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Introduction

Globalization, Urbanization, and the Second City

I n 1946 the victorious powers of World War II deliberated over where to house the prospective United Nations. Philadelphia was one of the finalists for the permanent headquarters, together with San Francisco and New York. The city based its argument explicitly on global considerations, including international travel times and the city's historic role as a center of liberty. The Pennsylvania and Delaware governments offered official motions of support, and the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the federal government to take city land for the site. In early December, on the first vote, Philadelphia tied for first with San Francisco, winning support from the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and India, among others. On December 11, however, John D. Rockefeller announced his willingness to donate land in New York City, between Forty-second and Forty-eighth streets; this changed several delegates' minds, and the next day New York won the final vote, 33 to 7 with 6 abstentions. Philadelphia had once again lost a global city function to New York, repeating its earlier losses of the first half of the 1800s.[1]

The story of how the United Nations ended up in New York City instead of Philadelphia demonstrates many of the themes of this book and provides one answer to the question of why, in an era of globalization, one should study cities. The story suggests, first, that globalization as a process is older than we often think; it goes back decades, if not centuries. Second, it shows that cities like Philadelphia, which we do

not ordinarily associate with globalization, can make credible claims to being globally engaged and integrated. Simultaneously, however, the story of how the United Nations was located in New York City suggests both that the number of global cities is limited and that moving up in the global urban system is a rare occurrence. Most cities might be better off trying to define an alternate pathway to global integration than striving to copy or dislodge a global city like New York or London. Third, it implies that cities and their residents can and do organize to pursue their own interests on a global scale. In the process they become agents of globalization, helping to further it. Fourth, and perhaps most important, it demonstrates the intimate connection between globalization and urbanization. Despite widespread claims that globalization liberates people from the chains of geography, globalization is a profoundly urban process.

These may seem like counterintuitive propositions. Skepticism about the relevance of urban studies and the future of cities is widespread. After all, many people maintain that globalization facilitates the abolition of space. The past forty years have witnessed dramatic changes in the world economy and in people's interconnectedness. Technologies like satellite communications, computer networking, and rapid air travel mean that any activity can be located anywhere. Electronic financial transactions circle the globe in the blink of an eye, jobs leave one country for another, workers move thousands of miles in search of employment, immigrants videoconference with distant family members, and the latest songs, films, and performances draw audiences perpetually in search of the next trend. This is what we call globalization: a process of increasing interconnectedness and increasing awareness of the world as a single place.[2] These developments pose challenges on multiple levels: for individuals, they bring threats to personal well-being and to one's sense of identity; for societies, they bring new risks to security and social cohesion; and for social science, they raises questions about the relevance of our ideas and theories. For all, globalization forces us to rethink how we understand the world and our place in it.

In fact, cities are not in any sense disappearing; rather, the world is urbanizing at an incredible pace. The global urban population is increasing at a rate of more than seventy million people per year, and in 2007, for the first time ever, more than 50 percent of the human race lived in cities. Not only can these changes be profoundly disorienting—the inflow or outflow of migrants, the flooding of a peaceful village with new consumer products or "dangerous" political and social ideas, the storms of both high-rise and informal construction in rapidly growing areas, the threat of layoffs from a new and distant company owner—but they also seem contradictory. How are we to make sense of this simultaneous rise of an ever more urbanized population together with space-demolishing technologies?

The answer, perhaps paradoxically, is that globalization actually makes cities more important. Globalization, in the simplest conceptualization, is

a process with two main components. It frees people, goods, capital, and information to circulate around the world more easily and swiftly, especially across borders. Also, it increases people's consciousness of the world as a whole, demonstrating how distant factors shape and have ramifications for a person's own actions. But neither of these components implies that social life loses its grounding in space. The flows of goods, people, information, and capital that constitute globalization are all processes that happen in and through space; they must travel through some set of channels, between points or nodes, along trade routes, cables, and satellite networks.

Indeed, globalization is not so much an overcoming or abolition of space as it is a restructuring of how and where people, ideas, and things flow in space. Understood this way, globalization does not at all make space irrelevant. Instead, it reorganizes how places are connected to or disconnected from one another, and it changes the preexisting relationships between places and the channels that permit things to flow in space. What the social theorist Anthony Giddens calls the "disembedding" of things and relationships from immediate copresence is only half of the story. The other half is a process of "re-embedding," in which other social relations are pinned down to specific times and places. In other words, each time globalization pushes people or activities to disconnect from a place, it also pushes them to establish a connection to a different place—a new home, a school, the faraway factory where one's shoes or tools are now made.[3]

In response to these transformations, many people and places wish to "hold down the global"—to capture some of these worldwide flows for themselves. Devising effective strategies to do so is, of course, risky and often difficult, but it is important to recognize that globalization is about the establishment of new connections as much as it is about the disruption of old ones. The inherently spatial nature of these breaking and establishing processes helps us understand why cities are important. Cities are critical sites for holding down the global. They are central nodes in the economic, cultural, and political flows that constitute globalization.[4] As nodes, cities concentrate social interactions and are the sources of innovations, new ideas, culture, and power. In addition, cities act as transformers, increasing the density, speed, and reach of sociospatial networks. Thus, they are the most important places for organizing and producing globalization, and an adequate understanding of globalization makes cities more, not less, important.

