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# Introduction

## “The Handwriting on the Wall”

Many young people with whom I have conversed over the past twenty years have seen the 1960s as a golden age in the United States, when African Americans completed the last stage of their long march from slavery to freedom by building a noble and courageous movement that captured the hearts and minds of the people of the United States and the sympathy of many throughout the world. It was a time when young Americans (including soldiers) opposed the militarism of the U.S. government, ultimately convincing most Americans that the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was not in the interest of the people of the United States or the people of Vietnam. It was a time when African Americans marched to center stage in American society and forced the walls of Jim Crow segregation to come tumbling down. It was a time when Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and the Black Panther Party raised high the banners of Black Liberation.

These young people often wanted to know what it was about my generation that enabled us to have such an impact on the country, which they saw as sorely lacking in their own generation. My response was always that there was nothing so special about my generation; we were products of our time. Sometimes I point out that a key intellectual failing of our popular discourse is a lack of appreciation of temporalities, but before my listeners' eyes glaze over in that “here comes another professorial lecture” expression, I move quickly to my main point about the 1960s: It was not merely the achievement of youth in the United States (as important as that was); the 1960s was a period of world revolution. All over the world the emancipatory designs of the common people tempered the corrosive and socially degrading power of corporate capitalism, and people of color boldly challenged the presumptions of a global geoculture rooted in the assumptions of

a white world supremacy. People of color all over the globe rose to claim their place in the human family as full and respected members of the world community. These movements in Africa, Latin America, and Asia inspired people of African descent, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, Asians, and whites in the United States to believe that a democratic, just, and egalitarian world was indeed possible and that they could and should contribute to the building of such a world.

The rise of what was called the dark world was heralded by Malcolm X as the end of white world supremacy. Malcolm pointed out that the black revolution in the United States was not the rebellion of a minority but a part of the worldwide struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor. The great Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong agreed. He argued that the evil system of imperialism began with the enslavement of the Black people and would surely come to an end with their complete liberation. While people often associate this period of militancy beyond the civil rights movement with Malcolm X's comment that we will achieve our freedom "by any means necessary" and the Black Panther Party's rhetoric about picking up the gun, the more enduring legacy of Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party was their contribution to a larger movement: They illuminated the landscape with their fresh understanding of the world and a vision that ordinary people who had been victims of the most ruthless exploitation and degradation could collectively create a world that was egalitarian, democratic, and just. However, the tension between the heroic act of the oppressed and the larger and more democratic vision that Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party articulated created a juncture at which federal and local law enforcement agencies could implicitly justify acting as occupying armies not only to bring these dangerous organizations under control but also to monitor and undermine the efforts of all who were involved in the movement as a whole. It is only in this context that we can understand how the FBI's war against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., could gain such wide support among liberals, who in theory supported the program of the civil rights movement.

While it is often difficult for the actors in these dramas to operate at a remove that allows them to see both sides of this story, it is much simpler to locate one's own assessment on the basis of whom one trusts. Can Black folks trust whites, who have so seldom risen above self-justifying discourse in their relationship to Black people? Can whites trust Blacks, whose judgments are so often refracted through the memory of past wrongs that they cannot appreciate that there has been a sea change in the racial attitudes of white Americans? Is it simply that there can be no trust from their very different locations within the racial order of U.S. society?

Intellectually and practically, this seemed to be a dead end, but maybe that is the reality. Derrick Bell (1992) and Molefi Asante's (1999) argument about the intractability of the racial divide may have won the day after all.<sup>1</sup> One cannot argue for a position simply because one does not wish to feed cynicism about the possibilities for social change or because one wants only one type of intellectual position to hold. This is clearly not my position. My first response to a simple

linear understanding of race relations is that one cannot fully understand the differences that separate liberal intellectuals, activists, and citizens unless one looks at the phenomenon over a long time frame. This, of course, takes us back to the issue of temporalities, or social time.

Like many who have argued for what has recently emerged as the study of the "long civil rights movement," I argue that we may understand the actions of these three entities better if we position the dilemma in the context of the rise to prominence of a liberal internationalism that Henry Luce referred to as the American century. It was through this worldview that powerful forces within the United States sought dominion over the earth. It consisted of a mature global liberalism promising the spread of the good and then the great society to all Americans and eventually to everyone in the world who followed America's example and *direction*. Though it was a frankly hegemonic project that was global in scope, it differed in form from the colonialism practiced by the European powers. It seemed to be of a piece with the civil rights movement, which sounded the central themes of democratization, equal rights, and social justice. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a young Baptist minister who had led the Montgomery Bus Boycott came to symbolize the spirit of the civil rights movement and the promise of America. He skillfully articulated a vision of the American dream that captured the imaginations of tens of millions of Americans of all colors and creeds. King's challenge that America live up to the true meaning of that dream was viewed as the final push that would inspire the people of the United States to complete the great unfinished American revolution. But Malcolm X was skeptical; he had listened carefully to the voices of millions of Black people who lived outside the Jim Crow South yet who were more deeply marginalized from the U.S. white mainstream. Malcolm X helped call the attention of the nation to these marginalized masses by speaking in their voice and helping them to speak in their own voice. Ultimately the eloquence of these voices plus the voices of "the barefoot people in the jungles of Vietnam" (King 1967) drew King closer to Malcolm's view, and King began to say that the operations of U.S. power were a nightmarish ordeal for the world's have-nots and for many of the most disadvantaged people of color within America's borders. During the early 1960s, the most idealistic period of America's global liberalism, the youthful rebels of Students for a Democratic Society argued for a radical democratization of U.S. society, but the rebellion against U.S. hegemony manifested in the struggles in Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, China, Ghana, Guinea, and other parts of Africa, Asia, and North America combined with the struggle of oppressed strata within the national borders of the United States undermined the largesse of the liberal state. The *rappports de force* had shifted decisively in favor of the colonized, semicolonized, dependent zones of the world-economy occupied in the main by people of color. Malcolm X, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, the Congress of Racial Equality, King, and a host of others called not only for solidarity with the revolutionaries of the three continents but also for the people of the United States to become a part of this elemental rebellion. The world revolutionary trend was global in scope, arrayed against the global power of the U.S. hegemon.<sup>2</sup>

In the conservative atmosphere of neoliberal globalization and the Project for the New American Century, it may be easy to forget or difficult to comprehend a time when third world elites allied with the American hegemon all over the world were under challenge, and many people felt that victory was in sight. What was truly remarkable about this period was the depth of support within the United States for these movements in opposition to the power of the country's own ruling class. This kind of internationalism had been a regular feature of large sections of the Black freedom struggle and of the world socialist movement, but now it was the dominant position of large sections of the population of the hegemonic power, with a majority of young blacks and 40 percent of college students arguing that a revolution was necessary in the United States.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s "all society was a battleground," argues Max Elbaum in the opening pages of his book *Revolution in the Air* (Elbaum 2002:2). Elbaum captures the essence of this period by pointing out that the radicalization of large segments of U.S. youth stemmed in part from their all-important recognition "that the power of the oppressed was on the rise and the strength of the status quo was on the wane" (Elbaum 2002:2). Increasingly revolution seemed to be on the agenda for significant numbers of young people (Elbaum 2002:2).

By the fall of 1968, he points out, 1 million students saw themselves as part of the Left, and 368,000 people agreed on the need for a mass revolutionary party. Among African Americans, he argues, revolutionary sentiments contended not just for influence but for preeminence, especially among those under thirty, as more than three hundred rebellions flared up among inner-city Blacks from 1964 to 1968.

He reminds us that Nixon's brutal invasion of Cambodia in May 1970 led to the largest explosion of protest on U.S. college campuses in the country's history. Four of ten college students, nearly 3 million people, thought that a revolution was necessary in the United States. (Elbaum 2002:18–19). *Business Week* lamented, "The invasion of Cambodia and the senseless shooting of four students at Kent State University in Ohio have consolidated the academic community against the war, against business, and against government. This is a dangerous situation. It threatens the whole economic and social structure of the nation" (*Business Week* 1970:140). This, then, is one level of explanation if we pay attention to the issue of social time, or temporalities. If there is a lesson in this short story, then persons who are involved in this discussion with me often conclude that indeed it is true that there is something special about the sixties as a time but that the key to understanding it is the coincidence between the times and the people who acted in it. This conclusion generally increases the discussion's intensity and complexity. I then argue that the next level of discussion relates to how we articulate an emphasis on social time with the actions of subjects. There are three trajectories that we should pay attention to if we are to understand where the 1960s fit within U.S. and world history. Careful attention to such a framework might enable us to see a history that we missed when we were focusing on that particular moment in time. First, there is the time frame of our historical system—the modern world-system, a capitalist world-economy—which came into existence

during the sixteenth century. We should be able to locate the civil rights movement within the trajectory of our historical social system. How does the U.S. civil rights movement relate to the conquest of America, the enslavement of Africans, and the naturalization of the relations of the conquerors to the conquered in the concept of race? Second, there is the time frame of the rise and expansion of Europe, the progenitor of the capitalist world economy, which articulated its dominance of the non-European world via an ideology of Pan-European racism, or white supremacy. Third, there is the shorter time frame of global hegemonic states, of which there have been three: the United Provinces, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unlike the formal empire of the era of British hegemony, the era of U.S. hegemony is marked by informal empire, or what some refer to as neocolonialism, thus U.S. support for formal decolonization with its clear implications for Jim Crow segregation in the United States.

While the emphasis of this work is on how Black internationalism articulated with the inexorable rise of the dark world during the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, it does not exclude that portion of the story that has to do with the rise, reign, and decline of the American century and with the workings of our historical social system, the capitalist world economy.

