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Introduction

Dimensions of Variation in Newly Diverse Transatlantic Destinations

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> And so everything changed just like that! A society with a long aptitude for squeezing out surplus family members . . . threw open its doors unequivocally to four hundred million fellow Europeans and conditionally to cherry-picked migrants from elsewhere. No statue of Liberty or Ellis Island was needed. No grand proclamations of an Irish Dream were issued. . . . In less than a decade Irish society experienced its greatest transformation since the 1846 Famine.
>
> —**Brian Fanning**, *New Guests of the Irish Nation*

> Spain is a laboratory of diversities because practically all the main forms of diversity are in interplay with each other.
>
> —**Ricard Zapata-Barrero**, "Managing Diversity in Spanish Society"

> Key aspects of [U.S.] Southern locales, especially their racial histories and lack of recallable immigrant histories, do create differences in the context of reception.
>
> —**Jamie Winders**, *Nashville in the New Millennium*

As has been extensively documented (Loyal 2011; Ó'Riain 2014), Ireland's unprecedented economic growth during the 1990s rapidly transformed it into a major country of immigration. Historically an emigration country, Ireland rather unexpectedly became a country in which relatively few immigrants resided to one in which they currently comprise nearly 17 percent of its total population, thus ranking it third among contemporary Western European societies in terms of its foreign-born population (OECD 2013). Over a similar period and in somewhat equivalent economic circumstances, the size of the foreign-born population also dramatically increased in the southern American state of Georgia. At the height of the

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immigration wave during the early twentieth century, when immigrants made up 15 percent of the American population (Gibson and Jung 2006), less than 3 percent of the population in Georgia was foreign born (Bankston 2007). By 2014, in contrast, 10 percent of Georgia's total population consisted of immigrants (Brown and Patten 2014), thus making the absolute size of its foreign-born population the ninth highest among American states.

Georgia's relatively recent experience with accelerating immigration flows is certainly not unique. Indeed, in 1990, fully 73 percent of immigrants resided in only a handful of traditional destination states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois (Singer 2004); by 2012, in contrast, the proportion of immigrants who resided in the aforementioned states had declined to less than 65 percent (American Community Surveys 2008–2012). As Figure I.1 illustrates, while immigrants remain spatially concentrated in the traditional destination states, foreign-born populations since 1990 have expanded most rapidly in states like Georgia and, more generally, across other nontraditional immigrant destinations in the Southeast and Midwest. Moreover, in addition to their residential dispersion within and across regions, migrants to the United States are now altogether avoiding or increasingly migrating from metropolitan areas and choosing to settle in suburban and rural destinations (Marrow 2005; Singer 2008).

As the previously cited examples suggest, migration to new destinations in Europe and the United States has expanded exponentially over the past few decades, and, within these destinations, immigrant populations have become increasing dispersed geographically. As a consequence, numerous local and regional destinations on both continents are experiencing new varieties of ethnic, cultural, and/or religious diversity. Informed and inspired by this transatlantic phenomenon, this volume is centrally concerned with the challenges posed by the proliferation of diversity for governments, majority populations, and immigrants. More specifically, its collective essays assess the effectiveness of the policy and political responses that have been spawned by increasing diversity in four types of new immigrant destinations: "intermediate" destination countries (Ireland and Italy); regions or subnational administrative units with especially distinctive cultural and/or political identities (Catalonia, the American South); new destination locales within traditional destination countries (cities in the American state of Utah and in rural England); and "early migration cycle" countries (Latvia and Poland).

What *specifically* defines a new immigrant destination? New immigrant destinations are European countries and cities and regions in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere that, until relatively recently, had not been sites of immigrant settlement for at least a century, if ever (Goździak and Bump 2008). Originally conceived by American social scientists to describe the geographic dispersion of immigrants revealed in data generated by the 2000



Figure I.1 Continental United States with States Shaded by Percent Change in Foreign-born Population, 1990–2012 (Top Ten Largest Proportion Foreign-born Labeled 1–10)

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U.S. Census (Marrow 2005; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005a), the concept of new immigrant destinations has now been embraced by numerous scholars in Europe (Morales 2014; Schnell and Azzolini 2015; Urso and Carammia 2014) who are investigating a similar phenomenon across the Atlantic (Messina 2009).

In the American context, "new" immigration implies a reference point of "old" immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Europe, on the other hand, old, or traditional, migration tends to refer to the immediate post–World War II period.[1] While these reference points and time frames obviously differ, the recent experiences of new immigrant destinations on both sides of the Atlantic are nevertheless similar along several dimensions.

