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Introduction

The malware known as Ranzy Locker belongs to the ThunderX ransomware family. It encrypts all important files on your computer.

Ranzy Locker malware was first spotted on October 21, 2020. When the victim infects the computer, it encrypts important files and demands a ransom for decryption. It performs the request process by communicating with the proton e-mail address through the key of the infected system in the readme.txt file it creates after encrypting the files.

The malware usually targets Windows systems.

Summary

Deleteme.exe takes snapshots of many applications and their information. The list of these applications is listed in detail in the detailed analysis section.

It tries to make the pest unanalyzable by applying various anti-debug methods and tries to complicate the analyst's job.

It deletes the data in the recycle bin and system backups, if any.

It receives the information of how many disks are defined in the system and the adapter information.

Finally, the victim encrypts all important data on the computer and demands a ransom.

deleteme.exe Analysis

The MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-256 information of the malware are given in the table below.

File Name	Exe File						
MD5	84e8bf44a339c6c2a51aedb17b52e83e						
SHA-1	6681ac4c02f2b2696590eebad5f8e94cf1723678						
SHA-	0db6f0721b23aba59852382dad8042be26832c7bb182d79f4734e17da3bcd5ee						
256							

It is understood that it is a 32-bit exe file of Portable Executable type.


Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Α	В	С	D	Ε	F	Ascii
00000000	4D	5A	90	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	FF	FF	00	00	MZ . ' J ÿÿ
00000010	В8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	,
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	01	00	00	
00000040	0E	1F	BA	0E	00	B4	09	CD	21	В8	01	4C	CD	21	54	68	ያ °g.1.Í!, LÍ!Th
00000050	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	72	61	6D	20	63	61	6E	6E	6F	is.program.canno
00000060	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	6E	20	69	6E	20	44	4F	53	20	t.be.run.in.DOS.
00000070	6D	6F	64	65	2E	0D	0D	0A	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	mode\$
08000000	E1	6C	A8	3C	Α5	0D	C6	6F	Α5	0D	C6	6F	Α5	0D	C6	6F	ál"<\.Hc\.Ec\.Ec\.Eo
00000090	FE	65	C5	6E	AF	0D	C6	6F	FΕ	65	C3	6E	30	0D	C6	6F	şeÅr . KoşeÃn0. Ko
000000A0	FE	65	C2	6E	B7	0D	C6	6F	6E	62	C2	6E	В4	0D	C6	6F	şeÂn .KonbÂn .Ko
000000B0	6E	62	C5	6E	B0	0D	C6	6F	6E	62	C3	6E	8F	0D	C6	6F	nbÅn°.ÆonbÃn .Æo
000000C0	FE	65	C7	6E	B0	0D	C6	6F	Α5	0D	C7	6F	2E	0D	C6	6F	şeÇn°.Æc¥.ÇoÆo
000000D0	23	7D	CF	6E	AF	0D	C6	6F	23	7D	39	6F	Α4	0D	C6	6F	#}ÏnÆo#}9o¤.Æo
000000E0	A5	0D	51	6F	Α4	0D	C6	6F	23	7D	C4	6E	Α4	0D	C6	6F	¥.Qo¤.Ho#}Än¤.Ho
000000F0	52	69	63	68	Α5	0D	C6	6F	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	Rich¥.Ho
00000100	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	50	45	00	00	4C	01	04	00	PETJ.

```
0018FE2C 00000004
0018FE30 00000000
0018FE34 0018FE60
 0018FE38
                  0040E103
                                  return to deleteme.0040E103 from deleteme.0040E8EF
 0018FE3C
0018FE40
                  0018FEE8
0018FE44
0018FE48
0018FE4C
                  0018FE98
                  00000000
                                 return to deleteme.0040C0B5 from deleteme.0040E0E6 return to deleteme.00401F36 from deleteme.0040C0B0
                  0040C0B5
 0018FE50
0018FE54
                  00401F36
0018FEE8
                  00420BF8 &"433A5C50726F6772616D2046696C65735C4D6963726F736F66742053514C20536572766572"
0018FE98 "43"
 0018FE58
0018FE58 00420BF8 &"433A5C50726F6772
0018FE60 0018FE00
0018FE64 004060B1 return to deleteme
0018FE64 0018FE98 "43"
0018FE65 0018FE98 "43"
0018FE70 0000036 0018FE74 00421D38
                                 return to deleteme.004060B1 from deleteme.00401F29 "43"
```

There is an ASCII like


"433A5C50726F6772616D2046696C65735C4D6963726F736F66742053514C20536572766572".

