§1 Buddhist Pūrvapakṣa A: Anti-Realism

§1.1 The Composite Whole (*avayavin*)

*Composite wholes appearing as gross and unitary can’t exist as such.*

§ *The composite whole’s properties conflict with those of its parts.*

**104,6** [One might object:] And yet surely, [non-yogic] perception is undoubtedly also accepted as apprehending objects which are not gross, like pleasure. [That’s] true. Nevertheless, some [namely, Buddhist Vijñānavādins] do not accept that what is apprehended (*grāhya*) [in perception] is something different from cognition. [So] it is in order to reject that [idea] that the following is taught: It [non-yogic perception] does apprehend gross objects, but since a cognition’s form (*jñānākāra*) does not possess grossness, the gross thing that is apprehended (*sthūlaṃ grāhyam*) is not of the nature of cognition.

**+104,7** And surely, [the objection might continue,] a gross thing different from cognition simply cannot exist at all. To explain: It’s just not the case that there exists a unitary composite whole in that way (*tathāsti*) [i.e., as gross] because [in that case] it would have to follow that when, say, [taking the whole to be a human body] its hand should move about, then it all [i.e., the whole body] (*sarva*) would [also] move. Or else, if that [whole body] does not move [when the hand is moving], then [there is again no unitary composite whole] because that would amount to proof that the moving [part] and non-moving [whole] are separate, like a cloth and water.

**+104,10** [Continuing the objection: There is] also [no composite whole] because, if there is covering of the one [part], this would result in covering of it all (*sarvam*), because there is no difference. Alternatively, on account of there being (*iti*) no covering of a certain [other] part, it [the whole] ought to appear as complete (*avikala*). Even if one were to allow that there could be covering of [only certain] parts and not [necessarily thereby] of the whole, then also in the case of half [of all the parts] being covered, the consequence would be that one sees it [the whole] just as before because of it [i.e., the whole itself] being uncovered. Also on the view that one sees the whole by way of seeing its parts (*avayavadarśana*), it would result that one would not apprehend the whole at all, since it is impossible to see all of the parts [at any one time]. [Or] if apprehending the whole results from seeing [just] a few parts, then there would be the unwanted result that, also when one see [only] two or three (*dvitra*) parts, one would apprehend it [i.e., the whole] as being [gross and unitary] like that (*tathābhūta*).

**+104,15** And if the whole, [by existing] in one part that is [dyed] red (*rakta*), should [itself thereby] be red, then it ought to appear as decidedly (*eva*) red also where it is located in the other parts. If this is not so, then even if all the parts were to be red, the whole ought to be apprehended as decidedly not red.

§ *The composite whole can be neither located physically nor found analytically.*

**+104,16** Furthermore, the composite whole cannot exist [also] because there is no possibility (*anupapatti*) of [it and the parts] residing (*vṛtti*) [in relation to each other]. To explain: People typically speak of a horn on a cow; they don’t usually speak of a cow in a horn. Among these [two options] (*tatra*), if [as people typically say] the parts are located in the whole, then the whole, which cannot be divided (*akhaṇḍa*), would be constrained (*avaruddha*) by one single part, and so where would the other parts be located? For indeed, several corporeal things cannot [simultaneously] reside in a single place (*ekadeśavṛtti*), and yet, besides the parts [themselves] (*avayavavyatirekeṇa*), the whole doesn’t have a different place (*pradeśabheda*) by means of which the parts would not [all] end up in a single place. And if one were to allow that (*abhyupagata*) substance can reside in a single substance, then this would also be contrary to reason (*yuktibādhā*).

**+105,6** Then there is the position that the composite whole is located in its parts. On this view as well, if it is located entirely in just a single part, then the other parts will fail to be a substratum for it (*tadanāśraya*). Moreover, if a substance had [only] a single thing for its substratum, then it would perpetually arise (*sadotpatti*) and never be destroyed. [One might] then [claim]: it [the whole] is located [only] partially (*ekadeśena*) in a [given] single [component] part (*avayava*). [To this we would say:] No [this is not correct], because, being indivisible, it [the whole] cannot have parts (*deśa*) besides its [component] parts (*avayava*s). Alternatively, if one were to allow this, then it [the whole] would [have to] reside also in those parts (*deśa*s) by means of other parts (*deśa*s), and so there would be an infinite regress.

**106,3** There is also no composite whole for the following reason: because when one mentally analyzes it (*buddhyā vivecanam*), it is not apprehended. For indeed, when one analyzes the parts [e.g., of a cloth] with thoughts like “This here is a thread, that is a thread” [and so on], the whole does not appear as [something] different from them. And through this [same reasoning] (*etena*) so too is defeated the view that the whole is a property of the parts. Therefore, there is no unitary whole which the object of a mental appearance of something gross could be.

§1.2 The Atom (*paramāṇu*)

*Atoms can neither explain apparent wholes nor exist at all.*

§ *The atom can’t explain the whole’s properties even when aggregated.*

**+106,6** Nor is the object of a mental appearance of something gross nothing more than an aggregate of atoms, since that [aggregate], insofar as it is something over and above the atoms, has [already] been disproved through our reasoning about [the residence problem of] the whole. Moreover, the atoms are not individually gross, so how could they be even if taken together? For indeed, it’s not the case that, when individually non-red things are in a state of being collected together (*samudāyāvasthāyām*), they are apprehended as having a red form; like sunrays appearing as water [in a mirage], such would be a mistaken apprehension.

§ *A partless atom contradicts conjunction and all-pervasive ether.*

**106,11** Then the following is said [in response to the Buddhist challenge]: If the apprehended thing distinct from cognition cannot be gross, then the apprehended thing must simply be subtle. That, too, is incorrect, since [as stated by Vasubandhu]: “Since it joins simultaneously with a set of six [other atoms], an atom has six parts (*aṃśa*) [rather than being partless] / [Alternatively], if [instead] the six [connected atoms] are in the same (*samāna*) place, then the overall thing (*piṇḍa*) would have the measure of [only] an atom. //” Moreover, whatever is corporeal [including the atom] would also necessarily have to have ten parts, according to the division of the directions (*dikpravibhāga*). And also, [the atom is implausible because] it’s not possible to speak of the existence of something which is not [ever] apprehended as itself (*svarūpeṇa*). And furthermore [as argued in the Nyāyasūtra], “because there is penetration [of the atom] by ether,” “or else (*vā*) ether is not all-pervasive,” the [partless] atom does not exist. Therefore, an external apprehended thing is impossible.

§2 Buddhist Pūrvapakṣa B: Cognition Non-Dualism

§2.1 Invariable Co-apprehension (*sahopalambhaniyama*)

*“Invariable co-apprehension” leaves a separate object unestablished.*

**+107,3** Thus it is taught [by Dharmakīrti]: “There is no other thing to be experienced by thought, nor further [resulting] experience for it. / Given the [ultimate] lack of apprehender or apprehended, it’s just [thought] itself that shines forth by itself. //” The meaning of this [latter point], taken as a whole (*samudāyārtha*), is that, given the absence of [any] apprehender or apprehended distinct from itself, it is [just] an awareness with both of those forms that, all by itself, illuminates its own nature, similar to light.

**+107,7** To elaborate [Dharmakīrti says]: Given that they are invariably apprehended together, there is no difference between blue and the cognition thereof. / For even though they appear as distinct, the [visible] form of blue (*rūpam nīlasya*) is not a completely different thing (*arthāntaram eva*) from the experience [thereof], given that they are invariably apprehended together, like when, for example, one apprehends two moons. For indeed, there cannot be non-apprehension of one of them and yet apprehension of the other, and this fact (*caitat*) would not be possible if they were of separate natures, because [besides being of the same nature] there is no essential connection [between them] that is the cause [for their invariable co-apprehension] (*pratibandhakāraṇa*).”

§2.2 Reflexive Awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)

*Practical behavior toward objects is not possible if cognition is not self-aware.*

**108,4** Then [Dharmakīrti says that one might suggest]: One becomes aware of an object-cognition [only] later, by means of another cognition. That is also untenable [Dharmakīrti says], for the following reason: Object-awareness (*arthadṛṣṭi*) is not established (*pra√sidh*) for one whose cognition is [itself] not directly perceived (*apratyakṣopalambhasya*). / For indeed, it’s not the case that one is aware of an object on account of the existence (*sattā*) of the object, but rather [one does so] on account of the existence of the cognition thereof. And that [existence of the cognition], insofar as it is not [itself] established by a means of valid knowledge (*apramāṇikā*), does not properly conduce to practical behaviors presupposing existence (*sattānibandhanān vyavahārān*). [But] if that [existence of the apprehension] cannot be clearly established, then neither is the object assured, and this would be the end of practical behavior concerning real things (*sadvyavahāra*). For indeed, even if something does really exist, if one is not aware of it, then it cannot be dealt with (*vyava√hṛ*) as real.

**108,10** Then [one might claim]: One becomes aware of the object-cognition through another cognition,. How then could this [latter] cognition, with its own existence not assured and [thus itself] as if non-existent (*asatkalpa*), establish the other [i.e., first] cognition? And in that search for [yet] another cognition [to establish that second one], there would be an infinite regress, and so, objects would not be established for anyone (*kasyacit*), with the result that everyone (*jagat*) would be blind and mute. [Or] if one allows for an endpoint (*niṣṭhā*) somewhere [in the sequence of cognitions], then that [foundational cognition] (*sa*) apprehends itself by itself and also (*ca*) at the same time the form of the object, and thus one could simply let those [cognitions] other than that [foundational] one be that way, too, since there’s no basis for any distinction [among them]. Thus (*tat*) it is established that apprehension [of the two] occurs [only] together, and on the basis of [them] being apprehended together, one can say that (*iti*) there is no [real] difference between a thing and the cognition thereof.

§2.3 Cognition as Possessing Forms (*sākāravāda*)

*Mind-internal factors suffice to explain objects.*

§ *Even without external objects, cognitive forms can explain inter-object specificity.*

**+108,15** And in this way, saying that (*…iti*) “apprehension of blue” means “apprehension of blue nature” (*nīlopalambha iti nīlasvabhāvopalambha*) means the following: that due to beginningless mental traces (*vāsanā*s), it is just awareness [itself] that is apprehended as arising with various forms, like awareness in a dream. And also [as Dharmakīrti says]: “If awareness has the form of blue etc., then what basis is there for an external [blue] object? / [Alternatively] if awareness does not have the form of blue etc., then what basis is there for an external [blue] object? //” [That is to say] if this form of blue etc. appears as a property of just the awareness itself, [and] having that same [cognitive] nature, then there is no warrant whatsoever for thinking that there is an object like e.g. blue that is distinct from that [awareness].

**+108,21** Then [perhaps] this [which appears] is not accepted as a form of cognition. Even so, how could the cognition which [then] has either no form or a different form establish [the external existence of] the blue and so on? For indeed, one cannot prove one thing on the basis of another without an essential connection, because that would be absurd. On the other hand (*tu*), if the essential connection is that it [e.g. the blue form in cognition] arises from that [external blue object], then things such as the visual faculty (*nayana*) and the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) [which similarly contribute to the arising of the cognition] ought to also be its objects, because in the absence of its [i.e. the external object’s] projecting (*arpakatva*) its own form [into awareness], then one also could not establish its productiveness which distinguishes [the external object from other causes of the cognition] (*janakatvaviśeṣa*). How [then], despite the absence of [such] distinctive productiveness, could one speak of only that [one] thing (*tasyaiva*) functioning as the direct object [of the action of knowing] (*karmakāraka*) or of it producing cognition featuring itself as object? As for those who accept that two consistently simultaneous things (*samānakālayor eva*) have the respective states (°*bhāva*) of apprehender and apprehended on the basis of an essential connection [between them] consisting in their [common] dependence on a single causal complex, their view will still have the problem that the visual faculty, the unseen force, and so on, which are [in fact all equally] dependent on the same (*eka*) causal complex as that [object is], would [themselves also] be apprehended, since there would be nothing distinguishing them [from the object in this way].

**109,1** Then [one might suggest]: The distinguishing feature (*viśeṣa*) is having the form of the object. Even then, what basis would there be for the external object? It is indeed a lone blue form that is apprehended here (*ayam*), and that is accepted as being of the nature of cognition; there does not in turn appear another form accompanying it. How [then] could this non-appearing [supposed second form] remain standing (*avatiṣṭheta*) as something external? Nor, given how no pervasion relation (*vyāpti*) has been established [between the two forms], can it [the supposed external form] possibly be knowable through inference.

**+109,4** Meanwhile (*tu*), others read [the verse] as follows: “If awareness has the form of blue etc., then what proof is there for the external object? / If awareness does not have the form of blue etc., then how could the experience (*saḥ anubhavaḥ*) be of that [supposed external blue object] (*tasya*)? //” Also in this case, the main idea is as follows: If the cognition has no form, then the [correct] allocation [of cognitions] to respective objects (*karma*) is not established, whereas (*ca*) if the cognition does have a form, then there is no proof for the external object.

§ *Even without external objects, mental traces can explain subject-object specificity.*

**+109,8** One might then object: “Given that the object form is apprehended in particular (*eva*) as what is apprehended and the cognition form in particular as what apprehends, how are the two the same? For indeed, if they were the same, the two would [each] also appear as their [respective] opposite.” It is not so because, through the power of beginningless obscurational traces, the [correct] establishment of such apprehensions [for each form] is [indeed made] possible. Thus it is taught [by Dharmakīrti]:

**109,16** This means: Awareness, although it doesn’t in its own right have forms of known and knowing, is [mentally] determined and then commonly dealt with just as it is apprehended by deluded (*bhrānta*) practical agents. But [the way] it is apprehended by those deluded ones [is namely] as being disrupted (*viplavā*) into the distinctly characterized apprehending and apprehended forms. The forms of apprehending and apprehended seem to have distinct characteristics, and these very things [the forms] constitute the disruption which the awareness is here being described as having. What is this [systematic disruption of even normal perceptive awareness] like? It is like the [seeming] distinction of [illusory floating] hairs etc. and cognition [thereof]. [That is], for those whose senses are afflicted by *timira* or the like, [floating] hairs and so on, which are actually non-existent, appear as if different from cognition, and just so (*yathā…tadvat*) do [the appearances] blue and so on [really not exist and yet appear as if different from cognition]. Given that (*yadā*) this [apparent] dividing up of awareness is due to none other than [primordial] ignorance, therefore it [awareness] (*iyam*) is not to be insisted upon as being [in reality] characterized by something apprehending and something apprehended. These two being insisted upon means needing to make into a further issue (*paryanuyojya*) the characteristics of apprehending and apprehended, which the awareness [itself] does not possess; indeed, a form [merely] superimposed out of [primordial] ignorance does not necessitate further scrutiny.

**+109,23** Thus, because in this way (*evam*) there exists neither apprehender nor apprehended distinct from awareness, it is awareness itself that, due to beginningless traces, appears with multiple forms. Therefore it is incorrect to have said that it [non-yogic perception] apprehends gross objects.

§3 Bhāsarvajña’s Siddhānta A: In Defense of Realism

§3.1 Partial Residence (*pradeśavṛttitva*)

*Partial residence of properties best explains part-whole differences.*

§ *Dharmakīrti’s paradox arguments against the whole are formally invalid.*

**109,27** Here it is countered that, first of all, it is incorrect to say that (*yat…iti*) there is no unitary whole on account of a consequence that all [body] parts must move when, for example, the hand moves, as there [simply] hasn’t been established any [positive or negative] pervasion [to prove this]. For indeed, there has never been apprehended any such [positive] pervasion as “whatever thing which, when its hand moves, all ends up moving, is non-existent”. Nor is there observed [as part of common knowledge] (*dṛṣṭa*) by the opponent [such as myself] any such [contrapositive] pervasion as “for that [e.g. body] which exists, it is not the case that it all ends up moving when for example its hand moves”. Moreover, it’s not the case that, if there is [given] no acceptable example case (*dṛṣṭānta*), the inferential reason is ever recognized (*√dṛś*) as being capable either of establishing one’s own position or of refuting another’s. As for (*api*) the [supposed unwanted] consequence, it takes place (*ātmānaṃ labhate*) [only] once a pervasion is established between the two [properties], like the entailment of a lamp on account of light.

**+110,5** Also, (*…api*) if there exists no external object [whatsoever] (*bāhyārthāsaṃbhave*), then it is inappropriate to say “Or else, if that [whole body] does not move [when the hand is moving], then this consequently amounts to proof that the moving and non-moving [part and whole] are separate.” For no non-crazy person will argue as follows: “There is no unitary son of a barren women, because it would have to follow that when, say, his hand should move about, then it all [his whole body] would [also] move. Or else, if that [whole body] does not move [when the son’s hand is moving], then [there is again no such son] because that would amount to proof that the moving and non-moving [part and whole] are separate, like a sky-flower and an ass’s horn”.

§ *The whole’s properties can differ from those of its parts.*

**+110,8** [One might object in reply that] the purport of the [said] consequence is that (*…ity ayaṃ prasaṅgārtha*) since being one and the same is contradictory for a [certain] moving thing and a [certain other] not-moving thing, someone who assumes unitariness for the whole ought to accept only and completely that it moves [when its part moves], whereas on the other hand (*ca*), someone who allows that a thing both moves and does not move should not accept that it is unitary. If [one objects] like this, then [to this we would say:] no, this [argument] is pointless. After all, no Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika [ever] accepts that a unitary whole [truly] both moves and does not move such that this consequence could count meaningfully against him (*yam prati…arthavān*).

**110,12** But surely [one might press]: Given that, even when there is movement of some part(s), there is [in fact observed] no movement of the other part(s), therefore both moving and not-moving do apply (*asti*), which establishes difference. [To which we respond:] What is undesirable on account of that? If indeed (*yadi nāma*) the [various] parts, by being moving or unmoving [as the case may be], are different [from one another], then what does that have to do with the whole, which is another thing [in its own right]? Indeed, when there arises (*utpadyate*) motion of the whole, then although some given part may be unmoving, it [the whole] is not. On the other hand, when it [motion of the whole] does not arise, then although a part may be moving, the whole is not. This is because, given that they are produced by distinct causal complexes, there does not apply any invariable rule (*niyamāyoga*) that the two movements, [namely that] of the [given] part and [that] of the whole, must arise simultaneously.

**+110,17** So (*tarhi*), when half the parts are moving, we do not [in fact always] know whether the whole is moving or not, since at that time (*tadā*) the thought may occur either way. To explain (*tathā hi*): Even if it [the whole] is [really] not moving (*niścalatve* ’pi), there may occur in relation to [certain of] its bases (*āśraya*s) which are seen to be moving the thought that it [the whole] is moving, like [it is also possible] in the cases of [other properties like] color and so on. [And on the other hand], even if it [the whole] is [really] moving, it is possible to think that it is not moving if, due to its inherence (*samavāya*) [also] in [visibly] motionless parts, one does not apprehend its motion; it is like when [a thing’s] motion is not apprehended on account of [the thing’s being at a] distance or the like. And yet (*ca*) one does not hold one’s breath (*anāśvāsa*) like this in every case, because if one apprehends no cause for doubt [about something], then it is appropriate to be confident about it. Indeed, otherwise, there would be no foundation whatsoever for [commonly] treating things as either moving or not-moving.

§ *Partial residence of certain properties resolves seeming contradictions.*

**111,6** Alternatively, similar to conjunction, so too does motion reside partially (*pradeśa-vṛtti*). In this way, even one and the same thing is not precluded (*vi√rudh*) from being thought about (°*pratyayaviṣayatvam*) as both moving and not moving. One might object (*iti cet*) that this is not tenable, given that, in the case of a person running, we apprehend that the motion does not reside partially. [To this we reply:] In that case then, neither will it be tenable for conjunction to reside partially, since we apprehend [also] that the conjunction between, for example, a cloth and water does not reside partially.

**111,10** One might respond (*…iti cet*) that in that case [of the cloth permeated with water], there is [just] a false impression (*abhimāna*) [to the effect] that it [conjunction] does not reside partially due to our apprehending the conjunction of e.g. the [whole] cloth with the water along with the [numerous] conjunctions of all the [individual] parts [of the cloth with the water]. [But] it’s the same also in this case [of the man running]: As a result of our apprehending the [positive] motion of the whole [person] along with the [positive] motions of all the parts, there occurs just such a false impression of [movement’s] not residing partially. We see no valid criterion (*…pramāṇaṃ na paśyāmaḥ*) for ascertaining what accounts for the [supposed] difference (*viśeṣaniścaye*) between two cases in which (*ity atra*) [on the one hand] there is conjunction of the [whole] body with, e.g., a wall (*kuḍya*) when [only] a finger is in conjunction with it but [on the other hand] there is no motion of the [whole] body even though there is motion of a hand. But then (*tu*), maybe any tenet can be proved merely by bringing it up! Therefore, insofar as movement does also reside partially, then just as there can be [non-contradictory] apprehension and non-apprehension of conjunction in one and the same [whole] thing, so can there be non-contradictory apprehension and non-apprehension of movement, as well.

**+111,16** It is with this [same argument] that [the question of the whole’s] being covered or not covered is [also] answered. Alternatively (*vā*), it is not the case that either apprehension of a [particular] part or contact of a sense faculty with a [particular] part are [such] causes for the apprehension of the whole (*avayavyupalambhe…kāraṇam*) by means of which, when [certain] parts are covered, be they one half [of the whole], three quarters (*tribhāga*), or so on, there should be non-apprehension also of the whole. Rather, contact [of the sense faculty] with it [i.e., the whole itself] is [the relevant cause for apprehension of the whole], provided that it [this contact] is accompanied by all [necessary] cooperating factors. And that [contact of a sense faculty with the whole] is to be inferred from the apprehension of it [the whole], while from the non-apprehension of it is inferred merely the incompleteness (*asamagratā*) of the cooperating factors.

**111,20** If one should ask why it is that one does not see the entire (*avikala*) whole also when a half is covered, [to this we would answer:] no, [this question is wrong], because, [given its] being by nature undivided, it [the whole] is seen most definitely as entire. [And yet], when it [the whole] is seen with its parts like that [i.e., half-covered] (*tasmiṃs tathāvayave dṛṣṭe*), it is not precluded (*aviruddha*) that one might also have a doubt [about what one has seen], depending on [the visible presence of] a distinguishing feature or lack thereof (*viśeṣāviśeṣa*), like a [characteristic] part or the like. Apprehension of its parts or the like (*tadavayavādi*°) and apprehension of the whole each have their respective causes, and so they do not invariably occur together. Therefore, even if [certain] parts are not apprehended, the whole is [still able to be] apprehended.

**111,24** Also when it was said “And if one [part] is [dyed] red [then the whole must be red]…” and so on, that too was incorrect. For indeed, it’s not the case that it is through the being red or not being red of [any given] part(s) that the whole is [respectively] such [i.e., red or not], since it [the whole] is something different from those [parts]. On the contrary (*api tu*), for a composite whole in particular (*eva*), being red is [just] conjunction with a red substance, and [similarly] not being red is [just] the absence of that [conjunction with a red substance]. And so (*iti*), given that conjunction does not reside pervasively (*avyāpyavṛttitvena*), it’s also not precluded (*na* virudhyate) that a single composite whole be [both] red and not red.

