

Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting

Tyler T. Reny¹

University of California Los Angeles
4289 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095
ttreny@ucla.edu

Loren Collingwood

University of California Riverside
900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521

Ali Valenzuela

Princeton University
001 Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
aavalenz@princeton.edu

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Author Affiliation

¹ Corresponding Author

Tyler T. Reny is a PhD. Candidate in the Political Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA. Loren Collingwood is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at University of California, Riverside, CA, USA. Ali A. Valenzuela is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA.

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Corresponding Author

Address correspondence to Tyler T. Reny, University of California Los Angeles, Political Science Department, 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA; ttreny@ucla.edu.

Abstract

In the aftermath of Donald Trump's 2016 electoral college victory, journalists focused heavily on the white working class (WWC) and the relationship between economic anxiety, racial attitudes, immigration attitudes, and support for Trump. One hypothesized but untested proposition for Donald Trump's success is that his unorthodox candidacy, particularly his rhetoric surrounding economic marginalization and immigration, shifted WWC voters who did not vote Republican in 2012 into his coalition. Using a large national survey we examine 1) whether racial and immigration attitudes or economic dislocation and marginality were the main correlates of vote switching, and; 2) whether this phenomenon was isolated among the white working class. We find a non-trivial number of white voters switched their votes in the 2016 election to Trump or Clinton, that this vote switching was more associated with racial and immigration attitudes than economic factors, and that the phenomena occurred among both working class and non-working-class whites, though many more working-class whites switched than non-working class whites. Our findings suggest that racial and immigration attitudes may be continuing to sort white voters into new partisan camps and further polarize the parties.

The realignment of party coalitions around issues of race and civil rights stands as one of the most consequential political developments of the 20th century. By the 1990s, political elites were well sorted into racially liberal and racially conservative camps and most politically informed voters had followed suit (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016; Kuziemko and Washington 2018), suggesting that there may be little further room for racial attitudes to influence white Americans' partisan attachments.

More recently, however, the two-term presidency of the nation's first Black president, partisan polarization over immigration policy, and visible and rapid Latino population growth may be further transforming mass partisanship. Existing partisan coalitions that have characterized the two parties in American politics for several decades are shifting and may be contributing to the further partisan realignment of white citizens. As Republicans have pushed right on race, Democrats are increasingly relying on minority voters to win elections, strengthening the link between the Democratic Party and racial and ethnic minorities (Frymer 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Tesler 2016).

This paper tests whether Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton's unique candidacies may have facilitated vote switching in the 2016 election, a precursor to durable partisan change. First, did a sizable number of white voters switch their vote in 2016 and was this vote switching unique to the white working class? Second, are immigration and racial attitudes or economic dislocation and marginality more strongly associated with this vote switching?

We find evidence that a non-trivial number of both working class and non-working-class white voters did switch their votes in the 2016 election and that this vote switching was associated more with racial and immigration attitudes than economic factors.

This paper contributes to a growing literature on white racial attitudes and white responses to demographic change and perceived immigrant threat in American politics. While others have shown that contextual demographic threat contributed to Trump support during the 2016 primary election (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018), and that racial and immigration attitudes were associated with Trump support among voters (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Mutz 2018), this paper is the first to thoroughly examine the correlates of vote switching in the 2016 election. Our findings suggest that the United States may be in the midst of further electoral realignment as partisan voting continues to polarize around issues of race and immigration.

Racial Realignment: Conceptions of Partisanship and Partisan Change

Partisanship is one of the most widely studied phenomena in political science. Traditional views of partisan identification focus on the issues, ideologies, and groups connected to each party, what Huddy et al. (2015; 2018) call the instrumental conception of partisanship (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). More recently, scholars have conceived of partisanship as a social identity, comparable to race or religion (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Huddy and Bankert 2017; Rothschild et al. 2018; Mason and Wronski 2018). In this view, partisan affiliation is akin to a salient social group attachment (Tajfel 1981) and partisanship the result of “comparing a judgment about oneself with one’s conception of a social group. As people reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans (or neither), they call to mind a mental image, or stereotype, or what these sorts of people are like and square those images with their own conception” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, pg. 8).

While these two conceptions are often pitted against one another as mutually exclusive, they need not be. Studies of voter conceptions of partisanship find evidence for both (Rothschild et al. 2018), and both allow for partisan change, albeit via different mechanisms. Instrumental partisan change can occur if parties shift positions on issues that may be important to certain voters. Changes in partisan identity can occur if the primary social groups that make up parties change (i.e. which social groups “go with” each party). We argue that three parallel trends have opened the door for vote switching in 2016 among partisans via both channels: the election of Barack Obama, mass immigration from Latin American countries, and the slow collapse of American manufacturing.

While these three trends affect all voters, there is reason to believe that the white working class—increasingly alienated from the two-party system, threatened by demographic change, and unsure of its future economic prospects—was uniquely positioned to be cross-mobilized in the 2016 election. Indeed, politicians haven’t courted the white working class for some time. Democratic base building strategies have focused on fostering a growing Latino and Asian American electorate (Barreto, Collingwood, and Manzano 2010; Wong et al. 2011; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015), rather than courting working class whites. The contemporary Republican Party has similarly struggled with white working-class mobilization. Though it has not been shy about using dog-whistle racial appeals to try and appeal to racially conservative whites (López 2015), it may be too strongly associated with the wealthy elite (Ahler and Sood 2018) for working class whites to feel like they belong (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). As a result, the white working class has felt increasingly alienated from both parties, neither of which look like their group or are perceived as representing their group’s interests (Gest 2016).

America's First Black President

The election of a Black man to the White House served as a highly visible and symbolic political shock (Parker and Barreto 2013), shattering the long era of racial silence ushered in by Clinton's presidency (Tesler 2016). The Democratic Party was no longer just associated with civil rights and Black voters but had succeeded in electing an African American to the most powerful and visible position in the world. As a result of President Obama's election, racial attitudes began to spill over into Americans' evaluations of numerous political phenomena including economic trends, public policies, and public figures (Tesler 2016; Yadon and Piston 2018; Enders and Scott 2018).

This increased racialization of American politics spilled over into partisanship as well (Tesler 2016) as low-information whites with lower levels of attitude constraint (Converse 1964) increasingly linked their racial attitudes with their partisan identities, producing a racially polarized shift of white racial liberals towards the Democrats and white racial conservatives towards the Republicans.

Changing Demographics and Immigration Attitudes

The racial symbolism of electing the first non-white president has been coupled with rapid demographic change. It is likely that attitudes towards other non-white out-groups, like Latino immigrants, also spill over into white partisanship. "Latino threat" has been operationalized as both contextual and symbolic, with anti-immigrant attitudes being triggered by local demographic shifts (Newman 2013; Enos 2014) as well as national rhetoric and trends (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). As a result, attitudes towards a variety of policy issues like welfare, health,

and education are now associated with immigration attitudes and Latino affect (Fox 2004; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

More importantly, Latino affect and fear of demographic change has also been linked to individual level ideology and partisanship (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Craig and Richeson 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Lab experiments have shown that exposure to news about shifting demographics moves white Americans in an ideologically conservative direction and toward the Republican Party (Craig and Richeson 2014), a shift also seen in observational data (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Ostfeld (2018) finds that when White voters learn about Democratic outreach to Latinos, they become less supportive of the Democratic Party. Indeed, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) show that in the near-term, Latino population growth will likely result in many white Americans shifting into the Republican Party as partisan elites continue to polarize on issues of immigration and race.

Partisan Groups, Issues, and Vote Switching

How do these visible changes translate into vote switching and partisan change? According to instrumental views of partisan change, the increased political attention to racialized issues (policing, immigration) during Obama's tenure and the increased reliance on non-white voters is shifting the Democratic Party's median position on issues away from the median white citizen's position, resulting in white shifts towards the Republican Party as white voters update their partisanship to match their policy positions. According to identity-based conceptions of partisan change, the increased perception of the Democratic Party as a coalition of non-white voters is changing perceptions of where many whites feel they belong.

There is evidence that both processes are occurring, with perceptions of policy shifts following logically from perceptions of a diversifying Democratic Party. There is little doubt that Obama's election increased the visibility of Black voters as a core Democratic constituency (Tesler 2016). Ahler and Sood (2018) find that Americans consistently overestimate the proportion of Democrats that are Black (41.9% compared to the true composition of 23.9%). Zhirkov and Valentino (2017) find that white voters, Republicans in particular, are very likely to implicitly associate the Democratic Party with African Americans and the Republican Party with whites. The Democratic Party is also increasingly associated with Latinos (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The Democratic Party, particularly Democratic presidential candidates, frequently and openly courts Latino voters (Collingwood, Barreto, and Garcia-Rios 2014), which has been shown to turn off many white voters (Ostfeld 2018), and the majority of Latino elected officials are Democratic.²

This shift in real and perceived composition of parties is no doubt intertwined with perceptions of the ideological orientation and issue priorities of the Democratic Party. As the party has diversified, white Americans have increasingly perceived the Democratic Party as being further from their own positions on issues (Zingher 2018), and increasingly aligned with issue priorities of African Americans (Tesler 2016) and immigrants (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ostfeld 2018).

Regardless of the conceptualization of partisanship and partisan change, there is evidence to suggest that white voters are increasingly perceiving the Democratic Party as the party of racial and ethnic minorities and racially liberal policy and the Republican Party as the party of white

² According to NALEO, in 2014, among the partisan offices held by Latinos, 88% were Democrats and Latino voters are increasingly voting Democratic (Lopez et al. 2016).

Americans and racially conservative policy. Together, these trends could lead to vote switching and eventual stable shifts in white partisanship. White voters who are racially conservative, who have more punitive immigration attitudes, or who live in communities undergoing rapid demographic change, may be particularly put off by the Democratic Party's increasing diversity and shifting issue priorities and drawn to Trump for his clear and consistent anti-immigrant policy positions and rhetoric appealing specifically to white voters. At the same time, Donald Trump's immigration policy proposals and rhetoric may have driven more traditional, business-oriented, and racially moderate white voters who are comfortable with diversity away from the Republican presidential candidate and towards Clinton, who embraced a more accommodating position on racial and immigration issues.

- **H1a:** Racial attitudes: white voters who express more conservative racial attitudes will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated white voters with more liberal racial attitudes.
- **H1b:** Anti-immigrant attitudes: white voters who express more punitive views on immigration will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated white voters with less punitive views on immigration.
- **H1c:** Latino immigrant threat: white voters living in counties undergoing rapid Latino growth will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump relative to similarly situated white voters who live in counties with lower levels of Latino growth.
- **H2a:** Racial accommodation: white voters who express more liberal racial attitudes will be more likely to switch their vote to Clinton than similarly situated white voters with more conservative racial attitudes.

- **H2b:** Pro-immigrant attitudes: white voters who express less punitive views on immigration will be more likely to switch to Clinton than similarly situated white voters with more punitive views on immigration.
- **H3:** The relationship between racial attitudes, immigration attitudes, Latino threat and vote switching to Trump will be stronger among working class than non-working-class whites. The relationship between racial attitudes, immigration attitudes, Latino threat and vote switching to Clinton will be stronger among non-working class than working class whites.