The phenomenon of mass migration to both Ireland and the American state of Georgia, for example, can largely be attributed to a similar set of facilitating economic conditions and a confluence of national and/or supranational changes in public policy. In the case of Georgia, the enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which regularized the status of undocumented immigrants nationally, facilitated immigrants' freedom of movement across the country while also increasing security at traditional crossing points along the U.S. southern border (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). At the same time, many midwestern and southern American states experiencing economic growth rates exceeding those elsewhere in the country served as a powerful magnet for foreign workers (Donato, Stainback, and Bankston 2006; Duchón and Murphy 2001; Johnson, Johnson-Webb, and Farrell 1999). Similarly, in Ireland, a booming economy, dubbed the "Celtic Tiger," attracted tens of thousands of labor migrants from Africa, Asia, and elsewhere in Europe during the 1990s (Ruhs 2003). Moreover, Ireland was among the first European Union (EU) member states to open its labor market to the ascension states in 2004, thus precipitating a significant inflow of migrants from Eastern Europe and particularly Poland (Honohan 2010). Although migration to Ireland has significantly slowed since the onset of the recent global recession, the demand for foreign workers in the advanced sectors of its economy and a steady inflow of asylum seekers from Nigeria, Pakistan, and China have persisted and have only solidified Ireland's status as a country of immigration (OECD 2013).

Significant migration to and immigrant dispersion within new destinations are thus clear trends on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, even as the intermediate countries of immigration in Europe (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) grapple with the challenges posed by the proliferation of diversity from previous decades, newer immigrant destinations continue to emerge, both subnationally and in new countries. For example, like many of its contemporary Southern, Central, and Eastern European neighbors, Poland, though still predominantly a country of emigration, now depends

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on a significant annual influx of migrants to buoy its economy and compensate for its shrinking population and increasingly suboptimal demographic profile (Drbohlav 2012; King and Mai 2008; Klementjeviene 2010; Matysiak and Nowok 2007; Peixoto et al. 2012). Owing to demographic pressures and in an effort to avoid future labor shortages and depopulation, analysts argue that Poland must admit approximately 5.2 million foreigners for permanent settlement by 2050 (Funacja Energia dla Europy 2013). In light of these forecasts, will Poland follow in the footsteps of Ireland and the Western European nations that preceded it and thus embark on the path of becoming a major country of immigration? While some observers are skeptical (Iglicka and Gmaj 2010), if and when it does so, Poland will join the ranks of numerous new immigrant destinations in Europe and the United States experiencing the proliferation of cultural, ethnic, and/or religious diversity resulting from mass immigrant settlement (Włoch 2013).

To aid in differentiating among the various immigration and immigrant settlement patterns across both new and older destinations, we begin this introductory chapter by touching base with Freeman's well-known typology of immigrant-receiving states. According to Freeman (1995: 881), a first set of traditional immigration countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) are united by their "histories of periodically open immigration, machineries of immigration planning and regulation, and densely organized webs of interest groups contesting policies." In these societies the phenomenon of mass immigrant settlement features prominently in both their founding narratives and subsequent political and social development. In contrast, a second set of traditional destination countries (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) initially experienced mass immigration only after World War II, with significant immigrant settlement beginning in the immediate postwar period up until the mid-1960s. Migrants from geographically proximate Southern European labor-surplus countries or colonial or former colonial territories eventually settled permanently in these Western European countries and, in so doing, were assigned identities as new ethnic or racial minorities (Messina et al. 1992). Yet a third set, the intermediate destination countries, which are located primarily in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, but also Ireland), did not begin to experience mass immigrant settlement until the late 1980s and early 1990s. All of the aforementioned countries have been challenged by the experience of mass immigration against the backdrop of accelerating intergovernmental and supranational initiatives to forge common immigration and immigrant policies within the framework of the EU. We also consider a fourth set of immigration-receiving states in this volume: the contemporary early migration cycle countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) that have experienced significant immigration only within the past decade. Figure I.2



Figure I.2 European Countries Shaded to Indicate Their Status as Traditional, Intermediate, or Early Migration Cycle Countries

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illustrates the geographical distribution of traditional, intermediate, and early migration cycle countries across contemporary Europe.