§ *Even undivided things can be treated as having partial residence of properties.*

**+111,27** If one objects “How could there not be pervasion [by e.g. redness] of that which is unitary?” [we respond that] no [this is wrong to ask], because conjunction undoubtedly (*eva*) has the property that (*evaṃ dharmo yena*) it is not [necessarily] apprehended in every part (*tatra tatra…na upalabhyate*) which the composite whole is regarded (*dṛśyate*) as being related to (*saṃbaddha*) like color and so on [would be apprehended], even if there is no deficiency in the causes of its [conjunction’s] apprehension. Similarly, it’s not the case that ether is delimited (*avacchidyate*) wherever it exists by conjunction with the ether in the ear canal [of a given person], since that would lead to the unwanted consequence that all sounds, given that they inhere in that [same ether], would be objects of a single [person’s] faculty of hearing (*ekaśrotra*). For this very reason, [we conclude that] sound, too, does not reside pervasively, since [if it did] that would lead to the unwanted consequence that even one [sound] arisen in a particular place (*kvacid utpannasyāpi*) would become an object for every faculty of hearing.

**+112,4** [On the one hand, in everyday practice] conjunction, sound, and so on are treated (*vyavahriyate*) as having this sort of property, even by means of the term “partial residence” (*pradeśa-vṛtti*śabda), and yet, [in reality] there does not exist a “part” (*pradeśa*) for ether or other such indivisible things. Even if there does exist the [component] part (*avayava*) as a [kind of] “part” (*pradeśa*) for the composite whole, the conjunction that belongs to the whole (*avayavisaṃyoga*) does not reside in that [component part], since that would lead to the unwanted consequence that wholes could not be a basis for conjunction. But if [for its part] the atom did not have parts, then it would not have conjunction [with anything], and because of that, with no arising of [whole, gross] bodies and so on, we would end up not apprehending anything [at all].

**+112,8** Therefore, just as, on your [Buddhist] view, one construes (*pari√kalp*) a part (*aṃśa*) for something actually undivided — namely, in that (*iti*) a non-conceptual cognition can have produced that same (*tad eva*) conceptual cognition that is, in a certain way, like it, and in a certain way not — just so [do we construe a part] also for the supporting basis (*ādhāra*) of conjunction and so on, and thus conjunction and so on reside partially [even for ether and atoms] without a problem. Therefore, even for a unitary thing, being [both] red and not red and so on (*raktārakatvādi*) are not contradictory.

§3.2 Variegated Color (*citrarūpa*)

*Variegated color is a real external entity.*

§ *Variegated color is a real quality by being a locus of multiple universals.*

**112,13** In that case, what is the color (*rūpa*) of that whole which has been brought about by those undoubtedly both (*eva*) red and not-red parts? [One might first answer:] There is not brought about any specific property (*viśeṣānārambha*), and so it [the overall color of the whole] is simply indescribable (*anirdeśya*) in terms of the specifics (*viśeṣataḥ*) of the [component] color causes (*kāraṇarūpa*) whose specific properties are [mutually] contradictory. But it’s [only] with respect to the bringing about of a specific property that there is a contradiction, not with respect to the bringing about of a general property. For indeed, the nature of color [in general] (*rūpātman*) is present in all cases of blue, yellow, and so on. What one understands from apprehending the composite whole in particular (*eva*) is that, despite being devoid of blue or another such specific property, a color has [nevertheless] arisen, since it is impossible to see a substance with no color [whatsoever], and because it would be absurd if one were to see one thing by means of the color of another. So, it is nothing more than just color in general (*rūpamātra*) that has arisen in that case (*tatra*), indescribable in terms of a specific property. However (*tu*), what appears [to the perceiver] in that case is [in fact] something variegated, on account of [the whole’s] connection with the variegated parts, like the appearance of blue and so on in a crystal.

**+112,19** [One might say:] If that is so, [then] also the color of an atomic dyad, when it is brought about by [single atoms’] colors whose specific characteristics are [mutually] contrasting (*viruddha*), ends up as indescribable, and thereby every color of a whole which follows from those [dyads] (*tatpūrvaka*) would become indescribable. And then (*tataḥ*), because the specific color of an [individual] atom (*paramāṇu*) is [itself] beyond the scope of the senses, that would be the end of describing specific colors altogether. [To which we would reply:] This is not so, because every bringing about [of something new] (*ārambha*) is dependent on the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), and the unseen force brings about effects that are applicable to human affairs (*puruṣārthopayogikārya*). On the other hand, insofar as things were to be brought about in that way (*tathārambhe*), it would not serve (*na…upayogaḥ*) human affairs. And so (*iti*) it is [clearly] not in every case (*na sarvatra*) that things are brought about in that way (*tathārambhaḥ*) or (*vā*) that there is a problem (*virodhaḥ*) with apprehending specific color.

**+113,4** Alternatively [one can say that] its [the whole’s] (*tad*°) color that has arisen is none other than [really] variegated, because this is exactly how it seems, with nothing to call it into question (*abādhita*). If one says that it is contradictory, and therefore improper, to say that it [the whole] is both (*ca*) unitary and variegated, [we would say] no [it’s not improper], because even if something [e.g., a color] is unitary, it can, by being the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) for multiple properties such as blueness etc., be the object of a mental appearance (*pratibhāsa*) of something variegated, in the same way that a cloth to which are bound multiple dyes such as red chalk and so on (*gairikādi*) is apprehended as being variegated.

**+113,7** If one says that, given that the universals (*jāti*) blueness [yellowness] and so on are [mutually] opposed, their inherence [together] in a single thing is not appropriate, [we would answer] no [this argument fails], since this opposition is not established. If one says that it is established, because one does not observe them together in other cases, [we would answer] no [that cannot be right], because then it would turn out that also blueness and water-lily-ness (*nīlatva, utpalatva*) would be [mutually] opposed. If one says that there is no opposition of these two, because they are seen [together] in a single thing, [we would answer that] this [observed compatibility] is the same [also for multiple colors].

**+113,10** Also with [positive] argumentation (*yuktyāpi*) it can be established (*saṃbhāvyate*) that the color of the whole, which is brought about by colors of [mutually] dissimilar kinds (*bhinnajātīya*), is a locus for multiple universals, [namely] since the colors of the parts are observed [as part of common knowledge] (*darśana*) to necessarily [have to] bring about colors [only] of their same [i.e., own] type in the whole. Let it be an example [for this argument] that also on the [Buddhist] opponent’s view, a cognition inlaid (*khacita*) with multiple mental traces is variegated [in this way]. For indeed, it is none other than differences of universals which are discussed with the [Buddhist] terms “difference of exclusion” and “difference of ability”. Whether or not these [exclusions and abilities] are [in turn] different from their substrates (*āśraya*s) is a different point of disagreement.

**+113,15** Therefore, as a locus of multiple universals, a unitary color is [really] variegated (*citra*). And yet (*ca*) when that [variegated color], although being such [a locus of multiple universals], is, on account of its multiple universals’ for whatever reason not [all] being observed [at once], apprehended as qualified by only a single (*ekenaiva*) particular universal, then it [the color of the whole] is apprehended as either white or red [alone], not as variegated, just like, for example, earth and color (*dharaṇirūpa*). Alternatively (*atha vā*), [one might say that] it is only the color of a [given] part (*avayava*) that is apprehended as white or red. By contrast (*tu*), the color of the whole is accepted as being directly perceived (*pratyakṣa*) only at the time that one apprehends something as variegated. [Either way] so be it, we do not insist [on any one position] in this matter, because our refutation of the challenge advanced by the Buddhist (*śākyoktadūṣaṇaparihāra*) will succeed in any event (*sarvathopapatteḥ*).

§ *Atoms cannot explain apprehension of complex properties like variegation.*

**113,21** On the other hand (*tu*), those who do not admit the [real existence of the] whole must for their own part (*api*) explain (*vaktavya*) the object of a mental appearance of something variegated etc. If they admit of an object with parts other than the atoms (*paramāṇuvilakṣaṇāvayavaviṣaya*), then that very thing being admitted is the whole. Meanwhile (*tu*), the atoms [themselves] cannot be sense objects (*akṣaviṣaya*) because they are beyond the scope of the senses, and also (*ca*) because they lack the characteristic mark of the object. Indeed, they [the Buddhists] accept that the characteristic mark of an object is that it produces a cognition which has its form. And yet, atoms do not produce a cognition with themselves as the form (*svākārajñāna*janaka), since, in every case [of cognition], one is aware only of something whose form is gross and so on. If something that produces a cognition with a different form [than its own] (*vilakṣaṇākārajñāna*janaka) can also be an object, then the visual faculty etc. as well would become an object.

**114,6** Now [one may say]: Atoms do project (*arpaka*) the form of blue etc., and for that very reason, they [themselves] are an object [of cognition]. [To which we would respond:] This is incorrect, since this form of blue etc. is apprehended (*saṃvedyate*) as none other than something that is by nature gross and so on; there does not appear any other form of blue etc. consisting in [nothing but] dissociated atoms (*asaṃśliṣṭaparamāṇu*).

**+114,8** Moreover (*ca*), how does one arrive at the following distinction: that only the blue form [in cognition], for example, has an external material cause (*bāhyopādāna*), and not, for example, the gross form [in cognition]? After all, like the e.g. gross form, so also (*api*) the e.g. blue form is not observed (*dṛṣṭa*) by the advocate of forms [in cognition] (*ākāravādin*) as something apart from the form located in (°*stha*) the cognition. So, how is it that, by means of direct perception and non-apprehension (*pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām*), a particular [external] object [e.g. blue] and the [cognitive] form thereof can be established as cause and result, respectively? Instead, by implication (*arthāpattyā*), also the gross form and so on (*ādi*) ought (*syāt*) to be established as having an external material cause, since this has the same [theoretical] benefit (*samānayogakṣema*).

**+114,12** Should one say that it is only the numerous atoms arranged in a certain configuration (*saṃniviṣṭa*) that appear as gross, [we would answer] no, because of what was [already] said [earlier]. A cognition which has such [gross] form in relation to atoms that are [in their own right] not individually gross when not collected together would certainly be erroneous. And furthermore, would those many [atoms] (*bahavaḥ*) project only a single form [into awareness], or would they project a different one for each atom? If [on the first alternative] they project only a single form into awareness, then it would end up that even perception, by apprehending a form that is common [to numerous individual things], would have a universal for an object. And it [perception] would also end up being erroneous, since those things [i.e., atoms] which each have [their own] distinct forms would be apprehended by means of [only] a single form. And [finally] (*ca*), there could not be a mental appearance of something variegated, for indeed, we do not speak of being variegated (*citratā nāma*) for something with a singular form.

**+114,18** Then [suppose]: The cognition has distinct forms for each atom. That also is incorrect, because a cognition which is [itself] undivided cannot have distinct forms. For indeed, insofar as there is a division of forms, either there must also be a division of cognitions, or else it [i.e., the cognition] will lose its [very] nature [as one single thing]; there is no other way out (*gati*). If one [then] says that (*iti cet*) a division of cognitions on the basis of a division of forms is in fact accepted, [we would respond that] no, [this is still wrong] because it is contrary to experience. One experiences only a single cognition of e.g. a pillar, [and] not that (*iti*) there are innumerable (*apari*saṃkhyāta) different cognitions, one per atom. Moreover, given that the cognitions, each of which amounts to no more than (*paryavasita*) an individual form, would have forms that are not mutually known to each other (*parasparato’*saṃvidita), like cognitions in distinct continua, how could there be an awareness of all (*api*) those many things [i.e., the atoms] as [together] having e.g. a gross form?

§ *Cognition alone cannot explain apprehension of variegation.*

**115,1** Then [one might say]: There is no external object whatsoever, and so (*iti*) in every case, it is just awareness that appears as having that form [of something external]. [We respond:] That is also incorrect, because (*hi*) how could awareness, for its own part, being singular, have a variegated form? If one allows a thing of undivided nature to be variegated, then come now (*khalu*), what crime has been committed by the whole such that, despite being well-known to all, it should be [so] repudiated?

**115,4** Now [one might say]: What we accept is not that a [single] thing of undivided nature has a variegated form, but rather that multiple cognitions (*anekaṃ vijñānam*),arisen simultaneously and with their own respective forms, are [together] spoken of as being variegated (*citram ity ucyate*). [To which we respond:] That is also not correct, because, as a result of [each cognition’s] amounting to (*niṣṭha*) reflexive awareness, only a single form is [able to be] experienced. [For the Buddhist opponent] it can by no means happen that one cognition experiences the form of another cognition. And then, without that experiencing [by one cognition of another cognition’s form], how could the simultaneous arising (*utpāda*) of cognitions with different forms be variegated? It would be like cognitions with multiple forms [arising] in distinct continua.

**+115,7** Then [one suggests]: By those [multiple cognitions], after they have arisen [together] in a single continuum, there is produced a single conceptualization (*vikalpa*) that determines (°*adhyavasāyin*) the variegated form. [Our answer:] No, [this is wrong] because it is observed that the cognition of something variegated (*citrajñāna*) also appears vividly, and you [Buddhists] don’t accept that conceptualizations appear vividly. If the conceptualization, in turn, [itself] has a unitary form, then how does it determine a variegated form? [Or] if it [itself] has a divided form, then how could something undivided have a divided form? By this same token (*iti…anenaiva*) is defeated also the endless talk about mental traces (*vāsanā*s).

**115,12** Now [it is suggested]: It is accepted that multiple simultaneously arisen cognitions are mutually knowable to each other through their being produced from the same substrate cause (*upādāna*), and in this way (*tena*), a mental appearance of something variegated is nothing more than the apprehension of multiple forms. [We answer:] This is not so, for indeed, if a cognition is apprehended (*upalabhyate*) as appropriating another cognition’s form, then how could it have a single form? And on the other hand (*ca*), if it is devoid of that [other cognition’s] form, then how could it be an awareness of that [other cognition] (*tat tasya saṃvedanam*)? And the same [failure to be the cognition’s object] would also be the case for the external object: If the form one becomes aware of is not of the same nature [as the object] (*atadātmabhūta*), then it [the cognition of the form] would be nothing more than a conceptualization of the form lacking in epistemic instrumentality (*niṣpramāṇikā*).

§3.3 Variegation Non-Dualism (*citrādvaita*)

*Non-dualistic negation of difference is incoherent.*

§ *Self-cognition and variegation non-dualism preclude proving the falsity of difference.*

**115,18** [Here one might suggest:] In that case, we should suppose (*astu*) non-duality of wondrous variegation (*citrādvaita*), and [we should] not [suppose] an external thing [that is] like that [i.e., variegated] (*evam*), since that [external thing], when analyzed as something different in nature [from cognition] (*bhinnātmanaḥ*), is impossible. And neither is it possible to analyze cognition [as different]. For indeed, cognition cannot on its own (*svayam*) analyze (*vivecyate*) itself (*ātman*), since one is aware of it [the cognition] only as having a unitary nature (*abhinnasvarūpa*). Nor [can it be analyzed] by another cognition, since that [other cognition] also is aware exclusively of itself (*ātman*).

**+115,21** Then [one might object to this Buddhist claim, saying]: There is [in fact able to be] analysis [of cognition] in that (*iti*) a cognitive form appearing as intact on its own (*kevala*) at one point in time (*idānīm*) is [known to be] different from a prior one [i.e., a prior cognitive form] not appearing [any more]. [The Buddhist would respond:] No [that cannot be], because there can be no [direct] awareness of a prior thing, on account of it being not given to immediate experience (*parokṣa*). And without knowledge (*pratīti*) of that [prior cognitive form], how could it [the present cognition] know that it is something separate from that [prior cognitive form]? If [one suggests that] it is known through memory, [the Buddhist answer is that] no [it cannot be], since memory is not a means of valid knowledge. If one says that it most certainly is a means of valid knowledge, given that it is produced from experience, [the answer is still that] no [this is incorrect], since there is no means by which it can be validly known that it [memory] was produced from that [experience]. For indeed, it is not the case that memory, without fully knowing (*aviditvaiva*) its [prior] direct experience, knows [the fact] that it has arisen from [that] experience. On the other hand (*tu*), if it were [directly] aware of the experience, then it would just be the experience [itself], not memory. By this [same line of argument] (*etena*) are rejected [also] inferential cognitions and so on. They too, by amounting to (°*niṣṭhatva*) reflexive awareness, are not capable of being aware of something else, for if they were aware of something else — [which is to say] if they were to end up (*āpatti*) having the form of that [other cognition] — then they would simply be that [other cognition].

**+116,3** Therefore, given that impossibility of analysis [into knower and known], there is only a lone, wondrously variegated (*citrā*) awareness with [multiple] forms (°*ākārā*) of apprehended and apprehender, [that is], of blue and so on, and thus (*iti*) is established [the theory of] non-duality through wondrous variegation. And because we apprehend this [cognition] to be this way [i.e. non-dual] (*itthaṃsvabhāvasyaitasya*) through a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇena*), there is also no contradiction.

**116,7** About this [Buddhist idea], it is said [by us] that this is inappropriate (*…anupapattiḥ*), because by just this *sūtra* — “definitive positions on numbers [of types of things existing in the world] (*saṃkhyaikānta*) cannot be proven through either the establishment (*upapatti*) or non-establishment of a [given] proving cause (*kāraṇa*)” — all non-dualist views are defeated. We will also expand on why this is the case later on.

**+116,9** For now (*iha*), though, a challenge is offered (*paryanu√yuj*) in the following way: If it is the theory of non-duality through wondrous variegation that you [the Buddhist] intend, then why all this effort (*mahāprayāsa*) in refuting the Veda? For in that, too, the ultimate object (*paramārtha*) is the Self (*ātman*), which is aware (*bodha*) by its [very] nature and without a doubt (*eva*) unitary, and which has diverse forms (*viśvākāra*). Similarly, scripture records that “Truly, all this [world] is *brahman*,” “The personal soul (*puruṣa*) is nothing but pure awareness,” and “This [world] (*idam*) is only one, there is no second.” [Therefore] you also should just say that (*ity evam eva*) this teaching [of yours] is for the purpose of becoming clear on (*niś√ci*) exactly this point (*artha*) of the Vedas, like [it is for] authors of such teachings as the Brahmasūtra [i.e. Bādarāyaṇa] (*śārīrikādiśāstrakāravat*). And on the other hand (*tu*), it’s not appropriate to speak of their [the Vedas’] lack of epistemic instrumentality, since then your [own] teaching, as well, given that its aim is no different from [the aim of] those [Vedas], would end up lacking [its own] epistemic instrumentality.

**+117,2** There might be the following [response from the Buddhist]: The property of [cognition’s] having a variegated form is itself (*api*) actually not [ultimately] real, as it cannot be apprehended. To explain: A reflexively known cognition, given that it is completely immersed (*nimagna*) in being aware of the form of reflexive knowing, is not aware of another [cognition’s] form. One might say [by way of objection] ”Even if it were aware of that [other cognition’s form], what would be the problem?” [To which the Buddhist would respond:] Nothing less than the incompatibility (*asaṃbhava*) of [a thing’s] own-nature and other natures. For indeed, it’s not possible that (*iti na yuktam*) a cognition uses its own nature to know another [cognition’s] form, since its [i.e., a given cognition’s] nature is differentially fixed (*vyavasthāna*) upon its own self. How can something whose nature is intent upon (*niviṣṭa*) its own form, and which is [thereby] strictly oriented toward itself, know another?

**+117,7** If one objects that it is oriented toward others, [the Buddhist would answer that] in that case, it cannot know its own self, [and] therefore, similar to cognitions in different continua, it [the cognition] is not aware of the two [itself and the other]. If one says that that [nature (*ātman*)] which has these two orientations (*ābhimukhya*) is what is singular, [the Buddhist answer would be to ask] what becomes aware of there being two things present? If one says “that [nature] itself”, [the Buddhist would say] then it turns out that there are the two orientations and reflexive awareness as a third thing. And then, if there is [to be] awareness of the three [things being present], one must admit another nature (*ātman*). And then that [nature] ends up having a trio of orientations and [again] self-awareness as a fourth thing. And then another, and then another, and so there would be a grand succession of pointless things. Therefore, there is just the single awareness.

**+117,12** [The Buddhist continues:] In that [awareness], the appearance of difference is merely an error (*upaplava*), and so (*iti*) also the cognition, [insofar as it is] not apprehended as it is, is in fact unreal, and so (*iti*) only emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is left. For indeed, without understanding what is different from a given thing (*tadanyāpratipattau*), it’s not possible to comprehend what is excluded from what is not that thing (*atad*rūpaparāvṛttam). Nor is it possible to differentially ascertain that one is aware of not apprehending the property of being excluded from non-awareness.

**+117,16** Thus it is taught [by Dharmakīrti]: “Intelligent people say this, which follows from the power of real things: / Things disappear (*viśīryante*) in the same way they are conceptualized (*cintyante*) //” If one accepts this (*etat*) about things in their own right (*svayam*) — namely, that (*yat…iti*) when it [a thing] is thought about, it disappears — then what can we do about this? And yet (*ca*), it’s [also] not appropriate for a person of proper reasoning (*nyāyavādin*) to accept something without consideration just because it appears (*pratibhāsamātreṇa*), since then one would also end up accepting [as real] the objects of dreams and so forth. With that being the case (*iti…tarhi*), [one might further ask:] how can one communicate the nature of [a means of valid knowledge] e.g. perception [merely] by rejecting an opponent’s position? [By Dharmakīrti] it is said about this [that what he teaches is in particular the nature] “of that [means of valid knowledge] which is practiced in common” (*sāṃvyavahārikasya*). Thus, it is said (*iti*), the non-dualism [taught] here, which is empty of all final elements of existence (*sarvadharmaśūnya*) and [itself] a mere appearance, is not the same as, e.g., *brahman* non-dualism.

**118,5** [Our response to all this] then (*tad*) [is that] this too is incorrect, since also in the Vedas, given the emphasis that “This [world] is only one”, neither being variegated nor being capable of transformation is accepted as [truly] real (*vastutaḥ*). On the one hand (*ca*), in the same way that you (*bhavatā*) speak of properties like having a form (*sākāratva*) and being momentary and so on as [being] merely a matter of common practice (*saṃvyavahāra*), so too in the Vedas [does one speak of] the [*ātman*’s] properties of being permanent and all-pervasive. And on the other hand (*ca*), in the same way that you teach your non-duality via exclusion of what is other, so too in the Vedas does one teach [non-duality] by means of expressions like (*ityādinā*) “it [the metaphysical person (*puruṣa*)] has no smell, no taste, no form”, and so on.

**+118,9** Now [consider that someone says]: We accept emptiness in the sense that (*iti*) nothing whatsoever [really] exists. [To that we would respond:] That is incorrect, since it conflicts with [the very fact of] your articulating a teaching of your own (*svavacanoccāraṇa*). If one says [in response] that articulating [anything] is indeed [a kind of] error, [we would say] even so, that which is mistaken (*yat…upaplūyate*), along with that by means of which it is [mistaken] (*yena…ca*), must certainly exist. For otherwise, this whole [world] would be nothing but unilluminable (*aprakāśya*) darkness.