But not all cities experience or participate in globalization in the same way. This book is about how two cities in particular—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Manchester, England—have engaged with globalization. Philadelphia and Manchester are not necessarily the sorts of places that first come to mind when one thinks of vibrant, globally engaged metropolises, but they both have been deeply integrated in global systems of trade, migration, and cultural innovation for more than two centuries. Moreover, their patterns of

global integration have been strikingly similar, and they have developed along comparable paths. In this book I analyze how Manchester and Philadelphia, in the early nineteenth century, came to be second cities (the particular pattern of global integration each adopted) and how each struggled to maintain that position across successive historical periods and against challenges from other cities. Understanding these events, however, requires situating the experiences of Manchester and Philadelphia within the main currents of thinking and writing about globalization and cities.

Second Cities, Global Cities, and the World City Hypothesis

A number of scholars have argued that cities are the key sites for globalization. In particular, these scholars have detailed the roles played by the largest, most economically central cities—*world*, or *global*, cities, like Paris and Tokyo. According to the "world city hypothesis" (WCH), global cities are principally defined as economic coordinating nodes in the world capitalist system—the nerve centers of global capitalism. Exactly which activities or sectors count as constitutive of the global city varies across accounts, but the crucial functions typically include some mix of corporate headquarters; finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE); and advanced producer services, like law, accounting, advertising, and architecture. The sociologist Saskia Sassen has done the most to offer a comprehensive definition. She wrote about a "new strategic role for major cities" centered specifically on the producer services. The main versions of the WCH, however, have many features in common.[5] They typically stress the following:

- The spread of capitalism as the most important causal force for urban change
- Global cities as sites for leading economic functions (and therefore the exercise of economic power): corporate headquarters, finance, and other producer services
- The crystallization of a global urban hierarchy through the functional specialization and differentiation of cities, with the implication that inequalities between cities or regions grow
- The role of global cities as magnets for international migration
- An increase in inequality within global cities caused by the growth of global city functions (this inequality sometimes produces social or political conflict)

Analytically, there are two main principles for defining the set of global cities. The first principle is a functional one: there is a worldwide division of labor among cities, and global cities specialize in certain critical activities.

All definitions of the global city rely to some extent on this principle, whether they focus on corporate headquarters, producer services, or global finance as the key activity. The financial sector, however—the most internationalized industry of all—plays a particularly important role. In fact, the set of global cities is substantially similar to the sites of the world's major stock, commodities, and financial markets; the presence of an international capital market appears to be a sufficient if not always a necessary criterion for global city status.[6] The second principle is hierarchical: the distribution of power across cities is fundamentally unequal. Most analysts see the international urban system as explicitly hierarchical, with the global cities that concentrate and house the most important activities also exercising dominance over activities in other cities. In other words, the operation of the first principle produces the second principle as a consequence.

Because globalization concentrates economic power rather than disperses it, global cities are few in number; even in the broadest definitions, only a few dozen exist. In the United States, in addition to New York, there are Los Angeles and Chicago, with frequent mentions of Miami, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., as well; in the United Kingdom, only London qualifies. The Globalization and World Cities project (GaWC) at Loughborough University in Leicestershire, England, for example, has used a network analysis of international linkages in the producer service industries (accounting, law, advertising, and finance) to identify a set of fifty-five world cities.[7]

This vision of concentrated power is consistent with most WCH writers' reliance on the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein—a theory of global-scale inequality—as their major intellectual frame.[8] World-systems theory takes the historical *longue durée* of capitalism—over a span of five centuries or more—as central, and explicitly argues that globalization is not a new phenomenon. The "modern world-system" originated in the "long sixteenth century" and involved the simultaneous formation of nation-states and global cities, the expansion of colonial rule, and the systematic institution of "core" and "periphery" economic roles. Cities like London, Paris, and New York have had global city roles (including in finance) for far longer than just a few decades, and most of the foundations of the current global urban system were laid in the nineteenth century, if not before. The global urban network per se is not a new development, although its shape and some of its dynamics may have changed.

