS PRESENTED TO THE CHAIRS.

THE SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION WILL BE GIVEN THE OPTION TO EITHER ACCEPT IT AS FRIENDLY OR UNFRIENDLY. A FRIENDLY AMENDMENT IS AUTOMATICALLY ACCEPTED, AND THE CONTENT THAT WAS AIMED TO BE CHANGED, ADDED OR DELETED IS DONE AS SUCH. AN UNFRIENDLY AMENDMENT MEANS THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL VOTE, TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANGE SHALL BE MADE. THIS IS DONE THROUGH A SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTE.

- 1) (TO INTRODUCE RESOLUTION) THE DELEGATE OF "YOUR ALLOTTED COUNTRY" WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A MOTION TO INTRODUCE *RESOLUTION NAME*
- 2) (AMENDMENTS) THE DELEGATE OF "YOUR ALLOTTED COUNTRY" WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A MOTION TO MOVE INTO THE AMENDMENT SESSION FOR *RESOLUTION NAME*
- 3) (TO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION) THE DELEGATE OF "YOUR ALLOTTED COUNTRY" WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A MOTION TO TABLE THE *RESOLUTION NAME* FOR THE VOTING PROCEDURE.

RESOLUTION FORMAT:

(NAME OF RESOLUTION)

SPONSORS:

SIGNATORIES:

TOPIC:

XYZ COMMITTEE NAME,

1. EVERY PREAMBULATORY CLAUSE ENDS WITH A COMMA (,)

2.EVERY OPERATIVE CLAUSE ENDS WITH A SEMICOLON (;)

3.EVERY SUB-CLAUSE TO A RESOLUTION SHOULD END WITH A COMMA (,) TILL AND UNLESS IT IS THE LAST SUB-CLAUSE TO THE MAIN CLAUSE, IT SHALL END WITH A SEMICOLON (;)

4.EVERY MAIN CLAUSE BEFORE STARTING WITH A SUB-CLAUSE SHOULD HAVE A COLON (:)

5.FULL STOP AT THE END OF THE RESOLUTION.

NOTE: IF ANY RESOLUTION IS MADE WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE FORMAT PROVIDED BY THE E.B. IT'LL BE CANCELLED AND WOULDN'T PASS BY THE DISCRETION OF THE E.B.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AT TFSMUN'25 WILL BE FUNCTIONING AS A SEMI- CRISIS COMMITTEE, THUS YOU WILL BE EXPECTED TO KNOW HOW THE CRISIS DOCUMENTATION IS MADE. FOR THE DELEGATES WHO ARE UNAWARE OF WHAT SEMI-CRISIS COMMITTEES ARE, A CRISIS COMMITTEE IS ONE OF THE MOST UNIQUE COMMITTEES IN A MUN WHERE THE SPECIALTIES INCLUDE A FAST-PACED NATURE, DYNAMISM AND UNPREDICTABILITY. IN A CRISIS COMMITTEE, THE MAIN AIM OF THE DELEGATES IS TO SOLVE OR RESPOND TO CRISIS UPDATES WHICH ARE PRESENTED TO THEM BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD (EB). IN ESSENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT A CRISIS UPDATE IS AND HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE USING VARIOUS CRISIS TOOLS.

A CRISIS UPDATE IS ESSENTIALLY AN UPDATE THAT DESCRIBES THE DEVELOPMENTS AND IT CLEARLY DESCRIBES THE CURRENT SITUATION IN COMMITTEE. AN EXAMPLE OF A CRISIS UPDATE CAN BE THE FOLLOWING:

ELECTRICITY IN THE KASHMIR VALLEY WAS CUT BETWEEN 2AM AND 9AM IN THE MORNING. HOWEVER, DURING THE BLACKOUT, AT 5AM IN THE MORNING, KASHMIRI HINDUS IN JAMMU BROKE DOWN THE MICS AND LOUDSPEAKERS OF A MOSQUE WHICH WAS AT THE BORDER BETWEEN A MUSLIM AND A HINDU NEIGHBORHOOD. AFTER A CRISIS UPDATE, THE FLOOR FOR DIRECTIVES WILL BE OPEN, SO DELEGATES MAY PLAY AROUND WITH THE CRISIS UPDATE, AND ALSO CONDUCT THEIR OWN PERSONAL OPERATIONS.

