# 1NC---Dartmouth LV---NUSO R4

## OFF

### 1---Framework

**“United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government. The affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.**

**OECD 87** — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987 (“United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179)

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of **three branches**: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### “Core” antitrust law is Sherman, Clayton and FTC Act

US Chamber of Commerce no date [America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers, https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws, poapst]

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation. The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

### 2---Green New Deal CP

#### We advocate that the United States federal government adopt the Green New Deal.

#### Green New Deal framework unites policy vision, moral framework, and power analysis to address climate change, racial injustice, and economic deprivation. The racist legacy of environmental injustice proves the need to craft a new vision rather than give in to inevitability of failure.

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

People often ask me why I decided to help develop the Green New Deal. Why did I, a twentysomething black woman, think I could help develop a policy proposal to address something as big as climate change? Often, I think they expect some grand story: about incredible courage or deep ambition or a master plan for the revolution. The truth is that I was scared—and I really needed a job.t

I grew up, raised by my mother and grandmother, in the same house that my mother grew up in, in a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago called Englewood. In the thirty years between my grandparents moving in with their three babies and me being born, Englewood had gone from being a (mostly) middle-income community, close-knit and quiet, to one of the poorest, most barren parts of the city. My neighborhood had so many problems: poverty, unemployment, underfunded schools, police brutality, pollution, violence. And those were just the big ones. I rarely saw anyone in power try to solve the problems in Englewood. And when they did try, it seemed to make things worse.

When I asked my mom and grandma why Englewood looked like this, they didn’t tell me about guns or drugs or gangs. They told me about the government. About how the highway system had been built through black neighborhoods, destroying communities that would never be rebuilt. About the public housing authority razing public housing and scattering families in the name of “urban development,” only for city officials to turn around and sell the land to developers on the cheap, now that the projects sat on prime real estate. About the city underfunding black schools and then shutting them down because of “underperformance.” And that’s just what happened to my neighborhood—not even what happened to my family. At the time I’m writing this, I now know that:

My grandmother’s family was not eligible for Social Security for at least fifteen years because her mother was a washerwoman, and the New Deal excluded agricultural and domestic workers (nearly all black at the time) from Social Security—President Roosevelt needed to secure votes from Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats needed cheap labor from economically vulnerable black people.

My grandfather bought our house without any help from the GI Bill, despite being a veteran of the Korean War. My mother told me that he was too proud to apply. The truth is, pride or not, the government denied home loans to black veterans, and the notorious redlining in Chicago meant that he wouldn’t have been approved anyway.

I grew up in a frontline community—meaning that I lived in an area close to a pollution source and with high levels of air pollution. I developed asthma, like most of my friends in my neighborhood. I could barely run until I was in my late teens, and I regularly missed school, which, in turn, meant that my self-employed mother had to miss work. My mother and I had no idea that I was sick because of where we lived. My lungs are weakened to this day.

Progress came with a price, and the price was us. And by the time the Green New Deal came into my life, I would be damned before I paid another dime.

WHAT IS POLICY?

I have spent my life trying to rewrite systems of power, and **policy** is nothing if not a **system for creating and distributing power.** This is, of course, not how most people think of public policy. In fact, most “official” definitions of policy say something like this:

Policy [is] a statement by government—at whatever level, in whatever form—of what it intends to do about a public problem. Such statements can be found in the Constitution, statutes, regulation, case law (that is, court decisions), agency or leadership decisions, or even in changes of the behavior of government officials at all levels. For example, a law that says that those caught driving while intoxicated will go to jail for up to one year is a statement of governmental policy to punish drunk drivers. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a statement of government policy toward the environment….

And: “Policy is what the government chooses to do or not to do” about a public problem.

This is all true. But definitions like this make policy design sound like it’s orderly and contained—much like going to the doctor. You have a problem; the doctor diagnoses it; you two find the best treatment. Creating policy is more like going to the doctor with a problem, having fifteen people argue about if it’s a “real” problem that requires a doctor to begin with, then having five of those people (plus some new strangers!) start arguing anew about what the cause of the problem is, only to be interrupted by the doctor’s boss coming in to tell them that they can only choose two of five possible treatment options because the other three would hurt the hospital’s bottom line. And once treatment begins, people argue over how to determine whether it’s successful and if it should be reversed to save money or time.

Policymaking is not a science. It is a fight over whose problems get addressed, how those problems are addressed, and how public power and resources are distributed. If politics is a fight to elect people who reflect and share our values, policy is a fight to actually enact those values—to mold the world, through the work of government, into what we think it should be.

That is why, contrary to popular belief, the most important part of a policy proposal is not the details—at least at the beginning. It’s the vision that the policy presents. As a statement about what the government is going to do, policy inherently tells a story about what went wrong, how the government can fix it, and who has power to shape society—whether it’s the state or the public or corporations. The best policies tell compelling stories, galvanizing legislators and citizens to fight for them, and provide public servants with a clear purpose when they sit down to implement the details. The stories may shift as opponents pick new battles; the details may need tweaks or overhauls as unexpected challenges emerge. A coherent policy vision provides the foundation that both the stories and the details draw upon. Three pillars—the problem, principles, and power—form that foundation, and anchor policymaking from conception to execution.

Problems are the center of any public policy. Because policy is the government’s response to a problem, policy can only be created if we agree that an issue constitutes not just a problem but a public problem—that is, a problem that affects the public that cannot be solved without the government. How we define the scope and origin of the problem determines how we’ll craft a solution. That’s why fossil fuel companies spend millions to sow doubts about the urgency of the climate crisis and cover up their culpability. It’s not just about saving face; it’s about changing our understanding of the problem and preventing government action.

Principles. Policymakers need a compass to navigate the near-infinite variety of policy designs, and principles— which include both our moral values and our theories of government—provide that compass. Remember, policymaking is collective problem-solving—not an objective “science.” Policymaking, like all decision-making, is guided not only by facts but by our values—about freedom and justice, about what we deserve, about what “other people” deserve and, perhaps most crucially, about what the government should and should not do. Principles are, in short, the moral and intellectual core of a policy. They define not only how we engage with a problem but what solutions we consider at all.

Problems in our society are rooted in power. Asking why a problem remains unresolved leads to questions of power: Who wields it and to what end? Are the powerful negligent or malevolent? By directing and entrenching flows of government resources and attention, policy always shapes the distribution of power. Effective, lasting policy changes must change the distributions of power that led to the problem initially, or else the old malefactors will undermine any success. When selecting the mechanisms a policy will use (a loan; a new legal protection; a direct public investment; a new federal agency), policymakers are deciding how to maintain or disrupt the balance of power. And this is not limited to power in the public sector. Governments write the laws, enforce the contracts, and build the infrastructure that make a society and economy possible. Policy changes reverberate beyond the public sector into every domain of our lives.

Problems, principles, and power are the pillars of any policy vision. Together, they animate the policymaking process, guiding not just the story policymakers tell but the decisions they make about what should (or should not) be included in a given proposal.

IS THE GREEN NEW DEAL A POLICY?

The Green New Deal is a proposal for a ten-year economic mobilization to rapidly transition the US to a zero-carbon economy and, in so doing so, regenerate and reorganize the US economy in ways that significantly reduce inequality and redress legacies of systemic oppression. The congressional Green New Deal (“GND”) resolution has five goals:

1. Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers.

2. Create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States.

3. Invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

4. Secure clean air and water, climate and community resilience, healthy food, access to nature, and a sustainable environment for all.

5. Promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of frontline and vulnerable communities, including Indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, lowincome workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth.

The GND resolution proposes to achieve these goals in two ways. The first is through a set of “projects” that, if completed, would nearly eliminate carbon emissions in the US. The second is through a set of policies that aim to protect Americans from the disruption and instability that transitioning away from fossil fuels will create and reduce inequity. Some people like to refer to the first set of projects as the “Green” part of the GND and the second as the “New Deal” part. While this may be a helpful rhetorical device, it is a dangerous way to conceptualize the GND. All parts of the GND advance decarbonization—even the “non-climate” policies like universal health care, education, and job training. Similarly, the “green” projects can help reduce inequity if they are designed to create millions of wellpaying jobs, bolster worker power, invest in local communities, and strengthen the social safety net—all of which the Green New Deal proposes to do. Addressing decarbonization and inequality simultaneously has prompted critics to accuse the GND of being a “progressive wish list,” not a policy. Their criticism often reveals a **narrow policy vision** guiding their thinking. The problem is simply the carbon in the atmosphere; Mr. Policy Doctor will prescribe the correct solution based on science; imbalances of power are mostly irrelevant, too difficult to disrupt when an urgent crisis needs solving. This is a compelling story. But it cannot guide policymakers tasked with averting catastrophic warming, as many authors in this book show.

The Green New Deal is a new policy vision—one that will guide government and society through the biggest task in modern history: decarbonizing our global economy within the next ten to twenty years. The stories and details of GND policy will undoubtedly change in the coming years, **but they will be anchored by the vision**—a conception of the problem, a set of principles, and an analysis of power—that the GND provides. Vision, however, is not enough. The GND also establishes a framework for a **national economic mobilization** and a set of **ever-evolving and specific policies that fit within this vision and framework**.

