CS 161 Computer Security

Discussion 2

Question 1 Software Vulnerabilities

()

For the following code, assume an attacker can control the value of basket, n, and owner_name passed into search_basket.

This code contains several security vulnerabilities. **Circle** *three* **such vulnerabilities** in the code and briefly explain each of the three on the next page.

```
struct cat {
2
       char name [64];
3
       char owner [64];
4
       int age;
5
  };
  /* Searches through a BASKET of cats of length N (N should be less
      than 32). • Adopts all cats with age less than 12 (kittens).
      Adoptes Ski gens have the r lowned and over will be n with OWNER_NAME
      . Returns the number of kitten's adopted. */
  size_t search_basket(struct cat *basket, int n, char *owner_name) {
9
       struct cal kittens [32]
       size_t numekters. It utores.com
10
       if (n > 32) return -1;
11
12
       for (size_t i = 0; i \le n; i++) {
           if (basked 1. nat. 1 estutores
/* Reassign the owner name. */
13
14
               strcpy(basket[i].owner, owner_name);
15
               /* Copy the kitten from the basket. */
16
17
               kittens[num kittens] = basket[i];
               num kittens++;
18
19
               /* Print helpful message. */
               printf("Adopting kitten: ");
20
               printf(basket[i].name);
21
               printf("\n");
22
           }
23
24
25
       /* Adopt kittens. */
       adopt kittens (kittens, num_kittens); // Implementation not shown
26
27
       return num_kittens;
28 }
```

1. Explanation:

Solution: Line **12** has a fencepost error: the conditional test should be i < n rather than i <= n. The test at line **11** assures that **n** doesn't exceed 32, but if it's equal to 32, and if all of the cats in **basket** are kittens, then the assignment at line **17** will write past the end of **kittens**, representing a buffer overflow vulnerability.

2. Explanation:

Solution: At line 12, we are checking if $i \le n$. i is an unsigned int and n is a signed int, so during the comparison n is cast to an unsigned int. We can pass in a value such as n = -1 and this would be cast to 0xffffffff which allows the for loop to keep going and write past the buffer.

3. Explanation:

Solution: On line **15** there is a call to stropy which writes the contents of owner_name, which is controlled by the attack in into the owner its fance variable of the dat struct. There are no checks that the length of the destination buffer is greater than or equal to the source buffer owner_name and therefore the buffer can be overflown.

Solution: Another possible solution is that on line **21** there is a printf call which prints the value stored in the name instance variable of the cat struct. This input is controlled by the attacker and is therefore subject to format string vulnerabilities since the attacker could assign the cats names

with string formativity them. 121. CSTUTOTCS

Some more minor issues concern the **name** strings in **basket** possibly not being correctly terminated with '\0' characters, which could lead to reading of memory outside of **basket** at line **21**.

Describe how an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain a shell:

Solution: Each vulnerability could lead to code execution. An attacker could also use the fencepost or the bound-checking error to overwrite the RIP and execute arbitrary code.

Consider the following vulnerable C code:

```
#include < stdio.h>
  #include < stdlib.h>
  char name [32];
  void echo(void) {
      char echo str[16];
8
      printf("What do you want me to echo back?\n");
9
      gets (echo str);
      printf("%s\n", echo_str);
10
11
12
13 int main(void) {
      printf("What's your name?\n");
14
      fread (name, 1, 32, stdin);
15
      printf("Hi %s\n", name);
16
17
      wassignment Project Exam Help
18
19
          echo();
20
      return 0; https://tutorcs.com
21
22
23
```

Assume you are on Wite adinatic x6 Stuntostic Sat there is no compiler padding or additional saved registers in all questions.

Q2.1 (5 min) Assume that non-executable pages are enabled so we cannot execute SHELLCODE on stack. We would like to exploit the system(char *command) function to start a shell. This function executes the string pointed to by command as a shell command. For example, system("ls") will list files in the current directory.

Construct an input to gets that would cause the program to execute the function call system("sh"). Assume that the address of system is 0xdeadbeef and that the address of the RIP of echo is 0x9ff61fc4. Write your answer in Python syntax (like in Project 1).

Hint: Recall that a return-to-libc attack relies on setting up the stack so that, when the program pops off and jumps to the RIP, the stack is set up in a way that looks like the function was called with a particular argument.