**+118,11** [The Buddhist might ask:] Even if something does exist, so what? [To which we would respond:] Well surely then (*nanu*) one should not refute the Vedas, since also they contain elucidation of knowledge and ignorance. Then [the objector says]: In the Vedas, non-duality is understood as a rejection of what is other (*anyanirākaraṇa*). On the other hand, in this [teaching of ours], the other is neither affirmed nor negated. Rather, the non-duality is merely a result of making known that the appearance of difference is false. [We would then answer:] That is incorrect, for insofar as difference [itself] is not negated, how could one make known that the appearance thereof is false?

**+118,16** Well surely [the Buddhist could respond], as soon as one investigates further (*parāmarśād eva*), that awareness of difference is [known to be] false. To explain: If awareness of difference is [just] awareness of self and [awareness of] other, then one would speak of [both] awareness of self and awareness of other. Moreover, in that way (*tathā ca*), the self-awareness would be based (*niṣṭha*) in its own nature, and the other-awareness, as well, would be based in the nature of the other (*parasya svātmani* niṣṭham), so that (*iti*) the awareness of difference would not even be unitary.

**+118,18** Now [an objector challenges the Buddhist]: Awareness of difference is [just] awareness of blue, yellow, and so on. [To which the Buddhist responds:] That’s also incorrect, for the following reason: Insofar as (*…iti*) awareness of blue is based in its blue nature, awareness of yellow is based in its yellow nature [and so on]. [In that way] every awareness is only a self-awareness, and so what here is the awareness of difference? Then [the objector says]: The awareness of difference is the singular awareness having for its object several things like blue and so on. [Buddhist answer:] Still, saying that (*iti*) the very same thing (*tad eva…tad eva…*) is [both] an awareness of blue and an awareness of yellow would be merely a statement of synonyms for just the same (*abhinna*) awareness. Nor is it possible to establish things as different (*bhinnavyavasthā*) on the basis of an undivided awareness, since that would be absurd. Therefore, an appearance of difference cannot be correct.

**118,24** Such speech as this from the Buddhist, like chewing on [empty] space, appears to be simply incoherent. To explain: First of all, the mental appearance of difference (*bhedapratibhāsa*) occurs to [absolutely] everyone, [so] how does one apprehend that it is not real? Through that mental appearance [of difference] itself, or through another mental appearance? To say that it is through that very one is incorrect, since it [the mental appearance] has difference for its object. For indeed, a mental appearance does not ascertain its own irreality [just] by seeing that the things before it are distinct (*bhinnā ete ’rthā iti*); if it did (*tanniścaye*), then, given the [recognized] disparity (*viparyayāt*), there would be no action [taken].

**+119,4** Then its irreality is ascertained by another cognition. [But in that case] how does that other cognition, which is also restricted to awareness of itself, know another’s irreality? If [one explains that] it takes both [cognitions] as its object, then how is that not an experience (*avagati*) of difference? [That is to say] it is a contradiction of one’s own words to say that it is not experience of difference even though it takes both [itself and another] as its object. If one says that there is no contradiction because one is speaking [here] by means of an assumption (*abhyupagama*) of the [idea of the] other, then is that assumption of the other [itself] experienced (*avagata*) as non-different with the assumption of self, or as different? If it is experienced as non-different, then that [assumption of the other] would be none other than the assumption of self. If it is experienced as different, then (*tadā*) the contradiction would [still] be to the same degree [as before] (*tadavastha*).

**+119,10** If one says that this [assumption of the other] is [simply] a reiteration (*anuvāda*) of worldly practice, then is that worldly practice itself (*khalu*) something different from true knowledge (*tattvadṛṣṭi*), or is it not something different? If it is not something different, then worldly practice is none other than true knowledge, and so difference would be established just on on the basis of such practice. If worldly practice is something different from true knowledge, then how is that [itself] not a difference? If one says that this [distinguishing between truth and worldly practice] is [itself] error, then that [error], too, is either different from true knowledge or non-different, and so the consequence is as before. It’s also not correct to say that there does exist a conventional difference. The convention (*saṃvṛti*), too, is either different from true knowledge or non-different, so the consequence has [still] not gone away.

**+119,16** Therefore, it is preferable that those who advocate non-dualism be silent, very silent, about the other (*para*maunaṃ jyāyaḥ). [Later on] we will refute non-dualism again. For now (*tāvat*), the proponent of reflexive-awareness is asked [the following]: By what is it ascertained that the determination of difference between known and knowing is false? For starters, it [the falseness] cannot be [ascertained] by it [the determination of difference] itself, since it is by nature an ascertainment of difference. Nor is it [ascertained to be false] by another cognition, because it is not allowed [by you] that a cognition can have another cognition for its object. Or, if this is assumed, then the inferential reason [for there being no external object, namely] “given the lack of [real] apprehended and apprehender” would be unestablished. Now [one might attempt to say]: The cognition does have another cognition as its object through [a kind of] error. [To that we answer:] No [that solution doesn’t work], since erroneous cognition is not a means of valid knowledge; this we will also discuss [later] in relation to inference.

§ *Error is impossible if difference is negated.*

**119,24** And [just] what is this erroneous cognition? Is it just the [cognition’s] apprehension of its own form, or is it superimposition of its own form onto something else, or is it superimposition of a different form onto itself? First, error is not just the [cognition’s] apprehension of its own form, because then it would result that all cognitions would be erroneous. Nor is error the [cognition’s] superimposition of its own form onto something else, since, if that something else has not been [previously] apprehended (*adṛṣṭa*), then the superimposition of the [cognition’s] own form onto it will not be possible. For indeed, one does not observe the superimposition of any form onto a thing which is completely unapprehended (*anupalabdha*).

**+120,2** Then error is [a cognition’s] superimposition of a different form onto itself. [But] also in that case, is the superimposition of a form that has already been apprehended (*dṛṣṭākāra*) or of a form that is not yet apprehended? First, the superimposition of an apprehended form does not work, since a false form is not apprehended. For indeed, in your view, never is the falseness of the determination of difference between apprehended and apprehender directly perceived (*adhyakṣeṇopalabdha*) such that there could be [known to be] superimposition of form upon another cognition.

**+120,5** Then the superimposition is of a form that has not [yet] been apprehended. [To this we reply:] That cannot be, since we do not observe this. For indeed, in every case of erroneous cognition, one observes the superimposition upon e.g. a conch only of e.g. a yellow form that has been apprehended [before elsewhere]. Also in such cases as [seeing two] moons, there is superimposition only of properties, like for example two-ness, that have been apprehended in other cases. Also (*ca*), if error were the superimposition of a form that has not [yet] been apprehended, then, like the erroneous cognition of the two moons etc., it [the erroneous cognition] would not agree (*avisaṃvādinī na syāt*) with the form of that [real thing, e.g., the moon]. And as result of that [disagreement], the cognition that the determination of difference between apprehended and apprehender is false would certainly not be a means of valid knowledge, and [then] given the lack of epistemic instrumentality of that [cognition of falseness], the determination of difference between apprehended and apprehender would be in fact correct.

**+120,10** Also in the case of [systematically] erroneous cognition about [there being] external objects, how is the form of an external object, which is [supposedly] not [ever] apprehended at all (*sarvathānupalabdho*), superimposed [onto anything]? For indeed, we never observe that the form of a particular jewel in the king’s treasury is superimposed [onto anything] by one who has not [ever] seen it (*ataddarśin*). Moreover, when there is an erroneous cognition [of an external object], is the form of an external object being superimposed by another cognition, or does it [the erroneous cognition] itself have that form? First, it [the form of the external object] is not superimposed by another cognition, since it [the other cognition] does not take that [erroneous cognition] (*tad*°) as an object. For indeed, like by the visual faculty onto taste and the like, no form is superimposed by anything onto something that is not the [proper] object (*aviṣaya*) [for that superimposing factor], and in your view, a cognition is not [ever] the object of another cognition.

**+120,15** So then, one says, the error itself [ostensibly] has that form. [But] no [that cannot be], because multiple forms (*anekākāra*) is contradictory for something with an undivided nature. Now [the Buddhist objects]: It is merely a non-existent (*avidyamāna*) multiplicity of forms that appears. [To which we respond:] No, because that would result in an [undesirable] opportunity for the emptiness of all things, and the problem with that (*tatra*) has [already] been stated. Moreover, this would amount to (*syāt*) the position that the object of error is something unreal (*asatkhyātivāda*), and that is contrary to your own doctrine.

**+120,18** Then [the Buddhist suggests]: Having multiple forms is accepted [by us] as the nature of cognition itself, and nothing is contrary to its very own nature. [To this we answer:] Well then clearly, if that’s the case, what’s the point of transgressing all conventional limits (*maryādā*)? It would be better that one instead accept this [having multiple forms] as being the nature of none other than the external object itself. If one assumes this, then there is a contradiction neither with everyday life, nor with reason. For indeed, one who assumes that a property and a property possessor are the same cannot avoid the contradictoriness of a singular thing having multiple forms, because [otherwise] it would result that there would be no problem with a singular thing having the nature of the entire world. Therefore, if one accepts that the form of the whole, as a locus of multiple properties, is indeed unitary, then there is no contradiction whatsoever.

**121,2** Also when it was said [that there is no whole] because, when analyzed (*vivec*yamāna) with the mind, the external [form] is impossible, whereas for its part (*tu*) cognition cannot be analyzed [at all], that is an ill-considered statement. For indeed, on the position in favor of reflexive awareness, cognition, first of all, given that it is suited for apprehension (*upalabdhiyogya*), can [at least] sometimes (*kadācit*) [indeed] be analyzed. On the other hand, how can the external [form], being by nature utterly imperceptible (*anupalabhya*), [ever] be analyzed? For indeed, it’s not possible to analyze e.g. an ornament of the king’s harem (*antaḥpura*) without having seen it.

§ *Analysis cannot prove non-existence of unreal things.*

**+121,5** If one says that it is [in particular] the form of cognition agreed to be (*abhimata*) external [to the cognition] that is perceptible (*dṛṣya*) and can therefore be analyzed, then [we would answer that] as a result of that [form] being analyzed, does that [supposedly external form] itself not exist, or does another thing [not exist]? That it would be that [form] itself [that doesn’t exist] is not correct, since this would mean that cognition [actually] has no form (*nirākāra*), and then it would be a contradiction for something variegated to be unitary. [But] neither does another thing [not exist], for if, when one thing is analyzed, it proves the non-existence of another, then the three worlds would end up not existing.

**+121,9** Now [one might say]: What is being negated is [only] that this [form] itself is something other than cognition. [We would answer:] No [this is incorrect], since that is not what is being discussed. Neither its [the form’s] being something other than cognition nor its not being so (*arthāntaratvam an*arthāntaratvaṃ vā) is up for discussion here. Rather, what is being discussed is how a singular thing could have a variegated form. [And] concerning that, it has already been stated [by me] that (*ity uktam*) a variegated form, insofar as it is not something different from cognition (*jñānānarthāntara*), is completely impossible.

**+121,12** Then [one says]: It is on the basis of analysis by numerous people that the external [object] is [found to be] impossible. By what, though, is the cognition analyzed, which ceases [to exist] once it has by way of reflexive awareness alone known itself to have a manifold form? [Our answer:] That is incorrect, for if cognition is not the object of another cognition, then none other than the view of non-duality would result. Alternatively, if it [cognition] is in a certain sense (*kathaṃcit*) [able to be] the object [of another cognition], then in just that same sense is there [able to be] analysis [of that cognition], so why is the analysis [of cognition said to be] impossible?

**+121,15** Also, [the claim] that (*iti*) the external [form] is [found to be] impossible on the basis of analysis by numerous people is incorrect because it is contradicted (*vyāhata*) [by that very fact of experience]. For indeed, how could that which is the object of the cognitions of numerous people not exist? If one says that it is through [a kind of] error that it is the object of the cognitions of numerous people, then in that case, the analysis [itself] is erroneous, and because it is therefore not a means of valid knowledge, it cannot establish [anything’s] non-existence. If one says [quoting Dharmakīrti] “Even an error, through a [certain] relation to [practical] objects (*arthasaṃbandha*), is [in fact able to be] valid knowledge (*pramā*),” [we would answer that] this is incorrect, since error has no relation [whatsoever] with (*saha*) the external object [that you say doesn’t exist]. Or, if it [error] (*tat*°) does have a connection, then that [external object] (*tasya*) is not non-existent.

**121,21** Moreover, is the whole analyzed by thinking about the whole or by thinking about the parts? It’s not, first of all, by thinking about the whole that the whole is analytically established not to exist, because that [thinking about the whole] is by nature an apprehension (*gṛhītirūpa*) of its existence, like a thought of blue etc. If, in turn, a thing’s non-existence is [able to be] established by thinking about its existence, then it would [equally] be the case that its existence is [able to be] established by thinking about its non-existence. [What] a nice establishment [that would be] then!

**+121,25** Now [consider that]: It is through a thought about its non-existence that it [the whole] is analyzed not to exist. [Our answer:] That may be true (*bhavatv evam*) for a case where a non-erroneous thought about non-existence does [in fact] occur (*asti*), and yet (*ca*), there does not occur in every situation [such] a thought about the non-existence of e.g. a pot. Therefore, non-existence is not [so] established in every case [of a whole].

**+122,2** Then it’s by thinking about the parts that it [the whole] is analyzed to not exist. [Also] that is incorrect, since a [positive] thought about the parts provides (*vi√dhā*) existence only to the parts themselves; it can neither provide nor deny existence to the whole, since it [the thought] does not have that [whole] as its object.

**122,5** Now one says: When the parts are being apprehended, the whole is not apprehended, [and] therefore it [the whole] certainly does not exist. [To which we answer:] Similarly then, when smell, touch, and visible form are being apprehended, taste is not apprehended, nor is the cognition of another person, [and] therefore it ends up that those two also do not exist. If one says that they don’t fail to exist, since another sense faculty [namely, the gustatory sense] apprehends the taste, and the other person apprehends his [own] cognition, [we answer that] similarly then, neither does the whole fail to exist, because it is apprehended by another cognition. To explain: It is only in relation to the parts that there occurs a mental appearance with different forms (*bhinnākāraḥ pratibhāsaḥ*), whereas in relation to the whole, there occurs a mental appearance with an undivided form.

**+122,10** If one says [that this is] because it [the whole] is the object of an undivided sense faculty, [we would answer:] no, [this reason doesn’t work] because, given [the appearance at other times of] blue and yellow etc., it is inconclusive. Moreover, how could there be a division of the sense faculties themselves? If one were to say [that it is] on the basis of a difference in the mental appearance, then [we would say that] one can [equally] let that same thing [i.e., the difference in mental appearance] be [an inferential mark] for something else (*anyatrāstu*). What’s the point of suggesting a division in the sense faculty?

**+122,12** Now [one might say]: If the whole exists, then why (*kim iti*) does it not appear to just anyone as something separate from the parts (*avayavavyāvṛtta*)? [To this we respond:] who says that it appears as such only to me? If it is [then] said that “This is an erroneous cognition that you are having”, [we would answer:] it is [in fact] none other than your own (*tavaiva*) apprehension of non-difference that is erroneous cognition. How could this cognition of mine, which undoubtedly agrees with everyone’s worldly behavior — [namely, the explanation] that this singular cloth has been brought about by numerous threads — be erroneous cognition? Even such arising [of cloth from threads] is impossible [for you] (*anupapannaḥ*) as a result of [our] negating [your doctrine of] momentariness. Therefore, it’s not the case that the non-existence of the whole follows from analysis.

**+122,16** By this [same argumentation] is refuted (*apāsta*) [also the idea] that when the threads are pulled apart (*tantvapakarṣaṇe*), the thought of the [whole] cloth is impossible. For indeed, if by pulling apart is meant the [physical] unraveling (*viśleṣaṇa*) of the threads, then it is indeed accepted [by us] that its [the cloth’s] non-existence results from the termination of conjunction [among the threads]. And yet (*ca*) it’s not the case that what is destroyed [at some time] is utterly non-existent [at all times], since that would result in the total non-existence of cognition, as well. On the other hand (*tu*), pulling apart [only] with thought, since it is not different in meaning from analysis, is negated [as a way of proving the whole’s non-existence] as soon as that [analyis] is [so] negated (*tanniṣedhenaiva*).

§3.4 Real Support (*āśraya, ādhāra*) for Many-to-One Relations

*Ontologically real support of one by many best explains apprehension of difference.*

§ *Cognition can have multiple objects as properties, including other cognitions.*

**122,22** Also, when it was said, in order to establish [that cognition is] reflexive awareness alone, that [cognition] is both self- and other-oriented (*svābhimukhaṃ parābhimukhaṃ ca*) and so on, in response to this (*tatra*) we will say that cognition is [in fact] not self-aware [at all]. For that reason, it [cognition] is not accepted [by us] as being self-oriented. [On the other hand] being other-oriented most certainly is accepted as a property of cognition, for which there is the technical notion of (*…iti saṃjñā*) “[the relationship of] being object and object-possessor”. [And] because there is awareness of the object even when there is no awareness of that [cognition], there is no infinite regress.

**+123,3** Furthermore (*ca*), as we will explain [later], given that property and property possessor are distinct, it is not true that [merely] on the basis of a distinction of properties [e.g., a cognitive object] there is [necessarily] also a division of the property possessor [e.g., the cognition]. And [in fact] because [we observe that] multiple particular objects like blue, yellow, and so on do appear in a cognition despite it being undivided, therefore it also incorrect to say [as you did before] “Nor is it possible to establish things as different on the basis of an undivided awareness, since that would be absurd.” Therefore, there is no problem if a cognition, even though it is unitary, is aware of numerous objects.

§ *The residence argument against the whole has unestablished terms.*

**123,8** Also, when it is said while refuting the whole [that it doesn’t exist] “because there is no possibility of [it and the parts] residing [in relation to each other] (*vṛttyanupa-patteḥ*)”, is that an independent proof (°*sādhana*) or is it a reduction to an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅgāpādana*)? First of all, [as] an independent proof [it] cannot be right, for indeed, it’s not the case, in your view, that anything at all [ever] resides in anything [else] (*kvacit*), whether completely or partially, and so (*ity ataḥ*), on the basis of [such] residence being [totally] impossible, every last thing would end up not existing.

**+123,11** Nor is it [proper as] an argument by unwanted consequence (*prasaṅgasādhana*), since there is no [established] pervasion like [there is] in the case of the light and lamp. Alternatively, if one assumes [such] a pervasion [as established], then [even so] there is no [properly] complete absence of the [pervading property, namely] residence of the whole [by way of it doing so] either completely or partially in quite the same way as (*eva*) [one can establish such absence of the pervading property in] the case of the light and lamp [example] (*prabhā*pradīpavad eva). For indeed, [it is true that] if a pervading property (*vyāpaka*) is established to not be present [in a given case], then it is correct to conclude that the pervaded property (*vyāpya*) is not present [either]. And yet (*ca*), if [this] residence [property] is completely unapprehended, then its being a pervader [of existence (*sattva*)] cannot [ever] be known, [and] so (*tat*) how could the whole [be said to] not exist on the basis of its failing to reside [in relation to its parts]? Even if one were to know it [i.e., residence] to pervade [existence] in a certain case (*kvacit*), [still] the whole is not [therefore] totally non-existent [in every case].

**+123,15** If one were to say that it is a valid argument by unwanted consequence] because the [realist] opponent accepts that [such] residence [logically] pervades the [existence of the] whole, [we would answer that] that’s incorrect. Indeed, [on the one hand, it is true that] once an opponent accepts in this way (*evam*) that [for example] primordial matter (*mūlaprakṛti*) pervades all [evolutionary] effects, then if that [primordial matter] should cease to exist (*tannivṛttau*), then [for that opponent] every [evolutionary] effect, whether sentient or insentient (*bodhābodha*) by nature, would also fail to exist. And yet (*ca*), it’s not the case that one’s opponents [in this case, we Naiyāyikas] accept the whole as [only] residing either entirely or partially, and so it’s not appropriate to proclaim (*udbhāvana*) a contradiction resulting from something accepted by the opponent. For indeed (*…hi*) what [we] opponents [actually] do accept is that the undivided whole resides in the different parts by means of none other than inherence-[type] residence (*samavāyavṛtti*), and we will explain [later] that it is [in fact] this [whole] that inheres (*samavāyaḥ…asya*).

§ *A single thing can be supported by multiple things and still be independent.*

**123,21** So, too, is it through conjunction[-type] residence (*saṃyogavṛtti*) that a rafter (*vaṃśa*) resides on its [support] columns (*stambha*s), [and] not partially [as it might seem], since it is not the single part that resides (*ekadeśasyāvṛtti*). In that case [one might wonder], why do we think that (*katham…iti pratītiḥ*) the rafter (*vaṃśaḥ*) resides partially on its columns? This [thought] is not difficult [to account for]. It’s true (*khalu*), for a whole [e.g., a rafter], the [component] part (*avayava*) is [a kind of] part (*deśa*), and for one beholding something [e.g., a column] conjoined (*saṃyuktaṃ*) with that one part (*avayava*), the thought occurs in that way. But [in fact] it’s not the case that the residence or the cause thereof occurs in the single part (*ekadeśe*) alone, because then conjunction would end up failing to be possible for [partless] things such as atoms, ether, and so on, [and] because of that, all effects [produced from conjunction] would end up not arising whatsoever.

**124,3** Then [one might say]: Whatever is one, resides in only one thing, like [a given instance of] color [resides in only one substance]. Therefore, one who accepts the oneness of e.g. the whole should not accept that it resides in multiple things. [Our answer to this would be:] No [this argument is wrong], because it [the residing in multiple places] is established by the same [type of] evidence (*pramāṇa*). [That is to say] on the basis of the very same [type of] evidence by which it is established that color resides in one thing, why is it not [also] accepted as established that e.g. the whole resides in multiple things? Alternatively, just as the basis of color can be in an inherence relation (*rūpāśrayasya…samavāyaḥ*) with multiple things [namely, other qualities] like smell, taste, etc., so too can e.g. the whole [be in an inherence relation] with multiple bases. What contradiction is there in this?

**124,8** But surely [one might further object], everyone has the thought that the branch is on the tree [and] the horn is on the cow, so how could the parts be the basis [of the whole]? [To this we would respond:] No [that’s not decisive], because [there is also the possibility] of thinking about it differently. The idea here is that (…*iti*), if there is a whole like e.g. a tree, being the way that it is (*yathāvasthita*), and if people are looking at a part like e.g. a branch which is [in fact] not falling on account of the opposition (*pratibandha*) provided by its connection with its [the tree’s] lower parts, the thought occurs to them that the [whole] e.g. tree is the basis of that [branch]. But [in a more important sense] the parts are the basis [for the whole], in that (*…iti*) only when they are present does the whole exist (*avasthiti*), whereas (*ca*) when they’re not, then it doesn’t. It’s in this way (*etena*) that also [the qualities] color and so on are explained to be reliant (*āśrita*) on substance.