In Europe, scholarship on new immigrant destinations has hitherto largely focused on cross-national comparisons. In the United States, on the other hand, similar scholarship has focused on subnational comparisons. In folding the United States into the aforementioned cross-national comparisons and by drawing attention to subnational variation not only in the United States but also in Europe, a key objective of this volume is to generate yet additional comparisons (Winders 2014). While we aspire to identify similarities in the transatlantic processes of new immigrant dispersion, we particularly aim to highlight two dimensions of variation among these destinations. First, new destinations vary with regard to their historical experience of cultural, ethnic, and/or religious diversity in ways that likely affect their policy and political responses to new immigrant populations. Second, as suggested by the EU-U.S. comparisons we offer below, new destinations differ in their scale and relationships to traditional destinations, whether as constituent units within traditional destinations—cities or regions—or as geographically proximate neighbors. Because their responses to diversity and formulation of immigrant integration policies are visible from their earliest stages, the observed variation in responses across new destinations presents immigration scholars with an opportunity to better understand the contextual factors that facilitate effective immigrant integration practices.

New Destinations: Key Dimensions of Similarity

What differentiates the new from the traditional immigrant destinations? Especially rapid immigrant flows, a lack of immigrant integration infrastructure, and an unusual pattern of immigrant settlement are among the key characteristics that virtually all new immigrant destinations share. On the first score, it is the unusual velocity by which immigrant populations have penetrated the new destinations that typically distinguishes these destinations (Winders 2013: 17). Indeed, several intermediate destination countries in Europe have accepted more persons for permanent settlement within their first decade of mass immigration than the traditional countries did during their first three decades as major destinations (Barbulescu forthcoming). Much like the aforementioned Irish experience, the foreign-born population in Spain, for example, increased more than fivefold from 1998 to 2010, or from 3 percent to 16 percent of the total Spanish population (Morales and Echazarra 2013: 347). During the same decade, the size of the foreign-born population increased by over 300 percent in Italy (OECD 2013: 386). Similarly, the foreign-born population in Greece expanded by 227 percent between 2001 and 2010, before modestly declining in 2011 (384). New immigrant destinations within the United States have also experienced high

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immigration velocities over a relatively short period. As Figure I.1 illustrates, though the American states of Indiana, Minnesota, and Utah had foreign-born populations of 3 percent or less in 1990, from 1990 to 2010 their foreign-born populations grew by more than 200 percent. Over the same period, immigrant populations in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee—states with less than a 3 percent foreign-born population in 1990—expanded by between 389 percent and 525 percent (American Community Survey 2008–2012). Overall, almost 40 percent of all migrants to the new destination states in the United States have arrived since 1999 (Terrazas 2011).

Partly as a result of their relatively recent and accelerated experience with mass immigrant settlement, new destinations also often lack an adequate legal and/or political infrastructure to respond adequately to the needs of immigrants (Drbohlav 2009: 53; Zapata-Barrero 2013: 4). Indeed, they have been particularly slow to develop a coherent or comprehensive immigrant integration regime (Boucher 2008; Davis 2009: 137; Waters and Jiménez 2005: 118). Moreover, even in those new destinations where a national integration regime is eventually established, albeit often hastily (Triandafyllidou 2009: 49), the primary administrative unit responsible for executing its objectives has frequently fallen to resource-strapped regional and/or local governments (Caponio 2010; Milly 2014: 163; Singer 2004: 16), a pattern especially prevalent in Italy, Spain, and the United States, where regional or state governments exercise considerable policy-making autonomy on matters of immigrant integration (Rodriguez 2008; Triandafyllidou 2009: 49). Perhaps not so coincidently, and as we discuss below, immigrant integration outcomes and the majority population's reception of immigrants within these countries vary considerably from one region to the next (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Koff 2006: 188; Zamora-Kapoor 2013).

In addition to their especially rapid immigration flows and lack of an adequate immigrant integration infrastructure, new destinations are distinguished by their unusual subnational dispersion of immigrants. As compared with the highly concentrated residential settlement pattern that was prevalent within the traditional destinations early in their immigrant history, new immigrants have settled far beyond a small number of subnational destinations (Massey and Capoferro 2008: 26; Suro and Tafoya 2004). For example, as Table I.1 demonstrates, only two of Spain's seventeen autonomous communities had an immigrant population of greater than 3 percent in 1998; in contrast, by 2013 all but three had an immigrant population of 6 percent or greater, with an average increase in foreign-born population of more than 10 percentage points. The contemporary residential dispersal pattern in Italy is similar, with immigrants making up more than 6 percent of the total population in thirteen of of the country's twenty regions (Table I.2). Moreover, each of Ireland's twenty-six counties has a foreigner population greater than 7 percent (Central Statistics Office 2012: 10). Across con-

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TABLE I.1 FOREIGNER POPULATION AND "IMMIGRATION A MAJOR PROBLEM" WITHIN SPAIN'S AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES IN PERCENTAGES

