

Every universal is first-orderizable,
but only *each* is first-orderized

Tyler Knowlton


University of Pennsylvania

CoSaQ - 5.18.22


Big picture: Linguistic meaning in the mind



Big picture: Linguistic meaning in the mind




Big picture: Linguistic meaning in the mind



Why each and every?




Why *each* and *every*?



- Can state precise hypotheses about their meanings

Why *each* and *every*?



- Can state precise hypotheses about their meanings
- Can leverage an understanding of supporting cognitive systems
e.g., those for representing individuals & groups

Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind

Psychosemantic proposal

- First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
- Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
- Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners

Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind

Psychosemantic proposal

- ➡ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- ➡ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
- ➡ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
- ➡ Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners

How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)




How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)




How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)



→ Evidence that *each* is somehow more individualistic than *every*

(e.g., Vendler 1962; Beghelli & Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Tunstall 1998; Landman 2003; Surányi 2003)


How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)



→ Evidence that *each* is somehow more individualistic than *every*

(e.g., Vendler 1962; Beghelli & Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Tunstall 1998; Landman 2003; Surányi 2003)

- (1) a. # In this talk, I combine **each** theory of quantification.
- b. ✓ In this talk, I combine **every** theory of quantification.


How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)



→ Evidence that *each* is somehow more individualistic than *every*

(e.g., Vendler 1962; Beghelli & Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Tunstall 1998; Landman 2003; Surányi 2003)

(2) Which book did you loan to **each** student?

Frankenstein to Frank, *Persuasion* to Paula, and *Dune* to Dani


How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The_X:Frog(X) ⊆ The_Y:Green(Y)

≈ The frogs_X are among the green-things_Y

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)



→ Evidence that *each* is somehow more individualistic than *every*

(e.g., Vendler 1962; Beghelli & Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Tunstall 1998; Landman 2003; Surányi 2003)

(2) Which book did you loan to **each** student?

Frankenstein to Frank, *Persuasion* to Paula, and *Dune* to Dani

(3) Which book did you loan to **every** student?

There's no one book I loaned to every student


How are *each* and *every* mentally represented?

“Each/Every frog is green”

The X :Frog(X) \subseteq The Y :Green(Y)

\approx The frogs $_X$ are among the green-things $_Y$

(Barwise & Cooper 1981)



→ Evidence that *each* is somehow more individualistic than *every*

(e.g., Vendler 1962; Beghelli & Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Tunstall 1998; Landman 2003; Surányi 2003)

→ Evidence that universal quantifiers are computationally simpler than e.g., *most*

(e.g., van Benthem 1986; McMillan et al. 2005; Clark & Grossman 2007; Szymanik 2007 2009; Szymanik & Zajenkowski 2010; 2011; Zajenkowski, Styła & Szymanik 2011; Isaac, Szymanik & Verbrugge 2014; Olm et al. 2014)

Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”

$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x) [\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any **individual**_x that's a frog

is such that **it**_x is green

(**First-order** representation)

Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any **individual**_x that’s a frog
is such that **it**_x is green

(**First-order** representation)

“**Every** frog is green”

$\text{The } F:\text{Frog}(F)[\forall x:F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The **frogs**_F are such that
any **individual**_x that’s one of **them**_F
is such that **it**_x is green

(**Second-order** representation)

Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$


≈ Any **individual_x** that's a frog
is such that **it_x** is green
(First-order representation)

“**Every** frog is green”

The **F**: $\text{Frog}(F)[\forall x:F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The **frogs_F** are such that
any **individual_x** that's one of **them_F**
is such that **it_x** is green
(Second-order representation)

Object-
Files




Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any **individual_x** that's a frog
is such that **it_x** is green
(First-order representation)





“**Every** frog is green”

The $F:\text{Frog}(F)[\forall x:F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The **frogs_F** are such that
any **individual_x** that's one of **them_F**
is such that **it_x** is green

(Second-order representation)

Object-
Files




Ensemble

Psychosemantic proposal


“Each frog is green”

$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any individual_x that's a frog
is such that it_x is green
(First-order representation)



Object-Files



“Every frog is green”


The $F: \text{Frog}(F)[\forall x: F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The frogs_F are such that
any individual_x that's one of them_F
is such that it_x is green

(Second-order representation)

Ensemble

What about second-order
relations (i.e., two groups)?