Maybe we can position ourselves best by examining Anibal Quijano's (2000) provocative notion about globalization, a term used as a *deus ex machina* in today's world, a stand-in for Margaret Thatcher's notion that there is no alternative but the current system. On the contrary, Quijano argues that what we call globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of the Americas and colonial-modern Eurocentric capitalism as a new global power. Fundamental to this new model of power, he argues, is the social classification of the world's population around the idea of race. While this concept is said to have originated with the origin of what Immanuel Wallerstein calls the modern world-system, Quijano points out that the racial axis of the modern world-system has proved to be more durable than its origin in the colonial situation. This is the basis of Quijano's notion that the model of power that is today hegemonic presupposes an element of coloniality.

My emphasis on the last five hundred to seven hundred years of Pan-European hegemony does not at all deny the fact that civilizations were recognized as distinct constellations of sociocultural formations for thousands of years prior to the rise of the modern, colonial, capitalist, Eurocentric world-system, which is the subject of this book, and of intellectual and public discourse, which is my focus here. Most relatively informed people know something of the parallel existence of such major civilizations as Egypt, Persia, China, the Aztec, the Maya, and the Incas long before the creation of the sociocultural formations in Europe that were united under Rome. At the time of the Roman Empire, there existed four major constellations, according to Anouar Abdel-Malek (2000):

- (a) China, maintaining its continuity since its formation, twenty-five centuries B.C. to this day.
- (b) The central area of Islam, in South-West Asia and North Africa, around the Arab caliphates and shi'ah Iran.

(c) The Indian sub-continent with a predominant Hindu culture while power was mainly the domain of Muslim rulers.

(d) The Mongol Asian and Eurasian world, which came under Muslim rule during recent times. (Abdel-Malek 2000:565)

As John Henrik Clarke (1996) points out in his historical studies of the African world, by this historical period Africa had had its long walk in the sun—and it was indeed a great and mighty walk—but the great African empires were in decline.

Abdel-Malek argues that from the eleventh century onward, the rising European power waged protracted warfare against Islam in the Arab world. Abdel-Malek is highly skeptical of the religious-civilizational banner under which the Crusades were launched, seeing them instead as a matter of plunder and subjugation. From the end of the fifteenth century to our time, according to Abdel-Malek, successive waves of colonialism, classical imperialism, and hegemonic imperialism were viewed as the spread of civilization (now identified exclusively with Pan-European civilization) to the rest of the world (Abdel-Malek 2005:564-566).

With the global expansion of European hegemony, this pattern spread to the rest of the world, along with the imposition of a Eurocentric perspective on knowledge and the use of a concept of race to naturalize the colonial relation between Europeans and non-Europeans. Race as the means to justify the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in the world's structure of power outlasted the system of formal colonialism. This history calls on us to look at racism from a world-historic perspective (Fernand Braudel's (1972) *longue duree*)<sup>3</sup> using Michael Omi and Howard Winant's (1994) idea of racial formation and the rearticulation of race over the middle run as a component of this longer-term trajectory.

Despite the significance of the enslavement of Africans and the struggles of people of African descent in the United States and the larger world to the struggle against racism, it should be clear that this is a global rather than a local issue. I do not see Black-White dynamics as a defining issue; rather, the issue is one of Pan-European racism, or white supremacy. I object to the facile and flattering notion that the United States of America is a nation of immigrants, which, except for African Americans, has been a city on a hill, a shining light that has attracted people from every corner of the world to its welcoming shores. Modern North America began not as a nation of immigrants, as is often claimed, but as a settler colony: British North America. This is clearer to no group more than the Native Americans, who were the first victims of this colonial expansion. The advancing frontier, so celebrated in North American folklore, is predicated on the dispossession of Native American lands and the elimination of the Native Americans themselves. I agree with Stephen Steinberg's (1989:5) insistence that the fabled diversity of the United States is based on the conquest, enslavement, and exploitation of foreign labor. The expansion of the United States entailed a process of imperial conquest that extended to Mexico, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, and a neocolonial policy of domination of all of the Americas

(the Monroe Doctrine), which during the American century spread to the whole world.

The incorporation of the Americas was the constitutive act of the formation of the modern world-system, which was a capitalist world-economy. It involved, first, the subordination of the Americas as a periphery to the Western European core states. The political subordination of additional peripheries included the colonization of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific and the incorporation of East Asia.

The war against Mexico reflected the U.S. quest for a passage to India in obedience to the "divine command to subdue and replenish the earth" (Takaki 1993:191). In doing so, the United States would finally bring civilization to the "Yellow" race, including the Chinese, who would be imported as cheap labor to build the transcontinental railroad. Railroad owners viewed them as quiet, peaceful, industrious, and economical but also wanted them to be permanently degraded caste labor, forced to be foreigners forever (the first were so designated via the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882). In the white imagination, the Chinese took on racial qualities that had been assigned to Blacks: dark skin, thick lips, morally inferiority, childlikeness, savageness, lustfulness—only "a slight remove from the African race." (Takaki 1993:205). Amalgamation with the Chinese would lead to "a mongrel of the most detestable sort that has ever afflicted the earth" (Takaki 1993:205). The Chinese Exclusion Act set the precedent for the National Origins Act of 1924, which prohibited Japanese immigration. The mass imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II was a continuation of more than a hundred years of racial aggression against people of Asian descent in the United States and in their homelands (Rhea 1997:40). Soon, however, the nineteenth-century expansion of an imperial and racist enterprise in the United States would join the rest of the Pan-European world in a fight to maintain white world supremacy in the face of a counterhegemonic force among the residents of the dark world.

The rise of the dark world had a number of fronts. I mention only a few elements of this arc of struggle here: the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1886; the Ethiopian defeat of Italy in 1896; the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905; the founding of the NAACP in 1909; the Mexican Revolution of 1910; the Chinese Revolution of 1911; the founding of the South African Native National Congress in 1912 (later to become the African National Congress); and a succession of revolutions in the Ottoman Empire (Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Arab world) in the early part of the twentieth century.

I am attempting here to restore an angle of vision that was much more common during the early twentieth century so that we may better understand how Black people fit in the international arena. "History is not everything," John Henrik Clarke once wrote, "but it is the starting point. History is a clock that people use to tell their time of day. It is a compass they use to find themselves on the map of human geography. It tells them where they are, but more importantly, what they must be" (Clarke 1987:3). With regard to the need for Africana history, Dr. Clarke pointed out that the Europeans not only colonized most of the world; "they began to colonize information about the world and its people,"



(Clarke 1994:2) forgetting or pretending to forget much that they had already known about the Africans.

It is because of this historiographical obfuscation that I have made this rather extended preface. While there are a variety of angles one might take to understand the history of African Americans—and there are some who would acknowledge the peculiar internationalism of Black social thought and praxis—I wish here to relate the trajectories of various manifestations of Black radicalism to the increasing social power of the dark world and the decline of white Western hegemony over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

There can be little question that the domination of the white world over the dark world has declined in the last 150 years. Although the hierarchical relationship between the white world and the dark world continues, the white world has made adjustments to the changes in *rappports de force* between the two worlds. The sense of self-assurance that once marked the persona of the Pan-European population is no more, although some have sought to overcompensate for the changes in *rapport de force* by assuming a more strident assertive stance. Hegemony does not require macho assertiveness, though, and thus the strident assertion of moral superiority among large sections of the Pan-European world, most decisively in the United States, is a sign not of strength but of a loss of confidence. The cultural options of the dominated people in the world-system include courting or imitating the dominant people to win their favor or allay their antagonisms, and distancing themselves from the dominant people to build their strength. In the 1950s Sekou Touré spoke of the need to overcome the complex of the colonized (Wallerstein 1966, 1958, Toure 1959, 1972).<sup>4</sup> Touré called for African peoples to overcome their identification with the oppressor, echoed in Malcolm X's mocking comments about the house Negro identifying with the master so much that when the master was sick, the house Negro asked, "Boss, we sick?" The distancing option is represented by the stance of Malcolm X's field Negro, what William Sales (1994) deems the tradition of field Negro revolt. Within the United States there has been a long and continuing debate about integration versus separation (Black Nationalism), codified in the work of Harold Cruse (1967), among others. But the two positions are seldom as diametrically opposed as indicated in political debates. Some nationalist approaches are aimed at pluralist integration on a group basis into the dominant society, and some integrationist-assimilationist approaches seek to use the best principles of the dominant group to compel them to recognize the entitlement of all to fair treatment, or as a means of creating space for more options by "putting on ole massa."

Some have joked that it requires a good deal of optimism to undertake a project about the end of white world supremacy, especially at a time when racism seems to be increasing in intensity not only in the United States but on a world scale. But this has not always been very funny over the past hundred years or so, and it is increasingly less funny some thirty-five years after the end of the period of unquestioned U.S. hegemony in the world-system, which lasted from 1945 to 1970. The rise of East Asia, the terrorist attack on U.S. territory by al Qaeda, and what Samuel Huntington sees as the Hispanic (mostly Mexican) challenge to the United States' Anglo-Protestant culture are all signs of growing



concern about both the decline of U.S. hegemony and the decline of the hegemonic status of the Pan-European world.

This is not the first time since the dawn of European hegemony five hundred years ago that such fears have assumed significance in the nation's discourse. World War I certainly shook the confidence of the Pan-European world and was reflected in Lothrop Stoddard's classic, *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy* (1920), and Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race or the Racial Basis of European History* (1916). While W.E.B. Du Bois's commentary in *The Souls of Black Folk* is often given credit for predicting that the problem of the twentieth century would be the problem of the color line, Du Bois's position at the time of that writing was much more optimistic, anticipating that a rational appeal would vindicate the race in the eyes of a significant section of a rational but ill-informed white public.