#### Only the state can transform society/behavior in time to avoid worst impacts of climate change

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

Climate action requires political action simply because, without political action, the scale of the challenge as well as the time within which this action must be achieved cannot be met. If the shutting down of the global economy during the first 4 months of COVID-19 led to an 8 percent annual decrease in carbon emissions, and this decrease is required yearly for the next 10 years, nothing short of coordinated national and international action can be effective. As the logic behind the CoP15 Paris Agreement understood, in a world structured by a system of states, the state remains, in relation with other states, the effective focus for these national and international acts of coordination. One can maintain, of course, that concerted reflection on goals and their practice cannot be rehearsed within the same state system that, in co-evolution with capitalism, has produced the climate problem in the first place.24 Yet, my argument here is simple: (1) climate action must be of a political kind if this action is to be coherent and effective, and the horizon of this understanding of the political (comprehensive and effective action) is in a vital sense defined by the state; (2) this political action redounds above all to the agency and responsibility of the state both in relation to its own citizenry and in relation to other states and their citizenry. In response to the challenge of time and scale, I argue we should turn to, not turn away from, the state as an agent of change. Only if one renounces the potential of political action today through historically constituted practices of political efficacy does one shun this kind of conclusion. In which case, I would argue, one has renounced politics for our age, as well as the major emotion on which politics is based, hope.25 Since Max Weber, the state is sociologically defined by the legitimate monopoly of violence that it holds over all other forms of force within a nationally determined territory.26 There are many ways in which this monopoly is contested today. The description of a state as ‘vulnerable’ is nothing but the indication that a particular state does not hold the monopoly of violence within its territory. Prior to questions of political authority and legitimacy, all states are today vulnerable in this sense given the nature of global challenges that follow intended and unintended processes of interdependence (global financial instability, global terrorism, migration flows, pandemics, climate change, etc.). That said, the responses both to the financial crisis of 2008 and (much more so) to the present COVID-19 crisis testify to the fact that the monopoly of violence particular to the effectiveness of state governance remains in place. Among an increasing complexity of social actors, the state still holds the levers of power that are decisive in effecting social transformation. Consequently, to one side of the empirical fact that countries constitute the beef of the UNFCCC climate regime, I am arguing that the state remains the primary vehicle of a politics of climate change. As the emerging literature on the Green New Deal implies, the state can do the following. At a national level, it can organize and steer fiscal, monetary and sector-policies like those of energy, transport, agriculture, the communications industry and housing in such a way that both businesses and consumers are motivated to shift behaviour towards a carbon-neutral society. This model of the state is one of a regulated market economy that uses the coordination of state direction with market dynamism to effect broad social change. Governments respond to markets as they plan ahead with regard to climate change (the rapid fall in the price of solar and wind energy, for example), and much of the new green infrastructure is/will be locally distributed and assembled (no ‘giant public works’ given that contemporary technology is smart).27 That said, governments are the sole governance body with appropriate fiscal and monetary tools (1) to set up the rebuilding of national economies with new strategic priorities; (2) to steer and to guarantee concerted action across sectors; and (3) to guarantee, in turn, that this action is underpinned by the principles of ‘a just transition’.28 If the timeline to a 50 percent reduction of carbon emissions is 2030, then the state must so organize and steer that solutions to climate change are integrated. Attention to ‘the climate emergency’ alone will not lead to the necessary change. This last point is important and suggests why the idea of the Green New Deal, whether one is on the Left or Right, harbours the appropriate response. The integration of climate policy with radical policies for poverty alleviation and re-employment in sustainable industries and commerce provides the only way in which the shift from an extractive to a regenerative economy and society is possible in the first place. Without this convergence of solutions, practical solutions to climate change will not only tackle the scale and timeline of the problem; they will re-create a deeply divided polity of the employed and unemployed that could lead to ever-worse scenarios of a politics based on division and fear, not community and hope. It is the state alone – in conjunction with the forces of the market and civil society – that can provide the vision, the terms of execution of this vision (organized integration) and, critically, the policy-leverage that can bring about economic and social convergence.

#### Scale and rate of climate change mean there is no time for pessimism, only state focused political action can stop extinction. This isn’t naïve liberal belief in progress, the SQ has already incorporated insights from their critique

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

The politics of climate change and the futures of IR What are the implications of the argument of the last two sections for the discipline of International Relations and its futures? I have argued, first, that climate change presents an empirical global challenge that necessitates not only a normative response, but a normative response through politics if this change is not, at worst, to obliterate human possibility, human time and human space. This political response requires, second, comprehensive, integrated political action on a scale and within a timeline that is historically unprecedented. Given both the nature of the response needed and the scale and time within which this response must work, this politics must be structured, third, through the modern state system and through the economic system upon which this system was built (capitalism). In contradistinction to sub-national and post-national forms of governance, it is only the state that has the power and leverage to organize, steer and enable concerted, coordinated, intersectoral action so that a just transition to a carbon-neutral, indeed carbon-negative society is in the least possible by 2050. If it is only the state in principle that can do this, the success of its action will, at the same time, only happen through enabling other actors across society (both domestic and global) to work to the end of transition more effectively than itself – in energy markets, in local areas, in financial investment strategies for nature-based solutions, in behavioural change towards a society of limits and so forth. The argument is, consequently, not state-centric; it posits that the state, within processes of social agency and social transformation, is the sole political instance of governance, at the same time, to enable and steer in an integrated, comprehensive manner. Fourth, I argue, therefore, that, against the background of faltering global governance regimes and a renewed nationalist mindset, it is the state that bears the responsibility, both towards its own citizens and towards those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, to respond to climate change and lead, with international institutions, climate alliances among states. Finally, fifth, I have intimated that it is through these alliances that coordinated global climate action will emerge that reorganizes the development agenda beyond the distinction between North and South. A new global order could emerge from this reorganization, in response to climate change. This sequence of points means that a state-focused perspective on international politics must continue to be embraced in the discipline of IR for the coming decades. In the last 40 years, and partly as a healthy intellectual reaction against the supposed domination of state-centred realism and inter-state liberalism in the discipline, there have been multiple initiatives in IR to step to one side of the state and seek the grain of international politics in other actors and processes (from Susan Strange’s Retreat of the State41 to recent critical theoretical interest, as also exemplified in this SI, in the ‘posthuman’). These diverse initiatives have made the discipline intellectually richer and more inter- and pluri-disciplinary. They have, I would suggest, come at the cost, however, of losing grasp of the state where and when the state remains a necessary agent of change. This article has argued that this is foremostly the case when it comes to responding to climate change. From this perspective, continued engagement with the state as an agent of change requires that the discipline as a whole re-engages with the legacy of Weberian realism (the state and the state system), the legacy of classical realism (the ethics of the lesser violence in world of limitation) and the legacy of the English School (state responsibility and state leadership), together with the insights of constructivism, in order to reconstruct domestic and foreign policies in tight relation to climate change and its effects.42 Only, perhaps, as a result of this reconstruction can something like a reinvigorated liberal internationalism emerge that has authentically cosmopolitan aspirations: that is, aspirations that do not redound to the national interests of the more powerful states, but seek to organize, amid the risks of regression, conflict and the greater violence, a global order of sustainable development and sustainability that transcends the conceptual and practical ‘North/South’ divide. A great deal needs to be unpacked in the suggestions of the last paragraph in order to map how the various theoretical legacies in IR can be turned to the most complex human interconnection at hand: climate change. Suffice it to add here three things of import. First, the discipline’s response to climate change must work across its various traditions and ‘schools’ to have ontological, epistemological, ethical and political traction upon it. I have maintained that the state must be foregrounded in this response, but this foregrounding can only make sense if the state is seen to be working in, through, and for a larger environment of actors and their practices. The discipline of IR needs to provide normative vision for, and empirical analysis of, this coordinated set of arrangements. Second, the move to deepen and reconfigure the sustainable development agenda in the light of response to climate change should, I have suggested several times, be far-reaching. Vision for, and analysis of, the ever-closer connections between the disciplines of International Relations and International Development must be forged; for example, connections based not on conflict and post-conflict scenarios, but primarily on what sustainable resilience means conceptually and policy-wise across all states and their populations. Third, and finally, a new academic mindset in the discipline may be required; or it should at least be fostered through the discipline. At a theoretical level, liberalism is considered the one ‘optimistic’ tradition within IR, a tradition predicated on belief in rational politics and cooperation, progress and embetterment. Liberalism harbours an optimism the very critique of which often defines the respective critical mindsets of realism, Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism (and) IR critical theory. These critiques have again been very rich for the discipline of IR over the last 40 years, perhaps, most tellingly for the contemporary student with regard to the hubris of post-Cold War liberalisms. In the context of climate change’s challenge for IR, a fierce optimism is nevertheless now required: an optimism no longer harnessed to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century terms of liberal progress, but a mindset of purpose that is focused, deftly aggressive and sustained within the logics of sustainable resilience. Given both the time and the scale of political action required for net-zero national and global societies to emerge by 2050, there is, in essence, no time to be pessimistic or sceptical; whatever happens empirically in the next 30 years, there is the time to place sustained, focused pressure on political institutions and their leaders so that social transformation towards a national and global society of limits is brought about. In this sense, fiercely optimistic, bearers of the discipline of IR should assume a strong intellectual, pedagogical and social role in the three coming decades.

#### Political battle over positive vision of national sovereignty key to defeat fascism.

William **MITCHELL** Economics @ Newcastle **AND** Thomas **FAZI** **’17** *Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty in a Post-Neoliberal World* p. 3-12

Given neoliberalism’s war against sovereignty, it should come as no surprise that ‘sovereignty has become the master-frame of contemporary politics’, as Paolo Gerbaudo notes.4 After all, as we argue in Chapter 5, the hollowing out of national sovereignty and curtailment of popular-democratic mechanisms – what has been termed depoliticisation – has been an essential element of the neoliberal project, aimed at insulating macroeconomic policies from popular contestation and removing any obstacles put in the way of economic exchanges and financial flows. Given the nefarious effects of depoliticisation, it is only natural that the revolt against neoliberalism should first and foremost take the form of demands for a repoliticisation of national decision-making processes. The fact that the vision of national sovereignty that was at the centre of the Trump and Brexit campaigns, and that currently dominates the public discourse, is a reactionary, quasi-fascist one – mostly defined along ethnic, exclusivist and authoritarian lines – should not be seen as an indictment of national sovereignty as such. History attests to the fact that national sovereignty and national self-determination are not intrinsically reactionary or jingoistic concepts – in fact, they were the rallying cries of countless nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialist and left-wing liberation movements.

Even if we limit our analysis to core capitalist countries, it is patently obvious that virtually all the major social, economic and political advancements of the past centuries were achieved through the institutions of the democratic nation state, not through international, multilateral or supranational institutions, which in a number of ways have, in fact, been used to roll back those very achievements, as we have seen in the context of the euro crisis, where supranational (and largely unaccountable) institutions such as the European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank (ECB) used their power and authority to impose crippling austerity on struggling countries. The problem, in short, is not national sovereignty as such, but the fact that the concept in recent years has been largely monopolised by the right and extreme right, which understandably sees it as a way to push through its xenophobic and identitarian agenda. It would therefore be a grave mistake to explain away the seduction of the ‘Trumpenproletariat’ by the far right as a case of false consciousness, as Marc Saxer notes;5 the working classes are simply turning to the only movements and parties that (so far) promise them some protection from the brutal currents of neoliberal globalisation (whether they can or truly intend to deliver on that promise is a different matter).

However, this simply raises an even bigger question: why has the left not been able to offer the working classes and increasingly proletarianised middle classes a credible alternative to neoliberalism and to neoliberal globalisation? More to the point, why has it not been able to develop a progressive view of national sovereignty? As we argue in this book, the reasons are numerous and overlapping. For starters, it is important to understand that the current existential crisis of the left has very deep historical roots, reaching as far back as the 1960s. If we want to comprehend how the left has gone astray, that is where we have to begin our analysis.

