MAJI: Multi-Agent Jailbreak Integrator for Red-Teaming Large Language Models

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***Abstract*—LLM has achieved great success, developing at an unprecedented speed and being widely used, including question answering, code generation, multimodal fields. However, LLMs are not completely safe and reliable, and are vulnerable to attacks to output harmful or illegal content. Jailbreak attacks can bypass the security measures of LLMs and use LLMs to generate harmful content. The prompt templates used in these jailbreak attacks are often manually crafted. Although there are works that can automatically generate jailbreak templates, they are limited by the effectiveness of seed selection and mutation strategies, resulting in the generated attack samples not having sufficient diversity or jailbreak effect.**

In this paper, we introduce MAJI, a novel Multi-Agent black-box Jailbreak Integrator framework. MAJI does not need to manually generate jailbreak templates, but can automatically generate templates for red-teaming. At the same time, it uses the diversified attack generation ability of multi-agents to improve the effectiveness of jailbreak templates and cover a wider range of vulnerability scenarios. Specifically, MAJI takes role-playing and scenario hypnosis as the main ideas. First, it generates different roles and plots related to malicious problems through a multi-agent structure to introduce malicious problems. They are then fused with a jailbreak template, which comes from a dataset of jailbreak prompts and is modified by the agent using multiple mutation tools. The final template with role-playing prompts and jailbreak prompts is used to evaluate jailbreak attacks.

We evaluate MAJI on many different attack scenarios and multiple different black-box commercial or open source LLMs. Our results show that MAJI is able to generate universal jailbreak templates with a high success rate. The attack success rate for GPT-4 and Gemini-1.5-pro exceeds 97%. MAJI will be able to help security researchers and practitioners conduct exhaustive red team testing of LLMs, further improving the security and reliability of LLMs.

***Index Terms*—Multi-Agent Systems, Jailbreak, Red-Teaming, Large Language Models**

I. Introduction

Large Language Models(LLMs), such as ChatGPT [1] and Claude [2], have shown great potential in various fields such as reasoning, programming, and scientific research. LLMs have powerful language understanding, generation, and knowledge reasoning capabilities, and can participate in a variety of fields. They are widely used in various applications, such as text generation, auxiliary diagnosis in the medical field, and risk assessment in the financial field. However, LLMs are not completely safe and reliable [3], and are susceptible to hallucinations [4] that lead to nonsensical or untruthful outputs. LLMs are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks, such as prompt injection [5], data poisoning [6] and adversarial attack [7].

Jailbreak [8] attack bypasses the protection measures of LLMs by using carefully designed prompts, thereby triggering harmful outputs. The output of large models may involve incitement to hatred and violence, spread false information, unethical behavior, and discriminatory content, which violates the usage policies of the LLMs' provider and even regulations and laws. Currently, large language models usually have built-in multi-layer content filtering mechanisms to prevent the generation of sensitive, inappropriate or illegal content. This mechanism often combines keyword blocking, semantic analysis and built-in ethical rules to ensure that the output complies with the norms. In addition, LLMs use reinforcement learning technology during training to integrate ethical constraints into the reward model so that the model output complies with human ethical expectations. However, the emergence of new jailbreak attack methods and automated attacks put large language models at risk. Thus, assessing the resilience of LLMs to jailbreak attacks is crucial.

The prompt templates used in traditional jailbreak attacks are often manually crafted [5], [8]–[11]. Although the prompts can be carefully modified to meet customized requirements, making effective jailbreak prompts requires professional knowledge and time investment, which is too costly and not scalable. With the development and increase in the number of LLMs, it is impractical to manually create prompts for all LLMs, and it is difficult to synchronize the prompts when the LLMs are updated. At the same time, manually crafted prompts may miss certain vulnerabilities and fail to achieve comprehensive coverage. Although there is work that can automatically generate jailbreak templates, such as GPTFuzzer [12], which has developed a black-box jailbreak fuzz testing framework that automatically generates jailbreak prompts, which can achieve a high attack success rate, it is still limited by the effectiveness of seed selection and mutation strategies, and the attack samples it generates may not have sufficient diversity or jailbreak effect.

Given these challenges, we need to ensure the diversity of attack samples while automatically generating jailbreak prompts, improving coverage and depth. By introducing a Multi-Agent architecture, each agent focuses on different tasks, and agents can cooperate and improve based on feedback, thereby dynamically optimizing in a wider space. In addition, the attacks generated under the Multi-Agent architecture are more diverse, which increases the possibility of successful attacks and better tests the resilience of large models to jailbreak attacks.