The social thought of people of African descent have long included the idea of the eventual rise of the dark world—from the Christianized Africans at the time of the American Revolution, who saw themselves as people of the New Covenant (Moses 1998:44), to ordinary field hands, who underwent a Pan-Africanization with religious men at the center (Stuckey 1975). The notion of the rising of the dark world is part and parcel of the culture of resistance that animated people of African descent in slave and postslavery societies. It is a logical consequence of the widespread notion that the United States is a white nation, as is discussed in the work of numerous scholars (M. Bush 2004; Alexander Saxton 1990). Hubert Harrison's *When Africa Awakes* (1997) and George Wells Parker's *The Children of the Sun* (1981) are early examples of the manner in which the early New Negro intellectuals embodied this outlook.

While many scholars have a passing familiarity with the work of Winthrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, the more general reading public might benefit from a short review of their work. In June 1914 Stoddard argued, "The world-wide struggle between the primary races of mankind—the 'conflict of color,' as it has been happily termed—bids fair to be the fundamental problem of the twentieth century" (quoted in Stoddard 1921:v). In the introduction to the Stoddard classic, Madison Grant focuses on Eurasia as the main theater of world history, a conflict between three races found in the western part of Eurasia and their Asiatic challenger. The races that are the focus of Grant's introduction to the Stoddard classic and the subjects of his *Passing of the Great Race* are "the great" Nordic race in the northwestern peninsula of Eurasia, the Mediterranean race (which has been Nordicized), the Alpine (or Slavic) race, and the Asiatic Mongols. Grant is alarmed by the retreat of the Nordic race westward from the grasslands of western Asia and eastern Europe to the borders of the Atlantic but takes comfort in the Nordicizing of the Mediterranean race north of the sea and the Nordicizing of some of the Slavic populations in central Europe, Austria, and the Balkans. But the establishment of a chain of alpine states from the Baltic to the Adriatic at the end of World War I at the expense of the Nordic ruling classes is said to take us back to the days of Charlemagne, whose successors took a thousand years to push the frontiers of Europe eastward (Stoddard 1921).

Grant concludes his introduction as follows: "Now that Asia, in the guise of Bolshevism with Semitic leadership and Chinese executioners, is organizing an assault upon western Europe, the new states—Slavic-Alpine in race, with little Nordic blood—may prove to be not frontier guards of western Europe but vanguards of Asia in central Europe." Grant doubts that the Alpine states can hold firm against Asian incursion "now that they have been deprived of Nordic ruling classes through democratic institutions" (Stoddard 1921:xxxii). For Grant, democratic ideals are fine as long as we are dealing with a homogenous population of Nordic blood, as in England or the United States, but it is "suicide pure and simple" for the white man to share his blood with or entrust his ideals to brown, yellow, black, or red men.

Stoddard echoes Grant's condemnation of Bolshevism as the archenemy of civilization and of the Nordic race: "To the Bolshevik mind, with its furious hatred of constructive ability and its fanatical determination to enforce leveling, proletarian equality, the very existence of superior biological values is a crime. Bolshevism has vowed the proletarianization of the world, beginning with the white peoples." Every political grievance, every act of discrimination, every nationalist aspiration is fuel for the Bolsheviks' incitement of race and class warfare. Stoddard sees the Bolshevik menace in "China, Japan, Afghanistan, India, Java, Persia, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and the 'black belts' of our own United States" (Stoddard 1921:220).

Stoddard concludes that "Bolshevism is the renegade, the traitor within the gates who would betray the citadel, degrade the very fiber of our being, and ultimately hurl a rebarbarized, racially impoverished world into the most debased and hopeless of moglelizations" (Stoddard 1921:221). It is for this reason that Bolshevism must be crushed, no matter what the cause, *not in defense of democracy*, as would later be claimed, but in order *to oppose the democracy*, leveling, and egalitarianism that Stoddard and Grant considered to be Bolshevik ideals. For Stoddard, there is no "imprescriptable right" to independence or to empire. One has to deal with the realities of each case in terms of the logic of the overall defense of the system of white world supremacy. Stoddard argues that the period of white expansion took two forms: areas of white settlement such as North America, which has become an integral part of the white world, and regions of political control such as India. Those areas of white settlement are called the "inner dikes" of white civilization and must be defended at all costs. Future generations are said to have "a right to demand of us that they be born white in a white man's land" (Stoddard 1921:226). This, Stoddard contends, is an elemental "call of the blood," which must be heard lest the white world heed the writing on the wall.

At the same time, Stoddard argues, the practically absolute world dominion that the white man enjoyed during the nineteenth century can no longer be maintained, since the "life conserving nature of white rule everywhere has favored colored multiplication." Therefore, in those areas of political control, such as Asia, where the populations are capable of self-governance, the white world should be governed by pragmatic considerations rather than by the overheated passions of "doctrinaire imperialists." In these areas whites should cede control

by evolutionary and peaceful means and thus retain the capacity of cooperative relationships with the newly independent regimes. The alternative to this pragmatic concession, Stoddard cautions, is the opening up of violent shortcuts that would be mutually disastrous, especially because the weakening of the white world during World War I evoked in "bellicose and fanatical minds the vision of a 'Pan Colored' alliance for the overthrow of white hegemony at a single stroke" (Stoddard 1921:229).

Not only would such a prospect make World War I seem like child's play, but also the fanning of the flames of needless antagonism would only increase the hostility of Asians toward the white world and could have dire geopolitical ramifications for the white world in the long run. Stoddard argues that causing such festering hatred might poison the attitudes of people in other colored lands and even reverberate among some in the white world as well. This kind and level of hostility could ultimately result in the formation of a "Pan-Colored" or "Colored-Bolshevist alliance" (Stoddard 1921:233). Therefore, taking a conciliatory attitude toward the aspirations of Asians for independence would enable the white world more effectively to defend what Stoddard considers the true "outer dikes" of the white world in Black Africa and "mongrel-ruled" Latin America, which could not stand alone (Stoddard 1921:232-233).

The danger to the "inner dikes" of the white world is constituted by allowing immigration to overwhelm the process of natural selection that had enabled America to amass an unprecedented racial treasure by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Stoddard argues that the colonial stock was perhaps the finest that nature had evolved since the classic Greeks, the pick of the Nordics of the British Isles and adjacent areas in Europe. Since the very process of migration was so difficult, only persons of courage, initiative, and strong willpower would face the difficult journey to "an untamed land haunted by ferocious savages" (Stoddard 1921:262). This magnificent stock was undermined, however, by the opening of the country to a deluge of immigrants, allowing for the dilution and supplanting of superior stock by inferior stock.

Stoddard laments the "impossibility of any advanced and prosperous community maintaining its social standards and handing down to its posterity" *in those days* of cheap and rapid transportation. The only solution to this dilemma, Stoddard argues, was restrictions on immigration. The entire logic of civilizational progress was undermined by the way that the modern world was proceeding. Why practice prudence if hungry strangers can crowd in at your table at places reserved for your children (Stoddard 1921:261)? The great accomplishments of the white man in abolishing distance have destroyed the protection that nature once conferred. The white world will be swamped by the triumphant colored races and will finally perish (Stoddard 1921:303).

Since the time of Stoddard's and Grant's classics, the twentieth century has been dotted with revolutionary challengers to the capitalist system and to the system of white Western hegemony. It was only in the 1960s, though, that the magnitude of the challenge in the United States assumed such proportions that scholars such as Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin began to refer to that period as the "civil war of the 1960s." Indeed, their conceptually bold *America*

*Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s* (2000) captures the scope of the transformation attempted but suffers from its short time frame and thus its inadequate periodization. Since Black internationalism has been one of the most consistent and persistent challengers to the problem of the color line and its more modern ideological analog the notion of liberal universalism and has constantly rebuked the United States for its grossly exaggerated democratic claims, I think an examination of Black internationalism is a necessary element for a thorough examination of the social tensions and contradictions in U.S. society and the larger social world in which it is embedded.

What I attempt to do in this project is to locate the New Negro, civil rights, and Black Power phases of the Black freedom struggle in a larger tradition with sites in the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa and among the social and national movements of the Three Continents. This study seeks to determine the overall impact of these movements, their impact on other social forces, and the resultant transitions in U.S. society as a whole. While this work is not a detailed history of these movements, it attempts a serious estimate of the significance and impact of the movements. Some may caution that a more modest scope is needed; this may be the case for some investigators, but I do not hesitate to locate myself in a long tradition of Black radical scholars, Black scholar activists, and radical scholars from a variety of traditions who have consistently attempted to contextualize social research within the framework of large-scale, long-term social change. Indeed, the use by Manning Marable (1984) and others of the term *Second Reconstruction* to describe the 1960s is an indication that other scholars feel the need for a broader conceptualization of these elements of social movement theory.

The origins of this study are in part positive, from my study of Black Nationalism and class struggle in the twentieth-century United States, and in part negative, from the practice of counterinsurgency forces operated by the state. Former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover argued during the early 1960s that the nation was in the midst of a social revolution, with the racial factor at its core (O'Reilly 1989:355). Hoover sought to prevent the rise of a messiah to unify the Black militant forces (Churchill and Vander Wall 1988, 1990), but Malcolm X and King were not only charismatic leaders who together commanded the attention of most of those at the bottom of the economic ladder and a substantial section of those in the middle; they were also visionary intellectuals who viewed America and its oppressed within a world context. They both called for siding with the barefoot people of the earth. King followed Malcolm X, and then the Black Panther Party followed both men, though it claimed only Malcolm X. The ruthless repression of this populist Left by the state's security forces in allegiance with conservative nonstate organizations led to the cadrefication of large segments of the New Left, which is noted in this study but the details of which are the subject of a subsequent research project.