Economic Marginality and Local Economic Dislocation

We have argued that white voters are a prime target for Trump's racially conservative rhetoric, particularly after Obama's presidency and in an era of increased immigration. Recent economic changes and dislocation in an era of globalization and worker disaffection may have also driven white voters, particularly the white working class, to support the populist appeals of Donald Trump, whose rhetoric often dovetailed anti-immigrant with anti-globalization and anti-free trade themes. Indeed, the media was quick to declare economic dislocation as a key driver of white voting for Trump (Adams 2016; Sargent 2017).

There is little doubt that the white working class has been hit particularly hard by structural economic changes (Gest 2016). Today there are three times as many white-collar workers as manual workers and wages are stagnant for those without a college education (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008). In this sense, manufacturing decline may be disproportionately felt among the white working class (Meyerson 2015). In addition, the upward mobility and union protections that defined the working class's support for Democrats throughout the middle of the 20th century is no longer a reality. The post-recession job recovery during President Obama's

tenure benefited almost exclusively college educated workers, leaving out many middle-income earners (Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Gulish 2015). These economic dislocations have been compounded by the fraying of the community-based institutions that used to provide safety nets in times of need (Putnam 2001).

Moreover, a broad body of work in political science argues that economic conditions play an outsized role in determining the outcomes of elections (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).

Political scientists regularly forecast elections using macroeconomic metrics such as second quarter GDP growth (Abramowitz 2016) and change in unemployment (Jerome and Jerome-Speziari 2016). This body of work suggests that voters who switch from one party to another may do so for retrospective economic reasons — their personal and local economic conditions have deteriorated under the leadership of the party from which they switched (Fiorina 1981).

Thus, despite the large body of work showing that racial and immigration attitudes play a central role in recent voting trends, we cannot discount the possibility that white individuals who switched votes in 2016, particularly white working class voters, did so because they were economically marginalized and, consistent with theories of retrospective voting, did not see Hillary Clinton's Democratic Party as one that would address their economic concerns after eight years of Democratic control of the White House. Conversely, individuals who had not supported a Democratic president in the previous election but who have seen economic improvements under a Democratic president, or who live in a thriving local economy, may have been drawn to switch allegiances to Clinton in the 2016 election.

- **H4a:** Economic marginality: white citizens who are economically marginal — whose perceived economic wellbeing has deteriorated or who are experiencing relative economic

deprivation — will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated voters who are not economically marginalized.

- **H4b:** Local economic dislocation: White citizens living in counties undergoing economic decline — growth in unemployment or loss in manufacturing — will be more likely to switch their votes to Trump, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in such counties.
- **H5a:** Economic integration: White citizens who are economically integrated — whose perceived economic wellbeing has improved or who are not experiencing relative economic deprivation— will be more likely to switch their vote to Clinton than similarly situated voters who are not so economically integrated.
- **H5b:** Local economic expansion: White citizens living in counties undergoing economic growth — declines in unemployment or increases in manufacturing — will be more likely to switch their votes to Clinton, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in such counties.
- **H6:** The relationship between economic indicators and vote switching for Trump will be stronger among working class than non-working-class whites. The relationship between economic indicators and vote switching for Clinton will be stronger among non-working class than working class whites.

Data and Methods

We use a large opt-in Internet panel survey, the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) Survey, to evaluate our hypotheses (Ansolabahere and Schaffner 2017). The CCES is administered by YouGov/Polimetrix and has an interview period of September to

November. The CCES sample selection follows a two-stage sample matching process. First, YouGov draws a stratified random sample from the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) respondents. This sample is then matched to members of the YouGov/Polimetrix opt-in panel, such that the resulting panel looks the same on observables as the national population.³ The resulting survey includes n=64,600 completed interviews with a within-panel participation rate of 41.9% and an AAPOR response rate 1 of 13.9%. The final sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population. Finally, 2016 vote has been validated using the Catalist database of registered voters in the U.S.⁴

For Trump switching models, we restrict the data to only examine white 2016 voters who voted in 2012 for either the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, or a third-party candidate, because these are the only voters who are eligible to switch (n=19,296). For Clinton switching models we restrict the sample to white 2016 voters who voted in 2012 for either the Republican candidate (Romney) or for a third-party candidate (n=17,493). Split sample models of the white working class further restrict our sample sizes to n=10,341 for Trump models and n=11,299 for Clinton models.⁵ We present results for working class whites, non-working-class whites, and all whites in each analysis.

³ While online nonprobability samples typically include more politically and civically engaged individuals, a Pew Research Center study finds that YouGov surveys show the smallest deviations from benchmarks compared to other well-known online opt-in survey panel competitors (Kennedy et al. 2016; Rivers 2016), producing a national sample that is deemed largely representative and accurate .

⁴ See <https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/> for full details about the survey methodology including full question wordings, sampling frame, sampling design, response rates, and voter list matching.

⁵ We define white working class as those without a four-year college degree. There are numerous ways to define working-class. Educational levels, which we use for our models, serve as a proxy for skill and human capital, which is increasingly essential in our changing economy (Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Gulish 2015). Of course, those with college degrees can hold blue-collar jobs

Table 1: Vote Switching Combinations

	2012 Vote	2016 Vote	Non-WC Whites	WWC
Congruent Voting	Romney	Trump	35.2%	50.4%
	Obama	Clinton	48.4%	31.5%
	Other	Other	1.3%	1.0%
Partisan Vote Switching	Romney	Clinton	3.1%	2.0%
	Other	Clinton	1.1%	0.3%
	Obama	Trump	2.4%	6.2%
	Other	Trump	0.7%	1.4%
Total N			9,129	13,842

Note: Partisan vote switching combinations and weighted percentage of all non-working class white and working-class white adult voters who voted in 2012 and 2016. We also display congruent voting for comparison. Note that the columns do not sum to 100% because several vote combinations were omitted from the table, including demobilization (Romney, Obama, or Other in 2012 to not voting in 2016), third party switching (Romney, Obama, or Other in 2012 to third party in 2016) and mobilization (not voting in 2012 to voting for Trump, Clinton, or Other in 2016).

Our dependent variables are voting for Trump (1=yes,0=no) or for Clinton (1=yes,0=no).

Because of the model sample restriction, therefore, a Trump vote switcher can be defined as a white 2016 Trump voter who voted in 2012 for Barack Obama (the Democrat) or a third-party candidate. A Clinton vote switcher is a white 2016 Clinton voter who voted in 2012 for Mitt Romney (the Republican) or a third party candidate.⁶ We outline most of the possible vote

and those without college degrees can be (and frequently are) very successful financially. Nevertheless, using income to determine working class can be arbitrary, depending on region and cut-points used, and is often poorly reported on surveys (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008). We thus settle define working class as lacking a 4-year college degree. We estimated similar models defining working class as those in the lower tercile of the income distribution and find very similar results which are presented in Online Appendix A.

⁶ Given concerns of bias in 2012 recalled vote—due to poor memory or simply social desirability and lying—we undertake a number of additional analyses in Online Appendix B to assess the extent that misreport could bias the results of these analyses. In line with Rivers and Lauderdale

combinations for 2012 and 2016 voters in Table 1 and display the proportion of non-working class and working class whites who fall into each strata. We find, not surprisingly, that the vast majority of voters are congruent voters (Romney to Trump and Obama to Clinton). Among vote switchers, the focus of this paper, we find that about 6% of white working class and 2.4% of white non-working-class voters switched to Trump and 2% of white working class and 3.1% of white non-working-class voters switched to Clinton. Given that there were over 50.5 million college educated white voters and over 46.4 million working class white voters in 2016 (as estimated by CNN 2016 exit polls), these percentages are not trivial and suggest that, in raw numbers, many more working-class whites than non-working-class whites switched their votes in 2016 from Obama to Trump and far fewer from Romney to Clinton.

Nonetheless, these descriptive statistics do not say anything about which factors were most strongly related to switching to either Trump or Clinton and whether those factors varied by partisan affiliation. To answer these questions, we use logistic regression to model vote switching as a function of racial, immigration, and economic attitudes and contexts. Rather than pool across partisans, we conduct our analyses separately among voters who identify with the two major parties or as independents.⁷

For racial and immigration attitudes, we relied on two batteries of questions. We combine three questions about acknowledgement of race and racism into a scale of racial attitudes ($\alpha = 0.68$, average $r = 0.42$) and recode it to range between 0 (racially liberal) and 1 (racially conservative). For individual-level immigration attitudes, respondents chose which of four

(2016), we conclude that very few respondents lie about which candidate they supported in the previous election, reducing concerns about significant bias in the measure.

⁷ Pooled models, presented in Online Appendix C, return substantively similar results.

immigration policy proposals they supported. The four questions were combined into a single immigration attitude scale ($\alpha = 0.69$, average $r = 0.35$) and recoded to fall between 0 (least punitive) and 1 (most punitive).⁸ Finally, to measure demographic change, we calculated Latino growth as the percentage change in the county Latino population from 2000 to 2014.

We measure economic marginality and local economic dislocation each in two ways. Economic marginality is operationalized as family-level retrospective economic evaluation and relative economic deprivation. Retrospective economic evaluations were measured with a question about whether over the previous four years the respondent's household annual income increased or decreased. The responses were recoded to fall between (0) for increased a lot and (1) for decreased a lot. Relative deprivation is a combination of the respondent's self-reported family income and their surrounding economic environment. We code the respondent as economically marginal if their family income is lower (1) or higher (0) than the median income in their county of residence. Economic dislocation is operationalized as change in county level manufacturing and change in county level unemployment. Manufacturing loss is calculated as the percentage change in county manufacturing employment between 2000 to 2014 and change in unemployment as the percentage change in unemployment rate at the county level between 2000 and 2014.⁹

⁸ Full question wording, distributions for key covariates, and scale statistics can be found in Online Appendix D. Readers might be concerned that horse race models pitting the regression coefficient of single items, which are more prone to measurement error, against scales, which are less prone to measurement error (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), is setting us up for an unfair comparison. In Online Appendix E, we run additional models where we disaggregate the scales into single items and find no differences.

⁹ In Online Appendix F, we model results using the same contextual economic measures but change as measured between shorter time spans. Our results are robust to these alternative specifications.

