

Capital, Community, and Cedar-Riverside: An Overview

THERE we were, maybe a hundred of us, in the street clutching our gold-painted plastic spoons—our “groundbreaking shovels”—on a warm summer day in 1986. We were celebrating yet another redevelopment project beginning in our neighborhood. That we were celebrating at all was momentous. Twenty years ago no one would have given odds that this neighborhood would even still be standing. But stand it did, and the redevelopment we were marking that day was vastly different from the plans of twenty years ago. More than just the plans were different, however. Tim Mungavan, one of the leading activists in the neighborhood, walked up to the microphone and explained to us just how different it was: “The traditional groundbreaking symbol is the gold shovel. These gold spoons you are holding symbolize the fact that a lot of people came together to make this happen—a lot of people making small efforts.” In contrast to urban development that is planned by the few in central offices far removed from the influence of citizens, in Cedar-Riverside we were celebrating the triumph of democracy in urban renewal planning. So there we were, occupying the street—legally, for a change—with our spoons in the air, having a good laugh and feeling the power of community.

This is the story of a community that overcame the odds against its own survival. Cedar-Riverside first triumphed by preventing the implementation of an urban renewal plan that slated the neighborhood for total demolition. And it won an even greater victory by implementing community-controlled redevelopment. This community,

with initially nothing more than its commitment and savvy, was up against all the power of development capital backed by the state. Out of the encroaching concrete of a massive, high-rise housing development designed by top-down planning to serve the profit needs of a private developer rose a powerful neighborhood-based, grass-roots movement. That movement not only stopped the spread of concrete, but went on to create one of the largest community-controlled urban redevelopment projects in the country to serve the residents of the community against the profit demands of capital.

Can urban communities prevail against capital, influencing urban redevelopment to serve community needs rather than capital needs? I attempt to answer that question by tracing the history of the Cedar-Riverside community and analyzing its historical path. The Cedar-Riverside neighborhood movement expresses fully the character of neighborhood resistance in the 1960s and 1970s and the transition to neighborhood-based development in the 1980s. What happened in Cedar-Riverside happened across the country (National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979; Henig, 1982; Mollenkopf, 1983; Checkoway, 1985; Giloth, 1985; Fainstein et al., 1986; Lenz, 1988), but rarely did the transition occur in single geographic locations, and even more rarely with such enormous stakes, involving thousands of people and millions of dollars. And Cedar-Riverside is most distinctive in that communities seldom win their defense so thoroughly. Cedar-Riverside thus provides a unique event that allows us to study fully the changing fortunes of capital and community in the struggle for the soul and turf of urban neighborhoods. Understanding Cedar-Riverside means understanding where community power comes from and how it can be used to resist domination by capital. The fact that there are regrettably few examples of successful community power (Fainstein, 1987) makes the study of Cedar-Riverside all the more important.

Community-based social movements are the least visible, least understood, and most widely practiced form of political action in North America. Small-scale, localized, community-based movements have been studied extensively by only a few (Boyte, 1980, 1984; Boyte and Riessman, 1986; Evans and Boyte, 1986; Castells, 1983; Delgado, 1986; Henig, 1982; Davis, 1991), and no common set of theoretical questions has guided that research (Posner, 1990). Neighborhood movements have not captured our attention nearly so much as the 1960s national-level civil rights, student/antiwar, and women's movements. And yet the total impact of small-scale community mobi-

lizations in stopping neighborhood destruction in the guise of urban renewal, and expanding community control over local circumstances, has been substantial. Too many scholars continue to deem worthy of study only those social movements that are national or regional in scope and highly visible in mobilization. As a result, researchers focus on the past and the visible while discrediting the importance of community-based mobilization, even when such efforts were the genesis for their favorite movements, as Aldon Morris (1984) has shown so convincingly for the civil rights movement.

What we are witnessing is, in Charles Tilly's (1984) terms, a shift in the "repertoire of collective action." In the second half of the twentieth century we have been party to a change in the class struggle. As capitalist-labor struggles that were centered on the shop floor became institutionalized and rule-bound through the acceptance of unions, the locus of struggle moved. Increasingly into the late twentieth century, social movements and citizen protests have been neither derived from clear class antagonisms nor directly focused on class issues (Katznelson, 1981; Harvey, 1978; Touraine, 1988; Čapek and Gilderbloom, 1992). The class dynamics of capitalism continue to generate the issues around which citizens mobilize, but the issues are generated at the output end of capitalism rather than at the input end. Instead of organizing as workers over issues related to the control of production, people are organizing as citizens and consumers around issues related to their social roles in reproducing themselves outside work. This is more than a "displaced class struggle" (Harvey, 1978), since the shift from organizing around production issues to organizing around reproduction issues no longer pits a working class directly against a capitalist class, but may pit the working class and the professional class against each other, or unite them; it may separate the poor and the working class. This urban organizing has, in Manuel Castells's (1977) terms, a "'pluri-class' nature."