Theoretical & empirical reasons to reject:

Knowlton, Pietroski, Williams, Halberda & Lidz (2021) *Semantics & linguistic theory*

Knowlton (2021) *UMD dissertation*

Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ **Psychosemantic proposal**
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*



Evidence


- Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
- Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
- Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners

Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ Psychosemantic proposal
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
- Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
- Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners




Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”

$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any **individual_x** that’s a frog
is such that **it_x** is green
(**First-order** representation)




“**Every** frog is green”


$\text{The } F: \text{Frog}(F)[\forall x: F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The **frogs_F** are such that
any **individual_x** that’s one of **them_F**
is such that **it_x** is green
(**Second-order** representation)

Object-
Files



Ensemble



Object-files

→ Individual properties encoded
(e.g., Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Kahneman et al. 1992; Xu & Chen 2009; Carey 2009)

Ensembles


→ Summary statistics encoded
(e.g., Ariely 2001; Chong & Treisman 2003; Haberman & Whitney 2011; Sweeny et al. 2015)

Cardinality (group property)

{Each/Every} big circle is blue


TRUE

FALSE



How many
{big/medium/small}
circles were there?

Percent error (initial condition "each")




Cardinality (group property)

{Each/Every} big circle is blue


TRUE

FALSE



How many
{big/medium/small}
circles were there?

Percent error (initial condition "each")




Center of Mass (**group** property)

Is {each/every} circle blue?

“Yes”

“No”

(with 3- to 8-year-olds)




Where was the middle
of the circles?

Is {each/every} circle blue?

“Yes”

“No”




Where was the middle
of the circles?

Center of Mass (group property)

(with 3- to 8-year-olds)

Distance from tap to actual set center




{Each/Every}
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE



One circle
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

Color (individual property)

Change detection accuracy



n = 36

{Each/Every}
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE



One circle
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

Color (**individual** property)

Change detection accuracy



n = 36

{Each/Every}
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE

300 ms

One circle
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

Color (**individual** property)

Color change detection: difficulty required for 70% accuracy following *each* or *every*



n = 36

{Each/Every}
circle is green



TRUE

FALSE



One circle
changed its color




TRUE

FALSE

Color (individual property)

Color change detection: difficulty required for 70% accuracy following *each* or *every*




Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ Psychosemantic proposal
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- ✓ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
 - ➡ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
 - ➡ Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners




Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ Psychosemantic proposal
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- ✓ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling **individual properties** vs. **summary statistics**
- ➡ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over **small & local** vs. **large & global** domains
- ➡ Language acquisition: **Object-files** vs. **ensembles** as evidence for learners




Psychosemantic proposal

“**Each** frog is green”


$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any **individual_x** that’s a frog
is such that **it_x** is green

(First-order representation)



Object-
Files




“**Every** frog is green”

$\text{The } F: \text{Frog}(F)[\forall x: F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ The **frogs_F** are such that
any **individual_x** that’s one of **them_F**
is such that **it_x** is green

(Second-order representation)



Object-files

→ Individual properties encoded
(e.g., Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Kahneman et al. 1992; Xu & Chen 2009; Carey 2009)

→ Strict working memory limit
(e.g., Vogel et al. 2001; Feigenson & Carey 2005; Wood & Spelke 2005; Alvarez & Franconeri 2007)

Ensembles

→ Summary statistics encoded
(e.g., Ariely 2001; Chong & Treisman 2003; Haberman & Whitney 2011; Sweeny et al. 2015)

→ No working memory limit
(e.g., Halberda et al. 2006; Zosh et al. 2011; Alvarez & Oliva 2008; Im & Halberda 2013)

Predictions

Those representations should lead to
downstream pragmatic consequences:

All else equal, *every* should be preferred for

Predictions

Those representations should lead to
downstream pragmatic consequences:

All else equal, *every* should be preferred for

➔ larger domains of quantification

Predictions

Those representations should lead to
downstream pragmatic consequences:

All else equal, *every* should be preferred for

- ➔ larger domains of quantification
- ➔ generalizing beyond locally-established domain

Every is better for larger domains

The bartender at the local tavern has made **three martinis**.