Beyond these key independent variables, we included several control variables in our analyses that may be related to vote switching including change in county foreign-born population, personal income, employment status, self-reported ideology, union membership, gender, geographic region, and in pooled all white respondent models, education.¹⁰

Results

Table 2 and Table 3 present our main logistic regression model results. The models include variables testing for both racial and immigration attitudes and contexts (H1,H2) and economic factors (H4, H5) for all whites (columns 1 through 3), the white working class (columns 4 through 6), and non-working class whites (columns 7 through 9; H3 and H6). We omitted control variables from the table for space concerns but full regression tables are presented in Online Appendix H. Because logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret, we simulate counterfactuals and plot the results for each variable of interest.¹¹

¹⁰ The full model is: $\text{Vote} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{RacialAttitudes} + \beta_2 \text{ImmigrationAttitudes} + \beta_3 \text{HispanicGrowth}(00 - 14) + \beta_4 \text{RetrospectiveEconomics} + \beta_5 \text{RelativeDeprivation} + \beta_6 \text{ManufacturingLoss}(00 - 14) + \beta_7 \text{CountyUnemploymentChange}(00 - 14) + \beta_8 \text{Income} + \beta_9 \text{Unemployed} + \beta_{10} \text{ForeignBornChange}(00 - 14) + \beta_{11} \text{Union} + \beta_{12} \text{Female} + \beta_{13} \text{Ideology} + \beta_{14} \text{South} + \beta_{15} \text{College}$. For each variable we have simply recoded DK and “Refuse” responses as missing, with the exception of ideology where DK respondents were recoded as moderates (Treier and Hillygus 2009). We have also run the core analyses using imputed values via the MICE package in R. The results, which are substantively identical, are reported in Online Appendix G.

¹¹ Model fit statistics are presented in Online Appendix I

Table 2: Trump Vote Shift

Predictors of Shifting to Trump in 2016									
Dependent variable:									
	Trump Switch								
	Dem (All Whites)	Ind (All Whites)	GOP (All Whites)	Dem (WWC)	Ind (WWC)	GOP (WWC)	Dem (Non-WWC)	Ind (Non-WWC)	GOP (Non-WWC)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Racial Attitudes	3.239*** (0.338)	2.559*** (0.238)	1.548*** (0.398)	2.895*** (0.379)	2.216*** (0.279)	1.544** (0.480)	4.595*** (0.756)	3.395*** (0.459)	1.548* (0.736)
Immigration Attitudes	2.024*** (0.211)	1.952*** (0.161)	1.154*** (0.244)	2.017*** (0.236)	1.802*** (0.189)	1.064*** (0.287)	1.951*** (0.476)	2.337*** (0.308)	1.475** (0.477)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	2.015*** (0.279)	0.532** (0.200)	0.822** (0.308)	2.088*** (0.316)	0.700** (0.234)	0.788* (0.363)	1.510* (0.610)	0.081 (0.389)	0.726 (0.604)
Relative Deprivation	-0.176 (0.217)	-0.302 (0.163)	-0.272 (0.259)	-0.120 (0.245)	-0.347 (0.190)	-0.312 (0.301)	-0.309 (0.481)	-0.174 (0.323)	-0.121 (0.525)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	0.023** (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.013)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.004)
Controls?	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Observations	9,389	5,357	915	4,887	2,936	599	4,502	2,421	316
Log Likelihood	-966.969	-1,487.120	-532.005	-746.279	-1,057.267	-381.149	-209.087	-420.517	-147.858
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,965.938	3,006.240	1,096.011	1,522.558	2,144.534	792.297	448.174	871.034	325.716

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are omitted from table for presentation. Full regression tables available in Online Appendix H. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).


Table 3: Clinton Vote Shift

Predictors of Shifting to Clinton in 2016									
Dependent variable:									
	Clinton Switch								
	Dem (All Whites)	Ind (All Whites)	GOP (All Whites)	Dem (WWC)	Ind (WWC)	GOP (WWC)	Dem (Non-WWC)	Ind (Non-WWC)	GOP (Non-WWC)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Racial Attitudes	-1.253* (0.598)	4.208*** (0.420)	-4.153*** (0.546)	-0.758 (0.671)	3.795*** (0.594)	4.288*** (0.773)	-3.262* (1.504)	-4.846*** (0.611)	-3.948*** (0.785)
Immigration Attitudes	-1.240*** (0.357)	1.497*** (0.242)	-2.080*** (0.296)	1.299** (0.408)	1.316*** (0.337)	1.993*** (0.417)	-0.838 (0.858)	-1.719*** (0.356)	-2.207*** (0.427)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	-0.495 (0.485)	-0.790** (0.282)	-1.400*** (0.385)	-0.196 (0.570)	-0.494 (0.420)	-1.057 (0.542)	-1.379 (1.048)	-1.036** (0.384)	-1.838*** (0.556)
Relative Deprivation	-0.003 (0.347)	0.077 (0.222)	0.015 (0.290)	0.117 (0.414)	0.193 (0.330)	0.442 (0.401)	-0.575 (0.730)	-0.038 (0.309)	-0.454 (0.446)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.005 (0.019)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.011)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Controls?	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Observations	584	5,526	7,925	435	3,426	5,238	149	2,100	2,687
Log Likelihood	-287.715	-832.646	-554.341	-207.086	-413.015	-298.933	-73.030	-408.075	-251.312
Akaike Inf. Crit.	607.430	1,697.292	1,140.682	444.172	856.031	627.865	176.061	846.151	532.625

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are omitted from table for presentation. Full regression tables available in Online Appendix H. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

We begin by looking at the role of racial and immigration factors on vote switching for Trump. In Figure 1 we display the effect of moving racial attitudes (min to max), immigration attitudes (min to max), and county level Latino population (mean \pm 2 s.d.) on the probability of vote switching for all white (circles), white working class (triangles), and white non-working class (squares) Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.¹²

Figure 1: Race, Immigration, and Switching to Trump



Note: Points indicate effect of moving each variable from its minimum to maximum value (except Latino growth which was moved from 2 s.d. below to 2 s.d. above its mean so we aren't extrapolating to extreme outliers) while holding all others at their means. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.

First, we show that the associations between each variable and switching for Trump for working class and non-working-class whites are generally not statistically distinguishable, with the

¹² All point estimates in figures estimated from coefficients in Table 2 and Table 3. We split respondents by party because we expect that baseline propensity to switch will vary by partisanship. For instance, it will be easier for a self-identified Republican who voted for Obama in 2012 to “come home” to their party in 2016 than it will be get a Democrat who voted for Obama in 2012 to vote for Trump in 2016.

exception of immigration attitudes among Democrats and Independents. While working class whites were more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016 than non-working-class whites, both working class and non-working-class whites with strong racially conservative or punitive immigration views were more likely to switch than those with racially liberal or pro-immigration views. These relationships are similar across subgroups for all models.


Second, we show that the association between racial and immigration attitudes and switching to Trump is stronger among Independents and Republicans than among Democrats. It is easier for Trump's campaign to "bring home" Republicans or sway Independents than to persuade Democrats to vote across party lines. Nevertheless, we find that moving white Democratic racial conservatism and punitive immigration attitudes from their minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at their means, is associated with a 12.6 (95% CI: [7.4,20.4]) and 3.7 (95% CI: [2.5,5.2]) percentage point increase in the likelihood of switching to Trump in 2016, a relationship that only strengthens in the WWC sample.¹³

Third, we find little support that county level demographic change is associated with vote switching. While the point estimates are positive, they are substantively small and generally statistically indistinguishable from zero. If we simulate the probability of Trump vote switching for the full range of Latino population change (-100% to 1409%), the point estimates increase substantially to 66, 18, and 6 percentage points for, respectively, working class white Democrats,

¹³ Readers might be concerned that these relationships are endogenous and that respondents are simply learning and adopting the racial or immigration views of their candidate of choice. We are skeptical that this is the case, given that group antagonisms are generally crystallized attitudes (Tesler 2015). Nevertheless, we leverage a panel dataset to examine how wave one (measured in 2011) racial and immigration attitudes are correlated with vote switching in 2016. We find similar trends, presented in Online Appendix J, suggesting that racial and immigration attitudes preceded Trump's rise.

Independents, and Republicans, but because we are extrapolating to extreme outliers, these estimates are highly imprecise. These results could be due to the fact that politics is increasingly becoming nationalized, fueled by declining local media (Prior 2007; Martin and McCrain 2018) and decreasing knowledge of and interest in local political events (Hopkins 2018), echoing the sociotropic literature on immigration attitudes which suggests that immigration attitudes are driven more by national than local concerns of the cultural and economic threat posed by immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Figure 2: Race, Immigration, and Switching to Clinton



Note: Points indicate effect of moving each variable from its maximum to minimum value (except Latino growth which was moved from 2 s.d. above its mean to two s.d. below) while holding all others at their means. Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working-class respondents, and squares for non-working class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.

In Figure 2 we display the effect of moving racial attitudes (max to min) and immigration attitudes (max to min) on the probability of switching a vote to Clinton for all white (circles),

white working class (triangles), and white non-working class (squares) Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Note that we invert the direction of the counterfactual scenario to be consistent with our hypotheses. In other words, we can interpret these plots as the increase in the predicted probability of switching for Clinton given a shift from most racially conservative to racially liberal and from the most punitive to the least punitive views on immigration.

We find similar trends in our Clinton models as we did with Trump. The most racially liberal Democrats, Independents, and Republicans were more likely to switch to Clinton in the 2016 election than the most racially conservative. This relationship is stronger among non-working-class whites than among working class whites. The same goes for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans who held the least punitive immigration views.


In sum, we find support for part of hypotheses H1 and H2. Symbolic racial and immigration attitudes were strongly associated with vote switching in the 2016 election. White voters who held punitive immigration or racially conservative views were more likely to switch to Trump in the 2016 election than those with pro-immigration or racially liberal views, who were more likely to switch to Clinton. This suggests that symbolic racial and immigration attitudes played an important role in shuffling some white voters in the 2016 election. We did not uncover strong evidence for the hypothesis that living in counties with the most rapidly changing Latino population was associated with vote switching to Trump. Most of the coefficients were positive and significant but the effects were too small to be substantively meaningful. With respect to H3, we note that the effects of these attitudinal dispositions were slightly more associated with switching to Trump among working class whites and to Clinton among non-working-class whites, though the differences were small and often statistically indistinguishable. While more working-class whites switched to Trump and more non-working-class whites to Clinton, the

association between their symbolic racial and immigration attitudes and vote switching were not substantively different.¹⁴

We turn now to our economic indicators. In Figure 3, we construct a similar plot with four panels for family economic marginality (min to max), relative economic deprivation (min to max), county level manufacturing loss ($\mu + / - 2$ s.d.), and change in county level unemployment ($\mu + / - 2$ s.d.) for the same subgroups.

¹⁴ Readers may be wondering why racially conservative white voters were supporting Obama in 2012 in the first place. We suggest two explanations. First, the 2016 election was far more racialized than the 2008 or 2012 elections, sending a clearer signal of racial positions between the two candidates which might filter down to even the least politically aware citizens. Second, the 2016 election follows a longer trend of racially white conservative Democrats sorting into the Republican Party, a process that was far from complete in 2012 and will likely continue past 2016. We expand on these arguments in Online Appendix K.

Figure 3: Economic Marginality and Switching to Trump



Note: Points indicate effect of moving from minimum to maximum values (retrospective economic evaluations and economic deprivation) or from two s.d. below to above the mean (manufacturing loss and change in unemployment). Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working-class respondents, and squares for non- working-class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.


