

YOUTH & CONFLICT



A TOOLKIT FOR INTERVENTION

Key Issues

Lessons Learned

Program Options

Monitoring and Evaluation

Resource



onflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, but in many places the costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failure have become unacceptably high. Violent conflict dramatically disrupts traditional development, and it can spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity across entire regions. Although development and humanitarian assistance programs are increasingly implemented in situations of open or latent violence, unfortunately, most still do not explicitly incorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their design or execution.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established to provide technical leadership on conflict to USAID Missions and our Washington based regional and pillar bureaus. The vast majority of our field missions and staff are currently working in areas that are either in conflict, coming out of conflict, or are at high-risk for violence. A central objective of the office is to integrate or "mainstream" best practices in conflict management and mitigation into more traditional development sectors such as agriculture, economic growth, democracy, education, and health. Where appropriate, CMM will be an advocate for stable change.

As Director of CMM, I am pleased to introduce this document on youth and conflict. I hope that readers will find the information contained herein thoughtful, innovative, and useful. CMM will release additional toolkits in the near future, and I trust that each one will bring its own unique value to discussions about development and conflict. We consider these toolkits to be "living documents" and would welcome your comments and observations to help us improve future iterations.

Elisabeth Kuitashindi.

Elisabeth Kvitashvili
Director
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID

STEERING YOUTH FROM VIOLENT CONFLICT: A TOOLKIT FOR PROGRAMMING

his toolkit is part of a series that explores how development assistance can address key risk factors associated with conflict. One area that is receiving increasing attention is the relationship between young people and violence. Recent studies have found a significant correlation between large youth cohorts and political instability and violence. A large pool of young people does not need to be destabilizing, however if young people — particularly young men — are uprooted, intolerant, jobless, and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for ethnic, religious, and political extremists seeking to mobilize violence.

This document: I) examines key issues related to youth participation in violence; 2) discusses lessons learned in developing programs for at-risk youth; 3) presents a range of program options; 4) includes illustrative monitoring and evaluation tools; and 5) identifies relevant USAID mechanisms and partners. Together, the elements of this toolkit are designed to help raise awareness about the linkages between young people, development aid, and conflict; and to help officers integrate a conflict perspective into their development programming.

The toolkits in this series explore individual risk factors in depth. They do not identify all relevant factors linked to violence. As such, they are designed to serve as companion pieces to conflict assessments. Conflict assessments provide a broad overview of destabilizing patterns and trends in a society. Using the Conflict Assessment Framework, they sift through the many potential causes of conflict that exist and zero in on those that are most likely to lead to violence (or renewed violence) in a particular context. While they provide recommendations about how to make development and humanitarian assistance more responsive to conflict dynamics, they do not provide detailed guidance on how to design specific activities. The toolkits in this series are intended to fill that gap by moving from a diagnosis of the problem to a more detailed discussion of potential interventions. Together, the assessment framework and toolkits are designed to help Missions gain a deeper understanding of the forces driving violence, as well as to develop more strategic and focused interventions.

This document was initially authored by Jack Goldstone, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. It was subsequently revised with substantial input from officers in USAID Missions and in Washington, experts on youth, and members of the NGO community. Comments, questions, and requests for additional information should be directed to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

United States Agency for International Development

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KEY ISSUES



When young people are uprooted, jobless, intolerant, alienated, and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to mobilize violence.

In many developing countries, young people are coming of age in societies that lack stable government, economic growth, or basic material and physical security. In such circumstances, youth often turn away from the authority and ideology of older generations and seek to mobilize their own generation in search of solutions.

his can be extremely positive in many places young people have been a powerful force for constructive change. In Serbia, young people played a key role in toppling Milosevic, and were instrumental in producing democratic revolution in Slovakia, Georgia, and the Ukraine. However, this same power can also serve destructive purposes if, for example, youth are exploited by proponents of violent ide-

ologies or seek to improve their situation by dominating others.

Although a large pool of young people is not inherently destabilizing, there is a strong correlation between large youth cohorts and political violence. When young people — particularly young men — are uprooted, jobless, intolerant, alienated, and have few opportunities for positive engage-

ment, they represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to mobilize violence.

Whether or not they participate directly in armed combat, youth are victimized by widespread violence. The attention of the international community has tended to focus on child soldiers. However, adolescents are far more likely than young children to be forcibly recruited into militias and to suffer the attendant problems of trauma, sexual abuse, and a loss of educational and economic opportunities.

To create stable societies, we need to counter the traumatizing and destructive experiences that war-affected youth have undergone. More broadly, we need to create conditions for positive and constructive roles for youth in developing countries, so they will not turn to violence in an attempt to satisfy their needs. An important way to avoid future conflict is to draw on the energy and capacities of youth as the leaders of tomorrow's societies.

DEFINING YOUTH

All youth are not the same, nor is their experience, and the concept of youth is itself debated: Some favor biological markers, in which youth is the period between puberty and parenthood, while others define youth in terms of cultural markers, a distinct social status with specific roles, rituals, and relationships. A young Zimbabwean offered a particularly compelling perspective, defining a youth as "Someone who is starting to enjoy freedom for the first time." (Role of Youth Survey 2003)

For the purposes of this study, youth are defined as having reached the stage in life where they are physically capable of assuming adult roles but would generally not be expected to make decisions or provide support for others. That is, they have left behind childhood but have not yet assumed the responsibilities of adulthood. The youth age range usually falls between 15 and 24, although some societies frame this differently. Indeed, in societies subject to crises or upheaval, the concept of youth may radically alter as boys and girls are forced to take on adult responsibilities at a very young age.

Definitions may also vary for men and women

YOUTH COHORTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC BULGES

Several studies have found that a disproportionately large youth cohort relative to the rest of the population — a trend that leads to a 'bulge' in a country's demographic structure — is linked to the potential for violence (Goldstone 1991, Fuller and Pitts 1990). There are several reasons why this can be the case: First, there is strength in numbers — an exceptionally large youth cohort is often conscious of itself as a larger force than its elders. Second, a large, youthful population may place heavy strains on schools, health care, housing, and other public services strains that can overwhelm fragile institutions and erode support for government authorities. Third, youth cohorts who are not given the opportunity to integrate into community and social structures are less able to acquire the skills they need for peaceful and constructive adult lives. A deprived, frustrated, or traumatized youth cohort, if left without help, can continue to foment violent conflict for decades.

The presence of a demographic bulge is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for violence. Youth bulges have only been statistically linked to conflict and state failure when they coincide with poor governance, a declining economy, or states with a high degree of ethnic or religious polarity. Indeed, a large number of young people can be a tremendous asset to developing societies. However, if young people find that opportunities for employment are absent or blocked, that families cannot offer support, that authorities cannot protect them or offer justice, and that hard work and education offer few benefits, some may turn to extremist groups or rebel leaders who promise a brighter future or immediate rewards.