The societal convulsions caused by this uprising affected not only the lower orders but the centers of governance as well, who in attempting to settle the grievances being raised crafted far-reaching policies that redefined and expanded notions of equality, justice, and democracy. This in turn had an impact

on scholars, including sociologists, and the public's understanding of race, class, and poverty. This shows that the public's ideas and their capacity for creative conceptualization is not static but responds to the agency of human subjects. Here we note some elements of the societal transformation that justified the use of the term the *Second Reconstruction*, but the details of that story will be the work of a subsequent research project.

The research undertaken here is intended to deepen the insights from my recent book, *We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century* (Bush 1999), and to broaden my focus on the trajectory of opposing ideologies and movements. The most urgent corrective to my previous work must involve a more sophisticated use of the concept of social time. Much of my elaboration about the trajectory of the Black Liberation movement in the twentieth century focused on the middle run. This was an important corrective to the focus on the short term that one finds in many works of historical analysis, but the work lacked all but a very cursory perspective on the long term.

In subsequent work I have attempted to correct this oversight. I follow the Working Group on Coloniality at the State University of New York at Binghamton (Binghamton University), which has argued that the modern capitalist world that unfolded over the last five hundred to seven hundred years had as a fundamental element processes of racial formation and domination that have been central to its expansion and organization. These processes have been the focus of social movements that have organized against the multiple forms of this global structure of racial formation and domination. Quijano argues that the formation of the Americas was constituted by two fundamental historical processes: (1) the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of "race," assumed to be a biological category that naturalized the hierarchical relationship between the conquerors and the conquered on the basis of the superiority of the conquerors and the inferiority of the conquered, and (2) the articulation of all known forms of labor control (slavery, serfdom, small-commodity production, and reciprocity) on the basis of capital and the world market. The population of the new world and later the entire world was ordered along these axes. Terms that had heretofore referred to geographical designations, such as *European*, *Spanish*, *Portuguese*, now referred to a putative racial designation. In the Americas, the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by the conquest. After the colonization of America, Quijano argues, the expansion of European colonialism to the rest of the world and the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new identity required the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, what Quijano views as "a theoretical perspective on the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans" (Quijano 2000:534–535).

Of course social domination was not new, but the use of the concept of race as a means of legitimizing this domination was indeed new and (with the important exception of gender) has proved to be the most effective and long-lasting instrument of universal social domination. Race became the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in

the new society's structure of power. Within the Pan-European world, race replaced religion as a means of ordering the world's people. In a presentation about cultures in conflict at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Wallerstein pointed out that it was in the course of a revolt against the dominance of religion that Enlightenment humanism-scientism staked its claim to a true universalism, one that could in theory be accessed by all via verifiable rational analysis. However, since people still came to different conclusions about truths, there was a need to resolve this quest for a universal truth. Enlightenment humanism-scientism was forced to create a hierarchy of human beings according to their degree of rationality. So if the course of things were to be ordered in the most useful way, then priority should be given to the more rational. This is of course the usefulness of the concept of race, because human populations are ordered on the basis of who is more rational, which of course always turns out to be groups to which the dominant strata belong.

This new structure of power included a new articulation of a variety of forms of labor control deliberately established to produce commodities for the world market. These forms of labor control, which included slavery, serfdom, petty commodity production, reciprocity, and wage labor, were not mere extensions of their historical antecedents, because of the manner in which they were tied and articulated under a system of commodity production for the world market.

In Anglo-America the indigenous people were not colonized but were formally recognized as nations, with formal international commercial and military relations. Colonial-racial relations existed only between Blacks and whites. When the nation began to expand, it dispossessed the Native Americans of their land and almost exterminated them. The survivors were then imprisoned within North American society as a colonized race (Quijano 2000:560), but "the use of race as the means of justifying the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in the world's structure of power outlasted the system of formal colonialism" (Bush 2006:345).

The fact that racism is so deeply encrusted in the social structures, the super-egos, and the institutional and ideological structures of the pan-European world; the fact that racism is what defines a European (white) identity means that many racialized practices pass under the radar of the non-racialized populations. They are simply normal and there is no need to take account of these practices.<sup>5</sup> It is therefore not a variable easily susceptible to liberal reformism (and its sometimes good intentions) or conservative color blindness (a much more defensive orientation often with eyes wide shut). While the rearticulation of racial discourse may alter the expression of this pillar of our historical system, it remains as firmly in place as ever.<sup>6</sup> Racism is not simply a divide-and-conquer strategy among capitalists; it is constitutive of the class system within historical capitalism, which has taken the form of a capitalist world-economy. So the radical impulse that insists that racism will be with us as long as we live in a capitalist system is fundamentally correct, even if we cannot accept the old line of the U.S. Socialist Party, based on the "class first" idea, that we must wait for socialism, which will abolish the "exploitation of man by man" and thus the basis of "natural" competition among workers, which most of the Socialist Party leadership

viewed as the foundation of racism within the capitalist system. Harrison's assertion that the Socialist Party militants saw this competition as natural is key here and is similar to the critique that Anibal Quijano and others have made of the Marxist revolutionary and intellectual tradition.

The old idea that capitalism began in Europe and later expanded to incorporate other parts of the world as colonial zones is an imprecise formulation. The capitalist world-economy was born as a European core *and* an American periphery. Racism was a part of that birth; it did not come later as a strategy of divide and conquer used by capital. It was part of the stratifying processes that were constitutive of historical capitalism, which was a capitalist world-economy.<sup>7</sup> The formation of a world working class performing different types of labor (wage labor, slave labor, petty commodity production, etc.) at different levels of remuneration was constitutive of the capitalist world-economy. Sections of the world worker's movement, particularly those outside the core zones, would eventually seek to explain such inequalities within the working classes in terms of the emergence of a labor aristocracy or a bourgeois stratum of the working class.

If the cultural hegemony of a European-based world-economy relied in part on the social glue of Pan-European racial solidarity as moral justification for and defense of Euro-North American world hegemony, then the subordinate populations of the non-European world and their descendents experienced this outlook as a system of oppressive humiliation that denied their humanity, intelligence, and dignity. People of African descent, who were at the bottom of the world status and social hierarchy, were actively engaged in constructing dreams of freedom and liberation, which in the postslavery twentieth century were often captured by the slogan "The Rise of the Dark World." This then became a central component of African American radical thought. Since radical Black Nationalism had little hope of a strictly "nationalist" solution, it has long pegged its hopes on an internationalist solution. The logic of Ida B. Wells's appeals against lynch-mob violence at the end of the nineteenth century; Du Bois at the turn of the century speaking at the Pan-African Congress; the New Negro Movement; Du Bois, Graham, and Robeson during the popular-front period; and Malcolm X, King, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Angela Davis, and the Black Panther Party during the 1960s and 1970s all followed this trend.<sup>8</sup>

The twentieth century had witnessed the dramatic rise of the dark world but not "the end of white world supremacy," which really seemed an accurate observation and not merely wishful thinking on the part of Nation of Islam leader Malcolm X in 1963 (Malcolm X 1971). While I argued in *We Are Not What We Seem* that Malcolm's judgment was premature but that it was indeed a sign of the times that we must continue to take seriously, it would benefit us to look at the logic of Malcolm X's argument in more detail. First let us look at a snapshot of Malcolm's comments, which in my view summarized Malcolm's reflections on the spirit of Bandung,<sup>9</sup> so salient to the times in which he spoke:

The time is past when the white world can exercise unilateral authority and control over the dark world. The independence and power of the dark world is on the increase; the dark world is rising in wealth, power,



prestige, and influence. It is the rise of the dark world that is causing the fall of the white world.

As the white man loses his power to oppress and exploit the dark world, the white man's own wealth (power or "world") decreases. . . . You and I were born at this turning point in history; we are witnessing the fulfillment of prophecy. Our present generation is witnessing the end of colonialism, Europeanism, Westernism, or "White-ism" . . . the end of white supremacy, the end of the evil white man's unjust rule. (Malcolm X 1971:130)<sup>10</sup>

The period during which Malcolm X spoke was the era of decolonization in Africa, a time when the spirit of Bandung was the framework for what Malcolm referred to as a worldwide revolution. For those who accepted the authority of the white world as a given, these were troubled times. Unlike a time when nothing could happen without the approval of the United States, the Soviet Union, or France, the people and nations of the dark world came together at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955 and agreed to submerge their differences and present a united front against the common enemy, the colonizing authorities of the European world. It was in the context of this unity of the African-Asian-Arab bloc, Malcolm argues, that African nations were able to obtain independence and join the United Nations.

Now the members of the dark world had a voice, a vote, in the United Nations and were soon able to outvote the white man, who had formerly been their colonial authority. By being able to outvote the colonial powers, they were able to force the people of Europe to "turn loose the Black man in Tanganyika, the Black man in the Congo, and the Black man in what we know today as the former French West African territories" (Malcolm X 1971:97). While Malcolm was certainly not deceived by the real power of the United Nations, he viewed it as a forum in which international debates and discussions about issues of world power and justice could be aired. For Malcolm the new arithmetic of the United Nations was an opportunity to exert pressure for more democracy on the hegemonic powers of the white world, who had long exercised unilateral and dictatorial powers over the peoples and nations of the dark world. The new arithmetic of the United Nations was the handwriting on the wall, and Malcolm X was a master at showcasing this handwriting so that it was plain for all to see. Malcolm would not allow the world to miss the significance of British prime minister Harold Macmillan's remarks and those of others "crying the blues" because of the passing of the famed British Empire, on which the sun had finally set. Like no one else, Malcolm was able to provide a narrative that explained in the clearest terms the implications of the French defeat in Indochina and the impact of the loss of its colonial possessions there on its economy and consequently on its inability to maintain an army sufficient to control its large West African colonies, leading ultimately to the collapse of French colonial power in Algeria under the weight of another fierce war of national liberation.