Today the post-war ‘Keynesian’ era is eulogised by many on the left as a golden age in which organised labour and enlightened thinkers and policymakers (such as Keynes himself) were able to impose a ‘class compromise’ on reluctant capitalists that delivered unprecedented levels of social progress, which were subsequently rolled back following the so-called neoliberal counter-revolution. It is thus argued that, in order to overcome neoliberalism, all it takes is for enough members of the establishment to be swayed by an alternative set of ideas. However, as we note in Chapter 2, the rise and fall of Keynesianism cannot simply be explained in terms of working-class strength or the victory of one ideology over another, but should instead be viewed as the outcome of the fortuitous confluence, in the aftermath of World War II, of a number of social, ideological, political, economic, technical and institutional conditions.

To fail to do so is to commit the same mistake that many leftists committed in the early post-war years. By failing to appreciate the extent to which the class compromise at the base of the Fordist-Keynesian system was, in fact, a crucial component of that history-specific regime of accumulation – actively supported by the capitalist class insofar as it was conducive to profit-making, and bound to be jettisoned once it ceased to be so – many socialists of the time convinced themselves ‘that they had done much more than they actually had to shift the balance of class power, and the relationship between states and markets’.6 Some even argued that the developed world had already entered a post-capitalist phase, in which all the characteristic features of capitalism had been permanently eliminated, thanks to a fundamental shift of power in favour of labour vis-à-vis capital, and of the state vis-à-vis the market. Needless to say, that was not the case. Furthermore, as we show in Chapter 3, monetarism – the ideological precursor to neoliberalism – had already started to percolate into left-wing policymaking circles as early as the late 1960s.

Thus, as argued in Chapters 2 and 3, many on the left found themselves lacking the necessary theoretical tools to understand – and correctly respond to – the capitalist crisis that engulfed the Keynesian model in the 1970s, convincing themselves that the distributional struggle that arose at the time could be resolved within the narrow limits of the social-democratic framework. The truth of the matter was that the labour–capital conflict that re-emerged in the 1970s could only have been resolved one way or another: on capital’s terms, through a reduction of labour’s bargaining power, or on labour’s terms, through an extension of the state’s control over investment and production. As we show in Chapters 3 and 4, with regard to the experience of the social-democratic governments of Britain and France in the 1970s and 1980s, the left proved unwilling to go this way. This left it (no pun intended) with no other choice but to ‘manage the capitalist crisis on behalf of capital’, as Stuart Hall wrote, by ideologically and politically legitimising neoliberalism as the only solution to the survival of capitalism.7

In this regard, as we show in Chapter 3, the Labour government of James Callaghan (1974–9) bears a very heavy responsibility. In an (in)famous speech in 1976, Callaghan justified the government’s programme of spending cuts and wage restraint by declaring Keynesianism dead, indirectly legitimising the emerging monetarist (neoliberal) dogma and effectively setting up the conditions for Labour’s ‘austerity lite’ to be refined into an all-out attack on the working class by Margaret Thatcher. Even worse, perhaps, Callaghan popularised the notion that austerity was the only solution to the economic crisis of the 1970s, anticipating Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) mantra, even though there were radical alternatives available at the time, such as those put forward by Tony Benn and others. These, however, were ‘no longer perceived to exist’.8 In this sense, the dismantling of the post-war Keynesian framework cannot simply be explained as the victory of one ideology (‘neoliberalism’) over another (‘Keynesianism’), but should rather be understood as the result of a number of overlapping ideological, economic and political factors: the capitalists’ response to the profit squeeze and to the political implications of full employment policies; the structural flaws of ‘actually existing Keynesianism’; and, importantly, the left’s inability to offer a coherent response to the crisis of the Keynesian framework, let alone a radical alternative. These are all analysed in-depth in the first chapters of the book.

Furthermore, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a new (fallacious) left consensus started to set in: that economic and financial internationalisation – what today we call ‘globalisation’ – had rendered the state increasingly powerless vis-à-vis ‘the forces of the market’, and that therefore countries had little choice but to abandon national economic strategies and all the traditional instruments of intervention in the economy (such as tariffs and other trade barriers, capital controls, currency and exchange rate manipulation, and fiscal and central bank policies), and hope, at best, for transnational or supranational forms of economic governance. In other words, government intervention in the economy came to be seen not only as ineffective but, increasingly, as outright impossible. This process – which was generally (and erroneously, as we shall see) framed as a shift from the state to the market – was accompanied by a ferocious attack on the very idea of national sovereignty, increasingly vilified as a relic of the past. As we show, the left – in particular the European left – played a crucial role in this regard as well, by cementing this ideological shift towards a post-national and post-sovereign view of the world, often anticipating the right on these issues.

One of the most consequential turning points in this respect, which is analysed in Chapter 4, was Mitterrand’s 1983 turn to austerity – the so-called tournant de la rigueur – just two years after the French Socialists’ historic victory in 1981. Mitterrand’s election had inspired the widespread belief that a radical break with capitalism – at least with the extreme form of capitalism that had recently taken hold in the Anglo-Saxon world – was still possible. By 1983, however, the French Socialists had succeeded in ‘proving’ the exact opposite: that neoliberal globalisation was an inescapable and inevitable reality. As Mitterrand stated at the time: ‘National sovereignty no longer means very much, or has much scope in the modern world economy. … A high degree of supra-nationality is essential.’9

The repercussions of Mitterrand’s about-turn are still being felt today. It is often brandished by left-wing and progressive intellectuals as proof of the fact that globalisation and the internationalisation of finance has ended the era of nation states and their capacity to pursue policies that are not in accord with the diktats of global capital. The claim is that if a government tries autonomously to pursue full employment and a progressive/redistributive agenda, it will inevitably be punished by the amorphous forces of global capital. This narrative claims that Mitterrand had no option but to abandon his agenda of radical reform. To most modern-day leftists, Mitterrand thus represents a pragmatist who was cognisant of the international capitalist forces he was up against and responsible enough to do what was best for France.

In fact, as we argue in the second part of the book, sovereign, currency-issuing states – such as France in the 1980s – far from being helpless against the power of global capital, still have the capacity to deliver full employment and social justice to their citizens. So how did the idea of the ‘death of the state’ come to be so ingrained in our collective consciousness? As we explain in Chapter 5, underlying this post-national view of the world was (is) a failure to understand – and in some cases an explicit attempt to conceal – on behalf of left-wing intellectuals and policymakers that ‘globalisation’ was (is) not the result of inexorable economic and technological changes but was (is) largely the product of state-driven processes. All the elements that we associate with neoliberal globalisation – delocalisation, deindustrialisation, the free movement of goods and capital, etc. – were (are), in most cases, the result of choices made by governments. More generally, states continue to play a crucial role in promoting, enforcing and sustaining a (neo)liberal international framework – though that would appear to be changing, as we discuss in Chapter 6 – as well as establishing the domestic conditions for allowing global accumulation to flourish.

The same can be said of neoliberalism tout court. There is a widespread belief – particularly among the left – that neoliberalism has involved (and involves) a ‘retreat’, ‘hollowing out’ or ‘withering away’ of the state, which in turn has fuelled the notion that today the state has been ‘overpowered’ by the market. However, as we argue in Chapter 5, neoliberalism has not entailed a retreat of the state but rather a reconfiguration of the state, aimed at placing the commanding heights of economic policy ‘in the hands of capital, and primarily financial interests’.10

It is self-evident, after all, that the process of neoliberalisation would not have been possible if governments – and in particular social-democratic governments – had not resorted to a wide array of tools to promote it: the liberalisation of goods and capital markets; the privatisation of resources and social services; the deregulation of business, and financial markets in particular; the reduction of workers’ rights (first and foremost, the right to collective bargaining) and more generally the repression of labour activism; the lowering of taxes on wealth and capital, at the expense of the middle and working classes; the slashing of social programmes; and so on. These policies were systemically pursued throughout the West (and imposed on developing countries) with unprecedented determination, and with the support of all the major international institutions and political parties.

As noted in Chapter 5, even the loss of national sovereignty – which has been invoked in the past, and continues to be invoked today, to justify neoliberal policies – is largely the result of a willing and conscious limitation of state sovereign rights by national elites. The reason why governments chose willingly to ‘tie their hands’ is all too clear: as the European case epitomises, the creation of self-imposed ‘external constraints’ allowed national politicians to reduce the politics costs of the neoliberal transition – which clearly involved unpopular policies – by ‘scapegoating’ institutionalised rules and ‘independent’ or international institutions, which in turn were presented as an inevitable outcome of the new, harsh realities of globalisation.

Moreover, neoliberalism has been (and is) associated with various forms of authoritarian statism – that is, the opposite of the minimal state advocated by neoliberals – as states have bolstered their security and policing arms as part of a generalised militarisation of civil protest. In other words, not only does neoliberal economic policy require the presence of a strong state, but it requires the presence of an authoritarian state (particularly where extreme forms of neoliberalism are concerned, such as the ones experimented with in periphery countries), at both the domestic and international level (see Chapter 5). In this sense, neoliberal ideology, at least in its official anti-state guise, should be considered little more than a convenient alibi for what has been and is essentially a political and state-driven project. Capital remains as dependent on the state today as it was under ‘Keynesianism’ – to police the working classes, bail out large firms that would otherwise go bankrupt, open up markets abroad (including through military intervention), etc. The ultimate irony, or indecency, is that traditional left establishment parties have become standard-bearers for neoliberalism themselves, both while in elected office and in opposition.

In the months and years that followed the financial crash of 2007–9, capital’s – and capitalism’s – continued dependency on the state in the age of neoliberalism became glaringly obvious, as the governments of the US, Europe and elsewhere bailed out their respective financial institutions to the tune of trillions of euros/dollars. In Europe, following the outbreak of the so-called ‘euro crisis’ in 2010, this was accompanied by a multi-level assault on the post-war European social and economic model aimed at restructuring and re-engineering European societies and economies along lines more favourable to capital. This radical reconfiguration of European societies – which, again, has seen social-democratic governments at the forefront – is not based on a retreat of the state in favour of the market, but rather on a reintensification of state intervention on the side of capital.

Nonetheless, the erroneous idea of the waning nation state has become an entrenched fixture of the left. As we argue throughout the book, we consider this to be central in understanding the decline of the traditional political left and its acquiescence to neoliberalism. In view of the above, it is hardly surprising that the mainstream left is, today, utterly incapable of offering a positive vision of national sovereignty in response to neoliberal globalisation. To make matters worse, most leftists have bought into the macroeconomic myths that the establishment uses to discourage any alternative use of state fiscal capacities. For example, they have accepted without question the so-called household budget analogy, which suggests that currency-issuing governments, like households, are financially constrained, and that fiscal deficits impose crippling debt burdens on future generations – a notion that we thoroughly debunk in Chapter 8.