Solution: Our goal is to make echo return to the system function by changing the RIP of echo to the address of system. When echo returns to system, the stack should look like the stack diagram below, because by calling convention the callee expects its arguments and its RIP to be pushed onto the stack by the caller. It's the callee's responsibility to push the SFP onto the stack as its first step.

Therefore we need to first place garbage bytes from the beginning of name up to the RIP of Scholling of the RIP of exhault the affire of system ('\xef\xbe\xad\xde') so that echo will return to system. Now, we want to create the stack diagram above to make the stack in line with what the system method expects. Thus, we add four bytes of garbage where the system method expects RIP of system to be. Note that, RIP of list in the address that system method will return to. Then, we place the address of "sh" at the location where system expects an argument, and place the string "sh" at that location (which is 8 bytes above the RIP of system).

Command (pointer to "sh") (Expected) RIP of system

As such, our exploit may look something like the following:

NOTE: Since the stack below the RIP of echo will get invalidated (because it's below the ESP) after echo returns, we cannot make any assumptions about whether the values placed there would remain as is. Therefore, you should not place the string "sh" in name.

Q2.2	(6 min) Assume that, in addition to non-executable pages, ASLR is also enabled. However, addresses of global variables are not randomized.
	Is it still possible to exploit this program and execute malicious shellcode?
	(G) Yes, because you can find the address of both name and system
	(H) Yes, because ASLR preserves the relative ordering of items on the stack
	(I) No, because non-executable pages means that you can't start a shell
	(J) No, because ASLR will randomize the code section of memory
	\bigcirc (K) ——
	\bigcirc (L) —

Solution: If ASLR is enabled, the address of system, a line of code in the code section of memory, will be randomized each time the program is run. Because our exploit uses this

address, ASLR will effectively prepent us from using our approach! Help

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Question 3 Hacked EvanBot

()

Hacked EvanBot is running code to violate students' privacy, and it's up to you to disable it before it's too late!

```
#include <stdio.h>

void spy_on_students(void) {
    char buffer [16];
    fread(buffer, 1, 24, stdin);

}

int main() {
    spy_on_students();
    return 0;
}
```

The shutdown code for Hacked EvanBot is located at address 0xdeadbeef, but there's just one problem—Bot has learned a new memory safety defense. Before returning from a function, it will check that its saved return Starts and thow an error attlemp is 0xteadbeef.

Clarification during exam: Assume little-endian x86 for all questions.

Assume all x86 instituctions are 8 bytes long. Assume all compiler optimizations and buffer overflow defenses are disabled. UDS. / UULOTCS. COII

The address of buffer is 0xbffff110.

Q3.1 (3 points) In the parts to ultrate ult

The first part of your input should be a single assembly instruction. What is the instruction? x86 pseudocode or a brief description of what the instruction should do (5 words max) is fine.

Solution: jmp *0xdeadbeef

You can't overwrite the rip with <code>0xdeadbeef</code>, but you can still overwrite the rip to point at arbitrary instructions located somewhere else. The idea here is to overwrite the rip to execute instructions in the buffer, and write a single jump instruction that starts executing code at <code>0xdeadbeef</code>.

Grading: most likely all or nothing, with some leniency as long as you mention something about jumping to address <code>0xdeadbeef</code>. We will consider alternate solutions, though.

¹In practice, x86 instructions are variable-length.

Q3.2	(3 points) The second part of your input should be some garbage bytes. How many garbage bytes do you need to write?							
	(G) 0	O (H) 4	(I) 8	(J) 12	(K) 16	(L) —		
	Solution: After the 8-byte instruction from the previous part, we need another 8 bytes to fill buffer, and then another 4 bytes to overwrite the sfp, for a total of 12 garbage bytes.							
Q3.3	(3 points) What are the last 4 bytes of your input? Write your answer in Project 1 Python syntax e.g. \x12\x34\x56\x78.							
	Solution: \x10\xf1\xff\xbf							
	This is the address of the jump instruction at the beginning of buffer. (The address may be slightly different on randomized versions of this exam.)							
	Partial credit for writing the address backwards.							
Q3.4	(3 pants Whe class you exact it is article to the city sation earties:)							
	(G) Immediately when the program starts							
	O (H) When the tatips crise teartores.com							
	(I) When the spy_on_students function returns							
	(J) When the und und partiture Stutores							
	(K) —							
	(L) ——							
	spy_on_s	_	ion returns, the	e rip of spy_ e program will				