THIS MIGHT SEEM COMPLICATED INITIALLY, THEREFORE, WE ADVISE YOU TO CAREFULLY READ THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS NOTES:

DIRECTIVES

DELEGATES UTILIZE DIRECTIVES TO WIELD THEIR PORTFOLIO POWERS, WHICH ARE DISTINCT TO EACH DELEGATE AND DEFINE THE REACH OF THEIR DIRECTIVES. FOR INSTANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MAY CONDUCT A STEALTH MILITARY OPERATION TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT ZELENSKY.

DIRECTIVES CAN GO BEYOND TRADITIONAL ROLES TO ACHIEVE OTHER OBJECTIVES, LIKE ENHANCING PORTFOLIO POWERS OR PURSUING PERSONAL GOALS, WHICH MAY INVOLVE CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES SUCH AS ASSASSINATIONS OR STATE ANNEXATION. HOWEVER, ALL THESE ACTIONS, INCLUDING INCREASING PORTFOLIO POWERS, MUST BE EXECUTED THROUGH COVERT DIRECTIVES IN THIS COMMITTEE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT COULD USE DIRECTIVES TO EXTORT OR LAUNDER MONEY FOR PERSONAL GAIN BY OFFERING A FAVORABLE DEAL TO A LARGE COMPANY.

WHILE CRISIS COMMITTEES OFFER CONSIDERABLE FREEDOM, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FOLLOW CERTAIN GUIDELINES WHEN CRAFTING DIRECTIVES:

FIRSTLY, DIRECTIVES SHOULD MAINTAIN A SENSE OF REALISM; THEY SHOULD BE PLAUSIBLE IN THE REAL WORLD, REGARDLESS OF HOW RADICAL OR EXTREME THEY ARE. IF A DIRECTIVE IS DEEMED UNREALISTIC, IT WILL FAIL.

SECONDLY, EFFECTIVE DIRECTIVES SHOULD BE DETAILED. WHILE A LACK OF DETAIL MIGHT NOT AFFECT WHETHER A DIRECTIVE FAILS OR PASSES, IT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT ITS EFFECTIVENESS. FOR INSTANCE, A DELEGATE WISHING TO BUILD A WALL ON THE US-MEXICO BORDER SHOULD NOT MERELY STATE "BUILD A WALL" BUT SHOULD INCLUDE DETAILS ON CONSTRUCTION, PURPOSE, AND THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL BENEFITS OF THE WALL.

THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF DIRECTIVES IN A CRISIS COMMITTEE:

- A) COVERT; SOMETHING TO BE DONE SECRETLY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE REST OF THE COMMITTEE, THE DETAILS ARE KNOWN ONLY TO THE EB. HOWEVER, ONLY THE OBJECTIVE OF THE DIRECTIVE WILL BE REVEALED TO THE EB ON THE CRISIS UPDATE.
- B) OVERT; SOMETHING TO BE DONE IN THE OPEN, WHOSE DETAILS CAN BE REVEALED TO THE REST OF THE COMMITTEE.

APART FROM THIS, DIRECTIVES CAN ALSO BE SPLIT INTO GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTORS TO A PARTICULAR DIRECTIVE;

- A) INDIVIDUAL DIRECTIVE: WRITTEN BY ONLY ONE DELEGATE.
- B) JOINT DIRECTIVE: WRITTEN BY MULTIPLE DELEGATES; THE INVOLVED DELEGATES WILL BE SHARING COMMON OBJECTIVES AND FURTHER SHARE RESOURCES, AND ETC.