But not all cities can be global cities; only a limited number can reach such an elevated position. I call Manchester and Philadelphia *second cities* precisely to point up the differences that separate them from the global cities. Second cities are the kinds of places people used to call provincial capitals. They have persistent, ongoing global interaction—they are globally integrated nodes—across several social spheres. They have significant relations with global and other cities all over the world, not just within

their own countries. They differ sharply, however, from global cities. Their characteristic fields of global prominence include manufacturing and the economy in general, international migration, cultural innovation, and production, but not international finance; this lack of an international financial sector or market is one of the main factors that separates second cities from global cities. They also engage in repeated efforts to build transportation infrastructure to enhance their global connections, and, very importantly, gradually elaborate a specifically second city urban identity through giant cultural planning projects. Manchester and Philadelphia, therefore, are not just global cities in miniature, or global cities "lite"; they represent the second city as a historical alternative to the "global city" path.

I first encountered the phrase "second city" as a technical term in the economist Peter Karl Kresl's work on regional trade liberalization schemes. Kresl originally applied the term to Chicago and Toronto, and then he expanded it to include places such as Buffalo. His definitional criteria, however, were vague: second cities had some concentration of corporate headquarters but were economically subordinate to the first or global cities in their national economies. The regional economist Ann Markusen, with her collaborators, refined this idea into the concept of the "second-tier" city: medium-sized cities with vibrant economies that have grown rapidly in the past several decades.[9] In the chapters that follow, I join this notion of the second city explicitly to globalization theory and reframe the second city as an expansion and elaboration of the WCH; Philadelphia and Manchester are globally integrated even though they are not "global cities" per se. There is thus no single answer to the question of how cities "go global"; rather, there are multiple developmental pathways to global integration.

In addition to emphasizing the patterns of interconnection and exchange that characterize global integration, the WCH also stresses that globalization has characteristic effects on urban social life. In particular, the process of globalization significantly increases inequality and polarization, both between and within cities. In terms of polarization between cities, the clear assumption in much of the discussion about global cities (which we might call the "peripheralization hypothesis") is that as global cities enjoy a relative increase in their power, other places are progressively marginalized. Such cities therefore suffer declines in economic well-being and prestige as a result of globalization. Saskia Sassen makes this claim explicitly: "Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities . . . [a] multiplicity of formerly important manufacturing centers and port cities have lost functions and are in decline." Another hypothesis suggests, however, that globalization entails new opportunities for nonglobal cities. The recent and increasing openness of national urban systems gives greater latitude for direct international linkages on the part of lesser cities. Donald Lyons and Scott Salmon, for example, argue that the erosion of nation-state borders brought on by globalization is dispersing "global control potential" to some

cities lower down in the urban hierarchy. In other words, global flows may pass around global cities as well as through them.[10] The difficulty is that very little existing scholarship has actually examined "nonglobal" cities explicitly or analyzed what alternate pathways of globalization might exist. The notion of the second city is one way to fill that broad space between the global city and the hopelessly marginalized city, thereby extending the reach of global city theory to new places. It enables a more complex and fully elaborated understanding of the global urban system than we have so far been able to capture or describe.

Within cities, the WCH argues, the growth of globally active firms and industries produces inequality in two main ways. First, these firms and industries typically have a bifurcated wage structure, with lots of high-wage and low-wage jobs but few middle-income ones. Second, the combination of high-wage workers and immigration leads to a rapid growth in low-wage and informal-sector service work at the lower end of the labor market, as elite professionals increase the demand for restaurants, document delivery, doormen, dog walkers, and a whole range of personal services. Furthermore, in global cities one sees these extremes of wealth and poverty right next to each other, in glaring juxtaposition. This within-city inequality is also true of Philadelphia and Manchester, but with a twist: inequality in these cities is shaped by their distinctive migration patterns, so that inequality plays out at least as much on racial, ethnic, and religious dimensions as along class lines (I discuss class and ethnic/racial inequality in Chapters 3 and 4). These two kinds of inequality, between places and within places, are just as important in Manchester and Philadelphia as in global cities, but they manifest differently.