Community	Foreign-born Proportion (1998)	Foreign-born Proportion (2013)	Increase (1998–2013)	Perception of Immigration as One of Three Major Problems (2012)
Islas Baleares	*4.8*	*20.1*	*15.3*	*10.2*
Islas Canarias	*3.4*	*14.2*	*10.8*	*4.1*
Comunidad Valenciana	*2.5*	*16.8*	*14.3*	*3.6*
Madrid	*2.3*	*14.7*	*12.4*	*3.8*
Cataluña	*2.0*	*15.3*	*13.3*	*8.2*
Andalucía	*1.4*	*8.6*	*7.2*	*3.4*
Murcia	*1.1*	*15.7*	*14.6*	*15.4*
La Rioja	*1.0*	*13.7*	*12.7*	*9.6*
Navarra	*0.8*	*10.5*	*9.7*	*10.6*
País Vasco	*0.7*	*6.8*	*6.1*	*4.8*
Galicia	*0.7*	*4.0*	*3.3*	*1.0*
Aragón	*0.7*	*12.9*	*12.2*	*5.8*
Castilla–La Mancha	*0.6*	*10.5*	*9.9*	*2.5*
Cantabria	*0.6*	*6.5*	*5.9*	*3.5*
Castilla y León	*0.6*	*6.5*	*5.9*	*3.3*
Asturias	*0.6*	*4.5*	*3.9*	*1.5*
Extremadura	*0.4*	*3.7*	*3.3*	*5.5*
Spain	***1.4***	***10.9***	***9.5***	***4.9***

Sources: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2012; González and Lázaro y Torres 2005: 40; Instituto Nacional Estadística 2013.

temporary Ireland there are no fewer than sixty towns in which foreigners equal or exceed 20 percent of the population (11); even relatively small towns (i.e., between 7,000 and 9,500 residents) now have a sizeable immigrant population. Given this geographic dispersal pattern, there are now few corners of Ireland, Italy, and Spain that have not been culturally, politically, and socially impacted by immigrant settlement (Fanning 2007). Similarly, the dispersion of immigrants to new destinations in the United States has been marked by migration not only to new cities but also increasingly to suburban and rural destinations (Marrow 2005; Singer 2008). Along these lines, 30 percent of U.S. towns and cities had foreign-born populations of at least 5 percent in 2012 (American Community Survey 2008–2012), as compared to 16 percent in 1990 (U.S. Census 1990).

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TABLE I.2 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN TOP THIRTEEN ITALIAN REGIONS, 2010

	% Regional Population	% Distribution in Italy	Incidence*
Emilia-Romagna	*11.3*	*8.5*	*1.5*
Umbria	*11.0*	*2.2*	*1.5*
Lombardia	*10.7*	*11.0*	*1.4*
Veneto	*10.2*	*11.0*	*1.4*
Toscana	*9.7*	*8.0*	*1.3*
Lazio	*9.5*	*11.8*	*1.3*
Marche	*9.4*	*3.2*	*1.3*
Piemonte	*8.9*	*8.7*	*1.2*
Trentino–Alto Adige	*8.7*	*2.0*	*1.2*
Fruili–Venezia Giulia	*8.5*	*2.3*	*1.1*
Liguria	*7.8*	*2.7*	*1.0*
Valle d'Aosta	*6.8*	*0.2*	*0.9*
Abruzzo	*6.0*	*1.7*	*0.8*
Italy	***7.5***	***100***	***1.0***

Source: ISTAT 2012: 42.

* Represents the ratio between the number of foreigners/immigrants living in the region (percentage of total regional population) and the total number of foreigners in the country (percentage of the total national population).

The aforementioned similarities of new destinations in Europe and the United States have generated settings that create an opportunity to better understand how governmental responses to diversity and immigration eventually emerge and shape the process of immigrant integration (Waters and Jiménez 2005). Moreover, rapid immigrant settlement, often in places without any previous experience of ethnic, cultural, and/or religious diversity, provides a laboratory within which we can investigate how social and political relations evolve in the context of growing diversity (Winders 2014: 151). Similarly, migration to destinations without preexisting policies that address the integration needs of immigrants enables us to observe the early formulation of such policies. The resulting subnational and cross-national variation in integration policies can also illuminate how varying policy regimes affect immigrant integration outcomes.

Defining Key Terms: Diversity and Integration

Before discussing two key mediating factors—a prior history of diversity and the scale and relationships to traditional destinations—that likely influence

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the policy and political responses of new immigrant destinations, it is necessary to briefly define *diversity* and *integration*, concepts that admittedly have contested meanings within the contemporary scholarly literature.