Malcolm turned the spotlight on the Netherlands' loss of Indonesia and the Belgian loss of the Congo. Malcolm taunted the former colonial powers, chiding

Belgium, which, he argued, had been a power on this earth as long as it controlled the mineral wealth the Belgian Congo. But once it lost control of its central African colony, the economy was so traumatized that the Belgian government collapsed.

Malcolm called out to both the Black, Brown, Yellow, and Red victims of Euro–North American hegemony and the residents of the Pan-European world themselves to read the handwriting on the wall. He called on them all to recognize the fundamental fact of that historical moment, in which the rise of the dark world was the occasion for the decrease in power of the white world over the dark world. It was his recognition of this change in the constellation of world power that gave Malcolm X such remarkable insight and that led him to make the correct call following the Kennedy assassination that this was a case of the chickens coming home to roost. If Dr. King's August 1963 speech represented the most articulate statement of the American dream and represented the height of the mature global liberalism that was the signpost of the American century, then it was Malcolm who most clearly understood and articulated the other side—or the underside—of this phenomenon. Malcolm X was a master teacher without peer (see Malcolm X 1971:81–120, 121–148; Sales 1994).

Power in defense of freedom, Malcolm argued, is greater than power on behalf of tyranny and oppression. For Malcolm the latter inevitably lacks the kind and degree of conviction of the former because the mentality of most who would implement power on behalf of tyranny and oppression is that of an employee.<sup>11</sup> However, there is a sense in which white supremacy has the capacity to produce a certain derangement and degrading of mentality that can be passionate in a negative and hateful sense. Malcolm clearly believes in the power of a life-affirming passion that can produce uncompromising and hopeful action (see, for example, Malcolm X 1965:150).

Malcolm X taught that this was a period of worldwide revolution far beyond the bounds of Mississippi, Alabama, and Harlem. The revolutionary forces coming to the fore were to oppose not simply the U.S., French, or English power structure but an international Western power structure consisting of U.S., French, English, Belgian, and other European interests. These former colonizers of the dark world had formed an international combine, but Malcolm called for unity among 22 million Black people in the United States and urged them to unite with 700 million of their Muslim sisters and brothers in Africa and Asia and with the revolutionary people in Africa, Asia, and the Americas (Malcolm X 1992:106–126). Malcolm reestablished in the 1960s what other people of African descent had known in the past—that the struggles of Black people in the United States were not just an American problem but a world problem.

Malcolm restored the sense of internationalism that had long been a part of the imagination of people of African descent—of its leaders and intellectuals and among the common people. Fanon Wilkins (2001) has most effectively navigated the break in this Black internationalism by the "liberal compromise" among sections of the civil rights leadership during the cold war period of the late 1940s to the late 1960s.<sup>12</sup> While Wilkins focuses on the continuity of Black internationalism breached by the liberal compromise, William Jelani

Cobb (2006) focuses on the history of Black anticommunism in the United States.

Malcolm clearly thought that the end had come for the dominant strata of the white world. He was of course not alone. "What time is it?" was a common refrain during the period from 1965 to 1975, when the cumulative strength of a variety of liberation movements seemed to signal the death knell of Pan-European domination.

Having established the convincing case made for Black internationalism by Malcolm X, I would like to look back at the social, economic, political, and spiritual forces that have been the foundation of my own analysis of this issue.

### Articulating the International Dimensions of the Black Experience

While this view comes preeminently from reflections on Malcolm X's remarks about the end of white world supremacy, my sense of Black internationalism was powerfully reinforced by an essay published in the mid-1980s by Bernard Magubane, a South African scholar and member of the African National Congress, then an anthropology professor at the University of Connecticut speaking at the tenth anniversary of the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell University, which focused on theoretical and research issues in Africana studies. The task that these scholars set for themselves was to understand the theoretical and research issues to be focused on in Africana studies during the next decade. The organizers of the conference could have hardly chosen a better person than Magubane to conceptualize the political economy of the Black world. The title of Magubane's presentation was "The Political Economy of the Black World—Origins of the Present Crisis."

I was impressed by his manner of addressing the conference. He cautioned his audience about viewing history as nostalgia and gently chastised some for their tendency to reify the past, as if Black history consists of simply identifying and enumerating "dead mummies" (Magubane 1984:283). The past, Magubane argued, is very much a part of the present, and Black poverty could not be understood without viewing it through the lens of a world perspective. In historical perspective, then, the economic plight of the black world is rooted in the exploitation that resulted from the rise and expansion of the world capitalist system.

The African slave trade not only integrated the Black world into the world capitalist system; it was the major source of primitive accumulation for European and American capitalists.<sup>13</sup> The overall consequence of this pattern of social and economic integration of Africans into the world-economy is that Black skin continues to be associated with genetic inferiority. One could thus conclude a system of structural and ideological racism turned on the historical incorporation of Africans into the capitalist world-economy as involuntary servants. This manner of incorporation of Africans into the emerging world-economy also had implications for the determination of agency. Thus, a very important consequence of the forced dispersal of African people as involuntary servants

within the capitalist world-economy made of Africans the first truly international proletariat and, moreover, made the fortunes of capitalism inseparable from the misfortunes of Blacks (Magubane 1984:285–286).

In describing the place of slavery in the capitalist world, Magubane quotes directly from a letter from Marx to P. V. Annenkov in 1846:<sup>14</sup>

Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance.

Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy—the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations.

Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the people. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World [Marx, 1971, 94–95].<sup>15</sup> (Magubane 1984:284)

For Magubane, Black people are held to be outcasts from civilization. Slavery not only shattered the fabric of African society; it is the foundation of Africa's underdevelopment. Moreover, the enslaved Africans were the first proletarians to suffer the full weight of capitalist exploitation and dehumanization (Magubane 1984:287). Despite the particularities of people of African descent, Magubane echoes Du Bois's call that we should never lose sight of our commonality with "that dark and vast sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas . . . in Central America . . . that great majority of mankind on whose bent and broken backs rest the founding stones of modern industry" (Magubane 1984:286).

There is a fertile intellectual tradition, Magubane informs us, that should assist us in overcoming this reified historical consciousness, consisting of intellectuals from various locations within the Black diaspora: Dr. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and Lerone Bennett, Jr. On the whole, Magubane suggests, the Black professional managerial strata everywhere have become accessories in the enslavement of their own masses. The counter to the status quo universalizing of the intermediate strata is that the class position of the overwhelming majority of the Black world, as an international proletariat, has been the foundation of much more enduring social aspirations located in much of the Pan-African and Garvey movements (Magubane 1984:293). I would only add that Magubane also might have mentioned the National Negro Congress and the Council on African Affairs of the 1930–1950 period, the 1960s radicals, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Revolutionary Action Movement, the Nation of Islam, and the Black

Panther Party; and the 1970s radicals from organizations such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the Congress of African Peoples, Malcolm X Liberation University, Peoples College, the Youth Organization for Black Unity, the Republic of New Africa, the African Peoples Party, the African People's Socialist Party, and many others.

There is an irony here that is not at all subtle. In contrast to the civilizational rhetoric of the enlightenment of which Marx and the European workers' movement were a part, the idea and practice of Black Liberation by the enslaved Africans and those at risk of enslavement in Africa itself were examples for the rise of the socialist and workers' movements of a later time.<sup>16</sup>

While Magubane recognizes the commonality of the Black experience and others despoiled by a rapacious system, he views the black experience as unique. Imperialism negated the historical process of African people in Africa and throughout the world. Yet despite the nominal independence of most African countries and the increasing electoral gains made by blacks in the United States, the Black world remains in the grips of hunger, poverty, and disease. For the most part Magubane attributes this political weakness to the ideological weakness of the black leadership, consisting in the main of a comprador bourgeoisie that voluntarily chooses capitalist solutions to the problems of poverty both for personal expediency and because they have been conditioned to believe in such solutions.<sup>17</sup>

Even this class is often on the margins of the power elite of the world-system, though, given their proximity to a group that is central to the pariah classes of the world-system. Despite the gains of some members of the African world, it is undoubtedly true that Pan-European racism is the Achilles' heel of the modern world-system, and the demographic situation of the United States, with its large, strategically located populations of color, is a key locus of struggle for a more just, democratic, and egalitarian world order.

Clearly Magubane articulates a class-based understanding of the international dimensions of the Black experience, focusing on processes of capitalist development and class formation in the context of capitalism as a world-system. He locates the cultural expression of Black internationalism in a structural context, in contrast to an approach that places greater emphasis on the evolution of a global African culture as an expression of what Eddie Glaude, Jr., calls "a specific form of life which binds Black people together in the United States and throughout the world" (2000:12). Glaude is much more evenhanded in this analysis and avoids the extremism of what I would call radical antiessentialists such as Paul Gilroy (2000). I too wish to avoid a misdirected and one-sided criticism of cultural nationalist or Afrocentric scholars and activists.