Localized social movements centered in urban neighborhoods, which are often struggling for control of land, provision of services, and community autonomy, are a classic case of this new social movement form. Cedar-Riversiders were once told by a New Town supporter that "this land is too valuable to have you people living on it." When land is commodified, when service provision is dependent on local and national economic circumstances, and when community autonomy requires economic self-sufficiency, the dynamics of capitalism are intimately involved in the struggle. Thus, community

becomes the new site of class resistance—of resistance to the commodification of neighborhoods—even though community citizens do not express their struggle in class terms.

These new social movements have become located not in classes, then, but in class-structured communities. African Americans, women, students, and especially neighborhoods may be located in particular places in the class structure. These groups, however, mobilize not on behalf of a class consciousness but on behalf of a community consciousness. That was especially true in the case of Cedar-Riverside. As the community formed around a variety of radical theories, including Marxism, residents organized with a highly developed critique of capitalism—not as workers, but as neighborhood residents who were seeing their housing and community services threatened by a capitalist developer working with the endorsement and financial backing of the state. On the foundation of these radical theories the residents built a vibrant alternative culture. And they happened to be located on land that both capital and the state considered crucial for purposes other than community building.

Cedar-Riverside: Background

Cedar-Riverside, named after the two main avenues that intersect in the neighborhood, is situated on top of some of the most valuable real estate in Minneapolis. The neighborhood lies just across the freeway from the city's central business district. It is also adjacent to the University of Minnesota's "West Bank" campus, on the west side of the Mississippi River across from the "main" campus, leading many residents to refer to the area as the "West Bank."¹

Cedar-Riverside was increasingly cut off from the rest of the city through the 1950s and 1960s by the construction of the Interstate 94 freeway along its southern border and the Interstate 35W freeway along its western border. The Mississippi River completed the neighborhood's isolation, intersecting with I-35W at the northern tip of the neighborhood and with I-94 at the eastern tip. Cedar-Riverside was one of the most clearly demarcated neighborhoods in the Twin Cities.

Within that tightly bounded three-hundred-acre triangle are four distinct residential areas. In the north end of the neighborhood is Seven Corners, named after its main intersection—until the late 1980s a severely underdesigned octopus emptying three thoroughfares into Cedar-Riverside. It is the "compromise" section of the neighborhood, where activists allowed a high-rise hotel and medium-density apart-

ments to be constructed in order to save the rest of the neighborhood and create tax-increment funds for its rehabilitation. Seven Corners is set off from the rest of the neighborhood by the West Bank of the University of Minnesota on its southern side.

To the south of Seven Corners, in the southwest section of the neighborhood, rise the concrete towers of Cedar Square West, later renamed Riverside Plaza. An eleven-building complex looming as high as thirty-nine stories over the neighborhood, Cedar Square West was the development around which the battle for the neighborhood erupted. The bare concrete towers, punctured only by windows and randomly scattered, weather worn blue, red, and yellow panels, rise above this neighborhood of single-family and duplex housing like a mad architect's vision of the ultimate in college dormitory life. But Riverside Plaza is no dormitory. In fact, it was only the first stage of what was to be a ten-stage "New Town in Town" urban renewal project that would stuff thirty thousand people into a three-hundred-acre space. With an urban renewal plan created by city government, the project was to be implemented by a private developer supported by local capital and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Riverside Plaza is all that remains of those grand plans. But even so, the complex houses about half the neighborhood's approximately 7,800 residents.

One block south of Riverside Plaza are the senior citizens' high rises, which continue the theme of high-density residential living. This complex began as public housing for senior citizens, but it gradually became transformed into public housing for the mentally ill population as well, leading to increasing conflicts. The young residents organized cultural, educational, and social services for the residents of the complex, but this segment of the neighborhood remained relatively separated from the political storms that raged on the West Bank.

Commercial activity radiates out from the intersection of Cedar and Riverside avenues, where Riverside Plaza, Seven Corners, the University of Minnesota, and the "old neighborhood" come together. This intersection is also the location of the New Riverside Cafe, the early center of militancy in the neighborhood.

The "old neighborhood," made up of predominantly single-family and duplex housing beginning across Cedar Avenue from Riverside Plaza and stretching east, was saved from the bulldozer and rehabilitated by the residents. The old neighborhood is divided into two sections. Cedar East is directly across the street from Cedar Square West and is bordered by the University of Minnesota on the north.

Riverside Park is isolated on the extreme eastern corner of the neighborhood, cut off by Augsburg College and St. Mary's and Riverside hospitals. It is the "suburbs" of the West Bank, separated from the bar traffic, congestion, and crime that spread out from the business district on the west side of the neighborhood.