Manchester and Philadelphia

I chose Manchester and Philadelphia for two main reasons: I wanted American and British cases, in order to mirror the overwhelming focus on New York and London in the globalization and cities literature. I also deliberately chose the oldest, earliest second cities, in order to give the longest historical perspective possible. The two cities started out in the seventeenth century in very different places, and through the turn of the nineteenth century they seemed to be becoming increasingly different from each other. But by the early nineteenth century that pattern shifted, and they started becoming increasingly alike. This occurred during a widespread era of structural change that reconfigured the global urban hierarchy: Manchester's rise implied the decline of Dhaka, Bangladesh, and other older textile centers; Philadelphia switched positions with New York; and manufacturing cities in general displaced many commercial centers. This process of growing similarity, or convergence, has continued ever since. Manchester and Philadelphia have managed to maintain their positions

as globally integrated second cities for nearly two hundred years. Indeed, globalization implies that cities come to resemble one another primarily because they fulfill similar global functions or roles, not because they are located in the same country. We should expect, therefore, that the global cities may have more in common with one another than with other cities in their respective countries, and the same goes for second cities.

This concern with longevity also helps answer a particular question: why not Chicago? Chicago for much of its history developed as one of the world's archetypal industrial cities, with an economic base in commerce and in transforming the raw materials of its extensive western hinterland. It was a transport and communications center, and it drew in both domestic and international migrants by the tens of thousands. Its role as the home of the Chicago School of Sociology and of modern architecture, particularly the invention of the skyscraper, made it a center for innovation in global culture. And it claimed the title "second city" for itself after the census of 1890, when it surpassed Philadelphia in the U.S. population rankings. But it is widely acknowledged that Chicago has in the past several decades ascended out of the ranks of second cities and become a global city. Not surprisingly, the key factor in the city's ascension is its international financial role as the center of the world commodities and futures markets, via the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Significantly, Chicago first began losing its second city characteristics during the deindustrialization of the post–World War II era. Chicago's global reach was secured in recent decades with the emergence of the city's financial sector as a real driver of urban development. In other words, Chicago traded second city status for global city status, a transformation not unlike that of Toronto or Sydney at the same time. This transformation introduced several complications that made it difficult to focus on what was specific to second cities.[11]

Philadelphia was founded in 1682 by William Penn, the proprietor of colonial Pennsylvania. Manchester is much older but was only a minor market town with a small population before 1700. The two cities' historical trajectories have also been remarkably similar, as evidenced by their overall patterns of population change. Table 1.1 shows the history of population change in both cities and their surrounding regions. Manchester's population describes an arc, from about 300,000 in 1851, up to 714,000 in 1911, and down to almost 400,000 in 2001.[12] Philadelphia's population shows evidence of a similar arc, but over a longer timescale, and its population decline in recent decades has not been as marked. Both cities' peak growth rates had ended by 1850, and they had become very large cities. They started to empty out in the 1950s; Manchester has lost about one-third of its population since World War II, and Philadelphia has lost more than one-fourth.

The similarities between them extended to their economies and their status as regional centers. In the nineteenth century Philadelphia and Manchester were two of the world's most prominent industrial metropolises; in

TABLE 1.1 POPULATION CHANGE: SELECT YEARS, 1850–2001
(IN THOUSANDS)

		Manchester			
Year	City	GMC	City as %	Region	City as %
1851	303	574	52.8	1,655	18.3
1891	505	2,155	23.4	3,507	14.4
1911	714	2,638	27.1	4,281	16.7
1951	703	2,716	25.9	4,642	15.1
1971	544	2,729	19.9	4,940	11.0
1991	405	2,499	16.2	4,840	8.4
2001	393	2,482	15.8	4,762	8.3

	Philadelphia		
Year	City	PMSA	City as %
1850	409	703	58.2
1890	1,047	1,580	66.3
1910	1,549	2,268	68.3
1950	2,072	3,671	56.4
1970	1,950	4,818	40.5
1990	1,586	4,857	32.7
2000	1,518	5,101	29.8

Sources: Great Britain, *Census of Great Britain in 1851* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1854); Great Britain, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, *Census of England and Wales* (London: HMSO, 1891, 1913, 1953, 1973, 1991); Great Britain, Office for National Statistics, *Census of England and Wales* (London: HMSO, 2001); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Compendium of the Seventh Census* (Washington: AOP Nicholson, 1854); U.S. Census Office, *Ninth Census of the United States, 1870* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1872), and *Tenth Census of the United States, 1880* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1883); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population and Housing* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892, 1914, 1952, 1972, 1984a, 1992, 2001).