**+124,12** On the basis of that view (*darśana*), even permanent things can be reliant [on other things]. In that way, even though universals are permanent, it is only on the basis of apprehending them in substantial objects (*piṇḍa*s) that they can be the object of effective practical behavior (*sadvyavahāra*), [and] not in the absence of physical objects. For this reason, one speaks practically of (*vyavahriyate*) [universals] being reliant on those [physical objects]. Therefore, [when Dharmakīrti says]: “It [earth] might be (*syāt*) a support for things like water, given the counteracting (*pratibandhataḥ*) of [e.g. water’s] movement [by e.g. an earthen jar], [but] for those things without motion, [like] qualities, universals, and actions, what’s the use of supports?” also this is an ill-considered statement. For indeed, it’s not the case that a support is known among ordinary people only as that which counteracts heaviness, but rather also differently, for example [in the cases of] a face [occurring] in a mirror, pain etc. [occurring] in the body, [and] a flash of light [occurring] on a sword. Therefore, one can to that extent carefully (*yatnena*) establish for the whole, which is unitary, a particular relation with multiple things [i.e., the parts], just as [one can do] for substance, which is unitary, with multiple things like color and so on. For each case (*tatra*), there should [simply] be assumed the appropriate (*yathāsaṃbhavam*) support-and-supported relation.

**125,8** Now consider that the inherence in a substance also of things like color is not accepted [by Buddhists]. In that case, what basis is there for [speaking of] the consequence [for us] that “Whatever is one, is located in only one thing”? Moreover, does [an instance of] color produce another [instance of] color with all of itself, or [does it do so] partially? If the color completely exhausts itself (*paravasita*) in the production of another [instance of] color, then it would not be able to produce [in addition to new instance of color] e.g. a cognition. For indeed, its nature is not [able to be] divided. Nor [does it do so] partially, since that which is indivisible doesn’t have parts, and also because [even assuming such parts] only the part would end up being productive. As for the cognition [of color], too (*api*), will it have arisen entirely from the color or [only] partially? If it has arisen entirely from the color, then it does not end up as having arisen from another [previous] cognition [too]. Nor [can it have done so] partially, since it [the cognition] has no parts.

**125,15** If one objects that this is not a consequence [that applies] for the [Buddhist] proponent of consciousness-only, [our answer is that] no, [it does in fact apply, because] even on that view (*tatrāpi*), if a single cognition is produced by multiple cognitions, produces multiple cognitions, and makes known multiple forms, the consequence does not go away. Alternatively (*vā*), if this [all] is not accepted, then none other than non-dualism would result, and the set of problems with that (*tatra…doṣajātam*) has [already] been stated and will be discussed [again later]. Through this [same argumentation], also [one thing] being [both] chief cause (*adhipatipratyaya*) and immediately preceding homogeneous cause (*samanantarapratyaya*) should be viewed as impossible. Therefore, for one [desirous of] refuting the whole by way of a dilemma about residence (*vṛttivikalpa*), also his own teaching ceases to have meaning.

**+126,1** If a cognition that is undoubtedly singular is [according to you simply] like that by nature (*tādṛktvabhāva*), then also the nature of the whole being like that (*tathābhūta*) should not be questioned, given that the theoretical benefit is the same. [As Kumārila says:] “When reflecting on something of the sort where (*yatra*…tādṛgarthavicāraṇe) a problem is the same for two [options] and so is (*ca tat*) the refutation, no single one [of the two options] (*naikaḥ*) ought to be subjected to [special] scrutiny.”

**126,6** [One might suggest that] in that case (*tarhi*), the whole does not exist separately for the following reason (*itaḥ*): because it is not apprehended as long as there is no apprehension of the parts. [For indeed] that which is not apprehended when there is no apprehension of another thing is not separate [from that other thing], like the additional moon (*candrāntaram*) [that is not apprehended] when there is no apprehension of the [real] moon. [To this we would respond:] This is not a [valid] inferential reason [at all], since it is inconclusive. To explain: [It is true that] as long as there is no apprehension of one of the Pleiades, one does not apprehend another of the Pleiades, and yet (*atha ca*), the Pleiades are [indeed] separate. Furthermore (*ca*), the reason is unestablished. To explain: Even when from afar there is no apprehension of the parts, e.g., the threads, the whole, e.g., a cloth, is [in fact] apprehended.

§ *Atoms can’t explain apprehension of wholes without real intermediate wholes.*

**+126,10** Moreover (*ca*) it’s not the case that one can construe (*kalpayitum*) an apprehension of e.g. threads even without their [directly] appearing [to the mind] (*apratibhāsane*) in the form of e.g. threads (*tantvādi*rūpeṇa), because that would be absurd. [As the Nyāyasūtra records:] “If one says that there is apprehension [of the whole] in the same way as in the case of an army or a forest, [one can answer that] no [it is not like that], because atoms are [forever] beyond the scope of the senses.” [In other words] one might have the following idea: Although elephants, horses, chariots, etc. [in the case of an army] and trees [in the case of a forest] are not seen as such (*tadrūpa*°) from a distance, it is nevertheless not about anything other than them that one apprehends “army” and “forest” [respectively]. In just the same way, even though from a distance there is no apprehension [of the parts] in the form of e.g. threads, it is nevertheless precisely about them that one has the thought e.g. “cloth”.

**+126,14** [But] given that the e.g. threads are [themselves] also (*api*) [necessarily] something over and above [their constituent] atoms, if one does not accept the [existence of the] whole, then they [the threads] themselves do not exist, [and so] how in turn could the thought “cloth” be about them? If one says that it [the thought] is about none other than the atoms themselves, [we would then answer] no [it cannot be], because atoms are beyond the scope of the senses. After all, not even an erroneous cognition can arise from a sense faculty concerning things that are beyond its [proper] scope. For indeed, there cannot occur [any] visual cognition in relation to a taste, for example. And in the same way that it’s not possible for a sense cognition, whether erroneous or not, to be about atoms that are [in their own right] beyond the scope of the senses, so also [can there not be cognition] concerning the qualities possessed by those [atoms] (*tadgata*). Hence (*iti*), if the whole [object] does not exist (*avayavy*abhāvāt), then [its qualities] sound, pleasure, and so on for their own part cannot arise, and thus (*iti*) there would also be no apprehension of them. Precisely this is what he [the Sūtrakāra] says [with]: “Everything fails to be apprehended if the whole is unestablished.”

**+126,20** If you suggest that it [the apprehension of the whole] is like a *timira*-sufferer’s apprehension in relation to a collection of hairs, then you [must] think [the following] (*atha manuṣe*): In the same way that, for one whose visual faculty is afflicted with *timira*, hairs do not appear individually but do appear [as] combined, so too do atoms [appear for normal people only as combined]. And yet (*ca*), in the same way that hairs do also appear individually for one whose visual faculty is not afflicted [with *timira*] and so are not completely beyond the scope of the senses, so [too] do atoms appear individually for a yogi, and so they also are not completely beyond the scope of the senses.

**+127,2** In that case then, it would result that nothing at all would be beyond the scope of the senses, since all things are objects for the sense faculties of yogis. And then, like the atoms, absolutely all objects ought to sometimes be apprehended by [normal] people like us through a sense faculty. And yet (*ca*) they are not apprehended. Therefore, just like e.g. the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), atoms, because they are beyond the scope of the senses, are not directly perceived by normal people like us, but hairs are not beyond the scope of the senses even for one whose visual faculty is afflicted with *timira* since [for that person] there occurs the thought “This is a collection of hairs.” On the other hand (*tu*), no one similarly has the thought “This is a collection of atoms.”

§ *Real wholes explain apprehension of natural types better than exclusion etc.*

**+127,7** Moreover, if it is only a collection of atoms that is seen in every case, then one would not, like [one does] in the case of the apprehension of a forest in relation to a collection of trees, apprehend different universals in various circumstances (*anekadhā*). If [to explain this] one says that it is because the component elements (*samudāyin*s) have different forms that there is in various circumstances [able to be] apprehension of different universals in relation to collections of those [components], then in that case, if e.g. the cloth and threads have [respectively] different component elements, then it is established that they are different [from each other] (*anya*).

**127,11** Then [it would seem]: The threads have the very same component elements as the cloth. How then is there apprehension of different universals? For indeed, even if there is a collection of [several] armies, one does not apprehend something different from an army (*senāvilakṣaṇa*). Also by those who are averse to the [real] universal, there is accepted in its place difference by way of exclusion (*vyāvṛttibheda*), and that, too, if the whole is not assumed, could not exist. For indeed, it is not as distinct from clumps (*puñja*s) of hair that a collection thereof appears like in the case of threads and cloth.

**+127,15** If one says that there is a difference of appearance corresponding to a difference in pragmatic efficacy (*arthakriyā*), [we would answer] no, because we observe difference of appearance even when that [difference in pragmatic efficacy] is not observed. If [instead] one says that it [the difference of appearance] is due to apprehending the [object’s] suitability (*yogyatādarśanāt*), then do pray tell (*khalu*), what other suitability is there besides a difference of the [real] universal (*jātibheda*)? If one says that the suitability [spoken of] (*asau yogyatā*) has for its basis that which is not different (*abhinnāśrayā*), [we respond that] no [that is not enough], because then it would end up that there would be the thought e.g. “cloth” also toward the parts thereof [i.e., toward the threads]. If one says [that this is not a problem] because one does not observe that [suitability] in those [parts, e.g., threads], then this suitability is beyond the scope of the senses, such that it is not apprehended even if its basis is apprehended. Thus, there would in no case whatsoever be the thought of e.g. a cloth.

**+127,20** If one says that it is by all parts [acting] together that their (*tad*°) [collective] pragmatic efficacy is brought about (*sādhyate*), and so, it is only when all [parts] together are apprehended that this suitability is [able to be] apprehended, [we would answer] no [that theory fails], because it’s not possible for one to see all parts [at any one time]. Therefore, it is only if the whole exists that it is possible to apprehend different universals (*jātibheda*). In that way (*tena*), once one apprehends the universal tree-ness, [then] in relation to the collection of those things that are the basis for that [universal tree-ness, namely the trees] (*tadāśraya*), [and] on the basis of the convention consisting in the notional label of forest (*vanasaṃjñāsaṃketa*), also the thought “forest” (*vanam* iti pratyayaḥ) can occur. For indeed, in the absence of its causal condition, also a convention cannot be enacted (*kṛ*), and so (*iti*) the thought “forest” would also not occur.

§ *There also exist collective things that are not real, unitary wholes.*

**127,26** Meanwhile (*tu*), some, believing that there never occurs an undivided thought in relation to [multiple] different things, say that the thought of e.g. an army has for its object plural number (*bahutvasaṃkhyā*), [while] others [say that] that it has being [itself] (*sattā*) for its object. First of all, it’s [simply] not the case that either plural number or e.g. being [itself] appear in the thought of e.g. an army. If it is [nevertheless] assumed on the basis that otherwise an undivided mental appearance would be impossible, then the thought of e.g. a cloth ought also (*api*) to have only that e.g. [quality of] number as its object. If one should say that [the assumption is proper] because there is no factor counteracting its [the thought’s] (*tasya*) also having the whole as its object (*avayavi*viṣayatva), then [we would answer that] given that there is also nothing that [positively] establishes [that], how can it [be said to] have that [i.e., the whole] for its object? If one says that none other than its having a different appearance from [the appearance of] the parts is what establishes it, [we would answer] no, because even if it has [only] number etc. for its object, that difference [of appearance] is [still] possible. Therefore, just like the thought of e.g. a cloth, on account of sharing a locus with thoughts qualified by action or qualities, does not have [only] number etc. for its object, in the same way, neither does the thought of e.g. an army.

**+128,8** And thus (*tathā ca*), the author of the [Nyāya] Sūtras did not correct the objection that “There is apprehension [of the whole] like in the case of an army or a forest” by saying either “No [that’s wrong], because e.g. an army (*senādeḥ*) is also undivided” or [by saying] “[No, that’s wrong] because it [the army] is a separate thing from the [foot-]soldiers and so on” but rather by saying “No, because atoms are beyond the scope of the senses.” [What’s more] for one saying that “one cannot treat different things as not different”, there would also be a contradiction with the sūtras, for by this [sūtra which states] (*ity anena*) “Those [sounds (*vārṇa*s)] ending in inflectional endings (*vibhakti*s) are a word (*pada*),” it is taught that sounds, despite being multiple (*bahavo* ’pi varṇāḥ), constitute a single word.

**+128,12** Moreover, if such [verbalized] thoughts as “the blossoming forest is being cut down”, “the great army is on the move”, etc. are substantiated as having number for their object by means of their being based on the inherence of quality and action in one thing, then also the person who advocates universals as the [only] meaning of words is certainly able to substantiate [that view] by relying on the particular proximity (*pratyāsatti*) that is the having of a common [referential] locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) in a phrase like “the white cow is going along.” And then, [the sūtra] “The meaning of a word (*padārthaḥ*) is, as the case may be (*tu*), individuals, form (*ākṛti*), and/or universals” would certainly lack authority. Therefore, it is none other than the basis of qualities and actions [itself] that appears in the thought of e.g. an army. On the other hand, the undivided appearance in that [thought] is certainly mistaken, like when, because of not apprehending the difference at a distance, it seems that “There are trees in the village”. If one says that the thought of e.g. a cloth is also like that, [we would reply] no [one cannot simply claim that], because that is [exactly] what has been brought up for discussion [here] (*vicāritatvāt*).

**+128,19** Alternatively, [it is better to say that] the whole is simply that thing, possessing color and so on, about which a mental appearance of something undivided is not erroneous. And it cannot be that (*na ca*) there is [such] error in each and every case. For indeed, it is by apprehending difference that the mental appearance of non-difference is counteracted. Furthermore, if there were no apprehension of something undivided in any case [whatsoever], then also the apprehension of difference [itself] cannot be real (*vāstava*), since difference has for its basis multiple undivided things. If one says that non-difference is apprehended in relation to the atom, [we would answer] no [that cannot be], since it [the atom] is beyond the scope of the senses. Moreover, it cannot be that (*mā*) these thoughts about cloths etc. have atoms as their objects, since they [those thoughts] share the same basis with the thought of large extent (*mahat*) like thoughts about ether and so on [do]. Hence, the whole is that thing, over and above the atoms, about which there is the thought of e.g. the cloth.

§ *The whole arises as a different entity among its parts, not as a property thereof.*

**+128,25** Others say that it [the whole] is nothing but a property of the atoms. [But] is that [property of the atoms] possessed of (°*yukta*) the color and so on, or is it devoid of it? If it [the property] possesses color and so on [and if it does so] as something over and above the atoms, then there is no dispute [between us], because it is no contradiction for an effect to be a property of its causes. If it is devoid of the e.g. color, then there is a clear contradiction (*adhyakṣavirodha*), since the e.g. cloth is apprehended to have e.g. color through none other than direct perception. Also on the Sāṃkhya view, as a result of assuming non-difference of property and property-possessor, it is impossible for a property that is beyond the range of the senses to be directly apprehended. For indeed, if it were directly perceptible, then the property-possessor, which is not different from that [property], would also have to be directly perceptible, or else (*vā*) it would undo the identity [of the two].

**129,6**

Furthermore, if you say that the thought [that occurs about a two-tiered pot] is that “These are two pots joined together”, [and] not that “It is many atoms” or “[It is] a property thereof”, and therefore (*tat*) that it [the thought of the pot etc.] is like the thought of a temple (*devakula*) and so on, then you [must] think [the following] (*atha manyase*): Just as a temple along with (*ca*) its surrounding compound (*prākāra*) is said to be (*ucyate*) nothing but a particular conjunction of bricks (*iṣṭakā*) and so on, and yet (*atha ca*) there [also] occurs the thought about them that the temple and its surrounding compound, [each of] which have [their own] color etc., are conjoined, that’s also how it is for pots etc.

**+129,9** [To this we would answer:] No [it is not merely conjunction], because the temple and so on is also accepted as being a whole. However, by Uddyotakara (*Tamo’ri*) it is [in fact] taught, [specifically] by way of a Sāṃkhya view (*abhiprāya*), that the thought of the temple etc. has a conjunction for its object, so as to show that an example case (*dṛṣṭānta*) completely fails to work (*sarvathā…nopapadyate*) on the Buddhist view. But [anyway] (*ca*) it’s not possible to explain the [entire Nyāya] system (*śāstra*) in full agreement (*avirodhena*) with the views (*mata*s) of all commentators (*vyākhyātṛ*) [including Uddyotakara], because in all systematic teachings, there can be division among commentators by way of their contradictory views, because commentators expound upon each others’ faults. Because of that, it is difficult to avoid [even] outright (*eva*) contradiction among the means of valid knowledge. Indeed (*khalu*), if the surrounding temple compound and so on were [in fact] by nature a conjunction (*saṃyogātmakatve*), then not only (*na* kevalam) does the previously stated thought not occur, [but] also (*api*) the thought of something undivided would not occur, since the conjunctions with the bricks and so on are many [in number].

**129,17** But surely [an objector might continue], given that it is only ones of the same type that can bring about [a unitary] substance, how is it that for e.g. a temple, which is brought about by things of different types like wood, bricks, and so on, being a whole is not contradicted by [this] means of valid knowledge? [To this we would answer:] No [there is no contradiction], because also things of different types are observed to bring about the body. If [however] they [the things that bring about the body] are [able to be] in a certain way of the same type, then let the wood, bricks, and so on, through their [own] shared nature of e.g. earth (*sa*pārthivādirūpeṇa), also be of the same type [in that same way]. What is contradicted here (*atra viruddham*)?

**+129,21** And surely [it should also be asked], why do e.g. threads and *vīraṇa* grass, although they are [both equally] of the nature of e.g. earth, not [together] bring about the cloth? Indeed (*nanu*), [despite] being of the same type [as the cloth made of earth], why don’t *vīraṇa* grasses bring about e.g. cloth even on their own? If one says that it is because they are incapable [of doing so], then one should just say that they are incapable, not that they are of a different type. On the other hand, threads and *vīraṇa* grasses and so on are all (*api*) [equally] capable of bringing about e.g. a rope. Therefore, whether they are of the same or of a different type (*samānajātīyānāṃ vijātīyānāṃ* vā), whatever things have been determined through positive and negative concomitance to be capable with regard to some effect should be admitted as bringing about that effect. One should not insist in a one-sided manner (*ekāntāgraha*) that only things of the same type are capable of bringing about [unitary substances].

**129,27** Surely [one might then object], in this way, even if all five elements [together] bring about [the body as] a single effect, there would be no contradiction. [To which we respond:] So be it, if [indeed] that sort of effect is [ever] observed. We [however] do not [in fact] recognize just such an effect, and so (*iti*) that [possibility of five elements together bringing about the body] is not admitted. Surely [one might say], the body does [in fact] consist of [all] five [elements]. [But] no [that’s not true], because it is [only] by way of its [the body’s] having [all] five [elements] as causal conditions (*nimitta*) that there is the metaphorical extension (*upacāra*) [of saying] that it consists of five [elements], not through its [the body’s actually] inhering in the five [elements].

**+130,3** To explain: Ether, first of all, cannot bring about substance at all, because it is all-pervasive and intangible. Moreover (*ca*), if the body had that [ether] as a cause characterized by inherence (*samavāyikāraṇa*), then it would [itself] be all-pervasive and devoid of form and so on. In turn (*api*), if it were produced from wind, then it would have touch as its only quality. Again (*api*), if it were produced from fire, then it would not be possessed of smell, taste, and heaviness. And [finally] (*ca*) if it were produced from water, it would not possess smell. Furthermore (*ca*), one would apprehend contrasting color and so on, because the whole conforms to the colors etc. of its parts. It is for this reason (*ataḥ*) that the body is not produced from multiple elements. But [it is] also (*ca*) because one apprehends by direct perception only [the body’s] earthen parts [i.e., atoms], because, just like in the case of [apprehending the properties of] pots and so on, one apprehends the moisture, heat, expiration, and so on only insofar as they inhere in that [other substance] which is conjoined [with the body] (*saṃyuktasamaveta*).

**130,10** Thus, even for bringing about [the water-dwelling body of] e.g. a fish, the earthen ones [i.e., atoms] are the [material] cause of that [effect, i.e., the body] which [then] inheres [in them], whereas the others are the causal conditions. However, if there appears an effect possessed of e.g. variegated color, then its parts which have contradictory properties (*viruddhadharmaka*) are definitely accepted as producing a single effect, as was stated earlier. Thus, in this same way, for the producing of a temple etc., some things, like the wood, bricks, and so on, should be accepted as being the cause characterized by inherence and the others as causal conditions, or alternatively (*vā*), they should all be accepted as being [such] a [material] cause characterized by inherence insofar as they are observed to be so (*yathādarśanam*). Therefore it is established that also the temple and so on is a whole.

**130,15** In that case, [it would seem then that] that which is characterized as a village could also be accepted as a whole. Some agree that this is true. Others [however] say that the e.g. houses, if they are not conjoined with each other (*parasparato’*saṃyuktānāṃ), cannot possibly bring about the e.g. village, because, if something is able to bring [things] about through conjunction with things that are not conjoined [with each other] (*asaṃyuktasaṃyogena*), and the village in this example. then it would end up that even parts [e.g. houses] located in a different place could bring it about [e.g. the village]. Therefore, our common practices (*vyavahāra*) concerning villages and so on should be viewed as being in fact (*eva*) about e.g. [mere] collections of houses. Also [such] common practice concerning an assembly of people (*pariṣad*) and so on is [able to be] explained in this very same way. In relation to e.g. collections of atoms [however] there does not also occur this kind of (*itthaṃbhūto ’pi*) of different (°*bheda*) common practice, as has already been stated earlier. Therefore, the whole does [in fact] exist.

§ *The infinitely small and indivisible atom provides a proper foundation for the whole.*

**+130,20** Also, that which was said for the sake of refuting [the existence of] atoms, [namely] “[If it joins simultaneously] with a set of six [other atoms]…”, is also incorrect, as it is counteracted by none other than (*eva*) the apprehension of their [the atoms’] effects. For indeed, an effect is not observed to exist in the absence of its material (*upādāna*°) cause. Meanwhile (*ca*), the whole has been established to exist, [and so] it must have a material cause. The fundamental (*mūla*) material cause that it has is [namely] the atom. [But] that cannot have parts, for if it did, then it would not be fundamental.

**+130,24** Now [one might suggest]: There simply is no fundamental material cause. [Our answer would be:] Even so [there remains the problem that], with no foundation, the whole [substance] (*sarvasya*) would cease to exist. Then [perhaps] the succession of [smaller and smaller] parts is not accepted to have a final limit (*avadhi*). [But] also in this way, [there remains the problem that], if there is no difference [among all things] in having infinitely many parts, then there would be no difference in the size or heaviness of, say, a mote of dust (*truṭi*) and a mountain. Therefore, there is a final limit to [the sequence of] smaller, even smaller, and so on (*alpataratamādeḥ*). And (*ca*) that [smallest material cause], once momentariness is refuted, is established to be unproduced. For indeed, a thing can arise neither in the absence of a material cause nor from a material cause of equal or greater size.

**+131,3** That an atom should have six parts is incorrect, because it contradicts one’s own words, like saying “My mother was a barren woman”. For indeed, that compared to which there exists no smaller thing is what one calls an atom. How could that have six parts, when its very own part is smaller [than it]? It’s true (*khalu*), a thing which has parts (*aṃśavat*) can by metaphorical extension be [said to be] “atomic” [in size] (*aṇu*), but most literally (*mukhya*), an atom is only what has no parts.