Overall, the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood is a unique place. In the 1960s many of the residents were hippies, beatniks, and student activists, breaking away from the working-class and middle-class roots of their parents. The "Haight-Ashbury of the Midwest," Cedar-Riverside was a national center for the counter culture. But in contrast to many other counter cultural centers that withered away or turned into upscale boutique neighborhoods, Cedar-Riverside institutionalized much of its alternative character. The activists of the 1960s stayed on in the neighborhood and brought a mature community into the 1990s. It is also an urban community that exerts significant influence over its fate and continually strives to provide an alternative local culture and even a local economy.

In the 1990s you can still find the 1960s in Cedar-Riverside. When you walk north along Cedar Avenue, you may stop at the West Bank Co-op Grocery,² buy jewelry from a street vendor, take in the sounds of a street musician, or browse in one of the shops selling exotic clothing. At the corner of Cedar and Riverside avenues is the New Riverside Cafe, where you can feast on vegetarian meals prepared by a self-proclaimed anarchist collective. Next door is KFAI "Fresh Air" radio, Minneapolis's only alternative radio station. If you continue down Riverside Avenue a couple of blocks, you come to an intersection occupied by the People's Center, the Meridel Le Sueur Center for Peace and Justice, and St. Martin's Table, all of which are committed to various forms of alternative community services and political activism. Farther down Riverside is yet another co-op grocery, North Country Food Co-op, which is worker-controlled (as opposed to the West Bank Co-op, which is consumer-controlled) and emphasizes organic foods.

If you turn into the neighborhood residential areas, you pass through blocks of single-family homes, duplexes, and townhouses that appear brand new. Many of these buildings are not new, however, but have been rebuilt from top to bottom and inside out, often with the frame and the woodwork the only original equipment. And all the homes are superinsulated against the harsh Minnesota winters.

In Seven Corners and the old neighborhood the residents controlled

the planning of rehabilitation and replacement of some 555 units of housing, more than half of which were single-family, duplex, or townhouse buildings, involving nearly \$13 million in funds. This redevelopment was conducted with a rigid "no-displacement" policy and an eye toward affordability which preserved half the units for low-income residents, including 103 federally subsidized "Section 8" units. All the units are controlled by the neighborhood through leasehold cooperative or management cooperative housing contracts, providing secure and affordable housing for nearly two thousand neighborhood residents (Brighton Development Corporation, 1990).

Capital and Community: A Contradiction in Urban Renewal

In attempting to understand how the people of Cedar-Riverside could so dramatically influence the course of urban redevelopment in their neighborhood, this book provides a much needed integration of two veins of research: the new urban sociology and the sociology of social movements.³ The new urban sociology literature gives us a perspective on urban dynamics that focuses on the role of powerful economic actors and economic structures that were sorely neglected by previous urban theories. New urban sociologists are centrally concerned with the character of power and inequality in the city: how the capitalist accumulation process and its accompanying crisis tendencies and capital-labor struggles shape the city, the interaction between capital and the state in arranging urban space, and the role of structure and agency in effecting urban social change (Zukin, 1980; Gottdeiner and Feagin, 1988). The social movements literature forces us to recognize the tasks involved in organizing citizens to attain power, asking questions about how social movements form and organize, how they recruit members, how they choose and use tactics, and what determines whether they succeed or fail.

Until now, attempts to study urban neighborhood mobilization have emphasized one or the other of these perspectives. The recent research on neighborhood movements in the new urban sociology tradition (N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, 1974; Lowe, 1986; Davis, 1991) has emphasized urban structures and power brokers in attempting to explain urban insurgency, building diverse theories of urban social movements almost without a reference to the two decades of social movement theory that has developed. Social movement theory, on the

other hand, has dealt with every movement, local or national, large or small, right wing or left wing, as if somehow the same explanatory framework is adequate.

In this book I show that neither perspective can explain why sometimes capital wins in struggles for the control of urban turf and why at other times communities persevere. Consequently, I steer an integrated course between those two perspectives, arguing, like Manuel Castells (1977, 1978, 1983), that the city is formed from struggle that is shaped, but not determined, by the class structure. It is also not dominated by economic elites, but neither is it a fair fight, since power is not as easily accessible to less class-privileged actors, even when they are organized.

We must integrate the new urban sociology and social movements theory primarily because neither can, by itself, explain the events of Cedar-Riverside. With a history spanning nearly three decades, the story of Cedar-Riverside shows how communities can fall victim to urban redevelopment that is planned from the top down and that displaces existing communities to produce profit rather than to serve community needs. A redevelopment plan sponsored by the City of Minneapolis designated the neighborhood an Urban Renewal District and specified that the existing neighborhood would be demolished and replaced by high-density housing to be constructed by a private developer. When Keith Heller entered the scene with the New Town plan, the Cedar-Riverside community lost four blocks of housing to Cedar Square West.