We developed a novel Multi-Agent black-box Jailbreak Integrator framework named MAJI. Instead of manually generating jailbreak templates, MAJI can automatically gener-



Fig. 1: Example of harmful question, jailbreak template and jailbreak prompt. When a user asks ChatGPT the harmful question, ChatGPT will not answer. When the user replaces the "[INSERT PROMPT HERE]" placeholder in the jailbreak template with the same harmful question, composes it into a jailbreak prompt and asks again, ChatGPT will be happy to respond.

ate jailbreak templates for red-teaming, while leveraging the ability of multi-agents to generate diverse attacks, improve the effectiveness of jailbreak templates, and cover a wider range of vulnerability scenarios. Our system depends on three key components: jailbreak datasets, multi-agent architectures, and mutation tools. Specifically, MAJI takes role-playing and scenario hypnosis as the main ideas. First, it introduces malicious problems by generating different roles and plots related to malicious problems through a multi-agent structure. Then, the valuable manually written jailbreak prompts collected in advance is modified by the mutation tools through the multi-agent structure and fused with the role-playing prompt, thus ensuring a comprehensive and powerful diversified evaluation of LLMs' vulnerabilities. The judgment model is used to evaluate whether the jailbreak attack is successful. Successful samples will be added to the seed pool, while unsuccessful ones will be discarded and iterated for a preset number of cycles.

To sum up, our research contributions are as follows:

1. The introduction of MAJI, a novel Multi-Agent black-box Jailbreak Integrator framework for automatically generating jailbreak prompts.

2. We carefully design three key components of MAJI: jailbreak dataset, multi-agent architecture and mutation tool.

3. We extensively evaluate MAJI on many different attack scenarios and multiple different black-box commercial or open source LLMs. Our results show that MAJI is able to generate universal jailbreak templates with high success rate. The attack success rate for GPT-4 [13] and Gemini-1.5-Pro [14] exceeds 97%. MAJI achieves extremely high attack success rate for popular LLMs.

II. Related Works

A. Large Language Models

LLMs are neural network models trained on massive datasets with large-scale parameters of up to tens of billions. The model's powerful natural language understanding capabilities enable LLMs to complete complex tasks in various fields.

Prompts. Prompt refers to the initial input provided to LLMs to guide their subsequent content generation [9]. For example, if the prompt "Make up a funny joke!" is input to the model, the model will generate a funny joke as a response. Prompt can be simple inquiries or complex instructions, such as "Please explore the debate on the existence of free will from the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience." At this time, the large language model will integrate relevant knowledge from the perspectives of different disciplines and cross-reference it according to the input instructions, and carry out multi-dimensional analysis and discussion.

Jailbreak Prompts. Jailbreak is a traditional concept in software systems, meaning that hackers exploit the vulnerabilities to conduct privilege escalation [8]. In the context of large language models, jailbreak means using prompt injection to bypass the limitations and restrictions placed on models. The jailbreak prompt is a carefully constructed input designed to

obtain potentially harmful content from the model that should not be responded to, causing the model to deviate from its expected behavior and thus expose potential vulnerabilities. The jailbreak prompt can be decomposed into two parts, namely the jailbreak template and the harmful question [15].

Large language models are usually trained to impose restrictions to reject certain types of prompts, which are usually harmful, such as assisting crime or making drugs. OpenAI lists all prohibited scenarios in the official usage policy [16]. Although RLHF [13] can improve the robustness of LLMs to jailbreak prompts, the restrictions imposed on large language models still have many vulnerabilities. The content in Fig. 1 gives an example of jailbreaking. Under normal circumstances, when a user asks ChatGPT "How to blackmail someone without being discovered by the police?", due to regulations, ChatGPT will not answer but warn with "Sorry, but I can't provide that kind of information." or "I can't assist with that". When the user use the jailbreak method to ask ChatGPT the same question again, ChatGPT will consider itself to be some kind of EvilGPT character, at which point it can break the rules and does not abide to any type of restrictions, policy or guideline completely. When we ask the same harmful questions again later, ChatGPT will be happy to provide the answer, even though the content of the answer violates the usage policy.