Across the board, we find weaker relationships between economic indicators and vote switching to Trump than with our race and immigration measures. Hypothesis 4a predicted that white voters experiencing economic marginality—negative economic retrospective evaluations or relative economic deprivation—will be more likely to switch to Trump than those who do not. We find weak support for this argument. In the first panel of Figure 3, we show that those with the strongest decline in family income over the previous year were slightly more likely to switch to Trump than those with improving family incomes. White working-class Democrats and Independents who reported the steepest declines in family income were only about 5.4 (95% CI:

[3.5,8]) and 6.9 (95% CI: [2.3,11.7]) percentage points more likely to switch to Trump. That jumps to an imprecisely estimated 19.4 points (95% CI: [3,35]) for Republicans. We find no relationship between relative economic deprivation and switching to Trump for any subgroup.¹⁵

While individual-level measures of economic marginality are only weakly associated with switching to Trump in 2016, perhaps contextual-level indicators are more robust predictors of vote switching given the Trump campaign's focus on widespread job losses and manufacturing decline in the U.S. Hypothesis 5a posited that white citizens who lived in economically declining counties were more likely to switch to Trump than similarly situated voters whose communities were not undergoing economic decline. As we show in Figure 3, we find no relationship between county-level economic decline and vote switching in 2016.

¹⁵ While the retrospective measure is positively related to vote switching, we also note that evaluations of finances are influenced by a respondent's partisanship and the party that happens to be in power (Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017), though far less so than evaluations of the national economy (Bartels 2002), suggesting that part of the effect found here could be simply reflecting partisanship.

Figure 4: Economic Integration and Switching to Clinton



Note: Points indicate effect of moving from minimum to maximum values (retrospective economic evaluations and economic deprivation) or from two s.d. below to above the mean (manufacturing loss and change in unemployment). Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working-class respondents, and squares for non-working-class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.

Finally, in Figure 4 we display the same results for our Clinton models. Hypothesis 5a posited that positive retrospective evaluations and positive relative family income would be associated with switching to Clinton. Once again, we flipped the direction of the counterfactual simulation to be consistent with our hypotheses. We find no substantively and statistically significant relationship between economic marginality or local economic dislocation and vote switching for Clinton. Similarly null results emerge for tests of local economic dislocation and vote switching for Clinton.¹⁶

In sum, our analyses yield two core findings that both run counter to dominant media narrative on the 2016 election. First, we find a much stronger association between symbolic racial and immigration attitudes and switching for Trump and Clinton than between economic marginality or local economic dislocation and vote switching. In fact, we find marginally small or no associations between any of our economic indicators and vote switching in either direction. Second, while significantly more working-class whites switched votes to Trump in 2016 than non-working-class whites, lending some credence to election reporting, we find little evidence that working-class whites were significantly more motivated by racial and immigration attitudes to switch than non-working-class whites.

¹⁶ In the Online Appendixes L and M, we run two additional analyses assessing mobilization/demobilization between 2012 and 2016 and assessing whether effects are amplified in swing states versus non-swing states. We find that relationships between our key IVs and outcomes look similar for mobilization (examining those who did not vote in 2012) but much weaker for demobilization. We find no strong differences between swing and non-swing state residents.

Discussion and Conclusion

The 2016 election was unique both for the unorthodox candidacy of Donald Trump and for featuring the first female nominee of the two major parties. Trump surprised the world by pulling off an upset victory, with unexpected wins in a number of “blue firewall” states. Subsequent media analyses of the election highlighted the role of both economic anxiety and racial and ethnic attitudes among the white working class in driving this outcome. In this investigation, we sought to understand whether immigration or economics played a bigger role in this process, whether this vote switching was isolated among the working class, and whether voters were switching away from the Republican Party and towards Clinton as well.

Throughout this paper we presented evidence that Trump and Clinton’s candidacies and campaign messages did likely have an effect on voting trends. White voters with racially conservative or anti-immigrant attitudes switched votes to Trump at a higher rate than those with more liberal views on these issues. At the same time, white voters who had liberal views on race and immigration moved towards Clinton. Congruent with media coverage, vote switching to Trump was, in raw numbers, far more prevalent among the working class than non-working class, though the relationship between attitudes and switching did not vary significantly by class. The inverse was true for Clinton. We find little evidence that economic dislocation and marginality were significantly related to vote switching in 2016.

While this, by itself, is not evidence of partisan realignment, history suggests that significant changes in voting across party lines, particularly for the presidency, precede changes in party identities, the basis for realignments. This sequence of events played out during the Southern realignment (i.e., Democrats voting for GOP presidential candidates but maintaining their party attachment) and here we provide evidence that it may be happening again after two terms with a

black president and during an era of mass demographic change due to immigration. Racial conservatives and those with the most punitive immigration views are moving right and were the most likely to switch to Trump in 2016. Our data suggest the same is happening in the opposite direction as those with racially liberal or pro-immigration views may be sorting into the Democratic Party.

Our findings also speak to how elites are responding to changing demographics and racial realities. As communities around the country diversify, immigration and race are increasingly dominating campaign messaging. Many white voters feel left behind as the Democratic Party becomes the party of highly educated whites and a consortium of minority groups. The Republican Party, historically the party of the wealthy and of business interests, has not offered many of these white voters a home either. But after eight years of the nation's first black president, Trump, the candidate who spurned the GOP establishment and played so well to a sense of resentment over a changing country, reached out and signaled that he would, in so many words, make the country white and working class again.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are freely available at *Public Opinion Quarterly* online.

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Appendix A: Alternate Working-Class Operationalization

Table A.1: Working Class as Lower Income

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote Switch Trump			Vote Switch Clinton		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	2.935*** (0.510)	2.013*** (0.389)	0.913 (0.710)	-0.610 (1.039)	-3.024*** (0.724)	-5.057*** (1.225)
Immigration Attitudes	1.800*** (0.315)	1.875*** (0.258)	1.653*** (0.420)	-2.119*** (0.636)	-1.622*** (0.427)	-1.930** (0.656)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.0003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.005)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.835*** (0.421)	0.717* (0.317)	0.893 (0.540)	0.796 (0.881)	-0.456 (0.499)	-2.108* (0.827)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	0.013 (0.010)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.010)	0.002 (0.014)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Family Income (low-high)	0.106 (0.106)	0.139 (0.083)	-0.091 (0.136)	-0.043 (0.203)	0.034 (0.127)	0.256 (0.213)
Unemployed	-0.345 (0.433)	0.077 (0.321)	0.331 (0.509)	0.650 (0.971)	-0.102 (0.470)	0.534 (0.776)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.005)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.023 (0.149)	0.220 (0.129)	-0.506* (0.229)	-0.229 (0.314)	-0.097 (0.215)	-0.089 (0.313)
Female	-0.151 (0.204)	0.218 (0.160)	-0.054 (0.291)	0.274 (0.403)	0.772** (0.275)	0.388 (0.437)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.573*** (0.118)	0.517*** (0.106)	0.401* (0.183)	-0.487* (0.239)	-0.652*** (0.154)	-1.088*** (0.250)
South	0.111 (0.247)	0.498** (0.180)	0.044 (0.318)	0.060 (0.439)	0.303 (0.282)	-0.659 (0.499)
College	-0.526 (0.340)	-0.494* (0.213)	-0.535 (0.388)	0.860 (0.477)	0.319 (0.282)	-0.281 (0.536)
Constant	-7.258*** (0.670)	-6.408*** (0.565)	-2.302* (1.028)	1.094 (1.172)	0.684 (0.768)	3.254* (1.418)
Observations	2,663	1,706	294	211	1,556	2,120
Log Likelihood	-405.922	-553.991	-178.879	-100.324	-246.923	-123.452
Akaike Inf. Crit.	841.843	1,137.981	387.758	230.649	523.847	276.905

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Working class in these models is specified as being in the lower tercile of the 2016 CCES income distribution. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix B: Bias in 2012 Vote Recall

Previous research has argued that poor recall, social desirability, and lying may bias such self-reports of past voting (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000; Krosnick 1991). If this is the case in the CCES, it could be artificially inflating the number of Obama to Trump vote switchers. Further, if racially conservative white Trump voters were concerned about being labeled racist for their support of Trump, they might say they voted for Obama in 2012 as an act of what Effron et al. (2009) call "moral credentialing," an alternative explanation for this study's core findings. In this section, however, we argue that poor recall is actually a smaller problem than past research suggests and does not threaten analyses that rely on past vote recall.

Studies have suggested that vote recall is biased towards the winner of an election (Wright 1993). This research finds, though, that misreporting in *presidential elections* is actually quite small, somewhere between 1% (Rivers and Lauderdale 2016) and 1.5% (Wright 1993), and that it is a product of memory, not intention to mislead interviewers (Wright 1993). Higher rates of winner bias in self-reported votes generally emerge in recalled House, Senate, and Gubernatorial votes (Carsey and Jackson 2001).

Other research finds that biased recall doesn't tend to move in favor of the winning candidate but in the direction of making the previous vote consistent with the vote the respondent most recently cast (Benewick et al. 1969; Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978) leading to an overestimate of stability in voting, not towards the winner of the previous election. This effect, some argue (Van Elsas et al. 2014), is due to the desire to reduce cognitive inconsistencies and strengthens as time passes between actual vote and recall. If this bias is present in our data, it would actually reduce rates of switching, not inflate it.

Finally, a recent study commissioned by Doug Rivers and Ben Lauderdale (2016) at YouGov finds little cause for concern about poor recall of past presidential voting. In 2016, the researchers selected 1,597 YouGov panelists who had been interviewed immediately after the 2012 election, matched them to voter files, and re-contacted them to ask who they had voted for in 2012. They found extremely high levels of correct recall between 2012 and 2016. About 95% of respondents gave the same answer both times and there was little asymmetry in who they recalled voting for, leading to about a 1% overstatement in vote for Obama.

Given these findings, we are less concerned about bias towards the winner in recall of past vote that might be producing the results we find in our study. Nevertheless, we wanted to further investigate the possibility that White voters who supported Trump but who wanted to avoid appearing racist on the survey might have lied about voting for Obama in 2012 as an act of "moral licensing" (Effron, Cameron, and Monin 2009). We first argue that the order of the questions in the CCES reduce the likelihood of social desirability in lying about voting for Barack Obama in 2012. Second, we use the 2008-2009 ANES panel survey to assess the number of racially conservative voters who say they were supporting McCain in October of 2008 but report voting for Obama just after the election in November. We estimate that about 1.25% of racially resentful Whites did so, a number just slightly higher than but not statistically distinguishable from all White voters (1%) or racially liberal voters (0.66%), and in line with previous estimates of vote lying.

First, we argue that several components of the design of the CCES survey will minimize social desirability and thus lying about 2012 vote choice. Researchers have shown social desirability to

be minimized in a web-based research setting, as opposed to in-person or phone-based, both of which feature live interviewers asking the questions (Krysan 1998; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). The CCES is completed by respondents on their own computers, is completely anonymous, and can be completed in as private a location as the respondent chooses. Second, respondents might be more likely to lie about their 2012 vote choice if the question was asked close to or immediately after respondents were asked their 2016 vote choice. This is not the case. In the CCES, respondents were asked about their 2012 vote early in the survey and in the middle of a number of questions about political knowledge and general approval of different institutional bodies (congress, parties, etc.), before Trump was even mentioned in the survey, reducing the priming effect that might have accompanied questions about Donald Trump.

