



# GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES 2017







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Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
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“

*The lives of millions of people depend on our collective ability to act.  
In our world of plenty, there is no excuse for inaction or indifference.*

(António Guterres, UN Secretary-General)

”

# 1. INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

Currently, the world is faced with an unprecedented call for action at a moment in which four countries have been identified as at risk of famine, and demand for humanitarian and resilience assistance is escalating. Against this background, informing the global and national food security community on the risk of food crises and on the severity of such crises is of fundamental importance. In recent years, stakeholders have made major investments to improve food security analysis and related early warning systems in order to prevent and tackle food crises more efficiently. Although significant improvements have been made over time in the methods and technologies used to improve the quality and timeliness of food security assessments and monitoring systems, a comprehensive global picture of food crises is still often missing. Partial geographical coverage and a lack of comparable data within a standardised system make it difficult to get a full global picture of food crises at any given time.

The European Union, WFP and FAO have joined forces to coordinate the compilation of analyses to increase the impact of

humanitarian and resilience responses through the preparation of the “*Global report on Food Crises*”. The Global Report enhances coordination and decision-making through a neutral analysis that informs program planning and implementation. The key objective and strength of the report is to establish a consultative and consensus-based process to compile food insecurity analysis from throughout the world into a global public product to inform annual planning and resource allocation decisions. Technical, operational and financial partners require evidence-based information to ensure appropriate planning and resources to tackle the consequences of food security crises within an evolving humanitarian financing landscape. The World Humanitarian Summit has prompted a major rethink of the way response financing is delivered in crisis settings, highlighting the need for more long-term development investments to address risk, prevent crises and build resilience.

Since 2013, the European Commission has worked to develop ways to compare and clarify the results of food security analyses across partners and

geographical areas to provide a comprehensive overview of the global food security situation. In 2015, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (EC-JRC) produced an annual report on food insecurity hotspots to inform decisions on food crisis allocations at the global level. In 2016, to increase the inclusiveness and transparency of the report, the European Commission invited FAO and WFP to contribute by providing additional food security data and analysis. Following the successful experience of the 2016 analysis,<sup>1</sup> the three organizations agreed to move forward, involving additional partners in the global assessment of the food crisis situation, with the aim of producing a consensus-based yearly report from early 2017. The initiative was cemented with the launch of the Global Network for Food Insecurity, Risk Reduction and Food Crises Response on 23 May 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey. It was then agreed to undertake this effort under the umbrella of the “Food Security Information Network” (FSIN),<sup>2</sup> an already structured global initiative co-sponsored by FAO, WFP and IFPRI.

<sup>1</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/report-food-crisis-jrc-20160425\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/report-food-crisis-jrc-20160425_en.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> See more at: <http://www.fsincop.net/>

The FSIN represents a commitment to support and strengthen – in both the development and emergency contexts – food and nutrition security information systems for producing reliable and accurate data to guide analysis and decision-making.

The Global Report on Food Crises 2017 is therefore the result of a consultative process established to involve a wide range of stakeholders who bring together credible and globally accepted findings from all major risk analysis and early warning systems. All partners are in agreement with the general magnitude and severity of acute food security suggested by this

report. Population estimates in this report may differ from individual agencies' estimates as they reflect a consensus-based approach.

The report is designed to: i) summarize available data and analysis from global, regional and national food security monitoring systems; ii) add value by bringing together this complex data and information to provide an accurate, comprehensive, transparent assessment of existing food security analysis, iii) identify key data and analytical gaps and iv) drive improved coordination and informed planning and implementation for humanitarian and resilience-building initiatives.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, it aims to instigate and inform better decision-making to

increase resilience for the food security of the world's most vulnerable people and "to ensure that no one is left behind" (High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, 2016).

The report retraces the critical issues that have emerged during 2016. It has a cascading structure, presenting country-by-country analysis to build a global picture of the prevalence and magnitude of food insecurity. The following section provides an explanation of the methodology together with the presentation of relevant criteria for the selection of countries analysed and the sources of data and information used, including caveats and limitations.

## 1.2 Methodology

Food security analyses and data on nutrition status at population level were compiled on countries that are vulnerable to food crises and have large food-insecure populations, through a joint review of existing information from globally accepted sources. The analysis covers the period January to December 2016; it is complemented by trends over the last few years where relevant, as well as forecasts of how food security is expected to evolve in 2017.

### 1.2.1 Information sources

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of standardized tools intended to provide a 'common currency' for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. This evidence-based approach uses international standards that allow situations to be compared across countries and over time. It is based on consensus-building processes to provide decision-makers with a rigorous analysis of food insecurity, along with objectives for response in both emergency and development

contexts.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, IPC analyses were used where available, along with the *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) in West Africa, which is a harmonized framework for the analysis and identification of areas at risk and vulnerable groups, which uses similar standards as IPC.<sup>5</sup>

IPC and CH analyses represent the main sources of information for this report for the countries where these protocols are used. A varied range of complementary sources – such as FAO GIEWS country briefs, FEWS NET products, Food Security Cluster (FSC) documents, EC-JRC

<sup>3</sup> Annex 1 details differences and complementarities between the *Global Report on Food Crises* and the *State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World*.

<sup>4</sup> For more information, visit [www.ipcinfo.org](http://www.ipcinfo.org)

<sup>5</sup> More information at: <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/afrique-de-louest/fr/>  
[http://www.agrhymet.ne/PDF/Manuel%20CH\\_version%20finale.pdf](http://www.agrhymet.ne/PDF/Manuel%20CH_version%20finale.pdf)

reports, SADC Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis and WFP VAM analysis products – were also used to give a comprehensive picture of countries affected by severe food crises. Nutrition information was extracted from available sources such as nutrition sections in OCHA humanitarian reports. The outlook and projected trends for 2017 are based on FEWS NET estimates or IPC/CH projections.

Because (i) this report aims to

inform decision-making including the prioritization of resource allocation, and (ii) not all IPC analyses are conducted during the same season (post-harvest vs. lean season), the overview table contains the 'peak' number, i.e. the highest number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3+ among all the IPC/CH analyses conducted during the year (current and projected). Where no IPC/CH estimates were available, FEWS NET IPC-compatible products and/or

products and estimations derived from the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) scale were used. The numbers of people in each IPC/CH Phase were estimated taking into account the phase descriptions and thresholds defined in the IPC/CH reference tables. The final estimates provided in this report try to make best use of all the information available at the time of writing, i.e. January 2017.

**Table 1: IPC/CH Phase descriptions (See full IPC reference table in Annex 2)**

| Phase Name                        | Phase description   | Priority response objective  |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Phase 1<br>Minimal                | Household (HH) group is able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.   | Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.                                 |
| Phase 2<br>Stressed               | Even with humanitarian assistance, HH group has minimally adequate food consumption but is able to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.  | Disaster risk reduction, protection of livelihoods.                              |
| Phase 3<br>Crisis                 | Even with humanitarian assistance, HH group has food consumption gaps with high or higher than usual acute malnutrition; OR HH group is marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.   | Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and reduce acute malnutrition. |
| Phase 4<br>Emergency              | Even with humanitarian assistance, HH group has large food consumption gaps resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR HH group has extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term. | Save lives and livelihoods.  |
| Phase 5<br>Famine/<br>Catastrophe | Even with humanitarian assistance, HH group has an extreme lack of food and/or basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death and destitution are evident.   | Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods                       |

**Source:** adapted from IPC Manual version 2.0. [http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC-Manual-2-Interactive.pdf](http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC-Manual-2-Interactive.pdf)

## 1.2.2 Geographical coverage

The FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)<sup>6</sup> classifies and regularly updates the list of countries requiring external assistance for food, dividing them into three categories according to the predominant driver: countries with (1) an exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production and supplies; (2) widespread lack of access to food; and (3) severe localized food insecurity.


Countries included in the GIEWS list in 2016 were automatically selected for this report, representing the countries currently facing acute food crises. We also included countries that have experienced at least one food crisis in the past three years or that have had at least three food crises in the past 10 years.<sup>7</sup> This

was in order to capture the persistence and protracted aspect of those crises. An additional set of countries were reviewed based on reports and publically available information on food insecurity, leading us to include countries from the Dry Corridor in Central America,<sup>8</sup> additional countries affected by El Niño in southern Africa and Libya as a result of the ongoing conflict. The final list of countries selected was also evaluated against the Index for Risk (INFORM), to cross check consistency between the major food crises selected according to this report's criteria and the very high risk category of the INFORM risk index. All countries ranked in the INFORM very high risk category are covered in Chapter 3 except for Myanmar, Mali and Côte

d'Ivoire.

This inclusive approach sought to be as comprehensive as possible and to avoid omitting new crises or countries that are not on the GIEWS watch list. Through this process, 65 countries (Map 1) were selected for overview analysis, which aimed to estimate food-insecure populations. Insufficient evidence and data prevented the team from producing acceptable estimates for the following selected countries: Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu and Venezuela; therefore, food security estimates are produced for a total of 48 countries (See table 2).

**Map 1: Countries covered in Chapter 2 – Global overview**



6 For more information, visit <http://www.fao.org/giews/en/>

7 Based on GIEWS lists for the past ten years.

8 El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

### 1.2.3 Detailed analysis per crisis and/or country

Declaration of an IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Response ('Level 3/L3' Response) activates a UN system-wide mobilization of capacity (leadership, staffing and funding) to enable the accelerated and scaled-up delivery of assistance and protection to people in need. An L3 Response is activated when a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes and when, following an analysis of five criteria – scale, complexity, urgency, capacity and reputational risk – it is clear that the capacity to lead, coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and

protection on the ground does not match the scale, complexity and urgency of the crisis.

As a first criterion, all countries/crises included on the IASC L3 emergencies list in 2016 were selected for more detailed analysis, i.e. Syria, South Sudan, Iraq and Yemen.<sup>9</sup>

Then, crises and/or countries fulfilling one of the following criteria were added:


- Countries with any segment of the population in IPC/CH Phase 4 *Emergency* or Phase 5 *Catastrophe*;
- Countries with at least 20 percent of the population in IPC/CH Phase 3 *Crisis*;

- Countries with at least 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 *Crisis*.

Case by case considerations were made based on a consultative process, adding countries affected by the Syria crisis, Cameroon affected by the Lake Chad basin crisis, and Ethiopia because of the lingering impact of El Niño-induced drought.

A detailed food security analysis is presented for those crises and/or countries facing acute food insecurity conditions selected according to IPC/CH Phase 3 *Crisis*, Phase 4 *Emergency*, or Phase 5 *Catastrophe/Famine*, as shown in the map below.

**Map 2: Countries covered in Chapter 3 – Major food crises in 2016**



<sup>9</sup> Syria: L3 activated on 15 January 2013; L3 extended for 6 months on 23 August 2016 (until February 2017). South Sudan: L3 activated on 11 February 2014; L3 deactivated on 5 May 2016. Iraq: L3 activated on 12 August 2014; L3 extended for 6 months on 23 August 2016 (until February 2017). Yemen: L3 activated on 1 July 2015 (for 6 months); L3 extended for 6 months on 23 August 2016 (until February 2017).

## 1.2.4 Countries to watch in 2017

Criteria used to establish a list of countries whose food security and nutrition situation should be watched closely in 2017 include the following:

- Countries that experienced major food crises in 2016;
- Countries that did not face major food crises in 2016 but whose IPC/CH analyses have predicted Phase 4 in 2017;
- Countries that faced more localized or less acute food insecurity in 2016 and/or are exposed to a significant risk in 2017 that may lead to a deterioration of food security and nutrition;
- Countries that were not covered by the report due to a lack of recent validated data; and
- Countries for which there were huge discrepancies

among the estimates of food-insecure populations produced by different organizations.

The main early warning sources used for identifying significant risks were FAO/GIEWS, FEWS NET, IASC Early Warning, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Crisis Group and INFORM.

## 1.2.5 Caveats

It is worth noting the following caveats:

- All partners are in agreement with the general magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity suggested by this report. Population estimates in this report may differ from individual agency estimates as they reflect a consensus-based approach;
- In cases where IPC or IPC compatible estimates do not

exist, other sources (CARI, Humanitarian Needs Overview and government released figures) were used, thus not ensuring full comparability between estimates;

- Inconsistency in the geographical coverage of IPC/CH analysis constituted a technical limit to present trends for some countries;
- Inclusion of nutrition information is embedded in the IPC acute analysis. Some data on nutrition status at population level (e.g. acute malnutrition prevalence estimates) is included as a stand-alone in the nutrition snapshots. However, overall analysis of driving factors and the link between food insecurity and nutrition outcomes is not made in any detail.

## 1.3 Structure of the report

The report is organised in four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background of this report and provides details on the methodology and criteria used to select the countries included, as well as any limitations. Chapter 2

gives a global overview of food crises and estimates of food-insecure populations. Chapter 3 is dedicated to more detailed analysis of 2016 major food crises, examining food insecurity and nutrition, as well as key drivers, outlook and trends for affected

countries. Chapter 4 concludes the report by providing an overview of countries with a concerning food security situation that should be prioritized for monitoring and the projection of food insecurity for the first semester of 2017.

“

*Leaving no one behind is a moral and political duty, and requires political will. Working in partnership is the best guarantee for addressing this common challenge in a globalised world.*

(Ms Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission)

”



## 2. GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES

# Outlook - 2017

# Main drivers of food insecurity - 2016

## ARMED CONFLICT

The acute and wide-reaching effects of conflicts left significant numbers of people food insecure



### Food insecure people IPC/CH Phase 3+

YEMEN  
AFGHANISTAN  
NORTH NIGERIA  
INCLUDING NORTHEAST NIGERIA  
SYRIA  
SOUTH SUDAN



## DISPLACEMENT

Conflict caused widespread displacement (internal/external)

SYRIA  
4.8M

YEMEN  
3.2M

IRAQ  
3.1M

SOUTH SUDAN  
3M

NORTHEAST NIGERIA  
2.1M

SOMALIA  
2.1M


## NATURAL DISASTERS

El Niño-driven drought conditions and other climatic shocks have damaged agricultural livelihoods undermining food security



### Food insecure people IPC/CH Phase 3+

ETHIOPIA  
MALAWI  
ZIMBABWE  
HAITI  
MOZAMBIQUE



Category 4  
Hurricane Matthew hit drought-affected Haiti in late 2016.

## FOOD INSECURITY OUTLOOK

Countries at risk of famine



### Food insecure people IPC/CH Phase 3+

YEMEN\*  
NORTH NIGERIA  
INCLUDING NORTHEAST NIGERIA  
SOUTH SUDAN\*  
SOMALIA\*



\*Figures confirmed by IPC analysis (January/February 2017)

# CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES

## 2.1 Highlights

Globally, 108 million people in 2016 were reported to be facing *Crisis* level food insecurity or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). This represents a 35 percent increase compared to 2015 when the figure was almost 80 million. The acute and wide-reaching effects of conflicts left significant numbers of food insecure people in need of urgent assistance in Yemen (17 million); Syria (7.0 million); South Sudan (4.9 million); Somalia (2.9 million); northeast Nigeria (4.7 million), Burundi (2.3 million) and Central African Republic (2 million). The immediate outlook points to worsening conditions in some locations, with risk of famine in isolated areas of northeast Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. Conflict causes widespread displacement (internal and external), protracting food insecurity and placing a burden on host communities. The populations



worst affected are those of Syria (6.3 million Internally Displaced People) and Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries (4.8 million); Iraq (3.1 million); Yemen (3.2 million), South Sudan (3 million), Somalia (2.1 million) and northeast Nigeria (2.1 million). In some countries, food security has been undermined by El Niño, which largely manifested in drought conditions that damaged agricultural livelihoods. The countries most affected are in eastern and southern Africa and include Somalia, Ethiopia (9.7 million), Madagascar (0.8 million in the Grand Sud), Malawi (6.7 million), Mozambique (1.9 million) and Zimbabwe (4.1 million). Projections for early 2017 indicate an increase in the severity of food insecurity in these regions. This is particularly the case in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

Record staple food prices, notably


in some southern African countries, Nigeria and South Sudan, also severely constrained food access for vulnerable populations, acutely aggravating food insecurity and the risk of malnutrition.

El Niño-induced weather patterns and conflicts were the main drivers of intensified food insecurity in 2016. The persistent nature of these drivers, and their associated impacts, has weakened households' capacity to cope, undermining their resilience and ability to recover from future shocks. The food crises in 2016 were both widespread and severe, affecting entire national populations, such as in Yemen, or causing acute damage in localized areas, such as in northeast Nigeria. These shocks were not bound by national borders and the spillover effects had a significant impact on neighbouring countries.

# POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASE 3 CRISIS AND ABOVE, January 2017



## FOOD SECURITY IPC/CH CRISIS PHASE 3 AND ABOVE<sup>10</sup>



### 2.1.1 Conflict and food insecurity

The negative impact of conflict on food security, nutrition and agriculture is an uncontested and globally recognized phenomenon. Conflict is a leading cause of food insecurity and hunger in several parts of the world, undermining food security in multiple ways and creating access problems for governments and humanitarian agencies who often struggle to reach those most in need. The causes of food insecurity in

conflicts are diverse but often coupled to disruptions in food production and food systems, plundering of crops and livestock, loss of assets and incomes or population displacement which all directly or indirectly impact availability, access and utilisation of food. In general, in conflict-affected areas, the lack of adequate access to food, combined with poor access to medical facilities – in some cases even a lack of access to clean water, has an immediate detrimental effect on

malnutrition, especially for vulnerable groups such as children under five, and pregnant or breastfeeding women.

The analysis presented in Chapter 3 covers eleven countries where conflict or widespread insecurity have acutely impacted food security: seven countries in Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan); and four in Asia and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen).

<sup>10</sup> The proportion refers to population analyzed and not necessarily the total population of a country.

The analysis also covers the spillover impact of these conflicts on neighbouring countries and the regional implications reflected on the number of people in acute food insecurity (e.g. the refugees or affected population in other countries). The largest and most widely-reaching conflicts resulted in the highest number of food-insecure people in need of urgent assistance in the following countries: Syria (7.0 million), Yemen (14.1 million), South Sudan (4.9 million), and the three states of northeast Nigeria (4.7 million). One of the primary effects of conflict is displacement (both internal and external), which can protract the food insecurity of those displaced and impact host communities. In the case of Syria, an estimated 6.3 million are internally displaced and, at the time of writing, a further 4.8 million people have fled the country seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Displacement can cause market failures, loss of assets, erosion of capital and disruption of economic activities, and it puts people in urgent need of assistance. Internal displacement is also a major cause of food insecurity, impoverishing people who are forced to move and putting pressure on the resources of host communities. In the case of South Sudan, an estimated 1.7 million people have been internally displaced by the conflict; in Yemen, the figure is 3 million while in Somalia more

than 2 million. In countries that host large refugee populations, such as Lebanon where 1 million refugees reside, this has put an enormous strain on existing resources.

In countries affected by conflict, the lack of access to food coupled with unsustainable coping mechanisms causes a rapid deterioration in the livelihoods of rural people. In many cases, the detrimental effect of the conflict on agriculture and other basic means of production slows economic progress and affects market development. In Afghanistan, conflict and insecurity have contributed to acute food insecurity, limiting market functionality, weakening the purchasing power of vulnerable households and seriously depleting livelihood assets. Meanwhile, in South Sudan, renewed and intensified fighting has disrupted agricultural activities and access to markets. The country has seen a general economic downturn characterized by a sharp devaluation of the local currency and very high food prices, which has put significant pressure on household access to food. In Somalia, population displacement, trade disruption due to insecurity and a scarcity of employment opportunities and income combined with high food prices and drought conditions have severely undermined food security. Food security in Somalia is deteriorating: 5 million people

(over 40 percent of the population) are food insecure (1.4 million are in IPC/CH Crisis Phase 3 or above) due in part to severe drought conditions in crop-producing areas during the 2015/16 agricultural season. The latest figures for Somalia point to 2.9 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 and higher between February and July 2017. In northeast Nigeria, rising food prices have aggravated the impact of the conflict and resulted in acute food insecurity. For a third consecutive year, planting failed in many farming areas and large numbers of people are trapped in inaccessible areas without food, water or health services. The Boko Haram insurgency also continues to affect neighbouring countries, namely Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In Yemen, as the conflict persists, nutrition is continuing to deteriorate. According to Yemen 2017<sup>11</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview, about 3.3 million children and pregnant or breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, including 462,000 children under five suffering from severe acute malnutrition.

## **2.1.2 Natural disasters and food insecurity**

Natural disasters and extreme weather events were also a primary driver of food insecurity in 2016, particularly for countries with inadequate capacities to respond to shocks and with populations characterized by low resilience.

The analysis covers ten countries that were affected by natural hazards, including El Niño: three countries in eastern Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti); six in southern Africa (Malawi, Madagascar, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland); and one in the Caribbean (Haiti). In Ethiopia, the impact of El Niño-related drought on pastoralist livelihoods and the wider agriculture sector left an estimated 9.7 million people in need of urgent food assistance. In the Horn of Africa, drought in late 2016 could trigger rising food insecurity with impacts on nutrition and livelihoods. In southern Africa, the humanitarian consequences of El Niño-induced drought were severe in Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The drought also placed severe pressure on food security in Angola, Namibia, Botswana and Zambia. The current conditions are the result of the cumulative impact of two consecutive years of drought, including El Niño-induced dry conditions in 2015/16 that resulted in below-average cereal production and livestock losses. Areas and countries of particular concern in southern Africa are southern Madagascar, where localized crop losses and reduced access to food are at critical levels (affecting 840,000 people, 52 percent of the population of the three drought-affected regions); Malawi, which registered the highest caseload of food-insecure people in the sub-region (estimated at 6.7 million people);

and Zimbabwe, with an estimated food-insecure population of 4.1 million people. While El Niño-induced drought was the main driver of stressed food security in southern Africa in 2016, the region is afflicted by high rates of poverty and structural vulnerabilities. In the Caribbean and Central America, during 2015 and early 2016, a drought exacerbated by El Niño hit Haiti and localized areas of the Dry Corridor in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. Haiti also suffered the category 4 Hurricane Matthew in late 2016, which directly affected 2.1 million Haitians (more than 20 percent of the population) and left 1.4 million people in need of food assistance.

### **2.1.3 Prices and food insecurity**

High food prices, while a potential opportunity for farmers who are net producers, have also acutely impinged on food security in several countries, severely constraining food access for vulnerable households. Prices largely declined on the international cereal market in 2016, reflecting downward pressure from ample global inventories and an increase in world cereal production in 2016. The lower international prices shrank the estimated world food import bill compared to 2015; much of the decline sprang from reduced expenditure on cereals and livestock products. However, despite significantly lower import costs at the global level, forecast reductions were much smaller for

food import bills in Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDC), particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. For some of these countries, currency depreciations and increased import needs in response to production shortfalls offset the positive gains of lower international prices. This was particularly the case for maize – a staple food across most of southern Africa; import costs are estimated to have risen for maize-importing LIFDCs in 2016. Despite generally lower international prices, several countries experienced rapid and acute food price increases, mostly triggered by sharp drops in national cereal outputs related to conflicts and unfavourable weather patterns, and in some cases the upward trends were exacerbated by currency depreciations. In Africa, record-high prices were recorded in Nigeria and South Sudan, driven by conflict and weak currencies, and in several southern African countries, caused by El Niño-induced production shortfalls. A slowdown in economic growth, which affected some countries in 2016, also had a detrimental impact on food security, limiting income opportunities and squeezing national financial capacities to respond effectively to shocks.

## **2.1.4 Food security outlook**

The immediate outlook points to a further deterioration of food security in certain hotspots, particularly in areas that have been severely affected by droughts and conflict. In southern Africa, the poor 2016 harvests have greatly reduced household food supplies. This is expected to result in a harsher lean season in early 2017. Further ahead, the early 2017 production outlook points to an expected recovery based on favourable rainfall forecasts, with the main harvest expected to start in April. However, there are forecasts of worsening food security, particularly for Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The current drought in East Africa is expected to increase food insecurity in early 2017, with major concerns in southern Somalia, south and south eastern Ethiopia and south eastern and coastal parts of Kenya.

According to the latest figures, the number of food-insecure people in Kenya increased from 1.3 million to 2.2 million in February 2017, leading the government to declare the current drought a national disaster.

Conflict and civil insecurity remain the primary drivers of acute food insecurity in many countries, severely constraining food access and eroding the resilience of households and governments. Some areas, especially those with large numbers of IDPs, will be particularly hard hit and there is a risk of famine in places such as northeast Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen and Somalia, particularly if humanitarian assistance cannot reach the population in need. The latest IPC analysis in South Sudan reported confirmed famine, or high risk of famine, in conflict-affected areas of Unity State between February and July. In 2017, widespread food insecurity is likely

to persist in Iraq and Syria (including among refugees in neighbouring countries). Other countries are currently facing more localized or less acute food insecurity but are at risk of worsening food security and nutrition in 2017. These are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Early warning sources also point to Libya, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Ukraine, as countries that could be falling under this category. Finally, the worsening economic situation in Venezuela might also cause severe shortages of consumer goods, including food and medicine. Hence, food security here will need to be monitored.

