Incremental Exploits: Efficient Jailbreak on Large Language Models with Multi-round Interactions

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***Abstract*—As large language models (LLMs) become widely deployed across various domains, security concerns, particularly jailbreaks that circumvent built-in safety mechanisms, have posed significant risks. Existing jailbreak methods primarily focus on single-turn interactions and face limitations in generalizability across different models and contexts, often exhibiting O(n) search complexity, where computational costs increase linearly with the attack scale. In this paper, we present Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak (MIEJ), a novel attack methodology that leverages the inherent conflict between the safety alignment mechanisms of LLMs and their contextual learning objectives during multi-turn dialogues. Our approach systematically circumvents AI safeguards by incrementally injecting adversarial content over multiple conversation rounds, achieving O(1) search complexity, which remains constant regardless of the attack scale. Compared to existing methods, MIEJ demonstrates superior efficiency (constant-time attacks), applicability (black-box deployment), transferability (cross-model generalization), and effectiveness (over 90% average success rate). Our findings expose vulnerabilities in current LLMs during extended conversations and highlight the need for improved safety mechanisms addressing multi-round interactions.**

***Index Terms*—Large Language Models, Model Vulnerability, Jailbreak**

I. Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of natural language tasks, including text generation, conversational systems, and content recommendation, achieving notable success [1]–[3]. Nevertheless, their impressive capabilities are accompanied by growing security concerns, particularly regarding jailbreaks, which have become a prominent focus of current research [4]. Jailbreaks involve carefully engineered inputs to circumvent LLMs' safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of unsafe content that may pose risks to users [5].

However, existing jailbreaks primarily focus on single-turn interactions and can be broadly categorized into *optimization-based* and *prompt-based* approaches. Optimization-based approaches leverage various algorithms, such as a combination of greedy search and gradient-based techniques [6], to exploit vulnerabilities in the model's internal structure or training process [7], [8]. Prompt-based approaches aim to craft prompts that elicit unintended harmful responses from LLMs. These methods often rely on linguistic manipulation to covertly induce harmful outputs.

Generally, these methods primarily function as single-turn jailbreaks, seeking to bypass safety mechanisms using a single well-crafted adversarial prompt [6] or a fabricated conversation [9], as shown in Figure 1. Although such approaches can achieve some success, they are often constrained by the directness and simplicity of single-turn interactions, failing to take advantage of LLMs' in-context learning capabilities [10] and the potential for multi-turn manipulation to better obscure the attacker's intent. With current LLMs achieving greater comprehensiveness in safety alignment [11], [12], they have become increasingly proficient at detecting inadequately concealed harmful intents. Consequently, single-turn jailbreaks face growing limitations, as they address isolated prompts without continuity, making it challenging to scale attacks or maintain context across multiple interactions.

In light of these limitations, we present *Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak (MIEJ)*, a novel method that utilizes the in-context learning capabilities of LLMs and their tendency for maintaining conversational continuity to subtly steer the model towards generating malicious content. We observe that humans typically adopt a *salami slicing tactic* to gradually achieve desired goals through multiple rounds, avoiding significant escalation or avoidance [13]. Inspired by this, we adopt a step-by-step conversational strategy, breaking down a single-turn request into smaller, less conspicuous components spread across several interactions. In this framework, we define a turn as a single interaction comprising a query and its corresponding response, and a round as a sequence of turns, where each turn is associated with a progressively increasing maliciousness threshold. As increasingly malicious content is introduced incrementally over multiple rounds, the model's inherent drive to maintain contextual consistency [14] gradually overshadows its safety mechanisms. Over time, this process erodes the model's safety alignment, established during training, leading to behavioral drift and, ultimately, the generation of harmful outputs in the course of an extended conversation.