**+131,6** Also it is incorrect [to have said] that “[Alternatively], if [the atom does not have parts and instead] the six [connected atoms] are in the same place (*ṣaṇṇām ekadeśatve*), then the overall thing would have the measure of [only] an atom”, since it is seen that the whole’s extent exceeds (*parimāṇātiśaya*) the extent of [any given one of] its parts. Based on that, it is inferred that also that which is [directly] brought about by atoms [i.e., a dvyaṇuka] has relatively greater (*adhika*) extent [than the individual atoms do], and [in turn one can infer that] the [produced] effect of those [produced dvyaṇukas, i.e., a tryaṇuka and so on] has an extent greater than theirs. Therefore, why would an overall thing end up being of the measure of just one atom?

**131,11** Further, that which was said, that “Through the division of the directions [into four cardinal, four ordinal, and two vertical], it [the corporeal atom] would have ten parts,” is also incorrect, since it is [only] when one thing constitutes a final reference point (*avadhi*) that other substances can be distributed (*pravibhajyante*) by means of the directions, like how the Himālayas are situated to the north of Prayāg and the Vindhyas are [situated] to the south [of the same].

**131,14** But surely [one might object], one does [in fact] observe a division even of the reference point [itself], such as when one says “This is its (*asya*) eastern part, this its western part, this its southern part, this its northern part.” [To which we respond:] No [the problem remains], because also in that case, it is [only] by one part being the reference point that the subdivision is possible for the other parts. And the atom has no parts, hence there can be no construing (*vikalpa*) of a [real] division into [parts like] eastern and so on.

**131,17** Now it is [perhaps] supposed that (*…iti vikalpyate*) it is relative to other substances (*dravyāntarebhyaḥ*) serving as reference points that the atom itself (*eva*) is eastern, southern, western, or northern. [To which we would answer:] Then there is no contradiction, since one observes different ways of referencing (*vyapadeśa*) even an undivided thing by way of different imposed properties (*upādhi*s).

**132,2**

Also [to have said] that [either the indivisible atom does not exist] “or else ether is not all-pervasive” is not correct, since that which is permanent and without parts cannot be divided. Then [one might insist]: If ether does not exist inside it [the atom] (*antas tasya*), then ether ends up not being all-pervasive. [To this we say:] No [that argument fails], because you have not fully understood the nature of something all-pervasive (*sarvagatasvarūpa*). To explain: All-pervasive is what one calls a substance which is by nature undivided and which has a connection with all corporeal things, and ether does have this character, which is inferred by the arising of sound in all places (*sarvatra*). Therefore, it [ether] is, too, in fact all-pervasive.

**+132,6** If one says that, without a connection to the interior of an atom, it [ether] is [definitely] not all-pervasive, [we responds that] no [that’s wrong], because that [interior of an atom], like a hare’s horn, doesn’t exist at all. For indeed, a singular, partless thing can have neither an outside nor an inside. And since it [ether] is connected with everything that exists as corporeal (*yad asti mūrtam*), how is it not all-pervasive? Therefore, this [argument] too is nothing but a trap for simpletons.

**+132,9** And so (*evaṃ ca*), because the whole and so on exist, the inferential reason [for the existence of cognition alone, namely] “because there is no apprehender or apprehended” is unestablished.

§4 Bhāsarvajña’s Siddhānta B: Against Cognition Non-Dualism

§4.1 On “Self-Awareness” (*svasaṃvedana*)

*Non-dual self-awareness cannot be proved.*

§ *The “co-” (saha*) in “invariable co-apprehension” requires real difference.

**132,11** Furthermore, in the statement that “Given that they are invariably apprehended together, there is no difference between an object and the cognition thereof, like when, for example, one apprehends two moons”, the inferential reason is, first of all, inconclusive. To explain: The Pleiades [also] are invariably apprehended together, and yet (*ca*) they are not non-different, as their difference is well established by universal agreement. Furthermore, in the same way that (*yathā*) one who [carefully] examines [them] (*vicārayataḥ*) can apprehend the Pleiades distinctly (*vivekena*), so [can one do] for a cognition and its object, as well.

**+132,14** Moreover, this [same] inferential reason is contradicted, since the word “together” (*saha*) can have meaning only if there is difference. Indeed, “together” doesn’t have any meaning if there is only one thing. If you say that there exists a meaning for [the word] “together” in dependence on error (*bhrānta*), then you [must] think the following (*atha manuṣe*): It is due to error (*bhrānteḥ*) that something, although undivided, is [mentally] determined by way of difference (*bhedena*), [and] it is in reliance on that [error] that one speaks of “apprehension together”, like in the case of apprehending two moons. In reality (*vastusthityā*), though, there is apprehension only of one.

**+132,18** [Our reply to this would be:] No [that argument doesn’t work], because what appears in that case [of the double moon] (*tatra*) is a superimposed divided form (*bhinnākāra*), and one cannot establish that the real (*vastubhūta*) [undivided] form is the same as (*abhinna*) that superimposed [divided] form. After all, the [true, mother-of-pearl] form of the conch shell (*śaṅkharūpa*) can’t be the same as the [superimposed] yellow form (*pītākāra*). To explain: Whether the property of having a divided form (*bhinnākāratā*) that appears in that case [of the two moons] (*tatra*) [truly] exists or not, either way, there is a contradiction with proving non-difference. For [on the one hand] how could two things which truly (*paramārthataḥ*) have a divided form be non-different [from each other]? [Alternatively] if the property of having a divided form is not ultimately real, then how is that [property] non-different with what is [in fact] ultimately real (*paramārthena saha*)?

**+133,3** If one says that it is only the [mutual] non-difference of the two things which are apprehended as having a divided form that is being established, and not (*na tu*) [the non-difference] of the property of having a divided form [with anything else], since that [property of having a divided form] is by nature empty, [then we answer:] even so, the inferential reason is inconclusive. [This is so] because even if it is another thing [unto itself], the property of having a divided form is invariably apprehended together with the form of awareness. Alternatively, if it [the empty property of having a divided form] is not another thing [over and above the form of awareness], then the form of awareness, which then would be identical with that [property], would [itself] also end up being empty in nature.

**+133,7** Also the [alternative] meaning of the inferential reason (*hetvartha*) “Given that they [a thing and the cognition thereof] are apprehended *by* one and the same [thing] (*ekena*)” is unestablished and so incorrect, since a [given] thing is apprehended by multiple people.

**133,9** Also, one who says that the meaning of [the inferential reason] “because they are invariably apprehended together (*saha*)” is “because there is apprehension *of* just one [thing] (*ekasya*)” must say whether it is apprehension only of cognition or only of the object. If it is only of cognition, then how could that [cognition] be [said to be] non-different with a thing that is not being apprehended? Because then it would end up that it [the cognition] could be [equally proven to be] non-different with all the three worlds. [And in any case] an inferential reason is useless for establishing the non-difference of a given thing (*tasya*) with its very own self (*tadātmanaiva*), because there is no dispute about that. It is with this [same argument] that [the second alternative, that] “there is apprehension only of the object” is [also] responded to. Moreover (*ca*), it [the reason understood in this way] is [on either alternative] unestablished, because there is [in fact commonly accepted to be] apprehension of both cognition and the object.

**+133,14** Now [consider that one says]: At the time when the object is being apprehended, the cognition is not apprehended, and (*ca*) when cognition is being apprehended, the object is not. In this way it is established that there is “apprehension of only (*eva*) one”. [To this we would answer:] Even so, you will end up contradicting your own position and accepting that of your opponent.

**133,17** Then [it might be said]: There is but a single apprehension of cognition and thing, and one cannot establish (*vyavasthiti*) a difference [between them] on the basis of that single apprehension. In that case, does it [the single apprehension] apprehend the difference [between the two], or does it not? If it does not apprehend the difference, then (*tadā*) how does one speak of [both] cognition and object? If it does apprehend the difference, then why say that one can’t establish a difference [between the two things] on the basis of it? If one says that [one cannot because] it’s like the cognition of e.g. two moons, [we would answer] no, because it has [already] been stated that one cannot establish non-difference [of the real form] with the superimposed form in that case.

§ *“Object-awareness” (*arthadṛṣṭi\*) requires real difference.

**+133,21** And based on what is it established [in the first place] that there is but a single apprehension of cognition and object? [The response may be:] Surely it has [already] been stated that “Object-awareness is not established for one whose cognition is [itself] not directly perceived.”. What [then] is this “establishment” (*prasiddhi*) of object-awareness? Is it the arising [of that awareness], or is it the [meta-]awareness [thereof]? And what, too, is that “cognition” (*upalambha*) for which [it is true that] (*yasya*) a lack of being directly perceived (*apratyakṣatva*) results in the object-awareness not being established? Is it none other than that very same object-awareness (*arthadṛṣṭi*), or is it a [different] cognition that produces that [object-awareness]?

**+134,3** Among these (*tad*), if the “cognition” (*upalambha*) is none other than the object-awareness [itself], and when that [object-awareness] (*tasya*) is not directly perceived, then it [i.e., the same object-awareness] cannot arise, then that is incorrect, for the object-awareness can [only ever] be directly perceived after [its] arising has [already] taken place, certainly not before. After all, one never observes the sequence that something has been directly perceived and then arises.

**+134,6** Then [it would seem]: The “cognition” (*upalambha*) is a [different] cognition (*jñāna*) that produces that object-awareness, [and] when that [producing cognition] (*tasya*) is not directly perceived, then the object-awareness does not arise. [But] that [too] is incorrect, because, as in the case of the visual faculty, also something that is not directly perceived can cause arising [of object-awareness], and also because when a person who is fast asleep wakes up due to e.g. an intense physical sensation, there is no awareness of the preceding [causal] moment of cognition. Moreover, even if the object-awareness is produced by a cognition that is [itself in fact] directly perceived, it is [still] not established [on account of that fact] that there is invariably apprehended [only] one of [either] the object or the cognition thereof.

**+134,9** Next [one may argue]: The “establishment” of the object-awareness is the [meta-]awareness [thereof]. Even so [there is a problem, because] the meaning of the statement [then] becomes “For one whose awareness is [itself] not directly perceived, object-awareness is not directly perceived.” And by this (*cānena*) nothing is proved.

**+134,11** Next [one may argue:] “awareness” (*dṛṣti*), in the sense of that which one is aware of (*dṛśyata iti*), is nothing but the object, and therefore the meaning of the [entire] statement is that, “For one whose object-cognition (*arthopalambha*) is not directly perceived, neither is the object directly perceived.” [Answer:] No [that argument fails], because it [the object] is a different thing from the cognition, and it is not reasonable that when one thing is not directly perceived, a thing different from that should [also] not be directly perceived, because that would be absurd.

**+135,2** Then [finally it may be argued]: If the cognition is [itself] not directly perceived, then there does not occur the [verbalized] thought that “The object was seen” (*dṛṣṭo ’rthaḥ*). [And indeed] we also share this view that [in other words] a qualifier, if not apprehended, cannot be a causal condition for a thought about something [so] qualified. And yet (*ca*) it is not in every case that an object is apprehended as necessarily qualified by awareness [itself]. [For example] in the sentence “The white cow is going along”, it’s not the awareness of the cow (*go*darśanam) that is experienced, but rather just the cow itself, qualified by the quality [of white color] and by the action [of going], that is apprehended.

§ *Practical behavior toward objects does not require awareness of cognition.*

**135,6** Surely though what is taught about this [by Dharmakīrti] is that: “Indeed, it’s not the case that one is aware of an object on account of the existence (*sattā*) of the object [itself], but rather [one is so aware] on account of the existence of the cognition thereof.” [To which we respond:] [So] what of it? [A Buddhist may continue:] Surely [in anticipation of that very question] it is [immediately thereafter] taught that: “That [existence of the cognition], insofar as it is not [itself] established by a means of valid knowledge, is not conducive to practical behaviors presupposing existence (*sattānibandhanān vyavahārān*).” [But] what is the meaning of this statement [as well]? Is it that the existence [of cognition] which one is not aware of (*apratīta*) fails to induce (°*pravartakatvam…nāsti*) also practical behavior in general (*vyavahāramātra*), or does it fail to induce [only] practical behavior qualified by [existence of cognition] itself?

**+135,9** To start with, it’s not the first case, because it is [in fact] on the basis of the existence of the e.g. visual faculty, despite one’s not being aware of it, that one observes the undertaking of practical behaviors consisting in thought, speech, and [physical actions like] e.g. retrieving (*ānayana*) [directed] toward color and the like. If you ask, “Assuming that one is not aware of that [existence of the visual faculty], how would one know that it was on that basis [i.e., due to the visual faculty] (*tataḥ*) that those practical behaviors had been undertaken?” [we would answer:] by none other than that very observation of practical behaviors toward that [object], just like [one has] certainty about a seed, demerit, and so on (*bījādharmādi*) on the basis of observing a sprout, pain, or the like.

**+135,13** Next [one might say that]: An existence one is not aware of fails to induce practical behavior qualified by that [particular existence itself]. There’s no disagreement about this. However, given that one does not in every case apprehend practical behavior [as] qualified by that, there is not necessarily [always] awareness of object-awareness.

**+135,15** If you object that, so long as that [cognition] is not established [through direct awareness of it], then neither (*api*) is the object established, [then we would respond:] what reason is there for this? Indeed, the cognition of that [object] does not, like an inferential reason, establish the object in such a way that (*yena*) if it [the cognition] failed to be established then so too would its object. Rather, it [the cognition] makes the object (*taṃ viṣayam*) fit for practical behaviors by its [the cognition’s] mere arising (*utpāda*mātra) as the cognition of that [object]. Therefore (*iti*) it is taught [by us] that even if that [cognition] is not established, the object most certainly is [able to be].

**+135,18** It is [also] accepted that, at a later time, one [sometimes] also comes to be aware of the cognition of that [object] by way of either direct perception or inference. And there is not in this way a regress [problem] (*aniṣṭhā*), since [the idea that there is] awareness of every cognition is not accepted [by us]. [That is to say] it is only for a cognition of which one is aware that one speaks of another cognition being the awareness thereof. On the other hand (*punar*), it is not true that a cognition of which one is unaware doesn’t exist whatsoever, nor that it does not produce its effect. Instead (*tu*), the following is correct: Insofar as one is not aware of something, it cannot be dealt with as real, as in the case of fire [one doesn’t yet know about]. And yet (*ca*) it’s not the case that if one doesn’t know about the e.g. fire, its effect, e.g. the smoke, neither arises nor is apprehended.

**+135,23** And so, in this way, just as in the case of the e.g. [unknown] fire, it is on account of a cognition of which one may very well (*eva*) *not* be aware that there occurs an effect which has that [object-cognition] as a causal condition and which is characterized as recalling an object to mind, speaking [about it], retrieving [it], and so on. Therefore, [universal] reflexive awareness, since it is incompatible with that [two-tiered causal account], should not be accepted.

§ *The nature of cognition need not involve reflexivity.*

**135,26** [One might object:] If cognition is not apprehended by itself, then it will end up not having the nature of light (*aprakāśātmaka*), and how can something which is, like a pot, not itself of the nature of light in turn (*api*) illuminate something else? [To this we would respond:] What is this “not being of the nature of light”? Is it [the cognition’s] not producing awareness, or [its] not being bright, or [its] not having the nature of awareness (*bodha*)?

**+136,2** Firstly, [that it should be the cognition’s] not producing awareness cannot be correct, since the visual faculty, even thought it is not known by itself, does produce awareness. [Second] if [one suggests that] it is [the cognition’s] not being bright, then [we would say that its] not being bright, [in the sense of] not having a radiant form (*abhāsvararūpa*), is in fact due to its being different in character (*vilakṣaṇa*) from the fire element (*tejas*), [and] not because of its not being known by itself (*nāsva*saṃviditatvāt). [Finally] if not having the nature of awareness results [as the last option] (*prasajyate*), [we again answer] no [this is wrong], because even if something is [itself] not apprehended (*avidita*), it doesn’t [automatically] lose its character. For indeed, it’s not the case that a thing’s nature ceases (*nivartate*) simply because the thing does not have self-awareness.

**136,7** If one asks, “If not self-awareness, what else is the nature of that which is aware (*bodha*)?” [we would answer:] none other than “aware-ness” (*bodhatva*) is the nature of that which is aware (*bodha*). If one says that this [awareness] is exactly what self-awareness is, [we would answer:] no [that does not solve the problem], because [cognition’s] being self-revealing (*svātmāvabhāsaka*) cannot be established merely through [the use of] other terminology. If one asks, “Since it doesn’t make known its [awareness’s own] nature, how could that [“aware-ness”] be the nature of awareness?” [we would answer that it is so] in the same way that fire (*agniḥ*), even without burning itself, has burning for its nature, [or] in the way that e.g. generous persons (*dātṛ*), even without e.g. giving away (*dāyaka*tva) their own selves, have the nature of a generous person.

§ *Memory’s sometimes featuring awareness is not proper evidence for reflexivity.*

**136,13** Yet surely [one might also say], given that one always (*sarvatra*) recalls an object consistently (*eva*) qualified by awareness (*darśana*), as in the thought “It was seen by me (*dṛṣṭaṃ mayā*)”, how could it not be the case that there is invariably just the one apprehension of the thing and the experiencing [thereof]? [To this we would respond:] This is not correct, because it is observed that one recalls the object also all by itself. To explain: In utterances like “I obeyed my mother and father (*mātaraṃpitaraṃ*),” “I have five servants and ten cows,” “Devadatta is at home,” and so on, only the object is recalled, not the experiencing [itself].

**136,17** Surely [one might counter:] the experiencing, too, is [indeed] recalled in these situations, because that person [reporting such things], if asked about it, says “Devadatta was seen [e.g., to be at home] by me.” [To this we would answer:] No [that argument fails] because this is possible [to explain] also in another way. [Namely] upon remembering the object (*arthasya*), even all by itself, one [first] infers its [the object’s] having been seen [by oneself], and then one speaks in this way.

**136,19** On the other hand, if this [explanation] is not accepted, then it would result [from your argument] that also the visual faculty would be invariably apprehended together [with the object]. To explain: When asked “How did you come to know about him [e.g., Devadatta, as being at home]?” the person says “He was seen [there by me] with none other than my sense of sight”. If one says, so be it, there is invariable apprehension also of that [visual faculty] (*tasyāpi*) together [with the object], [we would answer:] no [that won’t do], because it is contradicted [both] by the cognition [itself] and by your own system of teaching (*śāstra*). For indeed, first of all, it’s not the case that anyone is aware of e.g. the visual faculty in a cognition apprehending e.g. a blue object. Nor is [cognition’s having] a form of e.g. the visual faculty accepted in your system.

**+136,23** What’s more (*kiṃ ca*), there is [in that case] the unwanted consequence [for you] that also invariably apprehended together [with the object] is the admixture of [conceptual] verbalization (*abhilāpasaṃsarga*), since recollection is only [ever] of something mixed with that. For indeed, even a well-trained person cannot with recollection summon forth [before the mind] (*upasthāpayitum*) a [completely] pure object, nor [can this person], when asked, describe it to others. Moreover, if there is [able to be] direct experience (*anubhava*) of something mixed with [conceptual] verbalization, then this conflicts with [the statement that perception is] “free from conceptualization” and so on, and the theory of language non-duality (*śabdādvaitavāda*) [also] results. Therefore, it also cannot be established on the basis of memory that there is invariable apprehension [of the object] together [with the cognition thereof].

§ *Cognition is not alienated as a result of non-reflexivity.*

**137,4** If one says that, if cognition is not self-aware, then it ends up being external, like e.g. color, and [it ends up] not belonging to oneself, like cognition in another continuum, [we would answer:] to begin with, what is this “being external”? If it is [the cognition’s] being located in a place outside of one’s body, that is incorrect, since it’s not the case that e.g. color, for its part (*api*), is external [in this way] as a result of its not being self-aware, but rather [it is located outside the body] because of its having arisen there as a result of the capacity of its [particular] causal complex. On the other hand, a causal complex for e.g. cognition or pleasure is apprehended (*vidyate*) as [being] productive [thereof] only inside the body (*śarīrāntardeśe*), [and] it’s for that reason (*tataḥ*) that there is no arising [of such things] outside. In this way, the externality of cognition (*saṃvedana*bāhyatva) in the sense of [its] being located outside (*bahiṣṭhatvena*) is rejected.

**137,10** Nor can the externality [of cognition] consist in its being a thing apart from the category of cognition (*jñānavarga*), since a thing of a certain kind (*tajjātīya*) cannot be something apart from its [own] category (*tadvarga*). On the other hand, for pleasure and so on, externality in the sense of being a thing apart from the category of cognition is in fact accepted. Even so, one apprehends (*vedyate*) it [pleasure and so on] as having arisen only in the space inside the body, according to the capacity of its own causal complex, and so (*iti*) one does not call it external.

**+137,12** Alternatively (*yad vā*), [one can also argue that] it [cognition] is not external because it inheres in the self, and that it inheres in the self on account of being regulated (*niyamita*) by its own causes, not as a result of being self-aware. In this way (*iti*) also when it is said that it [cognition] would “end up not belonging to oneself, just like cognition in another continuum”, that too is inappropriate, because belonging to oneself and not belonging to oneself do not result from self-awareness or the lack thereof but rather from a [real] relation (*saṃbandha*) to the self or a lack thereof.

**+137,17** In your view, however, since all cognitions are apprehended by themselves (*svasaṃvedya*), then [according to your criterion] no cognition [whatsoever] would fail to belong to oneself. Then [one might suggest:] it is [only] for that one [i.e., person] (*yasya*) for whom something [i.e., a cognition] (*yat*) is not reflexively apprehended (*svasaṃvedyaṃ* na bhavati) that it [i.e. that cognition] does not belong as one’s own. [To which we would answer:] In that case then, neither preceding or following cognitions nor the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) accrued in other lives would belong to oneself. For indeed, there does not also [separately] (*api*) exist an apprehending (*saṃvedaka*) continuum accompanying all cognitions to which each of those [cognitions] (*tat* sarvam) would belong.

**137,21** Now [consider that one suggests that] even that [cognition] which is not apprehended by itself is, by being assisted or assisting (*upakāryopakāraka*) [able to be] said to belong to oneself. [To this we would respond:] Come now! In that case, one shouldn’t say [in the first place] that it [the cognition], insofar as it is not apprehended by itself, fails to belong to oneself, like cognitions in another continuum.

§ *Light as an example case does not help establish cognition’s independence.*

**137,24** Also, in the other statement that “Cognition illuminates its own self, because it is luminous (*prakāśaka*), like a lamp”, what is the meaning of the phrase “illuminates its own self”? If what is meant is nothing other than its being apprehended by itself, then this example lacks the property to be proved. After all, not even in your own [Buddhist] view is a lamp, which has the nature of visible form (*rūpātmaka*) apprehended by itself. Moreover, since it is not [properly] established for both parties to the discussion (*ubhayavādy*asiddha) that a lamp has the nature of cognition, the example [simply] is not proper.