## 2.2 Estimation of food-insecure population by country

Table 2: Estimation of food-insecure population by country in 2016

| Country                  | Total population analysed<br>Number (millions) | % of population analysed on total country population* | Population in Crisis, Emergency and Famine (IPC/CH Phase 3 and higher) |                                | Population in Stressed situation (IPC / CH Phase 2) |                                | Total food-insecure population (IPC/CH Phase 2 and higher) |                                |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
|                          |  |   | Number (millions)  | % of total population analysed | Number (millions)                                   | % of total population analysed | Number (million)   | % of total population analysed |
| Afghanistan              | 26.4   | 79%   | 8.5  | 32%                            | 4.8   | 18%                            | 13.3   | 50%                            |
| <i>Angola</i>            | 12.8   | 54%   | 0.1  | 1%                             | 0.7   | 5%                             | 0.8  | 6%                             |
| <i>Bangladesh</i>        | 3.7  | 2%  | 0.2  | 5%                             |   |                                | 0.2  | 5%                             |
| Burkina Faso             | 18.9   | 100%  | 0.2  | 1%                             | 1.9   | 10%                            | 2.1  | 11%                            |
| Burundi                  | 9.4  | 81%   | 2.3  | 25%                            | 4.1   | 44%                            | 6.4  | 69%                            |
| <i>Cameroon</i>          | 24.4   | 100%  | 0.3  | 1%                             | 2.2   | 9%                             | 2.5  | 10%                            |
| Central African Republic | 4.2  | 84%   | 2.0  | 48%                            |   |                                | 2.0  | 48%                            |
| Chad                     | 12.9   | 89%   | 1.0  | 8%                             | 2.7   | 21%                            | 3.7  | 29%                            |
| Côte d'Ivoire            | 19.4   | 89%   | 0.8  | 4%                             | 0.9   | 5%                             | 1.7  | 9%                             |
| DRC                      | 71.7   | 90%   | 5.9  | 8%                             | 3.0   | 4%                             | 8.9  | 12%                            |
| <i>DPRK</i>              | 25.3   | 100%  | 4.4  | 17%                            | 5.6   | 22%                            | 10.0   | 39%                            |
| Djibouti                 | 0.9  | 100%  | 0.2  | 22%                            | 0.0   | 5%                             | 0.2  | 18%                            |
| <i>Ethiopia</i>          | 102.9  | 100%  | 9.7  | 9%                             | 8.0   | 8%                             | 17.7   | 17%                            |
| Gambia                   | 1.9  | 94%   | 0.1  | 5%                             | 0.4   | 20%                            | 0.5  | 26%                            |
| <i>Guatemala</i>         | 16.3   | 98%   | 1.5  | 9%                             | 0.3   | 2%                             | 1.8  | 11%                            |
| Guinea                   | 8.9  | 70%   | 0.1  | 1%                             | 1.4   | 16%                            | 1.5  | 17%                            |
| Guinea-Bissau            | 1.1  | 62%   | 0.1  | 9%                             | 0.3   | 22%                            | 0.4  | 31%                            |
| Haiti                    | 10.3   | 95%   | 1.5  | 15%                            | 0.6   | 6%                             | 2.1  | 20%                            |
| Honduras                 | 4.5  | 52%   | 0.1  | 2%                             | 0.7   | 16%                            | 0.8  | 18%                            |
| <i>Iraq</i>              | 36.9   | 98%   | 1.5  | 4%                             | 0.9   | 2%                             | 2.4  | 7%                             |
| Kenya                    | 11.4   | 24%   | 1.3  | 11%                            |   |                                | 1.3  | 11%                            |
| Lesotho                  | 1.4  | 65%   | 0.5  | 35%                            | 0.5   | 33%                            | 1.0  | 69%                            |
| Liberia                  | 4.2  | 91%   | 0.1  | 2%                             | 0.8   | 18%                            | 0.9  | 21%                            |
| <i>Libya</i>             | 6.2  | 97%   | 0.4  | 6%                             | 1.0   | 16%                            | 1.4  | 22%                            |
| Southern Madagascar      | 1.6  | 7%  | 0.8  | 49%                            | 0.5   | 32%                            | 1.3  | 81%                            |
| <i>Malawi</i>            | 14.5   | 82%   | 6.7  | 46%                            |   |                                | 6.7  | 46%                            |
| Mali                     | 18.3   | 100%  | 0.2  | 1%                             | 1.9   | 10%                            | 2.1  | 11%                            |
| Mauritania               | 3.7  | 89%   | 0.1  | 3%                             | 0.5   | 13%                            | 0.6  | 16%                            |
| <i>Mozambique</i>        | 12.5   | 43%   | 1.9  | 15%                            | 4.2   | 33%                            | 6.1  | 49%                            |
| <i>Myanmar</i>           | 35.0   | 64%   | 0.7  | 2%                             | 1.8   | 5%                             | 2.5  | 7%                             |
| <i>Namibia</i>           | 1.3  | 52%   | 0.6  | 47%                            | 0.1   | 10%                            | 0.7  | 57%                            |
| Nepal                    | 28.9   | 100%  | 0.4  | 1%                             |   |                                | 0.4  | 1%                             |
| <i>Nicaragua</i>         | 5.9  | 93%   | 0.1  | 2%                             |   |                                | 0.1  | 2%                             |
| Niger                    | 18.0   | 87%   | 0.3  | 2%                             | 3.5   | 19%                            | 3.8  | 21%                            |
| North Nigeria**          | 92.0   | 49%   | 8.1  | 9%                             | 18.6  | 20%                            | 26.7   | 29%                            |
| Senegal                  | 11.9   | 77%   | 0.3  | 3%                             | 2.1   | 18%                            | 2.4  | 21%                            |
| Sierra Leone             | 6.4  | 99%   | 0.2  | 3%                             | 0.8   | 12%                            | 1.0  | 16%                            |
| <i>Somalia***</i>        | 13.0   | 100%  | 2.9  | 22%                            | 3.3   | 25%                            | 6.2  | 48%                            |
| <i>South Africa</i>      | 55.0   | 102%  | 3.9  | 7%                             | 10.4  | 19%                            | 14.3   | 26%                            |
| South Sudan***           | 12.0   | 94%   | 4.9  | 41%                            | 4.1   | 34%                            | 9.0  | 75%                            |
| Sudan                    | 36.8   | 89%   | 4.4  | 12%                            | 12.1  | 33%                            | 16.5   | 45%                            |
| <i>Swaziland</i>         | 1.0  | 77%   | 0.4  | 40%                            | 0.3   | 29%                            | 0.7  | 69%                            |
| <i>Syria</i>             | 18.6   | 100%  | 7.0  | 38%                            | 2.4   | 13%                            | 9.4  | 51%                            |
| Tanzania                 | 35.8   | 66%   | 0.4  | 1%                             |   |                                | 0.4  | 1%                             |
| Uganda                   | 39.0   | 94%   | 0.4  | 1%                             | 6.0   | 15%                            | 6.4  | 16%                            |
| Yemen                    | 28.2   | 100%  | 14.1   | 50%                            | 8.2   | 29%                            | 22.3   | 79%                            |
| <i>Zambia</i>            | 9.2  | 57%   |  |                                | 1.0   | 11%                            | 1.0  | 11%                            |
| <i>Zimbabwe</i>          | 10.2   | 64%   | 4.1  | 40%                            | 1.4   | 14%                            | 5.5  | 54%                            |

For countries in *italic*, the sources of food-insecure people estimates are from government, Food Security Cluster (HNO or HRP) or WFP-CARI.

\* For most countries, the population analysed is significantly below the total population because of the focus of IPC/CH analysis on rural population.

\*\* North Nigeria covers 16 states, including the three north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe which account for 4.7million in IPC/CH Phase 3 and higher.

\*\*\* Figures for South Sudan and Somalia refer to the IPC analyses conducted in January and February 2017 using data from 2016.

“

**We can prevent people dying from famine but if we do not scale up our efforts to save, protect and invest in rural livelihoods tens of millions will remain severely food insecure.** (José Graziano da Silva, FAO Director-General)


”



### 3. MAJOR FOOD CRISES IN 2016

### 3.1 Horn of Africa Drought

## DJIBOUTI

| <b>Food-insecure people<br/>in need of urgent action</b>   | <b>Food insecurity trends</b>  | <b>Food insecurity outlook</b>   |
|--|--|--|
| <b>2016</b>  | <b>2015 - 2016</b>   | <b>2017</b>  |
|  <b>0.2M<br/>PEOPLE</b><br>IPC 3+  |   | <br>Food consumption is expected to improve in the first quarter of 2017, thanks to near-average coastal rains in October/November 2016.  |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |  |  |
|  <b>HIGH<br/>POVERTY<br/>RATES</b>   |  <b>PROLONGED<br/>DROUGHT<br/>EXACERBATED<br/>BY EL NIÑO</b> |  <b>POPULATION<br/>DISPLACEMENT</b>  |
| <br><b>Dependence on external markets</b>   | <br><b>Crop production deficits</b>                         | <br><b>Large influx of people from Somalia and Ethiopia due to extreme weather, and from South Sudan due to conflict and insecurity</b> |
| <br><b>Food price volatility</b>  | <br><b>Loss of livestock</b>                                |  <b>REFUGEES</b><br><b>22,000</b>   |


**Background:** Communities in rural Djibouti and in Djibouti town have to contend with poverty and climatic shocks which hamper their economic and physical access to nutritious food. Food security has been undermined by recurrent droughts in recent years, exacerbated by El Niño in 2015. The regional migrant and refugee crisis has also led to flows of people from Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia arriving in Djibouti.

**Total population:** 900,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$3,368.48 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
**Poverty rate:** 42.2% (UNDP)  
**HDI rank:** 168 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Population dependent on pastoralism or agro-pastoralism:** nearly 80% (OCHA, 2012)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### Djibouti

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2015



### Djibouti

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2016



The latest IPC analysis conducted in Djibouti for October 2016 reported 196,910 people (46 percent of the total rural population) in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* conditions and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Although there was a 13 percent drop in the number of people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance between October 2015 (227,500 people) and October 2016 (197,000 people), some remote areas with extremely low demographic density in northern Obock and northern Dikhil shifted from *Crisis* to *Emergency* conditions. Two regions (Ali Sabieh and Tadjourah) were classified in *Crisis* and the remaining region (Arta) was classified under IPC Phase 1 *Minimum*.

Between the end of 2015 and mid-2016 all regions experienced some livelihood deterioration, mainly those most vulnerable to shocks in the agro-pastoral areas of the north-west and south-east. At the end of 2016, the situation stabilized thanks to favourable Karan rains.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

In October 2016, 7.5 percent of children aged 6-59 months were found to be acutely malnourished; 0.7 percent were severely malnourished.<sup>12</sup> Global acute malnutrition (GAM) has fallen by 9.5 percent since October 2015 but it increased by 4.3 percent through the lean season (May – October 2016). The biggest increase since May was in Obock and Dikhil where GAM rates are above 11 percent.<sup>13</sup>

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

High poverty rates, external market dependence and the impact of prolonged drought on agriculture are the main causes of poor and extremely poor household food availability and food access, thereby contributing to acute food insecurity across the country. Despite a marked improvement in livelihoods, food security indicators reflect an emergency situation in the regions of Dikhil and Obock. In pastoral Obock, over 70 percent of the population was found to have extremely inadequate household food consumption: fewer than 10 percent had an acceptable diet. An increase in the use of negative coping strategies also highlights how fragile livelihoods and productive systems are after years of drought and below-average rainfall, particularly in Dikhil and Obock. In the agro-pastoral livelihood zones of Dikhil, the loss of livestock and main sources of income (coal sales, external assistance, etc.) has curtailed the purchasing power of poor households. The late onset of the July–September *Karan/Karma* inland rainy season and overall below-average rains harmed livestock production and reduced the demand for unskilled daily labour related to livestock keeping. The share of household expenditure on food – a proxy measure of household poverty – rose by 9 percent from 66 percent to 75 percent between October 2015 and October 2016, with peaks in Tadjourah (82 percent) and Dikhil (80 percent). Climatic shocks continue to have an impact on purchasing power, with the vast majority of the population relying on markets for their food supply. In Dikhil and Obock, where household food consumption is worst, all food prices rose in 2016.

While agriculture accounts for less than 5 percent of GDP<sup>14</sup> and provides only 10 percent of the available food in the country, pastoralism and small-scale farming remain fundamental to the livelihoods of the rural population. Djibouti has a chronic food deficit and is dependent on imports to meet 90 percent of its food needs. As such, it is highly sensitive to external shocks such as spikes in food and fuel prices and natural disasters such as floods and droughts. Moreover, due to conflicts in neighbouring countries, Djibouti hosts 22,640 refugees and asylum seekers,<sup>15</sup> mainly from Yemen and Somalia, and they are highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. The food security of refugees in the camps of Ali Addeh and HolHolis is slightly better than that of the local communities, thanks to more consistent humanitarian food supply and the limited exposure of refugees to the impact of the

## OUTLOOK

Food consumption is expected to improve during the first part of 2017 thanks to near-average *Heys-Dada* (Oct–Feb) coastal rains, which have improved pasture conditions and food access. The majority of poor households are therefore expected to be in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity through May 2017. However, the refugee population and many poor households in pastoralist areas of Ali Sabieh, Obock and Tadjourah are likely to remain in *Crisis* conditions.

<sup>12</sup> According to mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) measurement.

<sup>13</sup> Food Security Monitoring System, Djibouti (October 2016, October 2015, May 2016).

<sup>14</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit (2016), Country Report: Djibouti, 20 October 2016.

<sup>15</sup> UNHCR, 30 April 2016. See <https://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Country%5B%5D=57>

# ETHIOPIA

| <b>Food-insecure people<br/>in need of urgent action</b>   | <b>Food insecurity trends</b>  | <b>Food insecurity outlook</b>   |
|--|--|--|
| <b>2016</b>  | <b>2015 - 2016</b>   | <b>2017</b>  |
|  <b>9.7M<br/>PEOPLE</b>                      |                                       |  <p>Food insecurity is expected to rise sharply in early 2017 in southern and south-eastern pastoral areas.</p>                           |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |  |  |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>             |  <b>HIGH FOOD PRICES</b>              |  <b>POPULATION DISPLACEMENT</b>  |
|  <p><b>Loss of crop and livestock</b></p> |  <p><b>Lack of employment</b></p>   |  <p><b>Large influx of people from Somalia and Kenya due to extreme weather and from South Sudan due to conflict and insecurity</b></p> |
|  <p><b>Loss of livelihoods</b></p>        |  <p><b>REFUGEES</b><br/>763,433</p> |  <p><b>IDPs</b><br/>718,154</p>   |


**Background:** For a population and economy that rely heavily on agriculture, the impacts of El Niño in 2015 were devastating for Ethiopia. The country experienced one of the most severe droughts in half a century. Rainfall was up to 50 percent below average, severely impacting the lives and livelihoods of farmers and herders.

Total population: 101,853,000  
(UNdata, proj. 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$1916.1  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 29.6% (UNDP)  
HDI rank: 174 (UNDP, 2015)  
Population dependent on agriculture: over 85% (UNDP, 2015)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### Ethiopia

Acute food insecurity situation, June 2016



### Ethiopia

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2016



In June, a government-led multi-agency *belg* assessment reported the number of food insecure at 9.7 million people – about 13 percent of the rural population for the period from August to December 2016. In December 2016, the total number of food insecure people has decreased to 5.6 million. This lower estimate was mainly based on projections of improved food availability and access following the positive impact of average to above-average *Kiremt* rains (July–September) on the *Meher* harvests (October–December). However, the October to December rains failed, resulting in a prolonged dry spell that has affected south and south-eastern areas. Consequently, poor rainfall, small planted areas and poor livestock health put people in southern and south-eastern pastoral areas at risk of severe food insecurity in 2017. In particular, those with livestock-based livelihoods in part of Somali, Oromia and SNNP are expected to be in need of assistance and to be a major priority for humanitarian actors in 2017.

Mixed-to-poor 2016 *belg* (spring) rains continued the cycle of hunger and malnutrition for the worst-affected rural communities. In spring 2016, malnutrition rates were staggering, with 2.7 million children under five acutely malnourished, and 0.4 million severely malnourished. A quarter of Ethiopia's *woredas* were officially classified as facing a nutrition crisis. According to analysis by the Ethiopian Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit, admissions to therapeutic feeding programmes across Ethiopia reached a peak at the start of the year, with 30 percent more admissions than the five-year average. However, admission rates then slowed: between August and September, 20 percent fewer children were admitted to the programmes compared to the previous months, and admissions were more than 30 percent lower than the five-year average.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

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The newly harvested *Meher* crops from October through January and humanitarian assistance have improved physical and economic food access, thereby improving child nutrition in the traditionally crop-dependent areas of the country.

A recent expansion of health facilities and health extension workers has increased outreach capacity to treat severe acute malnutrition. This will help address suboptimal child feeding practices and poor water, sanitation and hygiene, as well as poor public healthcare. However, nutrition continues to be of concern in several areas.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The key drivers of food insecurity in Ethiopia include drought, volatile and record-high prices, and localized insecurity. The 2015/16 El Niño-induced drought hit the central and north-eastern highlands and pastoral areas in the east and northeast, while below-average *Deyr* (Oct–Dec) rains affected the entire south and south-eastern pastoral areas of the country, bordering Kenya and Somalia. With over 85 percent of the population depending on agriculture for their food and income, the drought triggered a widespread livelihood crisis. Production losses have severely diminished household food security and purchasing power, forcing many to sell agricultural assets and abandon their livelihoods. Following two consecutive poor rainy seasons – *Belg* (February to May) and *Kiremt* (June to September), farming households in most of central and eastern Ethiopia suffered crop losses of between 50 and 90 percent in 2015/16.

Maize prices increased by 6–19 percent between July and September, as floods caused crop losses and disrupted marketing operations. In October, prices fell in several markets, including the capital, Addis Ababa, with the start of the 2016 *Meher* main season harvest. However, prices continued to rise in Diredawa market, located in a deficit, *Belg*-dependent area and in October 2016 were around 30 percent higher than in October 2015. In Addis Ababa, white sorghum and teff were 25 percent more expensive than one year earlier. By contrast, the price of wheat, partly imported, has been falling over the past 12 months, as the upward pressure on prices exerted by low domestic availability has been offset by imports and lower international prices.


Food insecurity in Ethiopia is chronic, and close to 10 million people chronically food-insecure are in fact targeted by the government's Production Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Livelihoods are hampered by poor access to basic services, limited rural infrastructure, a very low technological base in agriculture and a scarcity of off-farm employment opportunities that limits diversification. Ethiopia's 12 million pastoralists constitute 12–13 percent of the population. Most live in the lowland areas of the Afar and Somali regions, with smaller numbers in Oromia and SNNPR who are particularly affected by recurrent shocks such as droughts and livestock diseases, land encroachment by cultivators, rangeland degradation, and rangeland enclosure for dam construction, state farms or national parks.

## OUTLOOK

The *Meher* harvests between October and January are boosting food availability in crop-dependent areas. However, although the harvests have gradually improved food access, millions may remain at risk. Severe drought conditions are affecting livestock-dependent households in southern zones of the Oromia and Somali regions as well as in South Omo and its adjacent areas in SNNPR, which are entering the January to March dry season with depleted grazing pasture.

The limited natural sources of water point replenishment could jeopardise pasture rejuvenation and pastoralists' livelihoods until March or April 2017 when the *Belg/Gu/Ganna* rains are expected to start. Food and nutrition security could deteriorate in south and south-eastern Ethiopia in early 2017 if livestock production needs are not urgently supported.

# SOMALIA




**Background:** Somalia has endured two seasons of poor rainfall, exacerbated by the devastating effects of El Niño. Food insecurity is rising and may trigger a humanitarian crisis. Politically, Somalia is at a landmark with a new parliament and recent presidential elections, but the country continues to face regular militant attacks from the al-Shabab group, who are linked to al-Qaida.

Total population: 11,079,000 (UNdata, proj., 2016)  
 GDP per capita PPP: n/a  
 Poverty rate: 73% (UNDP, 2015)  
 Agricultural labour force: 60% of total (OCHA, 2016)  
 Agriculture as share of GVA: 60.2% (UNdata, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### Somalia


Acute food insecurity situation, July 2016



### Somalia

Acute food insecurity situation, Aug–Dec 2016



**Graph 1: Number (in thousands) of people in IPC Phase 2, 3, 4 and 5 in 2014–2016**

**Source:** Based on data from IPC

An IPC analysis conducted in August 2016 estimated that over 1.1 million people (nearly 9 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* during the second half of 2016 and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. This was particularly the case following the early onset of the lean season, which saw food security decline compared to February–June 2016 and a 20 percent increase in the number of people in *Crisis* and *Emergency*.

While the number of people in IPC Phases 3 and 4 has remained relatively stable over the past few years, the size of the food-insecure population rose by 60 percent between 2014 and 2016. This is mainly due to a significant increase in the number of people in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*, from nearly 2 million in 2014 to 3.7 million in 2016.

According to the latest findings of a countrywide seasonal assessment conducted in December 2016 over 2.9 million people are expected to face *Crisis* or *Emergency* (IPC Phases 3 or 4) across Somalia until June 2017. This is more than twice as many as estimated in August 2016.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, more than 3.3 million people are classified as *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2), bringing the total number of people facing acute food insecurity to over 6.2 million.<sup>17</sup>

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Acute malnutrition remains high in many parts of Somalia irrespective of both positive and negative changes in seasonal food security and livelihood outcomes, and continuous humanitarian interventions over the past eight consecutive seasons.

<sup>16</sup> The figures refer to the period of February to June each year.

<sup>17</sup> Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) and FEWSNET Technical Release, 2 February 2017.

Levels of acute malnutrition have increased since July 2016. Results from 27 separate nutrition surveys conducted between November and December 2016 by FSNAU and partners indicate that an estimated 363,000 children under 5 are acutely malnourished, including 71,000 who are severely malnourished and face increased risk of morbidity and death. Global Acute Malnutrition prevalence is above the *Critical* threshold (15 percent) in 13 out of 27 rural and displaced population groups surveyed. Severe acute malnutrition is *Critical or Very Critical* ( $\geq 4.0\%$ ) in 6 out of the 27 groups.

Poorly equipped health facilities and a lack of clean and safe water have recently led to outbreaks of diseases such as acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) and cholera. From January to October 2016, 13,653 cases of AWD or cholera were reported, with 497 related fatalities. About half of the cases were women and children under 5.<sup>18</sup>

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

As severe drought grips most parts of Somalia, the food crisis is worsening in rural areas following consecutive seasons of poor rainfall and low levels of river water. This has led to near total crop failures, fewer rural employment opportunities, widespread shortages of water and pasture with consequent increases in livestock deaths, and rapidly diminishing food access for poor households as staple food prices continue to rise and livestock prices fall.

Poor *Gu* (April to June) and *Deyr* (October to December) rainfall, localized floods, trade disruption, and new and continued population displacement contributed to a worsening food security situation throughout Somalia in 2016. In 2015/16, El Niño caused drought in Puntland, Somaliland and Gedo, and floods in the southern and central regions. Dwindling employment opportunities and income combined with high food prices and trade disruptions eroded the purchasing power of the rural poor – especially unskilled wage labourers. At the same time, trade was disrupted by insecurity caused by insurgency, which mainly affected the food security of urban populations who rely on markets and trade. The cost of living has increased for most urban households because of the seasonal rise in the price of sorghum, which represents a significant proportion of the standard basic food basket.

In central and southern regions - where tight supply is compounded by trade disruptions - maize and sorghum prices increased, particularly compared to last year. Urban population are likely to face rising food insecurity caused by worsening drought conditions and a consequent increase in staple food prices that will lower food access. IDPs across Somalia have also been hit hard by drought conditions as food prices rise and competition for wage labour opportunities increases in urban areas where most IDPs live. The influx of newly displaced people from rural parts continued in the last quarter of 2016.

Deepening drought conditions have affected the pastoral communities in the Northern Inland Pastoral livelihood zone (the regions of Sool, Sanaag, Bari and Nugaal), with reports of rapid depletion of livestock assets due to increased sale and mortality, declining livestock-to-cereals terms of trade and increased indebtedness. Total loss of livestock, destitution and displacement have also been reported in some parts of the zone. The agro-pastoral livelihoods of the Mudug and Galgadud regions in central Somalia have experienced near complete crop failure. The 2016 *Gu* cereal production in central and southern areas was 50 percent below the long-term average (1995–2015) and 20 percent below the five-year average (2011–2015). The *Deyr* season cereal harvest was 70 percent below the long-term (1995–2015) average and 75 percent below the five-year average (2011–2015).

Subsistence agriculture and pastoralism constitute the main livelihoods in Somalia. However, low productivity and low added-value make these activities particularly sensitive to shocks such as price variations, market disruption and land degradation. The livestock sector is paramount in the Somali economy as it represents 40 percent of GDP<sup>19</sup> livestock constitutes 80 percent of all exports. However, export levels and revenues from the livestock sector have been repeatedly undermined by droughts and international bans. Drought is the main driver of humanitarian crisis, which can be devastating in Somalia as it was when between October 2010 and May 2012, famine took the lives of 260,000 people, half of whom were children.


## OUTLOOK

Food security in the first quarter of the year will be undermined by the poor Deyr harvest, atypically low demand for agricultural labour and below-average pasture conditions. Households are expected to run out of their own stocks earlier than usual and will likely face a long and harsh lean season. With limited food stocks for sale and poor livestock value, household purchasing power is also expected to drop sharply. As a result, an increase in the severity of food insecurity and the size of the food-insecure population are expected during the January–March lean season.<sup>20</sup>

Looking further ahead, preliminary forecasts indicate that food security could worsen in some areas as below-average to near average rainfall is expected to prevail across most parts of Somalia during the 2017 Gu (April–June) season. In the lead-up to the Gu, staple food prices are expected to increase sharply and widespread livestock mortality is likely to occur as pasture and water resources become depleted. This could mean food security deteriorates in some areas. In a worst-case scenario where the Gu season is poorer than currently forecast, purchasing power declines to levels seen in 2010/11, and humanitarian assistance is unable to reach populations in need, IPC Phase 5 *Catastrophe/Famine* would be expected.<sup>21</sup>

## Somalia

Acute food insecurity situation, Feb–Jul 2017




19 FAO. "Somalia exports 5.3 million animals, 6% growth in 2015", 14 April 2016.

20 FEWS NET. Somalia Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017.

21 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) and FEWS NET Technical Release, 2 February 2017.

### 3.2 Conflict in Eastern and Central Africa

## BURUNDI




**Background:** Civil unrest and the ongoing political crisis have prevailed in Burundi since mid-2015. The effects of these developments are more significant in the areas affected by high chronic food insecurity. Structural factors, for which there are no short-term solutions, such as soil degradation resulting in lower soil fertility, high demographic pressure, rising poverty, high prevalence of diseases and the deterioration of the environment, all contribute to household vulnerability and low resilience to shocks in the long term.

Total population: 11,553,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
 GDP per capita PPP: US\$818.04 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
 Poverty rate: 64.6% (UNDP, 2015)  
 HDI rank: 184 (UNDP, 2015)  
 Agricultural labour force: 88.7% of total (FAO, 2013)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Burundi


Acute food insecurity situation, Jul-Sep 2016



Between May and June 2016, 2.3 million people (24 percent of the population) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in Burundi. A further 3.3 million were in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*. These estimates came three months after the Season A harvest, which accounts for 35 percent of national production.

