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## PROJECT OVERVIEW

Project name	Spatial Analysis of Contemporary Religious Diversity in Ukraine (SACRED-Ukraine)
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Publications based on the data	Brik, T., & Korolkov, S. (2020). Religious Markets in Ukraine: Post-communist Revivals and New Directions. In <i>Ukraine in Transformation</i> (pp. 145-165). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.  Brik, T. (2019). When church competition matters? Intra-doctrinal competition in Ukraine, 1992–2012. <i>Sociology of Religion</i> , 80(1), 45-82.  Brik T., Korolkov, S. (2019). <i>A spatial analysis of religious diversity and freedom in Ukraine after the Euromaidan</i> . In Elizabeth A. Clark, Dmytro Vovk (Eds.), <i>Religion during the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict</i> . Routledge.
Blogs and think-tank commentaries based on the data	Wilson Center (2018). Religious Regulations and Orthodox Competition in Ukraine. <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/religious-regulations-and-orthodox-competition-ukraine">https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/religious-regulations-and-orthodox-competition-ukraine</a> Vox Ukraine (2016). Church competition and religious participation: new evidence from Ukraine <a href="https://voxukraine.org/en/church-competition-and-religious-participation-new-evidence-from-ukraine/">https://voxukraine.org/en/church-competition-and-religious-participation-new-evidence-from-ukraine/</a>
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## Context

- The main goal of the SACRED-UKRAINE is to map almost 30 years of religious resurrections in Ukraine after the fall of the USSR.
- The project aims to contribute to the global discussion about the role of religious supply and state in shaping religious behavior and attitudes of people.

Ukraine is an excellent playground for empirical research on religious diversity since religious market of Ukraine has become “the one most likely to approximate the American model” (Casanova 1998:83–4).

Here are a few examples of the exceptional religious pluralism in Ukraine:

- Ukraine is as a stronghold of all major Christian denominations: Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Roman-Catholic, and Protestant.
- The Orthodox church is split in three independent jurisdictions: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC–KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).

- In 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople signed the *Tomos*, officially recognizing a new Orthodox Church of Ukraine as a canonical autocephalous Orthodox Church within the territory of Ukraine.
- A strong influence of the Greek-Catholic church in the Western Ukraine
- An active Baptist presence since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Ukraine had the largest Baptist communities in all of Europe and served as the Bible Belt of the Soviet Union, and as the base for transnational evangelical missions to all post-Soviet republics (Wanner, 2007).
- The revival and growth of Jewish religious communities and of Muslim communities, particularly of Crimean Tatars.

Religious supply is embedded in a long history of Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, Soviet era, and post-Soviet transformations marked with both nationalistic revivals and economic and social turbulences. Since 2015 and the ongoing conflict with Russia, religion also became important for political solidarity as well as international affairs.

Our data of religious supply are designed to help researchers and pundits in their investigations of:

- The level of religious supply in different years and regions
- Variation of religious supply over religious groups
- Religious freedoms and state regulations (e.g. see [Brik and Korolkov, 2019](#))
- Competition between as well as within Christian denominations (e.g. see [Brik, 2019](#))
- Correlation between religious supply, socio-economic conditions, nationalistic revivals, and religious behavior (see [Brik, 2019](#))

## DATA DESCRIPTION

Currently, the SACRED-UKRAINE includes two files

- PART1. Religious communities 1991-2015 (used for [Brik, 2019](#))
- PART2. Religious communities 1991-2018 (used for [Brik and Korolkov, 2020](#))

### Sources

The data are based on the following sources:

Type of a source	Description of a source	Label of a source in the data
"Lyudyna I Svit" (Людина і Світ ) (1991-2004)	A magazine that published data on religious communities and property	L&S
Церкви України в координатах нової Європи // Історія релігії у десяти томах. Том 10. Релігія і церква років незалежності України. – Київ-Дрогобич: Коло, 2003.	A text book with chapters by Viktor Yelenskyi who published statistical data	Yelenskyi
State Archives 1	The State Committee on Nationalities and Religions (before 2010)	Archives_state
State Archives 2	The Department for Religions and Nationalities in the Ministry of Culture (after 2010)	Archives_state
Archives and registers	Personal photo copies of former employees of the respective state departments	RegStat1-RegStat4
RISU website	Religious Information Service of Ukraine systematically collected and published statistical data on their website	RISU

### Regional unit of observation

Ukraine is divided in 27 administrative units: 24 regions, and two cities with a special status (Kyiv and Sevastopol). Ukrainian oblasts are similar to the European NUTS2 units.

