
Introduction: A Dialectic of Being and Value

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THE PUBLICATION of Victor Farías's *Heidegger et la nazisme* in 1987 was a controversial event in the usually placid world of philosophy. And while the general consensus may be that Farías's book is flawed, even deeply so, his unabashed critique of Heidegger has provoked one of the more extensive moral reflections in the history of recent philosophical publication.¹ As one surveys the extensive literature on *l'affaire Heidegger*, however, it becomes evident that scant attention has been devoted to any sustained analysis of the lifelong but troubled association of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. This is unfortunate because their relationship not only provides valuable historical and biographical information, but is a source of insight, as Joseph Margolis reminds us, regarding the moral responsibility of intellectuals and the nature and purpose of philosophy itself. The relatively recent publication of Jaspers's *Notizen zu Heidegger* and their *Briefwechsel*, combined with the even more recent appearance of the correspondence between Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt,² provides the occasion for redressing this scholarly deficit in a sustained and hopefully informative and constructive manner. This collection of essays is the product of that effort.³

During the organizational phase of this research, I somewhat serendipitously came across a lecture on Heidegger and Jaspers by Paul Tillich given at the Cooper Union in New York City in 1954. This essay, published here for the first time,⁴ is highly representative of the views of many, if not most, of Jaspers's and Heidegger's intellectual contemporaries during the 1950s. As our lead essay, Tillich's reflections provide a sense of historical context for the current discussion by reminding the reader that even during the time Heidegger was at the peak of his influence as a philosopher, his colleagues were not blind to the questionable implications of his politics. And while Paul Tillich, like Hannah

Arendt (as Leonard Ehrlich reminds us in his essay), here identifies Heidegger as a "great thinker" and Jaspers as a "noble scholar," this diminutive attribution of intellectual virtue also enables Tillich to amplify the larger moral significance of what might be termed the danger of Being's seduction of value—especially during times of great political and social crisis, when individuals are most prone to diminish the importance of immediate moral concerns for the sake of an alleged "greater good."

The events of recent decades confirm the accuracy of Tillich's observations and provide a productive basis for rethinking the scholarly significance of Jaspers in ways that heretofore have been overlooked. Indeed, Heidegger and Jaspers provide a case study for understanding the perennial conflict between Being and value, as understood and avowed by these two thinkers, in terms of the projects of fundamental ontology and speculative metaphysics, respectively. For example, Heidegger's stinging critique of "values" in his "Humanismus Brief" (1947), namely, that "thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being," strikes a quite different note for perceptive readers today than it did even a decade ago. The Achilles' heel of ontological pursuits intent upon disclosing "the lighting of Being," as Tillich suggests, lies in the self-exempted removal of the thinker from the moral and ethical considerations that might call into question the value of this kind of inquiry. Indeed, the tendency toward the deconstructive privatization of philosophizing, as Tillich recalls, was precisely the point of Nicolai Hartmann's critique of Heidegger's "subjectivism"—in spite of Heidegger's constant railing against post-Enlightenment subjectivist epistemologies. Ontological quests, then, sometimes provide warrants for the assumption that the thinker is somehow justified, *a priori*, in overturning tradition—that is, justified in not seeking justification on the grounds that the authentic thinker is driven by the higher but functionally useless purpose of "letting Being be."

Many scholars believe that Kant saves Jaspers's metaphysical reflections from ethical and moral paralysis in this regard, for throughout his career, Jaspers clearly and unequivocally viewed Kant as the "nodal point" in modern philosophy and devoted himself to rescuing what he considered to be the authentic spirit of Kant. It was not speculative metaphysics, Jaspers argued, that Kant repudiated, but ontology⁵—including the obscurely mystical medieval realism that seems to drive the Heideggerian quest for fundamental ontology. Jaspers, as William Blattner indicates, always regarded Kant's understanding of the "limit situation" as the primary metaphysical clue for developing a moral philosophy grounded in the mystery of freedom—in contrast to Heidegger's dissolution of these limits in order to stand once more in the "neighborhood of Being." As a

consequence of Heidegger's incessant repudiation of value theory and actual transgression of value, Karl Jaspers, like Eric Voegelin, ultimately viewed Heidegger as a kind of shaman with mystifying, seductive powers regarding "the magic of the extreme."⁶