However, designing conversational interactions that subtly manipulate the model without prematurely triggering its safety mechanisms presents significant challenges. A sudden increase in malicious intent heightens the likelihood of the model issuing a refusal, disrupting the conversation flow and making incremental malicious attempts harder to sustain. Once a refusal is triggered, the model becomes more vigilant and resistant to further manipulations. To address these challenges, we propose an incremental exploitation prompt generation mechanism, structured to facilitate the creation of conversation flows with progressively escalating levels of malice. These prompts are organized into different security topics, each containing progressively severe levels of malice. With these malice-escalation prompts, we can rigorously evaluate



Fig. 1: **Comparison of single-turn and multi-turn jailbreaks**. Single-turn jailbreaks rely on a single adversarial prompt to bypass safety mechanisms. Many-Shot Jailbreaking uses hundreds of demonstrations to fabricate dialogue history, which is essentially a type of single-turn jailbreak. Multi-turn jailbreaks incrementally manipulate the model over multiple interactions, breaking down harmful requests into smaller, less detectable steps.

LLMs' vulnerability to Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak by introducing incrementally escalating malicious content. The structured levels of malice allow us to simulate progressive attacks, revealing how models react to subtle shifts in malicious intent over extended interactions.

TABLE I: Comparison of Different Jailbreaking Attack Methods. We define search complexity as a metric that quantifies all computational resources and methodological efforts (e.g., querying the model) invested in crafting the final jailbreak prompt prior to its actual presentation to the target model.

Method	Knowledge Requirement	Search Complexity	Transfer-ability
GCG [6]	White-box	O(n)	×
PAIR [7]	Black-box	O(n)	+
TAP [15]	Black-box	O(n)	+
GPTFuzzer [16]	Black-box	O(n)	++
ActorAttack [17]	Black-box	O(n)	++
Human [18]	Black-box	O(n)	+
MIEJ (Ours)	**Black-box**	**O(1)**	**+++**

We summarize the advantages of our approach as follows:

- *Efficiency*: To the best of our knowledge, MIEJ demonstrates the first jailbreak achieving O(1) complexity that decouples computational effort from the attack scale, while the previous ones are mostly O(n). Specifically, MIEJ requires only a single injection of malicious context. Once this initial setup is complete, no additional queries and computations are needed for subsequent requests.
- *Applicability*: MIEJ works effectively in black-box setting, for it leverages the common capability of in-context learning of LLMs, making it still effective on state-of-the-art safety-aligned models like GPT-4 [1].
- *Transferability*: MIEJ demonstrates cross-model adaptability by generating universal adversarial contexts through a single setup. Unlike methods requiring model-specific tuning or suffering from overfitting, MIEJ seamlessly transfers attacks across different model architectures without additional queries, achieving practical generalization in real-world scenarios.
- *Effectiveness*: MIEJ achieves a higher jailbreak success rate compared to existing methods. By engaging the model in a series of interactions that incrementally introduce malicious content, MIEJ can more effectively bypass safety alignment. Specifically, MIEJ demonstrates an impressive average jailbreak success rate exceeding 90% across the evaluated models, outperforming baseline methods by a significant margin.

II. Related Work

Optimization-based attacks. These jailbreaks typically utilize optimization algorithms to manipulate model inputs or modify the model itself to induce the generation of harmful outputs, including gradient-based, logit-based, and fine-tuning-based approaches [19]. Gradient-based attacks append optimizable prefixes or suffixes to the original prompts, leveraging gradient information to adjust inputs and guide the language model toward producing targeted malicious content. Typically, Zou *et al*. [6] proposed the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) method, which appends an adversarial suffix and iteratively calculates the optimal substitution for each position, successfully executing attacks across various models. In certain scenarios, although attackers may not have full access to the model's internal information, they can still exploit logit-based attacks to manipulate the decoding process, influencing the token selection and inducing harmful outputs [20], [21]. In contrast, fine-tuning-based attacks involve retraining the model with malicious data, which reduces its safety alignment and renders the model more vulnerable to jailbreak attempts [22], [23]. These optimization-based attacks often rely heavily on internal model knowledge in white-box scenarios. Additionally, many approaches require multiple queries or even fine-tuning, which increases the attack cost.