Note: In 1850 Philadelphia numbers are for Philadelphia County. The Philadelphia PMSA (primary metropolitan statistical area) includes Philadelphia plus the suburban counties of Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester. The GMC is the ten-municipality Greater Manchester Council, consisting of Manchester plus Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, and Wigan. In 1851 the GMC number includes only Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, and Wigan, and the regional number includes only Lancashire, minus Liverpool. The Manchester region includes the GMC plus Cheshire and Lancashire counties (but not Liverpool/Merseyside).

fact, each was second only to the global cities in their respective countries. Both were massive centers for the textile industry—Manchester in cotton yarn and cloth and Philadelphia in wool, carpets, lace, hats, and clothing. Manchester was the home of the Industrial Revolution, while Philadelphia was a center of advanced manufacturing, including machining, shipbuilding, and locomotive construction. Both suffered greatly, however, as their manufacturing strength eroded in the middle of the twentieth century. A slow industrial decay was temporarily masked by World War II, but it resumed after the war and reached crisis proportions between 1960 and 1980.

Figure 1.1: Map of the
Manchester region.

Figure 1.2: Philadelphia
and its suburbs.

The two cities have now lost approximately 90 percent of their former manufacturing employment. Starting in these same decades, however, both experienced a massive expansion of service industries, and attempts at rejuvenation by local politicians began only a few years apart in the 1980s.

Both cities have long served as regional hegemons, dominating large hinterlands. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 map the two study regions. One important difference between them is that Manchester has always constituted a minority of its regional population. Manchester's industrial economy, from the

beginning, was a regional structure of firms arrayed in surrounding towns with Manchester as the coordinator; as a result, these towns became heavily populated with factories and workers. For two centuries, Manchester has dominated the economies of these surrounding mill towns and has also claimed to be the undisputed "capital of the North" of England. (My definition of the region, as is conventional, excludes Liverpool and its surrounding district of Merseyside.) Philadelphia, on the other hand, for a long time monopolized regional nonagricultural activity, and it was vastly larger and more powerful than any other city in the region. The city lies near the confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers and historically has integrated nearly the entire watershed of these two rivers. It has also competed with Baltimore for the Susquehanna River watershed in central Pennsylvania. The city sent tentacles of control out to Trenton, New Jersey; Wilmington, Delaware; and the Pennsylvania towns of Bethlehem, Reading, and Lancaster, as well as to the southern New Jersey shore. The fact that the city's hinterland lies in three states—New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania—but fully encompasses none, has complicated issues of politics and governance.

In both cities an existing literature, extending back to the nineteenth century, analyzes their economies, histories, and political cultures. Manchester's political and economic success—and more particularly, its triumphalist arrogance regarding its own virtues—spawned a substantial tradition of critical analysis. J. P. Kay, who studied the city after the cholera epidemic of 1832, was Manchester's first social critic and investigator. He pointed out the importance of poverty and neighborhood environmental conditions for public health. And of course, in *Hard Times* there was Dickens's thinly veiled Coketown, the city whose bricks "would have been red if the smoke and ashes had allowed it," with its portrait of Josiah Bounderby, the new middle-class man who would have everyone "discard the word Fancy altogether" in favor of "nothing but fact." But the city's most famous critic is undoubtedly Friedrich Engels, who lambasted the smoke, noise, and foul rivers; the deplorable living conditions of workers in general and the Irish in particular; and the habits of greed and willful neglect practiced by the wealthy.[13]

In the modern era the local interpretation of deindustrialization and postindustrialism has focused on the nearly two-centuries-long hegemony of free-market liberalism. These writers are critical of the ideologies of liberalism and neoliberalism, but they see liberal ideas ascendant everywhere in local politics. Despite a strong local union movement stretching back at least to the 1820s, labor's interests rarely carried the day or drove local politics and policy. Instead, liberalism fostered a disregard for poverty and inhuman living conditions in the mid-nineteenth century, and it encouraged the export of capital overseas rather than reinvestment in modernizing domestic production in the late nineteenth century. Liberalism's ideological

hegemony produced few benefits for the majority and gave too much priority to the market. More recently, a neoliberal rapprochement with capital by the Labour Party's political managers gutted social benefits in favor of a boosterist economic development policy that stressed interurban competition. Relatively autonomous local politicians have done capital's bidding because the old left-wing political coalition fell apart, and neoliberalism turned out to be a discursive and political project that could (at least weakly) unite a new set of constituencies.[14] In the end, however, most of these critics offer a grudging appreciation for what Manchester achieved in the 1990s, in the wake of its crisis of the 1970s and 1980s: "Manchester has at least been able to engender the trappings (if not the substance) of a postindustrial economic project: telematics, a significant international airport, a 'successful' Olympic bid, a degree of growth/agglomeration in the financial and advanced services."[15]