**+138,3** Now [one suggests that] it [cognition], [by] being independent of things of the same type [i.e., other cognitions] for [the production of] awareness of itself (*svātma*vedana), is said to “illuminate itself”. Then, also e.g. a tactile sensation (*sparśa*) would illuminate itself. And it’s not the case that just insofar as something does not depend on a cooperating factor (*sahakāri nāpekṣate*) of its same type for the production of awareness of itself, its self-awareness has been established. Even for light [itself] (*prakāśa*), [this] independence of things of its own type is not established, given that its [the light’s] two forms, [namely] of its whole [self] and of its [any given] part (*tadavayavāvayavirūpayoḥ*), are cooperating factors for each other, and also because it [the luminous thing] is [in fact] dependent on the visual faculty’s visible form [for production of awareness of itself]. Therefore (*iti*), based on what does this [independence of things of its own type] (*etat*) apply to something being illuminated by something different than it, like e.g. a pot [being illuminated] due to illumination [nearby] (*prakāśana*)?

**138,9** But there is something said about this [by Prajñākaragupta]: “And even a pot is not [really] illuminated by a lamp. Rather, there [simply] arises something just like that [namely, an illuminated pot] (*tathābhūtasyaiva*) from that [previous, unilluminated moment of the pot] (*tataḥ*).” That is wrong, because momentariness is going to be disproved. [But] even if there were arising in that way, it is still established that, prior to its arising in that way from a different thing, the pot did not have the nature of light, [and] on the basis of that example [so too are also] a lamp and cognition [apparently not of the nature of light and/or known in the prior moment]. So (*iti*) why does one say that there does not exist [any] cognition that is not apprehended? And yet (*ca*), surely [one should think that] (*nanu*), in the same way that a pot depends on an illuminating lamp even when the visual faculty and the form of its [the pot’s] parts (*svāvayava*rūpa) are present, so too should a lamp also require another [thing for its illumination]. Or else, the pot, too, like the lamp, should not need another illuminator over and above e.g. the visual faculty.

**+138,15** Now [a certain Buddhist says] (*atha*): One may object that (*…iti*) the pot has two illuminators, [namely] the lamp and the visual faculty, whereas (*ca*) the lamp has only the visual faculty [as its illuminator]. In that case, then [a Buddhist can respond]: “One thing has one, another has indeed two illuminators. / As appropriate to the situation (*yathāsaṃbhavataḥ*), another may not have even one. What’s the harm? //” [In other words] a very incapable thing has two [things as illuminators], another has [just] one, [and] another doesn’t even have one. Such is [simply] the nature of things. Therefore, whatever is the problem here? Now one might say [in reply] that, in relation to [that self-awareness as] the nature [of a cognition], there is a contradiction with [its] acting. This [according to the Buddhist] is wrong, and so he [i.e. Prajñākaragupta] says: “If that [self-awareness] is the nature of that [cognition], then whatever inconsistency is there? / For if there can be contradiction with a thing’s own nature, then absolutely everything would cease to exist. //”

**139,6** [To this we Naiyāyikas would answer:] First of all, that “One thing has one [illuminator]…” and so on is incorrect. Even if (*yadi nāma*) in a certain case, one cooperating factor is [sufficiently] capable (*sahakāri sam*artham), and in another case, multiple [cooperating factors are needed], even so, there cannot be unconditioned action. To explain: It ought to deter you for sure that [Dharmakīrti says that] “That which has no cause (*ahetu*) always (*nityam*) [either] exists or doesn’t exist, because it does not depend on anything else. / For insofar as there is [such] dependence, then there is variable existence (*kādācitkasaṃbhavaḥ*) [of the dependent thing]. //” Moreover, a thing like a tree or a rock that is devoid of all [necessary] cooperating factors is not observed to be capable of such actions as moving itself around and so on. On the other hand, alternation in the numbers (*saṃkhyāvikalpa*) of cooperating factors as observed [empirically] through positive and negative concomitance is accepted [by us].

**+139,12** Also [to say] that “If that is its nature…” and so on is incorrect, because that particular sort of [self-knowing] nature is not established. For indeed, if the example case and inferential reason [given for it] are inappropriate, then it is not established that it [i.e. the cognition] makes itself known (*svātmasaṃvedakatva*).

**+139,13** And what, in turn, is the meaning of this [inferential reason] “because it is luminous”? Is it having a radiant (*bhāsvara*) nature, or being a cooperating factor for that which is to be known, or being of the nature of awareness? [Firstly] that awareness has a radiant nature is unestablished. On the other hand, that it is a cooperating factor for that which is to be known is [left] inconclusive by the [also cooperating] visual faculty and so on. And in turn, that it is of the nature of awareness is indeed [too] unique [to this case to prove anything]. And yet (*ca*), an inferential reason, if its meaning is not [properly] ascertained (*anirūpitārtha*), cannot make [something else] known. Meanwhile (*tu*), it is denied by none other than the Buddhists themselves that one [namely, an inferential reason property] that is the same [across two cases] (*abhedin*) [merely] by way of a verbal similarity (*śabdasāmyāt*) can bring about inferential awareness (*anumitisādhaka*).

**139,20** If one asks what argument there is (*kiṃ pramāṇam*) also (*api*) that cognition is [as Nyāya claims] apprehended by another cognition, [we would respond that] it is that very one (*yad eva*) taught by the Ācāryas (*ācāryaiḥ*): [namely that] cognition is apprehended by an awareness other than itself, because it is something that can be apprehended (*vedya*), like e.g. visible form. [To say by way of objection to this] that (*…iti*), in that way (*tadvat*), it [cognition] will end up being external, not aware, and so on, is incorrect (*ayukta*), because it will be stated [later on] that there can be no refutation of something [i.e., an inferential reason] that is contradicted by a quality that is specific [to only some cases] (*viśeṣaviruddha*). [Furthermore] in order to prevent [the problem of] inconclusiveness [for this same argument], God (*parameśvara*) is to be accepted as having two cognitions, lest without this he be not omniscient (*vāsarva*jñatva). Or [as another alternative] one should [simply further] qualify the inferential reason (*hetu*viśeṣaṇa) with “so long as it [the cognition] is impermanent”.

§ *No difference whatsoever can be established if cognition knows only itself.*

**+139,24** And so, in this way, because it is unproven that it [cognition] knows itself, it is also unestablished that there is invariably apprehension together [of the object and its cognition], and so it is not established that there is no difference between cognition and its object. And therefore, the following is also incorrect: “That form of blue is its [cognition’s] nature, as is this experience. / It [the cognition] is described as being an experience of e.g. blue, despite also being an experience of its own nature. //”

**140,1** Furthermore, does this [inferential reason] invariable apprehension together possess (°*upapanna*) [the proper] positive and negative concomitance [with the target property], or does it lack it? Firstly, if it lacks the positive and negative concomitance [with its target property], then it cannot make [that specific target property] known, as that would be absurd. And [secondly], how can its [the reason’s] possession of the [proper] positive and negative concomitance [itself] be known if there is no apprehension of difference? Indeed, no one can apprehend positive and negative concomitance [that a thing has] with its very own self. Nor can one establish negative concomitance, for example, on the basis of a merely erroneous apprehension of difference, as that would be absurd. Nor, if there is no apprehension of difference whatsoever, is it possible even to differentiate error from non-error, and [so] it would end up that any view could be established simply by mentioning it.

**140,7** Now [one suggests:] it’s specifically the difference between cognition and object that is not apprehended, not also [the difference] between two cognitions. [We would respond:] That is incorrect, since, on the view of self-awareness, also the difference between two cognitions cannot be apprehended, as [already] mentioned at the beginning of the consideration of variegated color.

**+140,9** Furthermore, the difference between two cognitions cannot be known, first of all, through direct perception, because that [perceptual cognition] apprehends only itself. Indeed, without apprehension of the other, there can be no apprehension of the difference between self and other. And if one assumes [this] apprehension of the other, then the claim that “There is no other thing to be experienced [by thought]” and so on ends up being [directly] contradicted. Additionally, the [invariable] apprehension together would [then also] be inconclusive [as an inferential reason]. And yet (*ca*), it’s [simply] not appropriate that there be apprehension by one [cognition] that does not have a certain form of another cognition [that does have that form], because [in that case] there could end up being even an apprehension of e.g. blue by means of, indeed, a cognition with an e.g. non-blue form. And if it [the one cognition] did have that [same] form [as the other cognition], then it would simply be exactly that [other cognition]. How [then] could one establish the difference even between the two cognitions [in their respective roles] as apprehended and apprehending? Alternatively, if it [this difference of roles] could be established, then it could similarly be [established] for the object and cognition, too. Therefore, it cannot be through direct perception that there is apprehended a difference between two cognitions themselves.

**+140,15** And neither [can it be apprehended] by way of inference, since that [inference] is preceded by perception. Indeed, if there is no apprehending whatsoever of pervasion through direct perception, then an inference cannot take place (*na…ātmānam āsādayati*).

**+140,16** Thus, in this way, for those who advocate non-difference between apprehended and apprehending, there is no apprehending of other cognitions even (*api*) within one’s own continuum, [and so] how could one establish other continua? And therefore, also the tidings (*vārtā*) of e.g. other lives, the Buddha, etc. have been decisively driven far off, such that each and every systematic Buddhist teaching (*śāstra*) is [made] unintelligible. For if difference [itself] is not established, then [even] the common behavior of proving and disproving [in debate] and so on becomes impossible.

**140,21** Then there is the view that (*atha matam*) the apprehender’s non-difference with the apprehended [object] is accepted, but not [its non-difference] with the determined [object] (*adhyavaseya*). In turn [one asks the person with such a view] (*atha*), “What’s the difference between the apprehended and the determined [objects]?” [In response to which] the following is taught [by them]: That form which really appears (*vastutaḥ*) in the awareness is the apprehended, whereas that [form] which is superimposed is the determined. Alternatively, whatever appears in awareness is the apprehended, and that about which, although it has not [really] appeared, there is a false impression of it as having been apprehended (*gṛhītābhimānaḥ*) is what is determined, [and] it is only through determination of that [determined object] that action occurs. Thus it is taught: “Because action occurs (*pravartanāt*), not toward an [external] object [itself] (*anarthe*), [but instead] toward an appearance of one’s own, [namely] by determining the object, therefore also error is a means of valid knowledge, since, through [just such] a [determinative] connection with its object, it does not deviate from it.”

**+140,26** [To this we respond:] That too is incorrect, for in just the same way that a determination of something external cannot be a means of valid knowledge [about that external thing], since, if there can be no apprehension of its connection with the [by definition] utterly unapprehended external object, then its lack of deviation [from that external thing] is unestablished, neither can a determination of the difference between the cognitions in one’s own and in other continua [be a means of valid knowledge about that difference]. [Moreover] if something can be a means of knowledge just by not disagreeing with people’s common practical behaviors, then also the determination of something [truly] external, by simply not disagreeing with people’s behaviors, should be allowed to establish that [sort of external] object, since it provides the same benefit.

**141,3** Now [one might say the following]: Both another cognition of one’s own and a cognition in another continuum are apprehended (*dṛṣṭa*) by none other than themselves, and so (*tena*) a determination of them, insofar as it arises from them, [and] even though it is [in a certain sense] erroneous, can be a means of valid knowledge. On the other hand, an external object is not [ever definitely] experienced by [anyone or] anything, so how could a determination thereof be differentially established to have arisen from it and to be a means of valid knowledge?

**+141,6** [To this we would answer:] No [this is wrong], because determination of a thing cannot lead to knowledge of its absence. In the very same way that, by means of a determination of something external which [in reality] apprehends only its own self, it cannot be ascertained (*ava√gam*) whether an external object can be apprehended (*saṃ*vedya) or not, nor can this be ascertained about another cognition by means of a determination thereof. For there is no distinguishing feature between these two [cases] (*atra*). Meanwhile, recollection (*smṛti*) most definitely consists in determination, and so also recollection (*smaraṇa*) does not establish another cognition [as the true object of cognition].

§ *The difference required between cognitions might as well be granted to objects, too.*

**+141,9** If one asks how it is that self-awareness, in apprehending its own form that has arisen from another cognition, fails to establish the [said] other cognition (*jñānāntara*vyavasthāpakam), [we would answer by pointing out that] the same consequence [also] applies when asking how one [i.e. a cognition] arisen from an external object and apprehending its own nature fails to establish the [said] external object. Moreover, it’s not the case that the self-awareness itself can tell the difference between its definitely having arisen from another cognition rather than from an external object. Thus, in this way, because positing (*sthāpana*) an external object brings the same benefit as positing another cognition, the external object does not fail to exist.

**+141,14** Furthermore (*ca*), the difference between these two [cognitions] (*anayor api*) has not been established [by you]. And yet (*ca*), the inferential reason of “apprehension together” and so on is based on that [difference] (*tataḥ*). [That is to say] apprehension of difference is the foundation for comprehending the three [necessary] conditions [of that or any inferential reason]. [So] in doing away with that [difference], one simply defeats oneself. Thus, how on that basis can it be established that external objects don’t exist? In this [same] way, also that [argument] beginning “If awareness has the form of blue…” is defeated.

**+141,17** To explain, [some] concluding verses (*…iti saṃgrahaślokāḥ*): If [one] cognition has the form (*ābhā*) of another cognition, what means is there for knowing the difference between them? / If it [the first cognition] does not share the form (*sa*rūpa) of another cognition, then how does that [first cognition] apprehend that [other cognition]? // Just as [epistemic] connection and agreement (*saṃbandhasaṃvādau*) are difficult to account for in the case of external objects, / so are they [difficult] also in the case of another cognition for one who devotedly upholds (*niṣṭhavādin*) self-awareness. // If one can establish (*prasādhana*) difference between cognitions on the basis of agreement with what is well known to [ordinary] people, / then on the basis of that very same [agreement], external objects also end up being proven (*saṃsiddhi*). // Just as proof of the external [object] is not recognized (*īkṣyate*) through [your] subtle inspection (*sūkṣmekṣikā*), / so too is proof of the other cognition [not recognized by you]. Even the [very] difference between the one and the other is a difficult matter [for you]. // Just as a cognition cannot know its own difference from an external thing that is not apprehended, / so [can it not know its difference] from another cognition [that cannot be apprehended], as there is no difference [between these two] as regards [their] imperceptibility (*parokṣatva*). // If, on the basis that cognition of things with other forms (*vilakṣaṇākāra*) would be impossible otherwise, / one can establish the difference between [two] cognitions, then why not [let] this [difference] also [be established] for the external object? //

**142,2** Thus, in this way, one who denies the difference between apprehended and apprehender must accept none other than non-dualism. For if not, then also [what was said earlier, namely] “In the same way that it [awareness], which [in reality] is without forms of known and knowing, is [apprehended] by deluded ones…” and so on, is inappropriate, since the apprehension of an external object has been shown to provide the same [theoretical] benefit as apprehending another cognition. And in turn (*api*), if one accepts non-dualism, then contradiction is certainly unavoidable, as has been stated. This then is the well-known pattern (*nyāya*) of “got to the tumor, lost the eye” that has befallen (*āyāta*) the Buddhists.

**+142,7** Therefore in order to avoid this sort of contradiction (*itthaṃvirodha*), it should be accepted that an external object is apprehended by a cognition which does not at all have the form of that [external object]. And that external object is, first of all, generally (*prāyas*) apprehended by means of the [object’s proper] form as it actually is (*yathāvyavasthitenaivākāreṇa*). In certain cases, however, it can appear also with a superimposed form, on account of *timira* and so on. It is on this basis [of real external objects] (*ataḥ*) that it is possible also to differentially establish error and non-error, and not if one is aware [only] of cognition devoid of other limiting conditions (*anyopādhivinirmukta*).

§4.2 On “Lacking Object Support” (*nirālambanatva*)

*Cognition’s supposed lack of object-support cannot be proved.*

§ *Dreams are insufficient grounds for denying all object-support whatsoever.*

**142,12** But [then] another [namely, Prajñākaragupta] says [the following]: “All cognitions being discussed [here] (*vivādāspadībhūta*) are without object-support, because they are cognitions, like the cognitions in dreams and so on. And in the same way that, in the state of sleep, despite a lack of external objects, there occurs, based only on awareness of mere forms of cognition, [both] the determination of external objects and the differentiation of error from non-error, just so is it also in the waking state. The appearance of difference, as well, should be regarded in this way. And so, it is established that they [cognitions] in fact have no object-support, but the appearance of difference [itself] is not [thereby] negated, and so, there is in turn (*api*) no obstacle to the arising of inferential cogntion (*anumānotthāna*virodha). And even though the appearance of difference is erroneous, it is [still], by not disagreeing with everyday practice, a means of valid knowledge, and so it’s not true that positive concomitance and so on are unestablished.

**142,19** [To this we would respond:] First off, this inferential reason is suspected to be inconclusive (*saṃdigdhānaikāntika*), because it has not been established that being a cognition and having object-support are opposed [to each other]. Moreover, it’s not true that the [requisite] negative concomitance is established merely by saying that, for some cognitions, one does not observe the object-support as it is [later] determined to be (*yathādhyavasita*), because this [principle] is not accepted on your view either. And this is [precisely] what is taught [by Dharmakīrti]: “There cannot be [confirmed] a lack of deviant occurrence [of the inferential reason] among dissimilar cases merely through non-observation [thereof], / because deviation is [still] possible, like in the case of cooking rice in a pot. // That [inferential reason] for which (*yasya…tat*) negative concomitance is demonstrated merely through non-observation, / because it is [thereby] grounds for doubt, is said to have a remainder (*śeṣavat*). //”

**143,3** Then [someone might suggest that]: One thing [simply] cannot be the support of another. [One might ask:] What problem is there with this? [Namely, they say] the consequence that all things would be the support [for a given thing], since they are [all] equal in their otherness. [To this we would answer:] No, [this argument fails] because, in spite of difference, restriction is [still] possible, as in the case of causes. After all, the cause of smoke is neither its very own self nor all [other] things [just] because of [those things’] being equal in their otherness.

**+143,5** [Now one might object as follows:] Also, if there is arising of awareness, then how would the [external] thing, which would, like before [that arising], [still] not be light, become light? Alternatively, when it [the object] arises as something with the nature of light, that very thing [i.e., the luminous object] is awareness, since that [awareness] has light as its characteristic mark. If so, [we would answer] no, because once non-momentariness is established, then it is only on the basis of a [physical] connection between the object of that [awareness] and light that it [that object] can be illuminated, as with a lamp and a pot.

**+143,8** Moreover, a cognition is not apprehended by multiple knowing agents, but the opposite is true of an external object. To explain: Upon hearing that a dancer will dance, and wanting to see her, multiple people take action and then [they all] equally (*aviśeṣeṇa*) see her. If one says that this also occurs in a dream, [we answer that] no [it is not the same], because in that case [of dream cognition] there can be no chain of corroboration (*uttarottarasaṃvāda*).

§ *Inference itself requires object-support and cannot be erroneous.*

**+143,11** [And] when he [Prajñākaragupta] says that “All cognitions whatsoever are without object-support”, there’s a contradiction [inherent] in the [very] uttering of his statement. To explain: You’ve put forward this statement as an inferential means (*sādhanatvena*) for imparting [something] (*pratyāyana*) to someone else, and yet (*ca*) apprehension of the other (*parāvabodha*) does not exist for you. Alternatively, if [you allow that] there is apprehension [of the other], then, because that very apprehension of the other [necessarily] has object-support, there would for that very reason (*tenaiva*) be a lack of [the proper] exclusivity [for the inferential reason] (*anekāntaḥ*).

**+143,14** Moreover, if there is no apprehension of the other, then how does one [cognition] apprehend that all cognitions are cognitions? And if it is not apprehended, then the presence of the [inferential reason] property in the inferential locus (*pakṣadharmatva*) cannot assist [the inferential reason] in making known [the target property] (*gamakāṅga*). Likewise, if the example case (*dṛṣṭānta*) is not established, then it [the reason property] cannot [on its own] make known [the target property]. Alternatively, if it [the example case] is established, then it [the reason property] is inconclusive.

**+143,16** Similarly, if an inference, for its part, has for its object all cognitions, then that [inferential cognition], certainly, has support. If not, then how is it established [by such an unsupported inference] that all cognitions are without support? If one says that every inference is accepted as being a means of valid knowledge [in fact] only insofar as it has no support, such that this is not a problem, [we would answer that] that’s incorrect, because something without support cannot be a means of valid knowledge. After all, it is not [simply] a matter of stipulation (*pāribhāṣika*) that a cognition be [said to be both] a means of valid knowledge and without support. Rather, what one says is: That by means of which an object of knowledge is discriminated is a means of valid knowledge, whereas that [cognition] in which nothing appears is without object-support. So, how is there no contradiction between these two [properties]?

**143,22** If one says that there is no contradiction because although it [the cognition] has itself for support, it is said to be “without support” (*nirālambana*) as a result of its lack of dependence (*anapekṣayā*) on other things for support, [we would answer:] is it then now [claimed to be] the case that (*tat* kim idānīm) it [a cognition] (*tasya*) can be a means of inference (*anumāna*) in dependence on itself alone? And yet (*ca*), it cannot be that by means of something that has only itself for an object, other things can be established as either lacking or having support (*nirālambanatvaṃ* sālambanatvaṃ vā), because those [other things and their properties] are not the object [of that merely self-apprehending cognition]. After all, that which is not the object (*viṣaya*) of a thing cannot be established by that thing. For if it were so established, then, just like that thing’s own nature (*ātmasvarūpavat*), that very [established] thing would [in fact also] be the object [of that establishing factor], since an object is characterized [precisely] as that which is established.

**+143,26** If one says that, like in the case of the jewel [seen through the keyhole], even something that is not the object (*aviṣaya*) can be established [e.g. by a cognition] just so long as there is no disagreement, [we would answer:] no, because insofar as it is [truly] non-disagreeing, the cognition of the jewel is not established as having light [from the lamp] for its object. Alternatively, if [we allow that] it is [so] established, then that [very situation] constitutes none other than disagreement, so how can it [the thought of the jewel] (*tasya*) be non-disagreeing? That it is only the cognition of the jewel subsequent to that [initial, mistaken cognition of the lamplight as jewel] that is a means of valid knowledge, we shall discuss [later]. And, as was already shown earlier, the same theoretical benefit is had from the establishment (*siddheḥ*) of external objects as from establishing other cognitions [as the support].

**+143,29** In this way, like in the case of establishing other cognitions [as the support], so too is it established that blue etc. does not have the nature of awareness. [That is to say] it’s not right [to conclude] that, [just] because a given cognition of an external object may [sometimes] be observed to be [only] a seeming means of knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*), therefore all cognitions of external objects are only [ever] seeming means of knowledge, because [otherwise] the result would be that, based on [just] a [single] example case of inferential cognition in the state of sleep, [also] all inferences would end up as [mere] seeming means of knowledge.

**+143,32** If one should ask, “So, what’s wrong with that? There’s only [ever] inference without object-support, nothing else. If also inference, which is without support, is [therefore for you] not a means of valid knowledge, then what proof (*siddhi*) of [external] objects do you have?” [To this we would answer: Why] none [in fact], aside from [exactly] the one hoped for. [That is to say] it [this objection] might be as follows: Even if, on occasion, the cognition (*pratyaya*) of mother-of-pearl (*śuktikā*) which counteracts a cognition of silver is [itself] counteracted by [yet] another cognition (*pratyaya*) and so does not exist [any longer] (*asattva*), it’s certainly not the case that the cognition of silver in cases of sleep, illusion, and so on is [therefore] true. In the same way (*yathā…tadvat*), even if the inference about [cognitions’] not having support (*nirālambanānumāna*) does not exist [any longer] (*asattva*), nevertheless, the thought of [cognitions’] having support (*sālambanajñāna*) [which is] counteracted by that [inference] cannot be true.

