## Offcase

### 1NC---T

#### Protection means to command a cessation of use.

Johanna Matanich 96, ARTICLE: A Treaty Comes of Age for the Ancient Ones: Implications of the Law of the Sea for the Regulation of Whaling. Spring 1996. International Legal Perspectives, 8, 37, lexis

UNCLOS imposes a duty upon states to conserve whales that is stronger than their obligations under the International Whaling Convention. Generally, UNCLOS creates the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment in article 192. This obligation applies to all living resources. Beyond that Article 65 asks states to "co-operate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals."

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes rules for the interpretation of treaties. UNCLOS is to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of [their] object and purpose." What then, does the term "conservation" mean? Generally, there is little difference between the use of the terms "conservation" and "preservation." In the context of environmental protection, however, conservation connotes a conservative use of a resource, but a use nonetheless, while the term "protection" is used to command a cessation of use. Indeed, the term "conservation" is used in UNCLOS article 64 to characterize the regulation of active fisheries. Because conservation is associated with use in that article, it is logical to assume the UNCLOS drafters associated the term conservation with "use" in Article 65. The word "protection" was used in an early draft of the article, then deleted, [\*60] which provides further support for this conclusion.

#### Violation: the plan does not eliminate military use of water.

#### Vote Neg for limits and ground. There are infinite ways to affect water OR prevent threats---err Neg on a massive topic with unlimited mechanisms.

### 1NC---T

#### ‘Substantially’ means across the board---here’s a SCOTUS ruling.

Brian Anderson 5, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, WCASS Research / Special Projects Committee\* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy, <http://www.specialed.us/issues-504policy/504.htm>

A substantial limitation is a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.¶ The 504 regulation does not define substantial limitation, and the regulation gives discretion to schools to decide what substantial limitation is. The key here is to be consistent internally and to be consistent with pertinent court decisions.¶ The issue “Does it substantially limit the major life activity?” was clarified by the US Supreme Court decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, the Supreme Court noted that to meet the “substantially limit” definition, the disability must occur across the board in multiple environments, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504 eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s life, not only in school.

#### Violation---the plan selectively regulates.

#### Vote NEG for limits AND ground. The topic is massive already. Their interpretation bursts open the keg of topical affirmatives, decking any links.

### 1NC---CP

#### The fifty states and all relevant territories should cooperate over the management of water resources in accordance with international law.

#### States solves the aff solve.

Josh Patashnik 14, Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; Law Clerk to the Honorable Anthony M. Kennedy, United States Supreme Court, 2014, “Arizona V. California and the Equitable Apportionment of Interstate Waterways,” Arizona Law Review, Stras

One might reasonably ask, even if I am right, why does any of this matter? Equitable apportionment actions are rare, and some have argued that their era has passed. 255 What is the significance of the fact that, 50 years ago, the Court employed dubious legal reasoning to justify an outcome that it could have reached on sounder ground?

The answer is that the next several decades are virtually certain to give rise to a significant number of interstate water disputes--some old, some new. Climate change, combined with rapid rates of population growth in the West, seems likely to put increasing stress on limited water supplies, exacerbating existing interstate water conflicts. 256 Indeed, those same trends are spawning interstate conflicts over water even outside the West, 257 evidenced by the recent equitable apportionment litigation between South Carolina and North Carolina over the waters of the Catawba River. 258 Burgeoning disputes over limited groundwater supplies are another likely source of future equitable apportionment actions. 259 Elsewhere, some conflicts that were thought to have been resolved will likely need to be revisited in light of changing circumstances. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, for instance, the Court entertained Nebraska's motion to reopen a 50-year-old equitable apportionment in light of changed circumstances. 260 The same might be true of a number of interstate water compacts, which could become the [\*50] subject of increasing litigation if they are not renegotiated in coming years. 261 This includes the Colorado River Compact, where disputes are on the horizon on a multitude of issues ranging from who will bear the brunt of shortages to how to deal with obligations to the environment, Mexico, and Indian tribes. 262 If these disputes are not resolved through negotiation, it is possible that some states will seek to withdraw from interstate compacts and will seek equitable apportionments in the Supreme Court. 263

It would be preferable, of course, if these disputes could be settled by new and updated interstate compacts. Any lawyer or scholar familiar with the decades-long history of Arizona v. California is bound to recoil at the prospect of new litigation between states in the Supreme Court over water rights in the Colorado River basin. But there is little doubt that the Court's equitable apportionment jurisprudence will play an important role in any future negotiations between states over a diminishing supply of water in the basin. All such negotiations will take place in the shadow of the Court's doctrine, in the same way that other types of settlement discussions between would-be litigants are colored by the results the parties could expect to obtain in court. The risk is that the Court's doctrine, if problematic, could stand as an obstacle to fruitful negotiation. If some state believes that, notwithstanding the cost and uncertainty of litigation, it could achieve a better outcome in the Supreme Court than at the bargaining table, its incentive to compromise will be weakened. It is not difficult to imagine that some enterprising governor or state attorney general will opt to hold out and take his or her chances at the Supreme Court.

### 1NC---CP

#### The United States Congress and Executive should:

#### prohibit overdrawing aquifers,

#### invest in agriculture, especially for food insecure countries,

#### incentivize other countries to adopt the significant harms principle and reject equitable apportionment, and

#### fund desalination projects and provide water to insecure countries.

#### Payments convince other states.

Kabir ’17 [Muhammad; 2017; submitting a Political Science Ph.D. thesis at the City University of New York; Academic Works, “Asymmetric Alliances and Side Payments: Alliance Politics Between Unequal Powers,” https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2912&context=gc\_etds]

Side Payments: Side payments are positive incentives offered by one side to the other in exchange for the recipient’s concessions on issues/policies deemed important to the donor. Foreign economic aid, military aid, and loans are clear examples of such side payments.40 Aside from these obvious examples, side payments can take various shapes or forms. For instance, during a negotiation process one party can use territorial concessions as side payments to cement an agreement. The use of positive incentives in interstate bargaining is no secret. States use foreign economic policies to influence other states’ behavior and to achieve foreign policy objectives. This is a common practice of “statecraft.”

There is a well-developed area of research on the use of side payments (of which issue linkage is a part) in the bargaining literature. According to bargaining theories, policymakers use side payments as either direct monetary payments (such as bribes) or material concessions on other issues (such as issue linages) to encourage concessions on a given issue.42 Side payments and issue linkages, if used to provide a positive inducement, help sates to diminish conflict and to reach an otherwise unattainable level of cooperation during negotiations.43 Issue linkages, as a part of side payment mechanism, help states to solve distribution problems, arise when actors have different preferences over alternative possible agreements, in bargaining situations. As Morrow observed: “a linkage deal requires two issues that the sides believe are of different importance. Each side receives concessions on the issue it believes is of greater relative importance. . . [if] done properly, both sides prefer the linkage deal to going to war over the initial issue.” 44

A state may offer various types of incentives to encourage otherwise unwilling governments to cooperate with it. Side payments may come in the form of direct payments such as cash payments (or grants), loans, or military aid, etc. Positive incentives can also be in the form of indirect payments, such as unilateral trade concessions, investments, etc. In an alliance negotiation the nature and volume of side payments, however, will depend on the strategic value of the alliance to the more powerful side.45 I contend that side payments serve as a compensation mechanism that closes the deficit in net gains sometimes felt by a member (usually, the weaker side) of the alliance. Side payments sometimes increase the scope of the alliance to include economic and/or military dimensions. For a great power considering an alliance with a small state, the strategic value of the alliance may justify the cost of side payments; for the small state gains involve both economic and strategic dimensions at the expense of concessions on issues deemed important to the great power.46 This study probes the conditions under which side payments are used as a bargaining tool in asymmetric alliances.