Instead I would like to review briefly an analysis of Black internationalism that I believe is much more sophisticated, that of Tiffany Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley (2000). Patterson and Kelley take the position that dating back at least to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Black writers and activists (such as Juan Latino, Ottobah Cugano, Olaudah Equiano, and Jose Manuel Valdes) have described themselves as part of an international Black community. While some assume that this international Black consciousness was a consequence of the

dispersal of Africans away from the motherland, others argue that it was the context of the dispersal as much as internal developments in Africa that gave rise to this sense of community, or peoplehood, among people of African descent. In other words, racial capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and the slave trade are integral to the formation of what some call the African, or Black, diaspora, not simply as a counterculture but as integral to the formation and continuing functioning of the modern world-system. This takes the form of a counterculture only because of the manner in which a hegemonic Pan-European world has exorcised Blackness in order to create its own myths of racial purity, white supremacy, and Black inferiority (Patterson and Kelley 2000).

While Patterson and Kelley briefly review the work of those who assert that much of West and central African culture, in the form of music, dance, religion, and linguistic patterns, survived in the Americas (for example, Melville Herskovits, Sterling Stuckey, and Joseph Holloway), they seem to lean in the direction of scholars such as Sidney Mintz and Richard Price, who argue that what survived was a consequence of the process of cultural syncretism shaped by the context of the "cultural contact" (Patterson and Kelley 2000:16). Unlike E. Franklin Frazier and Charles Johnson, who in an earlier generation argued quite forcefully that there were no cultural retentions after the first generation, Mintz and Price do not outright reject all forms of cultural continuity between Old World and New World Africans but reject the notion of a single African culture, placing great emphasis on the emergence of new, dynamic cultures.

Patterson and Kelley point out that forced labor, racial oppression, colonial conditions, and capitalist exploitation were global processes that incorporated Black people into what I would call (following Wallerstein 1979) the modern world-system, or, more expansively (following Quijano and others), the modern, colonial, capitalist world-system (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodriguez 2002). These processes did not always operate in the same manner, according to Patterson and Kelley, but they did create systems that were sometimes tightly coordinated across oceans and national borders. For Patterson and Kelley this raises the question of whether the so-called cultural survivors were the most effective cultural baggage Africans used throughout the world in their struggle for survival or whether they were created by the very conditions under which Africans were forced to live.

One of the most valuable insights that we get from Patterson and Kelley's exploration of the concept of the African diaspora is that diaspora is both a process and a condition. It is a process, they argue, that constantly is being remade through movement, migration, and travel, as well as imagined through thought, cultural productions, and political struggles.

While we can see the usefulness of the term *diaspora*, in reality Black labor migration is a product of the same processes that induce other populations to migrate. So how do we position Chinese and Indian migration to the Caribbean, Africa, and the U.S. South in relation to the African diaspora? The patterns of these various populations of overlapping migration and systems of subordination have led to patterns of collective identity, such as Afro-Asian and Black and Latino solidarity and competition, and thus to the use of the term

*Black internationalism.* The Black world can be understood only in the context of the wider world and vice versa. Black internationalism, then, is related not only to Pan-Africanism but also to other international movements: socialism, communism, feminism, surrealism, Islam, and so on (Patterson and Kelley 2000:27).

Like Patterson and Kelley, Michelle Stephens (1998, 1999) articulates a version of Black internationalism that transcends Pan-Africanism, which she calls Black transnationalism. She views this as a specific process of group formation that takes place in the context of U.S.-based ethnic communities.

Stephens points out that social scientists in the 1990s increasingly came to refer to a set of processes by which immigrants became “transmigrants,” with allegiances, loyalties, and networks beyond the nation-state (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994:27). While most nonscholars may find this term awkward, it describes a reality that long predates the 1990s and can be readily identified in many communities in the African diaspora. Stephens locates the origins of scholarly research and commentary on this issue in Randolph Bourne’s 1918 essay titled “Trans-national America.” In this essay Bourne held that World War I had revealed the failure of the melting-pot theory of U.S. culture by instigating vigorous feelings of nationalistic and ethnic loyalty among European immigrants in the United States.

It was also during this period that nationalism and the nation-state were becoming normative features of the modern world-system. In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations were vehicles through which the principle of democratic national self-determination became a model of political organization. Stephens contrasts this new norm to the idea of proletarian internationalism promulgated by the Communist International, which was formed in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia (James 1993).

According to Stephens, the failure of the melting pot led Bourne to recast the American nation in a form that borrows from the internationalist rhetoric of the Russian Revolution (Stephens 1998:596). Since the intellectual contradictions of European nationalism were being played out in the ethnic body politic of the United States, Bourne envisioned a resolution that would combine both the dream of nationalism and the dream of internationalism. The tension of the nationalist currents in the mother country exerted great pressure on European immigrants, but this was not true, in Stephens’s view, of the immigrants from the Caribbean, where home was still a colony. At the same time, these immigrants tended to assimilate into what Hanchard (1990) calls the U.S. African American group, which at that time was decidedly a second-class citizen of the United States. Given this double exclusion, Stephens argues that Caribbean American intellectuals such as Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, and Claude McKay became central figures in articulating a Black transnational vision that transcended the nationalist vision of the European nations and the contradictory ethnic and national sensibilities of white Americans.

Briggs, an editor of the *New York Amsterdam News*, engaged in a public interrogation of President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric on democracy and the self-determination of nations. As early as 1917 Briggs argued that if Wilson wanted to guarantee freedom and self-determination for Poles and Serbs, why not for



colored Americans as well? Briggs also wanted to know what Wilson and the European nations intended to do about the European colonial empire in Africa. The League of Nations refused to include any but free states as members, so those who most needed self-determination and international protection from imperialism were excluded from the organization, leading Briggs to deem it "The League of Some Nations" (Stephens 1998:598).

Given the utter failure of Wilsonian internationalism to address the needs of Black people, Briggs turned to the alternative, the internationalism of the Bolsheviks and the Third International. Consistent with the norms of the Third International revolutionaries, Briggs formed a clandestine organization in 1919, which he called the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB).<sup>18</sup> Stephens describes it as a "secret revolutionary army, . . . the black arm of the international revolution" (Stephens 1998:598). In the October 1921 edition of *The Crusader*, the Supreme Council of the ABB offered a new program "for the Guidance of the Negro Race in the Great Liberation Struggle" (*The Crusader*, 1249, in Hill 1987).<sup>19</sup> In this program the Supreme Council of the ABB called for the creation of "A Great Negro Federation," which would include representatives from all Negro organizations. Stephens argues that the notion of the federation had been conceived at a meeting of the ABB membership attended by Claude McKay, editor of the white Left magazine *The Liberator*, who had just returned from England. The council decided that they would take this plan aboveground through the international convention of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association.

Stephens argues that Briggs's vision of a transnational federation as a stateless entity for organizing the proletariat of the darker races was based on an analysis of the position of Black people in the contemporary world that was similar to Garvey's, but Garvey's proposed solution of a Black empire differed fundamentally from that of the ABB, and sensing that the ABB members were seeking to co-opt the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Garvey expelled them from the 1921 international convention. The "Black Empire urge" that was championed by the Garveyites embodied a notion of Black freedom grounded not in self-determination or social revolution but in imperial political and cultural conquest of Africa by Western Negroes (Stephens 1998:600).

For Stephens it was Claude McKay who had the greatest understanding of what the coming together of the ABB and the Universal Negro Improvement Association would have meant for a radical vision and movement of Black self-determination. Stephens cites McKay's role in the Second Congress of the Communist International, where he argued for a Communist definition of self-determined Blackness, which Stephens argues was in the Black Belt South in the United States.<sup>20</sup> As McKay moved away from the political activities of both the New Negro Movement and the Communist International, he expressed his notion of Black transnationalism in the less-well-known sequel to *Home to Harlem*, the novel *Banjo: The Story without a Plot*. In this book McKay takes us through a world of denationalized colonial immigrants in the French seaport of Marseilles, who use their marginalization in Europe and their exclusion from the League of Nations as the basis for a transnationally imagined community.

This frees them to form relations with others across national borders for reasons that have nothing to do with *raison d'état* (Stephens 1998:603).

Stephens makes the important point that the New Negro intellectuals and activists could not be simply dismissed as having resorted to a “disengaged cosmopolitanism” or having resigned themselves to a “state of exile”; instead, Stephens says, they represented the hope for an engaged Black internationalism that could generate new conceptions of citizenship and the meaning of a national community (Stephens 1998:604).

We should not miss that Stephens's focus on the “Masculine Global Imaginary of Caribbean Intellectus in the United States 1914–1962” is framed almost entirely within the New Negro Manhood Rights Movement (Stephens 2005:46). The New Negro movement was about manliness and militariness, a sharp rejection of the subordinate and “feminized” status of Black men prior to this period. If Black male mobility is the trademark of the Black internationalism of the New Negro intellectuals portrayed by Stephens, the Black woman is the site of domesticity and nationalism (as in McKay's *Home to Harlem*). This new worldly sense of Black collectivity and subjectivity assumes specifically gendered and masculinist terms (Stephens 2005:48).

The turn-of-the-century notion of manhood into which the New Negro generation came to the fore was intimately connected to the idea of dominance. For Stephens the manliness and militariness of the New Negro Manhood Rights Movement was a response to white imperial domination. Stephens follows Carole Boyce Davies's notion that the woman of color appears at first to be invisible in narratives of nationalism and postcolonialism, but this is because she is doing something else somewhere else, in less territorial transnational spaces. The African women intellectuals and activists embody a less triumphalist vision of home, nation, and empire and an often vulnerable mobile subjectivity (Stephens 2005:17). Thus, the race's hybridity is mapped onto the body of the woman of color, and the masculine vision of the race's transnationalism is projected onto the Black male body (Stephens 2005:18).