Two of the country's eight livelihood zones – Plateau secs de l'Est and Plateaux humides (excluding Ngozi province) – were in *Crisis* conditions and the remaining six were recorded as *Stressed*.

**Graph 2: Number (in thousands) of people in IPC Phase 2, 3, 4 and 5 in 2014**



The graph shows how the total number of food insecure (IPC Phase 2 and above) has fallen since 2014, which was a particularly poor year. As described by a joint crop evaluation mission in 2014, agricultural season 2014B was well below average: bean production was down by 20 percent and overall production by 6 percent. Nevertheless, between 2014 and May-June 2016, a number of the people in IPC Phase 2 shifted to IPC Phases 3 and 4, reflecting more severe food insecurity for part of the population. This pattern can be mainly attributed to political instability, the effects of which were offset in the second part of 2016 by more favourable weather conditions.

**Source:** Based on data from IPC

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview of 2017,<sup>22</sup> around 226,000 children are suffering from acute malnutrition and 56,000 from severe acute malnutrition (SAM). Admissions of severely malnourished children reportedly more than doubled between 2013 and 2016. The most worrying situation is within communities in Rutana and Kirundo provinces, where the SAM rates have exceeded the 2 percent threshold. The worsening socio-economic situation, rising food insecurity, poor nutrition and sanitation practices, reduced access to clean water, and poor access to health facilities are among the causes of the deteriorating nutritional status of children in Burundi.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Ongoing civil insecurity remains the main driver of food insecurity, causing large displacements and disrupting livelihood activities. Economic conditions have deteriorated since April 2015 and agricultural activities have been disrupted by movement restrictions, creating a fragile food security situation for vulnerable households. Political instability has also restricted the usual/seasonal movements of goods and people, not only inside Burundi but also trade with neighbouring Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. These developments have limited the availability of food for purchase, as well as people's livelihoods and income.

FAO estimated that the impact of El Niño on agriculture had affected 90,000 people by June 2016.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the overall national deficit remains high and has increased as food imports – which account for 30 percent of food availability – have been hampered by insecurity and a lack of hard currency. Access to food has become increasingly difficult, particularly in Plateaux Secs de l'Est where over 50 percent of households rely on the market as their main source of food. Any fall in income therefore increases the vulnerability of these provinces. Moreover, food prices remain high year-on-year and compared to the 10-year average. In the third quarter of 2016, national maize prices rose by 30 percent; they increased by 27 percent in Bujumbura between August and November. Transport and import costs also grew exponentially. These price increases coupled with the low purchasing power of poor households are among the main drivers of food insecurity.<sup>24</sup>

Current staple food prices are slightly higher than last year and the five-year average; price increases are typical during the Sept-Dec lean period.<sup>25</sup> Structural factors such as soil degradation, demographics,<sup>26</sup> rising poverty, high disease prevalence and environmental degradation all contribute to vulnerability and low resilience, which is also hindered by the limited diversification of livelihoods and income opportunities. Income poverty concerns almost two thirds of the population, especially in rural areas.<sup>27</sup> The effects of the ongoing political crisis are felt more acutely in areas afflicted by high chronic food insecurity.

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<sup>22</sup> Available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno\\_burundi\\_2017\\_fr\\_small.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_burundi_2017_fr_small.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> FAO. Burundi Situation Report, June 2016.

<sup>24</sup> WFP. The Market Monitor, Issue 33, October 2016.

<sup>25</sup> FEWS NET. Burundi Remote Monitoring Update – October 2016.


<sup>26</sup> As the population is growing rapidly, the amount of fertile land available is decreasing.

<sup>27</sup> WFP. FSMS August 2016.

## OUTLOOK

Nationally, the economic situation is not likely to improve because of the ongoing socio-economic and political crisis. Instability is thwarting economic activity, especially in Bujumbura and its surroundings. Of major concern are the eastern border provinces of Muyinga, Cankuzo and Rutana, where the livelihoods of many poor households have been severely disrupted by conflict and migration restrictions, which are expected to continue. Moreover, erratic rainfall during the A season of the 2016/17 agricultural year resulted in poor harvest and deteriorated the food security situation. Below-average production in these areas will reduce food availability from January to May, and the food stocks of poor households are expected to run out earlier than usual. In these areas, IPC Phase 3 Crisis conditions are expected by late April/early May 2017.

# CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC



**Background:** Over the past three years, the country has experienced a major political crisis which has resulted in a violent conflict that has affected nearly the entire population. The crisis has devastated the economy and continues to constrain recovery through widespread insecurity despite a peace agreement in Bangui between the various armed groups signed in May 2015 and a constitutional referendum, presidential and parliamentary elections were held between December 2015 and March 2016.

Total population: 4,999,000 (UNdata, proj., 2016)

GDP per capita PPP: US\$656.02 (IMF, 2016 est.)

Poverty rate: 62.7% (UNDP, 2015)

HDI rank: 187 (UNDP, 2015)


Population depending on agriculture: over 75% (FAO, 2016)

Agricultural labour force: 70% of total (FAO, 2012)


## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Central African Republic

Acute food insecurity situation, Aug-Dec 2016



Graph 3: Number (thousands) of people in IPC Phase 3, 4 and 5 in 2014 – 2016<sup>28</sup>



Following three years of crisis, the already fragile food security situation in the Central African Republic has deteriorated sharply. An IPC analysis for the period August to December 2016 estimated that over 2 million people (nearly 40 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.

The préfecture (province) of Vakaga and four sous-préfectures (sub-provinces) in Ouham Pendé, Ouham and Nana-Grébizi préfectures were classified in IPC Phase 4 *Emergency*. A further 10 préfectures were classified in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and the remaining 5 in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*.

**Source:** Based on data from IPC

<sup>28</sup> As observed from the IPC Communication Template for August/December 2016 analysis, the technical working group combined the population numbers for Phase 3 and Phase 4. Therefore, it is not possible to separate the numbers and the bar reports populations in both phases combined.

Displaced populations are those worst hit. The areas with the largest concentration of internally displaced people (IDPs) are Ouaka, Ouhama, Haut-Mbomou, Nana-Grébizi and Bangui. In Vakaga, the return of refugees from South Sudan was found to be another factor contributing to food insecurity.

The August–December 2016 analysis detected deteriorating food security compared to the previous IPC analysis (December 2015 to June 2016), when three sous-préfectures were in *Emergency* and 1.8 million people were in *Crisis* or *Emergency*. Compared to the November–March 2014 assessment, 17 percent more people were in *Crisis* or *Emergency* in 2016.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

A SMART survey conducted in June 2016 found deteriorating food consumption and nutrition levels, accounting for a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of 18 percent.<sup>29</sup> The Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 cites a GAM rate above the *critical* level in Vakaga prefecture<sup>30</sup> (18 percent). National severe acute malnutrition is also reported to be above 2 percent in many prefectures. Not only are people eating less, dietary diversity has also fallen drastically: cassava is substituting more nutritious cereal and vegetable staples and people are consuming far less animal protein. This widespread dietary deterioration raises serious concerns for nutrition and health.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict and insecurity are the main drivers of food insecurity in the Central African Republic. The population is facing severely curtailed and constantly deteriorating access to food because of displacement and destroyed livelihoods, limited income-generating activities, and reduced own production and asset depletion – exacerbated by recurring looting and theft – as well as sharply reduced market activity and high food prices. Widespread insecurity has also affected humanitarian assistance delivery.

Food security in CAR depends heavily on subsistence agriculture. Around 60 percent of the population live in rural areas, and more than 75 percent depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The sector, including crop production, livestock rearing and fishing, has been severely affected by the conflict. In 2015, cereal output was 4 percent down from 2014 and 70 percent lower than the pre-crisis average (2008–2012). The production of cotton and coffee – the two most valuable cash crops – has also shrunk, cotton by 42 percent and coffee by 28 percent compared to pre-crisis levels.<sup>31</sup> In 2016, favourable weather conditions were not sufficient to improve agricultural output compared to recent years. Despite increased supply thanks to newly harvested crops, there are concerning food gaps for poor resident households in conflict areas, displaced households and host families. Many farmers lack adequate savings and agricultural inputs to secure enough food and income. In March 2016, cattle numbers were estimated to have declined by 46 percent and small ruminants by 57 percent compared to pre-crisis levels. In addition, armed groups continue to block and control migration corridors for transhumant livestock, with frequent reports of animal thefts and of animals being confined in localized areas by conflict. The result is an overall reduction in income from animal production. Moreover, despite this year's good rainfall and the rising levels of major waterways, loss of fishing equipment and overexploitation in some areas due to insecurity has resulted in reduced fish supply and cut income, particularly in Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou and Haute-Kotto. Disruptions to market food supply and trade corridors are exacerbated by poor road conditions and the weak stocking capacity of traders.

<sup>29</sup> The World Health Organization classifies global malnutrition rates above 15 percent as *Critical*.

<sup>30</sup> Available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rca\\_ocha\\_2017\\_hno.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rca_ocha_2017_hno.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> FAO/WFP, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) Report, 2016.

Both prices and inflation rates fell in 2016;<sup>32</sup> however, the latter was partly due to a serious drop in demand as household purchasing power declined. The humanitarian crisis has worsened since the 2013 coup, adding to long-term factors of under-development. Particularly high mortality rates and low life expectancy are reported across the country as a result of malaria and malnutrition, an inadequate healthcare system and chronic food insecurity. Finally, CAR is particularly subject to heavy rains provoking localized floods. There are also frequent reports of epidemics such as meningitis, measles and yellow fever, and of waterborne diseases such as cholera.

## OUTLOOK

IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* is expected to continue at least through the end of May 2017 in conflict-affected areas of north-western, south-eastern, and northern central parts of the country (Ouham, Ouham Pendé, Nana-Grébizi and Vakaga) because of below-average food stocks, trade disruption and the decline of most food and income sources. There will continue to be very little dietary diversity (with diets limited to cassava leaves, tubers and wild yams) and persistent food consumption gaps. Displaced populations, returnees, host households and poor households will continue to be of particular concern.

# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

| Food-insecure people<br>in need of urgent action   | Food insecurity trends   | Food insecurity outlook  |
|--|--|--|
| 2016   | 2015 - 2016  | 2017   |
|  <b>5.9M PEOPLE</b>            |   |                               |
| <b>IPC 3+</b>                 |  | Stable agricultural production is likely to provide households with food between February and April 2017.        |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |  |  |
|  <b>CONFLICT</b>              |  <b>EL NIÑO FLOODS<br/>AND TORRENTIAL<br/>RAINS</b> |  <b>MARKET<br/>DISRUPTION</b> |
|  <b>IDPs</b><br>2 million   |  <b>Crop damage</b>                               |  <b>High food prices</b>    |
|  <b>REFUGEES</b><br>449,764 |  <b>Animal and plant disease</b>                  |  <b>Reduced imports</b>     |


**Background:** A complex emergency has persisted for over 20 years in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Conflict between foreign, self-defence and other armed groups, mainly in the eastern and southern provinces, has engendered a prolonged, severe humanitarian crisis. Although security has improved slightly since 2013, humanitarian needs remain high and the conflict continues to displace the population. Humanitarian access is limited in the east, and lack of infrastructure is a problem across the country.

Total population: 79,723,000  
(UNdata, proj., 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$784.66 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 63.4% (UNDP, 2015)  
HDI rank: 176 (UNDP, 2015)  
Agricultural labour force: 70% of total (FAO, 2012)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Democratic Republic of Congo

Acute food insecurity situation, Jun 2016/Jan 2017



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine

Areas with Inadequate Evidence  
Not analyzed

! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance

Democratic Republic of Congo IPC  
Technical Working Group, Jun 2016/  
Jan 2017

Depending on data availability, the IPC Analyses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have covered different territories over time. Population estimates are therefore not directly comparable.

The latest IPC analysis covering the post-harvest period of June 2016 to January 2017 estimated that over 5.9 million people (nearly 8 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Of the 134 analysed territories, 4 were classified in *Emergency*, 49 were in *Crisis* and 63 were in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*.

Most of the food insecure are in the districts of Punia, Walikale, Beni and Irumu – classified as in *Emergency* conditions. These areas are characterized by civil insecurity and the presence of armed groups, as well as military operations by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)<sup>33</sup> and exactions in various forms (killings, kidnapping, rape, pillage and multiplication of illegal taxes). The forced displacement of populations is observed in these areas, resulting in severe food insecurity.

The majority of areas in *Crisis* conditions are located in the east and centre of the country. Here, the main drivers of food insecurity are intercommunal conflicts, poor access to agricultural inputs, locust invasions and erratic rainfall linked to El Niño.

Although IPC analysis in DRC has covered different territories and therefore offers incomparable population estimates, previous IPC classifications since 2013 show a certain continuity in the areas in IPC Phase 4 in the provinces of Tanganyika, South and North Kivu, Maniema and Ituri as well as pockets in IPC Phase 3 on the northern border with Central African Republic, in the south-east and the north-east of the country.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

According to the nutrition surveillance system (SNSAP)<sup>34</sup>, global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence remains above the 10 percent threshold in most territories. The highest rates are found in central and western provinces of the country: in Tanganyika, Maniema, Kasai Central, Kasai, Kwilu, Kwango, Upper Lomami, Tshuapa and Sankuru. In the east, GAM rates are acceptable but severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates are the highest in the country.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 reports that 3.9 million children are suffering from acute malnutrition, of whom 1.9 million are severely malnourished. The situation remains worrying with a forecast of 4 million malnourished children in areas where GAM rates are above 10 percent and SAM rates are over 2 percent.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Key drivers of acute food insecurity include conflicts among armed groups in the east and intercommunal violence in other areas, as well as instability in neighbouring countries which triggers recurrent and large-scale movements of refugees in DRC. Internal displacement and an influx of refugees from Burundi, Central African Republic and South Sudan in areas with already inadequate resources are straining the capacities of host communities. Ethnic violence in Tanganyika has displaced 332,000 people since September, and traditional power conflicts in Kasai have displaced a further 216,000. Insecurity and violence continue to have a severe impact on livelihoods and household food security, particularly in the former Eastern Province, North Kivu, South Kivu (Shabunda, Walungu, Fizi, Kalehe, Kabare and Mwenga) and former Katanga.

In addition, natural disasters and animal/plant diseases seriously reduce food availability, exacerbating food insecurity. Flooding and torrential rains in the last quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016, linked to El Niño, affected over 770,000 people and displaced over 40,000. The areas worst hit were along the Congo River and in the former province of Katanga. Flooding in Ituri district and in the provinces of Tshopo, Maniema, Mongala and former Katanga destroyed more than 5,500 hectares of cropland and wiped out food stocks, particularly in Tanganyika. El Niño drought had a heavy impact on agricultural production in 2015 in southern Africa, limiting exports of cereals, particularly maize, from Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania. Food prices were pushed up by reduced imports, coupled with market disruptions and additional demand from refugees. In Goma market in north-eastern North Kivu, prices of cassava flour, the main staple in northern and central areas, increased by 30 percent between April and August. Despite subsequent declines, prices were still 33 percent higher in October than 12 months earlier, partly due to additional demand from increasing numbers of Burundian refugees. In Lubumbashi market in southern Haut Katanga, prices of maize, the main staple in southern areas, have been highly volatile since early 2016. In October, maize prices were 60 percent higher than 12 months earlier, mainly because of reduced imports from Zambia.

DRC authorities struggle to control diseases and plagues such as cassava brown streak and banana bacterial wilt. Since November Equator province (north west) and Katanga (south east) have suffered from infestation of caterpillars attacking maize - which is of serious concern as maize is a fundamental part of the food basket.

In DRC, households spend an average 63 percent of their expenditure on food, though this proportion ranges between 54 and 75 percent in different territories. Poor food access is linked to low income, and the situation has deteriorated through the lean season. The agricultural sector supports the livelihoods of two thirds of the population.

<sup>34</sup> *Système de Surveillance Nutritionnelle, Sécurité Alimentaire et Alerte Précoce.*  
See [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/drc\\_hno\\_2016\\_3.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/drc_hno_2016_3.pdf)

## OUTLOOK


The harvest of the main agricultural season in late January/early February 2017 should allow households to have food between February and April. In particular, in South Kivu, North Kivu, Maniema, Tanganyika, Lualaba, and Haut-Lonami, poor households are likely to experience improved food availability and consequent *Minimal* (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity between January and May 2017.

The effects of insecurity will last in certain parts of Punia, Kabambare, Pangi, Kasongo, Mambasa, Irumu, Aru, Bondo, Ango, Dungu, Faraje Fizi, Uvira, Shabunda, Kalehe, Beni, Rutshuru and Walikale which will result in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity. Some populations will remain displaced, with below-average food stocks. Less than 20 percent of the total population will face *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) in Uvira, Fizi, Kabalo, Manono, Kalemie, Punia, Pangi, Kailo, Lubutu, Rutshuru, Walikale, Lubero, Beni, Isangi, Irumu and Bafwasende.

As a result of the late start of the rains and consequent belated harvests, food security is likely to be IPC Phase 2 *Stressed* in the territories of Nyunzu, Kabalo, Manono, and Kalemie in Tanganyika Province as well as in large parts of the Maniema province.<sup>35</sup>

At a political level, the national budget will drop from 8 billion to 3-4 billion in 2017 because of falling revenue from mineral exports. Most of the budget will therefore only serve to cover civil servant salaries, and very few investments in social and economic development are expected this year. In this context, it is critical to ensure a smooth political process in the run-up to the elections that are set to take place by the end of the year.

# SOUTH SUDAN




**Background:** The humanitarian needs across South Sudan continue to dramatically increase because of multiple threats, including armed conflict and inter-communal violence, economic decline, and climactic shocks. Despite the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, violence continues to affect civilians in all ten states. In the second half of 2016, fighting between armed actors erupted in new locations, including Western and Central Equatoria.

**Total population:** 12,733,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$1,670.79 (IMF 2016)  
**Poverty rate:** 50.6% (UNDP)  
**HDI rank:** 169 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Population depending on agriculture:** over 80% (UNDP, 2012)  
**Agriculture as share of GVA:** 4.2% (UN Data, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### South Sudan


Acute food insecurity situation, Aug–Sept 2016



### South Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct–Dec 2016



**Graph 4: Number of the population (in thousands) in IPC Phase 2, 3, 4 and 5 in 2013–2016**

**Source:** Based on data from IPC

In August-September 2016, the IPC analysis estimated 4.4 million people (37% of the total population) in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis*, IPC Phase 4 *Emergency* and IPC Phase 5 *Catastrophe*. A further 4.2 million were in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*. Out of the 4.4 million, approximately 400,000 live in the urban areas of Juba, Wau and Aweil towns and are facing *Crisis* and *Emergency* conditions. In Aweil North and Aweil West counties in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal, a combined 30,000 people were facing *Humanitarian Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) food insecurity because of low-resilience livelihoods, diminished household purchasing power, disrupted markets and high food prices. Projections for October-December 2016 estimated 3.4 million people to face *Crisis* and *Emergency* food insecurity. Improvements in the last quarter of the year are underpinned by increased consumption of dry harvest, wild foods, fish and livestock products.

The January 2017 IPC analysis shows a deterioration of the food security situation compared to the August-September 2016 analyses, which estimated 4.4 million people (37 percent of the population) facing IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and above. Food insecurity has increased dramatically since the start of the civil conflict in December 2013, and it reached record levels in 2016 and 2017. The August to September 2016 IPC analysis found that an additional 13 percent of the population had slipped into *Crisis*, *Emergency* or *Catastrophe* food insecurity compared to the same period in 2015, when food insecurity was already high because of the dramatic conflict in Unity state. In January 2017, an additional 0.5 million people are in Phase 3 or higher compared to September 2016. In 2017, the magnitude of the food-insecure population is reaching unprecedented levels. Moreover, severe food insecurity has expanded geographically to areas that were in the past relatively less affected, such as Central Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Of the 23 counties with recent data<sup>36</sup>, 14 have global acute malnutrition (GAM) at or above 15 percent, whilst GAM above 30 percent is observed in Unity State (Leer, Mayendit, and Panyijiar counties). Similarly, a worsening nutrition situation atypical to the post-harvest season is observed in the Greater Equatoria region – particularly in Greater Central Equatoria – a deterioration associated with widespread insecurity, lack of access, disruption of the 2016 agricultural season and the economic crisis.

<sup>36</sup> Latest nutrition data informed January 2017 IPC analysis.

Areas in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal show higher-than-usual levels of acute malnutrition expected for the post-harvest season, indicating a worsening situation.

In urban Juba,<sup>37</sup> average weight-for-height GAM prevalence was 11.2 percent which reflects WHO *Serious* levels. High levels of acute malnutrition are driven not only by high food insecurity but also by suboptimal child feeding practices; poor water, sanitation and hygiene; and poor public healthcare services.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict and insecurity, coupled with high food prices, economic crisis, low agricultural production and disrupted livelihoods are the main drivers of severe food insecurity in South Sudan. In 2016, the spread of conflict in Greater Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal and renewed conflict in the Greater Upper Nile severely depleted livelihoods and agricultural activities, lowering crop production. Scarce supplies and trade disruption meant low food availability on markets. Food security has deteriorated dramatically especially in the highly market-dependent Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal.

In addition to falling purchasing power, food insecurity is driven by high food prices that have been inflated by the sharp devaluation of the local currency<sup>38</sup> and high transport costs due to insecurity along the major trade routes. The Juba crisis in July 2016 restricted inflows of imported food through the main southern supply corridor, reducing supplies and driving up prices. In July, cereal prices were more than double those of June and were almost ten times higher than 2015 levels. Since then, crop harvests in most areas have moderated the price of key staples. Between August and October, prices of maize and sorghum fell by 10 to 50 percent from the record highs reached in July. Food aid distributions and the partial resumption of imports from Uganda also helped reduce food inflation. After months of sharp depreciation, the local currency stabilized in October, easing inflationary pressure and lowering prices. However, between October and November, maize and sorghum prices rose again in Juba, remaining about two to three times their levels in November 2015.

Food security has improved in Jonglei and Upper Nile thanks to better security conditions, which have allowed access to humanitarian assistance and the resumption of some agricultural activities, particularly in eastern parts of Upper Nile. By contrast, severe food insecurity persists in Unity because of the below-average harvest, high food prices and market disruptions attributed to ongoing insecurity. The worst food insecurity levels were found in Unity and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (61.3 percent of the population facing *Crisis*, *Emergency* or *Catastrophe* food insecurity. However, severe food insecurity is still high in Jonglei (53 percent), Western Bahr el Ghazal (50 percent), Eastern Equatoria (45 percent), Eastern Equatoria (45 percent) and Lakes (40.9 percent).

Recent conflicts have exacerbated a livelihood crisis that has its roots the prolonged civil war with the north, and the long history of marginalization and neglect with lack of investments in productive sectors such as agriculture and in social services and infrastructure. Most rural households rely on a combination of agriculture, livestock keeping, wild food gathering and hunting, fishing and barter/exchange as the basis of their livelihoods. However, the bulk of agricultural production rests on subsistence systems mainly because of the lack of improved agricultural inputs and techniques; poor infrastructure impeding access to markets; the lack of critical mass preventing farmers and herders from entering marketplaces and the banking system; and uncertainty regarding property rights and access to land.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, natural shocks such as floods, drought and animal diseases are frequent and recurrent; together with the protracted conflict and insecurity, they severely hamper agricultural activities.

<sup>37</sup> Juba Urban Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (September 2016).

<sup>38</sup> The instability and lack of foreign currency led to a record year-on-year inflation rate of 836 percent in October 2016, also underpinned by the depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound (SSP), which fell from SSP16/US\$ in August 2015 to SSP74/US\$ in November 2016.

<sup>39</sup> African Development Bank, 2013. South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan, Chapter 6: “Development of Agriculture in South Sudan”.


## OUTLOOK

The food security situation is likely to worsen between April and July 2017, corresponding with the lean season. It is expected to deteriorate further during the peak of the lean season in July 2017, reaching record levels. Conflict and insecurity are likely to continue throughout much of the country. The continued disruption to livelihoods, persistently high staple food prices and depleted food stocks will reinforce Crisis and Emergency food insecurity and there will be an increased risk of high levels of acute malnutrition and elevated mortality.

The latest IPC analysis conducted in January 2017 classified 4.9 million people (about 42 percent of the population) (IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and above). Of those, 100,000 people are facing *Famine* conditions (IPC Phase 5 *Catastrophe*) or high likelihood of *Famine* at least until July 2017 if humanitarian assistance is not delivered to this people. The affected population is concentrated in Greater Unity Counties namely Leer and Mayendit. In Koch County there is a high likelihood that *Famine* is ongoing while Panyijiar County will likely avoid *Famine* if adequate humanitarian assistance is provided from February to July. IPC projection analysis shows a further deterioration at the height of the lean season in July 2017 with the number of people in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and above increasing to 5.5 million (47 percent of the population).


## South Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation, Feb–Apr 2017



## South Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation, May–Jul 2017



# SUDAN

| Food-insecure people<br>in need of urgent action   | Food insecurity trends  | Food insecurity outlook   |
|--|---|---|
| 2016   | 2015 - 2016   | 2017  |
|  <b>4.4M</b><br>PEOPLE   |                                    |                              |
| IPC 3+    |   |   |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |   |   |
|  <b>CONFLICTS AND<br/>INTER-COMMUNAL<br/>VIOLENCE</b>   |  <b>POOR SEASONAL<br/>RAINFALL</b> |  <b>HIGH FOOD<br/>PRICES</b> |
|  <b>Population displacement<br/>and livelihoods disruption</b>  |  <b>Low crop production</b>      |  <b>Lack of employment</b> |
|  <p><b>IDPs</b><br/>2 million</p> <p><b>REFUGEES</b><br/>584,000</p> <p><b>RETURNES</b><br/>105,020</p> |  <b>Disrupted trade flows</b>  |   |


**Background:** Despite political developments in the second half of 2016, the security situation in Darfur remains highly volatile. On 8 August, the Sudanese government, opposition movements and several rebel groups gathered under the 'Sudan Call' in Addis Ababa and settled on a roadmap agreement. The agreement aims to pave the way towards ending the war in Darfur and the Two Areas – Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. It also seeks to address the urgent humanitarian needs and root causes of the conflict.