### 1NC---DA

#### The Court will preserve *Roe* now---BUT---it hinges on Roberts’ political capital AND court apoliticism.

Kimberly Robinson 21, reporter, 6/18/21, “Barrett Channels Roberts’ ‘Go-Slow’ Approach in Landmark Cases,” https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/barrett-channels-roberts-go-slow-approach-in-landmark-cases

The U.S. Supreme Court’s newest justice is showing signs that she’s more aligned with John Roberts and Brett Kavanaugh in the center than she is with her other conservative colleagues, refusing to support broad rulings that could shake the court’s credibility.

Amy Coney Barrett is “starting to show her stripes” as a moderate who prefers small movements in the law, not huge shifts, South Texas College of Law Houston professor [Josh Blackman](https://www.stcl.edu/about-us/faculty/josh-blackman/) said.

The justices handed down victories to both liberals and conservatives on Thursday saving the [Affordable Care Act](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf) again but siding with a religious group in the latest battle over [LGBT protections](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf).

Roberts, the chief justice, is viewed as an institutionalist who wants to conserve the public’s confidence in the court. So far, he favors incremental shifts in the law. “That’s been one of the Chief’s primary goals all along,” said Case Western Reserve law professor [Jonathan Adler](https://case.edu/law/our-school/faculty-directory/jonathan-h-adler).

He recently gained an ally in Kavanaugh in this pursuit, and it appears Barrett may join their ranks.

The court as a whole has has largely agreed in cases this year. The unanimous decision in the LGBT case was the 25th time the justices were unanimous in 41 rulings so far this term. There are 15 to go in coming days.

But the big test for Barrett will be next term starting in October when the justices will tackle hot-button issues like guns, abortion, and possibly affirmative action.

“It is a very conservative Court, even if we will only get glimpses of it this year,” said UC Berkeley law school Dean [Erwin Chemerinsky](https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/erwin-chemerinsky/).

Kicking the Can

Both the Affordable Care Act and LGBT rulings were “very, very narrow,” Georgia State law professor [EricSegall](https://law.gsu.edu/profile/eric-j-segall/) said.

In the Obamacare case, California v. Texas, the 7-2 majority handed down a procedural ruling to avoid undoing the landmark 2010 law. The justices said red states led by Texas didn’t have a legal basis—or standing—to challenge it.

Only Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch would have voted to gut the act, long a priority of Republicans.

The LGBT ruling, while unanimous in its outcome, was splintered in its reasoning. Hiding under the 9-0 breakdown was a dispute about whether to overturn the court’s divisive ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, which sparked the passage of the bipartisan Religious Freedom Protection Act and mini state versions across the country.

The court in Smith refused to require an exception from Oregon’s prohibition on peyote, saying religious objectors don’t get a free pass on “generally applicable” laws.

On opposite ends in the court’s LGBT ruling were the liberal justices—Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—along with Roberts, who wanted to uphold the court’s precedent in Smith, and the court’s most conservative members—Clarence Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch—who wanted it overruled once and for all.

In the middle was Barrett, joined by Kavanaugh, who acknowledged Smith‘s shortcomings but was concerned with the fallout should the court overrule it. “Yet what should replace Smith?” Barrett asked in a short concurrence.

Both cases were a punt, Blackman said, with the issues likely to return to the court at some point in the future.

End of the World

But the ACA and LGBT cases, along with the extraordinary agreement all term, suggests a majority of the justices don’t think it’s the right time to make major changes in the law.

“In the throes of everything"—the pandemic, Barrett’s first term, Kavanaugh’s biting confirmation, calls for Breyer to retire, and the caustic 2020 presidential election—"they didn’t want to shock the world this year,” Segall said.

“Preserving the court’s own political capital is incredibly important to the justices because they know their only capital is the confidence of the American people,” he added.

Adler said the court has developed a sort of 3-3-3 split—that is, three liberals, three conservative justices willing to chuck precedents they don’t agree with, and three conservative justices hesitant to overturn cases they may disagree with. Roberts, Kavanaugh, and now, apparently, Barrett make up that last group.

Adler said that split will create some interesting pressures for the three justices in the middle next term, when—as Segall said—"the world will end.”

The end of the world was a reference—in part—to the court’s abortion case, which could call into question the landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade and later cases.

#### Cajoling water protection drains Roberts’ PC AND steers politicized liberal policies.

Patrick Parenteau 20, Law Professor at Vermont Law School, 11/1/2020, “The Trump court and the erosion of environmental law,” https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/523839-the-trump-court-and-the-erosion-of-environmental-law, Stras

The confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett solidifies a conservative 6-3 majority on the Supreme Court and spells big trouble for environmental law in general and climate law in particular.

Justice Kavanaugh has replaced Chief Justice Roberts, both of whom recently joined the court’s liberal wing to reject a damaging interpretation of the Clean Water Act, as the swing vote. That speaks volumes about the outcomes in future environmental and climate cases where votes will be hard to find.

The court has become a political institution. It has already been packed with three of Donald Trump’s appointees who are smart, conservative and most importantly, young. These appointments have been selected from the list approved by the Federalist Society. Their confirmation has been engineered by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and his Republican colleagues, with no pretense of bipartisanship or adherence to Senate traditions. The result is a tectonic shift in the nation’s highest court, with profound implications for protection of public health, conservation of natural resources and, most importantly, confronting the existential threat of climate disruption.

There are four specific areas where the doctrinaire conservative viewpoint could have a major impact. First is the Commerce Clause. Virtually all the nation’s environmental laws are grounded on Congress’s authority to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce. Basic things like protection of air and water, preservation of endangered species, regulation of hazardous wastes and pesticides, protection of historic and cultural treasures, and many more.

The Commerce Clause is what Congress used to pass the Affordable Care Act (ACA) with its health insurance mandate. In a 2003 law review article Barrett argued that the ACA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority; and she has been very critical of Roberts’s decision upholding the law on the ground that the penalty for not complying with the mandate is a tax and Congress has broad taxing power.

Limiting Congress’s Commerce Clause power is a high priority for conservative groups like the Federalist Society, Cato Institute and the Chamber of Commerce. It has been at the center of attempts to invalidate the Endangered Species Act and reduce the scope of the Clean Water Act. Up to now those efforts have been rebuffed by the courts often by close margins. The Pacific Legal Foundation, which is a frequent plaintiff in these cases, must be licking their chops.

The second is access to the courts. Barrett is likely to follow the lead of her mentor, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, or whom I referred to as the Darth Vader of environmental standing. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Scalia set the bar very high for environmental plaintiffs challenging weak regulations as opposed to industry plaintiffs challenging strict regulations. In his dissent in Lujan, Justice Harry Blackmun characterized Scalia’s approach as a “slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing.” Ironically, it was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, whom Barrett is replacing, who put a stop to this expedition in the Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. case, which held that plaintiffs need not prove actual injury to the environment as long they had a reasonable concern that the river they were swimming in was not being polluted by an industrial discharge.