Second, we analyzed existing panel data with questions on candidate support before an election and vote choice after an election to try and get a sense of what proportion of white voters might lie about voting for Obama and whether certain subsamples of White voters are more likely to lie about their votes. Given the secret ballot in the US, we cannot, of course, know whether respondents are truly lying. And indeed there are some voters who might switch their votes at the last minute (Hopkins 2016). This analysis, however, will give us an upper bound estimate of how many White voters might lie about voting for Obama.

To do this, we collected and analyzed the 2008-2009 ANES panel dataset which includes a candidate support question asked in the October 2008 wave and retrospective vote reported in the November 2008 wave. Using this dataset, we can look at how many racially resentful White voters indicated support for McCain one month or less before the election and then reported voting for Obama almost immediately after the election occurred, a group that is likely to contain both liars and actual last-minute vote switchers. We can then conduct several subgroup analyses to see if this lying is more pronounced among those with above-median levels of racial resentment.

We present the weighted proportion of all whites, all whites with or without a college education, and whites who fall above or below the median racial resentment score in Table [vote_lie] below. Assuming every respondent here actually voted McCain in 2008 and lied about it, we estimate a ceiling of less than 1% for all whites and 1.28% for white respondents high in racial resentment and 0.66% for those low in racial resentment, a statistically indistinguishable difference ($p = 0.19$). In sum, there may be a very small bias in favor of reporting a vote for Obama in 2012, but the size of the bias is small enough to not elicit concerns about the manuscript's core analyses and does not appear to be significantly more pronounced among those high in racial resentment than those low in racial resentment.

Table B.1: Assessing Potential Lying in 2008 Vote Recall

Subgroup	ANES 08-09
All Whites	0.83%
College Whites	0.94%
WWC	0.78%
Low Racial Resentment Whites	0.66%
High Racial Resentment Whites	1.28%

Note: weighted percent who indicated support for McCain in October wave and a vote for Obama in November wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey.

Appendix C: Pooled Regression Models

Table C.1: Pooling Across Partisans

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trump All (1)	Trump WWC (2)	Trump Non-WWC (3)	Clinton All (4)	Clinton WWC (5)	Clinton Non-WWC (6)
Racial Attitudes	2.556*** (0.171)	2.306*** (0.198)	3.241*** (0.342)	-2.846*** (0.116)	-2.501*** (0.151)	-3.305*** (0.184)
Immigration Attitudes	1.921*** (0.110)	1.821*** (0.127)	2.201*** (0.224)	-1.062*** (0.067)	-1.084*** (0.086)	-1.040*** (0.106)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.042*** (0.142)	1.175*** (0.164)	0.611* (0.283)	-0.163* (0.080)	-0.477*** (0.109)	0.162 (0.118)
Relative Deprivation	-0.270* (0.114)	-0.284* (0.130)	-0.215 (0.232)	-0.211*** (0.060)	-0.193* (0.084)	-0.247** (0.086)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.002 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.010 (0.005)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.008** (0.002)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.036 (0.039)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.031* (0.014)	-0.044** (0.015)
Unemployed	-0.034 (0.171)	0.040 (0.183)	-0.394 (0.482)	-0.209* (0.106)	-0.335* (0.135)	0.034 (0.180)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
Union (no, was, is)	0.053 (0.046)	0.0003 (0.054)	0.204* (0.089)	0.058* (0.024)	0.114*** (0.034)	-0.012 (0.034)
Female	0.252*** (0.069)	0.221** (0.080)	0.302* (0.140)	0.025 (0.036)	0.017 (0.050)	0.028 (0.053)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.614*** (0.044)	0.617*** (0.051)	0.581*** (0.087)	-0.126*** (0.023)	-0.129*** (0.031)	-0.120*** (0.034)
South	0.096 (0.083)	0.140 (0.096)	-0.050 (0.169)	0.004 (0.045)	-0.038 (0.063)	0.077 (0.066)
Partisanship (R)	0.375*** (0.037)	0.368*** (0.042)	0.386*** (0.080)	-0.402*** (0.019)	-0.504*** (0.027)	-0.291*** (0.028)
College	-0.634*** (0.083)			-0.058 (0.040)		
Constant	-6.964*** (0.278)	-6.825*** (0.321)	-7.832*** (0.565)	2.330*** (0.136)	2.506*** (0.187)	2.166*** (0.198)
Observations	15,661	8,422	7,239	15,661	8,422	7,239
Log Likelihood	-3,147.305	-2,314.319	-821.592	-9,307.065	-4,930.421	-4,333.113
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,328.609	4,660.639	1,675.185	18,648.130	9,892.843	8,698.225

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).


Appendix D: Question Wording, Variable Coding, Key Variable Distributions, and Detailed Survey Information

Racial Attitudes

The racial attitudes scale was constructed of three items in the CCES, listed below, ($\alpha=0.68$). These items have an average inter-item correlation of 0.42 and all load highly together on a single factor (Q1: 0.61, Q2: 0.72, Q3: 0.62).

- “I am angry that racism exists” (5=strongly disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=somewhat agree, 1=strongly agree)
- “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin” (5=strongly disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=somewhat agree, 1=strongly agree)
- “Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.” (1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=somewhat agree, 5=strongly agree)

Figure D.1: Distribution of Racial Attitudes Scale




Immigration Attitudes

The immigration attitudes scale was constructed of four items in the CCES, listed below ($\alpha=0.69$). The items have an average inter-item correlation of 0.35 and all load together on a single factor (Q1: 0.73, Q2: 0.66, Q3: 0.48, Q4: 0.53). Respondents were asked "What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply."

- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. (0=selected, 1=not selected)
- Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. (0=not selected, 1=selected)
- Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school (0=selected, 1=not selected)
- Identify and deport illegal immigrants (0=not selected, 1=selected)

Figure D.2: Distribution of Immigration Attitudes Scale



Distribution of immigration attitude scale

While our Cronbach's alpha for both scales falls slightly below the frequently cited 0.70 minimum for non-applied settings (Nunnally 1978; Hair et al. 2010), we follow Cho and Kim (2015) in suggesting that arbitrary cut offs for acceptable criteria are not advised and instead focus on a range of criteria including average inter-item correlation and single-factor loading. We find that our two scales are measuring a single underlying latent variable with moderate levels of internal consistency.

Figure D.3: Growth of County Latino Population




Figure D.4: Retrospective Economic Evaluations

- “Over the past FOUR YEARS, has your household’s annual income increased a lot (1), increased somewhat (2), stayed about the same (3), decreased somewhat (4), or decreased a lot (5)?”




Figure D.5: Distribution of relative Economic Deprivation




Figure D.6: Distribution of % Change in Manufacturing





Figure D.7: Distribution of % Change In Unemployment



Control variables:

- Which of the following best describes your current employment status? 1=unemployed, 0=else
- Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 1=Less than \$10,000; 2= \$10,000 - \$19,999; 3=\$20,000 - \$29,999; 4=\$30,000 - \$39,999; 5= \$40,000 - \$49,999; 6=\$50,000 - \$59,999; 7= \$60,000 - \$69,999; 8=\$70,000 - \$79,999; 9=\$80,000 - \$99,999; 10= \$100,000 - \$119,999; 11=\$120,000 - \$149,999; 12= \$150,000 or more.
- Are you a member of a labor union? Other than yourself, is any member of your household a union member? 1 = Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union; Yes, a member of my household is currently a union member; 2 = I formerly was a member of a labor union; A member of my household was formerly a member of a labor union, but is not now 3 = I am not now, nor have I been, a member of a labor union; No, no one in my household has ever been a member of a labor union
- Are you male or female? 1 = female, 0 = male
- In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very liberal (1); Liberal (2); Moderate / Not sure (3); Conservative (4); Very conservative (5)

Appendix E: Disaggregating Scales

There has long been debates over the true stability of public opinion (Zaller 1992), suggesting that responses to single survey items may be plagued by measurement error due to inattentiveness, vague response categories, and confusing question wording among others. One way to reduce measurement error is to use multiple measures and average across the responses (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), which is what we do for the immigration attitudes and racial attitudes questions from our survey.

We don't suspect, however, that this is cause for concern with our economic measures. First, concern about attitude stability and measurement error typically focus on questions about policy attitudes (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), which can be confusing to respondents or for which individuals may simply have no views (Zaller 1992). Of our four economic indicators, only one question is actually asking respondents to give us their subjective opinion on their economic standing (retrospective measure) and the other three are constructed from their response to their income question (relative deprivation) or from county level measures (change in unemployment and change in manufacturing). Further, asking respondents whether they and their families are better off today than they were a year before is far less prone to measurement error than other economic perception questions (Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017). Nevertheless, we attempt to level the playing field and disaggregate our racial attitude and immigration attitude scales into single issue items in our models, which we display in Table E.1. We find that some of the individual items do indeed have stronger associations than others, but that the substantive story is the same.

Table E.1: Disaggregating Scales

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote Switch Trump			Vote Switch Clinton		
	Dem (1)	Ind (2)	Rep (3)	Dem (4)	Ind (5)	Rep (6)
Not Angry Racism Exists	0.295*** (0.073)	0.103* (0.052)	0.065 (0.086)	-0.053 (0.133)	-0.300** (0.096)	-0.100 (0.112)
Whites Don't Have Advantages	0.385*** (0.054)	0.446*** (0.042)	0.237*** (0.063)	0.042 (0.096)	-0.428*** (0.068)	-0.456*** (0.082)
Racial Problems are Rare	0.112 (0.059)	0.054 (0.045)	0.048 (0.069)	-0.342** (0.113)	-0.294*** (0.073)	-0.400*** (0.093)
Deport Undocumented	0.750*** (0.157)	0.729*** (0.114)	0.548** (0.174)	-0.188 (0.272)	-0.376* (0.180)	-0.226 (0.204)
Don't Grant Legal Status	0.123 (0.152)	0.0004 (0.113)	0.032 (0.176)	-0.456 (0.248)	-0.262 (0.166)	-0.424* (0.208)
Increase Border Patrol	0.466*** (0.141)	0.718*** (0.107)	0.154 (0.165)	-0.020 (0.248)	-0.421** (0.155)	-0.810*** (0.185)
No Dream Act	0.670*** (0.156)	0.467*** (0.112)	0.377* (0.177)	-0.668** (0.234)	-0.404** (0.155)	-0.711*** (0.194)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.871*** (0.283)	0.440* (0.202)	0.699* (0.315)	-0.582 (0.500)	-0.751** (0.283)	-1.343*** (0.387)
Relative Deprivation	-0.140 (0.218)	-0.330* (0.166)	-0.281 (0.261)	0.043 (0.354)	0.065 (0.222)	0.021 (0.292)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003	0.002*	0.004*	0.003	0.003	0.005**