- In 2014, the Crimean Autonomous republic (with Sevastopol as a capital city of this region) was annexed by Russia
- In 2014, since the war in Donbas started, Ukraine lost control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (see [Brik and Korolkov, 2018](#))
- Most of the data we use in the analysis are based on **26 regional units**. They are Kyiv, 24 oblasts, and Crimea with Sevastopol merged in one unit. Starting from 2015, Crimea is missing in our data, also the meaning of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast changes – from this period Ukrainian statistical data covers only those parts of the oblasts that are under the governmental control.

## WHY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES?

SACRED data is focused on religious communities.

According to Ukrainian legislation, a religious community is a local religious organization of faithful people who practice the same religion.

Community – is it a good representation of religious supply and religious market?

### *Pros (theory and context)*

- While priests supply religious services directly in churches (baptisms, confessions, marriages in churches), religious communities help to experience and evaluate religious goods (Sherkat 1997).
- Communities participate in social rituals that are important to produce agreement about the value of religious explanations (Stark and Finke 2000).
- Ukraine communities voice their concerns about tensions and conflict with other religious groups (Krindatch 2003).
- Theologians have argued that a religious community is the most crucial component of the Orthodox church (Hovorun 2015).
- Empirical literature on conversions shows that religious communities actively participate in promoting their doctrine and use their social ties to invite and convert new members (Stark and Finke 2000).
- Focusing on religious communities is consistent with the theory of club goods which has received particular attention in the existing literature on religious supply (Abramitzky 2008; Berman and Laitin 2008; Iannaccone 1992).

### *Pros (methodology)*

- Our data are well suited to study religious supply, religious markets, and religious pluralism. This line of research has been long criticized for invalid measures. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that the correlation between religious pluralism and religious behavior is likely to be spurious when surveys or censuses are used. Voas et al. (2002) argued that it is vital to find measures that are “relative to some base other than the total population” in order to avoid such methodological problems. Therefore, our project utilizes statistical data of religious communities instead of surveys or censuses.

### *Caveats*

- In Ukraine, religious communities are not obliged to register since the state has no legal rights to dictate religious practices. Therefore, local state offices obtain information about religious communities only after the latter apply for registration. It is possible that some religious communities are not well represented in these data.
- Although actual religious communities exist at the level of cities, villages, or even neighborhoods, they are officially registered at regional level. Thus, we have aggregated data at the level of regions.
- There is no information about the size of religious communities. A community has to include a minimum of 10 people. However, there is no information about the upper bound.

## LIST OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN OUR DATA

- More contextual information will be in a forthcoming chapter Brik & Casanova (2020)