The Philadelphia school of interpretation has been concerned above all with the relationship between elite leadership (or its failure) and the functioning of the local state, conceived variously as corruption, privatism, elite withdrawal, or fragmentation.[16] It argues that the mechanisms of the local state and local politics have been enduringly dysfunctional and thus that even in times of one-party control (much of the city's history) there has been no effective ideology that could push either a class or a collective universal interest forward. For E. Digby Baltzell, the Quaker withdrawal from politics in the eighteenth century combined with Philadelphia's extraordinary early wealth to create an insular, aristocratic elite that persisted in enjoying its privileges even as it abdicated public leadership. The divide between the social elite and the economic leadership produced a dysfunctional polity in which the local state served no one's interests well. Sam Bass Warner Jr., by contrast, argued that members of Philadelphia's elite had the dominant political economic ideology they wanted—a capitalist, utilitarian, and profoundly instrumental ideology that he called "privatism." In practice, however, this ideology led to incompetent governance, in large part because it confined government to fostering wealth creation by individuals and to preventing infringement of property rights. "Such political failures would be repeated over and over again in Philadelphia's later history. . . . No urban, economic democracy emerged with time because the popular goal of Philadelphia was the individual race for wealth."[17]

More recently, Carolyn Adams and her coauthors have placed much of the responsibility for the city's late-twentieth-century difficulties on deindustrialization and the evaporation of the economic "glue" that formerly held the city together.[18] But they also have reinvigorated the older tradition of political critique, arguing that such economic difficulties require effective political responses and that the city's political leaders have squabbled among themselves instead of cooperating on workable solutions. On this interpretation the Philadelphia elite and city government generally have

lacked the political will and leadership necessary to defend the city's collective best interests, and thus the city's success has come despite rather than because of their efforts.

These schools are not simply critiques, however; each school is intimately tied to the particular historical trajectories, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by which Manchester and Philadelphia came to occupy second position. The belief in the political effectiveness of liberalism in Manchester, for example, even when that effectiveness is being criticized, once again represents "the triumph of liberalism" as the city's historic political culture. The same is true for Philadelphia: the analytical focus on elite withdrawal and state weakness does not stand apart from the city's political culture as an objective, outside assessment, but embodies and even reinscribes the city's declensionist self-understanding. The different contents of Philadelphia's and Manchester's identities as second cities thus are intimately connected to their different historical pathways. The ways in which Mancunians and Philadelphians found themselves embedded in global processes long ago, and the actions they took to leverage that embeddedness to their own advantage, profoundly shaped the course of their development.

The Argument of the Book

The chapters that follow are divided into two overarching themes. Chapters 2 through 5 show how both cities came to occupy second position in the early nineteenth century and how they have been situated in global flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas ever since. These chapters detail the connections Philadelphia and Manchester have had to other cities and countries around the globe, both in terms of flows and organizational ties. The dominant theme is that these cities, rather than being marginalized or excluded, have long been fully active participants in global society across a range of dimensions. These chapters also compare and contrast Manchester's and Philadelphia's patterns of global integration with the global city pattern, to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the second city's role.

Chapter 2 analyzes each city's pathway or entry into second city status, between 1770 and 1840, when a structural shift in the international urban hierarchy led a new group of cities to emerge into "second" roles. Manchester and Philadelphia were two of the most important of this new crop, but they arrived at second position by different routes. Manchester rose into second city position from obscurity by means of industrial production and what we usually call the Industrial Revolution. Philadelphia became a second city industrial powerhouse following the loss of global city functions, particularly with the eclipse of the city's financial industry, and thus its entry into second city position was one of decline; it was during this period that New York replaced Philadelphia as America's global city.

Chapters 3 through 5 describe Manchester's and Philadelphia's positions in global flows and activities. Chapter 3 discusses economic patterns, including industrial concentrations, corporate headquarters, foreign direct investment (FDI), and international transportation links. Manchester and Philadelphia have continuously been active economic nodes in international networks of trade and industry, integrated as both locations for headquarters and sites for branch plants. The chapter makes use of a specially constructed database of international corporate hierarchies in order to demonstrate the two cities' global integration. Each city specialized in two or three of the leading industries of an era; historically, each city's economy was more focused on manufacturing than the global cities' economies were, and, significantly, each lacked an internationally oriented financial sector. Philadelphia and Manchester, over time, developed large firms and overall concentrations in selected advanced service industries, particularly in "meds and eds"—health care and higher education.[19] Figure 1.3, for example, shows the impact of Philadelphia's transition toward services on the city's skyline. The two cities have also faced recurring needs for restructuring, or economic diversification, and their failure or success at achieving such restructuring has been one of the main factors that determined whether they maintained their second city position over time.