This has gone hand in hand with another, equally tragic, development. As discussed in Chapter 5, following its historical defeat, the left’s traditional anti-capitalist focus on class slowly gave way to a liberal individualist understanding of emancipation. Waylaid by post-modernist and post-structuralist theories, left intellectuals slowly abandoned Marxian class categories to focus, instead, on elements of political power and the use of language and narratives as a way of establishing meaning. This also defined new arenas of political struggle that were diametrically opposed to those defined by Marx. Over the past three decades, the left focus on ‘capitalism’ has given way to a focus on issues such as racism, gender, homophobia, multiculturalism, etc. Marginality is no longer described in terms of class but rather in terms of identity. The struggle against the illegitimate hegemony of the capitalist class has given way to the struggles of a variety of (more or less) oppressed and marginalised groups: women, ethnic and racial minorities, the LGBTQ community, etc. As a result, class struggle has ceased to be seen as the path to liberation.

In this new post-modernist world, only categories that transcend Marxian class boundaries are considered meaningful. Moreover, the institutions that evolved to defend workers against capital – such as trade unions and social-democratic political parties – have become subjugated to these non-class struggle foci. What has emerged in practically all Western countries as a result, as Nancy Fraser notes, is a perverse political alignment between ‘mainstream currents of new social movements (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights), on the one side, and high-end “symbolic” and service-based business sectors (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood), on the other’.11 The result is a progressive neoliberalism ‘that mix[es] together truncated ideals of emancipation and lethal forms of financialization’, with the former unwittingly lending their charisma to the latter.

As societies have become increasingly divided between well-educated, highly mobile, highly skilled, socially progressive cosmopolitan urbanites, and lower-skilled and less educated peripherals who rarely work abroad and face competition from immigrants, the mainstream left has tended to consistently side with the former. Indeed, the split between the working classes and the intellectual-cultural left can be considered one of the main reasons behind the right-wing revolt currently engulfing the West. As argued by Jonathan Haidt, the way the globalist urban elites talk and act unwittingly activates authoritarian tendencies in a subset of nationalists.12 In a vicious feedback loop, however, the more the working classes turn to right-wing populism and nationalism, the more the intellectual-cultural left doubles down on its liberal-cosmopolitan fantasies, further radicalising the ethno-nationalism of the proletariat. As Wolfgang Streeck writes:

Protests against material and moral degradation are suspected of being essentially fascist, especially now that the former advocates of the plebeian classes have switched to the globalization party, so that if their former clients wish to complain about the pressures of capitalist modernization, the only language at their disposal is the pre-political, untreated linguistic raw material of everyday experiences of deprivation, economic or cultural. This results in constant breaches of the rules of civilized public speech, which in turn can trigger indignation at the top and mobilization at the bottom.13

This is particularly evident in the European debate, where, despite the disastrous effects of the EU and monetary union, the mainstream left – often appealing to exactly the same arguments used by Callaghan and Mitterrand 30–40 years ago – continues to cling on to these institutions and to the belief that they can be reformed in a progressive direction, despite all evidence to the contrary, and to dismiss any talk of restoring a progressive agenda on the foundation of retrieved national sovereignty as a ‘retreat into nationalist positions’, inevitably bound to plunge the continent into 1930s-style fascism.14 This position, as irrational as it may be, is not surprising, considering that European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is, after all, a brainchild of the European left (see Chapter 5). However, such a position presents numerous problems, which are ultimately rooted in a failure to understand the true nature of the EU and monetary union. First of all, it ignores the fact that the EU’s economic and political constitution is structured to produce the results that we are seeing – the erosion of popular sovereignty, the massive transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the upper classes, the weakening of labour and more generally the rollback of the democratic and social/economic gains that had previously been achieved by subordinate classes – and is designed precisely to impede the kind of radical reforms to which progressive integrationists or federalists aspire to.

More importantly, however, it effectively reduces the left to the role of defender of the status quo, thus allowing the political right to hegemonise the legitimate anti-systemic – and specifically anti-EU – grievances of citizens. This is tantamount to relinquishing the discursive and political battleground for a post-neoliberal hegemony – which is inextricably linked to the question of national sovereignty – to the right and extreme right. It is not hard to see that if progressive change can only be implemented at the global or even European level – in other words, if the alternative to the status quo offered to electorates is one between reactionary nationalism and progressive globalism – then the left has already lost the battle.

#### Some version of nationalism is inevitable-progressive nationalism undermines the source of neoliberal power

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What we are witnessing is not the end of globalisation – which will continue, although it will likely be characterised by increased tensions between the various fractions of international capital, particularly between the US, Germany, Japan and China, and by a combination of protectionism and internationalisation – but rather the birth of a post-neoliberal order. From a historical perspective, there was no reason to believe that neoliberalism would go on indefinitely. As we saw in Chapter 2, each distinctive stage of capitalist development is based on a specific accumulation strategy or hegemonic project, which derives its strength from its ability to guarantee economic growth and profit across a nation or region, while at the same time satisfying different social groups. Such regimes eventually become exhausted, falling into crisis. In this sense, just like Keynesianism fell into crisis in the 1970s and was supplanted by neoliberalism as the dominant accumulation regime, we can expect neoliberalism – now facing a crisis of its own – to give way to a new configuration of capitalism. The difference between then and now is that there is no new coherent ideology or accumulation regime waiting in the wings to replace neoliberalism. But we can be sure that it will involve the currency-issuing state as a central player (for example, the Chinese state is driving massive changes in global capitalism through its use of fiscal deficits and planned development).

The vague neo-protectionist and neo-nationalist rhetoric of ‘global Trumpism’, to use Mark Blyth’s apt definition,12 does not yet represent a new hegemonic force – as testified by the huge rift that it has opened within established political, economic and cultural elites. In other words, it is too early to say what this post-neoliberal order will look like. Antonio Gramsci famously described organic crises such as the one that we are currently going through as situations in which ‘the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born’. ‘In this interregnum’, he wrote, ‘a great variety of morbid symptoms’ – such as the ones that we have described above – tend to appear.13 If the future looks bleak, however, it is not because neoliberalism is inexorably destined to be supplanted by some form of twentieth-century fascism, as most mainstream and – alas – left analyses would have us believe, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that ‘reforming the status quo’ is the only viable alternative. No: what has allowed these ‘morbid symptoms’ to emerge as the dominant reaction to neoliberalism and globalisation is simply the fact that right-wing forces have been much more effective than left-wing or progressive forces at tapping into the legitimate grievances of the masses that have been disenfranchised, marginalised, impoverished and dispossessed by the 40-year-long neoliberal class war waged from above.

In particular, they are the only forces that have been able to provide a (more or less) coherent response to the widespread – and growing – yearning for greater territorial or national sovereignty, increasingly seen as the only way to ‘take back’ some degree of collective control over politics and society. Given neoliberalism’s war against sovereignty, it should come as no surprise that ‘sovereignty has become the master-frame of contemporary politics’, as Paolo Gerbaudo notes.14 As we have already seen, the hollowing out of national sovereignty and curtailment of popular-democratic mechanisms – what has been termed depoliticisation – has been an essential element of the neoliberal project, aimed at insulating macroeconomic policies from popular contestation and removing any obstacles put in the way of economic exchanges and financial flows. Given the nefarious effects of depoliticisation, it is only natural that the revolt against neoliberalism should first and foremost take the form of demands for a repoliticisation of national decision-making processes – that is, for a greater degree of democratic control over politics (and particularly over the destructive global flows unleashed by neoliberalism), which necessarily can only be exercised at the national level, in the absence of effective supranational mechanisms of representation. The European Union is obviously no exception: in fact, it is (correctly) seen by many as the embodiment of technocratic rule and elite estrangement from the masses, as demonstrated by the Brexit vote and the widespread euroscepticism engulfing the continent.

The fact that the vision of national sovereignty that was at the centre of the Trump and Brexit campaigns, and that currently dominates the public discourse, is a reactionary, quasi-fascist one – mostly defined along ethnic, exclusivist and isolationist lines, aimed at ensuring the security and protection of the ‘national community’ against the threat posed by a variety of internal and external enemies (minorities, migrants, Muslims, foreigners in general) and based on an even more exploitative and authoritarian form of capitalism – should not be seen as an indictment of national sovereignty as such. History attests to the fact that national sovereignty and national self-determination are not intrinsically reactionary or jingoistic concepts – in fact, they constituted foundational notions in the development of the modern left, seen in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and its influence on the Jacobins and the French revolution, and were the rallying cries of countless nineteenth and twentieth-century socialist and left-wing liberation movements. Even if we limit our analysis to core capitalist countries, it is patently obvious that virtually all the major social, economic and political advancements of the past centuries were achieved through the institutions of the democratic nation state, not through international, multilateral or supranational institutions, which in a number of ways have, in fact, been used to roll back those very achievements, as seen throughout this book. The problem, in short, is not national sovereignty as such, but the fact that the concept in recent years has been largely monopolised by the right and extreme right, which understandably sees it as a way to push through its xenophobic and identitarian agenda.

So why has the contemporary left not been able to develop an alternative, progressive view of national sovereignty in response to neoliberal globalisation? The answer should be clear by now: over the course of the past 30 years, most strands of left-wing or progressive thought have accepted the notion that national states have essentially been rendered obsolete by neoliberalism and/or globalisation and thus that meaningful change can only be achieved at the international/supranational level or – even worse – have come to view national sovereignty as an inherently reactionary construct, **synonymous with international conflict** and repressive control over migration.15 Furthermore, as we discuss in detail in the second part of the book, most leftists have also bought into the macroeconomic myths that the establishment uses to discourage any alternative use of state fiscal capacities. For example, they have accepted without question the so-called household budget analogy, which suggests that currency-issuing governments, like households, face financial constraints and thus must limit their spending or face sanctions from private bond markets. The latter are claimed to be able to starve governments of funds and force them to run out of money. The idea that a currency-issuing government can run out of money is, of course, nonsensical, but through careful framing and use of language, it has become a widely held belief in the general public debate – and among the left.

This is particularly evident in the European debate, where, despite the disastrous effects of the EU and monetary union, the left to a large extent continues to cling on to these institutions and to the belief that they can be reformed in a progressive direction, despite all evidence to the contrary, and to dismiss any talk of restoring a progressive agenda on the foundation of retrieved national sovereignty as a ‘retreat into nationalist positions’, inevitably bound to plunge the continent into 1930s-style fascism.16 This, however, is tantamount to relinquishing the discursive and political battleground for a post-neoliberal hegemony – which, as we have seen, is inextricably linked to the question of national sovereignty – to the right and extreme right. It is not hard to see that if progressive change can only be implemented at the global or even European level – in other words, if the alternative to the status quo offered to electorates is one between reactionary nationalism and progressive globalism – then the left has already lost the battle.

