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- The goal is to estimate preference parameters consistent with the equilibrium

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- Conditional on the parameter values, solve for the equilibrium
- Update the parameter values, re-solve for the equilibrium, ...
- Just like in Rust's (1987) NFXP algorithm

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- This reduces the need to solve for a fixed point
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  - Because the optimizer sees the constraints and makes “smarter” guesses



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## CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES TO ESTIMATION OF STRUCTURAL MODELS

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- Market demand is given by  $P(Q) = a - bQ$

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$$q^* = \frac{a - c}{b(N + 1)}$$

$$p^* = \frac{a + Nc}{N + 1}$$

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- Firm 1 minimizes negative profit subject to other firms' FOCs
- We impose symmetry: all firms choose the same output in equilibrium
- The optimizer finds the equilibrium without nested fixed-point iteration

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- Use non-linear demand functions