Angela Davis has recalled her first encounter with Malcolm X as one of four or five Black undergraduates at Brandeis University in the early 1960s. The meeting evoked in her a sense of Black Nationalism and pride in those components of her persona that she associated with Blackness (her hair, her speech patterns, her musical proclivities). While this feeling did not imply any action for her, she feels that she needed the sense of pride as much as she would “later need the appeal of the image of the leather-jacketed, black-bereted warriors standing with guns at the entrance of the California legislature” (an image that she glimpsed in a German newspaper while studying with Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt) (Davis 1998:290). It was this image of the Black Panther Party members that called her home and directed her into an organizing frenzy in the streets of South Central Los Angeles, during which she worked with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Black Panther Party, and the Che-Lumumba Club of the Communist Party of the United States of America (Davis 1998:290–291).

During the 1960s Davis expressed her nationalism in practice in progressive, politicized Black communities. This form of nationalist consciousness was a call

to transformative action, but she strenuously avoided forms of nationalism rooted in the masculinist notions and practice of male dominance, violence against women, and conservative essentialist racialization. During the Black Nationalist revival of the 1990s, the masculinist dimensions of Black Nationalism criticized by Angela Davis absorbed the cultural sentiment that it generated among young Blacks into depoliticized consumption, negative personal practices and attitudes toward women and gays and lesbians, and a tendency to move away from collective political practices.

Unlike the pronouncements of a Malcolm X, which made most Blacks feel good about themselves in the 1960s (and later), Angela Davis sought quite explicitly to avoid the pitfalls of Black Nationalism elaborated by Frantz Fanon, which she further elaborated. She did so against a backdrop of white Left anti-nationalism (the Communist Party of the USA), however, which made it somewhat difficult to separate her voice from those of her Communist Party comrades. Many of those from the left wing of the Black Power generation, whose views were closer to Davis's than they realized, did not listen closely enough to detect that she was indeed singing a different tune. This is not to deny that there was an element of patriarchy and heteronormativity involved in the dialogue of the deaf here.

Clearly Black scholars and activists have thought deeply about these issues and have fully investigated and articulated their analyses and conclusions from a variety of angles. While Magubane's address may have been intended to speak to an ascendant Afrocentric school of thought within the academy-based Africana studies movement, which he cautioned about a reified historical consciousness focusing on "dead mummies," as I have indicated above, I do not wish to engage in a one-sided and dogmatic debate against positions that we would today say are culturalist.

This project reviews the evolution of this worldview among people of African descent and integrates it into the internal dynamics of the evolution of American democracy. This study is a contribution to our understanding of the social world in two ways. There continues to be a need for the contextualization of the Black freedom struggle within the larger social world of which it is a part. Moreover, most analyses of race and class attempt to determine which is the primary determinant of social stratification, whereas in my account race and class are inextricably intertwined, though race occupies a fundamental position in the stratifying processes of historical capitalism.

The race-first versus the class-first debate among Black radicals at the turn of the century was an early expression of the ideological tension that sometimes split Black radicals and at other times was understood as a consequence of the contradictory social position that people of African descent occupied within the United States specifically and within the Pan-European world more generally.

W.E.B. Du Bois authored an early formulation with which many are already familiar. At the dawn of the twentieth century, on July 23, 24, and 25, 1900, the Pan-African Conference addressed the "nations of the world" regarding the "present situation and outlook of the darker races of mankind" (Lewis 1995:639). The young African American scholar W.E.B. Du Bois in his keynote address

argued, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line, the question as to how far differences of race . . . are going to be made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization” (Lewis 1995:639). This is not just an American problem, as Malcolm X would dramatically drive home later. Here it is the young Du Bois who argued that “the Negro problem in America is but a local phase of a world problem” (Lewis 1995:42).

Later Du Bois would author a text on the African origins of World War I, a position supported by most Black radicals of that time, both those who held to a class-first strategy and those who held to a race-first strategy. In practice there is a great deal of overlap between the two strategies. Hubert Harrison is acknowledged by all of the New Negro Manhood Rights Movement as the father of New Negro radicalism (Perry 2001). Harrison had been a member of the Socialist Party but was expelled because he would not accept the simplicities of how white members of the Socialist Party articulated a class-first position. Notice how Harrison expresses the manner in which race and class are intertwined in a system of racial capitalism:

The Nineteenth Christian Century saw the international expansion of capitalism—the economic system of the white peoples of Western Europe and America—and its establishment by force and fraud over the lands of the colored races, black, brown, and yellow. The opening years of the Twentieth Century present us with the sorry spectacle of those same white nations cutting each other’s throats to determine which of them shall enjoy the property which has been acquired. For this is the real sum and substance of the original “war aims” of the belligerents; although in conformity with Christian cunning, this is one which is never frankly avowed. Instead we are fed with the information that they are fighting for “Kultur” and “on behalf of small nationalities.” (Harrison, 1918, subsequently published in *When Africa Awakes*, 1920:116)

There is some public awareness about the impact of the political psychology of the anticolonial movements on groups located within the core states of the world-economy, especially people of African descent in the United States. While Professor Darryl Thomas’s (2001) recent work about the politics of third world solidarity is exemplary, there is today a dearth of scholarly work outside of the Pan-African traditions that has attempted to comprehend the structural and ideological components of this change in world and internal *rappports de force* in the manner that I have tried to do in this work. This is a far cry from the status of third world movements and thinkers from the time when Malcolm X, Dr. King, and a host of others seemed to think that the epoch of white world supremacy was in its terminal phase. In the 1960s and 1970s it was the very challenges to white Western hegemony mounted by social movements and the intellectuals with whom they were allied that gave rise to a vibrant intellectual tradition within the social movements and among intellectuals sympathetic to those movements. In the social sciences, the influence of these social movements was the primary

factor that gave birth to dependency theory and world-systems analysis as intellectual movements, which to some extent transformed the landscape of the world of social knowledge. Intellectuals and social movements in the core were inspired by the movements in the periphery of the world-system and by leaders and thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Aimé Césaire, Amílcar Cabral, Malcolm X, Ella Baker, Fannie Lou Hamer, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Angela Davis, Mohandas Gandhi, and Ho Chi Minh.

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, intellectuals in the United States and parts of the Pan-European world had been on the defensive for twenty years against a withering ideological offensive by the conservative and neoconservative carriers of the tradition of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, who now peddle their ideological harangue in the guise of color blindness. While this has enabled these conservatives to co-opt a considerable number of the liberal integrationists who up to this point were opposed to them, the increasing weight of the "third world within," both in the United States and in the Pan-European world as a whole, particularly in a world that is widely seen as increasingly subject to the dictates of a globalized capitalism, increasingly brings to the fore the issue of not only solidarity against white world supremacy but also global solidarity.

Such solidarity has long been a concern of intellectuals in the movements for racial and social justice among people of African descent and among movements for social justice in all lands. The interplay of feminism and antiracism has introduced notions that have dramatically altered the angle of vision of social movements and the intellectuals allied with them. Black feminist thought contains powerful criticism not only of racism, patriarchy, capitalism, and Eurocentrism but also of patriarchal notions within Black nationalism, while often offering a corrective Black feminist nationalism (or Afrocentrism) oriented not solely toward nation building per se but also toward reconceptualizing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of oppression. The work of Patricia Hill Collins (1991) and other Black feminists is used here to attempt to transcend the search for a counterhegemonic ideology such as traditional Afrocentrism and to a form of knowledge that involves dialogue between partial perspectives in which there is no need to decenter the experience of others (except for the dominant group, which by definition must be decentered). In this dialogue everyone has a voice, but everyone must listen and respond to others in order to remain in the community. Collins argues that sharing a common cause fosters dialogue and encourages groups to transcend their differences. As I have argued in previous work (Bush 1999), this kind of perspective seems central to the project of overcoming the contradictions among the people, which is in turn central to the overall project of social transformation to which all of these groups aspire. This project attempts to draw on the peoples' understanding and experience and weave them together with a comprehension of the structural forces and the larger social and historical system. I hope that this larger project (with sections focusing on theory, radical social movements, and radicalism in the twenty-first century) makes a modest contribution to the literature on Black Liberation, U.S. society, and related social struggles on a world scale.

The twentieth century was indeed the American century; about that there can be little disagreement. The likelihood of a new American century may exist in the imaginations of a lunatic fringe that has attached itself to state power in the United States, but their actions are doing more than any other factor to hasten the decline of U.S. hegemony. The twentieth century has no less been the site of the slow but steady reassertion of the power of the extra-European world. W.E.B. Du Bois had already sounded the alarm about the problem of the twentieth century. Even before World War I there were revolutions in Mexico, Afghanistan, Persia, and China, and the Japanese had defeated the Russians. Indeed, Wallerstein argues that the Russian Revolution was not really a proletarian revolution, but the most successful and spectacular of the rebellions against Pan-European dominance, even if the Bolsheviks leaned to the side of the Westernizers against the Slavophiles. But the debate about Westernization did not occur only among the Russian revolutionaries; it was a sign of the central ambivalence of the movements, which sought both to separate from and to integrate into the existing world-system as a means of obtaining social equality. When the German revolution did not rescue them and establish the proletarian revolution, though, they realized that their survival depended on their link to the world anti-imperialist struggle. Wallerstein argues that this was the meaning of the Baku congress in 1920, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in the city of Baku from September 1 to September 8, 1920 (Wallerstein 2000:4).