It is interesting to note, therefore, that while neo-Kantianism represented the establishment enemy for both Jaspers and Heidegger during their early periods, as Karsten Harries points out, Jaspers was primarily interested in getting beyond the formalism of the neo-Kantians and not beyond Kant. Heidegger, by contrast and as Hans-Georg Gadamer has written, always felt compelled "to get beyond Hegel" and, as such, beyond the entire tradition of German Idealism. In order to "get beyond" Hegel, he had to "get behind" him "by thinking more radically, deeply and comprehensively" everything that Hegel thought.⁷ Thus Hegel, the "consummation of Western metaphysics," and not Kant, was Heidegger's principal object of overcoming; for with the publication of *Sein und Zeit* (1927), as Gadamer observes, Heidegger had already "transformed the final and most powerful form of neo-Kantian thought, Husserl's phenomenology, into philosophy"—in other words, he had transformed phenomenology into something more than a purely transcendental logical method, and in so doing, Heidegger "draws close to Hegel."⁸ While Klaus Brinkmann here argues that Heidegger fails in this regard, Heidegger's effort probably helps to explain why the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), who, while at Freiburg, directed Heidegger's *Habilitations-schrift* on Duns Scotus's theory of categories, remained Heidegger's ally. However, once at Heidelberg, after replacing Windelband in 1916, Rickert became the erstwhile enemy of Jaspers because, as an "untrained" philosopher with a medical background, Jaspers recalls, he was perceived as bent on overturning the neo-Kantian position Rickert most clearly and unambiguously represented.⁹

In the same vein, it is instructive to note some of the particulars regarding the enthusiastic reception of Heidegger during his Marburg years (1923–1928)—precisely the period when, as Walter Biemel points out, it had become entirely evident that "the old neo-Kantianism had lost its influence." This loss of influence is perhaps best symbolized by the death of Paul Natorp in 1924. During the previous year, Natorp had been chiefly responsible for recruiting Heidegger to Marburg on the strength of his work on Aristotle.¹⁰ The members of Heidegger's impressive coterie of liberal Protestant colleagues and students at Marburg (including the likes of Rudolf Otto, Nicolai Hartmann, Paul Friedländer, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and Hans-Georg Gadamer) were themselves breaking out in various ways from the legacy of neo-Kantianism and, as a consequence, were deeply fascinated with Heidegger's phenom-

enological explorations of fundamental ontology. Nevertheless, one must remember that Heidegger accomplished this not only as an incipient expert on Brentano and Husserl, but primarily as a classicist and medievalist amidst the then-burgeoning interest in classical, medieval, and romantic culture at Marburg. For at the time of his arrival in Marburg, Heidegger was known for his work on Aristotle, Albertus Magnus, and Duns Scotus; he was, in short, a Catholic philosopher in the midst of a faculty comprised of what, at the time, was arguably the most distinguished collection of Protestant thinkers at the oldest Protestant university in Germany. Founded by Philip of Hesse in 1527, Marburg was the university forever memorialized by way of the Colloquy in 1529 between Luther and Zwingli—the debate that established definitively the philosophical boundaries between Catholics, Lutherans, and other Protestants regarding the nature of sacramental presence and, a fortiori, the dim prospects of any future Protestant natural theology or, for that matter, any future metaphysic. It is reasonable to assume, as Biemel also suggests, that given the obvious political and religious differences between Heidegger and his colleagues, he probably initially pondered, on accepting his appointment, the prospect of being something of a strange prophet in a strange land. But since the philosophical and theological faculty was in the midst of a full-scale rebellion from its liberal Protestant, neo-Kantian past, Heidegger had little cause for alarm—nor was he forced to confront (as might have been the case at Berlin or even Heidelberg) Jaspers's deeply held Kantian conviction, out of the nominalistic austerity of Luther, that "the God who meets us in nature is the God of wrath." There can be little doubt, I think, that the orbit of Heidegger regarding what Stephen Erickson calls the "space of transcendence" is heavily textured by the deconstructed language of the God knowable in terms of the *ens realissimum*, whereas Jaspers's orbit is nominalistic language where God, as the *ens singularissimum*, is known only through the language of the moral law.¹¹