Total population: 41,176,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
 GDP per capita PPP: US\$4,452.25 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
 Poverty rate: 46.5% (UNDP, 2015)  
 HDI rank: 167 (UNDP, 2015)  
 Population dependent on agriculture: 78% (UNDP, 2013)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation, Apr–Jul 2016



### Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct–Dec 2016



The latest IPC analysis for the post-harvest period October to December 2016 estimated that over 3.5 million people (9 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* in Sudan. This is an improvement compared to the previous analysis covering April to June 2016, which found 4.4 million (12 percent of the population) in *Crisis* and *Emergency* conditions in assessed areas.

Compared to the same period in 2015, food security across the country remains relatively stable following seasonal deteriorations. Even so, the number of food-insecure people in *Stressed*, *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions (IPC Phase 2 or higher) is high at over 42 percent.

Around 33 percent of food-insecure people are concentrated in the Darfur states. The situation remains challenging, particularly in East and West Darfur states where 19 percent of the population are in *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions. Other food-insecure states include North and South Kordofan, Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref. The worst food security conditions are reported among IDPs, host communities, households with vulnerable livelihoods in South Kordofan and Central and East Darfur states, and those living in conflict-affected areas.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Malnutrition rates are at alarming levels in some parts of 22 localities that were in IPC Phase 3: global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence ranges from 15 to 25 percent, and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) from 7 to 10 percent. In the remaining 144 localities analysed, GAM rates are below 5 percent and SAM rates vary from 0.3 to 3 percent. Poor food utilization – including poor access to safe drinking water – is another major driver of food insecurity. Displacements and the influx of refugees from South Sudan have compounded the shortage of drinking water in some areas. High rates of malnutrition were recorded in some *Crisis* and *Emergency* areas because of increased waterborne diseases during the rainy season. The prevalence of acute malnutrition is likely to follow seasonal trends during the outlook period (Oct–May). Nevertheless, rates are expected to improve thanks to the above-average harvest forecast for the 2016/17 agricultural season, which will increase food access.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The main drivers of food insecurity in Sudan are the protracted Darfur conflict and renewed insecurity in parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, which cause displacement and disrupt livelihoods and trade. High food prices and fragile household resilience to hazards (particularly to poor seasonal rainfall) also play a part.

Around 70 percent of Sudan's rural population relies on rainfed agriculture. In 2015/16, El Niño weather patterns severely damaged crop production. Carryover stocks were quickly depleted and food prices rose in most markets, thereby reducing purchasing power and access to food. The price rises combined with a lack of employment opportunities hit poor households particularly hard, especially unskilled wage labourers. However, favourable 2016 rains (June–September) led to above-average crop production and better pasture conditions across the country, lowering food prices and improving food security. Increased water availability for livestock and improved grazing conditions generated favourable terms of trade for pastoralists and livestock owners.

Despite these improvements, a notable portion of the population still suffers from inadequate food access, particularly in 22 localities in *Crisis* conditions. In October, prices of sorghum and millet were well above 2015 levels in several markets, reflecting tight domestic availability following the 2015 drought-reduced harvest. The highest prices of coarse grains were recorded in Al Fashir (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan), as insecurity disrupted trade and local production fell short.

Beyond national borders, the crisis in South Sudan has a significant impact on food security in Sudan. Refugees continue to arrive, many of whom face severe food insecurity because of the lack of suitable refugee camps and the loss of their livelihoods. Furthermore, the dramatic drop in South Sudan oil production has meant lost revenue from the use of the pipeline and port facilities in Port Sudan, with consequences for Sudan's economy. However, the country maintains a strong rate of economic growth. Nonetheless, major human development challenges remain: high rural poverty and rising urban poverty due to rural-urban migration; IDPs caused by the civil war and conflicts; climate change; and population growth. Natural disasters and climate change are also critical drivers of food insecurity. In addition to drought, households are vulnerable to flooding and subsequent epidemics. In August 2016, floods affected 122,000 people across Sudan, causing loss of livelihoods and assets, and triggering a major increase in malaria cases, particularly in the Blue Nile.

## OUTLOOK

The above-average crop production harvested at the end of 2016 is expected to improve food availability and access. However, localized conflicts, insecurity and additional displacements will continue to drive Crisis acute food insecurity in early 2017, particularly in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Jebel Marra. The number of refugees from South Sudan is expected to increase, resulting in additional urgent need for assistance.

### 3.3 Lake Chad Basin crisis in Western Africa

## LAKE CHAD BASIN REGIONAL CRISIS – Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger


| Food-insecure people in need of urgent action  | Food insecurity trends  | Food insecurity outlook   |
|--|---|---|
| 2016   | 2015 - 2016   | 2017  |
|  <b>6.3M PEOPLE</b> |  | Some areas previously held by Boko Haram are becoming more accessible for government and humanitarian assistance. However, many people will remain in critical need of food, water, health, sanitation services, protection, shelter and nutrition support. |

### Key drivers and other contributing factors




### Nigerian refugees


**88,700  
Niger**



**86,676  
Cameroon**



**7,917  
Chad**



**2.6M in total displaced in the Lake Chad Basin**

**Background:** The long-running Boko Haram-linked conflict across the Lake Chad Basin has reportedly left 8.2 million people destitute. Insecurity, displacement, and disrupted agriculture and cross-border trade continue to undermine livelihoods and increase food insecurity. The combined effect of growing insecurity, population growth and severe vulnerability to natural disasters has resulted in environmental degradation, poverty and underinvestment in social services. Staple food prices have increased substantially because of insecurity and increased transport costs.

### 3.3.1 Lake Chad Basin crisis in Western Africa

Suicide bombings and raids on villages and towns have affected the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin – Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. With 2.6 million displaced in December 2016, food insecurity has reached worrying proportions: 6.3 million people in the region are experiencing food insecurity and requiring urgent humanitarian action and 65,000 people in Nigeria's north-eastern states of Borno and Yobe are facing famine-like conditions. In most of the conflict-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, malnutrition rates have surpassed the WHO emergency threshold. Throughout the region, 568,000 people are severely acutely malnourished, and global acute malnutrition rates range from 10 to 15 percent, according to the latest surveys.

Insecurity, displacement, disrupted agricultural activities and severed cross-border trade continue to undermine livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin, triggering a sharp rise in food insecurity. The combined effect of growing insecurity, fast population growth and severe vulnerability to natural disasters has led to environmental degradation, poverty and underinvestment in social services. The conflict has damaged agriculture, disrupted food production and food systems, and caused the loss of assets, social services, incomes and natural resources. Staple food prices have increased substantially due to insecurity and increased transport costs.

Around 200,000 people are internally displaced in Cameroon's Far North region and the majority – 72 percent – are living in host communities. In Cameroon North, Far North, Adamawa and East regions, 2.5 million people are food-insecure – 298,000 severely so – according to the latest Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA). Nutrition has worsened in the north over recent years, linked to suicide attacks and insecurity that severely limit access to basic services.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, since the beginning of 2013, Boko Haram has multiplied its attacks in the Far North, pushing several thousand Nigerians and Cameroonian people to flee the border areas and triggering the closure of the border itself. The border closure has restricted the movement of food and goods, and Nigerian demand for goods from the Far North has plummeted. Under these conditions and given their low purchasing power, households are struggling to source food from the markets.

Around 46 percent of displacements in the Diffa region of south-east Niger are due to Boko Haram-related attacks. The arrival of a large number of Nigerians in border areas, along with the ongoing cross-border attacks, has put extreme pressure on already impoverished host communities, who are historically prone to cyclical droughts, chronic food insecurity, malnutrition and natural disasters.

In addition to insecurity, the main driver of food insecurity in Lake Chad Basin is the continuous sharp depreciation of Nigeria's currency caused by declining oil revenues. The Nigerian naira (NGN) has depreciated by more than 50 percent since the beginning of the year, seriously affecting trade flows, food prices and household incomes in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Although the prices of coarse grains remained unchanged or fell recently with the start of the 2016 early harvests, they remained more than twice their 2015 levels after the sharp increases of the previous months.

The weak local currency continues to affect regional price trends and trade flows and to support regional import demand for Nigerian cereals. This has increased Nigerian cereal exports to regional markets, putting significant pressure on domestic food supplies. The weak currency has also reduced Nigeria's imports from neighbouring countries, which is affecting household income and food security notably in the Sahel countries that usually export livestock and cash crops to Nigeria.

# CHAD

## Food-insecure people in need of urgent action

### Food insecurity trends

### Food insecurity outlook

2016



1M  
PEOPLE

CH 3+

2015 - 2016



*Stable except in Lake Chad Basin*

2017



Crisis food insecurity  
is expected at least until  
May 2017.

### Key drivers and other contributing factors



CONFLICT



HIGH FOOD PRICES



NATURAL  
DISASTERS



Refugee influx



Lack of employment



Crop deficits



Poor livestock, access to food,  
safe water and sanitation

**Background:** Chad faces instability from the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin and neighbouring countries. The country is also prone to desertification, climate shocks, agricultural land degradation and the drying up of Lake Chad.

Total population: 14,497,000 (UNdata,  
proj. 2016)


GDP per capita PPP: US\$2580.01  
(IMF, 2016 est.)

Poverty rate: 62.9% (UNDP)

HDI rank: 185 (UNDP, 2015)

Population dependent on farming and  
herding: 80% (OCHA, 2015)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW




The latest Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analysis for the harvest season October to December 2016 estimated that over 456,000 people (nearly 2 percent of the population) were in CH Phase 3 *Crisis* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in Chad. A further 2.4 million were in Phase 2 *Stressed* in 24 of the 88 departments analysed.

Thanks to an above-average harvest and humanitarian assistance, food security has improved nationwide since the last lean season (June to August 2016) when 1,052,000 people were in CH Phase 3 *Crisis* and 2,719,000 in CH Phase 2 *Stressed*.

However, it is expected to worsen during next lean season (June to August 2017). Close to 140,000 people are likely to face Phase 4 *Emergency* conditions, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. One million people (nearly 8 percent of the population) are projected in Phase 3 *Crisis*, and a further 2.8 million in Phase 2 *Stressed*. The most food-insecure populations will be in the Lac region and the Sahelian belt. The following departments are expected to be classified in CH Phase 3: Mamdi, Wayi, Bahr El Gazal South, Bahr El Gazal North, Kanem and Kanem North, as well as Sahelian parts of the departments of Abtouyour, Mourtcha, Assongha, Iriba and Mégri.

The CH analysis points to increasing numbers of people in Phases 3 and 4 during the 2016 lean season compared to previous years. Any improvements from good harvests have been offset by civil insecurity in areas affected by Boko Haram insurgency.

**Graph 5: Number of the population (in thousands) in CH/IPC Phase 2, 3,4 and 5 in 2013–2016**



## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Overall, nutrition is improving compared to previous years, although the national prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) of 11.2 percent found by the last SMART survey (August–September 2016) is still at WHO Alert levels (10 percent). GAM is above the *Emergency* threshold of 15 percent in six regions: Ennedi West (23.3 percent), Borkou (19.3 percent), Ouaddaï (16.9 percent), Batha (16.6 percent), Bahr El Gazel (16.1 percent) and Salamat (15.6 percent). The Kanem region is on the cusp of the *Emergency* threshold, with a prevalence of 14.9 percent. Malnutrition is in the *Critical* range in seven regions, with GAM above 10 percent.

The rate of severe acute malnutrition is also very high. It increased sharply in 2015 in several regions, where it remains above 2 percent despite a slight improvement in 2016. Nationally, malnutrition is driven by insufficient food; a high prevalence of preventable diseases and epidemics such as cholera, measles and malaria; and inappropriate childcare practices.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

In recent years, worsening food security in Chad has been driven by Boko Haram attacks and the conflict in Nigeria, with population displacement and refugee influxes. Attacks in the Lac region since the start of 2015 have forced tens of thousands of families to abandon their homes and daily activities in search of safety. The displacements increased the vulnerability of host communities, many of whom already needed assistance before the escalation of violence. The displaced families live in precarious conditions, lacking shelter and access to basic services and safe drinking water, especially in remote areas. Their arrival has put local infrastructures under unsustainable pressure. Health services are weak and lack qualified staff, appropriate equipment and essential drugs.

Natural disasters have also contributed to food insecurity, especially recurrent droughts in the Sahel regions of Chad. The country is subject to frequent epidemics such as cholera, measles and malaria. These are exacerbated by the limited access to basic services and health facilities. In fact, the food and nutrition security crisis, population movements, epidemics and natural hazards are interconnected and often affect the same populations, multiplying the impact of the humanitarian crisis.


## OUTLOOK

Though the conflict has lessened over the past few months in the Lac region, refugee flows continue to arrive from northeast Nigeria, where the conflict has intensified. Insecurity and displacements will continue destroy livelihoods and limit income activities, with reduced land cultivation, fishing and employment, and low market functioning. As such, Lac populations are expected to face consumption deficits from February onwards, and are likely to face CH Phase 3 *Crisis* food insecurity at least until May 2017.

Across the Sahelian belt, rains ended early in the 2016/2017 rainy season, harming pastures and crops in many departments. This will lead to poor livestock conditions during the lean period. The lack of employment opportunities combined with low animal prices and high food prices during the lean period will damage the purchasing power of poor households – especially unskilled wage labourers and agro-pastoralists. Poor food utilization – including poor access to safe water and improved sanitation – as well as the economic recession will be additional drivers of food insecurity in 2017. As a consequence, the regions of Kanem, Bahr El Gazel, Wadi Fira (Kobé and Megri) and Guéra (Abtouyour) are expected to be in CH Phase 2 *Stressed* from February to May 2017.

## Chad

Acute food insecurity situation, June 2017



# NIGER

## Food-insecure people in need of urgent action

## Food insecurity trends

## Food insecurity outlook

2016



2015 - 2016



2017

Food security is expected to deteriorate in the lean season from June to August.

## Key drivers and other contributing factors



CONFLICT



POPULATION  
DISPLACEMENT



NATURAL  
DISASTERS



Livelihood and market  
disruption



Poor agricultural campaign



Drought, Flood and Locust  
infestations



Aridity and soil infertility

**Background:** Boko Haram has intensified its attacks against civilians, mainly in the southeastern Diffa region bordering Nigeria and Chad. This has caused population displacement and destruction, putting pressure on resources and basic social services in host communities that have long been grappling with previous displacements and the combined effects of food insecurity, malnutrition, recurring epidemics, droughts and floods. Community tensions have been observed in the region due to increasing competition over land and resources between pastoralists and crop farmers, and between host and displaced communities (UNICEF, 2016).

Total population: 20,715,000 (UNdata,  
proj. 2016)

GDP per capita PPP: US\$1,113.89 (IMF,  
2016 est.)

Poverty rate: 45.1% (UNDP)


HDI rank: 188 (UNDP, 2015)

Agriculture's contribution to the  
population's incomes: 80% (Republic of  
Niger, 2015)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Niger

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct–Dec 2016



In November 2016, 19 of Niger's 63 departments were in *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) Phase 2 *Stressed*, and 2 were in Phase 3 *Crisis*, as shown in the map above. The other 42 departments were in CH Phase 1 *Minimal*.

During the post-harvest season October to November 2016, an estimated 321,730 people were in CH Phase 3 *Crisis* and 5,000 people were in CH Phase 4 *Emergency*, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. An additional 2.5 million people were in *Stressed* conditions.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

The nutrition situation reported by the last SMART survey conducted in August 2016 showed global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above the *Critical* level of 10 percent in four of Niger's eight regions. Stunting prevalence was over 50 percent in Maradi and Zinder, and was 39 percent in Dosso and Tahoua.

The high stunting rates reveal chronic vulnerability to malnutrition, also noticeable in GAM trends which have <sup>41</sup> been at *Critical* or *Emergency* levels for the last four years, despite a slight improvement in 2016.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Extreme poverty and natural hazards such as recurrent droughts, floods and locust infestations keep large parts of the population in chronic food insecurity, punctuated with frequent acute crises. Aridity and soil infertility across the country also explain the poor performance and vulnerability of agriculture and pastoralist systems.

Security issues at the borders with Mali, Libya, and Nigeria, as well as climatic and price shocks expose Niger to significant macroeconomic risks (World Bank, April 2016). The Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria has seriously affected the Diffa region, where the departments of Bosso and N'Guigmi are classified in *Crisis* conditions and where food insecurity is driven not just by the poor agro-pastoral campaign 2016/2017, but also and especially by attacks that damage livelihoods. Disruption to trade with Nigeria has left livestock markets dysfunctional, harming terms of trade in pastoral areas. A cholera outbreak in the Dosso region and a Rift Valley Fever epidemic in the Tahoua region also engendered food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity, severe malnutrition among children under 5 and high levels of poverty contribute to increased household vulnerability and low resilience to shocks over time.


## OUTLOOK

The CH analysis forecasts deteriorating food security in the lean season from June to August 2017. The number of people in *Crisis* conditions or worse is expected to rise from 326,700 between October and December 2016 to 748,700 at the peak of the lean season (June – Aug).


The number of departments in *Stressed* conditions is set to grow from 19 to 34, and those in *Crisis* from 2 to 5. The departments that could enter CH *Crisis* conditions are: Mayahi, Bosso, N'Gourtí, N'Guigmi and Banibangou.

### Niger

Acute food insecurity situation, Aug 2017



# NORTHEAST NIGERIA - Borno, Adamawa and Yobe



**Background:** Boko Haram-related violence in northeast Nigeria has triggered a growing humanitarian crisis. Now entering its eighth year, the crisis shows no sign of abating and is adding to the country's long history of chronic underdevelopment, with high rates of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. Long-standing environmental degradation is eroding livelihoods for farmers in the northeast and for fishermen in the Lac region, while conflict has caused displacement and human suffering on a massive scale. Over 20,000 people have been killed since the start of the conflict and up to 2.1 million have fled their homes: 1.8 million are internally displaced and 0.2 million are refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.


#### Nigeria (country)

Total population: 186,988,000  
(UNdata, proj. 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$5,929.87  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 62.6% (UNDP)  
HDI rank: 152 (UNDP, 2015)  
Agricultural labour force: over 60%  
(IFAD, 2012)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Nigeria

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct–Dec 2016



### Northeast Nigeria - Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states

The latest *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) analysis in Nigeria conducted in October 2016 identified 4.7 million people in CH Phase 3 or higher and in need of urgent assistance in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in northeast Nigeria. In Borno alone, 3.3 million of people – 60 percent of the population – are in CH Phase 3 or above, including 55,000 in CH Phase 5 *Famine* (i.e. *IPC Catastrophe*). Although territories in these areas are being liberated, data show that food security and nutrition are worsening, especially in Borno. The population in need of immediate humanitarian assistance (those in CH Phases 3 to 5) rose from 2 million in August 2016 to 3.3 million in October–December 2016 and is expected to reach 3.6 million in August 2017, which represent nearly 66 percent of the population of Borno. Of the 121,300 people expected to face *Famine* conditions in the next lean season, 96 percent will be in Borno, with the remaining 5,600 people in Yobe.


In November 2016, FEWS NET undertook an IPC-compatible analysis in local government areas (LGAs) recently liberated from Boko Haram and in parts of Borno with large IDP populations. Findings confirmed the alarming situation and enough evidence was gathered to conclude that a famine probably occurred between April and August 2016 in some IDP enclaves (Bama and Banki towns) and in other nearby inaccessible areas of Borno state where similar conditions of limited access to food and health services occurred before humanitarian assistance arrived. The analysis found at least 2,000 famine-related deaths may have occurred in Bama LGA between January and September, many of them young children. FEWS NET also found a high likelihood that famine will continue in inaccessible areas, assuming conditions remain similar to or worse than those observed in Bama and Banki towns between April and August 2016.

The populations worst affected are IDPs and those in inaccessible areas without humanitarian assistance. Assistance has improved food security and may be preventing famine in various IDP concentrations. Sustained humanitarian access is critical in many areas, and the current response has been insufficient to meet the very large emergency assistance needs.

### **North Nigeria – 16 states**

The October 2016 *Cadre Harmonisé* covered 13 states in addition to Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, assessing a total of 92 million people, including those most affected by conflict. The analysis found that 8.1 million people – 9 percent of the population studied – were facing acute food insecurity and required urgent lifesaving response and livelihood protection. Around 6.2 million people (7 percent) were in CH Phase 3 *Crisis*, 1.8 million (2 percent) were in CH Phase 4 *Emergency* and 55,000 people were in CH Phase 5 *Famine* (i.e. IPC *Catastrophe*). A further 18.6 million people (22 percent) were in CH Phase 2 *Stressed* and required resilience-building interventions.

**Graph 6: Prevalence of food insecurity in north Nigeria**



## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

The nutrition situation was already alarming in Nigeria at the end of 2015. In five of the northern states, global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence was estimated at over 10 percent, and stunting prevalence at over 40 percent, reflecting the nutritional vulnerability caused by chronic food insecurity and poverty (see map). The situation worsened in 2016 because of the continuing conflict and Boko Haram-related violence in the north-eastern states.<sup>42</sup>

As the Nigerian army has regained control of some parts of Borno,<sup>43</sup> more populations have become accessible since early 2016. Rapid SMART surveys conducted in June in LGAs in Borno revealed a GAM rate of 19.2 percent and a severe acute malnutrition (SAM) of 3.1 percent, indicating a critical and deteriorating nutrition situation. Exhaustive screenings conducted in camps in other Borno LGAs found extremely high GAM rates: 32 percent in Monguno, 58.8 percent in Dikwa and 39.1 percent in Bama. A SMART survey conducted in Jakusko LGA (Yobe state) in June found a GAM prevalence of 20.3 percent and a SAM prevalence of 8.9 percent – also emergency-level figures.

The government declared a nutrition emergency for Borno in June 2016. Since then, worsening food security is expected to have caused a further deterioration in nutrition. Food prices have risen and morbidity has increased with the rainy season, when vulnerability to waterborne disease is extremely high.

GAM prevalence is at the *Crisis* or *Emergency* threshold in the states of Borno, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara; and at the *Stressed* threshold in Benue, Niger, Plateau and Taraba. Peaks of extremely high GAM prevalence have been observed in newly liberated territory and IDP camps. Mass MUAC screenings conducted in 2016 by MSF and UNICEF revealed a nutrition emergency in Bama and Banki camps.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The 2016 cereal crop harvest was completed in January 2017. In spite of the late onset of the 2016 rainy season in the central and northern parts of the country, above-average and well-distributed rainfall from mid-July benefited crop development in the major producing states of the country. Moreover, enhanced government support to the agricultural sector and higher commodity prices helped increase the planted area and yields in some regions. However, in the northeast, the Boko Haram conflict has had a huge impact on agriculture because of the large-scale population displacement and the restrictions imposed on agriculture activities. This has led to a sharp drop in planted areas in some states, especially in Borno. Nigeria's aggregate cereal output in 2016 was tentatively estimated at about 22.6 million mt, 5 percent higher than the above-average level performance in 2015.


In 2016, Nigeria also faced the depreciation of its national currency caused by falling oil revenues. The Nigerian naira (NGN) has depreciated by more than 50 percent since early 2016, seriously affecting regional price trends and trade flows. Nigerian cereal exports to regional markets have increased, putting pressure on domestic food supplies. The weak currency has also suppressed Nigerian demand for imports from neighbouring countries, affecting household income and food security particularly in the Sahel countries that usually export livestock and cash crops to Nigeria.

<sup>42</sup> SMART survey conducted in July–September 2015.

<sup>43</sup> The state capital, Maiduguri, and Jere LGA host IDP communities.


## OUTLOOK

The ongoing conflict and insecurity in the northeast is likely to cause ever-worsening food security outcomes. Expected seasonal vulnerabilities, lower food availability, high food prices and the depletion of existing food stocks may render food access even more difficult. The latest CH analysis predicts that 11 million people – 12 percent of the population of 16 states – will be facing *Crisis*, *Emergency* or *Famine* conditions during next lean season (June to September 2017): 8.7 million people are expected to be in *Crisis*, 2 million in *Emergency* and 121,000 may face *Famine* conditions (IPC Phase *Catastrophe*). Most of them are expected to be in Borno and Yobe, which are structurally fragile and vulnerable because of the protracted conflict.



### 3.4 El Niño in Southern Africa

## EL NIÑO IN SOUTHERN AFRICA – Lesotho, southern Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe

| <b>Food-insecure people in need of urgent action</b>  | <b>Food insecurity trends</b>  | <b>Food insecurity outlook</b>  |
|---|--|---|
| <b>2016</b>   | <b>2015 - 2016</b>   | <b>2017</b>   |
|  <b>12M PEOPLE</b><br>Lesotho, southern Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe |   | <br>Food insecurity is expected to worsen in early 2017 as the lean season peaks, particularly if humanitarian programmes are not fully implemented. The main harvest from April onwards should provide some relief. |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>   |  |   |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>  |  <b>Poor agricultural season</b>                               |  <b>Sharp food prices increase</b>   |
|   |  <b>Economic downturn/ depreciation of currencies</b>       |  <b>Reduced imports from neighbouring countries including South Africa</b>   |
|   |  <b>Refugees</b><br><b>27,161 from Mozambique to Malawi</b> |   |

**Background:** The severe impact of El Niño weather patterns on agricultural production in 2016 caused an extremely stressed food security situation across southern Africa. The situation was exacerbated by an economic downturn in some countries, which weakened households' capacity to respond effectively to the shock and contributed to lowering resilience, already debilitated by a poor agricultural season in 2015. The effect of depreciating currencies in several countries added further upward pressure to domestic food prices and also increased the cost of importing food.

### 3.4.1 El Niño in southern Africa: Regional Perspective

The strong impact of El Niño weather patterns on agricultural production in 2016 caused severely stressed food security across southern Africa. The situation was exacerbated by an economic downturn in some countries, which weakened households' capacity to respond effectively to the shock and contributed to lowering resilience, already debilitated by a poor agricultural season in 2015.

In 2016, the production of staple cereal crops – mainly maize – fell in all countries except Namibia and Zambia, where, although there was a year-on-year production gain, output remained below average. Low production levels were driven by the delayed start of seasonal rains which curbed plantings, while the severe and extensive El Niño-induced drought depressed cereal yields and led to crop losses. As a result, cereal import requirements in the current marketing year are forecast to rise steeply. South Africa, the main exporter in the sub-region, also saw a fall in cereal output, so countries were forced to secure supplies from outside the region, in contrast to previous years.


The supply shortfalls in 2016 also triggered sharp food price increases, with maize prices reaching record highs in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. The effect of depreciating currencies in several countries added further upward pressure to domestic food prices and increased the cost of importing food.