Prompt-based attacks. These attacks bypass LLM safety mechanisms by crafting prompts to induce harmful outputs. Common strategies include designing deceptive scenarios (e.g., role-playing) [7], [24], using low-resource languages [25], encryption [26], or structural modifications to mask malicious intent. While these strategies can be effective, they often rely on static, manually crafted templates, limiting adaptability. More advanced methods use LLMs to generate



Fig. 2: **Overview of the proposed MIEJ.** In attack preparation, we developed incremental exploitation prompts for MIEJ implementation, categorized by security topics and levels of malice, with a peer-review process for objectivity and LLM augmentation for variety. In attack implementation, the attacker extracts prompts from the attack prompt pool in each round. The focus is on queries with escalating malice that involve different security topics, gradually breaching the security defenses of the LLMs.

adversarial prompts [15], [27], [28], reducing human involvement, increasing the variety and efficiency of attacks, but also raising the overall cost and complexity of execution. Many-shot Jailbreaking [9] exploits LLMs' in-context learning by injecting fabricated dialogues to manipulate outputs. However, these attacks require high-cost curation of massive malicious QA pairs, and their synthetic dialogues struggle to capture authentic conversational nuances, resulting in low success rates due to lacking real interactions' contextual depth.

III. Method

Figure 2 provides an overview of our Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak (**MIEJ**), a novel approach that leverages the long-context window, in-context learning ability of LLMs. The MIEJ method consists of two primary stages. First, we construct incremental exploitation prompts categorized into six distinct security topics, with each topic further divided into graded levels of malice. Second, by submitting these queries in a progressively harmful manner, the MIEJ exploits the LLM's response tendencies to gradually compromise its safety measures, ultimately leading to the output of unsafe content and a successful jailbreak.

A. Problem Statement

Threat model. The primary objective of jailbreaks is to bypass the ethical and safety constraints imposed on LLMs, such as those aligned with human values or developer-enforced guidelines, in order to compel the model to respond to malicious queries rather than refuse to answer. In our threat model, we consider a realistic conversation scenario similar to typical AI assistant deployments, where an attacker operates in a black-box environment engaging in a multi-round conversation with the LLM, as illustrated in Figure 1. The attacker submits a sequence of queries $Q = \{q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_n\}$, to which the model generates corresponding responses $R = \{r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n\}$. Each response r_i is conditioned on the entire prior conversation history $X = \{q_1, r_1, q_2, r_2, \ldots, q_i\}$, distinguishing our approach from traditional single-turn jailbreaks. The goal of the MIEJ is to ensure that after n turns of interaction, the final query elicits a response that provides an answer closely aligned with the malicious query, rather than the model producing a refusal message consistent with human-aligned values.

Formulation. Formally, we present the target LLM as $\mathcal{T}(x)$, where x is the input context. In the Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak scenario, we define the model's input at the beginning of each turn t as $\mathbf{x}_t$, where $\mathbf{x}_t$ consists of the conversation history from the previous $t-1$ turns combined with the attacker's current query q_t. Assuming the attack spans n turns, the attacker submits the target query q_{target}, which represents the jailbreak goal. The model's full context at this point is denoted as C, and the corresponding final response is r. Thus, the objective of our jailbreak can be formalized as

$$\max S(C, r), \text{with } r = \mathcal{T}(C), \tag{1}$$

where $S(C, r)$ represents the judge score, measuring the harmfulness of response r given the context C, and is typically obtained from an LLM, such as GPT-4o, which is capable of assessing the harmfulness of the generated content.

B. Attack Preparation

Motivation and insight. Previously, Anil *et al.* [9] leveraged the in-context learning capabilities of LLMs to develop Many-shot Jailbreaking. These methods prompt the model with fabricated conversations containing queries that the model would typically reject, and a notable scaling trend with the number of in-context demonstrations has been observed. However, these methods often rely on manually curated malicious question-answer pairs that are embedded within the prompt, simulating a conversation between an AI assistant and a user. For black-box LLMs, the prompt construction process based on user queries remains opaque.

Inspired by these works, our aim is to explore the vulnerability of LLMs in real conversational settings, focusing on exploiting their long-context windows. Due to the autoregressive nature of LLMs, which aim to generate highly probable sequences of text, the generation process is strongly

influenced by prior context [14]. We hypothesize that this creates a *response inertia* in interactions with LLMs. Specifically, by engaging in a multi-round conversation that begins with minimally harmful queries and gradually escalates in harmfulness, prior queries along with their corresponding responses form the context for subsequent interactions. This incremental approach increases the likelihood of the model responding to a harmful query compared to directly posing the target question. Intuitively, this query-response chain serves as a series of demonstrations that align more closely with the internal logic of the model.