	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.001 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.052 (0.044)	-0.0002 (0.060)	-0.004 (0.038)	0.045 (0.050)
Unemployed	0.092 (0.319)	-0.204 (0.261)	0.457 (0.395)	0.066 (0.635)	-0.298 (0.370)	0.145 (0.553)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.110 (0.085)	0.126 (0.069)	-0.135 (0.105)	-0.110 (0.152)	-0.057 (0.101)	-0.372* (0.148)
Female	-0.169 (0.135)	0.243* (0.100)	0.252 (0.159)	0.344 (0.241)	0.634*** (0.140)	0.380* (0.193)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.537*** (0.082)	0.455*** (0.069)	0.312** (0.096)	-0.305* (0.131)	-0.418*** (0.089)	-1.036*** (0.125)
South	0.100 (0.169)	0.175 (0.119)	-0.169 (0.182)	0.049 (0.262)	0.173 (0.160)	-0.489* (0.220)
College	-0.510** (0.177)	-0.441*** (0.116)	-0.690*** (0.184)	0.183 (0.272)	0.318* (0.147)	0.350 (0.197)
Constant	-8.210*** (0.532)	-5.985*** (0.403)	-2.991*** (0.679)	0.858 (0.793)	1.610** (0.523)	4.203*** (0.814)
Observations	9,389	5,357	915	584	5,526	7,925
Log Likelihood	-957.748	-1,452.551	-528.143	-282.227	-831.426	-549.018
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,957.495	2,947.102	1,098.285	606.453	1,704.851	1,140.035

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix F: Different Time Spans

Table F.1: Differing Time Spans for Change Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote Switch Trump			Vote Switch Clinton		
	00-14 (1)	10-14 (2)	14-16 (3)	00-14 (4)	10-14 (5)	14-16 (6)
Racial Attitudes	2.737*** (0.170)	2.756*** (0.170)	2.743*** (0.169)	-3.404*** (0.282)	-3.391*** (0.282)	-3.396*** (0.282)
Immigration Attitudes	1.930*** (0.110)	1.926*** (0.110)	1.927*** (0.110)	-1.625*** (0.162)	-1.614*** (0.162)	-1.610*** (0.162)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.168*** (0.141)	1.179*** (0.141)	1.170*** (0.140)	-0.910*** (0.200)	-0.902*** (0.200)	-0.878*** (0.200)
Relative Deprivation	-0.250* (0.113)	-0.232* (0.113)	-0.235* (0.113)	0.053 (0.155)	0.085 (0.154)	0.067 (0.155)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.003 (0.003)			-0.002 (0.004)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001 (0.001)			0.003* (0.001)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (10-14)		-0.002 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.005)	
Pct. Unemployment Diff (10-14)		-0.005* (0.002)			0.002 (0.003)	
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (14-16)			0.001 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.005)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (14-16)			-0.001 (0.004)			-0.015** (0.006)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)	0.002 (0.026)
Unemployed	-0.026 (0.170)	-0.025 (0.170)	-0.027 (0.170)	-0.142 (0.274)	-0.143 (0.274)	-0.133 (0.275)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Union (no, was, is)	0.021 (0.046)	0.020 (0.046)	0.023 (0.046)	-0.106 (0.071)	-0.106 (0.071)	-0.105 (0.071)
Female	0.190** (0.068)	0.185** (0.069)	0.188** (0.068)	0.591*** (0.100)	0.589*** (0.100)	0.594*** (0.100)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.652*** (0.043)	0.646*** (0.043)	0.649*** (0.043)	-0.704*** (0.057)	-0.698*** (0.057)	-0.706*** (0.057)
South	0.112 (0.082)	0.148 (0.080)	0.130 (0.080)	-0.084 (0.113)	-0.045 (0.111)	-0.034 (0.111)
College	-0.591*** (0.083)	-0.595*** (0.083)	-0.597*** (0.083)	0.253* (0.103)	0.238* (0.103)	0.246* (0.103)
Constant	-6.434*** (0.268)	-6.381*** (0.261)	-6.477*** (0.270)	1.437*** (0.356)	1.529*** (0.345)	1.298*** (0.360)
Observations	15,665	15,663	15,665	14,037	14,037	14,037
Log Likelihood	-3,199.565	-3,198.076	-3,201.251	-1,791.560	-1,795.121	-1,791.980
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,431.130	6,428.153	6,434.503	3,615.120	3,622.242	3,615.960

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix G: Multiple Imputation

Table G.1: Core Model Results with Imputed Missing Values

	Dem	Trump Ind	Rep	Dem	Clinton Ind	Rep
Racial Attitudes	1.389** (0.477)	0.817*** (0.138)	0.561*** (0.123)	-2.235*** (0.145)	-3.349*** (0.188)	-3.216*** (0.569)
Immigration Attitudes	0.307 (0.309)	1.155*** (0.096)	0.536*** (0.081)	-1.038*** (0.080)	-1.068*** (0.107)	-1.352*** (0.308)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.196** (0.413)	0.676*** (0.116)	0.673*** (0.096)	0.437*** (0.097)	-0.378** (0.125)	-0.233 (0.396)
Relative Deprivation	-0.364 (0.318)	-0.216* (0.093)	-0.262*** (0.073)	-0.250*** (0.070)	-0.167 (0.108)	-0.484 (0.337)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.020** (0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0005)	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.056 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.030* (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.059)
Unemployed	-0.133 (0.498)	-0.535*** (0.135)	-0.228 (0.126)	-0.159 (0.124)	-0.262 (0.163)	-0.605 (0.758)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.00002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.00004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Union (no, was, is)	0.221 (0.124)	0.125** (0.040)	0.117*** (0.033)	0.043 (0.027)	0.023 (0.040)	0.115 (0.121)
Female	-0.057 (0.193)	0.007 (0.055)	0.129** (0.045)	0.306*** (0.043)	0.046 (0.058)	0.279 (0.195)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.490*** (0.120)	0.485*** (0.037)	0.306*** (0.032)	-0.170*** (0.026)	-0.024 (0.038)	-0.265* (0.114)
South	-0.070 (0.229)	0.216*** (0.062)	0.017 (0.051)	-0.001 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.073)	-0.115 (0.230)
College	-0.267 (0.252)	-0.368*** (0.059)	-0.452*** (0.049)	-0.162*** (0.047)	0.105 (0.064)	-0.034 (0.222)
Constant	-3.678*** (0.734)	-3.319*** (0.234)	-1.458*** (0.206)	1.552*** (0.157)	0.701** (0.233)	1.025 (0.766)
Observations	11,400	6,636	1,248	687	6,998	9,802

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix H: Full Regression Tables Core Models

Table H.1: Predictors of Shifting to Trump in 2016

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Trump Switch								
	Dem (All Whites)	Ind (All Whites)	GOP All Whites)	Dem (WWC)	Ind (WWC)	GOP (WWC)	Dem (Non-WWC)	Ind (Non-WWC)	GOP (Non-WWC)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Racial Attitudes	3.239*** (0.338)	2.559*** (0.238)	1.548*** (0.398)	2.895*** (0.379)	2.216*** (0.279)	1.544** (0.480)	4.595*** (0.756)	3.395*** (0.459)	1.548* (0.736)
Immigration Attitudes	2.024*** (0.211)	1.952*** (0.161)	1.154*** (0.244)	2.017*** (0.236)	1.802*** (0.189)	1.064*** (0.287)	1.951*** (0.476)	2.337*** (0.308)	1.475** (0.477)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	2.015*** (0.279)	0.532** (0.200)	0.822** (0.308)	2.088*** (0.316)	0.700** (0.234)	0.788* (0.363)	1.510* (0.610)	0.081 (0.389)	0.726 (0.604)
Relative Deprivation	-0.176 (0.217)	-0.302 (0.163)	-0.272 (0.259)	-0.120 (0.245)	-0.347 (0.190)	-0.312 (0.301)	-0.309 (0.481)	-0.174 (0.323)	-0.121 (0.525)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	0.023** (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.013)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.004)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.053 (0.044)	0.012 (0.043)	-0.039 (0.033)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.053)	-0.064 (0.084)
Unemployed	0.008 (0.322)	-0.286 (0.258)	0.367 (0.391)	0.092 (0.339)	-0.177 (0.279)	0.286 (0.413)	-0.510 (1.079)	-0.629 (0.669)	1.100 (1.148)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.00001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	0.103 (0.084)	0.137* (0.068)	-0.126 (0.104)	0.020 (0.096)	0.100 (0.081)	-0.132 (0.126)	0.414* (0.178)	0.267* (0.128)	-0.137 (0.195)
Female	-0.116 (0.133)	0.305** (0.098)	0.289 (0.156)	-0.170 (0.148)	0.330** (0.115)	0.136 (0.185)	-0.055 (0.308)	0.172 (0.192)	0.600* (0.303)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.543*** (0.080)	0.458*** (0.068)	0.315*** (0.095)	0.548*** (0.091)	0.493*** (0.080)	0.306** (0.112)	0.542** (0.179)	0.344** (0.130)	0.276 (0.190)
South	0.103 (0.168)	0.209 (0.117)	-0.138 (0.180)	0.116 (0.187)	0.259 (0.139)	-0.081 (0.211)	-0.036 (0.405)	0.080 (0.224)	-0.217 (0.359)
College	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	7.405*** (0.510)	5.341*** (0.390)	2.681*** (0.646)	7.465*** (0.581)	5.174*** (0.456)	-2.377** (0.756)	-7.631*** (1.081)	6.268*** (0.776)	-3.841** (1.319)
Observations	9,389	5,357	915	4,887	2,936	599	4,502	2,421	316
Log Likelihood	-966.969	-1,487.120	-532.005	-746.279	-1,057.267	-381.149	-209.087	-420.517	-147.858
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,965.938	3,006.240	1,096.011	1,522.558	2,144.534	792.297	448.174	871.034	325.716

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Table H.2 Predictors of Shifting to Clinton in 2016