He said that {each/every} martini he made had an olive.

The bartender at the local tavern has made **three thousand martinis**.

He said that {each/**every**} martini he made had an olive.

12 items; within-subjects; n=100


Every is better for larger domains

The bartender at the local tavern has made **three martinis**.

He said that {each/every} martini he made had an olive.

The bartender at the local tavern has made **three thousand martinis**.

He said that {each/**every**} martini he made had an olive.



Every is better for larger domains

If someone said

Each martini needs an olive

Every martini needs an olive

how many martinis would you guess they have in mind?

1 item; n=198

Every is better for larger domains

If someone said

Each martini needs an olive

Every martini needs an olive

how many martinis would you guess they have in mind?

% responses below “4”:

Each: 67%

Every: 30%

1 item; n=198

Every is better for larger domains

If someone said

Each martini needs an olive

Every martini needs an olive

“all martinis generally”
“all martinis!”
“every martini ever made”
“every one that is made”
“an unlimited amount”
“as many as there are in the world”



how many martinis would you guess they have in mind?

% responses below “4”:

Each: 67%

Every: 30%

1 item; n=198

Every is better for generalizing

Each martini needs an olive ≈ some particular cocktails need garnishes

Every martini needs an olive ≈ part of a cocktail recipe

Every is better for generalizing

Each martini needs an olive ≈ some particular cocktails need garnishes

Every martini needs an olive ≈ part of a cocktail recipe



Ensembles

- ➔ No working memory limit (can support arbitrarily large domains)

(e.g., Halberda et al. 2006; Zosh et al. 2011; Alvarez & Oliva 2008; Im & Halberda 2013)

- ➔ Represented in terms of summary statistics

(e.g., Ariely 2001; Chong & Treisman 2003; Haberman & Whitney 2011; Sweeny et al. 2015)

Every is better for generalizing

The bartender at the local tavern made a few martinis.

He said that {each/every} martini **that he made**
has an olive.

He said that {each/**every**} martini **that's worth drinking**
has an olive.


12 items; within-subjects; n=100

Every is better for generalizing

The bartender at the local tavern made a few martinis.

He said that {each/every} martini **that he made** has an olive.

He said that {each/**every**} martini **that's worth drinking** has an olive.



12 items; within-subjects; n=100


Every is better for generalizing

The bartender at the local tavern made a few martinis.

He said that {each/every} martini **that he made** has an olive.


He said that {each/**every**} martini **that's worth drinking** has an olive.

Isn't this just domain size all over again?
| Martinis worth drinking | >
| Martinis the bartender made |



2 items; within-subjects; n=100


1



Look at these three daxes.


n=300

1



Look at these three daxes.


2



Each/Every dax is green.


n=300

1



Look at these three daxes.

2



Each/Every dax is green.


3



There's another dax under that tree, hidden by the shadow.


n=300

1



Look at these three daxes.

2



Each/Every dax is green.

3






There's another dax under that tree, hidden by the shadow.




4






How confident are you that this dax is green?

n=300





n=300




Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ Psychosemantic proposal
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- ✓ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling **individual properties** vs. **summary statistics**
- ✓ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over **small & local** vs. **large & global** domains
- ➡ Language acquisition: **Object-files** vs. **ensembles** as evidence for learners




Roadmap

- ✓ Big picture
- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind
- ✓ Psychosemantic proposal
- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

Evidence

- ✓ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling individual properties vs. summary statistics
- ✓ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over small & local vs. large & global domains
- ➔ Language acquisition: Object-files vs. ensembles as evidence for learners




Learners need to figure out:

Semantic category:

Quantity (not property)

→ Syntactic bootstrapping



Learners need to figure out:

Semantic category:


Quantity (not property)

→ Syntactic bootstrapping

Quantificational content:

Universal (not proportional, existential, etc.)