Standing is a particularly difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in climate cases because it impacts everyone and makes it hard to show the kind of particularized harm to an individual plaintiff that would satisfy Scalia. Even more problematic is the requirement that the relief sought must prevent or at least ameliorate the injury. This is where the separation of powers doctrine comes into play. A self-professed strict constructionist and originalist like Barrett is not going to entertain remedies that cross the line into policy making that is the province of the other branches of government — even when they are AWOL when it comes to addressing climate change.

Next comes revival of moribund doctrines like “nondelegation,” which is a vestige of the Franklin D. Roosevelt era and his efforts, including court-packing, to get his sweeping New Deal legislation passed and upheld by the court. Nondelegation means Congress cannot delegate legislative authority to agencies. It posits that the legislation must contain an “intelligible principle” to place a limit on agency authority. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., a unanimous court ruled, in an opinion authored by none other than Scalia, that the delegation of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to protect public health under the Clean Air Act provided the requisite intelligible principle.

More recently however, Justice Neil Gorsuch in a dissent joined by Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas in Gundy v United States, strongly suggested that the "intelligible principle" test was too “forgiving” and strayed from "the original meaning of the Constitution." And that "the Constitution does not permit judges to look the other way" when "constitutional lines are crossed." In her article Nondelegation on Stilts, Professor Lisa Heinzerling describes how five of the current justices — the Roberts as well as Samuel Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Thomas have already signaled an interest in resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine, though exactly how they would do so is unclear.

Finally, there is the “major question” doctrine, also known as the elephant in the mouse hole. This is the doctrine invoked to prohibit the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from regulating tobacco in FDA v. Brown & Williamson. The doctrine has the effect of denying Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation where the rule in question has broad social and economic importance and Congress has not expressly delegated the authority with clear direction. The doctrine was employed by Scalia in UARG v. EPA to reject the agency’s interpretation that it had authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new sources unless the sources were already regulated for other pollutants. For the conservative majority the fact that Congress had not directly spoken to the issue of greenhouse gas regulation was a reason to overturn EPA’s interpretation.

When asked by Sen. Kamala Harris (D-Calif.) whether “climate change was happening” Barrett replied, “I will not answer that because it is contentious.” There is nothing contentious about the reality of climate change. There is virtually unanimous agreement among climate scientists that is happening, that it is human caused, and that failure to deal with it will result in catastrophic outcomes for humanity.

#### Pro-life policies cause global war.

Rachel Emond 19, Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 9/23/2019, “How Anti-Choice Policies Increase the Likelihood of War,” https://inkstickmedia.com/how-anti-choice-policies-increase-the-likelihood-of-war/, Stras

The political discourse surrounding abortion and health care has dominated election cycles and governance in the United States for quite some time, but its impact doesn’t end at the border. In some fragile communities throughout the world, the politicization of access to abortions in the United States could lead them into conflict.

Just three days after his inauguration in 2017, President Trump signed an extremely restrictive anti-choice policy that will likely have wide-reaching negative impacts on global peace and security and US influence abroad.

This policy is actually an updated version of the “Mexico City Policy,” the Reagan-era act that prohibited non-governmental organizations that provide abortion-related services from receiving any US federal funding related to family planning and reproductive health.

The Trump Administration’s version of the Mexico City Policy has gone a step further. It prohibits foreign non-governmental organizations that provide abortion-related services from receiving any form of US global health assistance.

Beyond family planning and reproductive health, US global health assistance also includes funding for organizations doing work related to maternal and child health; nutrition; HIV under the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); prevention and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases; and hygiene programs. Many of the organizations that receive US global health assistance also receive aid from non-US sources, and use those alternative sources of funding to pay for reproductive health programs and abortion-related services. The Trump Administration’s policy would take that option off the table, should an organization want to continue receiving US funds.

Opponents of the policy have dubbed it the “Global Gag Rule,” because of the way it prevents local-level health care providers from not only providing abortions, but also from advocating for the legalization of abortion and educating about abortion as an option. Originally reported by Casey Quackenbush in TIME, some critics say the policy “holds life-saving aid hostage to ideology.”

Throughout the last 33 years, the Mexico City Policy has been a political football between Administrations: repealed by Democrats and dutifully reinstated by Republicans. This process forces a domestically politicized issue onto the international stage and in practice, this policy can actually have dangerous effects on US security.

IN COMMUNITIES IN WHICH CONFLICT ALREADY EXISTS OR TENSIONS ARE HIGH, INADEQUATE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE CAN EXACERBATE THE PREVAILING ISSUES.

In communities in which conflict already exists or tensions are high, inadequate access to health care can exacerbate the prevailing issues. The reverse is also true. During an outbreak of violence, health issues, such as communicable disease outbreaks and maternal mortality all rise.

According to the World Health Organization, “Investing in health is investing in peace. Health needs and contributes to physical, psychological, social and economic security. Investing in health can reduce the risk of conflict as well as mitigate its impact… Placing social services high on the political agenda helps maintain social stability, and reduce militarization in situations where the risk of violent conflict is high.”

Recent publications by the United States Institute of Peace, the World Health Organization, and the journal on Health Research Policy and Systems, have reported about the positive impact that effective health systems and equitable access to those systems has on reducing drivers of fragility, such as conflict or overall mortality rates. That is why development experts and global advocates for women’s rights believe that the newly expanded Mexico City Policy will affect the world’s most vulnerable individuals in the world’s most fragile communities.

Advocates of this policy contend that the effects of it will only be felt by abortion providers. In reality, it isn’t quite so simple.

In states such as Madagascar, Kenya, and Colombia, those living in rural communities often depend on non-governmental organizations for their healthcare. These services are provided by clinics that provide a multitude of services, including those related to sexual and reproductive health, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDs, and malaria. Because the aid they receive is intermingled, it can be difficult for these organizations to completely change their service model in order to sign and comply with the US Mexico City Policy. When organizations either cannot or choose not to sign on to the policy, clinics end up closing. This severely limits already at-risk individuals from access to even the most basic of health needs.

Ironically, since the Mexico City Policy is cutting off access to family planning services, including contraception, it might actually be increasing demand for abortions. Since its most recent implementation, the Mexico City Policy has already resulted in tens of millions of dollars in funding cuts. At the same time, there has been a 40% increase in abortions in some African countries. Looking ahead, some experts are estimating this policy could lead to 15,000 maternal deaths, 8 million unwanted pregnancies, and up to 26 million fewer women and families with access to contraception and family planning services.

While the Mexico City Policy does not change the total amount of health-related aid appropriated by Congress, the policy considerably weakens the ability that local health providers have to effectively serve their communities. The on-again/off-again nature of the policy causes extreme instability among local healthcare providers, many of which are the sole location for such services in a region. This instability leads to staff layoffs, higher transaction costs, and confusion about access to care. It also prevents healthcare providers from conducting any long-term planning to better meet the needs of a community.

No matter the intention of its supporters, the Mexico City Policy damages the health care infrastructure in the countries that rely on American aid the most. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflict in these communities and severely undermines American soft power.