Diversity

In the most general terms, Thomas Faist (2009: 174) observes that *immigration-related diversity* typically refers to "a plurality of languages, religions, and ethnic groups." Anna Triandafyllidou (2012: 24), on the other hand, more specifically defines the phenomenon of *cultural diversity* as the presence of a critical number of individuals or groups that have a different ethnic descent (ethnic diversity); physical characteristics (racial diversity); cultural traditions, customs, and language (cultural diversity); and/or religion (religious diversity) from the majority group within a particular country, region, or locale. Contrary to the simple notion of *difference*, which, according to Thomas Eriksen (2006: 14), "refers to morally objectionable or at least questionable notions and practices in a minority group or category," diversity implies "largely aesthetic, politically and morally neutral expressions of cultural difference."

Ruud Koopmans and Merlin Schaeffer (2013: 6) further argue that diversity is characterized by three dimensions: the relative size of the in-group, the unequal balance of populations over out-groups, and the variety of out-groups. Following from this definition, they observe that the "situation in most European immigration countries is generally a quasi-monoethnic one: a clear national majority is accompanied by a number of comparatively small minority immigrant groups." As we emphasized earlier, a condition of quasi-monoethnicism need not be applicable exclusively to countries. Traditional regions and localities within countries too may be accurately characterized as quasi-monoethnic (Waters and Jiménez 2005: 111–113). As a result, each level may be appropriately classified as more or less diverse (Voyer 2013). As Schaeffer (2014: 51) persuasively argues, a key variable here is that "it makes a difference whether the population is equally distributed over three or twenty ethnic groups." Indeed, as we discuss below, a growing literature, primarily generated by scholars in Europe, has been investigating the phenomenon of *superdiversity*, or what David Hollinger (1995) has characterized as the "diversification of diversity." According to Steven Vertovec (2007: 1024), *superdiversity* is a "condition distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants." It is defined by the unprecedented proliferation since the 1990s of ethnic, cultural, and/or religious identities within and across established territorial boundaries (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 124; Vertovec 2007: 1048).

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Integration

As cited above, national and subnational governments across Europe and the United States have adopted a variety of policies in response to the proliferation of diversity and the numerous policy and political challenges it poses. Although the essays in this volume do not speak to all of the key dimensions of these challenges, it is nevertheless helpful to have a baseline understanding of the concept of *integration* before moving forward. While no definition is universally embraced (Ireland 2004: 15; Miera 2012: 193), integration as scholars and policy makers employ it in most contexts has a positive connotation. If only for this reason, integration can be usefully distinguished from *adaptation*, *acculturation*, *assimilation*, *multiculturalism*, and other related terms that tend to evoke less-than-positive responses from immigrants themselves and/or their detractors (Castles et al. 2002: 115–119; Green 2007).

Rinus Penninx and Marco Martiniello (2004: 141) broadly characterize integration as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society." Irene Ponzo et al. (2013: 2) argue that it is "the dynamic, multi-actor process of mutual engagement that facilitates effective participation by all members of a diverse society in the economic, political, social and cultural life, and fosters a shared and inclusive sense of belonging." More specifically, Mitja Žagar (2008: 315–316) describes social integration "as a continuous process of voluntary, equal and full inclusion of all individuals, especially those who are marginalized, such as immigrants, persons belonging to ethnic and/or other minorities or deprived (social) groups, as well diverse distinct communities (as collective entities) into societies where they live." In identifying its key dimensions, Spencer Boyer (2009: 3) further defines the process of "successful" integration as one "that includes, but is not limited to, the spread of educational and economic mobility, social inclusion, and equal opportunity for newcomers and minorities into the mainstream of a society." On the opposite side of the coin, he argues, "poor integration results in the formation of an ethnically segregated bottom class composed of immigrant groups and/or communities of color."

In addition to Penninx and Martiniello's (2004: 141) characterization of integration as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society," immigrant integration, as we define it here, can be empirically measured as the progress immigrants are making along four major axes within a given society: employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship (Table I.3). As articulated by the Council of the European Union (2004a: 13):

> Employment is a vital part of the integration process, and efforts in education are essential in helping immigrants to become successful and more active participants in society. Not only access to the labor

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TABLE I.3 IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION MEASURES IN THE EU

Policy Area	Core Indicators
Employment	*Employment rate* *Unemployment rate* *Activity rate*
Education	*Highest educational attainment (share of population with tertiary, secondary, and primary or less than primary education)* *Share of low-achieving fifteen-year-olds in reading, mathematics, and science* *Share of thirty- to thirty-four-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment* *Share of those who leave education and training early*
Social inclusion	*Median net income—the median net income of the immigrant population as a proportion of the median net income of the total population* *At risk of poverty rate—share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 percent of national median* *Share of population perceiving their health status as good or poor* *Ratio of property owners to nonproperty owners among immigrants and the total population*
Active citizenship	*Share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship* *Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits* *Share of immigrants among elected representatives*

Source: European Ministerial Conference on Integration 2010.

market is important but also entry into society more generally, which makes social inclusion an important area. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process as active citizens supports their integration and enhances their sense of belonging.