Incremental exploitation prompts construction. To support MIEJ in generating malicious incremental conversation contexts, we introduce the Incremental Exploitation Prompt Generation Mechanism, which is designed to implement MIEJ based on a comprehensive conversation safety taxonomy. To counteract fine-tuning defenses targeting all malicious prompts, we generate adversarial prompts dynamically. Additionally, we provide a snapshot version of the Incremental Exploitation Prompts to ensure reproducibility and facilitate analysis. The generated prompts can be categorized into six key types to cover a broad range of safety concerns [29]–[31]: *National Security*, *Child Abuse*, *Physical Harm*, *Scams and Fraud*, *Self-mutilation*, and *General Illegal Acts*. This categorization aligns with the safety commitments of leading AI organizations: OpenAI explicitly prohibits AI-generated misleading content in political advertising **(National Security)** [29], enforces user data protection to prevent identity theft and financial fraud **(Scams and Fraud)** [29], while MetaAI addresses physical safety risks through anti-bullying protocols **(Physical Harm)** and suicide prevention mechanisms **(Self-mutilation)** [30]. Both OpenAI and Anthropic prioritize child protection with multi-layered safeguards against exploitation risks **(Child Abuse)** [29], [31]. Each security topic is further divided into four levels of malice, ranging from *Low* to *Very High*.

Furthermore, the prompts generated by our mechanism include parallel versions in ten languages, including English, with languages selected from low, medium, and high-resource security topics, following the guidelines by Deng *et al*. [25].

To ensure the objectivity of the generation mechanism and neutrality, we adopt a rigorous peer-review approach. Six experts specializing in ethical AI independently crafted adversarial prompts across six security topics and four levels of malice (Low to Very High). Each expert independently ranked the data entries, and only prompts with consistent rankings (inter-rater agreement > 0.85, measured by Fleiss' Kappa [32]) were included. These manually curated prompts were then augmented using few-shot learning with large language models (LLMs), expanding the malicious prompts while preserving the original malice level annotations.

To validate the malice level alignment of the expanded prompts, we implemented a two-stage verification framework:

Multi-Class Classification: A fine-tuned XLM-RoBERTa model [33], trained on the expert-labeled prompts, predicted malice levels with 92.3% accuracy and a 91.8% macro-F1 score.

Expert Consensus Validation: If the model prediction confidence fell below 85%, those prompts were re-evaluated.

C. Attack Implementation

To conduct MIEJ, the attacker progressively introduces harmful queries, bypassing the alignment constraints of LLMs, and induces the model to generate harmful responses. The key to the attack lies in exploiting the conversation history context, gradually increasing the malice of the conversation, and accumulating unsafe content over multiple interactions.

Gradual escalation of multi-round queries. Given the predefined set of incremental exploitation prompts $Q = \{Q_{l,c} \mid l \in \{1, 2, \ldots, l_{\text{max}}\}, c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, c_{\text{max}}\}\}$, where each $Q_{l,c}$ represents a set of prompts under malice level l and security topic c. During the i-th query, the attacker generates a prompt $q_i \in Q_{l,c}$ from the current malice level and security topic, and queries the target model $\mathcal{T}$. The model generates a response $r'_i = T(x_i)$, which is then evaluated by an external system based on a harmfulness score $S(x_i, r'_i) \in [1, 5]$. If the harmfulness score $S(x_i, r'_i)$ exceeds a predetermined threshold $S_{\text{threshold}}$, the response r'_i is accepted as r_i, meaning it is considered harmful enough to be part of the conversation history. Otherwise, the promptq_i and its corresponding response r'_i are discarded, and the attacker continues by generating another prompt from the same set $Q_{l,c}$.

The selection of prompts follows a structured procedure. At each malice level $l \in \{1, 2, \ldots, l_{\text{max}}\}$, the attacker sequentially selects prompts from all security topics $c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, c_{\text{max}}\}$. For each security topic c, the attacker queries the model with questions $x_i \in Q_{l,c}$ one at a time. Upon receiving a valid response r_i that meets the harm threshold, the attacker records the prompt and response. The attacker then selects another uncollected prompt from the same set and repeats this process. The attacker continues this process until k valid responses r_i that meet the harm threshold have been received (i.e., the count reaches k). At that point, the attacker proceeds to the next security topic within the same level. A **round** refers to the process of collecting k valid responses in each security topic **at a specific malice level**. Once all security topics at malice level l are completed, the attacker proceeds to the next level $l + 1$, repeating this process until reaching the final level l_{max} and security topic c_{max}.