The history of Cedar-Riverside also shows, however, how communities can organize to resist urban redevelopment imposed from without. There were nine more Cedar Square Wests planned for the neighborhood, but none survived the neighborhood resistance. Neighborhood activists developed innovative strategies and tactics that used environmental law to obtain a court injunction against further construction, undermining the economic and political support for the New Town plan. And the history finally shows how a neighborhood with a will to survive and an alternative vision can conduct urban redevelopment that is affordable, prevents displacement, is democratically planned, and supports the community. Once the New Town plan had been defeated, residents set about the hard work of doing their own redevelopment planning, securing as much capital and state cooperation as possible to finance the rehabilitation, and overseeing the development itself. But this late history also shows that capital still imposes limits on what communities can do. Resi-

dents increasingly found that they had to trade community control for adequate financing: the more they relied on capital and government funding sources, the less control they could exert over the redevelopment.

The conflict between capital and community is described by the new urban sociologists (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Feagin and Parker, 1990; Castells, 1983; Lowe, 1986) as a conflict between use values and exchange values. Following the basic Marxist distinction between use values as the production of goods and services for one's own use and exchange values as the production of goods and services to exchange with others, these researchers show how capitalists and their supporters view the city in terms of its worth in an exchange relationship, while city residents view it in terms of its usefulness in providing services, sustenance, and quality of life. Thus, capitalists support urban development that will increase the chances of further commodifying urban land and infrastructure toward making a profit, while citizens press for urban development that preserves urban land and infrastructure for their use and supports their community (Mollenkopf, 1981; Cox, 1981). A city park, for example, offers use values for its citizens—provided for all and available for all. But that park cannot generate profit unless it is privately owned and its land exchanged for rent or sale to those who can afford the price. Thus, every time that a use value is transformed into an exchange value, the community becomes deprived of that resource.⁴

The conflict between capitalist exchange values and community use values is most obviously expressed in disputes over urban redevelopment. This type of conflict centers on the distinction between top-down, capital-conscious urban redevelopment and democratic, community-based urban redevelopment. In order to transform use values into exchange values, community objections must be effectively silenced. As a result, urban redevelopment in the city is typically planned from the top down by the minions of corporate and government leaders. Even though they may not represent the interests of a particular capitalist developer, they are carefully conscious of capital's profit requirements and the city's dependence on capital for fiscal health, jobs, and overall stability. These redevelopment plans are then imposed on community citizens with only token opportunities for review. Often the redevelopment displaces communities by bulldozing them or, more insidiously, by hastening community deterioration through diverting funds away from urban neighborhoods. The alternative to top-down, capital-conscious urban

redevelopment is redevelopment whose plans are generated by the residents of those neighborhood communities through their direct participation in a democratic planning process based in their neighborhood. Of course, these two forms of urban redevelopment produce very different projects. Top-down, capital-conscious urban redevelopment produces immense, high-density, capital-intensive projects based on the hope for massive profits. Democratic, community-based urban redevelopment produces smaller, human-scale development that is much less able to generate high profits. In Cedar-Riverside the choice was between a developer's plan for housing thirty thousand residents in a three-hundred-acre space, or the community's housing and commercial rehabilitation plan to serve the four thousand or so residents who lived in the single-family homes and duplexes at the time.

To grasp fully the course of the struggle between capital and community, between exchange values and use values, and between top-down, capital-conscious development and democratic, community-based development, we must understand three concepts: the growth coalition, the community-based social movement, and the context in which the struggle takes place—the political opportunity structure.

Capital in the City and the Growth Coalition

Capital, the organized economic power of capitalists, built the great cities of the modern age. Whether labeled great industrialists or notorious robber barons, there is no disputing that it was those who controlled capital who designed and built the enormous steel mills, gleaming skyscrapers, massive feats of transportation technology and engineering, museums, universities, sports complexes, and everything else about which we marvel in the city. Capitalists have defined the shape and the quality of the city through modern history, deciding which neighborhoods would prosper and which would be destroyed, which workers would work and which would not, and what the city would become. And often they did this against the interests and sometimes the open rebellions of the citizens of those cities.

Little changed after World War II with the advent of the federal urban renewal programs to remove blighted neighborhoods long starved of capital. Since the start of federally sponsored urban renewal in the 1950s, capital has been its overwhelming beneficiary. From its beginnings in New Haven, Connecticut, where predominantly African-American housing was demolished for highway expansion and downtown retail development (N. Fainstein and S. Fain-

stein, 1986b; Domhoff, 1983), to today, when redevelopment dollars go to build mostly vacant office towers rather than housing for the homeless, urban renewal has directly or indirectly undermined urban communities. Urban planning has historically reflected a strong consciousness of the needs of capital and has created projects reflecting those needs—either directly through wiping out neighborhoods to build profit-based or tax-supported institutions, indirectly through wiping out neighborhoods to build infrastructure such as freeways, or in consequence through directing government dollars into urban redevelopment projects to benefit capitalists in downtowns rather than residents in neighborhoods. Urban capital's exchange-value orientation demands high-density, high-profit, and centrally controlled urban renewal. And though this often means that urban capitalists are directly involved in both the planning and the carrying out of urban renewal, that is not always the case. In fact, they can exert nearly as much influence indirectly as directly, because government is so "capital conscious," that is, aware of its dependence on capital and aware of capitalists' ability to move to the best "business climate" (Molotch, 1979; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Friedland and Palmer, 1984; Feagin and Parker, 1990). Thus, government, particularly local government, often acts as a capital-conscious agent in planning urban redevelopment that will retain and attract capital even if capital itself is not involved in the planning (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Friedland, 1983).