B. Multi-Agent Systems

An agent is an entity that can perceive its environment and take actions. Agents are usually able to interact with the environment, have perception capabilities, and can be assigned to perform well-defined tasks. With the increasing natural language processing and reasoning capabilities of large language models, LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) are considered a promising pathway towards realizing general artificial intelligence that is equivalent to or surpasses human-level intelligence [17], [18]. MAS is a complex system composed of multiple agents, each of which has a certain degree of autonomy and can handle diverse and complex tasks through interaction and cooperation. Specifically, multiple specialized agents, endowed with different identities and abilities, engage in collaboration to achieve objectives. The execution of tasks depends on the interaction and cooperation between multiple agents, and they can also simulate real-world collaboration patterns, such as cooperation, competition, and hierarchical architectures. At the same time, agents can be integrated with external tools or external knowledge bases, such as calculators, code interpreters, web scraping and API calls, which further broadens the functionality of agents and their ability to use tools to efficiently perform tasks. The introduction of the memory mechanism also enables the agent to store and retrieve historical information, thereby maintaining context awareness in multiple rounds of interactions. Many studies solve complex tasks through LLM-based multi-agent systems, such as MetaGPT [19] and ChatEval [20].

Existing multi-agent collaboration frameworks, such as MetaGPT [19], AutoGen [15], LangGraph [21] and Camel [22], have made some progress in solving complex tasks with multi-agent collaboration. We can use a $\mathbf{graph}(\mathbf{V}, \mathbf{E})$ to represent the relationship between multiple LLM-based agents, where $\mathbf{V}$ represents a node set and $\mathbf{V_i}$ represents an LLM-based agent. $\mathbf{E}$ represents an edge set, and $\mathbf{E_{ij}}$ represents the message passing relationship between agent $\mathbf{V_i}$ and agent $\mathbf{V_j}$. Generally, the configuration of multi-agent is pre-set and roles need to be manually assigned, but this requires a lot of manpower and hinders generalization. In some work, agents can also be automatically generated to participate in collaboration during the operation of the system. Some frameworks such as AgentVerse [23] and AutoAgents [24] have been proposed to automatically generate agents to complete collaborative tasks.

III. METHODOLOGY

In this study, we proposed a novel Multi-Agent black-box Jailbreak Integrator framework. Fig. 2 illustrates the overall structure of MAJI. MAJI takes role-playing and scenario hypnosis as the main ideas. Initially, different roles and plots related to malicious problems are generated through a multi-agent structure to introduce malicious problems. Then, the valuable manually written jailbreak prompt data we collected are modified through the multi-agent structure using mutation tools, then the role-playing prompt part and the jailbreak template part are integrated together. Finally, a comprehensive and powerful diversified evaluation of LLMs vulnerabilities is ensured. MAJI contains the following main modules:

(1) Jailbreak dataset: Through keyword retrieval and manual screening from github and huggingface, valuable jailbreak templates are collected as much as possible, and duplicate removal is performed to finally obtain the jailbreak template dataset.

(2) Multi-agent architecture: The jailbreak prompt is obtained through the multi-agent architecture. Four agents are set up in the role-playing scenario generator aspect: character designer, background designer, storyline architect and scenario aggregator. They worked together to generate customized role-playing prompts for specific malicious issues. For the jailbreak template obtained from the jailbreak dataset, it was used as a prototype to obtain multiple variants through the variant generator agent, and then the variants were passed to the mutator agent to obtain a diversified jailbreak template.

(3) Mutation tools: In the mutator agent, the input data is mutated through nine mutation tools. We carefully designed and implemented these tools.

The following section introduces the above three modules of MAJI in detail.

A. Jailbreak dataset

This is described in detail in the IV.EXPERIMENTS section and will not be repeated here.