YOUTH EDUCATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The great European revolutions of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries were all preceded by a vast expansion in secondary and higher education that far exceeded employment opportunities (Goldstone

WHY DO YOUNG PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN VIOLENCE?

While some young people are forced into violence, others choose to participate in conflict. Economic incentives can be a strong motivator for participation in violence. Young people often join militant groups because violence offers opportunities for economic gain through looting or banditry, because conflict promises to open up longer-term economic options, or quite simply because they are they are paid to do so. From Sierra Leone to Uzbekistan, young people often join militant groups because they are given cash or promised future financial gain, such as small mining concessions.

Few opportunities for constructive political engagement are open to young people in the developing world, particularly for those who lack personal connections. All too often, political parties and other social movements have used young people to intimidate rivals, destabilize opponents, and collect money for political campaigns. In Haiti, a broad range of political parties has relied on violent youth gangs to protect political turf and intimidate opponents.

Inadequate public services, especially education, also play a role. Many groups espousing violent ideologies have reached out to young people by providing access to education and other key services. More important, they have provided young people with a sense of community and purpose in a setting where these are scarce commodities. In places as diverse as Nigeria and Pakistan, failing school systems have allowed radical groups to reach poor, marginalized young people.

Photo opposite page: Children playing with a discarded bazooka.

Youth who are never integrated into community and social structures, or who never acquire the skills needed for peaceful and constructive adult lives, are at high risk. A deprived, frustrated, or traumatized youth cohort, if left without help, can continue to foment conflict for decades.

1991; Gillis 1974; Jarausch 1974). More recently, unemployed university graduates, often educated abroad, have been at the forefront of armed or extremist movements, from anti-colonial struggles in Africa, to anti-authoritarian movements in the former Soviet Union, to radical ethnic and religious movements in Asia.

These examples demonstrate an important point: education per se is not always a force for stability. In many countries, the failure of the government to provide adequate education has led students to turn to ethnic or religious alternatives, alternatives that often strengthen factionalism and intolerance and rarely provide the skills necessary to find jobs. Further education can fill time, but unless it leads to employment, the result can be frustration and alienation. Job availability is also critical. Even effective education may breed discontent and violence if students are being prepared for jobs that do not exist. Typically, youth unemployment is over three times as high as adult unemployment in developing countries and, in countries with stagnant economies, that proportion can be far higher (ILO 2002). For example, it is five times higher in Sri Lanka and seven in Egypt.

Unemployment is an important component of the risk associated with this age group. Young people often participate in violence because membership in extremist organizations provides immediate economic benefits, because violence itself offers opportunities for economic gain through direct payment or looting, or because conflict promises to open up longer term economic options, for example, through patronage if "their" ethnic or religious group captures power. Several studies of the Balkans, for example, show that the chance to earn an income through theft, smuggling, and banditry was often a more important motivation for the young men who joined militia groups than appeals to ethnic solidarity (Woodward, 1995; Mueller, 2000).

Thus, providing targeted job training and employment is a critical element in dampening incentives for young people to participate in violence. However, waiting for the broader economy to create appropriate jobs may not work. Youth should be encouraged to identify and create their own opportunities, for example, through entrepreneurship training and/or small-

scale credit. Whether they are engaged in simple repair work, craft and construction, or trade, youth should be encouraged to think of themselves as work providers, rather than merely job seekers.

Preparation for work involves more than acquiring job-specific skills; it must also entail learning certain "life" skills, such as discipline, teamwork, and feelings of pride and self-worth. These can be obtained through community work, such as infrastructure development (e.g., building or rehabilitating roads and schools) and service projects (e.g., caring for the ill and elderly). This work also helps to rebuild ties between young people and their communities, an important and constructive form of social engagement. Although not conventional employment, such activity meets real needs for youth and community development.

Because personal contacts are so important, education and work programs should connect youth with the broader community, particularly adults who may want to employ them. Mechanisms providing such linkages include mentoring, community service, apprenticeships, internships, and visits to offices, factories, or other work-sites. Partnerships between youth programs and business associations can help provide pathways to employment and benefits to employers as well as youth.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION

In many parts of the world, political parties and other social movements use young people to intimidate rivals, destabilize opponents, and fill campaign coffers. This is often the only form of political participation open to young people, particularly those with little education or few personal connections. The recent debate on youth participation in violence has tended to center on economic motivations. These are important, but it is critical to recognize that young people are drawn to militant movements for a very complex set of reasons.

Young people often recognize that they are a powerful force for political change. Yet most young people in the developing world are shut off from constructive political participation. Political parties are



often dominated by powerful (older) personalities, and are vehicles for the political and economic ambitions of party leaders and their close associates. Party leaders therefore have little incentive to open political structures to new entrants. In the absence of legitimate avenues for participation, young people may either opt out of political participation completely, or be drawn to movements that operate outside of, and often seek to overthrow, traditional political structures.

Similarly, in many parts of the world, leaders use negative ethnic and religious stereotypes to mobilize political violence, stereotypes that are often reinforced in school, by family members, and in the media. A number of programs, both inside and outside the formal school system, attempt to build tolerance and give young people the skills they need to manage conflict in a non-violent way.

EXTREMISM AND YOUTH

Terrorists originate from a wide range of economic, educational, and religious backgrounds. Most studies since the 1980s

suggest that the vast majority of new recruits into terrorist and other extremist organizations are young people between the ages of 15-29; and are generally of a low-to-middle economic background. However, the upper ranks of extremist or terrorist organizations are often filled by older, better-educated youth, who serve as international operatives and managers. In Indonesia, for example, Laksar lihad recruits young university students, while the socalled "Taliban" movement in northern Nigeria was spearheaded by unemployed university students. Conversely, poorlyeducated youth tend to become followers of extremist groups. Moroccan suicide bombers in Casablanca all came from the same slum neighborhoods, shared a similar lower-middle class background, and had limited access to the outside world. Lastly, it is important to recognize that not all extremists are men: secular organizations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade are known to recruit women for suicide attacks.

Several factors appear to pre-dispose young people toward extremism: a lack of economic opportunity and political expres-

Youth searching a garbage dump for food or anything of value.

When youth are shieldedfrom social and economic stresses, and can participate in decisions that affect their lives, they are more likely to pursue peaceful change.



Members of a youth militia group.

MORE LIKELY TO BACK TERRORISM?