One of the strongest forms of capital control of urban redevelopment is the "growth coalition."⁵ Portraying the city as a "growth machine," John Logan and Harvey Molotch (1987; also see Molotch, 1976) discuss the role of a variety of actors in the city who come together as a growth coalition to support urban growth, whether by providing services and other favorable investment conditions or by promoting the city's image. The main goal, for capitalists, is to increase the exchange value of land by intensifying land use and creating population growth (Domhoff, 1983; Lyon et al., 1981). Realtors, city institutions, corporations, media, and a variety of other capital actors also benefit immensely from urban growth (Logan and Molotch, 1987). In the process of forming a growth coalition, capitalists are able to achieve strategic access to local political parties and local government to promote their agenda outside the normal democratic process (Friedland, 1980). And politicians acquiesce, even though the increased costs in expanded city services, infrastructure repair and updating, and loss of tax revenue through tax abatement and other concessions made to corporations to produce growth often result in

a net loss in city fiscal health. Labor unions also support top-down, capital-conscious urban renewal, falling victim to promises of jobs for their members—promises that are typically inflated and jobs that are often temporary. In fact, it appears that growth benefits everyone involved in the city except its residents, who have to suffer the pollution, social disruption, community displacement, competition for jobs, and pressure on infrastructure that come with growth.

The degree of power of a growth coalition to pursue its growth agenda and externalize the costs of growth on disenfranchised communities is variable. According to Roger Friedland (1980), capitalists have three possible sources of power on the urban stage. They have power through participation in local politics as interest groups, institutionalized influence in city government on boards and committees, and leverage over policy through their control of the local economy. When a growth coalition brings all three of these sources of power together to dominate the agenda of local government, it creates an "urban regime"—"an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions" (Stone, 1989:5). Growth-oriented regimes are difficult to oppose because they achieve the status of a governing force based on the enormous resources of economic wealth gathered by their corporate members and their control over local investment activity. Regimes can also be populist or progressive and thereby respond more to citizen interests. But this regime type is difficult to sustain without unified support from citizens through a system of patronage, strong ideological commitment, or a widespread and tightly organized network of community-based organizations (Stone, 1987).

Growth coalitions are not always able to achieve the status of a stable urban regime, however. Although we do not know a great deal about why growth coalitions can fail,⁶ capital faces two problems in pursuing its growth agenda. The first problem is maintaining the local state's membership in, or support for, the growth coalition. The local state is a central capital-conscious player in holding the growth coalition together, if only because the planning process must be approved by various local government offices. Often, however, local government also has to go out and take the heat for the costs the development will impose on citizens. Essentially, the local state is caught between supporting capital accumulation and maintaining political legitimation through also providing "social reproduction" or "collective consumption" services—food, clothing, shelter, care—for citizens. The local

state must maintain some semblance of democracy, and to cave in too quickly undermines the authority of local representatives. As the volume and power of community-based groups increase, it becomes more and more difficult for local government blatantly to support a progrowth project that is clearly anticomunity. Thus, the local state is not completely free to support capital's growth agenda unconditionally while ignoring the citizenry (Lauria, 1986; Stone, 1989; Stoecker and Schmidbauer, 1991; Elkin, 1987).⁷ But it is even less able to support citizen communities against capital's growth agenda, since the mobility of individual capitalists allows them to hold the city's economic vitality hostage and enforce capital-consciousness on city hall. Capitalists can simply threaten to move out of the city, taking with them the jobs and tax base the local government is dependent on, unless their growth agenda prevails as public policy. Aside from mass citizen mobilization, about all that can block this influence are accumulation crises, in which capitalists overproduce, workers are laid off, the city coffers dry up, city services are cut, and citizens revolt (Harvey, 1978, 1985).

The other important problem faced by growth coalitions is that they are composed of actors whose individual interests are always potentially in conflict. It is often difficult for capitalists to agree on just what will facilitate growth. For example, the local rentier class, living off real estate investments and normally in favor of development, may oppose particular forms of growth fostered by large corporations (Molotch and Logan, 1984). And with limited markets, any increase in one market comes at the potential contraction of another. Capitalists are in a competitive relationship with regard to one another. Although they often call a truce for the purposes of attempting to expand markets overall, such agreements last only as long as all actors in the coalition define continued cooperation as in their individual self-interest. Thus, the growth coalition is prone to factioning, as individual capitalists may have different interests or may change their definition of what is in their self-interest (Domhoff, 1983; Feagin and Parker, 1990; Jenkins and Brents, 1989).