This admixture of religious and cultural factors suggests that Farías was on to something important in beginning his study of Heidegger as a Catholic youth in Messkirch and as a Jesuit novice in Freiburg. We forever remain the prisoners of our earliest childhood impressions regarding religion and values—or the lack of the same; and these influences are particularly free to play themselves out in philosophy. But while Farías is correct in suggesting that Heidegger was deeply impressed by a very specific form of German religious ethnocentrism, the philosophical and theological implications of this influence are developed inadequately. For the most telling significance of Heidegger's background, I suggest, consists not in locating the roots of his religious and political conscious-

ness in the conflict between Catholics and "Old Catholics" or in advancing the dubious proposition that Catholics are inherently more anti-Semitic than their Protestant Christian counterparts. The significance rather lies, I think, in recognizing that Heidegger, like many rural south-German Catholics, probably resented deeply the liberal-Protestant, social-democratic, modernist-cosmopolitan, north-German domination of culture, politics, and national identity after the Enlightenment. Thus when Heidegger elevates, as he does in the "Humanismus Brief," the "primordial world-historical" vision of "homelessness" through the "Remembrance" of the Swabian poet Hölderlin, and sets this against the "mere cosmopolitanism" of Goethe as something far more "significant" with respect to the meaning of authentic *humanitas*, we also have the basis for a quite stunning contrast to the liberal humanistic attitude of the north-German Karl Jaspers. Heidegger in fact concludes this oblique observation by saying that because Hölderlin was so much more "the shepherd of Being" than the court poet Goethe, "those young Germans who knew about Hölderlin, when confronted with death [during World Wars I and II], lived and thought something other than what the public held to be the typical German attitude."¹²

Because Heidegger was a south-German Catholic thinker of the highest rank, therefore, he probably believed that the problem of German national identity or *Being*, if you will, had much to do with the gradual usurpation of Catholic influence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and that the ineptitude of the Weimar Republic represented the decadent culmination of the shift of power from Catholic to Protestant, from south to north. This shift is symbolized politically by the bookends, so to speak, of the 1848 Revolution, namely, Metternich and Bismarck; but it really was a shift that stretched back much further, beyond Frederick the Great and even Luther, through the history of ideas, into Suarezian Thomism and the desperate attempt of the Church to shore up essentialism against the onslaughts of Scotist, Ockhamist, and Baconian nominalism. What was Luther and, indeed, what was Kant and the whole of nineteenth-century German philosophy if not the Protestant working-out of nominalistic *techné* and subjectivist individualism—a working-out that was, a fortiori, the "covering up" of Being? And what was the Reformation and its aftermath if not the turning back of Aristotle by the Pauline-Augustinian version of nominalism instantiated in the *Freiheitsprinzip* of Luther and the commencement of the secularized individualism that would reach its culmination in the twentieth century? To be sure, onto-theology, for Heidegger, commenced with Plato; hence, Heidegger's invitation to reconsider the origins of philosophy out of its pre-Socratic obscurity. Had Heidegger located the "forgetfulness of Being" in the high

and late middle ages, which may have been closer to his real intentions, he would not, needless to say, have enjoyed much of a hearing among his Protestant or, indeed his Jewish, colleagues.¹³

One of the more prominently identified reasons for the estrangement between Jaspers and Heidegger is usually located in their differences regarding the place and purpose of the university in the Germany of the 1930s. However, such differences remain superficial, as Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska suggests in her discussion of Jaspers and Heidegger on Schelling, unless they are perceived against the horizon of the quite different philosophical vocations of these two thinkers, as these vocations are informed by the meaning of *freedom*. Thus, while both Jaspers and Heidegger, in contrast to many, if not most, of their philosophical contemporaries, made highly influential public pronouncements on the ideas of a university and the civil society, it is the conception of freedom implicit in each that sets them apart. Jaspers's initial statement on *Die Idee der Universität* (1923), published shortly after his first major philosophical work, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919), reappeared in expanded form after the war in 1946, and again in 1961, under the same title, in collaboration with Kurt Rossmann.¹⁴ Heidegger, of course, presented his controversial rectorial address on the "The Self-Assertion of the German University" (*Die Selbstbehauptung der Universität*) to the faculty of Freiburg University on May 27, 1933. A regional sensation when first presented, the published text of this address was formally withdrawn from circulation on orders of the National Socialist Democratic Party (NSDAP) when the disillusioned Heidegger resigned after ten months as the chief academic officer of the University of Freiburg.¹⁵