At least one poll has found the backing of terrorism stronger among a better-educated group: A survey of 1,357 adults in the West Bank and Gaza found that support for terrorism against Israeli citizens was greater among professionals than laborers, and among secondary school graduates than among illiterate respondents (Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2001).

sion, accompanying feelings of humiliation and the peer respect associated with membership in extremist organizations. Youth lacking economic opportunities have less to lose by joining an extremist group, and humiliation — from abuse or discrimination — is often cited in interviews with terrorists as the main draw into extremist activity.

Additionally, some extremist organizations deliberately target children for indoctrination into terrorist activity; in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba reportedly began "training" children as young as eight years old for eventual recruitment. Lastly, young people willing to accept the risks of extremist activity may enjoy the support of their peers and society, as seen in the "martyr's posters" that lined the streets of Shi'a regions of Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps. One study of thirty-five secular and religious Middle Eastern extremists, for example, cited peer influence as a major factor in joining a terrorist group. (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003)

To reduce the risk of young people joining extremist organizations, missions should assess which of the above are most

relevant to a particular country's circumstances. Addressing root causes, such as youth unemployment, political exclusion, discrimination, and abuse, through youthspecific programs is one approach. Youth leaders and other positive role models could be engaged to steer young people in positive directions. Similarly, youth groups and associations could be tapped to reach out to alienated peers, helping to counter the sense of humiliation that leaves youth susceptible to recruitment. Given the socio-economic profile of recruits, such programming should not limit itself to the poorest, but focus on lower- and middleclass youth as well.

CHILDREN ORPHANED BY AIDS

Rising numbers of children are losing one or both parents to HIV/AIDS, resulting in an expanding cohort of under-educated, traumatized, and stigmatized youth whose potential for recruitment into gangs or militias may pose risks for conflict-prone countries. While there are no cases to date in which children orphaned by AIDS played a decisive role in a conflict, orphaned

children in general are at greater risk than others for recruitment, regardless of the cause. The potential threat, therefore, is real.

The scope of children orphaned by AIDS is alarming. By 2003, over 15 million children had already lost one or both parents to AIDS, a number expected to rise to over 18 million in Sub-Saharan Africa alone by 2010. Other regions are similarly at risk: although 82% of all AIDS orphans live in Sub-Saharan Africa, populous states in Asia — such as India and Pakistan — could witness a substantial rise in the number of AIDS orphans. While countries in Latin America have witnessed an overall decline in the number of orphans, states with a high-prevalence of AIDS, such as Haiti have experienced an increase in the number of children orphaned by AIDS.

The loss of one or both parents to AIDS exacts a heavy toll on children as they transition through youth to adulthood. Subject to trauma and left with few opportunities, such children may be more likely to join gangs and commit violent crime as they become adolescents. Older children in particular are more likely to suffer problems with education, work, and psychosocial health. While a UNAIDS study found that 90% of all children orphaned by AIDS are taken in by extended family members, they are nevertheless much more vulnerable than they had been prior to being orphaned. Families with an AIDSinfected member experience a decline in family income as great as 40-60%. A study in Côte d'Ivoire found that family health costs can rise as much as 400% when a family member is afflicted by AIDS (Richter). The stigma of AIDS can also drive children from school as taunting by fellow students or even teachers becomes unbearable. Children exposed to cumulative or sustained adversity are more likely to grow into maladjusted adults; overall, up to one-third of such children may develop psychosocial disorders, leaving some even more prone to violence.

SOCIAL DRIVERS FOR YOUTH RECRUITMENT TO VIOLENCE

Where youth cohorts face no major upheavals or are relatively small, thus giving them more interaction with adults, radical or violent youth mobilization seldom

occurs. Under these conditions, youth focus on activities that prepare them for adult lives, including education, training or apprenticeships, competition in sport and other forms of achievement, and social events. These activities tend to be solidly rooted in institutions-the families, schools. religious organizations, sports teams, clubsthat guide youth, reinforce their identity as members of a broader society, and shield them from recruitment to violent groups. Such activities provide the opportunity to develop leadership, social, and work skills that will prepare them for adult life, while also providing a sense of achievement and rewards for gaining these skills.

Social stresses-such as urbanization, factionalism, forced migrations, refugee crises, and unemployment-can cause the breakdown, ineffectiveness, or absence of such "shielding" institutions. Youth then seek other avenues to obtain skills, rewards, and identity within a group. Alternatives, such as gangs, criminal organizations, or even armed rebel groups, become attractive. Young women as well as young men take part voluntarily, or are abducted into ancillary activities, such as smuggling and prostitution. These organizations provide a sense of empowerment, shared identity, and access to material and sexual rewards that youth find (or believe) are unavailable in more conventional institution activities.

Some conventional institutions can also represent a social order that young people reject as failing or unjust, making alternative social groups more appealing. For example, South African black youth in the 1980s left a working school system identified with apartheid to join anti-apartheid groups — many of them violent — with the slogan "First liberation, then education." Where ruling regimes are seen as corrupt, ineffective, betraying nationalist principles, or hostile to certain ethnic, religious, regional, or class groups, youth may seek alternatives that promise to usher in a new system of authority or rewards.

URBANIZATION AND YOUTH

Urbanization concentrates precisely that demographic group most inclined to violence: unattached young males who have left their families behind and have come to the city seeking economic opportunities. The rapid growth of cities has fre-

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When youth demobilize from armed conflict, they need more than jobs, food, and medical care. Critical psychosocial needs - like gaining acceptance in their families and communities, and obtaining treatment for trauma - must also be met.

quently been a factor in popular mobilization for riots and protests, while urban migration helped provide the manpower for revolutionary or armed movements in countries such as Lebanon and Iran (Gugler 1982; Farhi 1990).

In many developing countries, urban migration has often been fueled by people seeking shelter from violent conflicts or drought, while others are responding to economic opportunity or the desire for the relative freedom and modernity of city life. The urban world offers a different set of challenges, temptations, and opportunities than those found in rural communities, ranging from access to a more diverse population to opportunities for entrepreneurship and self-definition. This makes urban centers particularly attractive to young people.

The urban informal economic sector also provides opportunities to youth, especially where growth in the formal sector has been held back by poor policies. While some of this activity is criminal, involving petty smuggling, theft, prostitution, and extortion, much of the informal sector serves as a creative response to economic hardship and involves the provision of services, small manufacturing, repair work, and transportation.

Urban communities may provide more excitement and opportunities for youth, but whether the eventual result is stable socialization or violent behavior depends on the institutions available to youth in urban settings. Where government or private enterprise provides housing, education, entertainment, and opportunities for advancement, youthful energies are generally channeled into productive outlets. However, where the urban economy (formal and informal) cannot absorb new entrants, and where there are few other institutions that provide support, violence becomes more likely.