The core of the attack lies in exploiting the accumulated conversation history to progressively steer the model into generating increasingly harmful responses. To achieve this, the attacker uses the current conversation history C at round t, where C_t is the concatenation of all previous prompts and accepted responses, represented as:

$$C_t = x_1 \oplus r_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus r_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus x_{i-1} \oplus r_{i-1}, \qquad (2)$$

with $\oplus$ denoting the concatenation operator and i representing the index of the current query in interactions. Using this context, the attacker selects a new prompt x_i from the pool of prompts at the current malice level and security topic $Q_{l,c}$

based on the accumulated conversation history and continues the interaction with the model:

$$x_i \sim Q_{l,c} \mid C_t. \tag{3}$$

Final target query. The attack process terminates once all prompts across all levels of malice l and security topics c after n rounds. The attacker accumulates the conversation context C_n, which includes all previous prompts and responses, forming the final context. The attacker aims to use this complete context C_n in conjunction with the target prompt x_{target} to induce the model to generate the most harmful final response r_{target}. This can be formalized as:

$$r_{\text{target}} = \mathcal{T}(C_n \oplus x_{\text{target}}) \tag{4}$$

where the goal is to construct C_n that maximizes the harmfulness score $S(C_n, x_{\text{target}})$, formalized as:

$$\arg\max_{C_n} S(C_n, r_{\text{target}}) \tag{5}$$

The jailbreak is deemed successful when the harmfulness score $S(C_n, r_{\text{target}})$ exceeds the threshold $S_{\text{threshold}}$. As the number of rounds increases, the harmfulness score $S(C_t, r_t)$ of the model's final response increases progressively with each round t. Our experiments confirm this, demonstrating what we refer to as *response inertia* in autoregressive LLMs: as the malice of the queries escalates, the model becomes likely to lower its guard and generate harmful responses.

IV. Experiments

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of MIEJ across various LLMs and security topics, comparing our results to state-of-the-art (SOTA) baselines, and subsequently exploring the integration of our method in multi-language scenarios. Furthermore, we conduct ablation studies to investigate the impact of query order, topic, and prompt quantity on the performance of our method.

A. Experimental Settings

Datasets and metrics. We conduct our experiments using the AdvBench benchmark dataset [6], which includes 520 prompts designed to elicit harmful information, as created by Chao *et al*. [7]. Additionally, we select a subset of the highest malice level prompts as the attack target set for topic-related experiments. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we employ the following metrics: (1) *Harmful score*: Since there is no definitive ground truth for measuring the harmfulness of the model's responses, we use GPT-4o to assess the harmfulness of the generated outputs. Following the approach outlined in [34], we categorize harmfulness into five levels, ranging from 1(Not Harmful) to 5(Very Harmful). Research suggests that GPT-4's evaluation capabilities are comparable to those of human annotators [35], providing a solid foundation for this automated assessment. (2) *JSR*: According to [34], a harmful score of 2 is defined as "contains misleading information or hints at harmful actions." We define a successful jailbreak when the harmful score is 2 or higher, indicating that the LLM has revealed malicious content. In our comparative experiment with 500 human-annotated samples, the harmfulness score threshold of 2 demonstrated a high Pearson correlation of 0.96 with human judgments. (3) *Number of queries*: This metric represents the number of queries required to successfully execute a jailbreak, reflecting the attack's efficiency.

Models. Our experiments are conducted on popular open-source models: ChatGLM3-6B [36], Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 [37],Qwen2-7B-Instruct [38], Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct [39], and Vicuna-7B-v1.5, as well as commercial closed-source models via API: GPT-3.5 (GPT-3.5-turbo-16k) and GPT-4 (GPT-4-32k) [1].

Comparison baselines. In our experiment, we compare our method against several attack recipes of jailbreaks: (1) Optimization-based attacks: GCG attack [6]; (2) Prompt-based attacks: PAIR [7], TAP [15], GPTfuzzer [16], Many-shot [9], ActorAttack [17] and Human [18]. All baselines are configured according to the optimal performance settings specified in the original papers to ensure both effectiveness and fairness.