Soft power efforts — like the promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights — have been a hallmark of the US foreign policy strategy for the last 70 years.

One of the primary ways the United States has historically strengthened national security, promoted US values abroad, and improved its global influence is through investments in global development, including public health. In Fiscal Year 2019, the US contributed $11 billion to global health funding through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) — more than any other contributor in the world. That funding is now entangled with the Mexico City Policy, directly undermining the goals of USAID. Further, in the developing world, the United States is now in constant competition with growing Chinese influence. By enacting policies that negate the reach of US soft power, the Trump Administration is actually weakening US security.

### 1NC---DA

#### The plan causes state budget crunch.

Noah D. Hall 16, Law Professor at Wayne State University; Joseph Regalia, Law Professor at UNLV, 2016, “Lines in the Sand: Interstate Groundwater Disputes in the Supreme Court,” <https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1230>, Stras

Bringing the state ownership theory back to life would reverse decades of precedent and signal a radical change in our natural resources and water law jurisprudence—and it would significantly undermine progress in national policy making. This approach also would inefficiently deplete state budgets: using interstate resources will now come with a price tag for wrongful conversion. Given both precedent and national policy concerns, the Court should instead apply its equitable apportionment doctrine to groundwater, as both the U.S. solicitor general and defendants have argued.

#### Screws the grid.

Kelly 15 [Cathleen Kelly, senior fellow for Energy and Environment at the Center for American Progress, “State Future Funds,” June 23, 2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2015/06/23/115778/state-future-funds]

Ask 50 governors or 100 mayors or 1,000 city council members to name their biggest challenges in serving their constituents and it’s a safe bet that a lack of money will top the list. Across the country, state and local leaders face budget shortfalls that, in some cases, are preventing them from accomplishing even the most basic tasks, from repairing roads, to training first responders, adequately maintaining schools, and providing critical social services.

The need to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure looms large. In 2013, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave America’s aging energy and public transit infrastructure grades of D+ and D, respectively. In the nation’s first-ever Quadrennial Energy Review, or QER, released in April 2015, federal energy experts highlight the growing vulnerability of the nation’s electrical grid to extreme weather and terrorist threats and the need for public and private investment to modernize the country’s energy infrastructure. The QER authors assert that upgrading the U.S. electrical grid—including grid storage, transmission, and power system operations—would allow for better integration of renewable energy into the national energy mix, reduce carbon pollution, help curb climate change, improve air quality and public health, and increase the reliability of electricity delivery in the face of more extreme weather. In addition, increasing the use of microgrids, or localized grids—which can be disconnected from the traditional grid to operate autonomously—and the use of distributed generation—or power generated at the point of use—can help communities keep the lights on when the larger system goes down in a storm or is otherwise disrupted. Microgrids and distributed generation that use renewable energy, such as wind and solar, can help to improve energy system reliability while also reducing carbon pollution and improving air quality.

Similarly, expanding public transit services—including metros and subways, buses, passenger trains, trams, and other light rail—would help to provide public transportation options to the roughly 45 percent of American households that lack access to public transit and the millions more who are making do with inadequate transit services. Public transit systems and bike and walking paths improve mobility, which in turn expands access to jobs. It also increases transportation options that are important not only for everyday needs such as traveling to and from work or school, but are also critical in times of emergency, particularly in terms of getting people to safety before extreme weather hits. Moreover, by taking cars off the road and reducing traffic congestion, public transit and bike and pedestrian paths improve air quality and public health.

#### Extinction.

Andres and Breetz 11 [Richard, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, and Hanna, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Richard and Hanna, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,” Strategic Forum, February 1, 2011]

Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD's key problem with electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national transmission grid ... [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage. The grid's fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems. (8) More recently, awareness has been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months. (9)Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that~~blinding~~[debilitating] an opponent with a grid black-out could escalate to nuclear war. America's current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.

## Equitable Apportionment ADV

### 1NC---Food D

#### COVID, climate, and conflict lock in long-term food insecurity---Delta intensifies it.

WB 21, the World Bank, 8/23/2021, “Food Security and COVID-19,” <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-and-covid-19>, cc

Aug 17, 2021 – An increasing number of countries are facing growing levels of acute food insecurity, reversing years of development gains. Even before COVID-19 reduced incomes and disrupted supply chains, chronic and acute hunger were on the rise due to various factors including conflict, socio-economic conditions, natural hazards, climate change and pests. COVID-19 impacts have led to severe and widespread increases in global food insecurity, affecting vulnerable households in almost every country, with impacts expected to continue through 2021, into 2022, and possibly beyond as the Delta variant continues its spread. This brief looks at rising food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic and World Bank responses to date.

Overview

The Agricultural Commodity Price Index remained near its highest level since 2013, and as of July 16, 2021, was approximately 30% higher than in January 2020. Maize, wheat, and rice prices were about 43%, 12% and 10% above their January 2020 levels. Surging prices reflect strong demand, along with weather uncertainties, macroeconomic conditions, and COVID-19-related supply disruptions, even though the global production outlook for major grains remains good.

The primary risks to food security are at the country level: Higher retail prices, combined with reduced incomes, mean more and more households are having to cut down on the quantity and quality of their food consumption.

#### No food wars.

Jonas Vestby et al. 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO; and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, 5/18/2018, “Does hunger cause conflict?” https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex---linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems---where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations---such as drought or famine---for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

## Article III ADV

### 1NC---AT: Democracy

#### It’s resilient, but irrelevant.

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick; Palgrave Macmillan, “Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective,” p. 239-243]

Key Findings: Rethinking the Value of Democracy

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes.

The first finding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed.

Another finding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The field has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena.

The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a flourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value.

Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly difficult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifically, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the conflict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4).

A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats).

The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not sufficient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5).

Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefits—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefits, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

### 1nc---Status DA

#### Weak democratic leadership relaxes rivals now

Emma Ashford 21, Foreign Affairs PhD from the University of Virginia, a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, citing Michael McFaul, a former Obama-era ambassador to Moscow, 1/7/2021, “America Can’t Promote Democracy Abroad. It Can’t Even Protect It at Home,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/07/america-cant-promote-protect-democracy-abroad/>, Stras

The jokes were funny, until they weren’t.

“What if journalists wrote about U.S. politics the way they wrote about other countries?” asked a dozen tongue-in-cheek articles since 2016. Twitter users joked about the embattled president of a former British colony, huddling in his palace, refusing to concede the election. But all of that ended Wednesday afternoon, when a violent mob rushed past U.S. Capitol Police and invaded Congress, forcing the evacuation of lawmakers and ending with tear gas, gunfire, and at least four deaths. The pictures called to mind Boris Yeltsin on top of a tank, the Arab Spring, or the streets of Venezuela. For those watching around the world, the United States had become what American leaders so often decried: a weak democracy unable to prevent violence and bloodshed from marring the transition of power from one leader to the next.