→ Pragmatic context



Learners need to figure out:

Semantic category:

Quantity (not property)

→ Syntactic bootstrapping


Quantificational content:

Universal (not proportional, existential, etc.)


→ Pragmatic context

Representational format:

First- vs. second-order universal



Object-files as route of semantic access



Object-files as route of semantic access



each frog is green

≈ Any thing that is a frog is s.t. it is green



Object-file representations (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman & Gibbs 1992)

→ Working memory limit of 3 (e.g., Feigenson & Carey 2005)



Object-files as route of semantic access


each frog is green

≈ Any thing that is a frog is s.t. it is green

↑
Object-file representations (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman & Gibbs 1992)

→ Working memory limit of 3 (e.g., Feigenson & Carey 2005)

Which concept of
universal quantification
does “each” pick out?



Each frog
is green



Object-files as route of semantic access


each frog is green

≈ Any thing that is a frog is s.t. it is green

↑
Object-file representations (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman & Gibbs 1992)

→ Working memory limit of 3 (e.g., Feigenson & Carey 2005)

Which concept of
universal quantification
does “each” pick out?



Each frog
is green




Each and *every* in child-directed speech


A photograph showing a woman in a red shirt and white shorts sitting at a wooden table, feeding a baby boy who is standing and reaching towards her. A blue rectangular box contains the text "You want one bite of each piece, huh?"

"You want one bite
of **each** piece, huh?"



Each and *every* in child-directed speech



Each and *every* in child-directed speech




Each and *every* in child-directed speech




each vs. *every*: $\chi^2=133.87$, $p<.001$
each vs. *all*: $\chi^2=5.37$, $p<.05$

Each and every in child-directed speech




Within working memory limit (< 4 items) ■ Yes ■ No



each vs. *every*: $\chi^2=16.25$, $p<.001$
each vs. *all*: $\chi^2=80.97$, $p<.001$


How are *each* & *every* acquired?




$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x)$
[Green(x)]

The F : Frog(F)
[$\forall x: F(x)$ [Green(x)]]

How are *each* & *every* acquired?




$\forall x: \text{Frog}(x)$
[Green(x)]




The F : Frog(F)
[$\forall x: F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$]

How are *each* & *every* acquired?




The F : $\text{Frog}(F)$
[$\forall x: F(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$]

How are *each* & *every* acquired?



How are *each* & *every* acquired?



Roadmap

✓ Big picture


- ✓ Linguistic meaning in the mind


✓ Psychosemantic proposal

- ✓ First-order *each*; Second-order *every*

✓ Evidence


- ✓ Sentence verification: Encoding & recalling **individual properties** vs. **summary statistics**
- ✓ Pragmatic use: Quantifying over **small & local** vs. **large & global** domains
- ✓ Language acquisition: **Object-files** vs. **ensembles** as evidence for learners






Probing the interface between linguistic meanings & non-linguistic cognitive systems can lead to a better understanding of:

- What meanings are



Probing the interface between linguistic meanings & non-linguistic cognitive systems can lead to a better understanding of:

- What meanings are
- How they're used



Probing the interface between linguistic meanings & non-linguistic cognitive systems can lead to a better understanding of:

- What meanings are
- How they're used
- How they're acquired

Thanks (to each & every one of you) for listening!

Collaborators on presented work:



Jeff Lidz



Anna Papafragou



Paul Pietroski



John Trueswell



Justin Halberda



Victor Gomes

Helpful discussants:

Nicolò Cesana-Arlotti
Alexander Williams
Valentine Hacquard
Ellen Lau
Florian Schwarz
Zoe Ovans
Darko Odic
Dan Swingley
Charles Yang
Liz Brannon
Sandy LaTourrette
Adam Liter
Yu'an Yang

RAs:

Simon Chervenak
Ebony Goldman
Alessandra Pintado-Urbanc



Language
at Maryland



Penn
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

mindCORE

Center for Outreach, Research, and Education

NSF NRT-1449815 & NSF BCS-2017525