The combination of high food prices and poor harvests severely restricted food access and availability, increasing food assistance requirements and contributing to rising malnutrition rates, with parts of Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique experiencing high levels of stunting. The El Niño-related drought hit these countries the hardest, along with Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Food insecurity also intensified in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, where better national capacities to respond to shocks helped avert a crisis. Of these countries, northern parts of Namibia and southern areas of Angola were particularly impacted by the drought in 2016; this followed the already poor agricultural season in 2015 that had severely undermined resilience capacities. To alleviate the current situation, the Government of Namibia is providing food assistance to 0.6 million people through the Drought Relief Food Programme, which is expected to continue until March 2017.

With the peak of the lean season in the first quarter of 2017, the number of food insecure and the severity of conditions is expected to increase, particularly if humanitarian programmes are not fully implemented. The situation should improve with the start of the main 2017 harvest, from April onwards. The agricultural outlook for 2017 is generally positive with aggregate cereal production expected to recover from the reduced 2016 output, mainly thanks to the recent beneficial rains that have boosted water reserves and vegetation conditions, and a weather forecast indicating the likelihood of above-average rainfall until the end of the season, which is expected to result in higher yields. However, although crop yields are expected to recover, the agricultural productivity of farming households is expected to be much lower, particularly because of restricted access to fertilizer and seed supplies, the result of two consecutive years of below-average harvests. Therefore, the area planted in 2017 may be limited in some areas, potentially pulling down production levels.

Despite the generally optimistic production prospects, there are two important threats to this year's harvest: i) an armyworm outbreak, which is known to have affected Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and ii) localized flooding following heavy rains in January and February. Although the armyworm infestation is not expected to have a substantial impact on national cereal outputs, local production is likely to be affected and supply shortfalls would prolong the already stressed food insecurity. Similarly, protracted flooding will likely lower yields in affected areas or result in complete crop losses.

# LESOTHO

| <b>Food-insecure people<br/>in need of urgent action</b>   | <b>Food insecurity trends</b>   | <b>Food insecurity outlook</b>   |
|--|---|--|
| <b>2016</b>  | <b>2015 - 2016</b>  | <b>2017</b>  |
|  <b>0.5M<br/>PEOPLE</b><br>IPC 3+  |                              | <br>At the peak of the lean season (November–March), 24 percent of the population are expected to face Crisis or Emergency food insecurity. |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |   |  |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN<br/>DROUGHT</b>   |  <b>HIGH FOOD<br/>PRICES</b> |  <b>HIGH<br/>POVERTY<br/>RATES</b>   |
|  <b>Reduced crop production</b>   |  <b>Loss of income</b>     | <br><b>Water scarcity, harmed livestock, lowering sales</b>   |
|  <b>Tighter national and regional supplies pushing up food prices</b>   |  <b>Unemployment</b>       |  <b>Loss or degradation of livelihoods</b>  |


**Background:** Lesotho has one of the highest income inequality ratio in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past two years, households whose livelihoods are based on agriculture have to cope with El Niño-related drought. The population also faces the second highest rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world: one in four adults is living with the virus (UNAIDS 2014). About 80% of the population live in rural areas and engage in subsistence agriculture as their main livelihood.

**Total population:** 2,160,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$3,107.44 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
**Poverty rate:** 57.3% (UNDP)  
**HDI rank:** 161 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Population dependent on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods:** 70% est. (OCHA, 2013)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Lesotho

Acute food insecurity situation, Apr–Jun 2016



#### Legend


IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Minimal                        |
| 2 | Stressed                       |
| 3 | Crisis                         |
| 4 | Emergency                      |
| 5 | Famine                         |
|   | Areas with Inadequate Evidence |
|   | Not analyzed                   |

Lesotho IPC Technical Working Group, Apr–Jun 2016

### Lesotho

Acute food insecurity situation, Jul–Sept 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Minimal                        |
| 2 | Stressed                       |
| 3 | Crisis                         |
| 4 | Emergency                      |
| 5 | Famine                         |
|   | Areas with Inadequate Evidence |
|   | Not analyzed                   |

Lesotho PC Technical Working Group, Jul–Sept 2016

An IPC analysis for the post-harvest period of July–October 2016 estimated that over 510,000 people (36 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency*, an increase of almost 200,000 people compared to April–June. Most of the population in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and above was in three districts: Berea (51 percent), Mafeteng (45 percent) and Qacha’s Nek (45 percent).

The most food-insecure households are those who have been worst hit by drought. Their purchasing power has been eroded by price increases, and they have limited or no food stocks and livelihood assets- such as livestock to sell- in order to meet food and non-food needs.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Acute malnutrition in Lesotho remains at acceptable levels. The global acute malnutrition rate ranges from 0.7 percent to a high of 6.6 percent in Mohale’s Hoek. Nonetheless, chronic malnutrition among children under five is critically high, affecting 33 percent nationwide, and over 50 percent of children suffer from anaemia.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The El Niño-induced drought triggered a second year of heightened food insecurity in 2016, mostly through a 66 percent drop in cereal production compared with the 2015 output. Production of maize, the main food staple, fell by 68 percent in 2016 from the near-average harvest of the previous year, reducing household food supplies and increasing reliance on markets. The significantly smaller harvest meant more imported maize was needed to cover normal per capita cereal consumption. Tighter national and regional supplies also pushed up food prices, reducing food access.

However, after a sharp increase at the start of the year, maize meal prices in Maseru began to fall from mid-2016 onwards, largely mirroring South African wholesale prices and thanks to a government price—subsidy scheme on basic food items. Even so, October retail prices of maize meal in the capital were still 25 percent higher year-on-year. The annual inflation rate in September was estimated at 6 percent, mostly driven by higher food prices. Low levels of production and higher prices have also diminished income and employment opportunities. Income from livestock sales steadily declined because of poor livestock body conditions, the result of inadequate water and pasture. The most vulnerable households are thus increasingly reliant on government assistance and on remittances to buy food.

The loss or degradation of livelihoods has spurred households to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as borrowing and using credit to purchase food, engaging in illegal activities, consuming seeds, resorting to child labour, or eating much smaller quantities. Economic migration to South Africa has also increased. Those most vulnerable – the elderly people living with HIV, AIDS or tuberculosis, and the disabled – are suffering from the scarcity of water, which jeopardizes the functioning of health services, puts women and children at risk, and pushes male household heads to migrate in search of employment. In May 2016, the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee found that 16.6 percent of households had begun to consume water from unprotected sources, and the vast majority were not treating it before consumption.

## OUTLOOK

At the peak of the lean season (November–March), 24 percent of the population are expected to face *Crisis* or *Emergency* food insecurity. Of this number, 8 percent will experience large food gaps and will require interventions to save their lives and livelihoods.

The planting of the 2017 summer cereal crops was completed at the end of December, and above-average rainfall has been forecast for the 2016/17 main summer cropping season (Oct–June). Vegetation growth has been boosted by heavy rains in the north, including in the main cereal-producing regions of Bera and Leribe. As a result, the early production outlook for 2017 cereal crops is generally favourable. With an expected recovery in the 2017 harvest, food security is forecast to improve in many areas between April and May 2017. Even so, some populations may remain in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed* conditions under the lingering impact of the 2016 drought.

# SOUTHERN MADAGASCAR

| Food-insecure people in need of urgent action   | Food insecurity trends  | Food insecurity outlook   |
|---|---|---|
| 2016  | 2015 - 2016   | 2017  |
|  <b>0.8M PEOPLE</b>                                   |    |    |
| <b>IPC 3+</b>                                        |   |   |
| <p align="center"><b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b></p>   |   |   |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>                      |  <b>HIGH FOOD PRICES</b>  |  <b>HIGH POVERTY RATES</b>                            |
|  <b>Reduced crop production and water scarcity</b> |  <b>Loss of income sources and low purchasing power parity</b> |  <b>Disruption of livelihoods and loss of assets</b> |
|  <b>Drop in livestock holdings</b>                 |  <b>Unemployment</b>   |  <b>Limited food and water access</b>                |


**Background:** Economic recovery is thwarted by extreme poverty and recent natural disasters such as floods, locust invasions and drought in the Grand Sud. Food and nutrition security was already under threat before 2013, but it has been severely undermined by erratic rainfall since September 2014, which has cut agricultural output. In 2016, dryness caused by El Niño led to the third consecutive year of below-average production, hitting southern Madagascar the hardest.

**Total population:** 24,916,000  
 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$1,504.70  
 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
**Poverty rate:** 71.5% (UNDP)  
**HDI rank:** 154 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Population dependent on agriculture:**  
 nearly 71% (UNCDF, 2016)  
**Agriculture as share of GVA:** 26%  
 (FAO, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Madagascar

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct-Dec 2016



An IPC analysis of Madagascar's Grand Sud conducted in September 2016 found that 840,000 people (5 percent of the population of Grand Sud) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency*. A further 528,000 (32 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed*. The analysed districts are home to 1.6 million people, representing 6 percent of the national population. Food security in the rest of the country was favourable and better than the same period in 2015.<sup>44</sup>

For October to December 2016, *Emergency* conditions were identified in the districts of Amboasary Sud, Beloha and Tsihombe, and in the *communes* of Analapatsy, Andranobory, Ankariera and Ranopiso in Taolagnaro district.

In these areas, between 25 and 45 percent of the population were facing *Emergency* food insecurity. Another four districts (Betioky, Bekily, Ambovombe and Ampanihy) and one *commune* (Beheloka in Tulear II district) were classified in *Crisis*.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

IPC Acute Malnutrition analysis in November 2016 estimated that the districts of Tsihombe, Ampanihy and Beloha would be in IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 *Alert* or Phase 3 *Serious* in the last two months of 2016 and the first trimester of 2017.

Nutrition remains of great concern in Ampanihy, where global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates are 7.9 percent, and in Tsihombe, where GAM rates are 11.4 percent. *Critical* and *Extremely Critical* levels of acute malnutrition have also been recorded in a number of communes in the eight districts analysed. Factors contributing to the critical levels of acute malnutrition include insufficient food, inadequate dietary diversity, poor access to water and sanitation, and inadequate access to health services. The situation is expected to worsen unless targeted humanitarian assistance and treatment programmes are implemented.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

One of the main drivers of current food insecurity in southern Madagascar is the drought caused by El Niño in 2016, which followed several years of below average rain. This has cut household agricultural production and led food stocks to run out earlier than usual. Rising food prices have exacerbated the situation, reducing food access. Household resilience to climatic shocks is low, after three consecutive years of inadequate and unevenly distributed rainfall. Below-average crop production in 2016 and a major drop in livestock holdings have put food security under acute stress. In the Grand Sud, the production of key staples such as maize, rice and cassava fell by 50 to 95 percent below the five-year average, resulting in the third consecutive year of below-average production. Households hardest hit are those who rely primarily on agriculture, who have lost all crops, sold their land and animals, and have no other sources of income. By mid-2016, more than one third of households had already resorted to emergency coping strategies including begging, selling animals, land or house, or migrating the entire family. About 40 percent of households had resorted to crisis coping strategies such as consuming seed stocks, thereby limiting their ability to plant off-season and main season crops.

The low 2016 crop production meant higher food prices, reducing household purchasing power. Extremely high levels of poverty and limited income opportunities make households in southern Madagascar particularly vulnerable to the effects of high food prices. With 80 percent of households dependent on markets for their food supply, price increases significantly reduce food access. Based on the national consumer price index, food prices in September 2016 were up by 6 percent year-on-year. Recurrent droughts, limited access to agricultural supplies and the overexploitation of natural resources have also undermined incomes for rural households in the south. The Malagasy agricultural sector is predominantly based on small-scale subsistence farming, and agricultural productivity is constrained by limited access to inputs, credits and markets. Infrastructure in the country is poorly developed, damaged by natural disasters and/or lack of maintenance.

Beyond the 2016 drought, difficult climatic conditions frequently contribute to food insecurity in Madagascar. The country is prone to natural disasters such as droughts in the south, as well as cyclones and floods. Locust invasions caused agricultural losses from 2012 until 2016, when a joint FAO/government three-year programme ended the invasions.

## OUTLOOK


According to FEWS NET, food insecurity is expected to remain high in the districts of Ampanihy, Ambovombe, Beloha and Tsihombe, and households are likely to cope by resorting to atypical migration, livestock sales and the consumption of cactus pear through to the end of the lean season in February 2017. Food assistance is being delivered to southern districts<sup>45</sup> over the next six months and will reach 60 percent of the food-insecure population. Consequently, most households in the area are expected to be in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed* until the start of the harvest because food stocks ran out very early and assets such as livestock have been depleted.

<sup>45</sup> Betioky, Toliara II, Ampanihy, Beloha, Bekily, Tsihombe, Ambovombe, Amboasary and Fort Dauphin.

Early forecasts point to normal to above-normal rains for 2017 crops, which should aid a recovery in production and improve food availability in April and May 2017. However, recovery will be slow because incomes have been particularly poor. As a result, most households in this livelihood zone will continue to face *Stressed* food security outcomes even after the start of the harvests.

## Madagascar

Acute food insecurity situation, Jan-Mar 2017




# MALAWI

| Food-insecure people<br>in need of urgent action  | Food insecurity trends  | Food insecurity outlook   |
|---|---|---|
| 2016  | 2015 - 2016   | 2017  |
|  <b>6.7M PEOPLE</b>  |    |  <p>Food security could worsen from January to March if the planned increase in humanitarian support does not materialize.</p> |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>   |   |   |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>  |  <b>RISING PRICES</b>  |  <b>HIGH POVERTY RATES</b>  |
|  <p><i>Reduced crop production</i></p>                                   |  <p><i>Loss of income</i></p>                                  |  <p><i>Limited food and water access</i></p>   |
|  <p><i>Extreme depletion of assets and disruption of livelihoods</i></p> |  <p><i>Limited economic opportunities and unemployment</i></p> |  <p><i>Animal and plant disease</i></p>  |

**Background:** After two consecutive years of below average crop production, the country is heavily dependent on international aid. On 12 April 2016, the President of Malawi declared a state of national disaster because of the impact of the drought on the economy, livelihoods and lives of Malawians. Moreover, the country has still not recovered from the devastating floods of 2015.

Total population: 17,750,000  
(UNdata, proj, 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$1,139.24  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 50.7% (UNDP)  
HDI rank: 173 (UNDP, 2015)  
Agricultural labour force: 80% (FAO, 2015)  
Agriculture as share of GVA: 33% (FAO, 2014)


## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW



According to an IPC analysis and the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC), nearly 4.1 million people (30 percent of the rural population) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* conditions between May and June 2016, which corresponds to the harvest period.

In August 2016, the SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis estimated that 6.5 million people were food insecure, number which has risen to 6.7 million as reported by the October 2016 update assessment.<sup>46</sup>

The highest number of food-insecure people were located in southern districts. The most food-insecure and vulnerable households were characterized by a sharply reduced 2016 harvest, and limited or minimal food stocks and livelihood assets (such as livestock).



<sup>46</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/report/lesotho/sadc-regional-vulnerability-assessment-and-analysis-synthesis-report-2016-august-2016> and MVAC, Food Security Forecast Update 2016/2017, October 2016

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Results from a SMART nutrition survey conducted in December 2016<sup>47</sup> indicate that the national global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate has risen from 2.5 percent recorded in May 2016 to 4.1 percent in December. Severe acute malnutrition prevalence has also increased from 0.5 percent in May to 0.8 percent in December. Overall, a poor nutrition situation was found in four of the seven livelihood zones surveyed, with GAM rates above 5 percent.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The current food insecurity situation in Malawi is mostly the result of two consecutive years of below-average crop production in 2015 and 2016, reflecting erratic weather conditions. The 2016 maize production is estimated at almost 2.4 million mt, which is 15 percent lower than the reduced harvest in 2015 and significantly lower than the five-year average. Prolonged dryness associated with El Niño was the main cause of poor production, mostly in central and southern cropping areas. Significantly lower production was also recorded for rice, sorghum and millet. As a result, total cereal production stands at just over 2.5 million mt, 34 percent below the five-year average.

Lower production has reduced food availability, making households more reliant on market supplies. High prices have weakened the purchasing power of vulnerable households, severely restricting food access. Following a temporary seasonal decline earlier in the year, the national average price of maize grain (the primary food staple) increased sharply during the second half of 2016. By November, it was up 60 percent year-on-year and at a near record high. Most of the year's price gains stem from the tight supply situation, although the weakened currency has added inflationary pressure. Increases in petrol prices towards the end of the year also helped sustain higher year-on-year prices, which are not expected to fall until the start of the next harvest in April 2017.

The Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation<sup>48</sup> began selling maize at MWK250/kg in the last quarter of 2016; this is higher than the national average market price in November. The food insecurity of poor and very poor households has remained severe, with households in Balaka, Mwanza and Nsanje districts employing unsustainable livelihood coping strategies in order to obtain income and food. The 2016 Household Economy Approach Survey, conducted in May by MVAC, found that actual survival deficits for poor and very poor households ranged between 15 and 40 percent in these districts, which indicates an extreme depletion of strategies and assets, leading to large food consumption gaps during the post-harvest season.

Malawi is frequently hit by natural disasters such as drought and flooding, as well as crop and livestock diseases. Recurrent climatic shocks have had devastating effects on the resilience of the Malawian population, which is already weakened by poverty and other underlying socio-economic factors. Over 90 percent of the rural population are smallholders whose lands depend on customary land tenure. The proportion of poor and very poor households is particularly high in remote parts of the north and south. These populations face limited access to assets, markets, education and financial services because of poor infrastructure and transportation, which considerably limit their economic opportunities. As a consequence, rural households can barely diversify their activities and face extended periods of unemployment during the year.

47 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Malawi%20Humanitarian%20SitRep%20%2311%20-%2031%20December%202016.pdf>

48 The government parastatal organization that procures and retails grain.

## OUTLOOK

Food security is expected to worsen in the first quarter of 2017, the peak of the lean season. Projections indicate a marginal increase in the number of food insecure and a further deterioration in the severity of conditions. FEWS NET projections point to *Emergency* and *Crisis* conditions by February. However, the situation is likely to improve from April 2017, when new supplies from the main season harvest will be available. Food security in most areas should therefore improve to *Stressed* between April and May.

Forecasts for the 2016/17 main summer cropping season (Nov–Jun) predict above-average rainfall, suggesting an early positive production outlook for the 2017 crops and a recovery in yields from the reduced levels of 2016. Even so, the poor 2016 harvest has cut the income of farming households and lowered their productive capacity, particularly regarding access to seeds and fertilizers. Although interventions by the government and the humanitarian community have helped improve the situation, plantings for the 2016/17 cropping season are likely to be lower than normal.

# MOZAMBIQUE

| <b>Food-insecure people<br/>in need of urgent action</b>  | <b>Food insecurity trends</b>  | <b>Food insecurity outlook</b>   |
|---|--|--|
| <b>2016</b>   | <b>2015 - 2016</b>   | <b>2017</b>  |
|  <b>1.9M<br/>PEOPLE</b><br>IPC 3+   |   | <br>Without assistance, food security could worsen in early 2017, with some chance of improvement from April onwards.   |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>   |  |  |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN<br/>DROUGHT</b><br> <p><i>Low crop production and depleted food stocks</i></p> |  <b>RISING<br/>PRICES</b><br> <p><i>Loss of income</i></p> |  <b>HIGH<br/>POVERTY<br/>RATES</b><br> <p><i>Chronic food insecurity and limited food and water access</i></p> |
|  <p><i>Disruption of livelihoods</i></p>   |  <p><i>Inflationary pressure</i></p>  |  <p><i>Other recurrent natural disasters and epidemics</i></p>  |


**Background:** Agriculture is predominant in Mozambique's economy and is vital to livelihoods. The 2015/16 El-Niño drought was therefore devastating and spurred the government to declare a red alert in the worst-affected provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia). Due to drought and ongoing political and military tension (especially in Manica province), 2,152 people are internally displaced while others fled to neighbouring countries such as Malawi.

**Total population:** 28,751,000  
(UNdata, proj, 2016)  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$1,228.22  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
**Poverty rate:** 54.7% (UNDP)  
**HDI rank:** 180 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Households dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods:** 89% est. (OCHA, 2016)  
**Agriculture as share of GVA:** 33% (FAO, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Mozambique

Acute food insecurity situation, Jul–Sept 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

Mozambique IPC Technical Working Group, Jul–Sept 2016


An IPC analysis for the post-harvest period July–September 2016 estimated that over 1.9 million people (14 percent of the population) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. A further 4.1 million (over 35 percent of the population) were in Phase 2 *Stressed*.

The food-insecure population is mainly concentrated in seven provinces<sup>49</sup> in the south and centre of Mozambique, where over 1.4 million people are in *Crisis* or *Emergency* and require urgent assistance to protect their livelihoods and bridge the food gap. The worst-hit households include those who experienced total crop failure in 2016, who do not own animals and who have no other significant sources of income apart from agriculture. By contrast, the northern provinces generally received beneficial rains, resulting in good harvests and grazing conditions in 2016.

The IPC findings predict a considerable deterioration in food security during the lean season between October 2016 and February 2017. Around 2.9 million people are estimated to be in *Crisis* conditions or worse during this period, more than seven times the number of people affected by the food crisis in 2015.<sup>50</sup>

### Mozambique

Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2016–Feb 2017



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

Mozambique IPC Technical Working Group, Oct 2016–Feb 2017

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

According to an IPC Acute Malnutrition analysis in August 2016,<sup>51</sup> global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence was 5.7 percent in Sofala and 9.1 percent in Zambezia, indicating IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 *Alert*. The situation remains of great concern in Cabo Delgado, which recorded in Phase 4 *Critical* conditions.<sup>52</sup> Zambezia and Nampula have the largest number of acutely malnourished people, as these provinces are relatively densely populated. Nationwide, 160,000 children are estimated to be acutely malnourished. Anaemia is also a major health problem, affecting over 70 percent of children aged 6–59 months across the country. This warrants immediate attention, especially in Cabo Delgado and Zambezia.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The main driver of food insecurity in 2016 was the El Niño-driven drought, which cut household production, causing food stocks to run out early and food prices to rise, all in the context of high chronic food insecurity and limited resilience to climatic shocks. Inadequate rainfall meant that total cereal production in 2016 (estimated at 2.4 million mt) was slightly lower than 2015 output, although it remained above the five-year average. The production of maize – the bulk of the country's cereal output – fell by 4 percent and rice production was down 8 percent. Production of sorghum, which is more resistant to drier conditions than maize, increased 8 percent year-on-year in 2016. The production shortfalls mainly reflect smaller harvests in the southern and central areas that were affected by the drought. An estimated 0.86 million hectares of arable land (18 percent of the total planted area) were affected by drought in the main cereal-producing provinces of Sofala and Tete (centre), and in minor-producing provinces of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo (south), with many households forced to replant several times.

Average-to-good harvests were predicted in northern provinces, which partly compensated for reduced output in the south and averted a steeper fall in national production. However, tighter domestic maize supplies put upward pressure on prices; most markets recorded grain prices well above their 2015 levels, with prices peaking in February. Inflationary pressure stemming from the depreciation of the national currency (metical) against the US dollar also pushed up prices further, with a national year-on-year inflation rate estimated at 25.5 percent in October 2016. Fuel prices also rose in October, following the first upward revision of fuel prices by the government since 2011; this is expected to sustain inflationary pressure. Against this backdrop, the poor agricultural season reduced income and eroded livelihoods, making households increasingly dependent on purchasing food from markets and therefore more vulnerable to price increases.

Acute food insecurity in most parts of Mozambique is exacerbated by high levels of poverty and limited resilience to climatic shocks. The country is frequently affected by cyclones, drought, floods and epidemics that cut incomes from farming and damage infrastructure. Productivity is also low because of a lack of technology, inadequate infrastructure and limited access to goods and services. As a result, most agricultural households produce at subsistence level.

<sup>51</sup> Produced by the Ministry of Health and SETSAN and covering 11 provinces.

<sup>52</sup> The evidence on acute malnutrition in Cabo Delgado is contradictory based on different assessments. Therefore this province needs further assessments to corroborate the results.

## OUTLOOK

Drought-affected populations are expected to remain in *Crisis* or *Emergency* in early 2017 because of consumption gaps and the negative coping strategies used to bridge these gaps. Around 2.3 million people are likely to require humanitarian assistance from January to March 2017. If no assistance is delivered, many households could slip into *Emergency* conditions. From April onwards, food security is likely to improve to IPC Phase 2 or even Phase 1, depending on the severity of the first quarter 2017. However, households in conflict-affected areas could face *Crisis* conditions in April and May 2017.

Although it is early in the season, rains have been generally beneficial so far and weather forecasts point to favourable rainfall for the rest of the season. Production prospects for 2017 crops are therefore positive. Although crop yields are expected to recover in central and southern areas, the poor 2016 harvest will have reduced the productive capacity of low-income households, who are normally reliant on their own seed supplies. This means they may plant smaller areas, counteracting the positive effects of the more favourable weather.

# SWAZILAND

| Food-insecure people<br>in need of urgent action   | Food insecurity trends  | Food insecurity outlook  |
|--|---|--|
| 2016   | 2015 - 2016   | 2017   |
| <br><b>0.35M PEOPLE</b><br><span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">IPC 3+  </span> |    | <br>Projections indicate that food security will deteriorate up to the next harvesting season in March 2017 due to insufficient food reserves and income. |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |   |  |
| <br><b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>   | <br><b>HIGH FOOD PRICES</b>                                | <br><b>HIGH POVERTY RATES</b>   |
| <br><b>Extensive crop losses</b>  | <br><b>High dependency on markets and loss of income</b> | <br><b>Disruption of livelihoods and unemployment</b>   |
| <br><b>Cattle deaths</b>  | <br><b>Economic downturn and high inflation</b>          | <br><b>Limited food and water access and HIV/AIDS pandemic</b>  |


**Background:** Food insecurity is on the rise in Swaziland because of El Niño-related drought. A national drought emergency was declared in February 2016. In fact, the rainfall of the 2015/2016 agricultural season was the lowest on record for at least 35 years. The 2014/2015 season was also poor, characterized by long dry spells and uneven rainfall distribution.