OCU	TBA, not in the data yet	<b>Orthodox Church of Ukraine</b> , on January 5, 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople signed the <i>Tomos</i> , officially recognizing a new Orthodox Church of Ukraine as a canonical autocephalous Orthodox Church within the territory of Ukraine.
UOC-MP	1991-2018	<b>The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate</b> . The UOC-MP pictures itself as a descendant of the Metropolis of Kyiv and all Rus. After the collapse of the USSR it received a status of the self-governed Ukrainian church under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church.
UOC-KP	1992-2018	<b>The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyivan Patriarchate</b> . Emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also considers itself as a descendant Metropolis of Kyiv and all Rus. However, it has more complex relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. The UOC-KP received a status of a “schismatic church” from the latter, it is one of the most popular churches among Ukrainian believers.
UAOC	1991-2018	<b>The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church</b> . The historical emergence of it during the Bolshevik Revolution marks the first modern attempt at Ukrainian confessionalization, independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, but such a project could not possibly succeed under Soviet communism. After the fall of the USSR, a new church was organized mostly by efforts of diaspora and clergy in exile who returned to Ukraine.
UAOC_novel	2006-2018	<b>The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Novel</b> . This group became independent from the UAOC in 2006.
UOC_others	1991-2018	<b>All others Ukrainian Orthodox churches</b> . All smaller and marginal groups of Orthodox including the Armenian church, old believers, Russian Orthodox church
UGCH	1991-2018	<b>Ukrainian Greek Catholics Church</b> . Emerged after the the Union of Brest (1595–96) within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the diocese of Lviv served as a main Orthodox stronghold against the “Unia.” Eventually, once Galicia was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the Partitions, the Greek Catholic Church became the hegemonic confession among Ruthenians/Ukrainians, determining the ethnic boundaries between Greek Catholic Ukrainians and Roman Catholic Poles (Himka, 1984).
RC	1991-2018	<b>Roman Catholic Church</b> .
Cath_Arm	2016-2018	<b>Armenian Catholic Church</b> .
Prot_all	1991-2018	<b>All Evangelist and Protestant churches</b> . The list of such churches is very long and includes different kinds of Lutherans, Baptists, Reformed, Adventist, Evangelist, Charismatic, Mormons and Jehovah witnesses. Despite these groups are sometimes very different they are merged together in this variable. The Jehovah witnesses and Evangelical Baptist are considered to be two large groups. For some years it is possible to see different groups as well.
Prot_Bapt	2006-2018	<b>Baptists</b>
Prot_HVE	2006-2018	<b>Evangelical Baptist</b>
Prot_Adven	2006-2018	<b>Adventist</b>
Prot_Char	2006-2018	<b>Charismatic churches</b>
Prot_JW	2006-2018	<b>Jehovah Witnesses</b>
Prot_other	2006-2018	<b>All other Evangelist and Protestant churches</b> .
Prot_all	1991-2004	<b>All Evangelist and Protestant churches</b>
Islam	1991-2018	<b>All Muslim groups</b> . Most of them are Crimean Tatars who live in Crimea. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, some Tatars migrated to Kyiv, Lviv, and Kherson
Judaism	1991-2018	<b>All Jewish religious groups</b> . Most of them are in big cities.
Buddhism	1991-2018	<b>All Buddhist groups</b>
Others	1991-2018	<b>All other religious groups</b> including but not limited to pagans, transcendental mediation, scientology, etc.

## TYPE OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

Religious statistical data in Ukraine mentions different types of religious communities in different years:

- “Active” (діючі) – **1999-2018**
- “Not-registered” (незапореєстровані) or “active without registration” – **1999-2018**

What is the difference between “*active*” and “*active without registration*”? Religious groups across the Globe often have to receive the legal status in order to operate openly within their states. However, states sometimes use registration requirements to increase restrictions on religions (Finke, Mataic, Fox, 2018). In Ukraine, religious communities are not obliged to register since the state has no legal rights to dictate religious practices. Therefore, some active religious groups prefer not to register some of the documents (i.e. statutes). Yet they are quite active which can be monitored on their webpages or via media activities. Both types represent de-facto active religious group.

- Earlier statistical data (which we have access to) for **1991-1999** did not make such differentiation. We interpret our data for **1991-1999** as total which includes both “active” and “active without registration”.
- **For the period of 2016-2018**, the data also include “inactive” (недіючі) churches. This novelty was designed to mark those religious groups which, to the best knowledge of the state authorities, did not exist or changed their affiliation. For example (1) when they receive direct request from a community to cancel their registration (2) when they monitor activities of religious communities and conclude that they do not exist. Nevertheless, authorities do not have legal rights to cancel existing registrations, therefore they put a label “inactive” on the file.