The divisions among capitalist members of the growth coalition are numerous, cross-cutting, and unpredictable. Early in the formulation of the growth-coalition concept, Molotch (1979) seemed to argue that multinational corporations were not as involved in growth coalitions as local capital, especially rentier capital. But other research disputes this notion (Morlock, 1974; Friedland, 1980), and some analysts hypothesize that big capital with local headquarters and locally residing

professionals and executives is more likely to become interested in growth coalitions (Friedland and Palmer, 1984; Berger et al., 1992). To the extent that big capital does get involved in promoting growth, it may run up against opposition from rentier capital. Growth supported by big capital takes over or overruns small local firms without producing the spin-off growth most beneficial to rentiers (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Banks may also be difficult growth-coalition partners, since they do not necessarily concentrate their loans on local growth-coalition projects but instead focus on lending to other big capital that may not produce local benefits (Ratcliff, 1980). There are also distinct divisions within local capital: industrial, finance, merchant, and property capital (Fleischmann and Feagin, 1987), with property capital perhaps divided into development capital and construction capital (Feagin and Parker, 1990). Such divisions, though not inherently antagonistic, represent the possible sources of growth-coalition tensions.

Understanding the role of these two qualities of the growth coalition—the potentially democratic character of government, and capital fractions in the growth coalition—helps us work toward knowledge of how growth coalitions may succeed or fail. But we cannot achieve that knowledge by studying the growth coalition by itself. We must also explore the role played by the organized resistance of communities in the growth machine's path. For it is that developing resistance that has the capacity to attack the growth coalition's structural weaknesses. Understanding how communities might attack those structural weaknesses requires understanding the character of "community."

Community in the City

Against the growth coalition stands the community. The attempts to convince citizens that top-down, capital-conscious redevelopment is good for everyone are numerous and well funded. But those who stand in the path of urban renewal, who will lose their homes, their neighbors, and literally their communities—who have to pay the "externalities" of such redevelopment—are often not swayed by the glossy propaganda.

What is the community we are so concerned about displacing? Larry Lyon (1987) sees community as having three basic structural elements: a geographic area, common ties among members, and interaction among members. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions. In all the classic definitions of community, theorists and

philosophers have emphasized the presence of common values and emotions—what Harry Boyte (1984) refers to as “communal ties” centered on values of cooperation, mutual aid, “closeness,” and a shared culture that is exclusive to the community. Lyon’s structural characteristics and Boyte’s cultural characteristics provide the underpinning for the six factors that Logan and Molotch (1987) find in strong neighborhood communities: “a focal point in which one’s daily needs are satisfied”; the availability of informal support networks; “a sense of physical and psychic security”; an identity; “agglomeration benefits,” unique services provided because enough demand has concentrated in the neighborhood; and a shared ethnicity. I emphasize the importance of the qualities of community along with the location of that community in a specific geographic space. Space plays a significant role in struggles between growth coalitions and the neighborhood communities in their paths and, as we will see, affects the dynamics of the conflict in important ways (Čapek and Gilderbloom, 1992).

Community has been an issue of study for social researchers ever since the industrial revolution and the beginnings of sociology. As capitalism and industrialization destroyed rural community life and forced citizens into cities for survival, many analysts feared that the bonds that made social life predictable and orderly would disintegrate. Ferdinand Tönnies (1963 [1887]) described the transition as a shift from “*gemeinschaft*”—in which the individual was one with the community, identifying with its traditions, customs, and values without question—to “*gesellschaft*”—in which the individual separated from the community and managed relationships from a perspective of rationality, disregarding traditional norms and morality. For Emile Durkheim (1964 [1893]), traditional life was based on “mechanical” solidarity, in which the members of the community were not distinguished by separate roles and practiced a strict conformity to cultural values. Industrialization created “organic” solidarity, in which the diversity of individuals occupying distinct roles and adopting divergent values was held together only by the interdependence of their roles.

It was the city where the fears of a *gesellschaft* lifestyle allowing only organic solidarity were concentrated. For Georg Simmel (1950 [1905]), it was in the city that all relationships were reduced to rational monetary relationships and individuals became emotionally cut off from one another. By the 1930s in the United States, Louis Wirth (1938) was echoing Simmel’s concern, arguing that as city populations became larger, more dense, and more heterogeneous, the emphasis on individualism and the destruction of community ties increased.