IN CONCLUSION THERE ARE 4 TYPES OF DIRECTIVES:

1.INDIVIDUAL COVERT DIRECTIVE

2.INDIVIDUAL OVERT DIRECTIVE

3.JOINT OVERT DIRECTIVE

4.JOINT COVERT DIRECTIVE

THE FOLLOWING WILL BE THE FORMAT, AND MUST STRICTLY BE FOLLOWED WITHOUT ANY CHANGES:

[TYPE OF DIRECTIVE (INDIVIDUAL / JOINT DIRECTIVE, COVERT / OVERT]

TO: THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

FROM:

OBJECTIVE: [THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AND THE GOAL OF THE DIRECTIVE MUST BE BRIEFED ABOUT] PLAN OF ACTION (POA):

[PREFERRED IN PHASES, AND WITH POINTS MENTIONED IN EACH INSTEAD OF LONG PARAGRAPHS, PICTURES AND DIAGRAMS MAY BE USED FOR REFERENCE.]

CONCLUSION / EXPECTED OUTCOME: [MENTION WHAT SHOULD POTENTIALLY BE THE OUTCOME IF YOUR DIRECTIVE PASSES.]

COMMUNIQUE

COMMUNIQUÉS ARE OFTEN USED TO CONTACT ENTITIES OUTSIDE THE COMMITTEE TO INVOLVE THEM IN A CERTAIN WAY IN THE CRISIS. USUALLY, THEY ARE WRITTEN AS A FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE EXTERNAL ACTOR, ASKING THEM FOR THE ACTION YOU WISH TO TAKE. NOTE THAT THESE ACTIONS LIE UNDER THE ABILITIES OF THE CORRESPONDENT AND NOT YOUR PORTFOLIO. COMMUNIQUES AGAIN CAN BE INDIVIDUAL OR JOINT AND CAN TAKE COVERT AND OVERT FORMS.

THEY SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:

[TYPE OF COMMUNIQUE (OVERT / COVERT)]

TO:

FROM:

[BODY OF THE COMMUNIQUE]

[SIGNATURE OF THE DELEGATE SENDING THE LETTER]

PRESS RELEASE

THESE ARE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DELEGATE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE PRESS, USUALLY USED AS A TOOL TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION OR REASON BEHIND THE DELEGATE'S ACTIONS IN A DIRECTIVE. THEY SHALL FOLLOW THE FOLLOWING FORMAT STRICTLY:

PRESS RELEASE


FROM:

TITLE OF PRESS RELEASE:

[BODY OF THE PRESS RELEASE]

[SIGNATURE OF THE DELEGATE]

AGENDA: DELIBERATION ON THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. FREEZE DATE: 5TH JANUARY, 1980.



MAP IN 1979 WHERE USSR DIRECTLY BORDERS AFGHANISTAN.

AFGHANISTAN AND USSR RELATIONS AND EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION

1.FROM 1955, THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDED MILITARY TRAINING AND ARMS EQUIPMENT TO THE MILITARY OF AFGHANISTAN.

2.IN THE SUMMER OF 1973, THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER, MOHAMMED DAOUD LAUNCHED A SUCCESSFUL COUP AGAINST THE RULING KING, ZAHIR SHAH WITH THE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) FOUNDED WITH MARXIST AND SOCIALIST IDEOLOGIES. THE SOVIET UNION PLAYED A BIG PART IN THIS COUP.

3.IN 1967, THE PDPA SPLIT INTO TWO FACTIONS: ONE OF THE FACTIONS KNOWN AS THE PARCHAMISTS WAS HEADED BY BABRAK KARMAL WHO WAS THE HEAD OF STATE OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE FREEZE DATE. HE RECOGNIZED THE LEADERSHIP OF DAOUD AND SAW THE COUP AS A MEANS TO INCREASE HIS OWN POWER.

4.THE OTHER FACTION WAS HEADED BY NOOR TARAKI AND WAS KNOWN AS THE KHALQS. THEY DID NOT COME TO RECOGNIZE THE LEADERSHIP OF DAOUD.