This ASCII means "C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server". Here, the malware controls the SQL database servers.






It creates and opens a mutex object named "Global\35355FA5-07E9-428B-B5A5-1C88CAB2B488".



"BgIAAACkAABSU0ExAAgAAAEAAQD5Z/x0FpIqOuckpgDTga4Yc3a1jlUA1F5Af5uw61G8EK/RFWT2qgi2k gvWG6V8AfsGbBBGTrFInJz8lzb6qkudvlxXCuK+CEAlyWC60S4BQN++zwdzJtYtYEfLRpp5WVkrM39cFn3ro hIXO7SgIzAADVzo1OoFjbAV8/NhcNWQBsslyHs+LttfEPJ61KljmW0aS1hJhvbh2A+kekJf48lgXMP04wFarl DHmDPFjfJTJ4Zo2bwvkfpgiwhcEsSGeeSJ108mCqnKbOeGvizxaDPkwOY5rOBknvZXHxZswqOvruRSUT4PJ OjBuBRhgEPblffy4qYej3JNtzteYDkCVCSY"

An encoded data given above is encountered. When this data is decoded, it is understood that the encryption system is RSA-1.

It then performs encryption operations.



The malicious implements various anti-debug methods. In the example given in the photo, anti-debug operation is performed with the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent API.

```
0018FDDC
          [0040F103 return to deleteme.0040F103 from deleteme.0040F8FF
0018FDE0
0018FDE4
           0018FEB0
0018FDE8
           0018FE3C
0018FDEC
           00000000
                      return to deleteme.0040C0B5 from deleteme.0040E0E6 return to deleteme.00401F36 from deleteme.0040C0B0
0018FDF0
           0040C0B5
0018FDF4
           00401F36
0018FDF8
           0018FEB0
0018FDFC | 004209B8 &"726561646D652E747874"
          0018FE3C
0018FE68
0018FE00
0018FE04
                      return to deleteme.00402288 from deleteme.00401F29
0018FE08
          00402288
0018FE0C
0018FE10
           0018FE3C
           19E5D74B
0018FE14
           00571BCE
0018FF18
           0058BD18 L"Application Data"
0018FE1C
           00000000
           0018FFB0
0018FE20
0018FE24 0018FE00 &"72"
```

When the string is decoded as "726561646D652E747874" which is encoded with ASCII, it is observed that the "readme.txt" document is created and it is understood that this document is the ransom demand document included in the continuation of the analysis.




Ransomware changes the extensions of the files it encrypts to ".lock".



The malware takes snapshots of the processes and some applications running on the system and checks whether they are running. These files are listed below;

winword.exe	visio.exe	ensvc.exe	mysql_opt.exe
occsd.exe	thabat.exe	ocomm.exe	outlook.exe
mysqld.exe	sqlagent.exe	sqlservr.exe	infopath.exe
sqlbrowser.exe	thunderbird.exe	msftesql.exe	wordpad.exe
synctime.exe	agntsvc.exe	dbsnmp.exe	mydesktopservice.exe
ocautoupds.exe	thebat64.exe	sqbcoreservice.exe	isqlplussvc.exe
oracle.exe	tbirdconfig.exe	mysqld-nt.exe	


These applications include various SQL servers, e-mail clients, notebooks and some software from Oracle.



It implements anti debug with GetTickCount API.

Some WMI queries are being executed. These queries are listed below;

vmickvpexchange	vmicquestinterface	vmicshutdow	vmicheartbeat
MSSQLFDLauncher	MSSQLSERVER	SQLBrowser	SQLSERVERAGENT
SQLWriter	MSSQL	WRSVC	ekrn



It connects to Services Control Manager with OpenSCManagerW and starts the vmickvpexchange service listed above with the Open ServicesW API.

The vmickvpexchange service provides a mechanism for exchanging data between the virtual machine and the operating system running on the physical computer.