The fear of the disintegration of community in the city continued into the 1950s with "community power" studies (Hunter, 1953; Dahl, 1961) that were concerned not so much with community as traditional bonds but with community as the web of power relationships and governing structures across the entire city. "Community" had become synonymous with "the city" and was no longer connected to the *gemeinschaft* quality of community life. *Gemeinschaft* community had become, analysis argued, "eclipsed" in the city (Stein, 1960), with a concomitant loss of cultural unity and "little sense of belonging, or feeling of identification, or intimate association with others" (Ross, 1955:4).

These analysts, along with many others, decried the existence of "subcultures" that, for them, were both cause and consequence of the loss of the city as a community. Convinced of the practicability of the melting-pot mythology, these researchers saw the persistence of independent, neighborhood-based communities as a tragedy. And in some ways, their evaluation was correct. As some urban neighborhoods, through either their class power or their race power, concentrated their efforts on preventing other neighborhood-based communities from gaining access to resources, or preventing "outsiders" from living or working within the neighborhood's boundaries, racism and class oppression was reinforced.

Other researchers, however, noticed that community was absent only at the most superficial level of analysis. At a deeper level of study of the city, one could find vibrant ethnic neighborhoods of tight community networks, stable traditions, and emotional security. Classic works by Herbert Gans (1982 [1962]), William Whyte (1943), Carol Stack (1974), and numerous others explored how poor people, ethnic groups, impoverished women, and traditional communities survived in the city in spite of forces that attempted to erode their bonds. Even in the most oppressed and exploited neighborhoods, the strong bonds of community were evident, as Stack (1974) showed. The sharing of members' resources, the cooperative work that generated community resources, and the mutual emotional and physical support provided by members, though invisible to the outside world, was a necessity for survival in the community that Stack studied. The invisibility of neighborhood-based communities, as well as their lack of legitimacy from the perspective of the melting-pot mythology, are what makes community studies of neighborhoods so important. And increasingly, those studies are of communities of resistance which recognize neighborhoods as the site of both community and political action in the city

(Henig, 1982; Fisher, 1984; Wylie, 1989; Davis, 1991; Saltman, 1990).

While capital builds cities through building exchange values, citizens build neighborhood communities through building use values. But like capitalists, who require a profit, or "surplus," to invest in city building, citizens also require a form of "surplus" to succeed in community building. True communities take responsibility for providing use values for their members: community services, celebrations, care for the sick, support for those in crisis, and resources for the needy all must come from a surplus that other members of the community are able to provide through their wages or volunteer labor (Stoecker, 1992; Laslett, 1981). Thus, when communities attempt to influence urban planning, it is to bring small shop owners back into their neighborhood commercial district, rehabilitate their housing, and support community-based services to build the community surplus. But none of this redevelopment generates the substantial profits attractive to capitalists, and it in fact stands as a barrier to the unfettered expansion of capital because it prevents the transformation of community resources into exchange values.

The conflict between capital and community is not only over material resources, however. It is a conflict between fundamental values of urban cultural diversity, political participation, and the satisfaction of collective consumption needs (Castells, 1983). Capital requires a growth consensus managed by centralized authority that emphasizes state support for the production of profit. Communities attempt to maintain autonomous urban subcultures, struggle for political decentralization to allow for political self-management, and strive for sustainable community services and an urban infrastructure that supports community life. The struggle between capital and community is rooted not simply in a material contradiction, then, but also in definitions over what is right, what is good, what is humane, and what is just. The struggle over high-density versus low-density living is not just about material costs and profits, but about the ability to maintain community under each condition. The debate over top-down versus community-based planning is about fundamental values of democracy and respect for diversity: not just the material turf of urban neighborhoods, but its cultural soul.

Community as Social Movement

Although culture may be the central defining quality of a strong community, culture is not enough in and of itself to allow communities to win in struggles over urban redevelopment. To defend them-

selves against the pressures of top-down, capital-conscious urban redevelopment, communities must mobilize as social movements. That means they must be able to recruit participants for research, demonstrations, negotiations, planning, and a variety of other tasks related to fighting outside threats. They must also be able to organize those participants into a structure that will make the most efficient and effective use of their resources. And finally, they must be able to employ tactics that will allow them to achieve their goals. Research in social movements offers many, often contradictory, answers to the question of how to provide these three ingredients. Ultimately, each one poses a dilemma for social movements, since it appears to require the movement to choose from contradictory alternatives.