It’s a sign of how broken U.S. foreign-policy debates are that the primary reaction from many commentators was to worry about America’s moral authority and global leadership. There were comments about how happy China’s Xi Jinping must be and worries that this would undermine U.S. democracy promotion abroad. Michael McFaul, a former Obama-era ambassador to Moscow, tweeted that “Trump today delivered his latest, but hopefully his last gift to Putin.” Meanwhile, a group of NGOs, including the National Endowment for Democracy, issued a statement reaffirming its “commitment to stand in solidarity with all those around the world who share democratic values.” In short: in the middle of a literal coup attempt aimed at halting the certification of a democratic election, with insurrectionists storming the Capitol, many foreign-policy hands were fretting about whether the United States could continue to spread democracy and human rights abroad and whether it might impact America’s ability to engage in great-power competition with China.

The United States has bigger problems than an inability to promote democracy around the world.

To call these reactions out of touch would be an understatement. At this point, the United States has bigger problems than an inability to promote democracy around the world or worrying about an ambitious global competition with China. U.S. domestic politics are staggering under the weight of decades of partisan abuse, and while most institutions have so far proved resilient, there is no guarantee they’ll stand up to the next autocratic wannabe. Almost the only institution that retains the trust of the American people is the military, a distinction that carries its own worrying implications.

Wednesday’s violence will certainly impact the United States’ global image, although the last four years under Donald Trump have done plenty of damage already. And while it is certainly true that the political turmoil that has engulfed the country since November will make it harder for the United States to build an international coalition against China, it’s hard to see why U.S. policymakers are prioritizing rallying an ambitious and poorly defined “alliance of democracies” to push back against China, rather than trying to stop the bleeding at home.

To be clear, this is not a call for America to retreat from the world; the United States benefits hugely from global engagement. But Wednesday’s crisis lays bare a central flaw with U.S. foreign policy today: Ambitious foreign-policy goals are completely out of step with the realities of the country’s domestic political and economic dysfunction.

How can anyone expect—as Joe Biden’s campaign promised—to “restore responsible American leadership on the world stage” if Americans cannot even govern themselves at home? How can the United States spread democracy or act as an example for others if it barely has a functioning democracy at home? Washington’s foreign-policy elites remain committed to the preservation of a three-decade foreign policy aimed at reshaping the world in America’s image. They are far too blasé about what that image has become in 2020.

Even the projects that have been undertaken since 2016 focusing on the intersection between domestic and foreign politics—such as this recent Carnegie Endowment project—have mostly focused on ways to either sell the country’s existing foreign policy to the American people or fix trade and investment policies so that the middle class benefits more. In reality, what is needed is a wholesale rethinking of foreign policy, a more modest and humble approach to the world, and an attempt to address the real problems created by domestic dysfunction.

Wednesday’s insurrection increases the likelihood that other countries will start to see the United States as a risk factor in the international system.

Wednesday’s insurrection worsens two concrete foreign-policy problems for the United States. First, it will increase the likelihood that other governments will be wary of any binding commitments or in-depth cooperation with the United States. Four years of Trump have already convinced countries in Europe and Asia that U.S. commitments may not be worth the paper they are written on, particularly in an increasingly partisan environment. The Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Paris climate accords were all victims of a shift to a more partisan, seesaw form of foreign policy. This week’s violence in Washington and the broader political turmoil since the November election have added to those concerns that future U.S. elections may not even be free and fair.

Second, it increases the likelihood that other countries will start to see the United States as a risk factor in the international system rather than a stabilizer. There is something to this fear: U.S. actions in the Middle East since 2001 helped to destabilize it, contributing to Europe’s refugee crises. U.S. sanctions policy has often been costly and unpopular with other countries. And the Trump administration’s brinkmanship over the last few years—with Iran, North Korea, and even with China—has been far more destabilizing than stabilizing. The risk of a U.S. leadership untethered from public scrutiny, or a nation that retains a massively powerful military while its domestic politics become ever more erratic and undemocratic, is one that other countries cannot take lightly.

#### Returning to norm-promotion consolidates resistance and creates an authoritarian alliance

Jennifer Lind 19, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House; and William C. Wohlforth, the Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, March/April 2019, “The Future of the Liberal Order Is Conservative,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/future-liberal-order-conservative

A more conservative order would recognize that both internal and external circumstances have changed and would adjust accordingly. First and most important, this demands a shift to a status quo mindset in Washington and allied capitals. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s occasional bluster about withdrawing from the world, his administration has retained all of the United States’ existing commitments while adding ambitious new ones, notably an effort to radically scale back Iran’s influence. And although the Obama administration was often accused of retrenchment, it, too, kept U.S. commitments in place and even tried its hand at regime change in Libya. Under a conservative approach, Washington would set aside such revisionist projects in order to concentrate its attention and resources on managing great-power rivalries.

As part of this, the United States should reduce the expectation that it will take on new allies. At the very least, any prospective ally should bring more capabilities than costs—a litmus test that has not been applied in recent years. Because the liberal order is in dire need of consolidation rather than expansion, it makes no sense to add small and weak states facing internal problems, especially if including them will exacerbate tensions among existing allies or, worse, with great-power rivals. In July 2018, NATO, with U.S. support, formally invited Macedonia to join the alliance (reviving a dispute with Greece over the name of the country), and the Trump administration has backed NATO membership for Bosnia, too (over the objections of the Serbian minority there). These straws may not break the camel’s back, but the principle of limitless expansion might.

The case of Taiwan shows what a successful conservative approach looks like in practice, demonstrating how the United States can deter a rival great power from expanding while preventing a partner from provoking it. For decades, Washington has declared that the island’s future should be resolved peacefully. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have sometimes sought to overturn the status quo, as when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian began making pro-independence moves after he was elected in 2000. In response, U.S. President George W. Bush publicly warned Chen against unilaterally changing the status quo—a tough stance toward a longtime U.S. partner that helped keep the peace. This policy may be tested again, as demographic and economic trends strengthen the Taiwanese people’s sense of national identity, as China grows more assertive, and as voices in the United States call for an unambiguously pro-Taiwan policy. But Washington should hold fast: for decades, conservatism has served it, and the region, well.

A conservative order would also entail drawing clearer lines between official efforts to promote democracy and those undertaken independently by civil society groups. By example and activism, vibrant civil societies in the United States and other liberal countries can do much to further democracy abroad. When governments get in the game, however, the results tend to backfire. As the political scientists Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke found in their comprehensive study, foreign-imposed regime change rarely leads to improved relations and frequently has the opposite effect. Liberal states should stand ready to help when a foreign government itself seeks assistance. But when one resists help, it is best to stay out. Meddling will only aggravate that government’s concerns about violations of sovereignty and tar opposition forces with the charge of being foreign pawns.

Far from ceding power to illiberal great powers, a strategy of conservatism would directly address those external threats. Part of the reason those countries contest the order is that it exacerbates their insecurities. Restraining the order’s expansionist impulses would reveal just how much of illiberal states’ current revisionism is defensive in nature and how much is driven by sheer ambition. It could also stymie potential balancing against the order by illiberal states—China, Iran, Russia, and others. Although these revisionists have many divergent geopolitical and economic interests that currently limit their cooperation, the more their rulers worry that their grip on power is under threat from a liberal order, the more they will be inclined to overcome their differences and team up to check liberal powers. Reduce that fear, and there will be more opportunities for the liberal states to divide and rule, or at least divide and deter.

