

# The psycho-logic of *each* and *every*

Tyler Knowlton

University of Maryland

3.12.21 @ Penn

Slides available at:

[tylerknowlton.com/talks/MindCORE.pdf](http://tylerknowlton.com/talks/MindCORE.pdf)

# Linguistic meaning in the mind




- ➔ What sorts of instructions do meanings provide to cognition?
- ➔ What can that relationship tell us about semantic representations?

# Why *each* and *every*?

- Can state precise hypotheses about their meaning representations
- Can leverage an understanding of supporting cognitive systems
- Other case studies include: *all*, *longest*, English & Cantonese *most*

“Every circle is green”

*The circles are such  
that they are all green*



# How are *each* & *every* mentally represented?

## Three hypotheses

- Two (psycho)logical distinctions: relational/restricted & first-/second-order

### Relational vs. Restricted

- Number cognition as a probe


### First- vs. Second-order (individual- vs. group- implicating)

- Object-files vs. Ensembles as a probe

# *Each/Every circle is green* – possible representations

The circles<sub>x</sub> are included in the green-things<sub>y</sub>


UNIVERSE:  $\text{TheX:Circle}(X) \subseteq \text{TheY:Green}(Y)$



**Unrestricted  
Second-order**

The circles<sub>x</sub> are such that all of them<sub>x</sub> are green


CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$



**Restricted  
Second-order**

The individual circles<sub>x</sub> are s.t. each one<sub>x</sub> is green


CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$



**Restricted  
First-order**

# How are *each* & *every* mentally represented?

Three hypotheses



**Relational vs. Restricted**

→ Number cognition as a probe

**First- vs. Second-order (individual- vs. group-implicating)**

→ Object-files vs. Ensembles as a probe

# Different representations

“Every circle is green”

## Relational (unrestricted)



$\text{TheX:Circle}(X) \subseteq \text{TheY:Green}(Y)$

$\approx$ The circles<sub>X</sub> are included in  
the green-things<sub>Y</sub>

## Restricted

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$

$\approx$ The circles<sub>X</sub> are such that  
all of them<sub>X</sub> are green



# Different behavioral predictions

**Linking hypothesis:** In evaluating a sentence, people are biased toward strategies that **directly compute the relations & operations expressed** by the semantic representation under evaluation

## Relational (unrestricted)

$\text{TheX:Circle}(X) \subseteq \text{TheY:Green}(Y)$


$\approx$ The circles<sub>X</sub> are included in  
the green-things<sub>Y</sub>

## Restricted

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$


$\approx$ The circles<sub>X</sub> are such that  
all of them<sub>X</sub> are green

Represent &  
compare both  
arguments



(Linking hypothesis from Lidz et al. 2011)


Treat  
arguments  
asymmetrically



Every big circle is blue


TRUE

FALSE



How many big circles  
were there?


## Measuring accuracy of #‐knowledge ( $\beta$ )




Every big circle is blue

TRUE


FALSE



1 sec



How many big circles  
are there?




1 sec

How many big circles  
were there?

#-knowledge following *every*  
vs.  
#-knowledge **baseline**

How many big circles  
were there?

# Every big circle is blue




# Every big circle is blue

## Relational

*The big-circles<sub>X</sub> are a subset of the blue-circles<sub>Y</sub>*

## Represent both arguments



# Every big circle is blue

## Relational


*The  $\text{big-circles}_X$  are a subset of the  $\text{blue-circles}_Y$*

Represent both arguments

## Restricted

*The  $\text{big-circles}_X$  are such that all of them<sub>X</sub> are blue*

Treat arguments asymmetrically



# Every big circle is blue

## Relational


*The big-circles<sub>X</sub>*  
are a subset of  
*the blue-circles<sub>Y</sub>*

**Represent both  
arguments**

## Restricted


*The big-circles<sub>X</sub>*  
are such that  
*all of them<sub>X</sub>* are blue

**Treat arguments  
asymmetrically**



# Every big circle is blue


Is the problem that  
the predicates are  
introduced in two  
different ways?



# Every circle that is big is blue


Is the problem that  
the predicates are  
introduced in two  
different ways?

No:  
both can be  
introduced with *is*!