Chapter 4 clarifies the distinctive migration patterns to these cities. Where global cities are correctly thought of as magnets for very large and diverse streams of international migration, Philadelphia and Manchester

Figure 1.3: The Philadelphia skyline.

have been migration centers in a distinctive way. First, sources for international migration concentrate in just a few countries (precisely which source countries they concentrate in varies by geography, historical precedent, and other factors). This pattern of selective international migration contrasts sharply with both popular and scholarly accounts of global cities. Second, internal migration is relatively more important for these two cities; as regional powerhouses and hegemons, they have large hinterlands and continuously draw a large stream of domestic migrants. Furthermore, this internal migration is often rural-to-urban migration by people from an ethnically distinct background, usually from rural or agricultural areas in decline. These communities of domestic or internal migrants persist for decades and bring more diversity to these cities than they would otherwise possess. The point is not that these cities lack immigrant populations altogether—a circumstance that would argue against the cities' involvement in global networks. The point is rather that the participation of Philadelphia and Manchester in global society is selective and specialized; they have many migrants but few migrant communities.

Chapter 5 shows how Manchester and Philadelphia have been crucial sites for innovation and production of global culture. Their contributions to global culture tend to occur in political ideologies, in the professions, and in claims to codify new knowledge or expertise—in fields such as medicine, theories of economic development, or management. By contrast, the "pull" of global cities as centers for pop culture production, and their essential role in high-culture production, creates real difficulties for places like Manchester and Philadelphia in terms of developing critical masses of cultural producers in these fields. It is almost as if they are cultural centers for the "middle class," including the cultural codes and practices that define and organize middle-class life. These cultural innovations and specializations tend to be notably pragmatic, utilitarian, or even self-serving. Precisely because they are "second," and in at least some measure self-conscious of this second position, people in Manchester and Philadelphia tend to focus more on cultural contributions to the world as a whole that assist them in competing with other cities. Residents' second city consciousness thus plays out not simply in the struggle for material or economic capital and position, but also in the struggle for symbolic capital and position.

The remaining chapters (Chapters 6 through 8) analyze how the two cities have tried to bolster or maintain their global positions through repeated efforts at transportation planning and creating cultural projects. Further, these chapters put the cities in motion by describing the political coalitions that engaged in these efforts. The key theme in this latter part of the book is what I call "municipal foreign policy" (MFP): the efforts of cities, particularly city governments or the local state, to take action on their own behalf in search of greater global integration and global prominence or recognition. They seek not only to foster increased global connectivity but also to

shape the pattern of international flows to their own benefit—to be masters of their fate. These attempts to shape space are central to their continued prosperity, to the vibrancy of their politics and social life, and even to their self-understanding as cities, regions, and communities. Furthermore, this municipal foreign policy pushes globalization processes forward. By their own actions—especially those in pursuit of deeper global integration—cities make globalization happen.

Manchester and Philadelphia have each exhibited a striking continuity over time, but this continuity has been contingent rather than foreordained. They have periodically renewed or reinvigorated their historic niches and roles in world society. Each city continued to have similar migration patterns, similar responses to competitive threats from other cities, and similar sectoral patterns of economic integration. Both also elaborated over time an increasingly specific sense of themselves as occupying an intermediate or secondary position relative to other cities. Their persistence as second cities happened neither by chance nor by some inexorably structural logic of globalization, however. It required great effort; people in the cities at various points chose courses of action that reinforced or reinvigorated their structural positions. Their continuity thus resulted at least in part from active attempts by city governments and the city elite to pursue increasing global integration.

As a result, the argument here tilts more toward the agency of cities and their residents than is common in the WCH. This is the key causal proposition of the book, and it puts me at odds with more structurally oriented globalization scholars. For these structuralists, economic globalization is an intractable, macro-level force that cities can only adapt to and not shape or influence. Most are deeply critical of the global marketplace, viewing it as a site of coercion and inequality that inevitably leaves large numbers of people—and places—behind. These concerns about the power of globalization to compel adaptation by cities often come paired with a critical attitude toward the economic and political restructuring of the past three decades and the neoliberal ideology that lies behind it. For example, Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift argue that globalization combined with economic restructuring results in the "disorganization of local government" and is "not likely to promise self-reproducing growth at the local level."[20]

I see things differently. My interest here is not so much in deciding whether globalization is good or bad as it is in determining whether our theoretical accounts of it are sufficiently comprehensive. It is not that there is no structure to globalization—indeed, I assume throughout this book that there is an urban hierarchy, and in Chapters 3 to 5 I detail Philadelphia's and Manchester's places in it. But focusing only on the structure and its power over cities is incomplete. Causality in analyses of globalization must be conceptualized as running in both directions. Globalization is not simply a cold, unforgiving structure, and cities are not simply component parts

slotted into a global system. Instead, globalization is a process actively pursued (or, as many critics of globalization have pointed out, resisted) by groups of people who consciously attempt to restructure the world's economic and social space in order to bolster their own positions and who, through their actions, have the opportunity to alter where the nodes and flows are located.