It needn’t be this way, however. A vision of national sovereignty which offers a radical alternative to that of both the right and the neoliberals – one based on popular sovereignty, democratic control over the economy, full employment, social justice, redistribution from the rich to the poor, inclusivity, and more generally the socio-ecological transformation of production and society – is not only necessary, it is possible. The fiscal capacity of the currency-issuing state remains intact and can be used to advance these objectives just as it has been used to ‘fund’ neoliberalism. This alternative is also the necessary prerequisite for the construction of a new international(ist) world order, based on interdependent but independent sovereign states. It is such a vision that we present in the second part of this book.

## CASE

### 1NC

#### [1] Their politics trade off with collective resistance – their account of power destroys agency

Hallward ‘6 [Peter; Professor of Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University, London, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p162-163]

Deleuze writes a philosophy of (virtual) difference without (actual) others. He intuits a purely internal or self-differing difference, a difference that excludes any constitutive mediation between the differed. Such a philosophy precludes a distinctively relational conception of politics as a matter of course. The politics of the future are likely to depend less on virtual mobility than on more resilient forms of cohesion, on more principled forms of commitment, on more integrated forms of coordination, on more resistant forms of defence. Rather than align ourselves with the nomadic war machine, our first task should be to develop appropriate ways of responding to the newly aggressive techniques of invasion, penetration and occupation which serve to police the embattled margins of empire. In a perverse twist of fate, it may be that today, in places like Palestine, Haiti and Iraq, the agents of imperialism have more to learn from Deleuzian rhizomatics than do their opponents.17 As we have repeatedly seen, the second corollary of Deleuze’s disqualification of actuality concerns the paralysis of the subject or actor. Since what powers Deleuze’s cosmology is the immediate differentiation of creation through the infinite proliferation of virtual creatings, the creatures that actualize these creatings are confined to a derivative if not limiting role. A creature’s own interests, actions or decisions are of minimal or preliminary significance at best: the renewal of creation always requires the paralysis and dissolution of the creature per se. The notion of a constrained or situated freedom, the notion that a subject’s own decisions might have genuine consequences – the whole notion, in short, of strategy – is thoroughly foreign to Deleuze’s conception of thought. Deleuze obliges us, in other words, to make an absolute distinction between what a subject does or decides and what is done or decided through the subject. By rendering this distinction absolute he abandons the category of the subject altogether. He abandons the decisive subject in favour of our more immediate subjection to the imperatives of creative life or thought. Deprived of any strategic apparatus, Deleuze’s philosophy thus combines the self-grounding sufficiency of pure force or infinite perfection with our symmetrical limitation to pure contemplation or in-action. On the one hand, Deleuze always maintains that ‘there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life’. Absolute life or creation tolerates no norm external to itself. The creative movement that orients us out of the world does not depend on a transcendent value beyond the world. After Spinoza, after Nietzsche, Deleuze rejects all forms of moral evaluation or strategic judgment. Every instance of decision, every confrontation with the question ‘what should we do?’, is to be resolved exclusively in terms of what we can do. An individual’s power or capacity is also its ‘natural right’, and the answer to the question of what an individual or body should do is again simplicity itself – it should go and will always go ‘as far as it can’ (WP, 74; EP, 258). But on the other hand, we know that an individual can only do this because its power is not that of the individual itself. By doing what it can, an individual only provides a vessel for the power that works through it, and which alone acts – or rather, which alone is. What impels u to ‘persevere in our being’ has nothing to do with us as such. So when, in the conclusion of their last joint project, Deleuze and Guattari observe the ‘vitalism has always had two possible interpretations’, it is not surprising that they should opt for the resolutely in-active interpretation. Vitalism, they explain, can be conceived either in terms of ‘an Idea that acts but is not, and that acts therefore only from the point of view of an external cerebral knowledge; or of a force that is but does not act, and which is therefore a pure internal Feeling [Sentir]’. Deleuze and Guattari embrace this second interpretation, they choose Leibnizian being over Kantian act, precisely because it disables action in favour of contemplation. It suspends any relation between a living and the lived, between a knowing and the know, between a creating and the created. They embrace it because what feeling ‘preserves is always in a state of detachment in relation to action and even to movement, and appears as a pure contemplation without knowledge’. As Deleuze understands, living contemplation proceeds at an immeasurable distance from what is merely lived, known or decided. Life lives and creation creates on a virtual plane that leads forever out of our actual world. Few philosophers have been as inspiring as Deleuze. But those of us who still seek to change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look for our inspiration elsewhere.

#### [2] The alternative fails – there’s nothing radical about rhizomatic politics or their account of difference – they produce a totalizing theory that destroys political struggle

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(Jodi, “Zizek against Democracy,” Law, Culture and the Humanities 2005(1):154-177, accessed 5-9-16 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

Zizek’s three arguments against multiculturalism / its failure to call into question the capitalist economy, its speculative identity with irrational violence, and its preclusion of politicization / can be read in terms of divergences from Connolly, Hardt and Negri, and Deleuze and Guattari. So, not only does Connolly’s emphasis on the pluralization of modes of becoming and Hardt’s and Negri’s account of a multitude of singularities seek to open the political terrain beyond an orthodox focus on class antagonism, say, but Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concepts of becoming machine, the communication of affective intensities, and the rhizomatic structures of being and thinking are effectively the ideology of the ‘‘netocracy’’ or digital elite. 47 For Zizek, the fundamental homology between these concepts and networked technoculture decreases their radicality. Furthermore, Zizek’s emphasis on the speculative identity of toleration and irrational violence contrasts with efforts in behalf of an ethos of generosity or critical responsiveness in Connolly’s work. For Zizek, insofar as such an ethos aims to combat and eliminate dogmatic certainty, it rests on precisely that fundament of irrational, contingent attachment it seeks to erase. 48 And, finally, Zizek’s rejection of a multitude of singularities should be read as an alternative to Hardt and Negri. For Zizek, singular positions are not political. They become political through articulation with other struggles and, in this way, are inseparable from the division of the social. Echoing Badiou, moreover, Zizek argues that emphasis on multitude and diversity masks ‘‘the underlying monotony of today’s global life.’’ He writes, ‘‘is there anything more monotonous than the Deleuzian poetry of contemporary life as the decentred proliferation of multitudes, of nontotalizable differences? What occludes (and thereby sustains) this monotony is the multiplicity of resignifications and displacements to which the basic ideological texture is submitted.’’ 50 The more things change, the more they remain the same. Or, lots of little micro-struggles don’t automatically produce macro-level change. Accordingly, one could say that even though Zizek is an avowed theorist of totality, Deleuze is the totalizing theorist, the theorist whose all-inclusive account of the social cannot account for the division necessary for political struggle. 51 Deleuze, and with him Connolly and Hardt and Negri, embraces an ethics of affirmation that eliminates negativity from the political. Politics becomes immanent, part of the nature of things, arising as a force both destructive and productive, deterritorializing and territorializing. 52 And all this teaming activity is ultimately inseparable from the flows and intensities circulating through the networks of global capitalist technoculture.

#### [3] Rhizomatic metaphors perpetuate colonialism is the name of democratic politics. The theoretical tourism of the 1AC is an insult to people who must live mobility and displacement as more than a metaphor.