Urbanization has a powerful pull, and programs to address urban youth need to build on that appeal, not seek to counter it. The goal should be to help make cities, where youth are often concentrated, centers of opportunity for positive and constructive socialization, rather than arenas of unrestrained competition for survival.

FACTIONALISM AND YOUTH

One result of urban migration is ethnic and religious mixing. In some countries, such as Kenya, urban centers have become foci of cooperation among diverse ethnic groups (Kahl 1998). However, this interaction also constitutes a risk. Often, in the absence of integrative institutions, youth turn to ethnically, religiously, or regionally exclusive communities. This does not automatically lead to conflict. However, if certain ethnic groups feel that political, economic, and social institutions are closed or hostile to them, youth may rebel against them or opt out, seeking to develop their own ethnically based organizations to meet their needs. Youth gangs and criminal organizations thus typically draw on minority ethnic groups - whether recent immigrants or longestablished groups — who have faced persistent discrimination and exclusion.

At the extreme, youth may be socialized by peer groups or their elders to perceive themselves as targets of attack, and therefore entitled to be aggressive in defense of their community. An education that stresses violations, threats, and dangers (as occurred in Hutu and Tutsi communities in Rwanda and Burundi, and in many Islamist madrasas throughout the Islamic world) can predispose youth to mobilize for violent self-protection or aggression. This may lead to glorification of violence and of attacks on enemies. The grooming of warriors is nothing new. However, if youth have few other outlets or institutions for solidarity, advancement, and achievement, the attractions of the warrior life can be so compelling as to preclude other options.

In general, the more hardened ethnic (or other) lines of division are in a society, the greater the attraction of confrontational organizations and violence as a means of assuring one's goals. Young people have proven to be particularly susceptible to recruitment into organizations that provide personal and ethnic pride by instilling confrontational ethnic hatreds. Where factionalism has been a major part of youth experience, special programs — such as "peace education" — may be important in countering that experience (Sommers 2001).



FORCED MIGRATION, REFUGEE CRISES, AND YOUTH

Perhaps no place emphasizes feelings of powerlessness and exclusion more than refugee camps and camps for internally displaced populations (IDPs). By definition, these are places for people whose normal institutional anchors have been destroyed; this effect is even more pronounced for young people. In addition, where refugees have been created by conflict and discrimination, camps can become prime places for the brewing of ethnic or group hatreds. It is not surprising that refugee and IDP camps have proven to be fertile recruiting grounds for extremist or militant groups, with Afghanistan and Chechnya offering two compelling examples.

Like cities with high youth migration, refugee communities have especially acute needs with regard to youth services. Most activities tend to center on basic survival. However, few institutions exist that address the full range of youth needs, including basic education, recreation, structured social events, training for jobs and economic self-support, and training in lead-


ership and self-governance. In addition youth may be concentrated and adults less numerous, particularly adult males, reducing resources for supervision and guidance of youth

YOUTH NEEDS IN REGIONS EMERGING FROM CONFLICT

So far, the discussion has focused on reasons why young people participate in violence. Consideration must also be given, however, to the needs of young people who have been subjected to violence. Many conflict situations have particularly devastating effects on youth who have been victims of forced labor, recruitment into militias, and child prostitution. Many more are displaced, separated from their families, or orphaned, and must undertake a long, painstaking process to rebuild their lives after war. Unless the special needs of war-affected youth are met during the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process, they will likely fall back into street life, prostitution, and/or crime, or be recruited as mercenaries for the next conflict.

Children in a refugee camp sitting on a piece of abandoned military hardware. The detritus of war has become a plaything for generations of children in many countries.

Overwhelmingly, youth in post-conflict situations identify security and education as their top two priority needs.



Ex-soldier at a demobilisation camp

Adolescence by its very nature is a time of rapid transformation, involving some degree of confusion and risk-taking as young people try on new roles and responsibilities. In the midst of conflict, or its aftermath, such confusion is multiplied; the social fabric is torn, expected pathways toward adult status are lost, and emergency needs take precedence. While children find themselves heading households, unemployment is rampant and traditional livelihoods are disrupted. Young people who experience war often lose the time, support and opportunities typically available to their age group in non-conflict settings, such as attending school, feeling part of a community, and growing into adult responsibilities gradually. In postconflict situations, young people often feel that they want to roll back the clock and make up for what they missed.

While young people often form a core part of fighting forces, youth needs are rarely met sufficiently during the process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). If they are not associated with an adult, for example, they are sometimes, prevented from accessing

services. Additionally, young combatants often spontaneously demobilize and melt into the wider population, thereby missing out on needed services. Youth, especially female youth, are also more vulnerable to being stigmatized and rejected by their home communities than adult combatants. In addition to these challenges, questions concerning youth's culpability in wartime atrocities are very complex. Similarly, a continuing concern in the post-conflict period is the potential for the "re-recruitment" of youth into militia groups. Because problems faced by young people in post-conflict situations are so pressing, a youth rights advocacy perspective is required alongside program development efforts.

Minimally, youth require a DDR process that not only meets their nutritional and health needs, but also their psychosocial needs, including the need to re-establish self-approval and acceptance within their families and communities. Not surprisingly, a high percentage of child soldiers have experienced physical and/or sexual abuse as well as ideological indoctrination, as in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Many young people have been separated from their

families or have witnessed the killing or injury of family members. The need for trauma counseling is critical. However, Western psychological models have not always been entirely successful in many developing countries, since they are sometimes perceived locally as leading to "admitting craziness." Western models may need to be adapted or supplemented with indigenous forms of healing and community reconciliation.


Increasingly, practitioners are recognizing the need for structured education, training, and recreation for youth as part of the DDR process. Overwhelmingly, youth in post-conflict situations identify both security and education as their top two priority needs. Education enables youth to recover some degree of normalcy, psychologically, and begins to help them rebuild their lives economically. There are many challenges, including the fact that many war-affected youth have been out of school for long periods of time, and that many have responsibility for supporting family members. Nevertheless, informal and/or accelerated schooling should be provided.

Virtually all youth displaced by war will

need to work to support themselves and their families, and DDR programs need to help youth develop viable livelihoods. Many past DDR operations have been criticized for failing to train ex-combatants for the actual range of employment opportunities available, and this is especially true for young people. Microfinance programs typically serve young people (age 18-24) if they have had some prior business experience, even marketplace hawking. Youth without such experience, however, may be better served by entrepreneurial skills training in conjunction with microfinance.