AFGHANISTAN AND USSR RELATIONS AND EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION

5.DAOUD TRIED TO RECONCILE RELATIONS WITH THE US AFTER SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND HENCE DROVE THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY AWAY FROM THE USSR.

6.HOWEVER ON APRIL 28 1978, MOST OF THE MILITARY SIDED WITH THE KHALQS WHO EXECUTED DAOUD AND HIS FAMILY. TO END THE FACTIONALISM, TARAKI BECAME PM WHILE KARMAL BECAME DEPUTY PM.

7.THE US GOVERNMENT WAS WORRIED AS TARAKI WOULD REALIGN HIS FOREIGN POLICY BACK TO THE SOVIETS AND WOULD UNDO THE DOINGS OF DAOUD. HOWEVER, THE US SENT AN AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN WHO WAS LATER KIDNAPPED AND KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN.

8.EVEN MORE CHAOS ENSUED WHEN HAFIZULLAH AMIN (A LONGTIME ALLY OF TARAKI) BECAME THE DEPUTY PM OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE WERE RUMOURS THAT THE LEADER OF THE PARCHAMISTS (KARMAL) WAS PLANNING A COUP TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. THE CHAOS WEAKENED THE NATIONAL PROGRAM TO SPREAD THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN AND RESULTED IN ARMED RESISTANCE ALL OVER.

9.IN RESPONSE TO THE RESISTANCE, TARAKI AND AMIN TRAVELLED TO MOSCOW AND SIGNED A PACT THAT ALLOWED FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION IN THE CASE OF THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR. TARAKI PROMISED THE SOVIETS THAT HE WOULD PREVENT CIVIL WAR.


10.HOWEVER, THE SITUATION WAS UNCERTAIN AND THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO REPLACE TARAKI AND AMIN TO PREVENT THE BREAKOUT OF A CIVIL WAR. IN AUGUST 1979, A HIGH-RANKING MILITARY DELEGATION VISITED AFGHANISTAN TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. TO WEAKEN THE SOVIET CONTROL, THE US SUPPLIED NON-LETHAL AID TO THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN OR THE FIGHTERS OF THE ARMED RESISTANCE.

11.HAFIZULLAH AMIN REALISED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO STRENGTHEN TARAKI'S REGIME AT HIS EXPENSE. THUS, FEW SOLDIERS WHO SUPPORTED AMIN, EXECUTED TARAKI IN OCTOBER. THIS INFURIATED MOSCOW WHO BEGAN SENDING TROOPS AT ITS BORDERS.

12.THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT COULD NO LONGER PROVIDE BASIC SECURITY AGAINST THE ISLAMIC FIGHTERS NEARING KABUL. ON 24 DECEMBER 1979, THE USSR INVADED AFGHANISTAN AND SENT TROOPS, AND SPECIAL FORCES. AMIN WAS KILLED AND BABRAK KARMAL WAS INSTALLED AS THE PUPPET RULER OF AFGHANISTAN.

13.THE US BEGAN TO SUPPLY MILITARY AID TO THE MUJAHIDEEN MAKING IT TOUGH FOR THE SOVIETS WHO WITHDREW AFTER 10 YEARS, MILLIONS OF LIVES AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. THEY LEFT THE COUNTRY IN TURMOIL LEADING TO THE CREATION OF THE TALIBAN (1994) WHICH PROVIDED A BASE FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN (1988) (MEMBER OF THE MUJAHIDEEN) TO TRAIN TERRORISTS.

THE START OF THE WAR AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS:



1.AS STATED ABOVE, THE EXECUTION OF TARAKI ANGERED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THOUGHT HE WAS DISLOYAL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND HENCE FELT THE NEED TO TOPPLE HIS REGIME.

2.ON 22 DECEMBER 1979, THE SOVIET AIR FORCE HAD REACHED KABUL. ALL TELECOMMUNICATION SIGNALS WERE STOPPED. THUS, NO INFORMATION COULD GO IN OR OUTSIDE KABUL. AMIN WAS FRIGHTENED AND THUS WENT TO THE TAJBEG PALACE.