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Becoming Minor: Rhizomes and Nomads To bring language slowly and progressively to the desert. - Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari " While poststructuralism potentially deconstructs the power relations inherent in Euro-American humanism, the metaphors of explanation utilized by many poststructuralist critics reinforce and depend upon specifically modernist versions of colonial discourse**.** While Deleuze and Guattari do not construct the sort of metaphysical binaries that we have seen in Baudrillard's later work, their metaphorical mapping of space can be read within the context of Euro-American discourses of modernism, emphasizing the benefits of distance and the valorization of displacement. Indeed, I would argue that their privileging of "nomadic" modes relies upon an opposition berween a central site of subjectivity and zones of marginality. Thus their advocacy of a process of "becoming minor" depends upon the erasure of the site of their own subject positions. What links these European poststructuralist theorists of displacement, then, is the specificity of their modernist critical traditions along with an inability to account for the transnational power relations that construct postrnodern subjectivities. This said, Deleuze and Guattari's theories of territory mark significant departures in poststructuralist paradigms. The relative popularity of many of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts and terms in Euro-American literary criticism and philosophical studies prompts a rigorous reading of their collaborative texts. Associated with radical reworkings of philosophy, critiques of psychoanalytic practices, support for the Italian alltonoltlia political movements and the French avant-garde, Deleuze and Guattari have produced (separately and together) many of the most provocative and overtly political texts of contemporary French poststructuralism. Utopian articulations of the future share textual space with incisive critiques of the structure and operation of Euro-American modernity. It is precisely Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on breaking out of or rupturing dominant social practices that both inspires and irks critics, leading to praise for their utopian vision as well as critiques of their tendency to romanticize the subjects of criticism." Deleuze and Guattari's texts vitally engage the context of EuroAmerican modernist experimentations in language and textual innovation even as they can be seen to be in tension with that very tradition. Indeed, their politically committed theorization of power relations challenges the dominant structures and practices of modernity. In their effort to imagine differently the social spaces and sites of subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari theorize alternative kinds of identities and modes of dwelling that counter the fixed comrnodifications of capitalist relations. Unanchored to any specific historical formation, the radical displacement that is continually evoked in these texts is most often referred to as "deterritorialization." First theorized in Anti-Oediplls to describe the dislodging and dispersal of desire in modern capitalist formations, the notion of deterritorialization appears throughout the collective texts, including A Thousand Platealls and Kafka: Toward a Minor Literatllre. Linked to deterritorialization (and its corollary, reterritorialization), the production of "nomad" or "nomadic" theory signifies the importance of modes of displacement in Deleuze and Guattari's work. Deleuze and Guattari appropriate a number of metaphors to produce sites of displacement in their theory. The botanical metaphor of the rootlike "rhizome," for example, enacts the subjectivities of deterrirorialization: burrowing through substance, fragmenting into simultaneous sprouts, moving with a certain stealth, powerful in its dispersion. Rejecting the classic, Western humanist metaphors of family trees and genealogies, the rhizome destabilizes the conventions of origins and endings: "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, berween things, interbeing, inlermf!il{o. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance."" As a metaphor for politics, then, the rhizome constitutes an anarchic relationship to space and subjectivity, resistant to and undermining the nation-state apparatus. From the rhizome to the nomad is not a far leap in the poetics of Euro-American poststructuralist theory. Like the rhizome, the nomadic subject symbolizes displacement and dispersion. In Deleuze and Guattari's work, the site of the desert, traditional home of the nomad, is not unlike Baudrillard's sublime, sidireal space: empry, liberatory, and a margin for linguistic, cultural, and political experimentation. For example, in their study of Kafka's poetics of alterity, Deleuze and Guattari make repeated reference to the desert as border or margin, linked to "underdevelopment," ''palois:' and a "third world."" Similarly, the nomad is likened to the "immigrant" and the "gypsy."'! In all of these allusions, modernity and posrrnodernity collapse into undifferentiated cultures; Euro-American (or even solely European) culture structures the point of view, erasing temporal and spatial differentiations. European gypsies and Third World immigrants share the same theoretical spaces not through structural relations of historically specific diasporas but through a kind of generalized poetics of displacement. In making recourse to the metaphors of marginality and displacement, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to displace the sedimented bulk of European humanist traditions. Their antihistoricism seeks to deconstruct classical lineages even as it may tend to homogenize or blur the kinds of differences upon which contemporary identity politics insist. Yet the utility of their methodology (which appears to be much more useful to Europeans and some North Americans-that is, to those who occupy the sites of domination in modernity) is always generalized. The Third World functions simply as a metaphorical margin for European oppositional strategies, an imaginary space, rather than a location of theoretical production itself. This kind of "othering" in theory repeats the anthropological gesture of erasing the subject position of the theorist and perpetuates a kind of colonial discourse in the name of progressive politics. In their emphasis upon linguistic "escape" and "lines of flight," Deleuze and Guattari roam into realms of nostalgia, searching for a way to detour Western civilization. Their theory of "becoming minor" evokes this Euro-American modernist move of utopian Right from the worst excesses of capitalism. "Becoming minor" is a strategy that only makes sense to the central, major, or powerful, yet it is presented as an imperative for "us all." Constructing binaries between major and minor, between developed and undeveloped, or center and periphery, in Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative texts modernity provides borders and zones of alterity to tempt the subversive bourgeois/ intellectual. Becoming minor, a utopian process of letting go of privileged identities and practices, requires emulating the ways and modes of modernity's "others." Yet, like all imperialist discourses, these spaces and identities are produced through their imagining; that is, the production of sites of escape or decolonization for the colonizer signals a kind of theoretical tourism**.** For these spaces of alterity are not the symbols of productive estrangement or disengagement for any other subjects. These imagined spaces are invested with subversive or destabilizing power by the "visitors," as it were. This theoretical activity doubles the metaphorical colonization of moderniry's margins and marginals - here colonial space must symbolize the imperialist past as a zone of utter alterity as well as the site of the liberation of the Euro-American subject. "Becoming minor" refers to the center-periphery geopolitics of modernity rather than the complex, transnational circuits of capital and power in postrnodernity. Thus when Deleuze and Guattari pose a "nomadology" against "history" they evince nostalgia for a space and a subject outside Western modernity, apart from all chronology and totalization. Their celebration of deterritorialization links the Euro-American modernist valuation of exile, expatriation, defarniliarization, and displacement and the colonial discourses of culrural differences to a philosophy that appears to critique the foundations of that very tradition. Deleuze and Guattari can be read as "high modernists," then, privileging language experimentation over all other strategies. Their model of deterritorialization, like most Euro-American modernist versions of exilic displacement, stresses the freedom of disconnection and the pleasures of interstitial subjectivity. Yet deterritorialization itself cannot escape colonial discourse. The movement of deterritorialization colonizes, appropriates, even raids other spaces: "Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency."" Deterritorialization is always reterritorialization, an increase of territory, an imperialization. The nomad serves as the site of this romanticized imaginary entry into the "becoming minor" of deterritorialization. In going "from one point to another" in the process of distributing "people (or animals) in an open space," nomads have "absolute movement," as distinct from migrants, who move in more determined and located ways. Paradoxically, the nomad can be seen to be the one who "does not move" in that the nomad's movements cannot be tracked or linked to a starting or end point. Like the metaphor of rhizome, nomadism signifies the inverse of dwelling or being and celebrates the intemezzo zone. As a symbol of utter and complete deterritorialization, the nomad does not engage in the reterritorialization that Deleuze and Guattari describe as a necessary component of language (the rerum of sense after the experimentation of "becoming minor"). The nomad in Deleuze and Guattari's texts embodies the practice of shifting location, vectors of deterritorialization, a "local absolute": "an absolute that is manifested locally, and engendered in a series of local operations of varying orientations: desert, steppe, ice, sea.""

#### [4] The aff’s performance of critique and difference in the academy becomes the affective energy that greases the violent wheels of neoliberalism

Ferguson 12 (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster @ UIC, “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 11-14)//NotJacob

The student movements of the sixties and seventies represent both a por­tion and a disruption of this genealogy. They point to an academic moment that helped to rearticulate the nature of state and capital, a moment in which truth as the ideal of the university and the mediator of state and civil society was joined by difference in general, and minoritized difference in particular. Moreover, the academy became the “training ground” for state and capital’s engagement with minority difference as a site of representa­tion and meaning. A historical and theoretical reconsideration of the interdisciplinary fields means displacing the economic and its thesis that the academy is a mere reflection or derivation of political economy. In terms of this narrative of rejection and derivation, we are the inheritors of a philosopher’s deception, the children of a ruse. The extent to which we accept the academy and things academic as the designs of the economic is the measure of our dependence on this trick secured through a rhetoric of impotence and remove. The modern Western academy was created as the repository and guar­antor of national culture as well as a cultivator and innovator of political economy. As such, the academy is an archive of sorts, whose technologies— or so the theory goes— are constantly refined to acquire the latest innovation. As an archiving institution, the academy is— to use Derrida’s description of the archive—“ institutive and conservative. Revolutionary and traditional. An economic archive in this double sense: it keeps, it puts in reserve, it saves, but in an unnatural fashion, that is to say in making the law (nomos) or in making people respect the law.” 25 The academy has always been an economic domain; that is, it has simultaneously determined who gets admitted while establishing the rules for membership and participation. In the context of the post– World War II United States, the American academy can be read as a record of the shifts and contradictions of polit­ical economy. Indeed, with the admission of women and people of color into predominantly white academic settings, the economic character of the American academy did not simply vanish. The academy would begin to put, keep in reserve, and save minoritized subjects and knowledges in an archival fashion, that is, by devising ways to make those subjects and knowledges respect power and its “laws.” Put differently, the ethnic and women’s studies movements applied pressures on the archival conventions of the academy in an effort to stretch those conventions so that previously excluded subjects might enjoy membership. But it also meant that those subjects would fall under new and revised laws. As a distinct archival economy, the American academy would help inform the archival agendas of state and capital— how best to institute new peoples, new knowledges, and cultures and at the same time discipline and exclude those subjects according to a new order. This was the moment in which power would hone its own archival econ­omy, producing formulas for the incorporation rather than the absolute repudiation of difference, all the while refining and perfecting its practices of exclusion and regulation. This is the time when power would restyle its archival propensities by dreaming up ways to affirm difference and keep it in hand. Ethnic studies and women’s studies movements were the proto­typical resources of incorporative and archival systems of power that re­ invented themselves because of civil rights and liberation movements of the fifties, sixties, and seventies. Part of the signature achievements of these affirmative modes of power was to make the pursuit of recognition and legitimacy into formidable horizons of pleasure, insinuating themselves into radical politics, trying to convince insurgents that “your dreams are also mine.” By excavating the social movements, we may be able to chart the emer­gence of this new kind of archival economy that transformed academic, political, economic, and social life from the late sixties and beyond. More­ over, focusing on the social movements and the denominations of inter­disciplinary forms that emerged from them might allow us to produce a counterarchive detailing the ways in which power worked through the “recognition” of minoritized histories, cultures, and experiences and how power used that “recognition” to resecure its status. The histories of inter­disciplinary engagements with forms of difference represent a conflicted and contradictory negotiation with this horizon of power. Seen this way, we must entrust the interdisciplines with a new charge, that of assessing power’s archival techniques and maneuvers. As Self-Portrait 2000 suggests, the involution of marginal differences and the development of the interdisciplines, broadly conceived, denoted the elaboration of power rather than the confirmation that our “liberty” had been secured. We must make it our business to critically deploy those modes of difference that have become part of power’s trick and devise ways to use them otherwise. The influence that the student movements had on institutional life within the United States points to a need to assess the streams of the academy within political economy. If state and particularly capital needed the academy to reorient their sensibilities toward the affirmation of difference— that is, to complete the constitutional project of the United States and begin to resolve the contradictions of social exclusion— then it also meant that the academy became the laboratory for the revalorization of modes of difference. This changing set of representations, the institutions that organized themselves around that set, and the modes of power that were compelled by and productive of those transformations are what we are calling the interdisciplines. The interdisciplines were an ensemble of institutions and techniques that offered positivities to populations and constituencies that had been denied institutional claims to agency. Hence, the interdisciplines connoted a new form of biopower organized around the affirmation, recog­nition, and legitimacy of minoritized life. To offset their possibility for future ruptures, power made legitimacy and recognition into grand enticements. In doing so, they would become power’s newest techniques for the taking of difference. What the students often offered as radical critiques of insti­tutional belonging would be turned into various institutions’ confirmation.

#### [5] The affirmative’s intellectual project doesn’t simply become commodified, it takes up the academy as a model for desire.