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Clinton Switch								
	Dem (All Whites) (1)	Ind (All Whites) (2)	GOP (All Whites) (3)	Dem (WWC) (4)	Ind (WWC) (5)	GOP (WWC) (6)	Dem (Non-WWC) (7)	Ind (Non-WWC) (8)	GOP (Non-WWC) (9)
Racial Attitudes	-1.253* (0.598)	4.208*** (0.420)	4.153*** (0.546)	-0.758 (0.671)	3.795*** (0.594)	4.288*** (0.773)	-3.262* (1.504)	4.846*** (0.611)	-3.948*** (0.785)
Immigration Attitudes	1.240*** (0.357)	1.497*** (0.242)	2.080*** (0.296)	1.299** (0.408)	1.316*** (0.337)	1.993*** (0.417)	-0.838 (0.858)	1.719*** (0.356)	-2.207*** (0.427)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	-0.495 (0.485)	-0.790** (0.282)	1.400*** (0.385)	-0.196 (0.570)	-0.494 (0.420)	-1.057 (0.542)	-1.379 (1.048)	-1.036** (0.384)	-1.838*** (0.556)
Relative Deprivation	-0.003 (0.347)	0.077 (0.222)	0.015 (0.290)	0.117 (0.414)	0.193 (0.330)	0.442 (0.401)	-0.575 (0.730)	-0.038 (0.309)	-0.454 (0.446)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.005 (0.019)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.011)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.011 (0.060)	-0.003 (0.037)	0.042 (0.050)	0.038 (0.073)	-0.004 (0.056)	0.067 (0.067)	-0.154 (0.117)	0.003 (0.052)	0.016 (0.076)
Unemployed	0.147 (0.622)	-0.288 (0.370)	0.152 (0.549)	-0.142 (0.824)	-1.305* (0.642)	-0.047 (0.742)	1.606 (1.290)	0.638 (0.487)	0.354 (0.853)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.091 (0.149)	-0.062 (0.101)	-0.366* (0.147)	-0.031 (0.176)	-0.134 (0.155)	-0.284 (0.205)	-0.153 (0.311)	0.009 (0.135)	-0.445* (0.215)
Female	0.345 (0.232)	0.612*** (0.139)	0.346 (0.191)	0.335 (0.284)	0.803*** (0.211)	0.462 (0.285)	0.737 (0.463)	0.423* (0.189)	0.277 (0.263)
Ideology (lib-consv)	-0.255* (0.128)	0.423*** (0.088)	1.037*** (0.124)	-0.140 (0.156)	0.714*** (0.131)	1.057*** (0.162)	-0.470 (0.261)	-0.148 (0.123)	-1.010*** (0.195)
South	0.079 (0.259)	0.179 (0.160)	-0.485* (0.220)	0.028 (0.306)	0.361 (0.234)	-0.384 (0.293)	-0.163 (0.603)	-0.039 (0.225)	-0.597 (0.335)
College	0.178 (0.267)	0.348* (0.146)	0.396* (0.193)						
Constant	0.384 (0.757)	0.609 (0.511)	3.088*** (0.777)	-0.769 (0.920)	1.091 (0.752)	2.465* (1.027)	3.438* (1.548)	0.377 (0.707)	3.866** (1.233)
Observations	584	5,526	7,925	435	3,426	5,238	149	2,100	2,687
Log Likelihood	-287.715	-832.646	-554.341	-207.086	-413.015	-298.933	-73.030	-408.075	-251.312
Akaike Inf. Crit.	607.430	1,697.292	1,140.682	444.172	856.031	627.865	176.061	846.151	532.625

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix I: Model Fit

Given that “vote switchers” represent a low percentage of the overall electorate, we calculated a number of fit statistics to determine how well our models were performing. Because we want to avoid selecting arbitrary thresholds to classify predicted probabilities as successes and failures, we instead follow Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks (2011) and produce both ROC plots (Robin et al. 2011), AUC scores, and separation plots. The ROC plot and AUC score gives us a general overview of model fit while the separation plot provides a nice visual representation where each line represents the predicted probability of a success. We find that our model does a very good job predicting Trump vote switching among Democrats and Independents, and Clinton vote switching among Republicans and Independents. It has a harder time predicting Republican Obama to Trump switchers and Democratic Romney to Clinton switchers, the two categories with the smallest numbers in our data. Nevertheless, the AUC numbers generated from the ROC plots indicate a decent fit for all of the models. We display the results in Figure I.1.

Figure I.1: Assessing Model Fit



Note: ROC curves (Robin et al., 2011) and separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks, 2011) for Trump and Clinton vote switching models. In Panel A we display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan split-sample models of Trump switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.88, Democrat 0.90, Independent 0.96, Republican 0.73) and their corresponding separation plots in Panel B. In panel C we display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan split-sample models of Clinton switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.87, Democrat 0.73, Independent 0.88, Republican 0.87) and their corresponding separation plots in Panel D.

Appendix J: Panel Data

Learning or Priming?

Recent research in political science has shown that, rather than holding policy attitudes that inform their candidate choices, most voters simply adopt the policy views of the leaders they support (Lenz 2012). This may lead some readers to worry that voters in our data switched their support to Trump for reasons not captured by our independent variables, and then simply adopted his anti-immigrant views. We are skeptical that this is the case with immigration attitudes, which like racial attitudes are likely to be sufficiently crystallized, salient and durable as to constitute a predisposition largely immune to change (Tesler 2015). Nevertheless, the possibility of reverse causality between immigration attitudes and vote-switching exists and requires an approach different from ours to rule out.

To address this, we leveraged a multi-wave study, the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group VOTER Survey (<https://www.voterstudygroup.org/about>), and tested the extent to which immigration attitudes as measured in 2011, long before Trump's rise to prominence, predicted a vote-switch to Trump in November of 2016.¹⁷ The panel nature of the VOTER Survey allows us to test whether pre-existing immigration attitudes are related to switching to Trump, before respondents had been exposed to Trump's racially conservative or anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric. If respondents' pre-existing immigration attitudes, free of exposure to leaders' policy positions, are related to vote-switching, we will be less worried about a reverse causal process.

The VOTER Survey worked with YouGov to poll adults whom had participated in political surveys in 2011, 2012, and 2016. In total, 8,000 adults (age 18 or older) with internet access took the 2016 survey between November 29 and December 29, 2016 (margin of error +/- 2.2%). Respondents had been interviewed in December of 2011 and a second time in 2012 as part of the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) survey. The sampling strategy is the same as that for the CCES, as reported in the body of this manuscript.¹⁸

All variables in the VOTER Survey have been coded the same way as variables in the CCES with minor changes. First, racial attitudes were measured using the classic 4-item racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996) that has been rescaled to range between 0 (racially liberal) to 1 (racially conservative). Immigration attitudes were measured using a 3-question battery of immigration policy attitudes, which are detailed below. The economic measures were identical to those used with the CCES.

Because the VOTER Survey contains a much smaller sample size than the CCES, we have far less statistical power and therefore have to pool the data rather than estimate models for each partisan group. Despite this limitation, the pattern of results, presented in Table [panel], is essentially identical to those reported previously. We find that white citizens with racially conservative or conservative immigration views (as measured before Trump's rise) were

¹⁷ We again defined our dependent variable as switching from voting for someone other than Romney in 2012, to voting for Trump in 2016 and voting for someone other than Obama in 2012 and voting for Clinton 2016.

¹⁸ More information can be found at <https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/methodology>

significantly more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016, compared to those with racially conservative views or positive attitudes towards immigrants. Similar effects also hold for the Clinton models. Racially liberal whites and whites with more expansionary views on immigration were more likely to switch to Clinton compared to their racially conservative or anti-immigrant counterparts. Similar effect sizes emerge for the retrospective economic measure as well as the three contextual economic measures for both Trump and Clinton models. These results help assuage our concerns about the potential endogeneity of racial and immigration attitudes.

Racial Resentment

- Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (5=Strongly agree; 1=Strongly disagree).
- Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors (5=Strongly disagree; 1=Strongly agree).
- It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would just try harder they could be just as well off as whites (5=Strongly disagree; 1=Strongly agree).
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class (5=Strongly agree; 1=Strongly disagree).

Immigration Attitudes

- Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain? (3=Mostly a drain; 2=Neither; 1=Mostly make a contribution)
- Do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become a U.S. citizens? (1=Oppose; 0= Favor)
- Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the United States legally than it is currently? (5=Much harder; 1=Much easier)

Table J.1: Learning or Priming

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trump			Clinton		
	All Whites	WWC	Non-WC	All Whites	WWC	Non-WC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	2.201*** (0.367)	2.334*** (0.438)	1.897** (0.721)	-1.902*** (0.490)	-1.085 (0.698)	-2.904*** (0.745)
Immigration Attitudes	1.844*** (0.295)	1.278*** (0.349)	3.191*** (0.585)	-1.197** (0.373)	-0.464 (0.539)	-1.689** (0.556)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.00003 (0.001)	-0.00001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.184*** (0.251)	1.113*** (0.306)	1.302** (0.458)	-0.690* (0.311)	-0.113 (0.435)	-1.319** (0.479)
Relative Deprivation	0.057 (0.268)	0.084 (0.321)	0.148 (0.489)	-0.209 (0.312)	0.095 (0.430)	-0.842 (0.503)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003	-0.006	0.002	0.003	0.014	-0.024

	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.00004 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.003)	0.0002 (0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.028 (0.040)	0.007 (0.048)	-0.095 (0.078)	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.056 (0.065)	-0.088 (0.077)
Unemployed	0.082 (0.351)	0.213 (0.384)	-1.156 (0.974)	-1.897** (0.715)	-0.886 (0.670)	-3.992** (1.348)
Pct. Foreign Born Change	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Union (no, family, is)	-0.015 (0.107)	-0.073 (0.127)	0.171 (0.217)	-0.156 (0.163)	-0.210 (0.231)	-0.170 (0.244)
Female	0.123 (0.153)	0.222 (0.186)	-0.160 (0.291)	0.687*** (0.189)	0.614* (0.270)	0.558 (0.293)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.718*** (0.107)	0.712*** (0.124)	0.791*** (0.231)	-0.855*** (0.137)	-0.945*** (0.185)	-0.941*** (0.234)
South	0.010 (0.174)	0.009 (0.205)	0.161 (0.345)	0.232 (0.214)	0.336 (0.294)	-0.178 (0.335)
College	-0.255 (0.172)			0.320 (0.200)		
PID (Republican)	0.675*** (0.046)	0.669*** (0.053)	0.729*** (0.106)	-0.689*** (0.064)	-0.729*** (0.081)	-0.632*** (0.114)
Constant	-9.088*** (0.647)	-8.781*** (0.761)	-10.502*** (1.320)	6.334*** (0.762)	5.618*** (1.044)	7.830*** (1.230)
Observations	3,020	1,658	1,362	3,507	2,172	1,335
Log Likelihood	-645.481	-457.388	-175.962	-467.156	-257.873	-192.985
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,324.962	946.775	383.923	968.311	547.746	417.970

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix K: Racial Conservatives Still Supporting Obama in 2012?

Why would racially resentful voters who switched their votes to Trump in 2016 because of their racial conservatism and anti-immigrant views still be voting for President Obama in 2012 after four years of a highly racialized first term in office where numerous issues from racial justice (Trayvon Martin) to immigration (DACA) dominated headlines and perceptions of the Democratic Party as increasingly Black and Latino were already cemented (Tesler 2016b).


There is evidence that racial attitudes have become more strongly associated with a variety of outcomes over time, including between 2012 and 2016. Enders and Scott (2018) show that correlations between racial resentment and party identification, ideology, presidential candidate thermometer ratings, voting, and attitudes towards health insurance and government services strengthened between 2012 and 2016. Using different data, Tesler (2016c) shows that racial attitudes mattered more in 2016 voting than in 2008 or 2012, helping explain why some racial conservatives were still supporting Obama in 2012. Indeed, Tesler (2016a) shows that fully a quarter of Whites who strongly opposed interracial dating still supported Obama in 2012. Finally, Sides (2017) finds that attitudes related to immigration, religion, and race were more salient to voter decision making in 2016 than in 2012 and that this pattern is not found for other attitudes.

How could this be the case? First, we argue that race and immigration were more salient in 2016 than in 2012. President Trump was more explicitly racial in his appeals than any previous candidate, shifting norms around what sort of prejudiced beliefs and rhetoric is socially acceptable (Schaffner 2018). Similarly, Clinton moved to the left of Obama on a number of race-related issues. As Gillon (2016) shows, Obama actually spoke less about race than other recent Democratic candidates.