As peace becomes a possibility in regions experiencing violence, planning for the needs of youth should begin immediately. While the needs of youth associated with the fighting forces — both male and female — should be addressed, they should not be segregated from other young people if possible. If former combatants are offered services and educational opportunities that are denied other young people, a perverse economy of entitlement may be established in which participation in war is rewarded. For this reason, the emphasis should be on social integration and meeting the needs of all youth, since, in fact, the effects of conflict spare none.

LESSONS LEARNED



Program goals must include integrating at-risk youth into society and not merely aim at compensating youth for current disadvantages.

Excellent programs address a wide range of youth issues in both developing and developed countries. The following lessons for building effective youth programs are based on practitioner experience and academic findings.

IDENTIFY, BUT DO NOT ISOLATE, ATRISK YOUTH

Allocating resources efficiently requires identifying concentrations of at-risk youth. While this varies by country, good places to start are cities with large populations of new migrants, IDP or refugee camps, and areas where there is evidence of religious or ethnic extremism. It is vital to be aware of different challenges faced along gender, age, ethnic and religious line as they may vary substantially.

Once at-risk youth are identified, the next step is to identify the mix of institutions and opportunities that are missing. Perhaps some have access to basic education, but others (women, certain ethnic groups, or the poor) do not. Some groups may have educational opportunities, but lack recreation or social outlets. By identifying what is missing from the full range of youth needs, programs can supplement or create institutions that can provide the missing elements. This goes far beyond the normal tendency to target those youth with

services, such as employment training, which can have the effect of further isolating at-risk young people. Such a narrow focus has even had the unintended consequence of rewarding participation in violence. For example, in the Niger Delta, the tendency of oil companies to provide resources to the most violent youth groups has reinforced the practice of turning to violence for economic gain.

Thus, program goals must include integrating at-risk youth into society, not merely compensating them for current disadvantages. This may involve organizing programs that bring together youth from both inside and outside the target group. Where possible, training should embrace all youth who could benefit, not just the most at-risk or marginalized. At-risk youth should be encouraged to aspire to positions of community leadership. Such skills create a powerful resource for the future, and their cultivation is essential for communities to build the strength they need to meet future crises on their own. Good programming also creates viable outlets for youth to participate in community, regional, and national society, giving them true platforms for their voices and including them in significant decision making on issues that affect them. This is key to forging partnerships between youth-led organizations and adult leaders.

2 BUILD COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS

Precisely because so many of the needs of youth are group and social needs, community-based programs are critical. Youth service institutions need to provide group-based activities (sports, community service, education) that provide positive identity, group empowerment, and acquisition of leadership, teamwork, and selfgovernance skills under adult supervision. They need to provide safe and structured arenas for competition, for peer bonding, and male-female relationships. Meeting individual needs is important as well, though this is usually best accomplished in the context of positive relationships developed within the program and between the youth and the larger community.

3 YOUTH LEADERSHIP AND OWNERSHIP

Most successful youth programs have built-in structures for youth leadership. When youth have a direct role in creating and maintaining their own programs, they participate more regularly and they develop critical leadership skills. Implementers need to plan for youth input into program design from the outset. Also, they will need to offer the necessary training for youth to be able to collaborate productively and meaningfully with adults. This training could include practical citizenship skills, such as public speaking, negotiation, advocacy, budgeting, and so forth.

4 FEMALE YOUTH

Gender must be kept in mind in working with youth for both program design and evaluation. While young men are more likely to participate in violence than young women, there are important exceptions in places like Nepal and Sri Lanka. Moreover, young men and young women often have quite different reasons for participating in violence.

In most developing countries, young women have the greatest burden in terms of meeting the daily subsistence needs of families and face significant obstacles to full participation.

Consequently, young women are much less likely to participate in educational and occupational training programs, recreational programs, or political events because they lack the time, or are excluded on other grounds.

Program designers must be sensitive to this reality and design programs that are flexible (in terms of time, place, and content) to meet girls' needs. Program evaluations should also disaggregate by gender to capture the usefulness of the program for male and female participants.

If services only target demobilized or at-risk youth and neglect others, then youth are de facto rewarded for violence. The emphasis should be on social integration and meeting the needs of all youth, since the effects of conflict spare none.



Education can transform youth into productive community participants.

Special attention must be paid to young women and youth leadership if programs are to be farreaching and sustainable.

5 HOLISTIC PROGRAMMING

Youth have a wide range of needs as they prepare for adult roles. They need to develop skills for economic self-reliance. They need citizenship skills, such as teamwork, leadership, discipline, communication, and social responsibility. They need arenas in which they can identify and test their talents and develop healthy relationships. Thus, programs that provide opportunities for growth in more than one area tend to be more useful. Programs should consider a mix of job training and job creation; political participation; sports and recreation; leadership; and health training. In high-risk regions, conflict resolution should be built into all of these activities.

PLANTRANSITIONS OFORYOUTH

Youth is a period of transition and preparation. Therefore, youth programs must go beyond serving immediate needs to readying youth for a healthy transition into adult roles. Ideally, programs should be designed as "feeders" into political, economic, and social institutions for adults. Cooperative relationships with larger institutions (such as schools, churches, mosques, and community service organizations) allow youth to interact with and learn from adults and to plan concrete options for their adult lives. Mentoring of youth by responsible adults in the community helps youth widen their horizons and build pathways toward the future.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

Some demographic trends are destabilizing. In Bare Branches: the Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population, Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer argue that disproportionately large, disenfranchised populations of young men are linked to domestic instability and inter-state war. In another take on the topic, the authors of "The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War" show that high birth and death rates can be destabilizing whereas small, healthy families improve a state's prospects for long-term stability. www.populationaction.org

Youth unemployment has skyrocketed to all-time global highs, according to the International Labor Organization's Youth Employment Network. Young people who have no access to legitimate employment are more likely to be drawn into exploitative or illicit activities, including conflict. www.ilo.org

Over 300,000 children fight as soldiers in current conflicts. Under the Children's Rights Section, Human Rights Watch has a range of publications on where child soldiers are used, why they are so often preferred as recruits, and the consequences to both children and society. www.hrw.org Even more children (estimates are over ten million) have been psychologically scarred by the trauma of conflict through abduction, detention, sexual assault and the murder of family members. The Canadian International Development Agency has made child protection one of its top social development priorities. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca and www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca

Approximately half of the world's 35 million refugees and internally displaced persons are under the age of 18, according to the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. The Commission's study, "Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict," outlines best practices in adolescent programming and underscores the importance of youth participation in program design.

www.theirc.org/resources/index.cfm

For guidance on designing, implementing, and evaluating youth education and protection programs in crises, consult the many resources of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). www.ineesite.org

Many innovative youth programs in the US can be adapted to developing countries. Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) www.ppv.org is a national nonprofit organization that has done extensive work on mentoring, youth employment, community service, faith-based initiatives, and youth violence-prevention. Best practices in youth employment and development programs are recorded at PEPNet, a project of the National Youth Employment Coalition. www.nyec.org/pepnet/index.html

Mentoring of youth by responsible adults in the community helps youth widen their horizons and build pathways toward the future.