Clarke 15 (Paul Clarke is a Lecturer in Performance Studies @ The University of Bristol “The Impact Market: The complicity of practitioner-researchers in ‘the spread of the university beyond the university’” *Performance Research* 20, no. 4, pp. 115-120)//NotJacob

The university territorializes new knowledges, which can be taught and exploited as cultural or economic capital; to use Harney and Moten’s analogy, it ‘encircle[es them with] war wagons’ (2013:34) in order to capitalize on them. Looked at from this perspective, my 2003 paper played a role in the discursive enclosure of ‘expert practices’ (Melrose 2007) in the institution’s unfolding encyclopaedia of knowledge and power. Practical action and doing performance work, which once belonged to the sphere of praxis, have become part of the realm of knowledge and belong to the university as intellectual property. Practices that were felt to be ‘just intuitive’ (Melrose 2005) have been named properly, as ‘expert-performancepractitioner-centred modes of knowledge and models of intelligibility’ (Melrose 2007), embodied thinking or somatic knowing. With performance becoming valued as a subject, and with the legitimation of practice-as-research, comes the ability to regulate its unruly ways and imprecise languages – to bring those who make this object of study within the university, its disciplines and governance. In the 1980s and early 1990s it might have been possible to work in the academy and borrow its resources to create professional practice outside. But, since the admission of practical research outcomes in HEFCE’s 1996 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the embedding of practice-as-research in UK research culture, the field of performance has been territorialized and work presented professionally counts as university product. There are few socio-cultural spaces beyond the scope of the REF and its new impact agenda, and in order to be a practitioner in the university you must demonstrate the excellence of work produced outside, plus evidence of external recognition. While the intellectual ‘worthiness’ (Melrose 2002) of practice-as-research and the counting of impact has strengthened the position of practitioners in universities and their potential for progression or promotion, this inclusion has undoubtedly influenced their creative activities. The debt that the performancemaker ‘owes to the academy’ for their entry is to ‘incorporate[, in their work,] a scholarly apparatus that enables [their peers] to assess [its] value and significance … as the results of … research’ (Cooper 2005, np). The ‘obligation’ is to make art with a research imperative and to produce excellence within the frame of the REF, which values practice if ‘enhancements’ are produced ‘in knowledge and understanding in the discipline’ (ibid.). This transforms the aims and aspirations of university practitioners, their ways of practising performance and the form of artwork produced, the quality of which is assessed according to criteria for research and impact rather than aesthetic judgements. In spite of the above, in the hierarchy of knowledge, monographs and peer-reviewed articles, like this one, still rule. Performance can only pass as research when accompanied by framing discursive documents – 300 word statements and questions, which are admittedly often written retrospectively, after the practical research has concluded and its outcomes are known. As Conquergood (2002) wrote thirteen years ago in his article ‘Performance studies: Interventions and radical research’, ‘knowing how’ (146) remains a ‘subjugated knowledge’ (Foucault 1980:81), struggling for its place. As he said then, ‘promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholars [… still] do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication’ (Conquergood 2002:153). Despite doing the necessary labour of teaching performance practice and producing impact, as a practitioner-researcher my position continues to feel weak and at risk, like an uninvited guest or imposter in the academy. In addition there is an ongoing fight to maintain the hours allocated for workshops, to justify the low staffstudent ratios necessary and the inefficiency of practice-based teaching, which fails to produce more student satisfaction in the National Student Survey (NSS) for less contact hours. Having internalized the precarity that even those of us on permanent contracts feel, I place an obligation on myself to fulfil all aspects of my role professionally and responsibly, perform self-assurance, compete effectively with other researchers (especially in UOA 35, Music, Drama, Dance and Performing Arts) and continue my professional development. I acknowledge the way that my subjectivity has been fabricated by the university and shaped by our precarious positions in it. Hence I cannot resist the desire to do well in the next REF, feeling driven to attempt to produce research excellence and be impactful. My subjectivity is one of the outputs of the institutional apparatus and I reproduce the university, HEFCE and Arts Council England’s values and ways of thinking as my own aspirations, putting myself into my work and wanting it to ‘influenc[e] civil society and quality of life’, to believe in this vision and the need to capture such contributions. For all this writing of subversion I may not have the autonomous agency or self-determination to resist, or be ‘disobedient’ in Virno’s terms (Virno 2004; see also Lazzarato 2010). As well as the good citizenship discussed above, the format of Bristol’s academic CV has a category for ‘Entrepreneurship’, a further academic responsibility to determine routes to market for research outputs and develop their competitiveness. Each institution’s environment statement for REF 2014 and impact case studies also accounted for academic enterprise, contribution ‘to economic prosperity’ (REF 2012) and scholars’ relationships with cultural and creative industries.6 I am an artistic director of Uninvited Guests and this company limited by guarantee was listed on the Environment Template along with its income. Here the professional world, ‘the industries of creativity’ 6 The REF 2014 Environment Template provides an account of the university department, or unit of assessment’s research strategy, people and staff development, income, statistical data, infrastructure and facilities, collaboration with other institutions or industries and contribution to the discipline or research base (see REF 2012). (Raunig 2013) and culture exterior to the university are encircled or brought inside its expanded walls. Uninvited Guests, its producers and those employed by it, become university workers by proxy, as they transfer practiceframed-as-research to wider audiences, whose number and diversity are measured. We may ask whether Uninvited Guests therefore reproduces the university and performs its social work in the private-public spheres beyond, whether its performers are unwitting agents or representatives of the university, marketing and distributing its knowledge, know-how and vision. The Department of Drama’s Environment Template measured the quality of Uninvited Guests’ performances by financial income, transformed audiences and reception into figures and capital, and quantified dissemination. It is worth noting that there is a double counting of Uninvited Guests’ output of impact and that Arts Council England (ACE), who fund the work, also use the neoliberal language of instrumentalization, social change and transformation. The company has received project funding from Grants for the arts and ACE for a number of research and development (R&D), production processes and national tours. The Arts Council’s website ‘talk[s] about the value of arts and culture to society’, how – in addition to art’s ‘intrinsic value’ – they ‘cherish’ the ways it ‘can illuminate our inner lives and enrich our emotional world’, along with producing ‘more measurable impact on our economy, health and wellbeing, society and culture’ (2014). ACE encourages the professionalization of artists as entrepreneurs, uses the terminology of the transformation economy (see Pine and Gilmore 2001), and makes demands on publicly funded cultural labourers similar to those asked of academic researchers – that is, to account for and evidence how their work is applied as an instrument of personal and social change, its extrinsic use-value: excellence in impact translates into investment as much as intrinsic aesthetic quality, and the latter may only accrue cultural capital. It could also be argued that, as well as art experiences, the Arts Council and state’s ethos, ideology and policies are disseminated or reproduced through touring to new neighbourhoods and diversifying audiences. With Arts Council England and funded venues operating within the same neoliberal conditions and policies as the university, being required to evidence their efficiency and efficacy, they subject arts producers to related impact agendas and evaluative metrics – apparatuses for accounting for interactions and engagement. While ‘defection’ from the university to the professional or public context is an option, it does not ‘modify the conditions within which the struggle takes place’, constitute an ‘exit’ or afford further autonomy, as the professional practitioner remains in service to the production of impact, in order to justify investment, and also to art market forces (Virno 2004:70). Closely related dispositifs – management instruments, financialized languages and evaluative frameworks – determine artists' drive to innovate and the association of practices with capital, both within and beyond the university. The business or profession of performance- making was once resistant to the production of commodities or exchangeable objects. Rather than producing material or durable goods, the outputs of this cooperative labour were cultural products that became themselves through disappearance. For Marx (1990 [1976]), in the case of teaching and performing, the product was inseparable from the act of producing and the producer; they were activities-without-end- product, like personal services. Performance, as Virno (2004) writes, ‘is an activity which finds its own … purpose … in itself, without objectifying itself into … a “finished product,” or into an object which would survive the performance’ (52). For him, theatre or performance ‘requires the presence of others’ (52) and interactions, and is hence closely aligned to praxis, the vita activa and political action. As I have noted, work has appropriated the activities of praxis, the political and social interactions that took place in the territory of politics and leisure, turning these to the public good of the private company – or in this case the university – and its ethos. Our economic model has shifted from ‘general intellect’ (Marx 1993 [1972]: 706), in which the common mode of labour is cognitive, to ‘general performance’ (Lütticken 2012), in which the majority of workers across diverse fields and forms are expected to perform themselves publicly, improve their performance and produce immaterial goods, such as relationships with customers and colleagues, positive feelings and affects. As Hardt and Negri (2004) write, contemporary labour ‘from sales work to financial services, is fundamentally a performance: the product is the act itself’ (200). In our post-Fordist times, cultural industry, and specifically performance, has become the ‘industry of the means of production’ (Virno 2004: 61). ‘Performance has been put to work’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 200) and it is ‘the special capabilities of [the] performing artist’ (Virno 2004: 52), their virtuosities, which are the contemporary tools, techniques and procedures of the means of production. If workers are generally expected to perform their labour, then performance abilities appreciate as embodied assets in people as ‘enterprises’ (Lazzarato 2012: 56). How does studying performance through practice resist the production of human capital and producing graduates as virtuosic ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ (Foucault 2008: 226)? The language of theatre and performance is prevalent in business schools and management studies, with Pine and Gilmore (2001) writing of companies staging unique events – shopping and dining experiences – in which the work ‘perishes upon its performance’ but ‘the value of the experience lingers in the memories of individuals engaged by the event’ (80). This chimes with performance studies’ thinking around the way that performance both disappears and remains (see Phelan 1993 and Schneider 2011). What does this context of an economy of experience, affects and transformation mean for the politics or ethics of teaching practical performance – producing students well-trained in the means of production, for experiential approaches to research and for the radical potential of companies like Uninvited Guests, which stage experiences or market unique, participatory performance events? In conclusion I will return to Conquergood, whose 2002 article, subtitled ‘Interventions and radical research’, was a foundational text for the inclusion of practice and applied performance research in the academy. In it he proposed ‘braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing’ (152), crisscrossing between ‘activity and analysis, … thinking and doing, interpreting and making (153), in order to challenge the academy’s ‘deeply entrenched division of labor’, hierarchy of value and organization of knowledge. What I would ask now is whether his mission to triangulate ‘practical knowledge, … propositional knowledge and politic[al]’ action remains resistant, if these spheres are already hybridized as scholarly work and part of the university’s terrain. It is precisely these hybrid modes that the academic institution currently seeks to develop and capitalize upon, through enterprise and networking with creative industries, and through engaging with diverse publics in order to generate measurable impact. Conquergood writes optimistically of research projects that reach outside the academy, of performance studies’ workers engaging with ‘activism, outreach’ (152), making meaningful connections and social commitments to communities – of political praxis. In the context of the contemporary university we need to consider the territorializing as well as radical possibilities of such articulations. How can creative practice fulfil its transgressive promise when it is institutionalized, transformed into the university’s impact, enterprise and product mix? If these activities are in the university and part of the work that a professional academic is contracted for, they can be acquired, commodified, managed and marketed by the university. The academy has embraced different ways of knowing, but to what end and are these modes of knowledge any less subjugated? Under these late capitalist conditions, can performance practice still generate fugitivity escape capture as knowledge or unsettle the ‘encyclopedic circle of the [state] university’ (Harney and Moten 2013: 34)? As Isabell Lorey (2010) proposes, can socio-political affects, impacts and exchanges with others retain a ‘capacity for refusal’, resisting being entirely measured or ‘economicized’ (5)? Are there ‘surpluses’ that cannot be capitalized on, ‘absorbed’ or ‘wholly determined’ by the institution, which produce ‘potentialities of resistance’? Can subversive intellectuals save some autonomous time for inconvenient academic freedom, inefficient and unprofessional activities, including study in Harney and Moten’s terms, without ‘knowledge production’ (12), output, credit or end? Can the ‘refugee colony’ of practitioner researchers, of which I am one, retain the subversive potential ‘to be in but not of the university’ (26), to steal into the academy and poach its resources, to intervene, as Conquergood claimed? Or do we borrow from the university solely for the university’s benefit? As a virtue of being incorporated in the neoliberal institution, are our subjectivities produced and shaped, such that, whether we are practising inside or outside, we are of the university, embodying ways of thinking, desires and aspirations that mimic institutional drives, values and vision? Or, in Lazzarato’s terms, can immaterial and cognitive wage-labourers access non- exploitative temporalities, in which antagonistic subjectivities may form themselves or be created, politically, intellectually and imaginatively independent of the interests of university and state productivity: can our practices be dissociated from capital and returned to common sense or collective knowledge, as public goods? (See Lazzarato 2010 and Chukrov 2010.)