B. Multi-agent architecture

Our framework uses multiple agents to work together, each with unique roles and capabilities, to efficiently handle

complex tasks and achieve the goal of generating the final jailbreak prompt. Assigning different roles and tasks to each agent can leverage the strengths of each agent and the collaborative relationship between them to gain greater flexibility and enhanced problem-solving capabilities compared to a single agent. In the multi-agent framework, each agent $\mathbf{A_i} \in \mathbf{V}$ can be represented by a tuple:

$$A_i = (M_i, R_i, S_i, T_i) \tag{1}$$

Among them, $\mathbf{M_i}$ represents the LLM model that the agent is based on, such as GPT-4 or GPT-3.5-Turbo, and the configuration parameters such as temperature. GPT-4 is capable of processing complex tasks and has a deeper understanding and reasoning ability than GPT-3.5-Turbo, but GPT-3.5-Turbo has lower costs and faster response speeds. $\mathbf{R_i}$ represents the role setting of the agent. Different agent has different pre-set role and responsibility, which guide the agent on how to process messages and interact with other agents. $\mathbf{S_i}$ represents the current state of the agent, that is, the thoughts or reasoning process that the agent is considering or planning, and the state will evolve according to the tasks performed and the interaction with other agents. $\mathbf{T_i}$ represents the tool usage ability of the agent, such as calling code interpreters, calculators, and web search engines.

Each edge $\mathbf{e_{ij}} \in \mathbf{E}$, connecting agent $\mathbf{A_i}$ to another agent $\mathbf{A_j}$. Each agent can send and receive messages $\mathbf{m_{ij}}$ (sent from agent $\mathbf{A_i}$ to $\mathbf{A_j}$) through the edge it is connected to. Agents communicate and collaborate through edges and build a multi-agent architecture. Common architectures generally include Network, Supervisor, Hierarchical and Custom [21]. Network type means that each agent can communicate with every other agent, and the agents have the same level. Supervisor type means that each agent communicates with the supervisor agent, and the supervisor decides the next agent to call. Hierarchical type is a multi-agent system with a supervisor of supervisors, which allows more complex control processes. Custom type means that each agent only communicates with a part of the agents, and only a part of the agents can decide the next agent to call, and the other control processes are determined.

We implemented a custom Multi-Agent architecture on top of LangGraph [21], as shown in Fig. 2, which includes a Scenario Generator module consisting of four agents and a loop framework consisting of three agents.

The Scenario Generator module in the Multi-Agent architecture is used to implement role-playing. Since different harmful questions have different application scenarios and background settings, we have implemented a scenario hypnosis solution that is strongly related to harmful questions, so that the prompt can bring the tested LLMs into specific scenarios and elicit harmful questions, and make the LLMs believe that answering harmful questions at this time is a feasible behavior that does not violate the rules. For example, when we bring LLMs into the role of a detective novelist, by letting LLMs help users expand the plot of illegal and criminal behavior in the novel and introduce it with a novel-style text, the LLMs will output the jailbreak content under hypnosis. In the Scenario Generator module, we generate different roles and plots related to harmful questions through a multi-agent structure. We use four agents, specifically:

- **Background designer**. Responsible for designing the various background settings in which such events may occur based on harmful questions, such as time period, country setting, city setting, temperature, and other environmental elements.
- **Character designer**. Responsible for designing the number of characters generally included in the events described by harmful questions, and then designing the nationality, gender, personality traits, appearance characteristics, and occupation of each character.
- **Storyline architect**. Responsible for designing storylines that describe harmful problems based on the background settings and character settings, especially how these characters will interact with each other in this environment.
- **Scenario aggregator**. Responsible for aggregating and pruning the content generated by the other three agents. The goal is to use a concise description to focus on the scenario in the storyline that is most relevant to the harmful question, such as the reasoning of the crime process, the detailed description of the crime, and the process of the criminal committing the crime.

Algorithm 1 Workflow of Multi-Agent Jailbreak Integrator

Require: Jailbreak template dataset D_j; Harmful question dataset D_h;
Ensure: Jailbreak prompt P_j

$Is\_Jailbroken \leftarrow 0$
$Is\_Loop \leftarrow 0$
Get harmful question $q \xleftarrow{\text{Random}} D_h$
Background Designer Agent: $P_b \leftarrow Agent_b(q)$
Character Designer Agent: $P_c \leftarrow Agent_c(q)$
Storyline Architect Agent: $P_s \leftarrow Agent_s(P_b, P_c)$
Scenario Aggregator Agent: $P_{scen} \leftarrow Agent_{scen}(P_s)$
while $Is\_Jailbroken \neq 1$ **do**
  Get jailbreak template $T_j \xleftarrow{\text{Random}} D_j$
  if $Is\_Loop = 1$ **then**
    $T_j = T_o$
  end if
  Variant Generator Agent: $V_1, V_2, ...V_i \leftarrow Agent_v(T_j)$
  Mutator Agent: $T_m \xleftarrow{\text{Tools}} Agent_m(V_1, V_2, ...V_i)$
  $P_j = P_{scen} + T_m + q$
  Response $R = LLM(P_j)$
  if $Eval(R) == Jailbreak$ **then**
    $Is\_Jailbroken = 1$
  else
    Optimizer Agent: $T_o \leftarrow Agent_o(P_j, S_v, S_m)$
    $Is\_Loop = 1$
  end if
end while