Following the war, of course, and to the chagrin of many of his devoted followers, Heidegger remained conspicuously silent with respect to acknowledging any personal moral culpability for his rectorial address—especially his nationalistic references to the primordial power of "blood and soil" and the "bond of service." Had he dealt with these matters directly and forthrightly, as Marcuse suggested and as Derrida and others have observed, the current scrutiny of his works probably would not be taking place. Certainly it is true that apart from his administrative activities in 1933–1934, Heidegger scarcely ever dealt directly with mundane political matters, remaining aloof from the "sound and fury" in the streets, as is not unusual among philosophers and intellectuals generally. For this reason, many of Heidegger's supporters are inclined to view his political activity as a "misstep" along the lines of the maxim "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread" and that Heidegger, for a moment, at least, was a fool to be duped by the Nazis. Others, less forgiving, including Tom Rockmore and Leonard Ehrlich, contend that

Heidegger's originary work in ontology, however oblique and obscure it might be at times with respect to matters of praxis, has a fundamental political and social implication, and that this implication is negative and morally destructive.

Jaspers, in contrast to Heidegger, was a highly visible and much more conventional moralist throughout his academic career. This was especially true after the war, when he was elected an honorary senator of the reconstituted University of Heidelberg and was also asked, by the Americans, to be the minister of culture—a position he declined in view of his advancing years and his imminent move to Basel. Furthermore, and as we see from his correspondence with Heidegger, Jaspers had mixed feelings about these righteous expectations—as would any citizen given the agonizing circumstances and apocalyptic proportions of the German defeat. As the extremities of Nazi brutality became apparent, however, Jaspers gave voice to what is perhaps the most famous postwar philosophical reflection by a German thinker, namely, *Die Schuldfrage* (1946), in which the moral culpability of all Germans, including intellectuals, is forthrightly acknowledged.¹⁶ Following this, Jaspers continued to deal with a variety of moral and ethical questions having a bearing not only on the future of German and European civilization, but world civilization. Responsive to the obvious dangers of the Cold War but also its inevitability in the face of the terrorism of Stalin and his successors, Jaspers was particularly concerned with the foreboding prospect of thermonuclear holocaust, which he addressed with great perceptiveness in his highly acclaimed *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen: Politisches Bewusstsein unserer Zeit* (1958). Here, and in a host of books and treatises wherein he explored the urgent need for moral and spiritual reawakening, Jaspers continued the amplification of themes already established in his highly successful *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931),¹⁷ which, by 1965, had gone through eleven editions. Like Heidegger, Jaspers was a major player in the exploration of basic issues in philosophical anthropology, or the philosophy of man, as it was then called, that so dominated academic discussion during the "time between the times." Unlike Heidegger's esoteric ruminations in fundamental ontology, however, Jaspers's philosophizing on the "grounds of possible Existenz" is exoteric, that is, driven by the desire to communicate in the spirit of liberal humanism, including the "illicit progressivism" it may presuppose, as Joseph Margolis suggests.

Whatever one ultimately makes out of the quality of the personal friendship shared by Jaspers and Heidegger, it was sufficiently close to command the exchange of at least 157 letters, the record of which is now available for public scrutiny through Hans Saner's edition of their *Briefwechsel* (1990). The extremity of their postwar alienation was evident,

however, when Jaspers suppressed, in 1957 and until after Heidegger's death, the publication of the section in his "Philosophical Autobiography" containing his personal reflections on Heidegger. Thus when the new "augmented" edition of the Paul Schilpp *Festschrift* appeared in 1981, Heidegger and especially Jaspers scholars were curious to see what Jaspers could have said in 1957 that could not be revealed publicly for nearly twenty-five years.¹⁸

Those familiar with the philosophical positions of both Jaspers and Heidegger cannot fail to be struck by the extent to which these materials, including Jaspers's *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (1978), represent a veritable minefield of philosophical, political, and psychological nuance—only the traces of which are directly evident in the *Briefwechsel*.¹⁹ To make sense of these allusions, one must again recall the nature of their philosophical rivalry during the early years—a rivalry that, at least from the standpoint of Jaspers, was fated not only by the politics that separated them during the Nazi years, but also by their disproportionate recognition as scholars after the war. For at the beginning of their scholarly careers, Jaspers and Heidegger initially shared the common belief (as in the case of Schelling and Hegel—and with a not altogether dissimilar outcome) that they were destined to rejuvenate German philosophy by breaking the bondage of the "dull, threadbare, authoritarian neo-Kantian scholasticism," as Jaspers disdainfully called it, dominating late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German philosophy. As such, both Jaspers and Heidegger believed that they were charting the waters of a newly creative philosophical science and "renewing the *Gestalt* of German philosophy" to the grandeur of its previous existence.