Consideration of local state agency, therefore, has to be a part of the analytical and theoretical picture we paint of how globalization works; it is necessary for the purpose of closing the analytical circle.[21] Municipal foreign policy is perhaps the most important kind of local action that occurs at a global scale and has global consequences. Cities are states in their own right, even though they are subordinated to their national governments. As subordinated states, cities have partially autonomous relations with external actors: transnational corporations, social movements, nongovernmental organizations, other national cities, their own national governments, and other city governments around the world. Of course, we cannot treat city governments as undifferentiated unitary entities. We must pay attention to the shifting patterns of local politics—the conflicts and coalitions among politicians, the economic elite, immigrants, and other groups—that lie behind state actions. It makes sense, however, to treat local governments as collective actors, just as it makes sense to treat other corporations and government entities as actors, although we know their policy decisions were made by people within the groups and coalitions.

Chapter 6 focuses on attempts to improve the cities' *material* position in global flows by means of transportation infrastructure planning. Most major cities repeatedly design global transportation infrastructure projects—airports, railroads, water ports—to enable them to connect more easily with other cities around the world. These projects are the core of MFP and fulfill dual functions: they are explicitly designed to preserve or enhance a city's access to and participation in global flows, and they also, whether intentionally or not, contribute substantially to the city's economic diversification. Such infrastructure projects go far in determining how cities adjust and prosper over time; they are crucial economic development projects, the effects of which reverberate throughout the entire region. They are thus a key to the dynamics of the global urban system, to how cities rise and fall in position and status relative to one another, and to whether they can maintain a position across historical periods. Transport infrastructure also—and by design—reshapes the pattern of global flows and thereby helps constitute globalization. In addition, in Manchester and Philadelphia, transportation projects, although they may have originated with the local elite, were typically pursued or directed by the local state and endorsed by large, diverse political coalitions. The role of the local state repeatedly overshadowed that of private capital, constituting a kind of urban-based mercantilism.

Chapter 7 examines the two cities' efforts to improve their *symbolic* position in global society via the definition of a second city identity and via planning for cultural extravaganzas like world's fairs or the Olympics. Cultural plans of this magnitude entail a simultaneous triple reconstruction of the metropolis: physical (rebuilding sections of the city), political (rebuilding a workable political coalition or regime out of a situation of discord), and symbolic (renarrating a city's identity to emphasize its secondness). Figure 1.4, for example, shows the results of recent attempts to reimagine Manchester's docklands as a site of cultural consumption. It is in particular through these projects that concerns about the global position of the city relative to other cities consciously enter into urban life, and these concerns are the building blocks of a second city identity. The second city identity itself is constructed via several discursive and symbolic strategies: through claims of a glorious past, of superiority over lesser national cities, of equality with an international group of similar provincial capitals, of favorable comparisons with global cities, and sometimes explicitly of being "second." People compare their city with other cities and, through these comparisons, they develop a cultural sense of their own city. The chapter also analyzes the role that these efforts play in reconstructing and shaping urban politics and governance, thereby providing a direct connection between global concerns and local action. Those who engage in such

Figure 1.4: The L. S. Lowry Centre for the Performing Arts at Salford Quays, built on the site of the old Manchester Ship Canal docks.

comparisons are, in particular, civic and political leaders, the economic elite, planners, intellectuals, and the media, but they also crop up in everyday discourse and popular understandings among residents and travelers. Urbanites thus socially construct an image of themselves and their city's place in an urban system through observations of other cities.

In Chapter 8, I consider the broader, macro-level implications of Philadelphia's and Manchester's attempts to shape the course of globalization to their own benefit. Here I ask what other cities count as second cities, how cities rise and fall in position over time, and how the institutional role or significance of the city, relative to the nation-state in particular, is changing as a result of contemporary globalization. Manchester and Philadelphia, in their attempts to capture portions of the growing global traffic and to define their own positions in the global system, actively pursued the increase of cross-border relationships and flows. This fact by itself is not surprising. But the evidence in these two cases clearly points toward a conclusion that is both more incisive and more general: the local state is an actor, with its own interests, carrying out its own foreign relations—or MFP. Very often, this municipal foreign policy explicitly aims at increasing the extent of the city's global integration and thereby furthers the process of globalization in general. By their own actions and by the actions of people in them, therefore, cities are in fact creators, sustainers, and pursuers of globalization. They make globalization happen.