### How to analyze these data?

- A **conservative approach** would be to exclude inactive from the analysis or to analyze 2016-2018 separately from other years Religious supply, therefore, is a total number of all religious groups regardless their relationship with the state.
- A **liberal approach** would be to merge all types of communities together and treat this final variable as a proxy of religious supply. Religious supply, therefore, is a total number of all religious groups that existed in the territory and left a trace of their existence. Even though these religious groups are not active at the moment, they still reflect some vitality of religious actors in the region.

## EXAMPLES

### Example 1

- Visualization of the data PART1. Religious communities 1991-2015 (used for [Brik, 2019](#))
- Data and code are here ([link](#))




- This graph plots absolute numbers of major religious groups in Ukraine
- Different sources sometimes have different numbers, thus in many cases we use estimates – averages of these numbers. It is also possible to drop particular observations from the data if a researcher can justify it and finds it necessary.



## Example 2

- Visualization of the data PART2. Religious communities 1991-2018 (used for [Brik and Korolkov, 2020](#))
- Data and code are here ([link](#))



- This graph plots absolute numbers of all Evangelistic and Protestant churches
- One can easily see that in 1998 there is a huge drop! This is due to the low-quality data
- Solution – **drop 1998 from the final analysis**

## DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

**1. YEARS.** Currently, the dataset includes period of 1991-2018 with some gaps

1994, 1995, 1996 – are missing

1998 – **is deleted due to the low-quality data**

In total the data cover **23 years** of observations.

## 2. REGIONS

Different sociological agencies might disagree on which oblast belong to each macro-region.

You can create your own classification if necessary.

	1.east	2.south	3.north	4.center	5.kyiv	6.west
Donetska oblast	23					
Kharkivska oblast	23					
Luganska oblast	23					
Crimea, Autonomy Republic		23				
Khersonska oblast		23				
Mykolaivska oblast		23				
Odessa oblast		23				
Zaporizska oblast		23				
Chernigivska oblast			23			
Kyivska oblast			23			
Sumska oblast			23			
Zhytomyrska oblast			23			
Cherkaska oblast				23		
Dnipropetrovska oblast				23		
Khmelnitska oblast				23		
Kirovogradska oblast				23		
Poltavska oblast				23		
Vynnytska oblast				23		
Kyiv city					23	
Chernivetska oblast						23
Ivano-Frankivska oblast						23
Lvivska oblast						23
Rivnenska oblast						23
Ternopilska oblast						23
Volynska oblast						23
Zakarpatska oblast						23

### 3. RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Orthodox (All)	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
1.east	416	214	91	946
2.south	411	193	0	758
3.north	645	266	129	1,212
4.center	680	369	64	1,423
5.kyiv	293	124	21	449
6.west	684	196	241	1,100

Catholic (All)	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
1.east	16.5	15.3	0	54
2.south	20.4	12.5	0	49
3.north	39.7	49.4	0	147
4.center	52.6	66.9	0	210
5.kyiv	19.9	6.75	2	30
6.west	520	540	0	1,708

S

Evangelistic and Protestant (ALL)	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
1.east	375	218	37	840
2.south	256	128	0	469
3.north	252	139	38	553*
4.center	309	137	22	553*
5.kyiv	293	117	12	423
6.west	325	169	22	608

\*553 – is the maximum sum of all groups in Kyiv oblast (North) and Vynnytska oblast (Center)

## TYPES OF COMMUNITIES

year	All	Active	Not registered	Inactive
1991	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1991	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1992	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1993	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1994	NA	NA	NA	NA
1995	NA	NA	NA	NA
1996	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1997	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
1998	NA	NA	NA	NA
1999	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2000	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2001	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2002	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2003	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2004	X	X	Not for Protestants, Muslims, Judaism, Buddhism	
2006	X	X	X	
2007	X	X	X	
2008	X	X	X	
2009	X	X	X	
2010	X	X	X	
2011	X	X	X	
2012	X	X	X	
2013	X	X	X	
2014	X	X	X	
2015	X	X	X	
2016	X	X	X	X
2017	X	X	X	X
2018	X	X	X	X

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