PROGRAM OPTIONS



The following programs are examples of innovative attempts to engage at-risk young people. The nexus between youth development programs and conflict is a new area, and tools are still being developed to measure their impact. However, many of these programs have shown promise in reaching out to young people who often are left behind in more traditional development efforts.

JOB TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

In the **West Bank**, the IT4Youth program enhances education and employability for Palestinian youth in rural areas through information technol-

ogy (IT) centers. A joint effort of USAID West Bank and Gaza, the Welfare Association, and the International Youth Foundation, it features 14 state-of-the-art school computer labs and an IT center. It trains teachers, parents, and youth in Internet skills and improves interest in education

and employability, increasing jobs and adding to regional stability.

www.it4youth.org

- A young man, George Onyango, who grew up in **Nairobi's** slums, in 1996 founded SIDAREC-Slums Information Development and Resources Centres. Its services for at-risk urban youth include recreational activities, computer training, HIV/AIDS-prevention training, basic business skills, and start-up loans for small enterprises. SIDAREC serves approximately 350 young people.
- In the **United States**, YouthBuild comprises 200 community-based programs that target unemployed and undereducated 16 to 24 year olds, who help build affordable housing-learning construction skills and working toward GEDs. The program emphasizes leadership, community service, and a positive community committed to success. Workshops and retreats teach decisionmaking, group facilitation, public speaking, and negotiating skills. YouthBuild participants share in the governance of their own program through an elected policy committee. www.youthbuild.org
- In southern Sri Lanka, Jobsnet links unemployed youth with local businesses, curbing unemployment and fostering labor market transparency. By increasing the number of gainfully employed young people, Jobsnet reduces the likelihood that Sri Lanka's youth cohort will be drawn to anti-peace political constituencies. www.jobsnet.lk
- In **Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**, an NGO, Viva Rio, organizes peace campaigns to overcome violence and social exclusion in urban slums. In addition to job training and employment placement, Viva Rio conducts voluntary weapons collection programs through churches, provides citizenship classes, and organizes social activities such as boxing, concerts, and mural creation. Free concerts feature artists whose music discourages involvement in criminal gangs and the use of guns. www.vivario.org.br

2 CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- In **Sierra Leone**, urban youth, once mobilized by politicians as thugs to intimidate voters, were trained in voter registration and election monitoring, giving them a stake in the process. Search for Common Ground brought together youth (ages 16-35) to create a national youth network. While educating marginalized populations about voting, the youth also held events challenging politicians not to use youth as a destabilizing force. www.sfcg.org
- Democracy Learning-Youth
 Participation program, building on the
 strength of young people's critical role
 in the pro-democracy movement that
 toppled **Serbia**'s Milosevic, supports
 the work of youth NGOs by equipping
 them to engage in democratic participation. The program explicitly encourages tolerance for differences, and is
 funded by the Balkan Children and
 Youth Foundation (part of the
 International Youth Foundation).

 www.iyfnet.org
- A project in **Yemen** promotes youth participation in decision-making and civic responsibility. The Al-Mocha Youth Association in Taiz emphasizes the positive role that youth can play in the democratic process through publication of a newsletter that discusses youth issues and issues related to democracy, direct participation in elections for association leadership, and sporting and cultural events.
- In Angola, a project of USAID's Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF) provides training and education to young people so that they can actively take part in the national reconciliation process. Christian Children's Fund implements the Building Resilience in Angolan Children and Communities project for 160,000 beneficiaries. The target group includes university students, political and community youth groups, and internally displaced youth and returnees. The aim is to strengthen community systems of solidarity and to promote reconciliation at the grassroots level. www.usaid.gov

Programs that provide opportunities for growth in more than one area tend to be more useful.

Programs should consider a mix of job training and job creation, political participation, sports and recreation, leadership, and health training.

Photo opposite page: Youth building a wheel chair. Occupational training is a critical element in dampening incentives for young people to participate in violence.



Jamaican students with placards urging peace at a funeral of a teacher who was killed after a wave of gang violence.

In response to Colombia's alarming rate of violence, USAID/Columbia and Children International have piloted a program, Hope for Columbia's Children, to train 100 youth in conflict resolution.

• World Education's youth leadership project in **Senegal**'s Casamance region trains youth association members in leadership development, including disseminating information to their communities. After participatory training, youth collaborate on self-selected projects to benefit the community, utilizing their new leadership skills while promoting peaceful reconstruction of their villages. www.worlded.org

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND COMMUNITY DIALOGUE

 The Youth Project of Search for Common Ground's intergenerational dialogue workshops in **Burundi** brought together young men — "the Guardians," armed by the military to protect their villages — into constructive dialogue with elders active in a traditional conflict resolution institution, bashingantahe. The Guardians learned how to draw upon traditional peacemaking methods, strengthening their

- skills to intervene without violence and help resolve conflicts. Workshops also facilitated participant discussions about their experiences in the war. These intergenerational relationships fosters resiliency among young people and gives them adult allies in preventing crises. www.sfcg.org
- In **Macedonia**, Common Ground Productions developed a project called Nashe Maalo (Our Neighborhood). This groundbreaking television series for children (7-12) was created by an interethnic team of television and conflictresolution professionals. It promotes understanding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.
- In response to **Colombia**'s alarming rate of violence, USAID/Colombia and Children International have piloted a program, Hope for Colombia's Children, to train 100 youth in multiple levels of conflict resolution: individual, family, and community conflict. They aim to produce a youth-oriented guide to conflict resolution techniques, and to have youth train their peers in their communities. **www.children.org**

4 EDUCATION AND TOLERANCE TRAINING

- In **Burundi**, young Hutu and Tutsi excombatants jointly developed a program that reaches out to school children to talk about the personal costs of violence. The Youth Project of Search for Common Ground and a local youth association (JAMAA) developed cartoon books that showed how elites recruit youth to engage in ethnically motivated violence. It is used by the Ministry of Education and is on national television. UNESCO awarded it an honorable mention (March 2003) for excellence in peace literature. www.sfcg.org
- To help prevent conflict in refugee camps in **Kenya**, a UNHCR Peace Education Program (PEP) emphasizes developing locally meaningful resource materials, including posters, role-play scenarios, proverb cards, booklets of poetry, and stories that illustrate both

- challenging and hopeful issues for reflection and discussion. Program success led Kenyan police to call on a program graduate to facilitate an agreement between two disputing clans. A group of program graduates also formed a group to resolve daily conflicts in camp affairs.
- The Balkan Children and Youth Foundation (BCYF), founded at the height of the conflict under the auspices of the International Youth Foundation, aims to improve the conditions and prospects for young people throughout the **Balkans'** region. Early projects focused on bringing young people together across ethnic divisions to participate in social activities such as drama, music, and films. Post-conflict initiatives have expanded to include discussions about globalization, unemployment, the media, the public school system, and civic engagement. www.iyfnet.org

In Burundi, young Hutu and Tutsi ex-combatants jointly developed a program that reaches out to school children to talk about the personal costs of violence.