Implementation details. The MIEJ is conducted in multi-round conversational settings. We utilize a set of attack prompts encompassing $C = 6$ major security topics, ranked into $L = 4$ levels of malice. Each conversation round involves querying the target model with $K = 2$ shots per security topic, randomly selected from the adversarial prompts. This yields a total of $K \times C = 12$ turns per round, with $L = 4$ rounds of conversations completed to constitute a comprehensive attack under default configuration.

B. Experimental Results



Fig. 3: An example of a successful jailbreak case using the MIEJ method on LLaMA-3-8B.

Effectiveness evaluation. We evaluate our MIEJ across various LLMs and security topics. For model evaluation, we apply default attack settings to all models, with target questions derived from AdvBench. Exceptionally, for Llama-3-8b, K is adjusted to 1 due to its limited context window, while for Qwen-2, K is set to 10 due to its long-context window. As illustrated in Table II, the MIEJ method achieves exceptionally high Jailbreak Success Rates (JSR), exceeding 97% across most open-source models and 70% across closed-source models. Additionally, the number of queries required remains minimal, averaging around 2 to 4 for most models, demonstrating the method's overall efficiency and effectiveness in achieving high success rates with minimal interaction. The proposed MIEJ effectively circumvents the models' safety mechanisms, prompting them to directly respond to malicious

TABLE II: Performance comparison of different jailbreaks on AdvBench in terms of JSR and average number of queries. Experiments maintain the same number number of shots between MIEJ and Many-shot. Many-shot does not require additional queries.

Category	Method	Metric	Vicuna-7b	Llama-3-70b	Llama-3-8b	Mistral	ChatGLM	Qwen-2	GPT-3.5-turbo	GPT-4
Single-Turn	GCG	JSR (%)	93.4	49.2	45.7	93.9	96.8	66.7	*GCG is only applicable*	
		Queries	256K	256K	256K	256K	256K	256K	*in white-box scenarios.*	
	TAP	JSR (%)	75.2	27.4	23.4	95.6	96.4	22.5	73.7	70.5
		Queries	18.3	25.3	27.8	6.3	6.1	28.2	18.9	19.1
	PAIR	JSR (%)	83.7	31.3	27.6	94.6	94.7	29.8	55.4	47.7
		Queries	14.3	20.8	24.6	9.6	7.6	26.4	19.3	20.5
	GPTfuzzer	JSR (%)	92.7	60.1	61.3	92.4	93.5	52.4	69.3	62.8
		Queries	9.5	17.5	17.4	7.1	8.1	19.2	16.9	17.3
	Many-shot	JSR (%)	16.2	1.7	0.3	54.3	28.7	1.2	3.3	2.4
		Queries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Multi-Turn	ActorAttack	JSR (%)	88.5	69.8	67.4	93.8	91.2	74.2	75.6	65.4
		Queries	5.3	5.8	6.4	6.9	5.8	**7.4**	6.7	7.1
	Human	JSR (%)	94.3	77.8	75.8	97.2	96.4	93.6	75.7	**71.3**
		Queries	6.4	6.5	6.8	8.9	9.3	12.6	10.3	10.8
	MIEJ (ours)	JSR (%)	**97.8**	**81.1**	**79.4**	**99.5**	**99.8**	**97.6**	**82.3**	71.1
		Queries	**2.6**	**3.9**	**4.0**	**2.2**	**2.5**	10.4	**4.3**	**5.2**

queries. It suggests that as the conversation continues, LLMs experience *unintended competition*, where the need for contextual coherence leads them to fulfill user requests, even as these requests become increasingly harmful. This highlights the challenge to safety alignment within multi-round interactions, as the models' in-context learning capabilities may override safety protocols, increasing the likelihood of harmful outputs over extended conversations. Figure 3 displays a successful jailbreak example on Llama-3-8b.