# How are *each* & *every* mentally represented?

Three hypotheses



Relational vs. Restricted

- ✓ Number cognition as a probe into which arguments are represented


**First- vs. Second-order** (individual- vs. group-implicating)

- ➔ Object-files vs. Ensembles as a probe into how arguments are encoded

# Different representations: groups or individuals?

## Second-order representations (*every*)

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)] \approx \text{The circles}_x \text{ are such that all of them}_x \text{ are green}$



## First-order representations (*each*)


CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx \text{The individual circles}_x \text{ are s.t. each one}_x \text{ is green}$




# Different underlying cognitive representations

## Second-order representations (every)

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)] \approx \text{The circles}_x \text{ are such that every } X \text{ is green}$



take on  $\geq 1$   
value at a time




## First-order representations (each) rely on object-files

CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx \text{The individual circles}_x \text{ are s.t. each one}_x \text{ is green}$



take on only 1  
value at a time

Objects individuated  
**individual properties** encoded




# Different underlying cognitive systems

**Second-order representations (every) rely on ensembles**

CIRCLES:  $\forall x [Green(x)] \approx$  The circles<sub>x</sub> are such that all of them<sub>x</sub> are green

Which side has **bigger** circles?




Objects abstracted away from  
**summary statistics** encoded

Ensemble<sub>1</sub>

Center: (x,y)  
Cardinality: 4  
Avg. Size:

each) rely on **object-files**  
Individual circles<sub>x</sub> are s.t. each one<sub>x</sub> is green


Objects individuated  
**individual properties** encoded



# Different representations & cognitive systems

**Second-order representations (every) rely on ensembles**

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)] \approx \text{The circles}_x \text{ are such that all of them}_x \text{ are green}$




take on  $\geq 1$   
value at a time

Objects abstracted away from  
**summary statistics** encoded

Ensemble<sub>1</sub>  
Center: (x,y)  
Cardinality: 4  
Avg. Size: 


**First-order representations (each) rely on object-files**

CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx \text{The individual circles}_x \text{ are s.t. each one}_x \text{ is green}$



take on only 1  
value at a time

Objects individuated  
**individual properties** encoded

OF<sub>1</sub>   OF<sub>2</sub>   OF<sub>3</sub>   OF<sub>4</sub>  


# Different behavioral predictions


**Linking hypothesis:** In evaluating a sentence, people are biased toward strategies that **directly compute the relations & operations expressed** by the semantic representation under evaluation

## First-order (*each*)

CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$

$\approx$ The individual circles<sub>x</sub> are such that each one<sub>x</sub> is green

Encode individual properties (e.g., color)




## Second-order (*every*)

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$

$\approx$ The circles<sub>X</sub> are such that all of them<sub>X</sub> are green


Encode summary statistics (e.g., #)




Abstract away from individual properties

{Each/Every} big circle is blue

TRUE      FALSE




How many  
{big/medium/small}  
circles were there?



{Each/Every} big circle is blue

TRUE


FALSE



How many  
{big/medium/small}  
circles were there?

(Knowlton et al. *under review*)

# #-knowledge accuracy - Bayesian estimates



{Each/Every}  
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE

300 ms

One circle  
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

## Color (individual property)



Color category naming task



{Each/Every}  
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE

300 ms

One circle  
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

## Color (**individual** property)

Change detection accuracy




{Each/Every}  
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE



One circle  
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

## Color (individual property)


Color change detection: difficulty required for 70% accuracy following *each* or *every*



n = 36

# How are *each* & *every* mentally represented?

Three hypotheses



Relational vs. Restricted

- ✓ Number cognition as a probe into which arguments are represented

**First- vs. Second-order** (individual- vs. group-implicating)

- ✓ Object-files vs. Ensembles as a probe into how arguments are encoded


# How are *each* & *every* mentally represented?

## *Every*: restricted second-order

The circles  $x$  are such that all of them  $x$  are green

CIRCLES:  $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$

→ Ensemble representations




## *Each*: restricted first-order

The individual circles  $x$  are such each one  $x$  is green

CIRCLES:  $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$

→ Object-file representations



# How are *each* & *every* acquired? (Future direction)

## Differences in child-directed speech

*Each* – generalize over local domain

“You have to ring up *each* thing”

“Could you put a flower on *each* plate?”


“Put sugar in *each* coffee”

*Every* – project beyond the local domain

“*Every* time I ask a question, you say you don’t know”

“You turn into a wild man *every* time we get out”

“She watches *every* movie they make”



# Thanks!

Slides available at: [tylerknowlton.com/talks/MindCORE.pdf](http://tylerknowlton.com/talks/MindCORE.pdf)

Special thanks to:

Jeffrey Lidz

Justin Halberda

Nicolò Cesana-Arlotti

Ellen Lau

Darko Odic

Zoe Ovans

The members of UMD's Language Acquisition lab

Paul Pietroski

Alexander Williams

Valentine Hacquard

Colin Phillips

Alexis Wellwood

Laurel Perkins



And audiences at:

Penn, USC, ELM, SALT, CUNY/HSP, & BUCLD

NSF #1449815

NSF #BCS-2017525