3.ON 27 DECEMBER, ABOUT 700 SOVIET TROOPS TOOK CONTROL OF MAJOR GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND DESTROYED ALL COMMUNICATION IN THE CITY WHICH PREVENTED THE AFGHAN MILITARY FROM COMMUNICATING. AT 7:15 PM, SOVIET TROOPS ENTERED THE TAJBEG PALACE IN KABUL AND KILLED AMIN, AND HIS TWO SONS. AFTER THE DEATH OF AMIN, BABRAK KARMAL WAS CHOSEN TO BE THE RULER OF AFGHANISTAN.

4.THE SOVIETS PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SOLDIERS DUE TO THE PACT SIGNED BY TARAKI AND AMIN IN 1978.

5.THE SOVIETS OCCUPIED MUCH OF AFGHANISTAN BUT WERE NOT ABLE TO KEEP CONTROL DUE TO GUERILLA WARFARE BY THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN.

6.THE WORLD SAW THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AS BRUTAL AND THREATENED TO BOYCOTT THE 1980 MOSCOW OLYMPIC GAMES. THE USA, UK AND PAKISTAN SUPPORTED THE MUJAHIDEEN AND GAVE THEM ARMS, AND AMMUNITION. SINCE AFGHANISTAN WAS A BORDERING COUNTRY OF PAKISTAN, THE ISI GAVE THE MUJAHIDEEN MUCH OF THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDED TO COMBAT SOVIET TROOPS.

THE START OF THE WAR AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS:

7.THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD AN ADVANTAGE DUE TO THE UNPREPAREDNESS OF SOVIET TROOPS FOR FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OF AFGHANISTAN. ALSO, MANY OF THE SOLDIERS THAT FOUGHT WERE CONSCRIPTS WHO WERE NOT EVEN TESTED IN COMBAT MAKING IT EASIER TO TARGET THE SOVIET TROOPS. SINCE THE MUJAHIDEEN BLENDED WELL WITH THE LOCAL PEOPLE, THE SOVIET TROOPS DESTROYED LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KILLED INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THIS GAVE THE MUJAHIDEEN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE.

8.THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS SEEN AS A WAR AGAINST ISLAM WHICH MADE MANY PEOPLE FROM THE OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS JOIN THE MUJAHIDEEN.

9. THE WAR WAS SEEN AS TOO COSTLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION, ULTIMATELY BEING A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO ITS WEAKENING AND DISINTEGRATION. BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE WASTED, AIRCRAFTS DESTROYED AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT USED IN THE WAR.

10.MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, THE PREMIER OF THE SOVIET UNION, DECIDED TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AS THE WAR HAD RUINED THE REPUTATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A SUPERPOWER. THE SOVIETS LEFT THE COUNTRY ON 15 FEBRUARY 1989 WITH THE VICTORY IN THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN.

CASUALTIES: 14,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS, 75,000 AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN SOLDIERS AND 2 MILLION AFGHAN CIVILIANS.


EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE SOVIET UNION:

1.MANY COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE US AND THE UK CONDEMNED THE SOVIETS FOR INVADING AFGHANISTAN. THIS LED TO THE US BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS OF 1980. COUNTRIES ALL OVER THE WORLD DISLIKED THE SOVIET UNION AND STARTED SUPPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN FOUGHT LEADING TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM IN THE REGION.

2.THE REPUTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT INTERNALLY ALSO DECLINED. WITH BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BEING SPENT AND THOUSANDS OF TROOPS WHO WERE NOT COMBAT READY BEING SENT INTO AFGHANISTAN, PEOPLE BEGAN TO QUESTION THE REASON FOR WAR WITH AFGHANISTAN.

