says in the first two parts develop special versions of the argument for limiting welfare economics to a narrower range of policy questions. I found Geoffrey Hodgson's essay, which explores the unduly neglected area of "institutional" economics, especially helpful. John O'Neill develops an especially clear and convincing version of Sagoff's argument that counting consumer preferences has little to do with good environmental decisions, and he advocates more deliberation as the basis for policy choice. Brian Wynne offers a well-argued critique of the overuse of economic methods in risk analysis.

Essays in the third part of *Valuing Nature?* offer new directions. Andrew Stirling provides an excellent survey and insightful analysis of "multi-criteria mapping," an important and too-often ignored alternative to economic hegemony; Michael Jacobs does a nice job of emphasizing the importance of democratic participation; and Foster proposes that we see environmental valuation as "creating" value, and he emphasizes broader educational opportunities as necessary to improve public decision making affecting the environment. While these prospective essays are stimulating and suggest some alternatives to a narrowly economistic approach to evaluating environmental choices, they at best suggest possible directions. No definitive solutions are offered.

Valuing Nature? is a valuable book, nonetheless, both because of the care exhibited in the analyses but also—and even more so—because it addresses important theoretical issues in a practical context affecting public decisions. In doing so, one hopes this collection will encourage philosophers and other theoreticians of environmental values to bring their analytic skills to bear upon the pressing crisis in environmental valuation and decision making.

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Fox, Michael Allen. *Deep Vegetarianism.*
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Pp. 234. $15.95 (paper).

The debate over ethical vegetarianism has a long, if little-known, history. This book by Michael Allen Fox provides an excellent overview and analysis of this history. One of Fox's general aims—to get the reader "to appreciate the complexity and power of vegetarianism by recognizing the diverse sources of the positions that support it" (p. 4)—is decidedly met in this small but dense volume. His argument for the claim that vegetarianism is an ethical obligation, however, falls a bit short of its mark.

Chapter 1 offers a brief history of vegetarianism. Beginning with Pythagorean arguments based on obligatory nonviolence and the ensoulment of animals, Fox leads us through a history replete with attempts to garner support for animal rights and vegetarianism. His extended look at Porphyry's multifaceted argument for vegetarianism illustrates how many contemporary themes were present in the ancient world. Porphyry's arguments for vegetarianism ran the gamut from its health benefits to the ease in procuring a vegetarian diet to its virtuous qualities. He recognizes that our inability to understand and communicate with nonhu-

man animals need not imply their deficiencies. Furthermore, he noted that the killing of animals in self-defense could not justify our dietary practices without also justifying some cannibalism. Fox uses the arguments of Porphyry to set the stage for the wide array of historical arguments for vegetarianism. He suggests that the idea of vegetarianism "may be percolating through the ages in a subterranean and subversive, countercultural manner" (p. 4).

In chapter 2, Fox explores how food symbolism has led to the entrenchment of meat eating in our culture. He notes that the questioning of meat eating amounts to the questioning of deeply held religious views (e.g., the dominion view) and of our belief in human superiority over animals (e.g., because we eat them, we must be superior). Furthermore, it may undermine current patterns of gender power. Fox considers ecofeminist arguments that compare the oppression of women with that of animals. The objectification, fragmentation, and consumption of the "products" of women and animals form a system of domination that distances the power group from the oppressed. According to this thesis, changing the practice of meat eating may require a much deeper social change in gender relations, and that could account in part for the resilience of meat eating.

In chapter 3, Fox analyzes the compartmentalization of thought and feeling that allows many meat eaters to hold apparently inconsistent views. Fox is particularly surprised at the ease with which many individuals keep companion pets and treat them as family members while not hesitating to feed on the pets' not-so-distant relatives. He concludes that our language is probably a major facilitator of this compartmentalization. Simply having different names for meat (e.g., pork) compared to its source (e.g., pig) allows us to ignore the connection.