While other axes could be profitably added to this list, the aforementioned capture the commonly accepted priority areas of immigrant integration. Taken together, they permit scholars to assess the degree to which immigrants are included within the immigration-receiving society (Penninx and Martiniello 2004).

Integration, of course, is not simply the accommodation of a host society to the objective needs and interests of its newcomers; rather, it is necessarily a two-way process requiring the continual adaptation of both immigrants and the receiving society (Castles et al. 2002: 113). Thus, the degree to which majority populations perceive immigration and the immigrants

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themselves with concern and the extent to which immigrants feel the discriminatory effects of this concern are potentially problematic for the integration process. Moreover, as numerous scholars have observed, immigrants and their receiving society are far from equal partners in the immigrant integration process. As Penninx (2003: 1) emphasizes, "The receiving society, in terms of its institutional structure and the way it reacts to newcomers, has much more say in the outcome of the process." Along these lines, national integration models, or what Dan Rodríguez-García et al. (2007: 15–16) label *incorporation models*, can be subsumed under three categories:

> [A]ssimilationist or republican (based on the idea that equality can be achieved through the full adoption of the rules and values of the dominant society and through the avoidance of any considerations of diversity, as in the case of France); multiculturalist or pluralist (based on the respect for and protection of cultural diversity within a framework of shared belonging, as in the cases of Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada); and a segregationist or exclusion model . . . characterized by separation between, or fragmentation of, ethnic-cultural communities, and distinguished particularly by its restrictive legal framework regarding access to citizenship, based on the ethno-racial criterion of *jus sanguinis*, as in the cases of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Although other scholars have adopted and employed somewhat different typologies (Soysal 1994), Rodríguez-García et al.'s categories represent fairly well the range of immigrant integration models currently prevailing among the traditional immigrant destinations (Boyer 2009: 3).

This said, Gary Freeman (2004: 960) appropriately cautions that "rather than anticipating a small number of distinct 'modes of immigrant incorporation' that might characterize the policies of particular countries, we should expect different modes in particular domains—state, market, welfare, culture—within individual states; the overall outcome being a mixed bag not fully assimilationist, pluralist, or multicultural." As we discuss below, we are especially mindful of Freeman's caution when he suggests that modes of immigrant integration can also vary at the subnational level. Such variation results in part because, irrespective of the destination—that is, local, regional, or national (Ireland 2004: 234)—the immigrant integration process is nearly always inherently conflict ridden. While destinations necessarily vary in the degree of conflict they experience, the immigrant integration process, as Frauke Miera (2012: 196) astutely observes, is one "in which the status quo is maintained and defended and that therefore entails dissent and conflict in order to produce something new."

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Dimensions of Variation and Resulting Questions

As the preceding sections make clear, new immigrant destinations share an experience of rapid in-flows, a nascent and/or suboptimal integration infrastructure, and an atypical pattern of immigrant dispersion that make them theoretically interesting sites in which to observe the formulation of policy and political responses to increasing diversity. New immigrant destinations nevertheless differ from one another in important ways, including their respective historical experiences of cultural, ethnic, and/or religious diversity and, relatedly, their relationship to traditional destinations. As a result, each of these dimensions of variation generates competing hypotheses about the overall prospects for success in pursuing a local, regional, or national project of immigrant integration.

Variation in Historical Experiences with Diversity

Many new immigrant destinations had little if any experience of ethnic and/or racial diversity prior to the 1980s (e.g., Ireland, Greece, and the U.S. states of Maine and Minnesota). Conversely, other new destinations (e.g., Spain and the American southern states) had been afflicted by long-standing ethnic or racial tensions that were exacerbated and/or made more complex by the relatively recent arrival and settlement of immigrants (Barker 2015: 157; Lee and Bean 2010; Messina 1992; Winders 2008; Zapata-Barrero 2013). As useful shorthand, we characterize the latter category of destinations, with their intersecting forms of diversity, as superdiverse. In this context it is hardly surprising that whenever people from significantly dissimilar backgrounds inhabit and interact within the same economic, social, and political space, interpersonal and intergroup frictions can ensue. Thus, to the extent that diversity precipitates especially thorny political and policy-related challenges, we can usefully ask whether such challenges are most acute in new destinations where diversity is unprecedented or in superdiverse destinations where new diversity overlies historically embedded cultural, ethnic, and/or racial tensions. Different theories of intergroup relations in the context of diversity offer conflicting answers.