# 2NC---Dartmouth LV---NUSO R4

## Framework

### TVA

#### The United States federal government should adopt a public interest standard that includes racial equity as a goal in antitrust law.

#### Antitrust reform should center on anti-racist remedies for competition. The status quo guarantees algorithmic biases and data practices that disproportionally impact Black communities and people of color.

Turner-Lee and Chin 21

(Nicol Turner-Lee- Senior Fellow - Governance Studies Director - Center for Technology Innovation, and Caitlin Chin- Research Analyst, Center for Technology Innovation - The Brookings Institution, 7-8-2021, "The debate on antitrust reform should incorporate racial equity," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/07/08/the-debate-on-antitrust-reform-should-incorporate-racial-equity/>, JKS)

Why racial equity is a competition concern

Under the letter of the law, antitrust and civil rights are generally treated as separate statutes. Yet in practice, their values intertwine: Market dominance can effectively put companies in a powerful position to exacerbate historical racial inequalities. Take the search engine market, for example, of which Google controls over 90%. In 2012, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney discovered that Google searches for individuals with Black-sounding names were more likely to generate advertisements for arrest records than searches for individuals with white-sounding names—even if no arrest records actually existed. This flawed system could result in significant emotional, reputational, or financial harm for racially-stereotyped individuals, as well as amplify the profiling associated with algorithmic biases. The lack of competition in the online search industry not only eliminates consumers’ options to choose a different, less-biased search engine, but also reduces market incentives for Google to improve its biased algorithms, as was recently illustrated by the dismissal of the former technical co-lead of Google’s Ethical Artificial Intelligence Team, Timnit Gebru. Large technology companies also routinely collect massive volumes of data about people, compounded in scale through mergers and acquisitions. Using this data, they can surveil selected populations for online behavioral advertising or micro-interactions based on known or inferred attributes. In this sense, advertisers choose which communities can see or do not see their ads—either through the direct targeting of demographic variables like age, gender, sexual orientation, or race, or through “proxy variables” like zip code, education, interests, and purchase history. These activities can disproportionately impact marginalized communities who may be shown different employment, credit cards, housing, and other advertisements based on the platform or advertising algorithm. More concerning, companies like Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook have each engaged in activities that have cemented their respective market power, allowing them to continue to wield control over the advertisements which their hundreds of millions of users see.

# 1NR---Dartmouth LV---NUSO R4

## Green New Deal CP

### State Key

#### Only governmental planning and institutional steering can support the Green New Deal framework. Government planning is the only alternative to market-driven extraction.

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

The Economic Theories Behind the Green New Deal

Several histories and theories influenced the vision of the Green New Deal, including the environmental justice movement, Keynesian economics, and the histories of World War II and the New Deal. But the most significant influence —at least during the early development of the GND—was a body of economic theory that we called the “new consensus.” Exemplified by the work of economists like Ha- Joon Chang, Mariana Mazzucato, Kate Raworth, Ann Pettifor, and Joseph Stiglitz, the new consensus rejects neoliberalism as the “right” governing paradigm for modern states. Instead, it contends that many of the crises that we face are the result not of government overreach but of government’s abdicating its economic responsibilities: as a market creator, as an industrial planner, and as an innovator. Neoclassical economists believe governments should only seek to correct market failures, but as Mazzucato writes in The Entrepreneurial State, “that view forgets that markets are blind… They may neglect societal or environmental concerns… they often head in suboptimal, path-dependent directions that are self-reinforcing.” When oil companies relentlessly pursue extraction in deeper and more dangerous parts of the earth while ignoring clean energy investment, this is “not just about market failure,” Mazzucato argues, but “it’s about the wrong kind of market getting stuck”; we need government “actively creating and shaping (new) markets, while regulating existing ones.”

Following Keynesian theory, Green New Dealers are guided by the principle that government can and must do things that **no other institutions do**—be they the market, the church, or the family. It’s the reason why strengthening the public sector and empowering the government are crucial to the policy vision of the GND, because we need a direct, efficient, and just economic transformation, which the market alone cannot—and will not—provide.

Governments have an **essential**, **constitutive role to play in steering** national economies, and the GND seeks to embrace this role by rebalancing the relationship between the public (the state) and the private (the market). This does not mean that businesses and financial markets should not or cannot have a role to play. New Consensus economists see the private sector as essential to economic transformation and prosperity. In the GND’s policy vision, the government is not a handmaiden of the market, relegated to only fixing market failures; it’s a leader and a risk-taker that uses its unique abilities to create, regulate, and shape markets.

With government playing a leading role in the economy, the arsenal of public powers available to policymakers is expanded, allowing us to comprehensively and equitably solve climate, social, and economic crises. Three additional principles from New Consensus economists should guide Green New Dealers as we craft policy.

First, the US government, at all levels, must have a coordinated vision and strategy for a new “green” economy. As Mazzucato argues, one of the reasons the US has failed to significantly reduce emissions and develop a competitive clean technology sector is that the federal government has adopted a “patchwork” approach to climate policy, uncoordinated across state agencies and jurisdictions. Second, public spending and investment are essential, not just for infrastructure and “public goods” but for innovation. Federal investment in R&D funded some of our most important technologies, including GPS, nanotechnology, and many key components of smartphones. Although we have most of the technology we need for decarbonization, we still need additional breakthroughs to fully transition from fossil fuels. However, as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), public spending for R&D has declined nearly 50 percent since the 1980s. GND policies must set aside neoliberal dogmas about the need to keep public spending low and instead embrace large-scale public investment strategies that rapidly decarbonize our economy and reposition the US as a leader, instead of a laggard, in the global green economy. Third, the Green New Deal should invest in the real economy, not financialization. Although engagement with financial markets and products is important to the success of the GND, its policies should invest, first and foremost, in the “real economy,” meaning the parts of the economy made up of the flow of goods and services. GND policies should focus on factors that translate to real economic outcomes for everyday people (for example, job creation, wage levels, rates of unionization, and so forth) before focusing on what makes sense for financial markets and monetary policy. Monetary policy still matters, but financial markets should not be a primary concern when designing and implementing policy for the Green New Deal.

Our values informed how we interpreted the theories of New Consensus thinkers. We designed the Green New Deal as an economic mobilization not simply because it was the best solution to meet the need to rapidly decarbonize but because it was the solution that also provided the greatest opportunity for compassion, dignity, and justice. From the New Deal to World War II, economic mobilizations built the American middle class; but, as we discussed before, they only served certain Americans. With the Green New Deal, we have a chance to decarbonize, rebuild our economy, and correct those failures, but only if we design policies that do not treat injustice as a necessary—or acceptable— consequence of capitalism.

## Case

### Colonial Metaphors

#### The 1AC perpetuates colonialism in the name of progressive politics. That’s Kaplan. Colonialism outweighs and turns the case – recolonization destroys other ways of life for the sake of development.

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Those who condemn recolonization from a principally moral position as something inherently reprehensible, are, I would contend, in a minority, at least for now, although with the new environmental and other radical movements their numbers are on the increase. They argue that whether recolonization would bring about material pros- perity is essentially irrelevant to their position. Recolonization is wrong in itself. Why? Because colonization (and recolonization) is destructive of much else that is of value to the subjected peoples. It is destructive of the indigenous ways of life of the colonized peoples and it fosters a homogenized culture everywhere. It destroys the social fabric of the colonized peoples, and this contributes to the society's incapacity to cope with situations of crises, often leading to violence. It imposes foreign institutions on the people, and because these are not indigenously rooted, they are not sustainable in the long run. Indeed, the kind of development that recolonization engenders in the present epoch is destructive of the environment and the spiritual values of the society. The world is the poorer because the homogenization of development is destructive of not only the biogenetic plurality of the world's resources but also the cultural plurality of the world's civilization.

#### Approaching subjectivity through the lens of negation and the abject erases the political nature of identity as mixed rather than particular.

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But first, I want to look briefly at one other, more current, alternative to conceptions of identity based on purity—the very recently developed notion of nomad subjectivity in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This concept is not analogous to assimilationism in being widely disseminated within dominant cultural discourses, but it is influential in many academic, theoretical circles and it gains support from some formulations of the new global world over. Nomad subjectivity announces that fluidity and indeterminateness will break up racial and cultural hierarchies that inflict oppression and subordination. Freed from state-imposed structures of identity by the indeterminate flows of capital, nomad subjectivity deterritorializes toward becoming like “a nomad, an immigrant, and a gypsy.” Within language, as within subjectivity, There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following their lines of escape. . . . Instead, it is now a question of a becoming that includes the maximum of difference as a difference of intensity, the crossing of a barrier. The flow of deterritorialization does not move between points but “has abandoned points, coordinates, and measure, like a drunken boat. . Deterritorializations thus have the effect of deconstructing racial and morphological identity categories along with national, cultural, and ethnic ones, and so the result is not a multiply situated subject but a nomadic subject without the concreteness implied by situation. This sort of view obviously connects more generally to a postmodernist notion of the indeterminate self, a self defined only by its negation of or resistance to categories of identity. And there is a strand of this in academic feminism among theorists who repudiate identity-based politics in the name of antiessentialism. Liberation is associated with the refusal to be characterized, described, or classified, and the only true strategy of resistance can be one of negation, a kind of permanent revolution on the metaphysical front. Unfortunately, nomadic subjectivity works no better than assimilationist doctrine to interpellate mixed identity: the nomad self is bounded to no community and represents an absence of identity rather than a multiply entangled and engaged identity. This is not the situation of mixed-race peoples who have deep (even if problematic) ties to specific communities; to be a free-floating unbound variable is not the same as being multiply categorized and ostracized by specific racial communities. It strikes me that the postmodem nomadic vision fits far better the multinational CEO with fax machine and cellular phone in hand who is bound to, or by, no national agenda, tax structure, cultural boundary, or geographical border. And what this suggests is that a simplistic promotion of fluidity will not suffice.