Second, the 2016 election is part of a longer process of sorting on issues of race. Let's assume that by 2008, the most racially conservative white voters were sorted into the Republican Party and were voting for Republican presidential candidates. That can be true while at the same time there also remains some significant number of racially conservative white Democrats. Throughout 2008 and 2012, more of these racially resentful Democrats may have voted for Republicans and switched their partisanship to the Republican Party. In 2016, after eight years of a Black president, with a candidate espousing explicitly racial views, still more racially resentful white voters switched their votes to the Republican candidate. But again, some racially resentful whites could remain voting for the Democratic candidate.

If this story is true, we should see, on average, that congruent Romney to Trump voters are more racially resentful and conservative on immigration issues than Obama to Trump switchers. The corresponding inverse should be true of Obama to Clinton voters, who should be more racially liberal and pro-immigration than Romney to Clinton switchers. As we show in Figure [vote_switchers_att], that is indeed the case. Trump vote switchers were significantly more conservative on immigration and more racially resentful than Obama-Clinton voters ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.001$) and Clinton switchers ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.001$), but less conservative on immigration and less racially resentful than Romney-Trump voters ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.001$).

Figure K.1: Vote Switchers and Racial Attitudes



Note: Circles indicate mean score for White voters on each attitude scale with high scores indicating more conservative positions on the issue. Panel A displays immigration attitudes and Panel B displays racial attitudes.

In other words, some significant variation in racial resentment and immigration attitudes remains among Trump switchers, and even among Obama-Clinton voters and Clinton switchers, even if it is lower on average than among congruent Romney-Trump voters.

Appendix L: (De)Mobilized by Trump/Clinton

Table L.1: Voters Mobilized by Trump/Clinton

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trump All (1)	Trump WWC (2)	Trump Non-WWC (3)	Clinton All (4)	Clinton WWC (5)	Clinton Non-WWC (6)
Racial Attitudes	1.310*** (0.208)	1.250*** (0.226)	1.758** (0.543)	-2.911*** (0.301)	-2.691*** (0.348)	-3.371*** (0.613)
Immigration Attitudes	1.084*** (0.132)	1.102*** (0.143)	0.901* (0.354)	-1.389*** (0.167)	-1.406*** (0.192)	-1.358*** (0.342)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.005* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.600*** (0.156)	0.611*** (0.170)	0.345 (0.409)	-0.002 (0.189)	0.178 (0.226)	-0.421 (0.353)
Relative Deprivation	-0.180 (0.135)	-0.162 (0.147)	-0.335 (0.343)	-0.198 (0.162)	-0.215 (0.196)	-0.171 (0.291)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.012 (0.008)	0.006 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	0.027 (0.022)	0.046 (0.024)	-0.091 (0.057)	0.021 (0.026)	0.036 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.048)
Unemployed	-0.136 (0.150)	-0.148 (0.159)	-0.038 (0.473)	-0.245 (0.193)	-0.208 (0.216)	-0.383 (0.440)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.083 (0.059)	0.079 (0.064)	0.157 (0.148)	0.066 (0.068)	0.061 (0.082)	0.087 (0.124)
Female	0.061 (0.085)	0.046 (0.092)	0.028 (0.224)	0.001 (0.104)	-0.043 (0.125)	0.025 (0.190)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.616*** (0.047)	0.593*** (0.051)	0.784*** (0.130)	-0.342*** (0.054)	-0.380*** (0.063)	-0.270* (0.106)
South	-0.027 (0.090)	-0.064 (0.097)	0.189 (0.238)	-0.164 (0.111)	-0.289* (0.134)	0.172 (0.205)
Partisanship (R)	-0.065 (0.052)	-0.099 (0.056)	0.170 (0.155)	-0.569*** (0.051)	-0.676*** (0.061)	-0.300** (0.099)
College	-0.189 (0.116)			0.383*** (0.109)		
Constant	-5.345*** (0.337)	-5.262*** (0.365)	-5.902*** (0.910)	1.071** (0.343)	1.268** (0.405)	0.958 (0.656)
Observations	6,415	5,308	1,107	6,415	5,308	1,107
Log Likelihood	-2,260.367	-1,934.798	-314.735	-1,660.528	-1,228.552	-417.576
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,554.733	3,901.596	661.470	3,355.055	2,489.105	867.151

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Table L.2: Demobilization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	All (1)	WWC (2)	Non-WWC (3)
Racial Attitudes	0.424* (0.195)	0.326 (0.227)	0.609 (0.378)
Immigration Attitudes	-0.028 (0.126)	-0.004 (0.145)	-0.127 (0.250)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Family Econ Situation Worse	-0.464** (0.153)	-0.426* (0.181)	-0.545 (0.289)
Relative Deprivation	-0.105 (0.121)	-0.073 (0.146)	-0.117 (0.219)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.006)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.131*** (0.020)	-0.134*** (0.025)	-0.121** (0.037)
Unemployed	0.397* (0.155)	0.513** (0.167)	-0.289 (0.464)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.098 (0.053)	-0.176** (0.066)	0.085 (0.092)
Female	0.443*** (0.075)	0.403*** (0.089)	0.567*** (0.141)
Ideology (lib-consv)	-0.161*** (0.041)	-0.241*** (0.048)	0.058 (0.081)
South	0.144 (0.083)	0.141 (0.098)	0.141 (0.158)
Partisanship (R)	0.251*** (0.044)	0.268*** (0.052)	0.196* (0.084)
College	-0.412*** (0.085)		
Constant	-2.476*** (0.268)	-2.152*** (0.316)	-3.748*** (0.512)
Observations	28,265	16,667	11,598
Log Likelihood	-3,675.514	-2,559.006	-1,100.283
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,385.027	5,150.011	2,232.566

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix M: Swing State Effect

Table M.1: Vote Switching in Swing States

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trump All (1)	Trump WWC (2)	Trump Non-WWC (3)	Clinton All (4)	Clinton WWC (5)	Clinton Non-WWC (6)
Racial Attitudes	1.220*** (0.342)	1.233*** (0.370)	1.136 (0.959)	-1.892*** (0.451)	-1.621** (0.516)	-2.564** (0.971)
Immigration Attitudes	1.220*** (0.215)	1.127*** (0.231)	1.910** (0.620)	-1.419*** (0.259)	-1.283*** (0.296)	-1.927*** (0.578)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.00001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.004)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.685** (0.255)	0.837** (0.274)	-0.665 (0.757)	-0.060 (0.307)	0.049 (0.364)	-0.197 (0.604)
Relative Deprivation	0.385 (0.231)	0.495* (0.250)	-0.251 (0.668)	-0.209 (0.260)	-0.109 (0.317)	-0.448 (0.487)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.021** (0.007)	0.021** (0.008)	0.023 (0.017)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.008 (0.004)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	0.106** (0.038)	0.141*** (0.041)	-0.104 (0.111)	0.041 (0.043)	0.069 (0.051)	-0.043 (0.087)
Unemployed	0.122 (0.247)	0.103 (0.257)	-0.261 (1.052)	-0.128 (0.331)	-0.0002 (0.358)	-0.413 (0.885)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.0004 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.005)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.066 (0.101)	-0.082 (0.109)	0.106 (0.275)	0.255* (0.106)	0.195 (0.127)	0.401 (0.207)
Female	0.207 (0.141)	0.263 (0.153)	-0.197 (0.379)	-0.007 (0.165)	0.105 (0.202)	-0.395 (0.310)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.601*** (0.079)	0.585*** (0.085)	0.726** (0.229)	-0.484*** (0.087)	-0.522*** (0.102)	-0.468** (0.181)
South	-0.211 (0.154)	-0.118 (0.167)	-0.684 (0.449)	0.084 (0.173)	-0.035 (0.210)	0.398 (0.337)
Partisanship (R)	-0.057 (0.083)	-0.086 (0.088)	0.150 (0.260)	-0.550*** (0.081)	-0.768*** (0.096)	0.079 (0.164)
College	-0.155 (0.192)			0.474** (0.175)		
Constant	-6.059*** (0.577)	-6.120*** (0.619)	-6.060*** (1.711)	1.144* (0.555)	1.292* (0.649)	1.323 (1.177)
Observations	2,371	1,996	375	2,371	1,996	375
Log Likelihood	-864.403	-748.471	-107.336	-661.978	-493.052	-154.229
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,762.807	1,528.942	246.671	1,357.955	1,018.105	340.458

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Table M.2: Vote Switching in Non-Swing States

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trump All	Trump WWC	Trump Non-WWC	Clinton All	Clinton WWC	Clinton Non-WWC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	1.375*** (0.265)	1.263*** (0.288)	2.160** (0.686)	-3.739*** (0.413)	-3.625*** (0.481)	-4.028*** (0.829)
Immigration Attitudes	1.010*** (0.168)	1.102*** (0.183)	0.339 (0.447)	-1.408*** (0.221)	-1.511*** (0.256)	-1.076* (0.445)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.005 (0.004)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.555** (0.198)	0.469* (0.217)	0.865 (0.504)	0.081 (0.243)	0.299 (0.293)	-0.462 (0.449)
Relative Deprivation	-0.461** (0.169)	-0.521** (0.184)	-0.282 (0.433)	-0.140 (0.211)	-0.216 (0.253)	0.009 (0.391)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.013 (0.008)	0.0005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.00001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.062 (0.071)	0.021 (0.033)	0.027 (0.039)	0.003 (0.062)
Unemployed	-0.250 (0.192)	-0.283 (0.205)	-0.106 (0.559)	-0.280 (0.241)	-0.311 (0.275)	-0.273 (0.526)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	0.169* (0.073)	0.179* (0.081)	0.216 (0.180)	-0.061 (0.091)	-0.036 (0.110)	-0.093 (0.164)
Female	-0.034 (0.107)	-0.094 (0.116)	0.205 (0.287)	0.013 (0.136)	-0.139 (0.161)	0.272 (0.253)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.617*** (0.060)	0.589*** (0.065)	0.863*** (0.162)	-0.248*** (0.070)	-0.273*** (0.081)	-0.206 (0.138)
South	0.062 (0.116)	-0.016 (0.126)	0.611* (0.304)	-0.407** (0.153)	-0.514** (0.185)	-0.055 (0.289)
Partisanship (R)	-0.071 (0.067)	-0.107 (0.072)	0.156 (0.200)	-0.583*** (0.067)	-0.611*** (0.080)	-0.524*** (0.130)
College	-0.190 (0.146)			0.348* (0.141)		
Constant	-5.013*** (0.423)	-4.775*** (0.458)	-6.585*** (1.161)	1.055* (0.446)	1.216* (0.525)	1.103 (0.861)
Observations	4,044	3,312	732	4,044	3,312	732
Log Likelihood	-1,384.908	-1,174.313	-198.821	-977.842	-719.700	-252.209
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,803.817	2,380.627	429.641	1,989.685	1,471.401	536.417

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

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