While the First Congress of the Peoples of the East is said to have marked a decisive break with the neglect of the national and colonial question by the Second International, based almost exclusively in the Pan-European world, in the first years of the existence of the Soviet Union the leadership felt that the imminent victory of the revolutionary forces in Western Europe was certain. Only in England and the United States was there a possibility that capitalism might survive another year or so (White 1974:493–494). The most vociferous opposition to this Eurocentric approach came from M. Sultan-Galiev (1982), who argued in 1919 that the leaders of the October Revolution had erred in directing their attention almost entirely to the West because of their sense that class antagonisms were sharpest there. “But the East, with its population of one and a half billion enslaved to the western European Bourgeoisie, is forgotten” (Sultan-Galiev 1982:7).

Sultan-Galiev was one of the early theoreticians to see clearly the centrality of imperial domination to the capitalist world-system. He argued that the might and force of the bourgeois culture and civilization of Europe and America is derived from their exploitation of the peoples of the East. The “lion’s share of all the material and spiritual wealth of the ‘whites’ is stolen from the East, and built at the expense of the blood and sweat of hundreds of millions of laboring masses of ‘natives’ of all colors and races” (Sultan-Galiev 1982:9). How contemporary are his words as he continues: “It was necessary for up to ten million aborigines of America and Africa to perish, and to extinguish completely from the face of the earth the entire rich culture of the ‘Incas’ in order that contemporary ‘freedom-loving’ America, with her ‘cosmopolitan culture’ of ‘progress and technology’ might be formed. The proud skyscrapers of Chicago, New York and other cities are on the bones of the

'redskins' and Negroes tortured by inhuman planters and on the smoking ruins of the destroyed cities of the 'Incas'"(Sultan-Galiev 1982:9).

Wallerstein argues that in comparison with the twentieth century, the nineteenth century was the century of progress, a time in which the capitalist system seemed to deliver a new and better world. The liberal geoculture seemed to sweep away all signs of the *ancien régime*. The citizen dethroned the crown as the bearer of sovereignty. It was the century of Pax Britannica in the core zones but also the century of the final imperialist conquest of the extra-European zones. In this world, to be bourgeois, white, male, Christian, and skilled were proof of civilization and a guarantee of progress. It was the progressive aura of this century that made the outbreak of World War I in 1914 such a shock in the Pan-European zones. While the twentieth century continued on something of a progressive road, the changes in *rapports de force* listed above forced Wallerstein to raise the question of whether the twentieth century is darkness at noon or bright sun at midnight.

It was of course during the nineteenth century that the liberal geoculture was formed and the Eurocentric nature of the modern world-system was locked solidly in place and adhered to across the political spectrum. Even Friedrich Engels was to argue, quite unambiguously, according to Abdel-Malek (1981:81), that the 1847 war between the United States and Mexico had a positive character, with the expansion of the U.S. territory into Mexico seen as the expansion of advanced capitalist civilization. The European Left had embraced the civilizing mission.

What, then, after all is said and done, is the problem of the color line that Dr. Du Bois famously raised at the opening of the twentieth century? Is it not that the dangerous classes of the extra-European world, including those descendants of the extra-European world within the political boundaries of the Pan-European world, had in fact not been tamed, not even by a long shot? The implication of this social fact is that they constituted a fundamental problem of the social order of the world-system, for which even today there is no simple resolution. M. Sultan-Galiev's words from nearly one hundred years ago ring just as true today, with barely a shift in the cast of characters. Gerald Horne notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union loosened the ties of Asian anticommunist conservatives to the United States, such that in a recent book Mahatir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara cite Lenin to show that European prosperity was based on exploiting the cheap labor and abundant resources of the colonies, and thus that European hegemony is based on plunder and exploitation. "If the United States can get away with . . . peddling arms throughout the Middle East, intervening militarily to protect its supply of oil, and arm twisting Japan to pay the bill—then the white race still rules the world" (Horne 1999:460). I would like here to underline Gerald Horne's contention that what has gone unnoticed in the wake of the decline of the Communist parties is the concomitant "general crisis of white supremacy" (Horne 1999:440). Black internationalism is one route that opens up this vast arena of potential for social transformation to a more comprehensive collective investigation.



Here I would like to insist on an element of caution regarding much of the discourse of the past twenty years or so about “the disuniting of America” from the center (Schlesinger 1991) and “the twilight of our common dreams” from the Left (Gitlin 1995). The turn to identity-based groups is not a consequence of the ultramilitant tactics of oppressed groups within the United States and elsewhere; it is a refuge from the very real disintegration of the state structures of the modern world-system as a locus of social reform that can better the lot of the world’s peoples. While it is true that the traditional antisystemic movements have reached the end of their rope, what this implies is a new strategy that we think has to start from a sense of international solidarity and international social justice, which is the reality of the world in which we now live. The confrontation with North-South polarization is essential to any such strategy. Black internationalism is one locus from which this strategy can be developed, to the extent that it reflects the outlook of a community and not just intellectuals and cadres.

## Organization of the Book

In Part I of the book I deal with the issue of theory as it developed historically. First, in Chapter 1, “The Peculiar Internationalism of Black Nationalism,” I try to articulate an understanding of Black Nationalism based on the development of nationalist consciousness rather than a strict adherence to any ideological notion of nationalism.<sup>21</sup> Use of such a flexible approach to the study of Black Nationalism enables us to study a range of phenomena, which include both self-proclaimed nationalists and those for whom racial solidarity is key to their political psychology. This enables us also to focus on some of the peculiarities of Black Nationalism, especially its internationalism. Once I have established my own understanding of Black Nationalism I move in Chapter 2, “The Sociology of the Color Line: W.E.B. Du Bois and the End of White World Supremacy,” to the most sustained critique of the color line in the history of African American social thought. In reviewing the contribution of Dr. Du Bois to the study of the color line and the debates that surround his work, I hope to provide a framework that will take us through the remainder of the book. In Chapter 3, “The Class First/Race First Debate: The Contradictions of Nationalism and Internationalism and the Stratification of the World-system,” we find the first revolutionary challenge to the status quo in the modern United States in the form of the New Negro Movement and follow that debate as it manifested itself during the 1960s. While this debate is central to the evolution of Black radicalism in the United States and on the world stage, it should be noted that the target of this debate was the world Left, especially the white Left in the United States, and large sections of the European Left.

As Rose Brewer (2003) argues, the focus on race and class in Black radical theory has long obscured the gender dimension of Black subordination and the central role of gender in the construction of social resistance in the African American sector of society. Chapter 4, “Black Feminism, Intersectionality, and the Critique of Masculinist Models of Liberation,” focuses on the unique role of

Black women in the Black freedom struggle and how the leadership of Black women gave a certain character to the movement that needed much more attention from all of us.<sup>22</sup>

Part II focuses on radical social movements, demonstrates the legacy of Black Internationalism rooted in the New Negro period and beyond, and shows how it was manifested from the 1960s to the present in the civil rights movement, the Black Power Movement, the Afrocentric movement, the multicultural movement, and the Black feminist movement. Chapter 5, "The Civil Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for the Redemption of America," demonstrates that the civil rights movement shared the Black radical and internationalist tradition and shows why FBI director J. Edgar Hoover viewed the civil rights movement as the center of a social revolution under way in the United States. Chapter 6, "Black Power, the American Dream, and the Spirit of Bandung: Malcolm X and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the Age of World Revolution," situates the Black Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the trajectories of Malcolm X and Dr. King in a long global context. This includes an interrogation of the notion that Dr. King's dream and Malcolm X's nightmare (Malcolm X 1966) were polar opposite views of the United States and thus represented opposing views of strategy for the Black freedom struggle. This reexamination of the legacies of these two giants of African American, U.S., and world leadership finds and details a convergence of views between Dr. King and Malcolm X, as well as a movement toward a common front, as I discussed in an earlier work (Bush 1999). A key issue in Chapters 5 and 6 is to locate these manifestations of the Black freedom struggle more clearly in the center of the international strategy of the U.S. elites and to demonstrate not only how the war against Vietnam undermined the war on poverty but how the U.S. right wing perceived people of color within our borders as in the same social category as our putative "enemies" of color outside our borders. Indeed, the failure of liberals to grasp the international dimensions of the struggle for social justice neutralized their often very sincere desire for social justice within our borders. This was something of a "dialogue of the deaf." One could conclude, though, that the stakes became clearer and some opted for a defense of what they felt the United States had contributed to the world, while others opted for living out the true meaning of our creed, or linking the American dream to the aspirations of all humanity. Increasingly radicals attempted to follow Malcolm X's advice that our struggle should be for human rights since civil rights were no longer an issue. The success of the civil rights movement in defeating Jim Crow had clarified the deeper nature of the contradictions in U.S. society, and the war in Vietnam had clarified the international dimensions of the struggle even more clearly.<sup>23</sup>

The U.S. defeat in Vietnam seemed to stay the hand of the United States in international affairs, but the conservative Right, which had mobilized against egalitarianism, racial liberalism, and libertarianism at the same time as the civil rights movement, continued to build despite the temporary setback of Watergate. The conservative setback of Watergate blinded the Left, which saw the conservative backlash to civil rights and the cutback of the war on poverty as attacks on the civil rights movement in a narrow sense instead of an attack on

the legacy of the New Deal, the welfare state, and the social democratic compromise. The victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought all of these things into focus. During the 1970s the Black Left had moved in two directions—one that affirmed its revolutionary nationalist legacy, the others still under the influence of the world revolutionary current, which started in the late 1960s to move toward merging elements of their organizations with the mostly white organizations that had come out of the New Left to create a multiracial or (in the language of the time) multinational form of organization.