Total population: 1,304,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$9,768.17 (IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 63% (UNDP)  
HDI rank: 150 (UNDP, 2015)  
Agricultural labour force: over 70% (World Bank, 2011)  
Agriculture as share of GVA: 7% (FAO, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Swaziland

Acute food insecurity situation, Apr-Jun 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

Swaziland IPC Technical Working Group, Apr-Jun 2016

### Swaziland

Acute food insecurity situation, Jul-Sept 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

Swaziland IPC Technical Working Group, Jul-Sept 2016

According to IPC analysis conducted for the post-harvest season April to June 2016, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* reached 260,000, representing nearly 30 percent of the population. A further 327,000 (36 percent) were in Phase 2 *Stressed*.

The number in *Crisis* or *Emergency* was expected to increase to 315,000 people (36 percent of the population) by September 2016 and to 350,000 (40 percent) during lean season from October 2016 to February 2017.

Food security is of particular concern in Lubombo, where cereal production fell to 88 percent of 2014/2015 output. In this region, 50 percent of the population (98,000 people) were estimated to be facing *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions.

The most food-insecure households are those who have lost all their harvest, who do not own animals and who have no other significant sources of income apart from agriculture. The highest proportion of acutely food-insecure people are found in Lubombo, which is the most drought-prone district and has the highest prevalence of stunting.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Acute food insecurity is exacerbated by high levels of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition; the latter is the major nutrition concern in Swaziland. Poor access to drinking water, precarious household health environments and poor feeding practices are widespread across all four regions, and also contribute to food insecurity and malnutrition. An assessment in 2014 found that stunting affected 25.5 percent of children under 5<sup>53</sup>, particularly in southern and eastern parts. Lubombo had the highest stunting prevalence at 27.3 percent. Micronutrient deficiencies contribute to stunting and maternal mortality.

A SMART survey carried out in early 2016 found a global acute malnutrition rate of 3.1 percent and a severe acute malnutrition rate of 2.5 percent. Several cases of oedema were identified in Hhohho and Lubombo. Stunting prevalence was medium at 21.1 percent and underweight was low at 5.5 percent.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Acute food insecurity in Swaziland in 2016 mainly resulted from the effects of El Niño, which caused extensive crop losses and cattle deaths across the country. Cereal production in 2016 – almost entirely maize – is estimated to be well below average and to be down 60 percent from 2015. Poor production is the result of the El Niño-related drought, which meant smaller planted areas and lower yields. The drought was most damaging in the low cereal-producing regions of Shiselweni (south) and Lubombo (east), which also had poor harvests in 2015. The lack of water and pasture led to the deaths of 80,000 cattle.

The late, poor and uneven rainfall damaged crop production, pushing up market prices. The national average price of maize meal was 54 percent higher than the previous season. Price rises remain a major concern, particularly in Shiselweni and Manzini where 26 percent of the population spend over 75 percent of their income on food. Rising oil prices and high inflation (8.7 percent) also pushed up maize prices, which are expected to remain high for the whole year.

In Swaziland, 70 percent of the population depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods, and 84 percent of the poor population live in rural areas. Areas with a more unfavourable climate limit yield potentials, constraining the production of poor households; the lack of infrastructure and limited access to water sources and irrigation prevent them from increasing their productivity. These households are therefore more sensitive to shocks, and climatic shocks act as a driver of poverty as much as unemployment or the HIV/AIDS pandemic.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Central Statistical Office MICS 2014.

<sup>54</sup> Available at: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp283963.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> The prevalence of adults aged 15 to 49 living with HIV/AIDS in Swaziland in 2015 ranged between 26.7 percent and 30.5 percent, according to UN Aids.

The country is frequently subject to natural disasters such as droughts, floods, hail and wind storms as well as outbreaks of disease. As such, the start of the rainy season is often synonymous with damaged infrastructure, reduced access to health facilities and increased risks of water and vector-borne diseases, such as cholera and malaria.


## OUTLOOK

The IPC analysis estimates that 30 to 55 percent of households will remain in *Crisis* or *Emergency* between October 2016 and February 2017, corresponding to the lean season. Food reserves and income will be insufficient to meet the needs of the population who are already acutely food insecure. Such households are likely to become increasingly dependent on the consumption of wild foods and to engage in unsustainable livelihood activities, such as selling charcoal.

Up to 15 percent of the population in the worst-hit areas, particularly in Lubombo and Shiselweni, are forecast to face *Emergency* conditions between October 2016 and February 2017. These households will require humanitarian assistance to prevent loss of life and high levels of acute malnutrition. Overall, nearly 39 percent of households in Swaziland require urgent support to protect livelihoods and reduce food gaps.

Forecasts for the 2016/17 main summer cropping season (Oct-Jun) point to average to above-average rainfall; this follows a season largely characterized by severe dryness. Based on the current weather outlook, early production prospects for 2017 crops are generally favourable. However, the productive capacity of farming households is expected to be lower than normal, particularly because of reduced seed supplies from the poor 2016 output.

# ZIMBABWE

| Food-insecure people in need of urgent action  | Food insecurity trends   | Food insecurity outlook   |
|--|--|---|
| 2016   | 2015 - 2016  | 2017  |
|  <b>4.1M PEOPLE</b><br>IPC 3+  |   | <br>Food security is likely to deteriorate up to the next harvest in March 2017. |
| <b>Key drivers and other contributing factors</b>  |  |   |
|  <b>EL NIÑO-DRIVEN DROUGHT</b>   |  <b>ECONOMIC DOWNTURN</b>                         |  <b>HIGH POVERTY RATES</b>  |
|  <p><i>Lower crop production and depleted food stocks</i></p>   |  <p><i>Loss of income</i></p>                   |  <p><i>Liquidity constraints and erosion of purchasing power</i></p>           |
|  <p><i>Deterioration of livestock conditions and cattle deaths</i></p>  |  <p><i>Lack of employment opportunities</i></p> |  <p><i>Limited households assets and disruption of livelihoods</i></p>         |


**Background:** El Niño-induced drought had a severe impact in 2016 on the agricultural output of the country and consequences on food security. As a result, the Government of Zimbabwe declared a State of National Disaster in February 2016. The devastation caused by the drought accentuated high levels of poverty springing from economic, environmental and political shocks of the last decade.

**Total population:** 15,967,000  
*(UNdata, proj, 2016)*  
**GDP per capita PPP:** US\$1,953.33  
*(IMF, 2016 est.)*  
**Poverty rate:** 62.6% (ZIMSTAT)  
**HDI rank:** 155 (UNDP, 2015)  
**Population dependent on agriculture:**  
*over 70% (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012 est.)*

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Zimbabwe

Acute food insecurity situation, May-Jun 2016



#### Legend


IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- |                                |           |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| 1                              | Minimal   |
| 2                              | Stressed  |
| 3                              | Crisis    |
| 4                              | Emergency |
| 5                              | Famine    |
| Areas with Inadequate Evidence |           |
| Not analyzed                   |           |

Zimbabwe IPC Technical Working Group, May-Jun 2016

### Zimbabwe

Acute food insecurity situation, Jul 2016-Mar 2017



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- |                                |           |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| 1                              | Minimal   |
| 2                              | Stressed  |
| 3                              | Crisis    |
| 4                              | Emergency |
| 5                              | Famine    |
| Areas with Inadequate Evidence |           |
| Not analyzed                   |           |

Zimbabwe IPC Technical Working Group, Jul 2016-Mar 2017

Based on Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) Rural Livelihood Assessment data, the latest IPC Analysis conducted in June 2016 estimated that 2.3 million people (17 percent of rural households) were in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* between May and June 2016, which corresponds to the harvesting season.

The provinces of Matabeleland North and South, Manicaland, Midlands and Masvingo recorded the highest percentage of people in *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions. In absolute numbers, the worst affected provinces are Masvingo, Midlands, Manicaland and Matabeleland South.

Between July 2016 and March 2017, the ZIMVAC findings point to a notable deterioration in food security with over 4 million people (42 percent of the rural population) in need of support. Around 7 percent (103,500 people) of this population would face *Emergency* conditions, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods.

During this period, provinces in the south and south-east are expected to host the highest number of people in need. The majority of food-insecure households are those who have been severely affected by drought and who have very limited and/or depleted food stocks and livelihoods.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Global acute malnutrition rates range from 2.6 percent in Mashonaland East to 6.7 percent in Mashonaland West. Food insecurity is increasing the proportion of households consuming an inadequate diet and adopting emergency livelihood coping strategies. Overall, levels of acute malnutrition have not yet been critical, but malnutrition rates may increase because of food consumption gaps and livelihood changes, particularly for poor and very poor households. In Mashonaland West, severe acute malnutrition ranges from 1.1 to 3.4 percent. Here, the population is at high risk of a persistent increase in malnutrition rates.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

In 2016, the main drivers of food insecurity in Zimbabwe were the severe impact of El Niño-induced drought and the sharp economic downturn, which engendered unemployment and liquidity constraints. Below-average rainfall during the 2015/16 cropping season significantly reduced cereal production. Livestock weight and health conditions deteriorated and cattle deaths were registered in some districts in the south and south-east. The prolonged dryness saw a 27 percent drop in cereal production compared with the already below-average output in 2015. The poor harvest and households' limited grain reserves meant that household food stocks were consumed within just two months in affected areas.

Despite upward pressure stemming from two consecutively poor years of cereal production and tight national supplies, Zimbabwe is estimated to have experienced deflation in 2016. Prices of maize meal, the primary food staple, fell by up to 50 percent between January and October 2016. The lower year-on-year levels are mostly the result of the stronger US dollar (the main currency used in the country). This made imports cheaper, despite higher prices in South Africa, the country's main source of grain. Additionally, liquidity constraints eroded purchasing power, which in turn reduced demand and lessened inflationary pressure, further contributing to the lower prices. Ample cereal imports also eased supply pressure.

Despite lower year-on-year prices, household food access continues to be limited by low income, particularly because agricultural employment is scarce. Indeed, the drought caused a drop in demand for agricultural labourers, which led households to resort to unsustainable coping strategies. Purchasing power – especially for unskilled wage labourers – also fell, thereby contributing to food insecurity.

The vulnerability of certain population groups makes them more susceptible to food insecurity. These include households headed by children, the elderly, households affected by HIV<sup>56</sup>, households with little or no livestock, and households with limited access to remittances. The severe drought has thus increased food insecurity and exacerbated extreme poverty in Zimbabwe, where 72 percent of the population live on less than US\$1.25 a day. Even traditionally food-secure regions such as the provinces of Mashonaland have been severely hit.

## OUTLOOK


Projections suggest that food insecurity will deteriorate up to the next harvesting season in March 2017. Over 4.1 million rural households are expected to face *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions and to be in need of humanitarian assistance, in the context of increasing political turmoil and the economic crisis. Food security is expected to worsen during the peak lean season (Jan–Mar) and the worst affected areas will experience *Emergency* conditions. Traditional cereal-surplus producing areas in the Mashonaland provinces will continue to have *Stressed* food security.

In terms of agriculture, the productive capacity of farming households is expected to be lower in 2017, particularly because of reduced access to fertilizer and seed supplies, the result of two consecutive years of below-average harvests. This is being partly alleviated by extensive agricultural input support from the government and the humanitarian community. Although 2017 maize plantings are not expected to be larger than previous years, current favourable weather forecasts suggest 2017 yields will be better than the poor performance of 2016.

96 <sup>56</sup> HIV prevalence rates range from 16 to 20 percent across the provinces of Zimbabwe, except in Matabeleland, where reports indicate an HIV prevalence rate of more than 20 percent, according to OCHA.

### 3.5 Conflict in Asia, Near and Middle East

## AFGHANISTAN



\*Forced to leave Pakistan and expected to return before the end of the year


**Background:** Afghanistan has endured protracted conflict for almost 35 years, which has seriously hampered poverty reduction and development, putting pressure on society and depleting its coping mechanisms. Armed non-state actors have spread the conflict beyond the southern and eastern regions of the country, with 11.6 million civilians killed or injured in 2016. The underlying fragility of Afghanistan also means it has little resilience in the face of the frequent natural disasters that occur in the country.

Total population: 33,370,000  
(UNdata, proj., 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$1957.29  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 36% (UNDP, 2015)  
HDI rank: 171 (UNDP, 2015)  
Population dependent on agriculture:  
75% (USAID, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


### Afghanistan

Acute food insecurity situation, Apr-June 2016




### Afghanistan

Acute food insecurity situation, Jul-Dec 2016



**Graph 7: Number of people (in thousands) in IPC Phase 2, 3 , 4 and 5 in 2013 – 2016<sup>57</sup>**



An IPC analysis for the pre-harvest season April to June 2016 estimated that over 8.5 million people (nearly 32 percent of the population) were in Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency* and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. A further 4.7 million were in Phase 2 *Stressed*. Of the 32 provinces analysed, 22 were classified as being in *Crisis* and the remaining 10 in *Stressed*.<sup>58</sup>

The most food-insecure populations in Afghanistan are in the provinces of Badakhshan, Ghor, Daykundi and Bamyan, where between 12 and 15 percent of the population face *Emergency* food insecurity. Badghis also has an extremely high proportion of people in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* or Phase 4 *Emergency*.

**Source:** Based on data from IPC

IPC classifications since 2013 show that these provinces have repeatedly been classified among the most food insecure in the country, both before and after harvests. They suffer from a combination of natural disasters, conflict and seasonal food deficits and they endure the longest lean season (from November to April). Countrywide, IDPs, host communities and households with vulnerable livelihoods are the most food insecure. Undocumented returnees are also affected as they do not receive any type of humanitarian assistance during departure and on arrival, support is often insufficient.

The IPC analysis predicted that food security would improve considerably during the post-harvest season (Jul-Dec), when 4.3 million people were expected to be in *Crisis* or *Emergency* conditions in the 32 provinces analysed. Another 8.7 million people (33 percent of the population) were classified as *Stressed*. Despite the harvest and expected improvement in market functionality, nine provinces remain in *Crisis*. Two are of particular concern: Hilmand in the south, because of increasing civil insecurity; and Nangarhar on the border with Pakistan in the east, which is receiving an estimated 90 percent of returnees. Food insecurity was found to be higher in urban than rural areas, mainly because of a lack of sustainable incomes.

In Afghanistan, food security is strongly marked by seasonality. A comparison between equivalent seasons reveals a slight deterioration in food security over the past three years. This is illustrated by a 5 percent increase in the number of people in IPC Phases 2, 3 and 4 between the post-harvest periods of 2014 and 2016.

<sup>57</sup> As some of the IPC analyses carried out between 2013 and 2016 did not cover the provinces of Laghman and Nimruz, IPC estimates for these two areas are not included in this diagram. This is to ensure that the IPC results presented for different time periods are comparable.

<sup>58</sup> FEWS NET analysis suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance during 2016 may be lower than the IPC estimate. For more information, see: <http://www.fews.net/central-asia/afghanistan>

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

The National Nutrition Surveillance System (NNSS) of the Ministry of Public Health surveyed children aged 0 to 24 months between April and June 2016 (the start of the main season harvests). It found a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 21 percent,<sup>59</sup> and a severe acute malnutrition (SAM) prevalence of 8.4 percent.<sup>60</sup> Recent security constraints in many areas of Afghanistan have restricted access to food, health and nutrition services for periods of time. This has likely increased the prevalence of acute malnutrition, particularly in Kunduz, Nangarhar, Hillmand, Badakhshan and Ghor. The NNSS screenings suggested similar GAM prevalence in different regions of the country. In Kunduz, GAM prevalence was 34.1 percent and SAM 12.2 percent. In Nangarhar, GAM was at 33.6 percent and SAM at 14.6 percent - a substantial increase from the first quarter of 2016.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The acute food insecurity reported in June was the result of the peak lean season combined with a lack of access to food caused by insecurity, as well as livelihood and economic factors. The latter include widespread poverty; a lack of employment opportunities; the depletion of livelihood assets during the harsh 2015/16 lean season; limited market functionality; and food price fluctuations. All these factors curbed household purchasing power, particularly among the poor and unskilled wage labourers. Moreover, 67,700 people were affected by floods, landslides, avalanches and/or earthquakes during the 2015/16 winter season alone.

The vast majority of the population are affected by insecurity, which triggers widespread displacement. Internally displaced people (IDPs) have minimal access to food, sanitation and health facilities. They lack protection and shelter, and their livelihoods are severely disrupted. Increasing numbers of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran are being forced to return. The lack of suitable refugee camps and livelihood activities has generated severe food insecurity, also for host communities. Many are expected to require some form of humanitarian assistance, especially during the cold winter season.

Ongoing conflict has heavily damaged the agricultural sector as well as other livelihoods, entrenching food insecurity. Limited access to land and agricultural inputs translates into low household food production and increased dependency on markets. Although wheat grain prices were almost stable in all major markets between August and November 2016, large regional price differences persist, due in part to inadequate infrastructure. Wheat grain can be almost 40 percent more expensive in Kandahar than in Herat. Sharp spikes in the prices of staple foods have been observed in some conflict-affected areas, although these have been short-lived. Outbreaks of agricultural plant diseases also increased in 2016 in some provinces.

Food security in Afghanistan is strongly influenced by seasonality because production is limited and winters are very harsh in the north-east and central highland provinces, where food insecurity is highest and the lean season lasts from November to April. Badakhshan in the north-east has a long history of poverty and food insecurity as a result of its remoteness, poor accessibility, mostly mountainous terrain and very harsh winters. By contrast, Ghor province has been repeatedly hit by drought in the past five years.

<sup>59</sup> Weight-for-height <-2 and/or the presence of oedema.

<sup>60</sup> Weight-for-height <-3 and/or the presence of oedema. This level of acute malnutrition is considered very high according to the WHO thresholds; however, it must be noted that it is not based on a sample that is representative of the country.

## OUTLOOK

In early 2017, markets are predicted to function normally thanks to normal imports of wheat flour from Pakistan and Kazakhstan, near-average aggregate grain harvests, and strong second-season production of fruit, maize and rice. This will help households to stock grain for the winter, except in conflict-affected areas where ongoing fighting continuously affects supply and demand. Many poor households are likely to struggle to stock sufficiently before the winter and will face difficulty in meeting basic food and non-food needs in early 2017, as their food stocks will be depleted and employment opportunities are at a minimum until spring agricultural activities begin.

Falling purchasing power and disrupted livelihoods in many conflict-affected areas will mean a greater need for food assistance compared to recent years. *Crisis* conditions are therefore likely among newly displaced people and undocumented returnees from Pakistan, as well as among poor households in the central highlands and in north-eastern agro-pastoral areas, particularly during the peak lean season (Jan–Apr).

# IRAQ

## Food-insecure people in need of urgent action

## Food insecurity trends

## Food insecurity outlook

2016



**1.5M  
PEOPLE**

2015 - 2016



2017



Food security is expected to deteriorate as access constraints continue to hamper the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

## Key drivers and other contributing factors



CONFLICT



POPULATION  
DISPLACEMENT



HIGH FOOD  
PRICES



Poor agricultural production



Livelihoods disruption



Loss of assets



3 million



REFUGEES  
228,894  
Syrian refugees



RETURNEES  
1.2 million



Lack of employment

**Background:** Iraq has been facing a complex humanitarian crisis since 2014, when conflict erupted between armed groups and government forces. The conflict has displaced over 3.1 million people across Iraq and left more than 10 million in need of humanitarian assistance. However, access to the most vulnerable people is a key challenge, limiting the provision of life-saving assistance. Meanwhile, the government's social protection network is shrinking, reducing support for front-line healthcare, emergency shelter, education, and water and sanitation. As a result, Iraqi families who are unable to find the support and security they need are running out of options to cope.

Total population: 37,548,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)

GDP per capita PPP: US\$16,543.77 (IMF, 2016 est.)

Poverty rate: 13% (UNDP)

HDI rank: 121 (UNDP, 2015)

Population dependent on agriculture: 30% (FAO, 2012)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

The rapidly changing conflict dynamics in Iraq are mirrored in the volatile food security situation across the country. An estimated 2.4 million people<sup>61</sup> are food insecure, of whom 1.5 million are estimated to be severely food insecure. According to WFP's mVAM monitoring system, food insecurity is higher in districts affected by conflict and displacement. Those most vulnerable and food insecure are households and internally displaced people (IDPs) in conflict-affected areas, and returnees in liberated areas.

In 2016, the governorates of Anbar (particularly the districts of Fallujah and Heet), Salah Al-Din and Ninewa (particularly Mosul) had the highest levels of poor and borderline food consumption and the highest proportions of households resorting to negative coping strategies. In liberated areas such as Fallujah (recaptured by Iraqi forces in August 2016), households continued to suffer the aftershocks of months of siege and lack of assistance.

Data from WFP mVAM covering the district of Mosul show that in November 2016, 27 percent of the population had inadequate food consumption. This proportion was higher among residents (non-IDPs), probably because IDPs benefitted from food assistance.

In other areas of the country, although many households were resorting to negative coping strategies, most were consuming an acceptable diet. Overall, the efficiency and quality of the Public Distribution System has been insufficient to cover the needs of the population, with households reporting delays in distribution as well as incomplete rations and poor quality food (WFP mVAM, 2016).

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

In 2016, rapid nutritional assessments of IDP children under 5 found low rates of malnutrition according to WHO classification: wasting rates below 5 percent; stunting rates below 20 percent and underweight rates below 10 percent.

Since the October Mosul offensive, there have been a few cases of malnourished children who were found to have been ill for months and were no longer able to consume food. The nutritional status of newly-displaced people is being monitored and seems to be stable for now but this could change if the conflict continues. A survey at the start of 2017 in all camps will provide accurate data on the nutritional status of children under 5, and pregnant and breastfeeding women.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Since violence erupted, over 3 million people have become internally displaced across more than 100 districts in Iraq. On 8 December 2016, IOM identified more than 1.2 million returnees. The humanitarian situation has been changing rapidly as the conflict continues and affects different areas of the country. Fighting to reconquer Mosul started in October 2016, displacing more than 115,000 people by 27 December 2016.<sup>62</sup> Most IDPs are in camps to the east and south of Mosul in Ninewa, Erbil and Anbar governorates and in host communities.<sup>63</sup>

Conflict is damaging the food security of the Iraqi population in different ways. The loss of assets, disruption to livelihoods and lack of employment opportunities represent the major drivers of food insecurity. Employment and livelihood opportunities are more challenging for people living inside camps compared to those in host communities.

<sup>61</sup> OCHA 2017. Humanitarian Response Plan.

<sup>62</sup> IOM, Displaced Tracking Matrix.

<sup>63</sup> OCHA. *Mosul Humanitarian Crisis* info sheet, November 2016.

The average monthly income for people in camps (US\$382) is much lower than those outside (US\$599). In Mosul, households reported a lack of employment and rising food prices as their main concerns.<sup>64</sup>

Farmers and rural households in conflict areas have been badly affected and are resorting to negative livelihood coping strategies such as selling their livestock at lower prices, either to generate fast cash or because they cannot afford fodder and vaccinations for their cattle. In the long term, even in liberated areas, access to agricultural land will be reduced by the high number of unexploded ordnance and mines laid by ISIL.

Production levels continue to fall in areas most affected by conflict. A large part of the cereal production belt is now directly under the control of rebel forces, affecting access to agricultural inputs, cereal harvests and post-harvesting activities. Before the conflict, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din produced nearly 33 percent of the annual national wheat production and 38 percent of barley production. An agriculture and livelihoods needs assessment in February 2016 found that 70 to 80 percent of corn, wheat and barley cultivations had been damaged or destroyed in parts of Salah Al-Din. In Ninewa, 32 percent of the arable land normally used for wheat was compromised, and 68 percent was destroyed. Likewise, 43 percent of the land used for barley production was damaged and 57 percent was completely destroyed (FAO, 2016). WFP reports that limited water supplies and periodic drought are additional factors preventing domestic agriculture from making a larger contribution to overall cereal supply.<sup>65</sup>

Markets remain the primary food source for households. In addition to food shortages, the escalating conflict has caused severe fuel scarcity, damaging market functionality and sustaining higher local prices, limiting food access for the most vulnerable. WFP reported that inaccessible and besieged areas recorded the biggest food price increases and as result, in October 2016 the purchasing power of people living in hotspot locations was 17 percent lower than in the rest of the country.<sup>66</sup> WFP market monitoring and a market assessment in October 2016 found that blocked trade routes were the main impediment to market functionality, as markets in newly liberated areas have shown the capacity to regain functionality and to ensure price stability once trading resumes and stocks are restored.

The protracted nature of the conflict is severely weakening the resilience of IDPs: they are becoming increasingly reliant on assistance to access basic services because of their loss of income and assets. Meanwhile, the government's social protection system – including support for frontline healthcare, emergency shelter, education, and water and sanitation – is diminishing.

## OUTLOOK

The humanitarian community predicts that the number of people in need of assistance in Iraq could rise to 12 or 13 million as the Mosul crisis evolves. Humanitarian needs will remain severe, particularly for displaced families inside and outside of camps, the vulnerable residents of retaken communities, and people fleeing intense fighting. Cold temperatures will also hit vulnerable households hard during the first quarter of the year, making winterization a priority. OCHA estimates that Mosul military operations alone could affect up to 1.5 million people and displace up to 1 million in the coming months, all of whom will require immediate food assistance.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, security issues will continue to hamper access for humanitarian assistance to those in need, further diminishing their food security. Vulnerable residents of newly retaken areas are also expected to face severe shortages of basic goods and medical services.


<sup>64</sup> WFP mVAM. *Gogjali – Focus on Mosul*.

<sup>65</sup> WFP 2016. *Rapid Market Assessment in Tikrit, Al Dour, Samarra, and Balad, Salah al-Din Governorate*

<sup>66</sup> WFP VAM *Iraq Market Monitor Report*, Issue No. 3, October

<sup>67</sup> OCHA *Mosul Humanitarian Crisis info sheet*, November 2016

# SYRIAN REGIONAL CRISIS – Syria and refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt




**Background:** The devastating conflict in Syria started in March 2011, causing over 280,000 casualties and unprecedented displacement in neighbouring countries. In Turkey, the majority of refugees live in host communities in urban areas in the southern parts of the country with a very low well-being index. In Lebanon, refugees live in over 1,700 communities across the country often in overcrowded conditions. Bekaa Valley has become the principle destination in Lebanon. In Jordan, almost 80 percent of refugees have settled in host communities, particularly in urban Amman and the northern governorate of Jordan; the rest constitute the largest camp population in the region (80,000 in Za'atari Camp). In Iraq, refugees have mainly settled in Kurdistan Region of Iraq and live alongside over 1 million displaced Iraqis. In Egypt, refugees are living in communities throughout the country mainly in the governorates of Alexandria, Cairo, Giza and Qalyubia.