Our essayists explore various aspects of this background, including how both Jaspers and Heidegger, during the tempestuous period during and following World War I, were inspired by common sources in their quest for philosophical originality (namely, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Schelling, Husserl, and the romantic German poets and mystics), and how both dedicated themselves to publishing "first works" that the rest of the philosophical world could not safely ignore. Nevertheless, when Jaspers published his *Philosophie* in 1932, Heidegger, six years younger than Jaspers, had already presented *Sein und Zeit* to the world in 1927. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (Jaspers's successor at Heidelberg) observes, Jaspers's three-volume magnum opus, while not "stillborn from the press," so to speak, did not receive the attention it properly deserved. This neglect was due in large measure to with the manner in which Heidegger's *Being and Time* had successfully riveted the attention not only of the philosophical world but the academic world generally.²⁰ Compared with the "ground-breaking work" of Heidegger, Jaspers's *Philosophie*, published

in a three-part form reminiscent of both Kant and Hegel, seemed to his more hostile critics (including Heidegger, who already, in 1919, had severely criticized his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* in an unpublished review he shared with Jaspers) an existentialized repristination of German Idealism. As a consequence, Jaspers had to content himself with taking an academic "back seat" to Heidegger. But what probably troubled Jaspers even more following World War II, as Heidegger's philosophical star continued its remarkable ascent, was the psychological pain of coming to terms with the realization that his suppliant position would continue indefinitely, Heidegger's politics notwithstanding. Thus even after the *Katastrophe*, it must have seemed to Jaspers that moral resolve counted for little—especially in academe, as European and American intellectuals alike preoccupied themselves with the formal concerns of analytical philosophy, on the one hand, or flirted with neo-Marxist or primordialist ontologies, on the other. Such options, in Jaspers's view, simply diverted attention from the exigent challenge of "authentic philosophizing on the grounds of possible Existenz," which, for him, always meant moral philosophizing in the spirit of Kant. One cannot fail to detect, as Harold Oliver notes, the hint of deep psychological resentment in Jaspers's personal reflections regarding these issues. Nor can one escape, in the related context Tillich mentions, the sarcastic moral irony embedded in the reflections of Hendrik Pos regarding Heidegger's alleged "snub" of Ernst Cassirer during their 1929 encounter in Davos, Switzerland, as the postwar elevation of Heidegger as the prophet of Being continued.²¹

Questions of Being and value, of course, are both meaning questions, but the modes in which such questions are raised are sometimes disjunctive, as clearly tends to be the case between Jaspers and Heidegger. Therefore, while Jaspers and Heidegger each viewed the university as the morally constitutive institutional agency in Germany after the demoralizing defeat of World War I, they did not agree on *how* this moral reconstruction might best take place or *what* its implications might ultimately be in terms of actualization. Jaspers conceptualized his convictions rather strictly along the lines of the Humboldtian model of a university equally dedicated to both education and research. He also held rather strictly to the Kantian notion that only individuals, not societies or collectivities, can be enlightened—a position not far from Luther's conception that "the good man does good works; good works do not make a man good." Little by way of "moral resolve" is to be expected, therefore, from the university as a corporate entity. Thus when Heidegger embraced the *Führerprinzip* as the means of transforming the essence of the university, Heidegger's "resolve," in the rectorial address, as Tillich observes,

becomes highly conspicuous as contrast to what "moral resolve" can be adduced from his otherwise elusive analyses of Being.

The moral pessimism of Max Weber probably served to adumbrate Jaspers's views as to what was and was not properly within the legitimate purview of the university; indeed, after Kant, Weber is the most constant influence in the philosophy of Jaspers. During the years following World War II, Jaspers's critique of *Katholizität*, combined with his relentless critique of totality (which not only influenced Hannah Arendt but also served to endear Jaspers to many conservatives), reinforces his earlier suspicions regarding the messianic pretensions of some intellectuals. Jaspers never tired, therefore, of warning against the usurpation of the independent authority of the university and the thwarting of due process through the nationalistic intrusions of the state. Indeed, Heidegger's repudiation of Jaspers's defense of pacifism within the context of academic freedom, in his first essay on "The Idea of the University," as "the most irrelevant of irrelevancies" was a portent of things to come, whether with respect to the alienation of sentiments between Jaspers and Heidegger or, far more significantly, the disaster that was soon to envelop the entire world.