3.SINCE THE US FUNDED AND SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN, THE USSR HAD A HARD TIME FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OF AFGHANISTAN AND HAD ULTIMATELY LOST THE WAR. THIS CHALLENGED THE USSR'S REPUTATION AS A SUPERPOWER AND QUESTIONED THE INVINCIBILITY OF THE SOVIET RED ARMY. MANY SMALL REPUBLICS IN EASTERN EUROPE WERE INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET DEFEAT TO FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

4.THIS ULTIMATELY LED TO INSTABILITY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION ALSO RUINING THEIR REPUTATION WHICH CAUSED ITS DISINTEGRATION INTO MANY COUNTRIES IN 1991.



MILITARY SPENDING OF US AND USSR: USSR SPENDING HITS AN ALL TIME HIGH SINCE WORLD WAR II.

LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE WAR:

1.DUE TO US ARMS FUNDING AND TRAINING OF SOLDIERS IN THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN AND WORLDWIDE SUPPORT FOR THEIR MANNERS OF FIGHTING, THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD OR LETHAL SUICIDE ATTACKS IN THE NAME OF RELIGION BECAME POPULAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT LATER BECAME AN UNCONTROLLABLE ISSUE IN THE LATE 1990S AND STILL CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM.

2.ONCE THE SOVIET UNION LEFT AFGHANISTAN, THE US TRIED TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY WHICH THE MUJAHIDEEN DID NOT WANT. HENCE, MULLAH OMAR, A PROMINENT LEADER IN THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN FORMED THE TALIBAN WHICH FOLLOWED STRICT ISLAMIC LAWS TO RULE AFGHANISTAN AND ALSO SUPPORTED TERRORISM AGAINST THE WEST.

3.IN 1996, THE TALIBAN TOOK POWER IN AFGHANISTAN.

4.OSAMA BIN LADEN, A SAUDI MERCHANT WHO JOINED AS A LEADER IN THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN, WAS DETERMINED TO FIGHT AGAINST US DOMINATION IN THE REGION AND LAUNCHED A HOLY WAR AGAINST THEM. HE FORMED AL-QAEDA, A TERRORIST ORGANISATION AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS, IN 1988. AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN SERVED AS REGIONS WHERE HE COULD BRAINWASH YOUNG ADULTS AND TRAIN THEM INTO SUICIDE FIGHTERS.

5.OSAMA BIN LADEN IS BEST KNOWN FOR MASTERMINDING THE 9/11 ATTACKS ON 11TH SEPTEMBER 2001. 4 PLANES WERE HIJACKED OF WHICH 2 WERE FLOWN INTO THE TWIN TOWERS OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE IN NEW YORK AND 1 WAS FLOWN INTO THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OF THE US KNOWN AS THE PENTAGON.

6.IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE MAINLAND US WAS ATTACKED BY ANY ENTITY. AN ATTACK ON THE MAINLAND HAD NOT EVEN OCCURRED DURING THE WORLD WARS THUS INSTILLING A SENSE OF ANGER AGAINST THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST WHERE TERRORISM WAS HARD TO CONTROL. A SENSE OF PARANOIA FILLED ALL CITIZENS OF THE US. THIS CAN EVEN BE SEEN TODAY AND THE DAY WHEN THE 9/11 ATTACKS HAPPENED CAN BE SEEN AS THE START OF THE DECLINE OF THE US.

7.THE US WENT ON TO ATTACK AFGHANISTAN AND REMOVE THE TALIBAN FROM POWER. THE US-AFGHAN WAR WAS FOUGHT FOR A PERIOD OF 20 YEARS UNTIL 2021. THE US ALSO ATTACKED IRAQ WHERE SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS DEPOSED FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

8.THUS, IN THE SHORT RUN, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN CAN BE SEEN AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, IN THE LONG RUN, IT HAS LED TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WEST. AFTER THE 9/11 ATTACKS, THE US ATTACKED MANY COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST LEADING TO CHAOS THERE TOO AND SINCE THE TERRORIST ATTACK WAS THE FIRST DIRECT ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND, IT FILLED AMERICANS WITH A SENSE OF FEAR AND PARANOIA THAT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO AMERICA'S DECLINE IN THE LAST 20 YEARS.