## Syria (country)

Total population: 18,564,000 (UNdata, proj. 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: 64% loss since start of the crisis (UNDP)  
Poverty rate: 85% live in poverty; 69% live in extreme poverty (HNO 2017)  
HDI rank: From 113 in 2010 to 174 (0.443) (UNDP)  
Population dependent on agriculture: 80% (ACAPS, 2013)


## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Syrian Arab Republic: Prevalence of Food Insecurity—Sub-district (November 2016)



Source: WFP, Food Security Cluster

Syria - Food security conditions in selected besieged and hard-to-reach areas, Aug 2016



Food security in Syria has plummeted since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. The Food Security Sector mid-year review of needs estimated that in June 2016, 9.4 million Syrians were in need of food assistance. The number of food-insecure people<sup>68</sup> has risen from 6.3 million to 6.7 million (up 6 percent) and those at risk of food insecurity<sup>69</sup> have increased from 2.4 million to 2.7 million (up 13 percent). The largest increases were reported for the governorates of Quneitra, Dar'a, Damascus, Idleb and Aleppo, all affected by large population movements since late 2015 due to an escalation of conflict, as well as by market price changes and food shortages. Aleppo alone registered a 24 percent increase in the number of people at risk of food insecurity.

An August 2016 assessment found particularly acute food insecurity conditions among more than 590,000 people living in 18 besieged and hard-to-reach areas, where food supplies are extremely limited and where the population largely relies on food assistance. In late September, the humanitarian and security situation in eastern Aleppo city (EAC) became extremely worrying following an unprecedented escalation of violence that caused an increasing number of civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure, including hospitals. In November, an estimated 275,000 people were trapped inside EAC, where humanitarian partners had not been able to provide assistance since July 2016. WFP VAM found that more than 45 percent of households in EAC had inadequate food consumption and food supplies were being exhausted. By 22 December, an estimated 35,000 people had been evacuated from besieged neighbourhoods in EAC (OCHA, 2016). However, the thousands of people still trapped in the besieged enclave have enormous needs and their food security is deteriorating<sup>70</sup> dramatically, raising major concerns of likely growing hunger and malnutrition, including for people who manage to leave.

IDPs and returnees without sustainable livelihoods remain among those most food insecure. The coping strategies applied by households are often irreversible, such as selling productive assets. Levels of negative coping are higher in areas directly affected by conflict.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

In Syria the prevalence of global acute malnutrition is 7.2 percent.<sup>71</sup> Few locations have levels of malnutrition that are classified as *Acceptable*. Data on the nutrition status of IDPs in Syria remains sparse given security and access constraints. The nutrition sector estimates that 86,000 children aged 6-59 months are acutely malnourished, 670,000 children are suffering from micronutrient deficiencies, 1 million children under 2 require optimal feeding to ensure adequate nutrition, and 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women require nutrition services to prevent undernutrition and sustain optimal nutritional wellbeing.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The 2016 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) found that agricultural production continues to be seriously hampered by the conflict. Insecurity is restricting access to fields, disrupting electricity supplies and destroying storage facilities, irrigation infrastructures and machinery. Better conditions were found in relatively accessible areas. Insecurity is also pushing up prices and impeding access to agricultural inputs such as fuel, seeds and fertilizers. The surface area planted with cereals in the 2015/16 cropping season was the smallest on record, and wheat production was estimated to be 55 percent lower than the pre-conflict average. By contrast, barley production reached above-average levels thanks to its capacity to resist adverse weather and input conditions.

<sup>68</sup> Households with unacceptable food consumption and high levels of negative coping strategies.

<sup>69</sup> Households with acceptable levels of food consumption but at risk of food insecurity because of the levels of negative coping strategies they are employing to meet their basic needs.

<sup>70</sup> FSC, 2016.

<sup>71</sup> OCHA (2016) Syria HRP.

Syria's traditionally vibrant livestock sector has suffered increasingly since 2011: pasture availability and access is much reduced and feed prices continue to rise. The production of poultry – the main and most affordable source of animal protein – has shrunk by 60 percent, mostly because feed has become so expensive.

Producers, transporters and traders face rising transaction costs and security risks. In turn, household food access is limited both physically – by fragmented market functionality and severe shortages caused by transportation bottlenecks – and financially, because of high inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, and price increases that particularly affect the purchasing power of the poorest households. Wheat prices in June 2016 were up almost 50 percent year-on-year. Livestock prices doubled between 2015 and 2016. However, the latest data from WFP market price monitoring (Oct 2016) indicate that despite poor market functionality in besieged areas, food prices have been levelling off thanks to humanitarian assistance.

The CFSAM also found that large areas of arable land in the governorates of Aleppo, Idlib and Homs had been hit by drought, the effects of which were compounded by the already damaged irrigation infrastructure.

The security situation continues to underpin and aggravate various other factors contributing to food insecurity, which in Syria is characterized by a high degree of economic vulnerability and asset depletion. A typical food-insecure household has large food consumption gaps with an extreme loss of livelihood assets. The public sector, private business and industries have been severely disrupted. Since 2011, 3 million jobs have been lost and in early 2015, unemployment stood at 57 percent – 10 percent higher than at the start of the conflict.

Sixty nine percent of the population live in extreme poverty and are unable to cover their basic needs, including food.<sup>72</sup> Casual labour is the main income source for borderline food-insecure households, but opportunities are increasingly scarce and IDPs and returnees have saturated labour markets. Displacement is also one of the major drivers of food insecurity as IDPs lose their livelihoods and productive assets.

Years of conflict have had a cumulative effect not just on the economy, but also on people's coping capacity. Those most vulnerable are households headed by women or children, some of whom are also IDPs. Many of these households have been reliant on remittances, which have become unpredictable, leading to a high dependence on food assistance and alternative sources of income, including friends or relations.

## OUTLOOK

As a resolution to the conflict is not foreseen any time soon, particularly in Aleppo and in ISIL-controlled areas, Syrians are expected to face increasingly worse food security. The main drivers of food insecurity will remain in place, preventing any significant improvement. Population movements will continue as fighting intensifies. Continuing violence will impede the restoration of livelihoods and full market functionality. As a result, millions of people will remain highly dependent on humanitarian assistance to cover their basic needs. In areas that remain hard to reach or under siege, civilians are more likely to experience malnutrition and disease.

With worsening conditions and fewer options available, households are also likely to resort more to crisis and emergency strategies to cope with the lack of food and resources. In terms of agricultural performance, the resilience of farmers has been heavily compromised by almost six years of conflict. There is a risk that many will abandon food production, with potentially grave consequences for national food availability and for the food security of farming households. In addition, without urgent support for veterinary services, animal diseases may spread possibly even beyond national borders, thereby affecting livestock in neighbouring countries.

# SYRIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES: EGYPT, IRAQ, LEBANON, JORDAN AND TURKEY

## ***Regional overview and impact on host countries***

The flow of Syrian refugees into neighbouring countries began in April 2011. It rose exponentially as the conflict escalated and spread within Syria. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan became the main destinations of this human flow, while most Syrians of Kurdish origin headed to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. By December 2016, the number of registered Syrian refugees in the top five host countries reached 4.81 million.<sup>73</sup> The vast majority of Syrian refugees are settled in urban, peri-urban and rural areas; just 10 percent are hosted in official camps. Children account for nearly half of the refugee population.

The refugee influxes are having enormous social and economic impacts on host communities. Vulnerable host populations are increasingly resorting to negative coping strategies in response to increases in rents and competition for local jobs, which in turn have lowered wages and increased social tensions. Local services such as health, education and water are under severe strain. Loss of trade with Syria has also affected businesses in host countries. Economic repercussions - including trade and market disruptions and unstable security in some areas - also affect the agricultural economy and food production in host countries. For instance, in areas bordering Syria, the risk of trans-boundary animal and crop diseases has increased, and in areas with large refugee populations, there is evidence of environmental and natural resource depletion, water pollution and land degradation. Since 2014, the Syrian refugee crisis response has been coordinated through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), a multi-partner effort linking humanitarian and resilience-building actions to address a crisis of such unprecedented scale, length and complexity.

## ***Food insecurity overview***

The majority of Syrian refugees in the five main host countries rely on humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs, and assistance is their primary source of food. After almost six years of displacement, assessments reveal an alarming deterioration in refugee food security. In Lebanon, 36 percent of refugees are food insecure (34 percent moderately and 2 percent severely food insecure); 58 percent are mildly food secure and risk sliding to food insecurity without continued humanitarian assistance. In Turkey, almost one third of Syrian refugee households are food insecure. In Egypt, 61 percent of households are severely economically vulnerable. In Jordan, 72 percent of Syrian refugees are either food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity.

Poverty and access to stable employment are strongly associated with household food security, including with levels of food consumption and with the adoption of livelihood and/or consumption coping strategies. Households particularly vulnerable to food insecurity are those headed by women, children,<sup>74</sup> or the elderly; those with lower levels of education; and those with higher dependency ratios. Deteriorating conditions are mainly registered outside official camps, where refugees are more vulnerable and exposed to external shocks and where most are living below the poverty line. Local market capacity to meet the additional needs of the refugees varies; food price fluctuations affect food access for the most vulnerable.

<sup>73</sup> At the same time, a growing number of Syrians have attempted to reach Europe. In 2015 alone, 1 million people reached Europe by sea, almost five times more than in 2014 (219,000 people). Around 1 million asylum applications have been registered. Germany and Sweden remain the EU's top receiving countries. However, after an initially empathetic welcome, European countries have progressively implemented measures to manage – or prevent – the influx of Syrian refugees.

<sup>74</sup> UNICEF has warned the international community that malnutrition, a lack of education, poor healthcare and emotional distress are among the many factors creating what could become a “lost generation” of Syrian children. The No Lost Generation initiative was launched in 2013 as a commitment by humanitarian actors and donors to combine efforts across sectors in support of children and youth affected by the Syria crisis, which is jeopardizing their safety, wellbeing, education and, as a result, their future.

### **Syrian Refugees in Turkey**

A WFP pre-assistance baseline survey undertaken in the second half of 2015 revealed precarious food security in off-camp Syrian refugee households in the southern provinces of Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa in Turkey. This was linked to high levels of poverty and limited access to regular employment. Measured by the Turkish national living standard, more than 90 percent of interviewed households were found to be below the poverty line. Most refugee households were relying on incomes from seasonal or irregular employment to cover their basic needs.

Using WFP CARI methodology, the assessment found that almost one third of households were moderately or severely food insecure, and 66 percent were marginally food secure. Higher rates of food insecurity were observed in Sanliurfa (43 percent) and Hatay (38 percent) compared to the two other provinces. Moreover, 38 percent of respondents were resorting to crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies, including involving children in income generation. Households were also employing negative consumption-based coping mechanisms because of a lack of food or money, including relying on cheaper foods, reducing the number of meals a day and limiting portion sizes. In fact, food consumption was borderline or poor, with significant food consumption gaps for 29 percent of households.

A 2016 vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees living in Istanbul showed that 73 percent had acceptable food consumption, 12 percent had poor consumption and 15 percent had borderline consumption.

### **Syrian Refugees in Lebanon**

The food security of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been worsening in recent years and continued to decline in 2016.<sup>75</sup> Around 34 percent of households are moderately food insecure and 1.6 percent are severely food insecure. The most food-insecure districts are Akkar, Baalbek, Hermel, Marjaayoun, Nabatieh, Tyre and Zahle. Everywhere apart from Hermel, the percentage of households with severe and moderate food insecurity increased significantly in 2016.

Food insecurity among Syrian refugees in Lebanon is firstly characterized by limited access to food and by coping strategies that deplete assets: 74 percent used crisis and/or emergency strategies to cope with a lack of food in 2016, an alarming upward trend compared to 2015 (61 percent) and 2014 (28 percent). Figures show a considerable deterioration in the quality of diets compared to 2015: the percentage of households consuming inadequate diets doubled in 2016 (32 percent compared to 16 percent in 2015), and refugees with low dietary diversity increased from 4 percent in 2015 to 14 percent in 2016. WFP Food Security Outcome Monitoring (FSOM) shows that when levels of assistance returned to forecast levels, it helped slow the deterioration of food security over 2016.

A 2015 WFP market assessment showed that the Lebanese food sector has managed to meet the increased demand generated by Syrian refugees, mainly thanks to imports: Lebanese cereal imports have increased by over 20 percent. However, the economy has been showing signs of weakening. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, GDP growth in Lebanon has slowed; the number of poor Lebanese with inadequate access to social protection is increasing; and the extra competition over public services and employment is reflected in a growing number of people living below the poverty line. In terms of agriculture, Lebanese exporters of horticultural products are experiencing difficulties because of the conflict in Syria, which has disrupted trade and land routes, particularly when the last border crossing between Syria and Jordan was closed in March 2015. Farmers near the border with Syria have also reported that security concerns have prevented them from accessing their fields and orchards.

### **Syrian Refugees in Jordan**

After negative trends in 2014 and 2015, food security among off-camp Syrian refugees in Jordan has begun to rise again in 2016.<sup>76</sup> This improvement is mainly thanks to increases in food assistance. Even so, 60 percent of households remain vulnerable to food insecurity and 12 percent are food insecure. Levels of food insecurity have fallen in all governorates except in Irbid. Al Tafileh and Al Zarqa register the highest levels with more than 80 percent of refugees either vulnerable to food insecurity or food insecure.

However, income sources have diversified since 2014, with skilled and unskilled labour now representing the primary source of income for 40 percent of refugee households in host communities, compared to 20 percent in 2014.

Trends registered in refugee camps such as Azraq and Za'atari also confirm an overall improvement in food security since last year, although vulnerability to food insecurity remains high at 65 percent.

While in 2014 refugees in host communities were more likely to be food secure than those in camps, currently, more off-camp refugees are food insecure (12 percent) than those living in camps (5 percent).

### **Syrian Refugees in Iraq**

Ongoing internal conflict and insecurity has hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance –including food assistance – in the worst-hit areas, particularly in Anbar governorate where 4,500 Syrian refugees reside. By contrast, access to the population in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has not been of serious concern so far.

A 2015 food security and vulnerability assessment among refugees living in nine camps across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq<sup>77</sup> found that, by applying CARI methodology, 70.4 percent of households fell into the marginally food-secure category, and 13.9 percent were moderately or severely food insecure. Good levels of food consumption were linked to the refugees' ability to earn an income and access products in the market. In mid-2016, Iraq recorded the largest discrepancy of all host countries between levels of acceptable food consumption among households headed by women (50 percent) and those headed by men (72 percent).

Over the year, dietary diversity improved for beneficiaries, and they reported resorting less to negative food-based coping strategies. However, there was a rise in emergency coping strategies such as accepting high risk, illegal, socially degrading or exploitative temporary jobs.

### **Syrian Refugees in Egypt**

Most of the refugees in Egypt live in vulnerable host communities where national safety nets are already overstretched after two decades of economic decline. This is compounded by the negative impact of protracted displacement and the lack of livelihood opportunities. Fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates with related domestic inflation also threaten food access for vulnerable and food-insecure households.

In September 2015, 68,000 Syrian refugees were assessed to be food insecure.<sup>78</sup> Preliminary findings from the 2016 Egypt Vulnerability Assessment of Refugees confirm that food consumption is deteriorating and more refugees were also found to be adopting negative coping mechanisms, such as sending school-age children to work and reducing expenditure on health and education.

<sup>76</sup> WFP, REACH, 2016, (CFSME).

<sup>77</sup> WFP, REACH, 2015.

<sup>78</sup> 3RP Plan 2016–2017, Egypt.

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Despite the magnitude of the crisis, Syrian refugees have not experienced elevated rates of acute malnutrition. Among women and children, the prevalence of acute malnutrition was relatively low. Global acute malnutrition prevalence among children aged 6 to 59 months was below the WHO *Acceptable* threshold (<5 percent) in all settings.<sup>79</sup> The prevalence of acute malnutrition among women, as measured by mid-upper arm circumference, also indicated relatively low levels of wasting (3.5–6.5 percent). However, the prevalence of anaemia suggests a serious public health problem among women and children, especially in Za’atri camp; this requires response interventions that address micronutrient deficiencies such as food fortification.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The main cause of food insecurity among Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries is a lack of income and purchasing power. Restrictions on access to labour markets have reduced refugees' livelihood opportunities, curtailing their capacity to meet their basic needs without external assistance. As a result, they are increasingly reliant on food assistance and loans as their primary livelihood source. However, livelihood support is insufficient and food assistance has been dwindling, particularly up to 2015, because of funding fatigue.

Syrian refugees face extremely high rates of poverty: 93 percent of those living outside camps in Jordan live below the poverty line, as do over 70 percent of refugees in Lebanon, 65 percent in Egypt and 37 percent in Iraq. To cope, households are increasingly resorting to severe, often irreversible strategies. This trend heightens the risk of future food insecurity as households have even less margin to cope with shocks.

Most Syrian refugees had diverse and good quality diets before the crisis, but their food security deteriorated as livelihoods and markets were disrupted. Before crossing the border, the majority of refugees were internally displaced multiple times and saw their food consumption decline sharply. While most of those who have left the country are consuming at least two meals a day – an improvement from their experience as IDPs, they remain unable to afford the quality and quantity of diet they had before the crisis. Food security has also been driven by poor living conditions, which have spurred an increase in infectious diseases.

## REGIONAL OUTLOOK


As their savings and assets are exhausted, households are likely to resort to more frequent use of severe, increasingly irreversible coping strategies. Poor or borderline food consumption levels may increase as households lose their capacity to cope with shocks and are more likely to employ strategies that erode their food security. Most of the refugees who are able to find work are engaged in casual employment, making it difficult to build back savings.

The ongoing conflict in Syria will continue to generate displacement, but large-scale new arrivals to the top five refugee-hosting countries are not expected in 2017.<sup>80</sup> By the end of 2017, the number of refugees is forecast to drop slightly, stabilizing at 4.7 million people, thanks to a combination of factors including departures from the region through resettlement and other forms of admission to third countries.


<sup>79</sup> Nutritional situation among Syrian refugees hosted in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon: cross sectional surveys. Conflict and Health, 2016.

<sup>80</sup> 3RP Regional Strategic Overview, 2017-2018

# YEMEN




## Key drivers and other contributing factors




**Background:** Conflict erupted in Yemen in March 2015. Since then, the humanitarian situation has progressively deteriorated. The economy has taken a serious blow, with GDP contracting almost 35 percent in 2015, according to government figures. Oil production has almost stopped, slashing total public revenue by 54 percent. This has severely compromised the ability of public institutions to deliver basic services. Restrictions on imports of food, medicines and fuel have amplified humanitarian needs, as Yemen is dependent on imports for over 90 percent of staple foods and nearly all its fuel.

Total population: 27,478,000  
(UNdata, proj. 2016)  
GDP per capita PPP: US\$2,521.09  
(IMF, 2016 est.)  
Poverty rate: 27.5% (UNDP)  
HDI rank: 160 (UNDP, 2015)  
Agricultural labour force: 37% (FAO 2014)  
Agriculture as share of GVA: 14.7%  
(UNdata, 2014)

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW



**Graph 8: Number of people in IPC Phase 3, 4 and 5 in 2014 – 2016**



**Source:** Based on data from IPC

<sup>81</sup> The availability of food security data for Yemen was limited during 2016. FEWS NET analysis suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance during 2016 may be lower than the IPC estimate. For more information, see: <http://www.fews.net/east-africa/yemen>

<sup>82</sup> Al Bayda, Abyan, Ad Dali, Al Hodeidah, Hajjah, Lahiq, Sa'ada, Shabwah and Taiz.

An IPC analysis conducted in Yemen in June 2016 found 7.1 million people in Phase 3 *Crisis* and 7 million in Phase 4 *Emergency*. The combined figure of over 14.1 million people represents 51 percent of the population. An additional 8.2 million people were estimated to be in Phase 2 *Stressed*.<sup>81</sup>

The levels of food insecurity are alarming in the governorates witnessing active conflict, and they are expected to deteriorate further. *Emergency* conditions were found in 9 out of 22 governorates. The highest levels of food insecurity are among internally displaced people (IDPs) who have lost their livelihoods due to displacement. Their situation also impacts host communities, whose resources are stretched.<sup>82</sup>

The number of food insecure has increased by 10 percent compared to 2015 (an additional 1.2 million people), and by 33 percent compared to 2014 (an additional 3.5 million).

Even before the conflict, provinces currently in *Emergency* conditions had been repeatedly classified as the most food-insecure in the country.

In October 2016, despite the start of the second harvest season, food consumption levels worsened across the country. This indicated deteriorating food security, with 24.9 percent of the population recording poor food consumption scores, compared with 21.4 percent in September. The worst decline was in the governorates of Sana'a, Dhamar and Shabwah.<sup>83</sup>

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

Malnutrition already affected a large proportion of Yemeni children before the conflict, when more than 1 in 10 were acutely malnourished and the prevalence of global stunting was 41.3 percent.<sup>84</sup> According to the Yemen 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview,<sup>85</sup> 3.3 million children and pregnant or breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, including 462,000 children under 5 suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM). This represents a 63 percent increase since late 2015. The situation is most critical in the governorates of Hodeida, Sa'ada, Taiz, Hajjah and Lahej. Preventable diseases such as diarrhoea, malnutrition and respiratory tract infections are major issues, when less than a third of the population has access to medical care, and fewer than half of health facilities are functional.

Findings of the latest EFSNA confirm that acute malnutrition is at alarming levels. Four governorates (Abyan, Taiz, Al Hodaidah, and Hadramout) have GAM prevalence above the WHO *Critical* threshold ( $\geq 15\%$ ). Seven and eight governorates have GAM prevalence at serious levels (10-14.9%) and poor levels (5-9.9%), respectively.<sup>86</sup> Malnutrition is more severe in the lowlands than the highlands. Health, water and sanitation issues are likely contributing factors to the ongoing cholera outbreak in Yemen. WHO estimates that 7.6 million people live in high-risk areas.

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The main driver of food insecurity in Yemen is the ongoing conflict, with its devastating effects in terms of population displacement, economic performance, agricultural losses – including for the fisheries and livestock sectors – and the widespread disruption of infrastructure, services, markets and livelihoods.

Despite above-average rainfall, the limited access to water as well as shortages of seeds and fertilizers have crippled crop production, particularly in Taiz, Sa'ada, Marib, Hajjah and Sana'a. The scarcity and high prices of fuel have resulted in high costs for irrigation, transportation and the marketing of agricultural products. This has affected the whole agriculture and fisheries value chain. The blockage of livestock exports to neighbouring countries has reduced the prices of livestock, causing extensive losses for producers.

Financial access to food has been hard hit by falling purchasing power, caused by dwindling employment opportunities and income combined with high inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Government employees, who represent 31 percent of the national workforce, have not received a salary for over three months. Safety net assistance provided by the social welfare fund that supported 2.5 million vulnerable poor people has been suspended.

<sup>83</sup> WFP, mVAM bulletin No 15, October 2016. 69 strategies they are employing to meet their basic needs.

<sup>84</sup> WFP, CFSS, 2014.

<sup>85</sup> According to a UNICEF press release published on December 2016, nearly 2.2 million children in Yemen are acutely malnourished and require urgent care. At least 462,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition, an increase of almost 200 percent since 2014. An additional 1.7 million children are suffering from moderate acute malnutrition.

<sup>86</sup> Yemen EFSNA, *preliminary results (2017)* <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-emergency-food-security-and-nutrition-assessment-efsna-2016-preliminary-results>

Annual inflation is currently estimated at over 30 percent and is expected to increase, reducing purchasing power for many. Price fluctuations in the local markets have been registered: in April 2016, the average prices of locally produced goods were over 70 percent above their pre-crisis levels. There is significant price variation across governorates according to the intensity of conflict, with the highest prices recorded in Taiz.

Food security has also been undermined by natural disasters, including locust plagues and flooding caused by unusually heavy rains in April 2016 and during the 2015 tropical cyclones.<sup>87</sup>

## OUTLOOK


Both the security and the macro-economic situation in Yemen are uncertain. As of March and throughout July 2017, 17 million people are estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* and Phase 4 *Emergency*. This corresponds to 60% of the population and represents a 20% increase compared to the results of the IPC Analysis conducted in June 2016. Food insecurity levels are alarming across the country. Out of 22 governorates, seven governorates are in *Emergency*, ten governorates are in *Crisis* and three governorates are in Phase 3! where “!” indicates that the area would have been in *Emergency* or worse without humanitarian assistance.

Of particular concern is the magnitude of food insecurity in Al Hodaidah and Taiz governorates, where almost 2,23 million people are classified in Phase 3 *Crisis* and over 1,91 million people in Phase 4 *Emergency*.

Conflict and insecurity continue to be the main drivers of acute food insecurity, with devastating effects on livelihoods and the nutrition situation. In conflict areas, restrictions and disruptions of commercial and humanitarian imports, mass displacements, loss of income, fuel scarcity and high prices, disrupted market systems, high food prices and the collapse of public services are aggravating the situation. IDPs and hosts communities are expected to face some of the most severe outcomes. Some pocket areas are likely to experience more catastrophic conditions unless an adequate level of humanitarian food assistance and protection of livelihood is availed.