**+144,6** [To this we would answer:] What does one mean by this? If it is that, whether without a means of valid knowledge [at all] or (*vā*) with a merely seeming means of knowledge, other cognitions which are utterly unapprehended can be established as definitely false, that’s incorrect, because [first of all] in the [complete] absence of a means of valid knowledge, it’s not possible to secure the establishment (*vyavasthāsiddhi*) of an object of knowledge.

**144,9** [And second] if that [falsity of other cognitions] could be established by a seeming means of knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsena tatsiddhau*), then one could also secure the establishment (*vyavasthāsiddhi*) of external objects on the basis of that very same [type of] thing, since it is precisely that which conditions (*nimitta*) the securing of that establishment that [we say] is a non-erroneous means of valid knowledge. For indeed, being a means of valid knowledge and non-erroneous (*pramāṇābhrāntatva*) does not have two prongs (*viṣāṇe*), but rather, by whichever thing some subject (*padārtha*) is established as being how it is, that very thing is a non-erroneous means of valid knowledge, just like self-awareness on your [own] view [is just one thing]. And neither is it true that the falseness of a cognition of silver can be [properly] established by an erroneous cognition of mother-of-pearl. Rather, it is only by non-erroneous cognition subsequent to them that the irreality of both the cognitions of silver and of mother-of-pearl is established.

**144,14** Alternatively (*yad vā*), [one can say that] the cognition of mother-of-pearl is erroneous only with respect to [truly] having mother-of-pearl as its object, whereas (*tu*) it is in fact non-erroneous (*a*bhrānta) by virtue of its having for its object the cognition of silver qualified as false, because it does not disagree [with reality] in that respect. And if something non-disagreeing can [also] be erroneous [in this way], then self-awareness [despite being non-disagreeing] could also be erroneous, and then one would [simply] stipulate as a rule (*pāribhāṣika*) that cognitions are [by definition always] erroneous.

**+144,16** If (*atha*) by the example case of e.g. a cognition of silver there is brought about total disestablishment of all means and objects of valid knowledge, [then] in that case (*tathā sati*) one arrives at the Cārvāka view [of Jayarāśi] (*suragurumatānupraveśaḥ*). And then, deliberation (*vicāra*) on e.g. future lives as well as deliberation on means of valid knowledge [in particular inferences] based on those [other lives and so on] would be completely impossible.

**144,20** And yet, not even (*na* ca…api) even the disestablishment of other cognitions can be secured if they are not apprehended (*apratīta*). Meanwhile (*tu*), you who rely on reflexive awareness alone cannot [even] apprehend (*paśyati*) another cognition. And [mind you] no one is stopping you if you are arguing (*sādhayantam*) for reflexive awareness’s own (*ātmanaḥ*) lack of support or erroneousness, but the word “all” [in your inference] (*sarvaśabda*) is meaningless. Alternatively, if [you do accept that] there is apprehension of other cognitions, then it [the inference] is said [by us] to be inconclusive.

§ *Object-support is simply that which is (actually) apprehended.*

**+144,23** Alternatively, this inferential reason [“because they are cognitions”] is [unsatisfactory because it is] contradicted. To explain: [One can also argue that] all cognitions do have support, because they are cognitions, like the cognitions that have as their support other cognitions. If one says that the example case [in this counter-inference] is unestablished as a property possessor (*dharmyasiddha*), [we would answer:] so is it now [claimed to be] the case that (*tat kim idānīṃ*) neither [one’s own] cognitions in e.g. dreams nor other people’s cognitions can be apprehended? And if they are not apprehended, then how could there be [shared] practical behavior (*vyavahāra*) by means of them?

**+144,26** [One might say:] Who says that “They [dream cognitions etc.] are not apprehended”? Rather, what we say is that they do not become the support [of any cognition]. [To which we would reply:] “They are apprehended, and yet (*ca*) they do not become the support [of any cognition]” — that’s quite the statement (*suvyāhṛtam*). After all, the support is not something totally different from what is apprehended, because [otherwise] there would be the result that also self-awareness would then be [truly] without support.

**+144,29** [One might object:] That thing which appears as itself (*svarūpeṇa*) in a given experience is the support of that [experience], not merely that which is apprehended, because [otherwise] even something being remembered would end up being an object-support. If you say this, [we would answer:] No [this concern is not warranted], since one may characterize [e.g., memory] in multiple ways, such as being contrary to the object-support, not contrary [to it], doubtful [as to whether it is contrary or not contrary to it], and so on. That’s why (*yataḥ*) “that which is known”, “support”, “object”, “thing”, and “that which appears in cognition” are all synonyms (*iti paryāyāḥ*). Moreover, that which appears in a non-disagreeing cognition does [by virtue of that factor alone] appear as none other than itself. Thus, how could it be that other cognitions cannot be the support?

**145,4** Another objection: How, by means of a form (*ākāra*) common to other cognitions, can one apprehend the proper form (*svarūpa*) of a [given] cognition? For indeed, they [the other cognitions] have no common form [after all], and the un-shared form that they [each do] have, being remote, does not appear at all. Hence, it [i.e., a given cognition] is not the object-support [for another cognition]. [Answer:] That’s incorrect, [on the one hand] because the common form does also exist in a real way (*vāstava*), and [on the other hand] because an inference has that [common form, i.e., universal] for an object (*tadviṣayatvād anumānasya*), as we shall explain.

**145,8** And if [one should claim that] it is a form (*rūpa*) unconnected (*asaṃsargin*) with other cognitions and in fact unreal that appears, [and] it’s only for this [form] that a lack of object-support is being established, then, like an inference establishing the sharpness of a hare’s horn, this would be utterly meaningless. For indeed, as with a hare’s horn, one cannot apprehend, even indirectly (*pāramparyeṇāpi*), a connection with other cognitions that are completely unapprehended and not truly existent (*paramārthāsad*).

**+145,11** And as for (*api*) the example of the jewel, it is not really all that proper here, since the jewel’s proper form (*svarūpa*), which most certainly does really exist, is apprehended by the same knowing agent (*pramātṛ*) at a time after the action [of moving toward the jewel], [but] not so the proper form of other cognitions. Alternatively, if it is, then how does the cognition thereof not have object-support?

§ *Negating an unobserved entity is not like inferring specific properties of a known one.*

**145,15** Also the following is taught [by opponents] (*yad apy uktam*): Once it is established, by none other than everyday cognition, that there is a difference between e.g. waking and sleep cognitions, then, on that basis, there can to begin with be practical talk about proving a target property (*sādhya*sādhanavyavahāra). [But] later, if by a reflective person there is noticed no [inferential] reason for [affirming] the separation between them (*na* kiṃcid atra vibhāgakāraṇam) and thereby (iti) one establishes [their] non-difference, then in that case (*tathā sati*), what problem is this for an opponent [like us]?

**+145,17** For indeed, if there is a problem in this way, then there would be a problem also for establishing the epistemic instrumentality of the Vedas. To explain: So long as the Vedas are not apprehended to be distinct (*pṛthaggrahaṇam*) from everyday utterances which are not means of valid knowledge, there can be no establishment of the nature of the property-possessor [in question] (*dharmin*). And if that [nature of the Vedas] is not established, then neither can their epistemic instrumentality be established, and so an inference [to this effect] would be fruitless. And yet (*ca*), they [the Vedas] cannot be differentiated on the basis of a difference in the sequence (*ānupūrvī*) of intonation and phonemes (*svaravarṇa*), because also for those [texts] other than those [Vedas] there can mutually be [established] difference in that way.

**145,22** Now [one might suggest]: Let’s say there is (*asti tāvat*) a given text (*ayaṃ prabandhaḥ*) about which one is wondering (*…iti vicāryamāṇaḥ*) whether it is Vedic or not. If it turns out to be (*bhaviṣyati*) a means of valid knowledge, then [let us say that] it is certainly Vedic. Otherwise then [let us say that] we have no use for it, and so we’ll get rid of it (*parityakṣyāmaḥ*). [Answer:] It’s the same [problem] also in this case. [To explain:] Let’s say (*tāvat*) there is observed a [given waking] cognition. [Then] there are two possibilities (*kalpane*): Compared to this [waking cognition] (*asmāt*), a dream cognition (*svapnaprasiddhi*) is either different (*bhinna*) or not (*no* vā). / What will turn out to be the case (*yathā bhaviṣyati*), [only] later (*paraṃ*) we will discover (*tathā* drakṣyāmaḥ). It’s also so [in the case of the Vedas] (*ity api*). // [That is to say] if, upon later consideration, either the dream cognition or the other [waking cognition] may be [found to be] distinct from the other, then we will apprehend difference [between the two]. Or (*atha*), it might be that (*iti*) [upon reflection] there is not any grounds for [maintaining] difference [between the two], in which case (*tadā*) we will know (*prati√pad*) that there was no difference. What then is the contradiction here?

**+146,2** [To all this, we would respond:] This is just ignorant slackjawing (*andhavijṛmbhitam*). Those who advocate the epistemic instrumentality of the Vedas, it should be said (*khalu*), first of all apprehend (*√paś*) the everyday [external] world, and they can apprehend (*√jñā*) a cognition thereof. On that basis [then], for that [particular] property-possessor (*dharmin*) called the Vedas which is well known to everyday people in its general aspect (*sāmānyena*), it is [also] appropriate to investigate [additional] particular aspects (*viśeṣa*) like e.g. epistemic instrumentality. You, however, cannot apprehend anything at all besides self-awareness.

**+146,5** Moreover, if there is apprehension of the locus and so on by means of a fallacious means of knowledge, then how would [such] an inferential reason with false components be a means of knowledge? [Here one might object:] But surely, in the [Pramāṇavārtika-]Alaṃkāra, Prajñākaragupta himself has raised a concern about this [problem] and countered it. Here’s what he says:

**+146,8** If one says that a prior [cognition which was an] apprehender of difference is not a means of valid knowledge, then so be it. What’s the problem? [The problem is that] there would [then] be no dividing up (*pravibhāga*) into locus and so on. [To this we would answer:] Granting that there would not be [any such dividing up] (*mā bhūt*), what is now the problem for us [Buddhists as a result of that]? [Namely, the objection continues,] none other than the following: That that [later inferential cognition] which [in turn supposedly] establishes the non-difference is [thereby also] not a means of valid knowledge. [To this we would answer:] If that’s the case, then [also] the [initial] cognition (*pratipatti*) of a property-possessor characterized [here] as the Vedas and having properties in common (*sādhāraṇa*dharmin) with both means of valid knowledge and non-means thereof will [itself] certainly not be a means of valid knowledge, since at a later time it [the initial doubtful cognition] ceases [to be valid] (*nivartana*) as a result of the [later] establishment of [the Vedas’] epistemic instrumentality. So, because that [initial doubtful cognition] which establishes the property-possessor [for the sake of inference] is not a means of valid knowledge, then so too would that [inferential cognition] which establishes the epistemic instrumentality [of the Vedas] by means of that [initial doubtful cognition] not be a means of valid knowledge, and therefore, one cannot establish the epistemic instrumentality of the Vedas. As a result of this (*tataḥ*), all practical talk about proving properties to be proved would fall apart.

**146,14** One might object [against this Buddhist suggestion] that (*atha…iti*) even if one [initially] apprehends the property-possessor as having properties in common (*sādhāraṇa*), [nevertheless] that [cognition] which does the apprehending does not fail to be a means of valid knowledge, because it is epistemic instrumentality as something additional (*adhika*) that is [later] established about that very same thing [i.e., the property-possessor]. [To this we would answer that] that’s also wrong, for the following reason: If [you think that] being a means of valid knowledge [just] is the nature of that property-possessor [i.e., the Vedas] itself, then how, despite the [initial] apprehension of that [property-possessor] by means of [the initial doubtful cognition which constitutes] an invalidation of that [property of being a means of knowledge], could it [i.e., the later cognition of the Vedas as a valid means of knowledge] be valid knowledge?” Indeed, Vedic speech is [claimed to be] by nature (°*svarūpa*) a means of valid knowledge. [But] if there is [initial] apprehension of that [Vedic speech] as contrary to that [nature of being a means of valid knowledge], then, when there is undermining (*unmūlana*) of what is contrary in that way [i.e., of the initial cognition that is ambivalent about whether Vedic speech is a means of knowledge] by another [later cognition] (*apareṇa*), how would it [Vedic speech] not fail to be a means of valid knowledge?

**146,21** Now [one might object]: This is not a refutation [of the epistemic instrumentality of the Vedas], because we assume [e.g. epistemic instrumentality to be] a distinct property. [Answer:] No [that argument doesn’t work], because there would end up being an infinite regress. To explain: If the property is distinct, [then] there would have to be an additional relation with it (*tena yogaḥ paraḥ*). And with that again a relation, and with that [etc.], and so there would be an endless overflow of properties. If the connectedness is accepted to be the nature of the two, then the epistemic instrumentality [still] follows (*prāpta*). [So] what is problematic for us? Though a thing may [initially] be apprehended by way of difference due to the occurrence of superimposition, how is the apprehension of non-difference, which results from thinking carefully [about the same], not valid knowledge?

**147,3** Neither (*api*) should one raise the concern that, for one who apprehends non-difference (*abhedapratipattṛ*), the means of proof does not function [as it should] by way of the division of the locus and so on, because [it is] in anticipation of (°*apekṣayā*) the cognitions of others [that] this mere restatement (*anuvādamātra*) is, even by itself, [just] by repeating something previous (*pūrvābhyāsa*), a [legitimate] formulation of a means [of inference] (*sādhanaprayoga*). In this way, it is unobjectionable that another is made to understand [through inference-for-another] that one also [previously] experienced such a thought [through inference-for-oneself].

**147,6** [Answer:] This we see as him [Prajñākaragupta] crying out confusedly, cut to the quick with an arrow of envy. To explain: Firstly, provided that we establish the general and particular characters of the Vedas as distinct properties, then in that case, there’s definitely no room for your view.

**147,9** And if one objects that those two [properties] are in fact results of (°*nibandhana*) an exclusion of what is not them, then even so [we would answer], [it is, generally speaking, only] as long as a property-possessor is [initially] apprehended and ascertained by means of a common nature (*sadṛśātmanā*), [that] it is possible for an inference to function so as to rule out the inappropriate attribution (*samāropa*) [of a wrong property] resulting from not apprehending other [distinguishing] properties [directly]. But so long as the property-possessors, being [here] characterized as other cognitions, are themselves never the objects of cognitions (*dṛṣṭigocarāḥ*), then on what basis would the inference function? For indeed, not even a well-trained person can create a painting on [a canvas of empty] space. For indeed, [only] if the property-possessors, [here] characterized as other cognitions, are apprehended as they are (*svarūpeṇa*), could one then (*tadā*) also understand the process by which (*…ity eṣāpi prakriyā saṃbhāvyeta*), by means of the [initial] ascertainment (*niścaya*) about their being cognitions which will have arisen because of that apprehension, an inference functions with the aim of ruling out the inappropriate attribution [of the wrong property, namely, having support] which results from not apprehending the [cognition’s] lack of object-support. On the other hand (*ca*), [this process is] not [understandable] if the property-possessors are not apprehended, like *piśāca*s.

**147,16** And yet, for you [Buddhists], there does not even exist apprehension of other cognitions over and above self-awareness, as was [already] said. On the other hand, when you say this “Though a thing may [initially] be apprehended by way of difference…” and so on, this is the talk of someone who has forgotten the topic (*vismṛtaprakaraṇa*), since what’s currently being discussed (*prakrānta*) is the [supposed] means for establishing the lack of object-support for all cognitions, not non-dualism. [The Buddhist might object:] The non-difference accepted [by us] for all cognitions is in particular their non-distinction (*aviśeṣa*) by way of lacking object-supported, not non-dualism. [To which we would answer:] Even so, if there is no apprehension of other cognitions, then inference [simply] cannot function. On the other hand, if they are apprehended, then what is said is that the inferential reason is inconclusive.

**147,21** Now [one might object]: What is established in this manner (*krama*) is the ruling out of inappropriate attribution of difference only for self-awareness. [To this we would answer:] No [this cannot be right], for the reason already considered previously. [But to go] further [into it] (*api ca*): Is the difference ruled out by the very same thing [i.e. cognition] by which it is superimposed, or is it [ruled out] by another cognition? It’s [first of all] not correct that it should be by the very same [cognition], since it is contradictory for the forms of the superimposing and the ruling out forms to be one and the same.

**+147,25** If instead (*atha*) it is [ruled out] by another cognition, [then to that we would answer] who else besides a Buddhist could say something like “There exists another cognition, and yet (*ca*) there is no difference”? Also, it’s certainly incorrect to say that “in anticipation of the cognitions of others, this mere restatement is even by itself, by way of repeating something previous (*pūrvābhyāsa*)…” and so on, because it is contrary to [your] non-difference. Moreover, neither another’s unapprehended cognition (*apratipannaḥ* parapratyayaḥ) nor (*ca*) a repetition of something prior (*pūrvābhyāsa*) is fit to be spoken of as an inferential reason.

**+147,29** If you say [as an objection] that, like in the case of [floating] hairs, etc., something can be apprehended in the total absence of support, [we would answer] no [this comparison is inappropriate], because a cognition of [floating] hairs, etc. [i.e., an illusion] is not a means of valid knowledge. [And] for this very reason, a Buddhist who considers as a means of valid knowledge the two verses beginning with “It [awareness] being [in reality] without forms of known and knowing…” would have to accept none other than non-dualism. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction with those [two verses]. [And furthermore] as a result of that same cognition without object-support, so too could there [equally] be an establishment of external objects, just like there is of other cognitions. Thus, alas, it’s a terrible situation the Buddhist has stumbled into.

§ *Other interpretations of “without” (nir-) do not help the argument.*

**148,4** Furthermore, if having “no” (*nir*°) support is understood to be having oneself for support, then the example case is devoid of the target property, since it has not been established that e.g. dream cognitions also have themselves for support. [This is so] because it was stated [earlier] that there is no means of valid knowledge for [the idea of] self-awareness, and [also] because the apprehension of other things [besides the cognition itself] has [in fact] been proved.

**148,7** [Or] if what is meant [by cognitions’ having no support] is that they have no support whatsoever, then, like a pot etc., also cognition would be unestablished. And then, given the contradiction for your view (*svadṛṣṭivirodhe*), the world [as we know it] would be at an end [for you] (*astaṃgata*).

**+148,8** [Or] if what is meant [by cognitions’ having no support] is that they don’t have for support (°*an*ālambana) external objects, that’s incorrect, since those who argue in favor of the error theory of the [apprehended object that is] contrary [to reality] (*viparītakhyātiṃ* *samarthayatām*) teach that memory, too, has for its [real] support that which is remembered.

**+148,10** [Or if what is meant is that] they [all cognitions] do not have for support (°*an*ālambana) the object as it appears (*yathāprati*bhātārtha), as in e.g. dream cognitions, then in that case, even a cognition appearing with [the form of] awareness [itself] (*bodhāvabhāsin*) would end up not having that [awareness] for support. And because of that, like external objects, awareness [itself] also would not be established, and so the whole world would end up blind. For indeed, if nothing can be established as real, then neither can the distortion consisting in error (*bhrānty*upaplava) be established [as real], because it would end up being a mere convention (*paribhāṣā*).

§ *Negation can only apply to specific properties of previously established objects.*

**+148,13** Now [you might say]: Something apprehended as external, like e.g. [floating] hair, can be established as unreal (*asattvasiddhiḥ*) through our not observing obtainment of the object. [And] once that mental appearance is [thereby] established as lacking object-support, then all cognitions, since they are characterized (*upalakṣaṇa*) by the same nature as those [erroneous cognitions], can [also] be established as lacking object-support. And meanwhile (*punar*), there’s not anything [i.e., any other cognition] that counteracts (*bādhaka*) them [all cognitions] as having themselves for support. [To this we would answer:] That’s also incorrect, because it is not established that they [all cognitions] are characterized by the same nature [as erroneous cognitions]. For if there is no obtaining (*a*prāpti) of objects in any scenario, then indeed, it is established that they have the same nature, but if an object is [in fact] obtained in some cases, then how is it [possible to say] that they have the same nature?

**+148,18** Now [consider that one says]: There is in fact never [any] obtaining of an object. [To this we would answer:] Then how can one negate that [object]? For it’s not possible to negate an object that is utterly unapprehended, like a *piśāca*. [You might say:] What’s negated is its [the object’s] (*asya*) difference from cognition, not the object itself, because it [the object] is of the nature of cognition. [We answer:] How, in turn (*api*), can that difference, which is utterly unapprehended, be negated?

**+148,20** If it [the difference] is [in fact] apprehended, then in that case, it’s not utterly unreal. [You might object:] How can one negate e.g. an ass’s horn or the primordial cause [of Sāṃkhya] (*pradhāna*)? [We would answer:] No [that’s an inappropriate comparison], for even in those cases, what is negated is that [on the one hand] something horn-like (*viṣāṇajātīya*), which has in fact been apprehended [before], could have grown on the head of an ass, and that, on the other hand, pleasure, pain, and ignorance [which have also been apprehended before] are the material cause of the world. Alternatively, what is negated [in the latter case] is that the material cause of the world, which is inferred [to exist] through reasoning about atoms, is of the nature of pleasure and so on and that it is unitary. In this same way, it should be understood also in other cases that one is negating the [particular properties like] place, time, causal capacity, and so on of something which certainly has been apprehended [already]. And yet (*ca*), on the position of self-awareness, what is [in fact] taught is that difference is never [actually] apprehended [at all].

**148,28** Moreover (*ca*), the negation of difference [between cognition and object] is not a means of valid knowledge because its object is undone by [none other than] direct perception. To explain: A cognition is known to be characterized by an inwardly-facing form (*antarmukhākāra*), unsteadiness, and so on, whereas an object like e.g. blue is known as being external and steady. And also [the negation of difference is not a means of knowledge] (*ca*) because it contradicts the everyday actions of even the simplest living being (*prāṇabhṛnmātra*). For indeed, there is no one who, with knowledge (°*avagamena*) only of cognitions being destroyed moment to moment, takes action to obtain what is desired and to avoid what is not. [And] to say [simply] that (*iti cet*) this whole world (*etat sarvam*) is like e.g. a dream is not correct, because even you are observed to take action and so on when troubling things arise for you (*utpannabādhaka*).

§ *Buddhist conceptual cognition properly exemplifies other-cognition without regress.*

**149,4** Another [Buddhist] objection: If an object is a different thing from cognition, then how could any object whatsoever be apprehended by that [cognition]? If it is by way of perceptual connection [of thing and cognition] (*darśanasaṃbandha*), then in turn, if that connection is its own thing, then one must fashion (°*-kalpanā*) another connection also for that connection, and so there would be an infinite regress. If it [the connection] is not a different thing, then how can an object which is a different thing from cognition be established by direct perception? Therefore, what is correct is that one apprehends the object insofar as it exists as internal to (°*antaḥpraviṣṭaḥ san*) the cognition [itself], whereas insofar as it [the object] doesn’t [at all] touch it [the cognition], then one does not [apprehend it].

