Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Legal Transparency Report

Reporting period: January 2022 - June 2022

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The trust of our users is ISRG's most critical asset. Transparency regarding legal requests is an important part of making sure our users can trust us, and to that end we will be publishing reports twice annually. Reports will be published three months after the period covered in order to allow us time to research all requests and orders received during the period.

ISRG provides a secure, open, and transparent service for the public's benefit. As such, ISRG opposes the introduction of a back door, specialized law enforcement or government access, or any other deliberate weakness in Let's Encrypt or any of our systems. As of the date of this report, we have never received a request or demand of any kind, formal or informal from any government agency anywhere in the world, that ISRG include a back door, specialized access, or any other deliberate weakness in Let's Encrypt. If we were to receive such a request, we would oppose it with all the legal and technical tools available to us.

Type	Number
Emergency requests	0
Subpoenas (civil)	0
Other court orders (civil)	0
Subpoenas (administrative)	1
Subpoenas (grand jury)	16
Subpoenas (criminal)	0
2703(d) court orders (criminal)	2
Search warrants (criminal)	0
Pen register orders (criminal)	0
Wiretap orders (criminal)	0
Other court orders (criminal)	0
MLAT orders	0
National Security Letters	0
Pen register orders (FISA)	0
Wiretap orders (FISA)	0
FISA 702 orders	0
Patriot 215 orders	0
Other FISA orders	0
Other national security orders	0

Please see the next page for explanations of recent changes to this report.

As of the April 1, 2022, report, we have added a new type of request category: "2703(d) court orders (criminal)." This is a court order issued by a judge or magistrate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), based on a finding that there are specific and articulable facts showing that the information requested is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. We have previously reported these within the "Other court orders (criminal)," category (which we are retaining), but we believe that reporting the results for both categories separately will provide more granular information going forward.

As of the April 1, 2022, report, we have eliminated the "Users Affected" column. We did this because we do not reliably know how many users (individuals or entities) are affected based on the data we have. In the past, we have made a per-subpoena best effort approximation of the numbers of users affected based on factors including the number of registration IDs (accounts), email addresses, and domains contained in the data disclosed to law enforcement. However, such estimates are challenging to make, and we are concerned that they provide a false sense of precision because we cannot reliably correlate accounts, optionally provided email addresses, or domains with a certain number of users of our service. For example, some entities may use a single account, others may use many, and we cannot reliably tell when multiple accounts belong to the same user.