Recruiting members to a movement requires both getting people involved and keeping them involved. Movement recruiters often "frame" the movement's issues to appeal to the potential member's values and world view (Snow et al., 1986) and then provide an individual incentive to join up. As demonstrated in the "free rider" problem (Olson, 1965), it is not in any individual's self-interest to contribute to the provision of a collective good such as a clean environment, peace, or a saved neighborhood. Instead, potential members must receive an individual reward for becoming involved. But individual incentives maintain commitment only until the member receives the reward (Bailis, 1974; Piven and Cloward, 1979) and may fail to maintain commitment to "high-risk activism" (McAdam, 1986; Wandersman et al., 1987).⁵

A potential resolution to this dilemma is to employ "solidary incentives" (Wilson, 1973), which maintain commitment to the people in the movement rather than to the movement itself, essentially creating a movement community. When groups, rather than individuals, are recruited to a movement, the social relationships that maintain the group also can maintain involvement in the movement (Oberschall, 1973; Snow, Zurcher, and Eklund-Olson, 1980; Fine and Stoecker, 1985). Creating community, then, may be the best way to increase recruitment and commitment, and can hold a movement together even when it is in "abeyance" (Taylor, 1989). In a true neighborhood community that provides a focal point, support network, security, identity, agglomeration benefits, and a shared culture (Logan and Molotch, 1987), these solidary incentives already exist. Building community, then, builds solidary incentives.

The dilemma of organizing members is problematic both for the overall social movement and for individual social movement organi-

zations. Organizing at either level can be centralized or decentralized. At the social movement level, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine (1970; Gerlach, 1976, 1983) argue that social movements typically adopt a movement structure of many leaders (decentralization) and many organizations (segmentation) with overlapping communication networks (reticulation).⁹ This "DSR" structure is said to limit the effects of repression and failure of any movement segment, maximize diversity of strategies and tactics, and create rivalries between movement segments which increase the effort of each segment. This structure restricts coordination of the entire movement, however (Dwyer, 1983; McAdam, 1982:186). William Gamson (1975), in contrast, advocates a centralized and bureaucratic movement structure, centered on a single movement organization. He argues that this structure produces greater movement efficiency and coordination and reduces movement factioning.

The same dilemma occurs at the level of the social movement organization. Centralization increases efficiency (Gamson, 1975:89; Breines, 1980; Staggenborg, 1989b) and provides the added advantage of maintaining relations with establishment groups and funders (Jenkins, 1985; Staggenborg, 1988). Centralized organizations are subject to oligarchy and goal displacement, however, as the leaders become more concerned with maintaining their own power than with meeting the original movement goals (Michels, 1962 [1915]; Kato-vich, Weiland, and Couch, 1981). Decentralized organizations, by providing for greater involvement of members, better mobilize membership (Zald and Ash, 1966), increase strategic and tactical innovation and flexibility (Staggenborg, 1988, 1989b), and better develop member talents (Yates, 1973:79). But decentralized organizations can also become oligarchical if they are not formally structured (Staggenborg, 1989b; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Freeman, 1972-73), and they are less able to respond quickly to new crises and opportunities (Breines, 1980).

As with managing the recruitment dilemma, managing the organizing dilemma necessitates addressing the issue of community. The profession of community organizing is, essentially, about creating community. Saul Alinsky (1971) said that there is no such thing as a "disorganized community." Thus, the community is already organized, and if it has the characteristics of a true community, it is neither very centralized nor very bureaucratized, and the imposition of a rigid hierarchical structure on top of that community structure may create power struggles within the community. But not creating more formal-

ized movement organizations may inhibit the community's ability to confront outside threats. An organized movement must be built from an organized community—connected, yet distinct, as we will see.

The tactical dilemma that all social movements face is fairly straightforward. Movements need both favorable policy decisions and resources from the outside world, including the news media, the public, and antagonists (Barkan, 1979). The impoverished rarely have resources to withhold or negotiate with, and bargaining is dependent on having something to bargain with (Turner, 1970). Disruptive tactics, including actions such as rent strikes for localized movements, do produce victories and sometimes are the only means of doing so (Shlay and Faulkner, 1984; N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, 1974; Gamson, 1975; Lamb, 1975; Steedly and Foley, 1979). But the fear of repression makes militant tactics difficult to organize (Lowe, 1986), and such practices risk alienating moderate allies, who may then cut off resources to the movement (Schumacher, 1978; Barkan, 1986). Moderate tactics, such as informational pickets, negotiation, or lobbying, will not alienate moderate allies but may have little or no effect in slowing down the movement's target (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

A strong community may be better able to control members' fears and reduce the need for outside resources. The more that community members feel protected by the community, know their children will be cared for if the demonstration lands them in jail, and are supported and joined in militant action by others in the community, the more likely they may engage in those militant actions. The willingness of large numbers of Clamshell Alliance members to go to jail for their blockade of the Seabrook nuclear power plant, for example, was achieved with the community created by small "affinity groups," whose memberships remained stable and served as an immediate support group throughout the struggle against Seabrook (Barkan, 1979).

Capital, Community, and the Political Opportunity Structure

The struggle between capital and community plays itself out on the urban stage amid a variety of other characters. We can refer to this stage as the *political opportunity structure*. First coined by Peter Eisinger (1973) to help explain the outcomes of urban social movements, then picked up and elaborated by Sidney Tarrow (1983), this concept is useful for setting the stage. Briefly, the political opportunity structure refers to the openness or closure of political institutions, the stability of political alignments, and the availability of allies for conflicting actors.