Conflict, or group-threat, theory generally assumes that the increased presence of out-groups in a given society fuels ever-greater competition with in-groups, thus ultimately resulting in out-group prejudice and in-group solidarity (Blalock 1967; Key 1949). Alternatively, and more recently, Robert Putnam (2007: 149) has introduced "constrict theory," arguing that the proliferation of diversity erodes both in- and out-group solidarity, a phenomenon he summarizes as "hunker[ing] down." Both theories contend that greater diversity spawns greater societal tension and, in so doing, implicitly suggest that superdiverse new immigrant destinations will be especially conflictual.

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Contrary to conflict and constrict theories, contact theory does not predict that greater diversity will necessarily precipitate greater discord. Rather, it posits the more optimistic view that intergroup contact will yield relative social harmony if the interacting groups enjoy a similar status, work cooperatively toward a shared goal, and have the blessing of the relevant authorities (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Although a positive outcome is hardly predestined, contact theory offers the prospect that places with experience in navigating the challenges of diversity, such as superdiverse destinations, may be better prepared to integrate immigrant newcomers.

The existing scholarship on immigrant integration in new destinations, in fact, supports both hypotheses. In advancing the thesis that superdiverse destinations produce greater conflict, several social scientists have suggested that these more diverse settings produce not one but two tiers of immigrant integration conflict (Messina 1992; Zapata-Barrero 2010: 388). On the first tier, the aspirations, claims, interests, and very often the cultural, ethnic, and/or religious identities of immigrant populations conflict with those of a significant fraction of the national majority population. On a second tier, the aspirations, claims, interests, and identities of immigrant populations directly or indirectly collide with those of regional minority communities (Chiba 2010; Kymlicka 2001: 65) that identify themselves as "distinct in . . . their culture, language, history, religion, tradition or political past" (Thompson and Rudolph 1989: 2). In this view, many, if not most, indigenous minority communities are ambivalent about immigrants and immigration. On the one hand, regional governments and employers across Europe and numerous new immigrant destination states in the United States have recruited foreign workers and/or facilitated their entry into the economy in order to alleviate labor shortages, ameliorate declining birthrates, and spur greater economic growth and productivity (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2007; Krissman 2000; Migration Observatory 2013). On the other hand, in those regions with an especially distinctive cultural, ethnic, and/or religious identity, the dominant regional population oftentimes perceives immigrants as potentially threatening of the status they have assiduously worked to achieve (Núñez 2002: 229; Tarchi 2007: 189).

In these superdiverse new destinations, public policies that were formulated by national governments to ameliorate historical ethnic conflicts, such as sovereignty-sharing arrangements within multinational states, have often proved inadequate to meeting the challenges posed by the establishment of new cultural, ethnic, and/or religious minorities (Bousetta 2009; Gilligan, Hainsworth, and McGarry 2014; Hainsworth 1998; Messina et al. 1992; Zapata-Barrero 2013: 4). In Spain (as discussed in Chapter 3 herein, by Amado Alarcón), new social cleavages spawned by mass immigration in recent decades have been awkwardly superimposed over older cleavages that were associated with the country's transition to democracy and the dominant

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presence of "minority nations" in the historical regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country (Zapata-Barrero 2009, 2013). Similarly, in the United States, civil rights policies formulated to rectify the historical injustices of slavery and Jim Crow illuminate that responses to diversity are designed to serve marginalized ethnic minorities rather than foreign nationals (Bloemraad 2006a; Kasinitz et al. 2008).

On the other hand, however, superdiverse new destinations more often than not have some experience implementing policies that aim to navigate successfully at least some form of historical diversity. The policies and the institutions that have developed in response may, in some cases, be reshaped to successfully address new immigrant diversity (Waters and Kasinitz 2013), as Helen B. Marrow's description of the contemporary American South in Chapter 4 of this volume suggests. In this respect, and at least in the short-term, unprecedented diversity may pose greater challenges for politics and policy makers than new diversity that has been superimposed on long-standing social cleavages. Indeed, in previously homogeneous new destinations, governments are often challenged to combat popular outbreaks of discrimination and prejudice that accompany the transition from relatively homogeneous to heterogeneous social settings (Juhasz 2010; Marrow 2011: 247–251; Walker and Leitner 2011: 159). Along these lines, Daniel Hopkins (2010) has discovered that, in the American context, majority populations in the host communities are especially likely to respond negatively when they experience a sudden influx of immigrants at a time when national rhetoric politicizes immigration. Clearly, then, the literature and experience of new destinations present conflicting accounts as to how prior experience with diversity shapes the reception of new immigrant populations, a key dimension of variation that the collected essays in this volume explore.