### Yemen

Acute food insecurity situation, Mar-Jul 2017



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine

Areas with Inadequate Evidence

Not analyzed

! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance

Yemen IPC Technical Working Group, Mar-Jul 2017

## 3.6 Latin America and the Caribbean

### 3.6.1 Drought and Hurricane Matthew in Haiti

| HAITI   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Food-insecure people in need of urgent action   | Food insecurity trends   | Food insecurity outlook  |
| 2016  | 2015 - 2016  | 2017   |
|  <b>1.5M PEOPLE</b>  |                                       |  <p>The loss of food stocks and crops, combined with reduced income-earning opportunities, will likely limit households' ability to meet their food needs during the peak of the lean season (April-June).</p>  |
| <i>Key drivers and other contributing factors</i>   |  |  |
|  <b>EL NIÑO DROUGHT AND HURRICANE MATTHEW</b>   |  <b>HIGH FOOD PRICES</b>             |  <b>POPULATION DISPLACEMENT</b>  |
|  <p><b>Crop losses and limited food availability</b></p>   |  <p><b>Market disruption</b></p>    |  <p><b>RETURNEES</b><br/><b>149,500</b><br/>Repatriated/deported/<br/>returned from<br/>Dominican Republic</p>  <p><b>IDPs</b><br/><b>55,000</b><br/>Displaced by<br/>earthquake</p>  <p><b>IDPs</b><br/><b>175,000</b><br/>Evacuated to<br/>temporary shelters<br/>after "Matthew"</p> |
|  <p><b>Loss of food stocks and livelihood assets</b></p>   |  <p><b>Low purchasing power</b></p> | <p><b>Total population:</b> 10,848,000 (UNdata,<br/>proj. 2016)</p> <p><b>GDP per capita PPP:</b> US\$1784.36<br/>(IMF, 2016 est.)</p> <p><b>Poverty rate:</b> 58.6% (UNDP, 2012)</p> <p><b>HDI rank:</b> 163 (UNDP, 2012)</p> <p><b>Population depending on agriculture:</b><br/>60% (USAID, 2014)</p>  |
| <p><b>Background:</b> Haiti faces major humanitarian, political and development challenges. Three quarters of the population live on less than US\$2 a day, and access to electricity, water, sanitation and healthcare is limited. Over the past two decades, these issues have been exacerbated by a series of natural disasters including severe storms, flooding and the devastating earthquake of 2010. Most recently, El Niño drought slashed agricultural output in 2015/6, and Hurricane Matthew in October 2016 affected the lives and livelihoods of over 2 million people.</p> |  |  |

## FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

### Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation, Apr-Jun 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification


- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance

Haiti IPC Technical Working Group,  
Apr-Jun 2016

### Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation, May-Jul 2016



#### Legend

IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 Minimal
- 2 Stressed
- 3 Crisis
- 4 Emergency
- 5 Famine
- Areas with Inadequate Evidence
- Not analyzed

! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance

Sudan IPC Technical Working Group,  
Apr-Jul 2016

In January 2016, before the hurricane, 3.6 million people were food insecure in Haiti, of whom 1.5 million were severely food insecure.<sup>88</sup> In August 2016, this number decreased to 3.2 million. The improvement mostly reflected a recovery of the 2016 spring harvest from the previous year's reduced output and the positive impact of humanitarian interventions in the communes with the highest proportion of people in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis*.<sup>89</sup> The IPC analysis conducted for July–September 2016 classified all analysed areas in Phase 2 *Stressed*, except for three areas in Phase 1, namely: the rice zone of Artibonite, the banana production area and the Plateau area of the Artibonite (sub-humid plateau region).

Hurricane Matthew devastated parts of Haiti in October 2016. According to the subsequent Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA),<sup>90</sup> the hurricane affected 2.1 million Haitians (more than 20 percent of the population) and left 1.4 million people in need of food assistance, of whom 806,600 were in urgent need of food assistance. Food and nutritional security has gradually worsened since 2013 following three years of drought exacerbated by El Niño, which affected 2015 output (CNSA, WFP 2016). Drought-affected departments were also among those worst hit by Hurricane Matthew, namely Nippes, Ouest and Nord-Ouest, as well as Sud-Est and Nord-Est (FEWS NET, February 2016).

## NUTRITION SNAPSHOT

The latest validated records for national levels of malnutrition refer to the 2012 *Children's Morbidity and Malnutrition Assessment* by the Children's Institute of Haiti (*Institut Haïtien de l'Enfance*, 2013). According to this study, global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence was 5 percent (65,000 people), and 22 percent of children were stunted (274,000). Morbidity was identified as one of the main determinants of malnutrition. In more recent years, the situation has deteriorated because of natural disasters such as the drought and the hurricane, which have increased food insecurity and restricted access to sanitation facilities.

In 2016, a nutrition survey conducted in the 20 communes most affected by drought found an average GAM rate of 8.4 percent. Six communes were in *alert* with GAM rates greater than 10 percent. Two of them were above the *Emergency* level of 15 percent and had severe acute malnutrition rates of between 8 and 10 percent.<sup>91</sup>

In December 2016, OCHA reported that humanitarian partners were increasingly concerned about nutrition in the hurricane worst-hit areas. UNICEF, the Ministry of Public Health and Population and their partners conducted screenings in November in three of the most affected communes in Grand'Anse and in six communes in the Sud region. Findings point to a worsening nutritional situation with malnutrition levels two to four times higher than normal, although final figures are not yet available (OCHA, 2016).

## KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The current levels of food insecurity are the result of severe drought in 2015 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016, both of which had devastating effects on agriculture and severely limited physical and economic access to food. In 2015, agricultural production fell by more than 50 percent compared to the long-term average<sup>92</sup> and by more than 24 percent compared to the drought-affected 2014 season.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>88</sup> CNSA, WFP, EFSA 2016.

<sup>89</sup> CNSA, July 2016.

<sup>90</sup> Conducted by WFP, FAO and the Haitian National Coordination for Food Security Office (CNSA) in the five departments most affected by the hurricane.

<sup>91</sup> UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children 2016.

<sup>92</sup> FEWS NET, Feb–Sept 2016.

<sup>93</sup> CNSA, WFP, EFSA 2016

Prolonged drought during the 2015 planting seasons in Nippes, Nord-Est, Sud-Est, Ouest, Nord-Ouest and Sud reduced the cultivated area by 20 to 30 percent compared to the average. In 2016, as the effects of El Niño dissipated, more normal rainfall patterns and cheap agricultural inputs resulted in a good spring harvest, improving food availability for the first half of the year. However, Hurricane Matthew destroyed over 75 percent of the standing crops of about 75 percent of farming households in the five most affected districts; the highest concentration of damage was in Sud and Grand'Anse. Moreover, two in every three households lost between 75 percent and 100 percent of their food stocks.<sup>94</sup>

Food prices and market functions were also affected by drought conditions and the hurricane. In early 2016, prices rose for locally grown food crops as consequence of the El Niño-induced drought, which caused crop losses across the country and limited food availability. Moreover, poor crop production has left local markets as the only source of food in practically all departments. The prices of staple foods such as maize and beans were above the five-year average on all markets.<sup>95</sup> Food share expenditure, a proxy indicator of poverty and purchasing power, is fairly high: 49 percent of households are spending more than 65 percent of their expenditure on food.<sup>96</sup> In October, prices rose by 15 to 25 percent for the main staple foods because transport routes were destroyed. In November, the prices returned to pre-Matthew levels, increasing food access. However, the availability of local products in the Grand'Anse, Nippes and Sud was low. Crucial seasonal products, such as the bananas, beans and yams were critically low in supply, especially in the markets of the Grand'Anse.

These recent natural disasters have exacerbated the effects of underlying chronic food security drivers such as monetary poverty and limited purchasing power; high market dependency; low agricultural productivity and income; recurrent natural disasters; environmental degradation; poor infrastructure and limited market integration; and very low levels of education. Agricultural productivity is low because of a lack of adequate inputs, infrastructure and mechanization, as well as environmental degradation. Haiti is also highly exposed to natural hazards such as hurricanes, floods, landslides and droughts. In 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake devastated Haiti, claiming 222,750 lives and displacing 1.5 million. This disaster was followed by a cholera outbreak with over 770,000 suspected cases at its onset, and with 15,794 new cases registered between January and 21 May 2016.<sup>97</sup>

## OUTLOOK

The IPC analysis conducted early 2017 reported the departments most affected by Hurricane Matthew (Grand'Anse, Sud and Nippes) in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis*, despite the delivery of food assistance. Without food assistance, these departments would have most likely been in IPC Phase 4 *Emergency*. Other departments (Sud-Est, Haut Artibonite, Nord-Est), which were less or not affected by hurricane Mathieu, are also classified in IPC Phase 3 due to the effects of the drought. It is estimated that 1.9 to 2.6 million people are in IPC Phase 2 *Stressed* and 1.3 to 2.1 million in IPC Phase 3 *Crisis* for the period from February to May 2017.<sup>98</sup> The situation is expected to slightly improve from June onwards, thanks to harvests. However, Hurricane Matthew directly struck southwestern Haiti, causing severe, widespread damage to housing, crops and livelihood assets. The loss of food stocks and crops, combined with reduced income-earning opportunities, will likely limit households' ability to meet their food needs during the peak of the lean season.

<sup>94</sup> CNSA, FEWS NET, WFP, October-November 2016.

<sup>95</sup> FEWS NET, 2016.


<sup>96</sup> CNSA, WFP, EFSA 2016.

<sup>97</sup> ECHO, 2016.

<sup>98</sup> 98 Haiti IPC Technical Working Group.


## Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation, Feb-May 2017



## Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation, Jun-Sep 2017



“

*The numbers tell a deeply worrying story. It is a race against time - we need to act now to save the lives and livelihoods of the millions at the brink of starvation today.* (Ertharin Cousin, WFP Executive Director)

”

A photograph of a man standing in front of a yellow corrugated metal wall. He is wearing a blue vest over a plaid shirt and jeans. He is holding a small brown bag in his hands. The wall has a padlock on it.

## 4. MAIN COUNTRIES TO WATCH IN 2017

# CHAPTER 4: MAIN COUNTRIES TO WATCH IN 2017

Several countries will require special attention in 2017, in terms of food security and nutrition analysis and monitoring, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

All major food crises highlighted in Chapter 3 will most likely continue in 2017 and will still require regular, intense food and nutrition security monitoring. In particular, there is a risk that famine may be declared in some areas of northeast Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, where food security conditions are expected to deteriorate due to armed conflict, drought and macroeconomic collapse.

In 2017, widespread food insecurity is likely to persist in Iraq, Syria (including among refugees in neighbouring countries), Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Iraq and Syria should be assessed to gauge the feasibility of conducting an IPC exercise or a similarly inclusive approach based on consensus.

Some countries are currently facing more localized or less acute food insecurity and/or are exposed to specific risks that may lead to worsening food security and nutrition conditions in 2017. They are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

Early warning sources highlight a likely deterioration of food security in Libya, Myanmar and Ukraine, while October CH analyses have projected Phase 4 *Emergency* in 2017 in some countries that did not face major food crises in 2016, including Mali, Senegal, Mauritania

and Liberia. Sri Lanka is also likely to face the risk of additional drought impacts given the current seasonal forecast information. The availability of up-to-date information in early 2017 will be crucial to confirm these projections and inform the humanitarian response accordingly.

Increased investments in food security monitoring systems would be required in countries not covered by this report because of lack of recent data as well as in countries where sizable discrepancies were observed among estimates of food-insecure caseloads produced by different organizations. These countries include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan and Venezuela. The table below, while not exhaustive, lists the most critical countries to watch in 2017.

**Table 3: Main countries to watch in 2017**

| <b>Countries / Crises</b>   | <b>Projection 2017<br/>based on most<br/>likely scenario</b><br><i>Magnitude range using<br/>FEWS 2017 outlook<br/>and 2017 HRP for<br/>Syria and Iraq</i> | <b>Additional risk</b>   |
|---|--|--|
| <b>Countries with risk of famine (by magnitude then in alphabetical order)</b>  |  |  |
| <b>Yemen</b>  | Over 10 million  | Conflict.  |
| <b>Nigeria (North east)</b>   | 4 to 6 million   | Conflict involving Boko Haram.   |
| <b>South Sudan</b>  | 4 to 6 million   | Conflict across the country.   |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 2 to 4 million   | Conflict, drought, increasing refugee returns from Dadaab.   |
| <b>Countries with high magnitude of food insecurity or localized severe food insecurity (by magnitude then in alphabetical order)</b> |  |  |
| <b>Syria Regional Crisis (Syria and Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries)</b>  | 8 to 10 million  | Conflict and forced resettlement of refugees in Kurdish areas of Syria; siege of Ar Raqqa.                         |
| <b>Ethiopia</b>   | 4 to 6 million   | Areas with active conflicts in Oromia and Amhara; drought in south.  |
| <b>Malawi</b>   | 4 to 6 million   | Drought, floods.   |
| <b>Zimbabwe</b>   | 4 to 6 million   | Drought, economic crisis, political shocks.  |
| <b>Afghanistan</b>  | 2 to 4 million   | Conflict with massive numbers of Afghan returnees.   |
| <b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>   | 2 to 4 million   | Electoral violence and resurgence of conflict, with increase in arrivals of South Sudanese and Burundian refugees. |
| <b>Mozambique</b>   | 2 to 4 million   | Drought, economic crisis, security incidents.  |
| <b>Kenya</b>  | 2 to 4 million   | Drought in south eastern and coastal areas.  |
| <b>Sudan</b>  | 2 to 4 million   | Conflict, displacement.  |
| <b>Guatemala</b>  | 1 to 2 million   | Drought.   |
| <b>Haiti</b>  | 1 to 2 million   | Drought.   |
| <b>Iraq</b>   | 1 to 2 million   | Armed Conflict.  |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 1 to 2 million   | Drought, high influx of refugees from South Sudan.   |
| <b>Burundi</b>  | 0.5 to 1 million   | Persistent violence along ethnic lines.  |
| <b>Central African Republic</b>   | 0.5 to 1 million   | Conflict.  |
| <b>Chad (Lac region)*</b>   | 0.5 to 1 million   | Conflict involving Boko Haram.   |
| <b>Madagascar (Southern)</b>  | 0.5 to 1 million   | Drought.   |
| <b>Niger (Diffa region)*</b>  | 0.5 to 1 million   | Conflict involving Boko Haram.   |

\* Countries affected by the Lake Chad Basin crisis.



# GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES 2017

# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| <b>ACAPS</b>    | Assessment Capacities Project                                     |
| <b>AWD</b>      | Acute watery diarrhoea  |
| <b>CAR</b>      | Central African Republic  |
| <b>CARI</b>     | Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security   |
| <b>CFSAM</b>    | Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission                         |
| <b>CH</b>       | <i>Cadre Harmonisé</i> – Harmonized framework                     |
| <b>CILSS</b>    | Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel                        |
| <b>CNSA</b>     | Haitian National Coordination for Food Security Office            |
| <b>DRC</b>      | Democratic Republic of Congo                                      |
| <b>EAC</b>      | Eastern Aleppo city (Syria)                                       |
| <b>EC</b>       | European Commission   |
| <b>EFSA</b>     | Emergency Food Security Assessment                                |
| <b>FARDC</b>    | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo              |
| <b>FAO</b>      | Food and Agriculture Organization                                 |
| <b>FCS</b>      | Food Consumption Score  |
| <b>FEWS NET</b> | Famine Early Warning Systems Network                              |
| <b>FSC</b>      | Food Security Cluster   |
| <b>FSNAU</b>    | Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit                         |
| <b>FSOM</b>     | Food Security Outcome Monitoring                                  |
| <b>GAM</b>      | Global acute malnutrition   |
| <b>GDP</b>      | Gross Domestic Product  |
| <b>GIEWS</b>    | Global Information and Early Warning System                       |
| <b>HCR</b>      | High Commissioner for Refugees                                    |
| <b>HIV/AIDS</b> | Human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome |
| <b>IASC</b>     | Inter-Agency Standing Committee                                   |
| <b>IDP</b>      | Internally displaced person                                       |
| <b>IFAD</b>     | International Fund for Agricultural Development                   |
| <b>IGAD</b>     | Intergovernmental Authority on Development                        |
| <b>INFORM</b>   | Index for risk  |
| <b>IOM</b>      | International Organization for Migration                          |
| <b>IPC</b>      | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification                     |
| <b>ISIL</b>     | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant                              |
| <b>JRC</b>      | European Commission – Joint Research Centre                       |
| <b>LGA</b>      | Local Government Areas (Nigeria)                                  |
| <b>LIFDC</b>    | Low-income food-deficit countries                                 |
| <b>MICS</b>     | Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey                                 |
| <b>MVAC</b>     | Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee                         |
| <b>MWK</b>      | Malawian kwacha   |
| <b>NGN</b>      | Nigerian naira  |
| <b>NNSS</b>     | National Nutrition Surveillance System (Afghanistan)              |
| <b>OCHA</b>     | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs               |
| <b>OECD</b>     | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development            |
| <b>SADC</b>     | Southern Africa Development Community                             |
| <b>SAM</b>      | Severe acute malnutrition   |
| <b>SICA</b>     | Central American Integration System                               |
| <b>SMART</b>    | Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions  |
| <b>SNNPR</b>    | Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (Ethiopia)    |
| <b>SNSAP</b>    | Nutrition and Food Security Early Warning System                  |
| <b>UNDP</b>     | United Nations Development Programme                              |
| <b>UNICEF</b>   | United Nations Children's Fund                                    |
| <b>UNSMOM</b>   | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia                      |
| <b>WHO</b>      | World Health Organization   |
| <b>WFP</b>      | World Food Programme  |
| <b>ZVAC</b>     | Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee                       |

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# ANNEXES

## **Annex 1: Differences and complementarities between the Global Report on Food Crises and the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (ex-SOFI)**

Both reports represent multi-partnership efforts aiming to complement each other in providing a comprehensive picture of food security/insecurity around the world. Yet, they have well distinguished objectives and rely on different data and methodologies. The most important differences between the two global reports are presented in the following table.

|                              | <i>The Global Report on Food Crises</i>   | <i>The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World</i>   |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| <b>Main Objectives</b>       | Assesses acute food insecurity originating from major crises  | Assesses the achievement of Sustainable Development goals (SDGs) by monitoring long-term trends in chronic food insecurity and mal-  |
| <b>Geographical Coverage</b> | Focuses on the countries affected by food crises. Coverage may vary every year  | Coverage is global. All countries where data are available are includ-   |
| <b>Information sources</b>   | Secondary information mainly based on available Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and <i>Cadre Harmonisé</i> (CH) reports                         | Official statistics from countries are used to inform the compilation of SDG indicators endorsed by the UN Statistical Commission for global monitoring of Targets 2.1 and 2.2 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  |
| <b>Analytical purposes</b>   | National and sub-national focus on the cause of food insecurity in hotspots. Not  | Assesses the achievement of SDGs at the global, regional and national level by monitoring medium and long-time trends in the state   |
| <b>Reference periods</b>     | Short-term food insecurity estimates refer to the 'peak' of the situation during the year   | Estimates refer to the average situation over a period that varies from one to three years, depending on the indicator and the timeli-   |
| <b>Timeliness</b>            | Timeliness is vital for this report. It provides the most recent and up-to-date information to inform decision-making and resource allocation in emergency contexts | Statistical rigor and reliability of the information are key for this report. To reduce the impact of year-to-year variability due to data quality issues, some structural indicators are expressed as three-year moving averages and/or may be reported with a delay and/or |
| <b>Main users</b>            | Donors and policy-makers operating in humanitarian and resilience contexts  | Governments, international agencies, academia, media and anyone interested in the long-term evolution of food security and nutrition   |

# ANNEXES

## Annex 2a: IPC reference tables

**Diagram 4: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Area Classification**

*Purpose: To guide short term strategic objectives linked to medium and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.*

*Usage: Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.*

| Phase Name and Description                    | Phase 1 Minimal   | Phase 2 Stressed   | Phase 3 Crisis   | Phase 4 Emergency   | Phase 5 Famine   |
|---|---|--|--|---|--|
|   | <i>More than four in five households (HHs) are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance</i> | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i><br><br><i>Minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.</i> | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i><br><br><i>Food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition<br/>OR<br/>Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</i> | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i><br><br><i>Large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality<br/>OR<br/>Extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term.</i> | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident.</i><br><br><i>(Evidence for all three criteria of food consumption, wasting, and CDR is required to classify Famine.)</i> |
| Priority Response Objectives                  | Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction   | Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods   | Urgent Action Required to: →   |   |  |
| Food Consumption and Livelihood Change        |   |  | Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition   | Save lives and livelihoods  | Prevent widespread mortality and total collapse of livelihoods   |
| Area Outcomes (directly measured or inferred) | More than 80% of households in the area are able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical strategies to access food and income, and livelihoods are sustainable  | Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 2 or worse   | Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 3 or worse   | Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 4 or worse  | Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 5  |
| Nutritional Status*                           | Acute Malnutrition: <5%<br>BMI <18.5 Prevalence: <10%   | Acute Malnutrition: 5–10%,<br>BMI <18.5 Prevalence: 10–20%   | Acute Malnutrition: 10–15% OR > usual and increasing<br>BMI <18.5 Prevalence: 20–40%, 1.5 x greater than reference   | Acute Malnutrition: 15–30%; OR > usual and increasing<br>BMI <18.5 Prevalence: >40%   | Acute Malnutrition: >30%<br>BMI <18.5 Prevalence: far > 40%  |
| Mortality*                                    | CDR: <0.5/10,000/day<br>USDR: ≤1/10,000/day   | CDR: <0.5/10,000/day<br>USDR: ≤1/10,000/day  | CDR: 0.5–1/10,000/day<br>USDR: 1–2/10,000/day  | CDR: 1–2/10,000/day OR >2x reference<br>USDR: 2–4/10,000/day  | CDR: >2/10,000/day<br>USDR: >4/10,000/day  |

\*For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits must be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of a Phase classification. For example, elevated malnutrition due to disease outbreak or lack of health access—if it is determined to not be related to food consumption deficits—should not be used as evidence for an IPC classification. Similarly, excess mortality rates due to, murder or conflict—if they are not related to food consumption deficits—should not be used as evidence for a Phase classification. For Acute Malnutrition, the IPC thresholds are based on % of children under 5 years that are below 2 standard deviations of weight for height or presence of oedema. BMI is an acronym for Body Mass Index. CDR is Crude Death Rate. USDR is Under 5 Death Rate.

**Annex 2b: IPC reference tables****Diagram 5: Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Household Group Classification**

**Purpose:** To guide short-term strategic objectives tailored to the needs of household groups with relatively similar Phase classifications, which should compliment medium- and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.

| Phase Name and Description                            | Phase 1<br>None  | Phase 2<br>Stressed   | Phase 3<br>Crisis   | Phase 4<br>Emergency  | Phase 5<br>Catastrophe   |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|
|   | <i>HH group is able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</i>   | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance:<br/>- HH group has minimally adequate food consumption but is unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies</i>  | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance:<br/>- HH group has food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition;<br/>OR<br/>- HH group is marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</i>   | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance:<br/>- HH group has large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality;<br/>OR<br/>- HH group has extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term.</i> | <i>Even with any humanitarian assistance:<br/>- HH group has an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, and destitution are evident.</i>                |
| Priority Response Objectives                          | Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction  | Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods  | <b>Urgent Action Required to:</b> →   |   |  |
| Household Outcomes<br>(directly measured or inferred) | <b>Food Consumption*</b><br>(quantity and nutritional quality)<br><br><i>Quantity: adequate (2,100kcal pp/day); stable<br/>HDDS: no recent deterioration and &gt;=4 food groups (based on 12 food groups)<br/>FCS: "acceptable consumption"; stable<br/>HHS: "none" (0)<br/>CSI: = reference, stable<br/>HEA: No "Livelihood Protection Deficit"</i>                 | <b>Quantity: minimally adequate (2,100kcal pp/day)<br/>HDDS: recent deterioration of HDDS (loss of 1 food group from typical based on 12 food groups)<br/>FCS: "acceptable" consumption (but deteriorating)<br/>HHS: "slight" (1)<br/>CSI: = reference, but unstable<br/>HEA: "Small or moderate Livelihood Protection Deficit"</b> | <b>Quantity: food gap; below 2,100 kcal pp/day OR 2,100 kcal pp/day via asset stripping<br/>HDDS: severe recent deterioration of HDDS (loss of 2 food groups from typical based on 12 food groups)<br/>FCS: "borderline" consumption<br/>HHS: "moderate" (2-3)<br/>CSI: &gt; reference and increasing<br/>HEA: Substantial "Livelihood Protection Deficit" OR small "Survival Deficit" of &lt;20%</b> | <b>Quantity: large food gap; much below 2,100kcal pp/day<br/>HDDS: &lt;4 out of 12 food groups<br/>FCS: "poor" consumption<br/>HHS: "severe" (4-6)<br/>CSI: Significantly &gt; reference<br/>HEA: "Survival Deficit" &gt;20% but &lt;50% with reversible coping considered</b>            | <b>Quantity: extreme food gap<br/>HDDS 1-2 out of 12 food groups<br/>FCS: [below] "poor" consumption<br/>HHS: "severe" (6)<br/>CSI: far &gt; reference<br/>HEA: "Survival Deficit" &gt;50% with reversible coping considered</b> |
| Livelihood Change<br>(assets and strategies)          | Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets   | <b>Livelihood: Stressed strategies and assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods<br/>Coping: "Insurance Strategies"</b>  | <b>Livelihood: Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and assets that will lead to high food consumption gaps<br/>Coping: "Crisis Strategies"</b>  | <b>Livelihood: Extreme depletion/ liquidation of strategies and assets that will lead to very high food consumption gaps<br/>Coping: "Distress Strategies"</b>  | <b>Livelihood: Near complete collapse of strategies and assets<br/>Coping: effectively no ability to cope</b>  |
| Contributing Factors                                  | <i>For Contributing Factors, specific indicators and thresholds for inferring Phase need to be determined and analysed according to the unique causes and livelihood context of household groups. General descriptions are provided below. See IPC Analytical Framework for further guidance on key aspects of availability, access, utilization, and stability.</i> |   |   |   |  |
| Food Availability, Access, Utilization, and Stability | <i>Adequate to meet food consumption requirements and short-term stable;<br/>Safe Water ≥15 litres pppd</i>  | <i>Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements;<br/>Safe Water marginally ≥15 litres pppd</i>   | <i>Highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements;<br/>Safe Water 7.5 to 15 litres pppd</i>  | <i>Very highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements;<br/>Safe Water 4 to 7.5 litres pppd</i>  | <i>Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements;<br/>Safe Water &lt;4 litres pppd</i>  |
| Hazards and Vulnerability                             | <i>None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption</i>  | <i>Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption</i>   | <i>Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits</i>   | <i>Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or food consumption deficits</i>  | <i>Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits</i>   |

\*The acronyms for the commonly used methodologies included in the reference table include: HDDS (Household Dietary Diversity Score), FCS (Food Consumption Score), HHS (Household Hunger Score), CSI (Coping Strategies Index), and HEA (Household Economy Approach).



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