**+149,8** Thus it is said: “It cannot be by means of a [given] cognition [of it] that an object is established to be external to it [the cognition] (*ataḥ*). On the other hand (*tu*), if it [the object] should be external to the cognition, then it itself (*sa eva*) cannot be established. / If one apprehends blue, then how is it said to be external? If one does not apprehend it, then how is it said to be external? / If it [a cognition] were apprehended (*vedane*) by another [cognition], then [that second cognition would be apprehended] by that [third] one, [and that third one apprehended] by that [fourth] one (*tena tena*), and hence this would be an infinite regress. And again (*ca*), if it [a cognition] were apprehended by another [cognition], then how would this [very fact] be determined in its own right (*ātmanā*)?”

**149,16** [To this we would answer:] This is also incorrect. Indeed, it was already established earlier that each and every thing that is apprehended is apprehended by a cognition distinct from it. And also (*ca*), we will explain that the property and property possessor are two different things.

**149,19** Moreover, just like with ascertainment (*niścaya*) [on your view], there is no infinite regress. [That is,] on your view, ascertainment is conceptual in character (*vikalparūpa*), and even as it certainly does not ascertain itself, it does ascertain another thing, and there is not [thereby] an infinite regress of ascertainment. In the same way (*yathā…tathā*), it’s not problematic (*aduṣṭa*) also for another cognition (*anyasyāpi jñānasya*), while [being itself] certainly not apprehended (*ajñātasyaiva*), to be able to differentially establish another thing as its known object (*jñeya*).

**+149,21** And you yourself [certainly do] accept that ascertainment does [successfully] differentially establish another thing, since it is taught [by you] that “When there is [illusory] cognition of [floating] hairs, it has come about (*prāptir āsīt*) as a result of remembering something experienced previously, [and] immediately following the appearance of something like that (*evaṃbhūtapratibhāsa*). From that (*tad*), a conceptual construction arises (*utpattimat*) by way of a manifestation (*ullekha*) of apprehended and apprehending [forms], and that [conceptualization] in turn, being in itself (*so ’pi svarūpeṇa*) totally without forms (*rūpa*s) of apprehended and apprehending, is differentially established as such by another [cognition]. There is no automatic (*svataḥ*) regress also of that.”

**+149,25** If you say, since conceptualization is of the nature of memory, it is certainly without object-support, [we would answer:] fine, [but] even so, it [the conceptualization] is in the first place (*tāvat*) certainly accepted [by you] as being capable of differentially establishing another thing as having the character of (°*ātmakatvena*) e.g. apprehended and apprehending [forms], momentariness, and so on. Similarly [then], let those [same cognitions] which are, sure (*eva*), without object-support (*nirālambanānām*) [also] be able to differentially establish external objects as having (°*ka*) [the properties of] e.g. steadiness and so on. We’re not obstinate [about this] (*nāsmākaṃ grahaḥ*). [That is to say] this might be the view: Because conceptual construction is of the nature of memory, and because it thus can possess epistemic instrumentality only by way of differentially establishing (°*vyavasthāpakatvenaiva*) an object just as it is experienced (*yathānubhūtārtha*), therefore a conceptual construction can possess epistemic instrumentality (*prāmāṇya*) only if it differentially establishes a property of a cognition apprehended by itself (*svavidita*), [and] not, on the other hand (*na tu*), if it should differentially establish a property of an external object that is [in fact] not directly experienced [by the conceptual cognition] (*an*anubhūta).

**+150,1** [To this we would answer:] How would this [property of the cognition] be known? First of all, it’s certainly not possible that its [i.e. a cognition’s] own nature of e.g. momentariness can be apprehended by being directly experienced, purely (*eva*) non-conceptually. Meanwhile (*tu*), as for (*api*) that which is external, there is certainty (*niścaya*) about it, so (*iti*) how is [it claimed that] it [i.e. the external object is] not experienced? And also (*ca*), it is not accepted on your view that something that apprehends what has [already] been apprehended can have epistemic instrumentality, since it is said [by you] that (*iti vacanāt*), “Given that it [memory] apprehends a [thing’s] form as it was [previously] apprehended (*yathādṛṣṭākāra*), it is not a means of knowledge,” and also because there is the qualification “Alternatively, it [a means of valid knowledge] is that by which there is illumination of an object that was [previously] unknown.”

§ *An inferential subject must be established also for oneself through perception etc.*

**150,6** Moreover, how are the things which distinctly (*vicchedena*) appear also in e.g. dream cognitions ascertained to be unreal? If one says [it is ascertained] on the basis of either disagreement or non-apprehension of pragmatic efficacy (*arthakriyānupalabdhi*), [in either case] that is incorrect. For insofar as (*yadi*) the [positive existence of an] object (*artha*) is ever apprehended as pervaded by non-disagreement or by pragmatic efficacy, then the non-existence of the object (*arthābhāva*) can be established by the absence of those [non-disagreement and pragmatic efficacy], just as where there is no fire, there is no smoke. But when one completely disavows (*atyantāpahnava*) external objects, then it [the object’s non-existence] is not [ever] apprehended as having a pervaded-pervading relationship with anything at all, so how can the contrapositive pervasion apply (*kathaṃ viparyayavyāptiḥ*)?

The following might be supposed [in response]: The fact that cognitions in e.g. dreams do not have [real] objects (*viṣayābhāva*) is [already clearly] established for everyone, so it is not being proven by us. [Answer:] No [this response is inappropriate], because what is well-established for [normal] people is not accepted as a means of valid knowledge. Alternatively, if it is, then on that basis alone, [real] objects can be established [also] for the waking cognitions which have been made the inferential locus [by you here]. Thus, how is a lack of object-support established for all cognitions?

**+150,14** Moreover (*ca*), it’s not appropriate to take up as an example case something with which one does not oneself agree (*svayam…a*pratipadyamānasya) merely on the basis of what is well-established [only] for the opponent, because an inference for the sake of others is characterized [by Dignāga] as illuminating something [already] acknowledged by oneself. It is furthermore taught: “For indeed, inference-for-another is a statement of an inferential mark, with its three [necessary] characteristics, for the sake of producing in [the mind of] another a cognition of that [target property] which is characterized by the inferential mark in the very same way that [such] a cognition about that [target property] which is characterized by the inferential mark has [previously] arisen for oneself (*svayam…utpannam*) on the basis of that [same] inferential mark with its three [necessary] characteristics.” [This is explained as being called an “inference”] “on the basis of a metaphorical extension of effect onto cause”. [Furthermore] the use of [the phrase] (*grahaṇa*) “illuminating something [already] acknowledged by oneself” is [according to Dharmakīrti] for the sake of conveying that that which is known to an opponent from [their own] scripture is not a [proper] means of establishing [anything], and that there is no establishment [of anything] based on something meaningless (*anartha*).” Therefore, dream cognitions and so on are not, merely by being well-established for an opponent, appropriate as an example case. What’s more, the argument (*sādhana*) beginning with “apprehension together” was already refuted earlier, and so the example case [here, of dream cognitions] cannot be established on the basis of that. Alternatively, if it [the example] is established [for use], then also the property to be proved could be established on the basis of that alone, so that [the inferential reason of] being a cognition would be useless.

**+150,21** Moreover, the form of e.g. blue appearing in e.g. dream cognitions is certainly something practical agents understand to be unreal as a result of a blocking cognition. So (*tat*), if (*yadi*) that [unreal form] (*asau*) is not a different thing from the cognition, then the cognition itself (*eva*) ends up being unreal [as well]. Otherwise [i.e. if it is a different thing] (*vā*), [then] the e.g. dream cognition does not have the form of e.g. blue (*a*nīlādyākāra), and therefore, the inference about the lack of object-support would [in fact] end up having the sense (*vākyārtha*) that “all cognitions are without form, because they are cognitions, like e.g. dream cognitions”. And if in this way, cognition has a form of e.g. blue that is neither distinct nor non-distinct [from the cognition], then there results a complete failure of ordinary behavior.

§ *Without object-support, one cannot explain successful correspondence.*

**+150,27** And if all cognitions are without object-support, then based on what is there restriction in (*iti…ayaṃ niyamaḥ*) practical agents’ sometimes disagreeing and at other times, even when there is a separation (*vyavadhāna*) of place, time, and so on, nevertheless (*eva*) agreeing? If you say that it is due to differences in mental traces, then you [must] think [the following] (*atha manyase*): There is disagreement about that which is conditioned (*yatra…°nimittam*) by a weak mental trace, whereas there is agreement about that which is conditioned by a firm mental trace. [To which we would answer:] No [one cannot claim this], because there is no means of valid knowledge [to prove it]. Moreover, in this way, it’s better that [simply] the external objects themselves (*eva*), by way of their [own] differences of firm vs. not firm (*dṛḍhādṛḍhabhedena*) be construed as (*kalpanīyam*) the causal condition [for restricted intersubjective agreement], since they [the external objects] can be the object of practical activities, whereas mental traces cannot.

**+151,6** Moreover, what is the causal condition for the [supposed] firmness of a [given] mental trace? First, it’s not an intense cognition (*paṭupratyaya*), since the specialness of a first-time object (*apūrvārthaviśeṣa*) is not accepted. And there does not arise (*utpadyate*) without rhyme or reason a particular cognition (*pratyaya*) on the basis of awareness (*jñāna*) alone. Alternatively, if (*atha*) an attentive cognition or a cognition with repetition are [proposed as] the causal condition, [then we would answer] no [these cannot be it either], because there is inconsistency [in their production of firm mental traces] (*vyabhicāra*). To explain: For those overcome by desire, sorrow, and so on, even if objects like one’s [absent] lover, one’s [deceased] children, and so on are cognized along with a great deal of attention or repetition (*ādarābhy*āsātiśayapratīta), nevertheless, a cognition with such an object is observed to sometimes disagree [with reality]. And on the other hand (*punar*), sometimes a cognition concerning [something which had been] a completely first-time object, despite its [the object’s] not producing surprise (*anāścaryakārin*), does in fact agree [with reality]. [Objection:] Also in that case, there is a mental trace produced in a previous birth. [Answer:] No, [that also cannot explain the agreement,] because that [mental trace] can [be made to] disappear through repetition of cognition that is contrary to it (*tad*viparīta). For otherwise, also the mental traces of desire and so on could not [be made to] disappear through repetition of e.g. [the idea of] no-self.

**+151,14** Moreover, if there are no objects distinct from cognition, then there is no cause that can awaken mental traces in a regulated way (*niyata*°). For indeed, once a previous cognition has been destroyed, there exists [as a remainder] a cognition existing in the present time (*sāmpratam*) which certainly has the nature of multiple mental traces. How could appearances arise in a regulated way on the basis of that alone? Later on, too, we shall consider the mental trace as causal condition (*vāsanānimitta*), so it can be let alone for now.

§ *Without object-support, one cannot explain intersubjective action.*

**151,18** Furthermore, an object like e.g. blue is not merely of the nature of cognition [also] for the following reason: because it [the object] can be known by [both] oneself and others. For indeed, that which is of the nature of cognition cannot be known by multiple people. How then is it to be understand that an object can be apprehended by multiple people? [Supposedly, one might say] because of the inferential mark that there is no disagreement (*avisaṃvāda*) in e.g. the undertaking of speech acts (*vacanapravṛtti*). But [in fact] since the e.g. speech of two people who see floaters (*taimirikadvayavacana*) finds disagreement among other people, it [i.e., a lack of disagreement per se] is not an [appropriate] inferential mark.

**+151,21** And if the thoughts of others cannot be apprehended, then it would result that there would be no undertaking of action at all in e.g. the writing of systematic texts (*śāstrapraṇayana*) and so on. For not even a madman, only for the purpose of his own understanding, quotes (*vyā√cakṣ*) a text, advances proofs and so on in debate, and refutes (*ni√grah*) his own self by pointing out (*udbhāvana*) [which] e.g. statements [of his own are] lacking a [proper] inferential means [i.e. reason] (*sādhana*) or ancillary [inferential] components (*aṅga*).

**151,25** [One might object:] Even if there is no external object, there is no problem, since it [an object’s being known by multiple people] can be inferred by the inferential mark that there appear practical behaviors resulting from the functioning of others’ thoughts. To explain: The arising of appearances, independent of one’s own efforts and intentions, of [others’] gestures and speech acts is inferred to be due to the agency of the other [person] (*anyādhipatyena*). [We woudl answer:] This is not right. After all (*hi*), for those who advocate [the existence of] only self-awareness, even knowing another cognition of one’s own is not possible, [so] how could one know the thoughts of others? This has already been elaborated previously.

**152,2** Moreover, for one who says that, all cognitions are, like dreams, without object-support, how can it be established that there are other mental continua? For there can be no substantial (*vāstava*) proof of other persons by means of the appearances of [bodily] motions and speech acts (*gamanavacane*) which are observed in dreams (*svapnadṛṣṭa*). Nor can there be by way of [mere] dream thoughts (*svapnabuddhyā*) any stating and debating [of philosophical positions] and so on (*ākhyānavādādikaraṇam*) or victory and defeat in relation to opponents (*parānugrahajayaparājayādikam*). [And from that] it follows that there is no [more] undertaking of the means of bringing about (°*sādhanānuṣṭhāna*) positive merit and [eventually] liberation. After all, that which is done in a dream, [like, say] religious rites at e.g. Buddha shrines (*buddhālayādi*karma) or [also] celibacy, cannot bring about positive merit (*na…dharmasādhanam…yuktam*), nor can [for example] eating what is not given, having sex with inappropriate people, and so on [if done in dreams] bring about negative merit. And yet it is not the case (*na ca*), if [as you say] the two states of dream and waking are equally devoid of [real] objects, that there exists a difference between them by means of which (*yena*) the means for [successfully] bringing about positive merit and so on can be differentially established [as being possible] in one [state and] not the other.

**+152,10** [Here the Buddhist might object:] Even toward the means for bringing about [positive] merit and so on, one undertakes action only (*eva*) on the basis of error. [To which we would answer:] Why then do you [Buddhists], who [supposedly] understand reality, act so as to bring about awakening in [your] disciples by instructing [them] to, for example, make donations to the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha? To say that this [action] is because of [the teacher’s] previous mental impressions (*saṃskāra*s) is also no real answer, because after all, no one, even if incompletely awakened (*vikalavatpratibuddho ’pi*), undertakes to eat impure food, for example.

**+152,13** Therefore, these Buddhists, showing through their talk of emptiness a lack of substance [on their part] (*asāratā*), and misleading (*vipra√tṝ*) people by saying things like (*ity evam*) “Give to the Buddha, give to the Dharma, give to the Saṃgha” and then, making [good] use of (*upayoga*) the [donated] tasty food and drink and so on, and, despite there not being a difference in the previous mental impressions [so they say], [carefully] abstaining from eating impure food and so on, and [yet at the same time] saying things like “similar to [illusory apprehension of a firebrand’s] circular whirling (*cakrabhramaṇavat*), [human] action is simply the result of our previous mental impressions”, they [thereby] display only their own mischievousness. For just as when there is no [more] whirling (*bhrānti*) of the wheel [of fire], the mental impression of whirling motion (*bhramaṇa*) does not [actively] arise (*bhavati*), in the same way, when the error (*bhrānti*) concerning tasty food and so on has ceased, the mental impression caused by that [also] does not apply [anymore]. After all, once an error concerning e.g. water has ceased, no one is seen to act on the basis of the [responsible] mental impression alone for the sake of accomplishing practical activity with it [e.g. quenching thirst].

§ *Without object-support, one cannot explain diversity of appearances.*

**+152,20** Moreover, if there is no [external] object blue or the like, then how is there cognition of e.g. blue? For indeed, there is no effect without a cause, since this [idea] is contradicted by [the saying that a causeless thing] “either ever exists or (*vā*) does not exist” and so on. Moreover, there cannot arise (*saṃbhavati*) a distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) appearance on the basis of mere, unqualified awareness alone, as that would result in a contradiction with the inference [of a specific cause] from an effect. For it cannot be the [same] beginningless continuum [of awareness] apprehended equally (*avicchedena*) for every cognition of blue and so on [that is the means] by which (*yena*) the effect’s [particular] conformity to its cause could be apprehended. Indeed, how, within a unitary (*eka*) stream of object appearances, does an appearance manifest itself (*prādur√bhū*) as different from that [stream] without encountering a cause distinct from that [stream]?

**+152,26** Meanwhile, on the position that there are external objects, a person can, as long as cooperating factors are not hindered for him, [simply] have, upon encountering an [external] object like e.g. water, an undistorted (*avitatha*) cognition of the e.g. water in complete conformity to that object. On the other hand (*tu*), when his cooperating factors are hindered, the opposite occurs. [Examples of the latter are] like when (*yathā*), in relation to [what is actually] mist, those with afflicted sense organs have, as a result of the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) and so on, a cognition of a Gandharva city, [or when] those with sense organs overcome by e.g. a magic spell (*mantra*) have a cognition of food in relation to some [non-food] substance employed by a magician (*māyāvin*). Even e.g. dream cognition can occur about none other than an external object as a result of incidental occurrence (*upanipāta*) of other causal conditions, as was already explained earlier.

**153,4** On the other hand (*ca*), there is no such diversity of causes on the position of consciousness-only, so how could it be that there is diversity of appearances? If you say that the diversity of appearances results from the trace impressions, [we would answer by asking] if objects distinct from cognition are not accepted, then what [exactly] is a trace impression?

**153,7** Well surely it is taught [by the opponent] that those who understand mental traces understand by “mental trace” a power produced by previous cognitions. [To which we would answer:] So now (*atha*), does the previous cognition produce [such] a power which [itself] produces (*utpādikā*) cognitions similar to itself, or [does it produce one that] produces different cognitions? In the former case, from a cognition of blue produced by (*utpāditāt*) a cognition of blue there arises a cognition of blue, and in turn from that, [there arises] none other than a [further] cognition of blue, and so there is a continuum of [just] blue cognitions. In [such] a unitary (*eka*) continuum, there could not arise cognition with a manifold form.

**+153,11** On the other hand, in the latter case, there could not be a stream of cognitions with one [same] (*eka*) form for any length of time (*kiyantam api kālam*). What’s more, it also wouldn’t be possible for it to produce at another [later] time something [namely, a cognition] similar to it, since, thanks to momentariness, a thing that has ceased to exist (*naṣṭa*) cannot produce [anything]. Also the idea that (*…ity etad api*) it [the relatedness of moments in a continuum] is “like the redness in cotton” is something we will refute later on.

**153,14** Moreover (*kiṃ ca*), it is observed that a thing is [generally] infused (*vāsyamāna*) by means of something other than the material cause [itself], like e.g. cotton [cloth] with e.g. [the color of] lac, or (*ca*) a garment with e.g. [the fragrance of] flowers. And yet (*ca*) for cognition, no other cause (*anyat*~kāraṇam) besides the material cause is accepted [by you here]. On the other hand (*tu*), how could cognition in another continuum, which is, like external objects, not knowable [to the cognitions in one’s own continuum] be accepted (*√kalp*) as that which does the infusing?

§ *Without object-support, one cannot explain vividness and newness.*

**+153,16** And if the mental trace itself were the causal condition [for itself being fixed in place], then it would be just memory, [and there would] not [be any] vividness (*spaṣṭābhatā*) [in it]. For indeed, there exists no clear example case properly established for both [of us] (*spaṣṭa ubhayaprasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ*) concerning a vivid cognition resulting from mental traces alone. On the other hand, concerning the opposite [case] (*viparyaye tu*), memory itself is an [accepted] example case. [Meanwhile] the cognition [that occurs] for those overcome with e.g. desire [and] in which there appears e.g. a woman is no [proper] example case [for such vivid cognition], since it remains to be established [as arising from mental traces alone], given that it, too, has e.g. a post for its object-support, and because it does not arise for one whose eyes are shut.

**153,21** Also when it is said that, just as the objects apprehended in a dream are not real because of not being apprehended in the waking state, so too are the objects apprehended while awake (*jāgradupalabdhārthānām*) not real because of not being apprehended in the dream state, that too is incorrect, because the things apprehended in dream are observed to be distorted (*viplava*) even during the dream [itself]. To explain: Even if one drinks a large amount of water [in a dream], thirst is not quenched (*tṛṣṇāvicchedo* na bhavati); even if one eats food, hunger does not cease; dead people and those with their heads cut off are seen living and talking; even cows and so on (*gavādayo ’pi*) are seen talking; there is suddenly (*kṣaṇamātreṇa*) inversion of the classes (*jāti*) of animals and humans, as well as overturning of cause and effect. Such is the [kind of] distortion that appears [in dreams]. On the other hand (*ca*), waking cognitions are not also subsequently reconciled (*anusandhīyante*) within the dream state as being decidedly unreal.

**154,7** But surely [the Buddhist objects], despite (*api*) its being apprehended during sleep, seminal emission does not deviate [from reality]. [To which we say:] What of it? [The Buddhist continues: Namely, that] it [then] ends up that the cause thereof, namely, the [dreamt-of] contact with a woman is also real. [Here we would answer:] No [this does not follow], because seminal emission (*retaḥsyanda*) is also possible as a result of intense (°*-atiśaya*) desire arising out of a false cognition, and [also] because [upon waking] there is no apprehension of [other] effects (*kārya*) such as garlands, perfumed ointments, nail scratches, and so on. Therefore, whether for someone awake or asleep, that cognition which does not disagree [with reality] is one with a real object. Meanwhile, that which does disagree is one with an unreal object, which is to say (*ity arthaḥ*), one whose object-support is contrary [to reality].

**154,12** Moreover, that which is apprehended to correlate positively and negatively with contemplation fits as being causally conditioned (°*-nimittaṃ yuktam*) by mental traces, like desire, anger, and so on. Meanwhile, things like money and grain and so on do not grow and prosper (*saṃ√pad*) for one who lacks the [proper] means, like ploughing, even despite intense contemplation. [And on the other hand], it is observed that, even without contemplation, one does obtain first-time objects, whether desirable or undesirable.

**154,15** Then, one might [finally] object out of [sheer] boldness (*atha vaiyātyāt*) that a first-time object is not [ever] apprehended at all. To that (*tad*) it is taught [in response] that, in that case (*tadā*), a first-time apprehension of a systematic teaching concerning liberation, too, could not occur (*na syāt*). And then, the mental trace that is the means for liberation cannot bring about liberation because it is, just like the mental trace that is the causal condition for [continued] transmigration, not in accord with reality (*atāttvika*). For indeed, [in your view] it is not the case that there is ever apprehended a causal condition which could produce (°*-dhāyaka*) a first-time trace impression and based on which (*yadvaśāt*) liberation, which is [by nature always] for the first time (*apūrva*), could occur.

§ *Conclusion: The gross object form belongs to the (whole) external object-support.*

**+154,18** Thus, in this way, because it is contradicted by means of valid knowledge like direct perception and so on, as well as by those things [taught] in your own system (*śāstrārtha*), it is certainly incorrect [for you] to say that everything is cognition without any object-support at all. So, it was correctly taught [by us] that [it is] an [external] object, not cognition, [that] possesses the gross form [we perceive].