#### Rising states won’t aggressively challenge the international order now because it suits their interests---that invests the overall order with resilience

Rohan Mukherjee 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, 2/22/19, “Policy Series: Two Cheers for the Liberal World Order: The International Order and Rising Powers in a Trumpian World,” <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5bo-two-cheers>

The empirical evidence since the end of the Cold War suggests that rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil are content not to challenge the liberal order despite their varying levels of dissatisfaction with it.[24] Instead, they have adopted a free-riding strategy, i.e. not fully paying the costs of maintaining the order while benefiting significantly from it. This type of strategy is what underlies China’s exploitation of international trading rules, India’s grandstanding on climate change, and Brazil’s outsized influence relative to its economic power within the World Trade Organization (WTO).[25]

This unwillingness to genuinely contribute to the liberal order may seem puzzling given that it makes these countries diplomatically vulnerable to the charge of free-riding. It is explained, however, by the non-material aspects of the order, or what Gilpin called the “hierarchy of prestige.”[26] Put simply, the distribution of prestige within the liberal order is still skewed in favor of the U.S. and its allies, while the distribution of power is shifting steadily in favor of the rising powers. Voting rights at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), permanent membership of the UNSC, top leadership positions in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the official designation of nuclear weapons states in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and small-group decision-making within the WTO are some of the more prominent institutional aspects of the liberal order that rising powers to varying extents have contested as exclusionary, discriminatory, and unequal.[27] Wherever possible, they have sought to reform institutions from within. Where these efforts have been repeatedly frustrated, they have established new institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group (which, unlike the IMF, operates on the principle of “one country, one vote, and no veto”)[28] and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),[29] or bolstered existing forums where they already hold leadership positions, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The overarching question is this: who gets to be included in the club of great powers that manage the liberal order alongside the United States? Club membership brings both material and status benefits, but it also comes at a price. Rising powers are unwilling to pay the price unless they are made full and equal members, especially since material benefits already accrue to them in significant measure simply through membership in the order. For its part, the U.S. has been unwilling to admit rising powers into the club, questioning their ability to act as “responsible stakeholders.”[30] These conflicting incentives create a chicken-and-egg problem: rising powers decline full responsibility without elite membership, while the U.S. refuses them elite membership without full responsibility.

The Trump Transformation

The Trump presidency has unsettled this equilibrium. Washington’s newfound willingness to challenge the fundamental tenets of the global order—capitalism, democracy, and multilateralism—and Trump’s undermining of key institutional arrangements in areas such as international trade, climate change, and arms control have opened up space in the upper echelons of the global governance architecture for rising powers (and other countries). In the security realm, as Trump shifts U.S. global strategy to what looks like offshore balancing,[31] China and India have each begun stepping up their strategic presence to the extent of their respective capabilities, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Across the board, Chinese and Indian leaders are counselling caution and patience with an eye to managing Washington’s illiberal turn toward the liberal international order.[32] In the process, the rising powers have become the guardians of the status quo and the U.S. has finally taken ownership of its post-Cold War role as a revisionist power.[33] There is no better example of the decoupling of the liberal order and U.S. foreign policy. The Trump presidency has in effect been a gift to Xi’s Chinese Dream and Modi’s desire to make India a “leading power”[34] within the parameters of the existing order. As the second-ranked power in the international system, China in particular has perceived an opportunity “to define itself as the representative and spokesperson of forward-looking forces.”[35]

Yet, as Chinese and Indian leaders well know, global leadership is a costly proposition. The cost is only worthwhile if the eclipse of U.S. credibility under Trump can translate into status benefits for their countries. The decoupling of the U.S. from the international order of its own creation becomes significant in this context. In the absence of an engaged Washington, it is unclear whether the institutions that comprise the international order will function on business-as-usual terms, or they will be more open to reform and the inclusion of new aspirants to the great-power club. Despite Trump’s disengagement, the U.S. still retains significant structural power in the international order and may be willing to exert this power in order to prevent rising states from rushing too quickly to fill the temporary leadership void.

A more fundamental challenge faces the rising powers, which is simply the lack of capacity and vision to fundamentally alter the basis of the liberal order. Importantly, none of the rising powers has a credible alternative set of principles or institutional arrangements to offer as the foundation of a new order.[36] China’s influence, while growing, is largely based on a mercantilist approach and is increasingly facing resistance across the vast geography covered by the Belt and Road Initiative.[37] India lacks the capacity to maintain international order and must focus inward on long-term economic development before it can shoulder global responsibilities. Brazil lacks the hard power resources and domestic political consensus necessary to single-handedly underwrite an international order.[38] At a fundamental level, none of these powers has any reason to fundamentally alter an order that has so far handsomely abetted their stellar economic performance, enhanced their diplomatic influence, and ensured their national security.

A contemporary alternative to the liberal order therefore does not exist. This fact should give pause to both those who celebrate the order’s alleged demise and those who mourn it. The current policy and academic debates fail to consider this simple question: relative to what is the liberal order a failure or success? In other words, could the world have done better? The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, yes, the United States could have set up a ‘truly’ liberal international rules-based order; this is a question of degree. On the other hand, no, there was no other credible alternative that was attractive to as large a number of countries as the U.S.-led liberal order; this is a question of type. At present, the fact that no other major power is in a position to offer an alternative type of global order suggests that the much-maligned liberal order, while it may change in degree, is fundamentally secure. If not Washington, then Beijing, New Delhi, and Brasilia will ensure this outcome.

Looking Forward

Historically, new international orders have emerged in the aftermath of major wars. Major wars are today ruled out by the state of military technology, i.e., nuclear weapons. Barring a change in this dimension, we can expect the politics of power shifts to play out to a great extent in international institutions. The evolution of the liberal international order will depend on the role of the dominant and rising powers within it. If Donald Trump is a one-term aberration, then the U.S. may course-correct after 2020 and reinvest in the liberal order. Outcomes will then hinge on Washington’s ability to accommodate the status demands of an increasingly powerful cabal of rising powers.

If Donald Trump turns out to be a two-term president, or a herald of deeper changes in the United States’ worldview, then the U.S. will likely further disengage from an order that it perceives to be a bad deal (precisely because that order has benefited rising powers to such an extent). Outcomes will then hinge on the ability of rising powers to take leadership of one or more issue areas, or to co-manage the order as its new guardians. The former scenario will lead to a fragmentation of the liberal order as the respective powers impose their own preferences on different pieces of it. The latter scenario may reinvest the order with resilience by aligning the distribution of capabilities with the distribution of prestige. Nonetheless, severe conflicts of interest will remain as the U.S. goes from system insider to outsider.[39]

For decades now, rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil have benefited from the liberal order while criticizing it and even seeking to undermine certain aspects of it. Today, as Washington begins to abdicate leadership and undermine the order itself, these countries will be called upon to match their rhetoric with action and genuinely take leadership of the order so that they can reform it. It will take a great deal of creative thinking and diplomatic energy in these capitals to overcome long histories of reflexive free-riding and sniping at U.S. leadership from the sidelines. It is unclear if the rising powers are even up to the task.

No matter the outcome, one thing is clear. The age of U.S. dominance is over. In whatever form the order evolves, it will be strenuously negotiated, not imposed by a single power.

#### Revisionist states are only dangerous when they’ve just had their ambitions denied---the plan creates the only scenario for great power war

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke.

Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late.

In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain.

Obviously, rational analysis does not always prevail in world politics. Rising states can become intoxicated with their own strength; they may simply get tired of waiting to attain the status they desire; or some domestic pressure may impel leaders to act dangerously. But revisionists whose power has begun to decline, or who have hit a rogue bump in the road, may not feel that they even have the option of waiting.

## International Water Law ADV

### 1NC---Water Shortage D

#### No water shortages. Water is reducible, renewable, and recyclable!

Asit K. Biswas 19, universally acknowledged as one of the world's leading authorities on water, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore, and Cecilia Tortajada, Professor in Practice at University of Glasgow’s School of Interdisciplinary Studies and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Water Policy at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, “Water crisis and water wars: myths and realities,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 35(5), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2019.1636502>, Stras

These are frightening statistics that have been repeated ad nauseam by academics, water professionals, political figures and international organizations without any serious scrutiny of the validity of their underlying assumptions, the methodology of their estimates, or the national and international data-sets available and their quality.

The fundamental question that arises is, are such frightening forecasts correct, or should they be taken with a very big pinch of salt? Probabilities are, it is likely to be the latter.

First, as every school kid knows, water is a renewable resource. It is not like oil, natural gas or coal, which after being used break down into different components and cannot be used again. Water, by contrast, can be used, and the wastewater generated can be treated and reused. Properly managed, this process can continue indefinitely. Thus, how much renewable water a country has is not a meaningful metric. When the World Commission on Water started its work, one of the first decisions it made was that no attempt would be made to estimate how much water a country, or the world, had that could be used, because it is not a meaningful number. How much water is available for use will depend primarily on how well this resource is managed.

Yet most international and national institutions have decided that if a country has less than 1700 m3 per person of renewable freshwater, it is suffering from water stress. If this figure falls below 1000 m3 per person, it is facing scarcity.

This muddled thinking explains, to a significant extent, the absurdity of WRI’s ranking Singapore as one of the world’s seven most water-scarce countries. By the current widely accepted standard, Singapore has only about 110 m3 of freshwater per person, which, according to WRI, makes it as water-scarce as the other six most water-scarce countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, San Marino, United Arab Emirates and Palestine. However, if one asks any Singaporean citizen if he/she has seen any sign of water scarcity, the answer will most definitely be no.

Singapore did have serious water problems when it became independent in 1965. By improving its water management practices very significantly, it has not had a water problem since about 1980, even though its population has more than tripled, from 1.89 million in 1965 to 5.86 million in 2019. Equally, its per capita GDP has increased during the same period, from USD 516 to USD 55,600, an astronomical 108-fold increase. Yet, in spite of this phenomenal growth, and very low freshwater availability, Singaporeans do not feel any signs of water stress, let alone scarcity. By 2061, Singapore’s water demand is expected to double, and the water currently being imported from Malaysia, accounting for 50% of supply, will stop completely. Yet, with good planning and management Singapore does not anticipate any serious water problem before or after 2061.

Compare Singapore and Qatar, two countries WRI considers to be facing the most serious water scarcity problems. Singapore’s domestic water use is 143 litres per capita per day (lpcd), and unaccounted-for losses are 5%. Thus, Singapore has to produce 150 litres so that an average Singaporean receives 143 litres at home.

In contrast, an average Qatari national uses 1200 lpcd, with unaccounted-for losses conservatively estimated at 35%. This means Qatar has to produce 1620 litres so that an average Qatari receives 1200 litres at home. Thus, Qatar has to produce nearly 11 times as much water per person as Singapore does. In addition, a Qatari national does not pay for water. In Singapore, the domestic rate is fixed at the marginal cost of producing the water.

With additional new policy instruments, we expect Singapore’s water use to be well below 100 lpcd by 2040. Already several Belgian cities are using less than 70 lpcd.

In terms of industrial water use, which is increasing the most in terms of total percentage in global use, major multinational corporations like Unilever and Nestlé are leading the way to reduce their water footprints very significantly. Unilever reduced total water abstraction for its factories by 44% between 2008 and 2018. It reduced its total water abstraction in 2018 by 7.2% compared to 2017. It has saved 22 billion litres of water compared to 2008, with very significant increases in production.

Unilever’s average payback time for measures to increase water use efficiency has been just over two years. Reduced water consumption has also reduced its energy costs, since less water had to be pumped and heated, and less wastewater had to be treated. Between 2008 and 2017, water conservation reduced Unilever’s annual energy bills by €105 million.

Similarly, Nestlé reduced its water withdrawals per tonne of product, for every product category, by 29.6% between 2010 and 2018. Its most innovative idea has been zero-water factories. By installing condensate recovery units for milk, which is 88% water, it made its plant in Lagos de Moreno, Mexico, a zero-water factory. The plant does not abstract water from outside sources. Similar total water savings have been achieved, or soon will be achieved, in six plants in Brazil, and one each in China, India, Pakistan, South Africa and California (Biswas & Tortajada, 2019).

Many other industries are now following the footsteps of Unilever and Nestlé, and increasingly more corporations are likely to go this route.

Agricultural water use, the largest user of water in the world at 70%, is also becoming more efficient. Globally, water used by agriculture, as a percentage of total water use, has been steadily declining for over a decade. China dramatically reduced its agricultural water abstraction per hectare of irrigated land, by 20%, between 1990 and 2012 (Doczi, Calow, & d’Alançon, 2014). The emphasis on improving agricultural water use efficiency has increased very significantly since then. Importantly, food production since 1990 has continued to grow steadily, as have its economic activities. China is successfully decoupling its economy from water use. Between 2012 and 2017, China reduced its water consumption per RMB 10,000 by 30%, while increasing industrial value added by 52.9% (Wang, 2019).

With the increasing emphasis on water conservation and pollution at China’s highest political levels, by 2030, water use is likely to decrease even more dramatically compared to what has been witnessed in the past.

More and more countries are being forced to improve their water management practices, since they have no real alternative. Industries are realizing they can survive and thrive only by steadily improving their water efficiency. The general public is becoming aware of the value and the cost of water and of the uncertainties posed by climate change to all related sectors. Cumulatively, all these developments will ensure that the global water scene by 2030 will be very different from the present. A by-product of all these changes is likely to be that the present misguided focus on scarcity due to physical lack of water will move to considering how best water management practices and processes can be improved so that significantly more can be done with the same quantum of water and its regular reuse.

### 1NC---Africa D

#### No Africa wars.

Burbach & Fettweis 16 – Dr. David T. Burbach, National Security Affairs Professor at the Naval War College, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Christopher J. Fettweis, Political Science Professor at Tulane University. [The Coming Peace: Africa's Declining Conflicts, 9-22-16, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-coming-peace-africas-declining-conflicts]

Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever.

“Africa” and “conflict” are words all too often linked in Western minds. From Cold War proxy wars, to what Robert Kaplan saw as “[the coming anarchy](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/)”  in the 1990s, to Boko Haram massacres today, news from Africa may seem dominated by never-ending conflict. That image is out of date. In 2002 Tony Blair was justified in describing the state of Africa as a “[scar on the conscience of humanity](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/africa-a-scar-on-the-conscience-of-the-world-52775.html)”, but in the years since there has been an underappreciated success story in Africa. The amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. Troubled areas remain, unfortunately, but the larger picture of receding conflict has implications for how we think about African security needs. Outside actors can help reinforce positive external and internal trends that mitigate conflict, can avoid creating new conflict zones like Libya or South Sudan, and should recognize emerging human security needs that are becoming relatively more important as armed conflict declines.