Comparison with other jailbreaks. We compare our method with SOTA jailbreak techniques using default configurations. The number of queries represents the average attempts to query a single target question. Since MIEJ only requires a complete progression of harmful queries through L conversational rounds to jailbreak all target questions, its search complexity is $O(1)$, independent of the number of target questions in the test dataset. As a result, as the dataset size increases, the average query count approaches 1, as shown in Figure 6. In contrast, other jailbreak methods typically require multiple iterative queries for each harmful question, resulting in a complexity of $O(n)$, where n represents the number of target questions in the test dataset. This iterative querying strategy leads to significantly higher query costs and time overhead in large-scale test datasets. As shown in Table II, MIEJ outperforms other baselines in Jailbreak Success Rate (JSR) while utilizing fewer queries across both open-source and proprietary models.

In contrast to the most related method, Many-shot Jailbreaking (MSJ), MIEJ maintains the same number of question-answer pairs (24 for Llama-3-8b with $K = 1$; 240 for Qwen-2 with $K = 10$ and 48 for others with $K = 2$) in the experiment. As shown in Table II, MIEJ demonstrates significantly higher JSR compared to MSJ under the current experimental settings. Notably, Anil *et al*. [9] mention that MSJ does not perform well with fewer shots and only begins to work consistently with 256 shots. This comparison corroborates the notion that authentic conversational history resonates more effectively with LLMs than fabricated conversations, which often lack the nuances and depth necessary to engage the model's in-context learning capabilities. As a result, genuine interactions are more likely to elicit the desired responses to harmful inquiries.

Cross-model transferability. Based on the adversarial prompt dataset AdvBench, we conducted a systematic evaluation of the cross-model transferability of three adversarial jailbreaking methods on multiple open-source and closed-source large language models. Specifically, if a jailbreaking strategy can induce the same illicit response on a model other than the one it was originally trained on, we consider it a successful transfer. By quantifying success rates across various model combinations, we can assess both the generalizability of these strategies and the internal defense mechanisms of each model against jailbreaking attacks. As illustrated in Table III, MIEJ achieves higher cross-model transferability compared to other methods. This success primarily stems from a shared vulnerability across the tested models, wherein a multi-round escalation of maliciousness and real-time prompt adjustment can systematically bypass safety mechanisms.

TABLE III: Transferability of jailbreaks on AdvBench. Success rates of three attack methods across open-source and closed-source models, reflecting the ability to generalize jailbreak strategies across different model architectures.

Method	Model	Open-source			Closed-source	
		Qwen-2	Llama-3-8b	Mistral	GPT-3.5-turbo	GPT-4
PAIR	Llama-3-8b	37.2	-	53.1	31.6	28.7
	GPT-4	45.3	21.4	57.5	39.4	-
ActorAttack	Llama-3-8b	41.4	-	**61.1**	29.7	33.2
	GPT-4	47.2	23.7	45.5	41.2	-
MIEJ	Llama-3-8b	52.2	-	59.8	43.2	**36.7**
	GPT-4	**53.3**	**34.2**	53.8	**45.7**	-

Integration with multi-languages. In conversational scenarios, LLMs are frequently required to engage with users in multiple languages. Research has shown that the prevalence of unsafe content generated by LLMs tends to increase as the availability of language resources decreases [25]. We conduct experiments on GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 using three languages with varying resource levels: Vietnamese (high-resource), Thai (mid-resource), and Javanese (low-resource) [40], and compare the results to those in English. As illustrated in Figure 4, the results indicate that attacks are more effective in languages with fewer resources. This suggests that uneven resource

TABLE IV: Jailbreak effectiveness on target prompts related to specific security topics in the absence of relevant conversation history.

Model	Metric	General Illegal Acts	Child Abuse	Physical Harm	Scams and Fraud	Self-mutilation	National Security
ChatGLM	Harmful Score JSR (%)	4.30 (-) 90 (↓5)	3.20 (↓0.20) 60 (↓10)	3.85 (↓0.25) 60 (↓20)	4.10 (↓0.35) 85 (↓15)	3.05 (↓1.60) 55 (↓40)	4.60 (↑0.15) 90 (↓10)
Llama-3-8b	Harmful Score JSR (%)	3.35 (↓0.15) 60 (↓5)	1.00 (-) 0 (-)	1.60 (↓0.80) 20 (↓20)	2.50 (↓1.20) 40 (↓30)	1.00 (-) 0 (-)	1.75 (↓2.35) 25 (↓60)
Mistral	Harmful Score JSR (%)	3.55 (↓0.10) 75 (↓15)	3.50 (↓0.3) 70 (↓5)	3.95 (↑0.10) 85 (↓10)	3.20 (↓0.10) 85 (-)	1.90 (↓0.60) 25 (↓15)	3.20 (↓0.40) 75 (↓15)
Qwen-2	Harmful Score JSR (%)	2.00 (↓0.75) 40 (↓25)	2.10 (↓0.35) 35 (↓5)	1.30 (↓0.20) 10 (↓10)	2.35 (↓0.35) 65 (↓25)	1.00 (-) 0 (↓5)	2.55 (↓0.95) 60 (↓15)