Malware tries to make it impossible to recover data after the files are encrypted by executing various commands. It encodes these commands as ASCII and decodes them one by one. All the commands it executes are listed below;

Command	Action
wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -deleteOldest	Deletes all the oldest system backups.
wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractiv	Deletes all Shadow Copies.
wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP	Deletes all system backups.
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No	Disables Windows recovery and repair.
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures	Disables Windows recovery. If an error occurs,
	it will attempt to boot the computer normally.
vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet	Deletes all Shadow Copies.

```
| First Add 1960 | Prof. | Add 1
```

It creates a thread.


Checks how many disks are defined in the system.

```
0018FBA8 005CBF70
                                                 00000104
    0018FBAC
0018FBB0
                                                 19E5D527
   0018FBB4
                                                 000001E0
   0018FBB8
0018FBBC
                                                 0041D43C
                                                 00000010
   0018FBC0
0018FBC4
                                                                                               return to deleteme.00401D68 from deleteme.00409AD0
                                                 00401D68
   0018FBC8
0018FBCC
                                                 0018FCB4
                                                 0018FC9C
   0018FBD0
                                                 0018FCB4
                                                000001E0
00401D68
   0018FBD4
   0018FBD8
                                                                                               return to deleteme.00401D68 from deleteme.00409AD0
 0018FBDC | 005CBF70 | 0018FBDC | 
                                                                                                return to deleteme.00403BE5 from deleteme.00409550
"\"subid\":\"1009\","
   0018FBE4
0018FBE8
                                                005B82B8
   0018FRF0
                                                00000107
   0018FBF4
                                                 19E5D527
   0018FBF8 0018FE6C
                                                                                               Pointer to SEH_Record[1]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Varsayılan
```

It has been determined that when the data encoded as ASCII is decoded, it receives data such as "ext":", "network":", "subid":", "lang":", {PATTERN_ID}, {UID}.

```
### 100-000004 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 | $300 |
```

The malware takes the system language.



It checks the local disks in the system.



It gets the local IP address of the system.



After the encryption process is completed, it creates the readme.txt file, defines a special key to the victim computer in this file, and then states that it is necessary to contact the protonmail address in this file in order to recover the encrypted files.

Protection Methods

Up-to-date anti-virus software should be used.

The operating system should be kept up to date.

File and printer sharing services should be disabled. If these services are required, strong passwords or Active Directory authentication should be used.

Multi-factor authentication should be used.

Users' permissions to install and run unwanted software applications should be restricted. Users should not be added to the local administrators group unless necessary.

Strong passwords should be used.

Care should be taken when opening e-mail attachments.

Unnecessary services should be disabled on agency workstations and servers.

Suspicious email attachments should be scanned or removed.

Users' web browsing habits should be monitored and access to sites with negative content should be restricted.

Care should be taken when using removable media (eg USB flash drives, external drives, CDs).

All software downloaded from the internet should be scanned before running.

Awareness of the latest threats should be maintained and appropriate access control lists should be implemented.

Yara Rule

```
import "hash"
rule Ranzy_Locker
meta:
author = "ZAYOTEM-TAHA HİCRET"
description = "RanzyLocker"
first date = "21.10.2020"
report date = "05.08.2021"
file_name = "deleteme.exe"
strings:
$s1 = "476C6F62616C5C3335335354641352D303745392D343238422D423541352D314338384341423242343838"
$s2 = "776D69632E65786520534841444F57434F5059202F6E6F696E746572616374697665"
$s3 ="776261646D696E2044454C4554452053595354454D53544154454241434B5550"
$s4 ="776261646D696E2044454C4554452053595354454D53544154454241434B5550202D64656C6574654F6C64657374"
$s5 ="626364656469742E657865202F736574207B64656661756C747D207265636F76657279656E61626C6564204E6F"
$s6
="626364656469742E657865202F736574207B64656661756C747D20626F6F74737461747573706F6C6963792069676E6F72
65616C6C6661696C75726573"
$s7 ="76737361646D696E2E6578652044656C65746520536861646F7773202F416C6C202F5175696574"
$s8 ="433A5C50726F6772616D2046696C65735C4D6963726F736F66742053514C20536572766572"
$s9 ="534F4654574152455C4D6963726F736F66745C45524944"
condition:
hash.md5(0, filesize) == "84e8bf44a339c6c2a51aedb17b52e83e"
or
all
of
them
```



Taha HİCRET

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