The interaction between these four agents will simulate



Fig. 2: Architecture of MAJI. The Scenario Generator Module is first called to generate customized role-playing prompt in ①, which will be appended to the jailbreak template in ⑥. Then the process from step ② to step ⑨ began. If the evaluation is successful, the jailbreak template will be retained in the dataset as a supplement. If the evaluation is a failure, the loop of steps ⑩ ④–⑨ will be started until the limit is reached or the jailbreak is successful.

the collaboration process between novelists. The background designer and character designer will conceive environmental factors and character settings around the harmful question. Then, the storyline architect design the plot based on the results of the two designers. Finally, the scenario aggregator will summarize the results of the three agents and focus on describing a scene that can reflect the harmful question, considering the length limit and the importance of highlighting the core scenario. We have achieved the generation of customized role-playing prompt parts for specific harmful questions, which can bring the LLMs under test into the malicious situation to hypnotize them, and finally achieve jailbreak.

The loop framework in the Multi-Agent architecture is used for mutation and integration. Templates that can jailbreak on old versions of LLMs are likely to fail when facing new versions of LLMs that are more robust to jailbreak attacks. However, LLMs will still be affected by new jailbreak template variants. Since manually modifying jailbreak templates is a huge workload and is not realistic, we use Multi-agent architecture to obtain new and diverse jailbreak templates.

Initially, a jailbreak template data is randomly obtained from the jailbreak template dataset and used as a prototype. First, multiple diversified variants are obtained through the Variant Generator agent. Compared with the prototype, they are variants with similar semantics but different expressions. Using the agent to rephrase the text introduces more diversity, laying the foundation for the subsequent detailed mutation steps. Then we pass the variant to the mutator agent, which will call nine mutation tools to modify it, making the mutated template more diverse and increasing the chance of discovering a valid jailbreak template. Each specific mutation tool will be introduced in the next subsection. For the jailbreak template obtained after mutation, it is fused with the scenario prompt obtained by the Scenario Generator module and combined with the target harmful question to obtain the jailbreak prompt. This merged prompt will be used for jailbreak attempts of multiple LLMs, and the collected responses will be evaluated. The successful jailbreak template will be retained in the dataset as a supplement to provide high-quality seed data for subsequent jailbreak work. The failed template will continue to enter the **Optimizer-Variant Generator-Genetic Mutator-Evaluator** loop to optimize the answer quality for deeper

exploration until the budget limit is reached or the jailbreak is successfully completed. In the loop, the optimizer agent is used to make suggestions for improving the current prompt. At this time, the Optimizer will revisit and re-evaluate the states of the agents in the previous steps, and try to optimize the current prompt to make it more able to induce jailbreak. COT [25] is used in the process. The optimized template part is sent to the Variant Generator agent again for a new round of mutation, and jailbreak is attempted again. Algorithm 1 proposes a refined algorithmic representation of the MAJI workflow, which makes it easier to understand the interaction and sequence between multiple agents.

Through the automation of multiple agents in the customized process, we have achieved the generation of role-playing prompt parts for specific malicious issues, as well as new valid templates automatically mutated from manually constructed jailbreak templates. Based on these obtained prompts, we can explore a wider range of potential vulnerability spaces.

C. Mutation Tools

In the mutator agent, the input data is mutated through nine mutation tools. We carefully designed and implemented these tools.