MONITORING & EVALUATION



Children in refugee camp. No place emphasizes feelings of powerlessness and exclusion more than refugee camps. The following monitoring and evaluation tools have been developed specifically for gauging the effectiveness of programs that incorporate both youth and conflict: those that seek to better young peoples' economic, social and political conditions in order to help improve their lives and remove the factors that can drive youth toward conflict.

he framework, indicators and illustrative activities have been developed from several USAID programs and monitoring plans, with significant input from a panel of experts and USAID mission staff. As such, these should be viewed as general models that must be adapted to a country's specific context. Please note that the CMM Office plans to

update and revise this M&E section as its understanding evolves, and welcomes your comments as part of this process. If you have any questions about these tools, please contact either Zachary Rothschild or Elizabeth Martin in the CMM Office. For additional guidance and resources on monitoring and evaluation, please visit USAID's Evaluation site at

USAID/CMM ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

GOAL: DRIVERS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE MITIGATED^{1,2}

SUB GOAL: CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGE YOUTH TO

PROMOTE PEACE

OBJECTIVE I: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH INCREASED

• % youth employed in targeted areas

• % change in incomes from constructive employment

• % youth perceiving more optimistic view of future (economic, self-image, effectiveness)

• % of businesses started by youth still in operation one year later

IR 1.1 BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENT BETTER ABLE TO EMPLOY YOUTH

- % business or institutions employing youth
- increased advocacy by local, regional and national youth groups

I.I.I Economic and social incentives to employ youth increased

 % business or institutions responding to incentives for at-risk/ marginalized youth

I.I.2 Youth organizations and businesses' institutional capacities developed

- % increase in skill levels of youth-owned businesses
- % increase in equipment quality in youth-owned businesses

1.1.3 Credit opportunities for youth expanded

- % of youth being approved for small loans
- % of youth using loans to start small businesses

IR 1.2 YOUTH BETTER EQUIPPED TO ENTER MARKETPLACE

- %/# of schools offering vocational/technical training specifically for young men and women
- % of trained youth obtaining employment

1.2.1 Applied academic skills for job success improved

- % increase in youth literacy and numeracy rates from training programs
- % special groups (IDPs, refugees, young ex-combatants, women) secondary school graduation rate (disaggregate by gender, other relevant social cleavages)

I.2.2 Market-driven vocational, business, and professional skills developed

- % of youth with access to training
- % apprenticeships/internships filled by youth
- # of courses incorporating basic work-business ethics

I. In this document youth are defined as having reached the stage in life where they are physically capable of assuming adult roles (i.e., have passed puberty), usually between ages 15 and 24, although different societies frame this differently. Definitions may vary for men and women. Indicators should be disaggregated by youth age groups.

The illustrative indicators should be viewed as general models which must be adapted to a country's specific context.

Youth and communities at risk for engaging in violence should be targeted, where appropriate, based upon an assessment. For discussion on identifying at-risk youth refer to the Youth & Conflict Toolkit, Lessons Learned, Section 1.

USAID/CMM ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS



A 13-year-old gang member shows off his gun for the camera.

OBJECTIVE 2: CIVIC/POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH **INCREASED**

- % youth organizations capacity increased (e.g. effective management of resources)
- social outlets which include multi-ethnic/racial/religious youth increased (sports, clubs, scouts)
- % of eligible youth involved in electoral process
- # and quality of youth consultations in peace processes (index)

GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS IR 2.1 **ENGAGE YOUTH IN CIVIC AND POLICY PROCESSES**

- % of target CSOs engaged in civic action programs that involve youth (human rights education, civic dialogues, accountability, transparency)
- % of youth citizens reached by civic and political action programs undertaken by CSOs/CBOs satisfaction index (CSO/CBO/youth)

YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIC AND IR 2.2 **POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS INCREASED**

- proportion of youth in community-based organizations (CBO), or CSOs leadership positions (measured over time)
- increase in youth-led advocacy

MEDIA COVERAGE OF YOUTH CONCERNS IMPROVED IR 2.3

- increase in articles/advertisements with positive messages about youth in newspaper/radio/TV
- increase in media resources devoted to raising community awareness of youth issues

IMPROVED RESPONSE TO NEEDS OF CONFLICT-OBJECTIVE 3: AFFECTED YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES

- #/% ex-combatants reintegrated into their community (index)
- community-based program participation by young female war-participants
- local government resources (\$) directed toward conflict-affected youth & communities

IR 3.1 SPECIAL HEALTH NEEDS MET

• % of conflict affected youth with special needs met

3.1.1 Access to trauma and psychosocial support for conflict-affected groups increased

- % of sexual gender based violence victims (SGBV) receiving assistance (psychosocial, medical, legal, other support)
- % of victims able to access services

USAID/CMM ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

3.1.2 Reproductive and other key conflict-related health needs addressed

- % of conflict affected youth receiving key health services
- increased awareness about HIV/AIDS
- increased prevention of unwanted youth pregnancies

IR 3.2 COMMUNITY HEALING PROMOTED

- # of multi-racial/ethnic/religious community-based (CBOs/CSOs) healing initiatives underway (including traditional, transformational)
- #/% youth engaged in community healing activities

3.2.1 Tensions between youth war-participants and victims alleviated

- more equitable access to critical resources (water, housing, land)
- more inclusive participation in community events
- community dialogue including youth ex-combatants enhanced .
- # community groups with members who are former adversaries

3.2.2 Reintegration of ex-combatant youth facilitated through community-based support

- % ex-combatants with self-sustaining forms of employment
- % ex-combatants adopting civilian identity
 (e.g. enhanced civic interest, voting, membership in organizations, personal relationships, ambitions, etc.)
- community-generated activities involving ex-combatants increased

3.2.3 Community and personal security improved


- youth perceptions about security, violence and crime (index)
- measurable crime rates (e.g., violent incidents, reported rapes, thefts)
- % of threatened population with access to safe havens available