Fig. 4: Jailbreak effectiveness of MIEJ across languages with different resource levels during the training and finetuning phase of LLMs. Vietnamese, Thai, and Javanese represent languages with high, mid, and low resource levels, respectively.

allocation during safety alignment leads to a misalignment in generalization, with the robustness of safety mechanisms in non-English languages notably weaker.

C. Ablation Studies

Effects of omitted security topics. We evaluate the impact of omitting corresponding conversation history on the attack effectiveness for target prompts of the specific security topic. For each level, we traverse the security topics while excluding the selected security topic, resulting in complete L-round conversations that contained no references to the omitted security topics, thus configuring $C = 5$. As shown in Table IV, the results demonstrate that in the absence of these omitted topics, the LLMs exhibit lower success rates, highlighting the critical role of conversation history related to the target query in facilitating effective conversation jailbreaks.



Fig. 5: Jailbreak effectiveness of MIEJ across different rounds (left) and K values (right). In the left plot, K is fixed at 2, with rounds representing the collection of valid responses at increasing levels of malice. In the right plot, the malice level is fixed at 4 (R=4), with K representing the shots of valid question-response pairs recorded per security topic.

Effects of shots (K) and rounds (R) per topic. To assess the impact of varying shots (K) and rounds (R) across different security topics on attack effectiveness, we conduct experiments on Qwen-2 by adjusting K and evaluating across different R. As shown in Figure 5, the results reveal that as K increases, the harmfulness of the generated text escalates, leading to a corresponding increase in JSR for the target prompts. Similarly, increasing the number of rounds (R) amplifies the harmfulness score and the JSR by allowing LLM to process more comprehensive contextual information over multiple iterations. This trend underscores that the mechanisms underlying MIEJ align closely with in-context learning: with more queries and iterative rounds per security topic, LLMs assimilate additional contextual cues, and the token distribution probabilities of the generated content increasingly shift toward harmful regions.



Fig. 6: Comparison of query complexity across methods. MIEJ achieves O(1) complexity, while other methods exhibit O(n) behavior.



Fig. 7: Impact of query orders on the average number of queries. LLMs are queried in malice-ascending or random orders.

Effects of query order by malice level. The key challenge in designing interaction sequences for jailbreaks is manipulating the model without prematurely triggering its safety mechanisms. Sudden increases in malicious queries during a conversation elevate the likelihood of the model issuing a refusal, disrupting the flow and making it harder to maintain incremental malicious attempts. Once a refusal is triggered, the model becomes more resistant to further manipulation. We design experiments to evaluate the effects of query order on attack performance, specifically contrasting level-independent query sequences with those ordered by levels of malice. In the level-independent setting, harmful queries are randomly selected, potentially causing a sudden spike in malice early in the conversation. As shown in Figure 7, we conduct five independent trials for each configuration across multiple models. The results indicate that level-independent query orders significantly increase the total number of queries required to complete the attack. In the case of Qwen-2, the attack can not even be completed under this configuration.

V. Conclusion

This paper introduces *Multi-round Incremental Exploitation Jailbreak (MIEJ)*, a novel black-box automated method that

demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-round, incremental attack patterns for LLM jailbreaking. We propose a novel prompt generation mechanism specifically designed to systematically generate multilingual, multi-topic, and multi-level queries. This mechanism facilitates the creation of incrementally harmful conversations, ultimately resulting in behavior drift and the generation of harmful outputs by LLMs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIEJ excels in effectiveness, applicability, and efficiency in uncovering vulnerabilities in large language models. These findings highlight the necessity of reinforcing model safety to mitigate the risks posed by multi-round conversational exploits.

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