Variation in Relationship to Traditional Destinations

In addition to new destinations with distinctive histories of diversity, contemporary immigrants are entering political and social settings that have been informed, if not directly influenced by, the experiences of the traditional immigrant destinations (Arango 2012: 50–51; Drbohlav 2012: 195). In the case of the subnational dispersion of immigrants, as in the American state of Georgia, the new destination is nested within a traditional receiving country whose policies and historical experiences more or less inevitably shape subnational responses to immigrants (Marrow 2011). In the case of dispersion to the new immigration-receiving countries within Europe, new destination responses may be influenced by the experiences of traditional immigrant-receiving countries and the supranational policies of the EU, as the EU has incrementally pressured its member state countries to harmonize their immigrant and immigration policies in recent decades (Bijl and Verweij

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2012: 12–14; Palidda 2009: 360). As a consequence, the policies of the EU member states are reputed to be converging, particularly in the area of anti-discrimination policies (Givens 2014). This said, the degree to which the experiences of the traditional receiving countries are pertinent for new destinations remains a subject of spirited debate (Faßmann and Reeger 2012: 67). Inspiring this discussion is the key question of whether the politics of immigrant settlement in the new destinations are following a similar trajectory to that in the traditional destinations (Messina 2009).

It is, of course, premature to arrive at a definitive answer to this question. Both the early immigration countries and the intermediate countries are but in the preliminary stages of receiving, accommodating, and integrating their respective immigrant populations. Even Italy, one of the "oldest" of the intermediate destination countries, continues to be severely tested in transforming its immigrant population into ethnic minority citizens (Bonifazi, Strozza, and Vitiello 2012; Colombo and Sciortino 2004). Nevertheless, Joaquín Arango (2012: 56–57) hypothesizes that "historical precedence has significantly conditioned the immigration policies of Southern and Eastern European countries, and therefore their experiences and realities. This is because they have grown, or are starting to grow, as countries of immigration at a time in which other, more developed immigration countries existed nearby."

If proximity to countries, regions, or municipalities with a long-standing experience of immigration *does* significantly shape the experience of new destinations in coping with immigrant integration, it is not unreasonable to assume there is something resembling a common dynamic that is driving the immigration/immigrant integration process, a dynamic that perhaps compels a nascent country of immigration to travel along a familiar political-policy pathway (Messina 2007). On the other hand, it may be equally likely that the new destinations that are emerging during this period will remain distinct from their earlier counterparts as a result of a cohort effect. Moreover, greater variation in destinations both nationally and subnationally may ultimately result in greater variation in integration policies, immigrant outcomes, and the resulting political dynamics. Indeed, despite the efforts of federal and supranational systems, immigrant integration policies are not necessarily harmonized across all levels of government (Jeram 2013; Marrow 2011: 234). Moreover, even the best-designed and best-intentioned immigrant integration initiatives formulated and implemented at one governmental level can be effectively undermined at other levels (Alexander 2004: 59; Caponio 2010; Jones-Correa 2011), especially but not exclusively in federal systems of governance (Joppke and Seidle 2012; Kinney and Cohen 2013; Varsanyi 2010a). Thus, it is conceivable that the rise of new immigrant destinations could result in a divergence rather than a convergence of immigrant integration outcomes.

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While divergence remains possible, several comparative scholars have presented evidence of convergence in integration policies and public responses in the new destinations that is driven less by the phenomenon of policy diffusion or emulation (Bennett 1991; Cornelius and Tsuda 2004: 17) than by a kind of parallel path development, a process during which the new immigrant destinations, as the traditional destinations before them did, initially embrace mass immigration primarily for economic reasons (Ambrosini 2013) and subsequently experience similar political and social repercussions (Messina 2009). If so, such a common pathway is likely punctuated by discrete steps or stages in which permanent immigrant settlement occurs and the general process of immigrant integration more or less predictably unfolds within a new immigrant destination (Faßmann and Reeger 2012).

While evidence from the traditional and intermediate immigrant destinations suggests the existence of such a common pathway, it is unclear whether intermediate destinations will necessarily continue along this trajectory. Moreover, it is still too soon to know whether the early migration cycle countries or the new subnational destinations will follow the political-policy pathway forged by older destinations. Thus, we conclude this introductory chapter by investigating whether traditional, intermediate, and early immigrant destinations currently diverge with regard to the general political and social environment within which immigrants are being received. Although space constraints prevent us from addressing this question comprehensively, we nevertheless wish to establish an empirical foundation upon which it can be fruitfully investigated in the future.