Africa’s waning wars

Quietly over the last 15 years, many African wars did end, to paraphrase [Scott Strauss](https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/09/22/the-coming-peace-africas-declining-conflicts/%2010.1093/afraf/ads015). Lingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations including Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained their status as functional, if weak, states. Eastern Congo is still violent, but far less so than during the 1990s “African World War”. Overall, 21st century Africa has seen more wars end or abate than ignite.

The trend towards peace in Africa can be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict (for more on data sources, tabulation, and trend analysis, see [Burbach and Fettweis 2014](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2014.963967)). The [Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), for example, tracks conflicts from 1946 to the present](http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm), scoring each for the intensity of its societal impact. Figure 1 shows the yearly sum of conflict intensity assessed by CSP, for both Africa and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War brought peace to much of the world, but African conflicts increased in the 1990s. States like Somalia and Sierra Leone collapsed into warlordism, for example. Central Africa was hit by the Rwanda genocide and bloody chaos in Eastern Congo, killing one to five million people.  At least three-fourths of the world’s total war deaths in the late 1990s took place in Africa ([Burbach and Fettweis 2014](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2014.963967), Figure 4).

After the year 2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity as measured by CSP fell by approximately half. A similar pattern is shown by the [Uppsala Conflict Data Project](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/). Using somewhat different definitions, the Uppsala data shows that the number of conflicts in Africa resulting in 1,000 or more “[battle deaths](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/)” per year declined from an average of 12 in the late 1990s to an average of 3.5 from 2010-2013. Some decades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola in 2002; elsewhere, states gradually gained the upper hand on armed disorder. Given the unfortunate rise of warfare in the Middle East, Africa is no longer the most violent region of the world.

The decline of warfare in Africa is even more dramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly, [up 150% since 1980](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/). Declining conflict despite a much larger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially. An average of 32 people per 100,000 population were killed per year in the 1980s and 45 per 100,000 in the 1990s. In 2013, though the rate was only 8 per 100,000 ([Burbach & Fettweis 2014](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963967), Figure 5). World Health Organization [data shows](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates/en/index1.html)an astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths from 2000 to 2012. In the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today, perhaps three to six times as many Africans die in road crashes than from conflict. Many more Africans are harmed by [crime or domestic violence](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates/en/index1.html) than by warfare. Africa is still afflicted by more conflict than most ofthe world and the suffering of those involved is very real. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever in the post-independence period.

Celebrating African peace may seem premature given the civil war in South Sudan or the ravages of Boko Haram. Conflict has increased since 2011, but the level of armed conflict still remains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000. The most tragic development is the civil war in South Sudan, which the [U.N. estimated had killed 50,000 as of spring 2016.](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest-un-idUSKCN0W503Q)Fortunately, [South Sudan’s case is nearly unique](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/at-four-years-old-south-sudan-is-the-world-s-most-failed-state): [a newly created nation](https://bostonreview.net/world/mahmood-mamdani-south-sudan-failed-transition), devoid of physical or administrative infrastructure, with ethnically divided, soon-to-be-unemployed armed factions eyeing the lucrative oil revenues awaiting whomever could seize power. As [academic panelists noted in 2011](http://africanpoliticsgroup.org/index.php/2011/08/conference-panel-south-sudan-a-lens-for-a-new-paradigm-of-african-politics/) – two years before the civil war – predictors of conflict were flashing red in South Sudan. Few African countries contain such a combustible mix of problems anymore.

Accounting for the decline

There are several factors behind the ebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed and funded rival factions in civil wars, allowing bloody wars to fester for decades in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Then, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed. A disinterested world mostly left Africa to its fate, but continued trade in weapons and resources [with warlords](https://www.rienner.com/title/Warlord_Politics_and_African_States). In the last decade, however, the [U.S.](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/Africa/20150107_The_Development_of_AFRICOM.pdf), [Europe](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/african_peace_facility_annual_report_2014_en.pdf), and [China](http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/into_africa_chinas_global_security_shift) have all become more active in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are[together pressing](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/world/africa/for-the-us-and-china-a-test-of-diplomacy-on-south-sudan.html?_r=1) the South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become somewhat less willing to [sell arms](http://allafrica.com/stories/201609100263.html) or [purchase](http://www.dw.com/en/un-lifts-diamond-export-embargo-for-ivory-coast/a-17601628) [minerals](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43639.pdf) that directly fuel conflicts, admittedly with a [long way to go](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB24-Darfur-Embargo.pdf).

Africans themselves deserve great credit for ending the wars that plagued their continent.  Economic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation [have all](https://www.brookings.edu/book/emerging-africa/) made state failure and internal conflict less likely. As [Paul Collier](http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-5481-0) among others has noted, civil wars tend to create vicious cycles that spread insecurity to whole regions. Many regions of Africa have climbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other. The nations of Africa increasingly [work together](http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/08/26/afraf.ads058.short) through the institutions of the African Union to head off or resolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. Needs still outpace available resources, but that cooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa.

### 1NC---Water War D

#### No water wars.

Asit K. Biswas 19, universally acknowledged as one of the world's leading authorities on water, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore, and Cecilia Tortajada, Professor in Practice at University of Glasgow’s School of Interdisciplinary Studies and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Water Policy at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, “Water crisis and water wars: myths and realities,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 35(5), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2019.1636502>, Stras

A direct by-product of the current limited thinking has been the increasing focus on ‘water wars’ between countries because of lack of water. This thinking is both linear and wrong. Simply put, the thinking goes that as countries run out of water because of steadily increasing demand, they may go to war over water over the uses and allocations of transboundary river waters. This unwarranted preoccupation with water wars can be seen by simply referring to Google. As of 20 June, ‘water scarcity’ produces 34.2 million results, and ‘water wars’, 654 million – almost 20 times as many. In fact, an eminent development expert, Ismail Serageldin (2009/2010), former vice president of the World Bank and chairman of the Global Water Partnership, predicted in 1995 that ‘the wars of the next century will be about water.’

The fact is that in the entirety of human history, no two countries have ever gone to war over water. The price of water all over the world is very low, and there is no global market or trade for water, unless one considers bottled water, which represents a miniscule fraction of global water use. All countries are steadily realizing that they have to significantly improve their management practices to reduce the demand for all types of water uses and to control water contamination. No country can increase water availability progressively, constantly and cost-effectively ad infinitum. If countries make determined and sustained efforts to improve water management practices, and there are signs that some are gradually doing so, their water problems can be solved. As Biswas (2006) noted in his Stockholm Water Prize Lecture, ‘if ever there is a war between two countries, it will never be because of water. Perhaps the 10th or 15th reason for the war could be water, but not the first three’. In the future, countries will have to manage their water significantly better, because they will have no other choice. ‘Water wars’ is a myth that has been around for at least four decades. There are no signs that they will occur in the foreseeable future anywhere in the world.