Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) Tutorial

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Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE): In a MSNE, a player chooses a probability for each of their strategies that makes the *expected* payoffs of the **other** player's strategies equal.

Example: To find the MSNE, assign complementary probabilities to each player's strategies. In a 2x2 game, we typically assign p and (1-p) to the row player's strategies and q and (1-q) to the column player's strategies.

Next, <u>for each player</u>, set up the expected payoff for each strategy. Then, set those expected payoffs equal to each other.

Important Note: When finding the expected payoff for a strategy, we multiply each of the player's payoffs from that strategy by the **other** player's corresponding probabilities and add them together!

For Player 1, we have:

Expected Payoff of A = 0q + 3(1-q) = 1q + 2(1-q) = Expected Payoff of B.

Solving for q, gives us q = 1/2 because:

$$0q + 3(1-q) = 1q + 2(1-q) \rightarrow 3-3q = 1q + 2-2q \rightarrow 3-3q = 2-q \rightarrow -2q = -1 \rightarrow q = 1/2.$$

Now that we know q = 1/2, it is easy to find that 1-q = 1/2.

For Player 2, we have

Expected Payoff of
$$C = 5p + 6(1-p) = 4p + 7(1-p) = Expected Payoff of D$$

Solving for p, gives us p = 1/2 because:

$$5p + 6(1-p) = 4p + 7(1-p) \rightarrow 5p + 6-6p = 4p + 7-7p \rightarrow 6-1p = 7-3p \rightarrow 2p = 1 \rightarrow p = 1/2.$$

Now since we know p = 1/2, it is easy to find that 1-p = 1/2.

Putting our work together, and referencing our matrix for the strategies that correspond to p and 1-p for Player 1, and q and 1-q for Player 2, the **MSNE** is Player 1 chooses A with probability (p=)1/2 and B with probability (1-p=)1/2. Player 2 chooses C with probability (q=)1/2 and D with probability (1-q=)1/2.