Chapter 4 offers a short taxonomy of variations of vegetarianism (e.g., lacto-ovo-vegetarians, vegans, fruitarians, etc.) and grounds for vegetarianism (e.g., entitlement theories based on the rights of animals vs. endangerment theories focused on human health, human and animal well-being, and ecological health). The next three chapters explore a wide variety of arguments for vegetarianism, including "health, animal suffering and death, impartiality or disinterested moral concern, environmental concerns, the manipulation of nature, world hunger and social injustice, interconnected forms of oppression, interspecies kinship and compassion, universal non-violence, and spiritual and religious arguments" (p. 61). Fox's aim is to offer something persuasive for everyone. One who has not already seen the now well-known statistical comparisons (e.g., the amount of grain fed to livestock in the United States each year is enough to feed approximately 800 million people a vegetarian diet [p. 86]) may be astonished by these numbers and the force of the other arguments. Why, then, do so many of us persist in eating meat? The cases of two individuals who espoused animal-friendly philosophies and yet continued to eat meat may enlighten us. Schopenhauer believed that all living creatures shared the same kind of metaphysical will and were in that regard equal, and yet he justified meat eating because he thought its pleasures far outweighed the suffering of the animals eaten. Schweitzer, whose main principle was a "reverence for all life," also ate meat; although this discrepancy has not been accounted for historically, it may have much to do with deeply entrenched personal habits. As Fox notes in an earlier chapter (see p. 31), the foods that we eat during childhood have such a strong link to our cultural and personal

identities that we define comfort according to those same foods in adulthood. That personal attachment to meat may explain why the strength of the vegetarian arguments often does not translate into new behavior.

Chapter 8 raises eleven arguments against vegetarianism. These include everything from financial arguments about the devastating effects of destroying the meat industry to naturalist arguments about our biological superiority to feminist critiques of vegetarianism as a movement of privilege. Fox's treatment of these arguments is evenhanded. While he quickly dispenses with some of the weaker arguments (e.g., the argument that human overpopulation will necessarily result from widespread vegetarianism), he is willing to compromise on other points. Thus, he happily makes an allowance for meat-eating indigenous tribes to continue their practices because they are in "very special and unavoidable circumstances" which do not exist in the rest of the world. He also acknowledges that those who cannot get adequate nutrition through a meat-free diet (e.g., third-world women who cannot afford or find sufficient nutritional supplements) should not be obligated to sacrifice their health for the sake of vegetarianism.

Fox's compromising nature, however, may go too far. In an attempt to avoid the charge of requiring moral sainthood, he undercuts his own strong thesis. Fox concedes that "each of us has to decide for him- or herself how far an obligation to help must be extended" (p. 171). Thus, our obligation either to avoid all animal products (e.g., leather) or to avoid *eating* animals and their products depends not on their rights or welfare but ultimately on our own sense of our ability to help. While this sounds delightfully tolerant, it quickly deflates the larger argument. If I simply do not feel able to give up my weekly hamburger, then I am not obliged to do so. Fox wants this flexibility to hold only within the circle of vegetarian options (so that we can each decide to be, e.g., vegans or fruitarians), but it is unclear why the flexibility would not likewise extend into the domain of meat eating. I may be morally commendable for buying free-range beef, but by Fox's argument, I am not obligated to do so any more than I am obligated to become a vegan rather than a vegetarian. On the other hand, perhaps his intention is simply to make us more aware that there is any moral relevance in our dietary choices. That aim has clearly been met.

Chapter 9's conclusion, that we need to wake up and see ourselves as part of nature, with a goal of compassionate cohabitation with other species, is clearly a strong and reasonable environmentalist position. But that position does not so clearly require vegetarianism.

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Griswold, Jr., Charles L. *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv+412. $59.95 (cloth); $21.95 (paper).

Charles Griswold has written an impressive and thought-provoking book which demands to be read at several levels. Taking Smith first and foremost as a philosopher, Griswold provides a rich and subtle analysis of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*