Like John Cardinal Newman a century earlier, Jaspers believed that the university must be "supra-nationalistic and supra-political" in order to preserve its educational mission in the service of truth. A basic difference between Jaspers and Newman, of course, had to do with the latter's conviction that sponsorship by a supranational hierarchical ecclesiastical institution with its own political agenda might provide this kind of independence.²² Such an alliance, for Jaspers, is fundamentally in conflict with his Kantian views regarding the freedom and moral autonomy of the individual self-consciousness, however benevolent and well-intentioned the moral authority of the sponsoring institution might appear to be. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the cherished ideal of a wholly detached, autonomous, academic freedom in the service of truth was identical with the elitist-modernist illusion he denounced in his rectorial address. There are no rational or historical grounds, he argues, for assuming that the independence of the research university will provide an island of sanity and hope during periods of national crisis. On the contrary, "there are times," Heidegger says to Jaspers, "when one has to choose" between insular, self-serving notions of academic freedom, on the one hand, and the pursuit of knowledge in the service of what one perceives to be the greater good, on the other.²³ Of course, Heidegger believed that such a choice must be guided by what Heidegger identifies, in his rectorial address, as a "spiritual" apprehension of the "essence" of truth. Unfortunately this "essence," rooted in Heidegger's primordialistic,

pre-Socratic understanding of *aletheia*, as both Leonard Ehrlich and Tom Rockmore point out, remains hopelessly obscure. Thus when Heidegger asserts that "Spirit is the primordially attuned resoluteness towards the essence of Being,"²⁴ such oracular utterances, however mystically sublime they might be, could easily be distorted in the service of their opposite, as indeed turned out to be the case.

These differences do not diminish the fact that both Jaspers and Heidegger were deeply concerned with coming to terms with secularism and the power of technology. On the imminent dangers of technological massification and the deadly implications of "instrumentalist rationality" becoming the lodestar of academic self-understanding, they are entirely agreed.²⁵ How one might deal with these problems, especially in their advanced, late-modern form, is another matter, and this probably is where a major difference between Heidegger and Jaspers lies. For in the case of Jaspers, morally defensible answers regarding the problems generated by science and technology can arise only through the "loving struggle of communication," that is, in the spirit of dialogical mediation, a notion to which Habermas is deeply indebted. Heidegger, who did not have Jaspers's scientific background and who sometimes seemed to Jaspers grounded in some obscure form of "medieval scholasticism," had considerably less faith in dialectical-dialogical processes. For if the goal of modern academic inquiry is "value free" science, Heidegger asks, how can there be anything like authentic dialogue, since the goal of true dialogue is some kind of intellectual and moral conversion. Heidegger, like Nietzsche, pushes toward a higher, transformatory sense of value—a transformation consistent, he believes, with true *Wissenschaft*, namely, the value-transformed apprehension of Being become manifest in the call to the "spiritual bond of service."

It is at the point of remedy, then, that the conflict between questions of value and questions of Being becomes clearly manifest in Jaspers and Heidegger; and it is a conflict that seems to originate, as Klaus Brinkmann argues, in profound disagreement regarding the nature of the *good*. Given this disagreement, it is not surprising that Jaspers and Heidegger have quite different and conflicting conceptions of freedom and Transcendence, and that these conceptions, given the benefit of hindsight, might be identified with the social and political consequences they seem to entail.

