

4. BOETHIUS ON PREDESTINATION AND FREE WILL

This argument is in fact based on an adaptation of the Aristotelian definition of knowledge: if I *know* something, then the object of my knowledge *necessarily*¹⁵⁰ is the way I know it to be, simply because that's the way knowledge (Greek *epistêmê*, Latin *scientia*, Arabic *'ilm*) is defined – at least in one of its many Aristotelian senses.¹⁵¹

4.2.1. *The distinction between absolute and conditional necessity*¹⁵²

One Aristotelian text that is important in this regard is this one from the *De interpretatione* (19a23-6):

*That what exists is when it is, and what does not exist is not when it is not, necessary.*¹⁵³

For Aristotle, there can be *epistêmê* in this strict sense – the sense, that is, in which such knowledge is always true (*APo* II, 19, 100b18) – only of uni-