3.2.4 Individual, institutional, and local government peace capacities built


- CSO/CBOs/individuals able to effectively participate in peace process
- % CSOs/CBOs/schools with effective peace education programs
- % of communities with peace-building, conflict resolution/opportunities for out-of-school youth
- proportion of local government committees that use traditional or community-based mechanisms for resolution of conflicts

IR 3.3 GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES IMPROVED

- # of community services available
- % change in a customer satisfaction index








- Connect youth with adult decision makers
- Civic education
- Engagement of youth in developing/sponsoring civic events
- Dialogue sessions
- Town hall meetings
- Peace benefit understood and promoted
- Provision of outlets such as sports event, development of clubs (male/female)
- Support to youth society networks
- TA, training to government on how to engage youth

- Youth voter registration
- Involve youth in election monitoring leadership positions
- Youth congress
- Youth-led research projects, advocacy
- Provide high profile outlets for youth voices
- Hosting community and cross community events
- Student government
- Peer-to-peer mentoring

- Support platforms for youth voices in media
- Youth-led and produced media
- Peace journalism skills training



RESOURCES



USAID CONTRACTING MECHANISMS FOR YOUTH AND CONFLICT PROGRAMMING

EQUIP3/YOUTH TRUST LEADER WITH ASSOCIATES AWARD MECHANISM (EGAT/ED)

This cooperative agreement helps to prepare out-of-school children and youth for their roles in work, civil society, and family life. The project engages out-of-school and disenfranchised youth as partners and resources in addressing the social service and economic development needs of their communities, while helping them acquire the skills needed for produc-

tive futures. Prime Recipient: Education Development Center. Sub-Recipients: International Youth Foundation; Academy for Educational Development; National Youth Employment Coalition. Associate Organizations: Catholic Relief Services; International Council on National Youth Policy; Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc.; Partners of the Americas; Plan International; Sesame Workshop; StreetKids International; World Learning.

www.equip123.net

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE CIVIL SOCIETY STRENGTHENING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (DCHA/DG)

This agreement may be used to implement programs targeting youth to increase their participation in political processes and civil society activities. The two lead agencies are: the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and Pact, Inc. Under AED, affiliates with experience programming for youth are: Mercy Corps International and Search for Common Ground; and under Pact: The Center for Civic Education; Children's Resources International, and World Education.

www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_ and_governance/publications/pdfs/ug.pdf

BASIC EDUCATION AND POLICY SUPPORT (BEPS) IQC (EGAT/ED)

BEPS provides assistance in improving the quality, access, equity, and efficiency of education, particularly basic education.

"Education in Crisis Situations" is one area of expertise, as well as longer-term improvement of basic education through policy support and technical assistance. Creative Associates International is the primary agency, with sub-contractors: CARE, GroundWork, and The George Washington University.

www.beps.net

INTERNATIONAL YOUTH FOUNDATION COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (EGAT/PR/UP)

This cooperative agreement aims to increase the employability of youth through life skills, vocational, information and communications technology (ICT) and entrepreneurship training ("holistic employability training"). Youth also are provided with mentors, coaching and counseling, internships, and job placement in urban areas. Prime Recipient: International Youth Foundation Sub-Recipients: Alliance for

African Youth, Lions Clubs International, Youth Development Trust of South Africa, and Nokia. Contact: Vicki Clark vclark@usaid.org.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (EGAT/EG/EDFM)

Youth Business International (YBI), the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, is a UK-based business NGO that assists youth from ages 18-35 with starting a pre-microenterprise business. YBI works with business people around the world who share a similar corporate social responsibility agenda, which includes transfer of their knowledge and experience to potential young entrepreneurs to reduce unemployment, alleviating poverty and developing a healthy enterprise culture. It is important to note that many of the youth in these activities are unable to obtain bank loans to start a business, and often are blue-collar workers, carpenters, painters, construction workers, and administrative support staff for health transport and kiosk businesses. The YBI program currently operates in 22 countries, and has helped 70,000 disadvantaged young people become entrepreneurs, with over 60 percent sustaining their businesses through the assistance of 8,000 business volunteers. The current programs are also open to applicants working in all business sectors. To qualify to receive help, youth applicants must: 1) have a viable business plan; 2) be judged to have the personality to become an entrepreneur; 3) demonstrate that they have been unable to obtain help elsewhere. YBI will contribute to start-up costs of any new operation. www.youth-business.org

Contact Person: Georgia Sambunaris, gsambunaris@usaid.gov

> Photo opposite page: Boy with ammunition belt.

US GOVERNMENT AND DONOR CONTACTS

USAID field staff may wish to consult with other USG Agencies and donors that support youth and conflict programming. Even though some of the contacts listed below focus primarily on children rather than youth, their work often encompasses youth and conflict as well. While the list below is not comprehensive, it does represent some of the most active donors.

USAID/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

Zachary Rothschild Youth and Conflict Specialist Ronald Reagan Building 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20523

Phone: 202-712-5928 E-mail: zrothschild@usaid.gov

State Department

Carla Menares-Bury Coordinator for Trafficking in Persons Programs 2201 C Street NW Washington, DC 20520

Phone: 202-312-9649 E-mail: menares-buryCH@state.gov Website: www.state.gov/g/tip

Department of Labor

Meg Cronin
International Child Labor Program
International Labor Affairs
200 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20210

Phone: 202-693-4838 E-mail: cronin.meghan@dol.gov

Open Society Institute

Sarah Klaus
Deputy Director of Children and
Youth Network Programs
400 West 59th St
New York, NY 10019

E-mail: sklaus@sorosny.org or

Liz Lorant
Director of Children and
Youth Network Programs
400 West 59th St
New York, NY 10019

Phone: 212-547-6918 Email: elorant@sorosny.org

World Bank

Viviana Mangiaterra Youth Advisor 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433

Phone: 202-473-4502

E-mail: vmangiaterra@worldbank.org

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Natalie Zend
Children's Rights, Human Rights and
Participation Division, Policy Branch
200 Promenade du Portage
Gatineau, Quebec
KIA 0G4
Canada

Phone: 819-994-7927 E-mail: NATALIE_ZEND@acdi-cida.gc.ca Website: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/childprotection

Department for International Development (DFID)

Phillip Ryland-Jones Program Officer for Children Affected by Armed Conflict 20 Victoria St. 5th Floor London SWIHONF United Kingdom

Phone: +44 207 023 0066 E-mail: p-ryland-jones@dfid.gov.uk

UNICEF

Manuel Fontaine Senior Advisor on Child Protection and Children and Armed Conflict 3 United Nations Plaza New York, New York 10017 U.S.A.

Phone: 212-326-7686 E-mail: mfontaine@unicef.org

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