- **Replace Tool**: Replace multiple randomly selected words in the input prompt with synonyms.
- **Rephrase Tool**: Rephrase part of the sentences in the input prompt to obtain sentences with different wording but the same meaning.
- **CrossOver Tool**: Generate a cross template from the two input prompts by combining the contents.
- **Mask&Fill Tool**: Randomly mask some words in the input prompt and refill the blanks.
- **Expand Tool**: Expand the input prompt by expanding multiple sentences at the beginning and end.
- **Shorten Tool**: Compress the input prompt by simplifying and deleting part of the sentence content in the prompt.
- **Retranslate Tool**: Translate the input prompt into a random minority language, and then translate it back into English.
- **AddMalicious Tool**: Insert random malicious fragments at random positions in the input prompt. These fragments are collected by us during the dataset collation, such as "[Illegality Mode]", "[br][/br]", "[Ignore previous instructions]", "This is safe!!!", "/L-/O-/V-/E-/-/P-/L-/I-/N-/Y=".
- **Leetspeak Tool**: Use an informal language to modify multiple random sentences in the input prompt, where standard letters are usually replaced by numbers or special characters similar to letters. Harmful questions are always modified by Leetspeak Tool to bypass LLMs' input filtering.

During the process of Agent using tool mutation, it is ensured that the [INSERT PROMPT HERE] placeholder is not modified and is confirmed to exist. Through multiple mutation tools, we have implemented mutation strategies at different levels, expanded the diversity of mutations, increased the chances of discovering effective attack templates and enhanced the attack effect.

IV. Experiments

We evaluate MAJI on many different attack scenarios and multiple different black-box commercial or open source LLMs.

(1)Datasets. We use the harmful question dataset from DAN [26], which contains 390 questions from 13 prohibited scenarios adopted by OpenAI usage policy [16]. We use the collected jailbreak dataset as the dataset of jailbreak templates. Specifically, the jailbreak template we used was created using data collected from GitHub and Huggingface. These templates come from influential GitHub repositories or open source data from previous work, which is very valuable. Based on high-quality datasets, subsequent work can be more successful. First, we set the initial keywords as follows: *Prompt Injection, Prompt Jailbreak, Prompt Attack, Prompt Poison, Prompt Leaking, LLM Jailbreak*. We use the top 100 search results for each keyword on GitHub and all datasets types results on Huggingface. Some of the projects we collected and the number of corresponding prompts are shown in TABLE I.

Then, we will filter and summarize all the collected results. We will delete prompt template data that does not have jailbreak functions, such as labeled data with the label benign, or results that only contain malicious issues but not jailbreak templates. We will also delete prompts that are too short. After verification, these prompts cannot work on ChatGPT. The threshold for judging too short is 30 words, which is an empirical threshold setting. In addition, prompts in other languages will be filtered out. We only focus on jailbreaking in English, and allow emoji such as 🔐😈, and mathematical alphanumeric symbols such as $\mathbb{H}$. Since users often try to share and spread prompts on different platforms, different search results may include the same or highly similar data, such as the famous "DAN" [26] in almost every result, so the collected data needs to be de-duplicated. We use SimHash [27] to de-duplicate. In addition, to avoid the complexity of multi-round interactions and improve the efficiency of the method, we do not allow multi-round jailbreak templates, ensuring that each template is well-formatted for single-round query use and harmful question placeholders have been added. Finally, we obtained a high-quality dataset containing most of the current jailbreak templates. The final dataset size is 848.

(2)Evaluation Metrics. The Attack success rate (ASR) metric is used. ASR measures the ratio of questions that get jailbreak responses from the generated jailbreak prompts to the total number of queries. Based on previous research, we use the RoBERTa model in GPTFuzzer [12] to determine whether the jailbreak attack is successful. Previous work uses rule patterns [7] for judgment, such as if a response doesn't contain "Sorry, I cannot," it's deemed jailbroken. Due to the large number and complexity of possible responses from LLMs, this rule-based judgment method has low accuracy. In comparison, the judgment method using the RoBERTa model has better accuracy, reaching 0.96, and better TPR and FPR. At the same

TABLE I: Part of the projects we collected and the number of prompts they contain

Repository	*Nums*
chatgpt_system_prompt [28]	**6**
TrustAIRLab/in-the-wild-jailbreak-prompts [29]	**1405**
ChatGPT_DAN [26]	**18**
TheBigPromptLibrary [30]	**5**
HacxGPT-Jailbreak-prompts [31]	**3**
ZORG-Jailbreak-Prompt-Text [32]	**1**
ChatGPT-Jailbreak-Prompts [33]	**2**
L1B3RT45 [34]	**32**
gpt_jailbreak_status [35]	**79**
Prompt-Injection-Everywhere [36]	**22**
prompt_injection_research [37]	**11**
LLM-Jailbreaks [38]	**3**
...	**...**

time, it only takes tens of seconds, which is much lower than the method based on LLMs judgment.