We remain with the question as to whether such dire consequences can be avoided today and in the immediate future. Given the collapse of the dialectic of ideology that has dominated nearly a century of category formation and analysis, do we now have a unique opportunity to develop, in Jaspers's phrase, more encompassing conceptions of freedom and the

good that can lead us to more constructive conceptions of praxis? Have we moved beyond the "noumenal sources of privilege and validation" that Joseph Margolis finds objectionable in Heidegger and Jaspers; and are we ready for yet another assault on the "single paradigm of rationality" proposed by Klaus Brinkmann? And what of the role of consensus when such projects are performed within the context of the advanced, liberal democracy? Is it possible even to begin to develop actualizable conceptions of the good during a time in which institutional life has been so devaluated, a time when fewer and fewer people actively identify with what Alasdair MacIntyre calls "the tradition constituted, tradition constituting" universe of critical moral discourse?²⁶

The quality of ethical life, as Hegel well understood, depends very largely on the strength and vitality of the institutions of the civil society through which we are given to ourselves. Obviously, neither Jaspers nor Heidegger ever encountered anything like the free-market version of deontological liberalism that increasingly characterizes the advanced postindustrial state. It is clear that both Heidegger and Jaspers were fearful, in their respective ways, that radically deontological approaches to ethics and moral philosophy bereft of the numinous dimensions of "the essence of reason," whether through a "default of thinking" or remaining oblivious to "ciphers of Transcendence," might lead to severe deformations of value. But it is also clear, especially in the case of Heidegger, that "heeding the call of Being" through quasi-archaic modes of renunciation (or what Paul Ricoeur has called "the direct route to ontology") has tremendous risks as the alternative to working out, publicly and prudentially, formally and dialogically, the thorny and seemingly irreconcilable questions of value and Being that appear anew in every age. Indeed, Heidegger's fear of "massification," whether on the American or the Soviet model, led precisely to the uncritical small-scale actualization of the quasi-ontologically grounded nationalism that became synonymous with a terror unparalleled in human history.

Heidegger's arguably "deconstructive manipulation"²⁷ of the phrase out of Plato's *Republic* (497 d. 9) in the final line of his rectorial address—"All that is great stands in the storm,"—perhaps provides the final irony in this regard, since he neither offered any real criteria for the discernment of "authentic greatness," nor could he foresee how seemingly insignificant, even trivial, rhetorical assertions might be caught up in the vortex of an utterly demonic whirlwind. In this regard, it may be well to heed the superlatives in the utterance of the corporal from Linz when he confidently asserted that "the great masses of the people. . . will more easily fall victim to a great lie than to a small one." To the horrible truth inherent in this cynical assertion we might append what seems to be the

only available moral conterposition, namely, Jaspers's conviction that "philosophy alone yields clarity against the perversions of reason."²⁸ By this, Jaspers does not mean that reason itself is perverse; he means rather that many of reason's constructions are perverse, and that this is most likely to happen when the dialectic of value and Being is sundered. Only philosophical faith can hold this dialectic together, and by this he means a faith that is not ready-made nor likely to issue from philosophers who consider themselves members of an "isolated priesthood" in the service of Being. Just as the mature Hegel, in one of his most prudent moments, said that philosophy has to do with "comprehending one's time in thought," so also Jaspers understands that philosophical faith is discovered ever anew on the grounds of possible Existenz and always in the mediating spirit of dialogue.

NOTES

1. Victor Fariás, *Heidegger et la nazisme* (Paris: Éditions verdier, 1987). See the English translation by Paul Burrell and Gabriel Ricci, edited by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore, *Heidegger and Nazism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). For a partial list of recent publications on *l'affaire Heidegger*, see the bibliography following Chapter 10 below.

2. See Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Heidegger*, ed. Hans Saner (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1978); *Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel, 1920–1963*, ed. Hans Saner (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1990); and *Correspondence, 1926–1969: Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers*, trans. Robert and Rita Kimber (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).

3. In their earlier forms, the essays contained herein (with the exception of Tillich's) were delivered in conjunction with the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association Eastern and Pacific Divisions, in 1990–1992, and the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Existential Phenomenology in 1992.

4. I would here like to thank Dr. Mutie Tillich Farris for the permission to publish her father's lecture as the lead essay in this collection. I would also like to thank Dr. Alan Seaburg, director of the Tillich Archive at the Andover Library, Harvard Divinity School, for his kind assistance in securing this permission.

5. See Karl Jaspers, *Kant*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962).

6. See Eric Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," *Southern Review* 17, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 235–287.

7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 100–116.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

9. See Jaspers's "Philosophical Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, ed. Paul Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1957), pp. 3–94. I cite this as a

somewhat ironic alliance since Heidegger clearly presented more of a repudiation of Rickert's value theory than Jaspers did. Had Rickert lived beyond the "turning" of Heidegger, he would, no doubt, have reassessed his position. See also Jaspers's preface to the fourth edition of *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1971).

10. Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, trans. J. L. Mehta (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 9-16.

11. Adherence to the primacy of the moral law was what make Kantianism popular to many Jewish thinkers since natural, that is, ontological, speculations into the nature of Being, are idolatrous. See William Kluback's analysis of work of the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen in this regard, in *The Idea of Humanity* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1987). See also Karl Jaspers, *Chiffren der Transzendenz* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1970), and the strength of his tribute to the biblical "personal" cipher of God as distinct from the "incarnate" cipher drawn from the mystery cults.

12. See "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings of Heidegger*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 219.

13. For other aspects of Heidegger's problems with modernity, see Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), especially chap. 6, "Nazism and Technology," pp. 204-243.

14. Jaspers addressed this topic several times in three book-length works and in numerous articles. The 1923 version was reinterpreted and expanded to nearly twice its original length in 1946, in light of the obviously dramatic political, social, and economic changes of the previous decades. This was the work that was translated into English (with some omissions) by H.A.T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt in 1959 under the title *The Idea of the University* (Boston: Beacon Press). Jaspers again addressed this topic, under the same title, with Kurt Rossmann, in 1961 (Berlin: Springer Verlag).

15. I say "now controversial" because many, including Jaspers, were full of praise at the time of its delivery. See the text of the rectorate together with his postwar reflections in Günther Neske and Emil Kettering, eds., *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. Lisa Harries with an Introduction by Karsten Harries (New York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. 3-32, 237-238.

16. Even this was "not enough" for some members of the philosophical community—especially exiled surviving Jewish scholars such as Gershom Scholem. See my comments on Gershom Scholem's view of *Die Schuldfrage*, Jaspers's radio lectures preparatory to this treatise, and his condemnation of Jaspers's defense of Hannah Arendt's critique of Zionism during the Eichmann trial in *Transcendence and Hermeneutics* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 138-141. One of the problems, of course, is that the German conception of *Schuld* is not directly equivalent to what English-speaking people understand as "guilt"—especially insofar as this term encompasses "shame." Heidegger, in fact, acknowledged this, as Karsten Harries points out in his essay.

17. The "spiritual" motif in Heidegger's rectorial address may, in fact, have been inspired, at least in part, by Jaspers's highly successful text on the same

topic. See also Jacques Derrida's reflections on Heidegger's use of *Geist* and *geistlich* in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Derrida sees the force of Hegel, and also Hölderlin, behind Heidegger's use of "spirit" in this instance; however, the themes developed by Jaspers in *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (English translation by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul as *Man in the Modern Age* [1933]), are much closer, I think, to the immediate occasion of Heidegger's manifesto in 1933.

18. See "The Library of Living Philosophers" edition of *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, ed. Paul Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1957; augmented edition, 1981).

19. See my article "Jaspers, Heidegger, and the Phantom of Existentialism," in *Human Studies* 7 (1984):387-395.

20. See Hans-Georg Gadamer's essay on "The Phenomenological Movement" (1963), in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 130-181.

21. See Hendrik Pos, "Reflections on Cassirer," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Paul Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1949), pp. 63-72; see also Tillich's comments in this volume.

22. See Jaroslav Pelikan's sustained personal reflection on Newman in *The Idea of a University: A Reexamination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). While the German model of the university also plays a major role in Pelikan's assessment of Newman vis-à-vis the American university, he makes mention of Jaspers only in his bibliography, and of Heidegger not at all.

23. See Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography," in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, pp. 75/1-75/16.

24. Neske and Kettering, *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, p. 9.

25. See again Jaspers's *Man in the Modern Age*; and Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology," in *Basic Writings*, pp. 283-318.

26. See Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Theory: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). MacIntyre argues that only a tradition-based, actual "community of rational discourse" (as distinct from the largely theoretical community of Habermas) can overcome the dialectic of cancellation implicit in the largely privatized discourse of rationalism and irrationalism. The proposals of Margolis and Brinkmann, in order to be effective, need to meet the social/communal test, it would seem.

27. I am indebted to John McCumber on this point.

28. Karl Jaspers, *The Future of Mankind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 209. See further development of this notion in my article "Glasnost and Enlightenment," in *Philosophy Today* (Summer 1990): pp. 99-110.