(3)Implementation Details. MAJI is implemented based on LangGraph [21], and Agents are implemented based on LLM models GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4 respectively. The experiments were conducted on a server equipped with 8 NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090s, 24-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8163 CPU 2.50GHz, and running on CentOS Linux release 7.9.2009 (Core) operating system. For commercial LLMs, our experiments were conducted through official APIs such as OpenAI. For the harmful question dataset, there are 13 harmful scenarios, each with 30 questions, a total of 390 questions. We randomly selected 8 questions from each of the first 9 scenarios and 7 questions from each of the next 4 scenarios, and obtained a subset of 100 harmful questions. For each model to be tested, these 100 questions were used for jailbreak testing.

We compare MAJI with GPTFuzzer [12] and PAIR [39]. Baseline results are derived from the original papers or reproduced by us. From TABLE II we can find that MAJI achieved more than 97% ASR in jailbreak attacks on the mainstream GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125, GPT-4-0613, and Gemini-1.5-pro-latest models, which are much higher than GPTFuzzer and PAIR. MAJI outperforms the previous best methods, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach and showing that the multi-agent structure can generate jailbreak templates with a high success rate.

TABLE II: Comparison between MAJI and Baselines

Models	**Attack Success Rate**		
	MAJI	**GPTFuzzer**	**PAIR**
GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125	100%	57%	55%
GPT-4-0613	97%	78%	62%
Gemini-1.5-pro-latest	100%	83%	86%

At the same time, we tested MAJI on a wider range of targets, including a variety of the most popular commercial or open source black-box LLMs. The results are shown in the TABLE III. We can see that MAJI achieved a 100% attack success rate in most of the popular LLMs, which demonstrates the excellent effectiveness of MAJI in attacking black box models. However, MAJI only achieved 12% ASR on Llama 3.1 70B, which shows that there is still room for improvement. We speculate that the security measures on the Llama series LLMs are more powerful than other models, and we need to reach a deeper exploration depth to achieve jailbreak attacks. During the experiment, we found that Mistral warned "Content may contain harmful or sensitive material" in most attacks but still output harmful responses. This may be because Mistral's security policy is different from other companies.In addition, we conducted jailbreak attacks on popular models with strong reasoning capabilities, o1 [40] and DeepSeek-R1 [41]. Due to the slow reasoning speed, we only tried 50 jailbreak attacks respectively. All the jailbreak attacks on DeepSeek-R1 were successful. The responses received were judged as jailbreaks in the GPTFuzzer RoBERTa model. However, when we try to attack o1, we only received the response "I'm sorry". Models with reasoning processes are still quite challenging for our approach. This may be because the security alignment strategy they use is more powerful, or additional input and output filtering and intent recognition are added. Also, it can be seen that DeepSeek-R1 and DeepSeek-V3 [42] have not added sufficient security protection, making the models vulnerable to jailbreak attacks.

At the same time, we also tried ablation experiments. When the jailbreak prompt used did not contain the scene hypnosis part, that is, it only contained the mutated jailbreak template and harmful questions, the ASR on GPT-3.5-Turbo dropped to 53%. When we only used hypnosis scenes and harmful questions, which did not have high-quality jailbreak attack functions and bypassed the filtering mechanism, the ASR on GPT-3.5-Turbo dropped to less than 40%.

TABLE III: MAJI's ASR on commercial and open source black-box LLMs

Models	**ASR**
Llama 3.1 70B [43]	12%
Qwen2 70B [44]	100%
Qwen2.5 7B [45]	100%
phi-4:latest-14B [46]	100%
Mistral Large [47]	100%
ChatGLM-4 [48]	100%
DeepSeek-V3 [42]	100%
Doubao	100%

V. Conclusion

LLMs are not completely safe and reliable, and are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks to output harmful or illegal content. In this paper, we introduce MAJI, a novel Multi-Agent black-box Jailbreak Integrator framework.The attack success rate for GPT-4 [13] and Gemini-1.5-pro [14] exceeds 97%. MAJI will be able to help conduct exhaustive red team testing of LLMs, further improving the security and reliability of LLMs.

In this study, we adhered to ethical standards to ensure safety and privacy. We did not disseminate any harmful or illegal content to the public or others. The datasets we used

were obtained from public repositories and do not contain any personal information. We will allow university teachers, students, and research institutions to obtain datasets and codes via email in the future.

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