



On Secure Inter- and Intra-Vehicle Communications

M. M. Hasan and H. T. Mouftah



uOttawa


Presenter: Mahmud Hasan

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Outline

- Introduction
- System Overview
- Proposed Techniques
- Numerical Results
- Conclusion



Introduction

- Vehicular Communications
 - Vehicle-to-anything (V2X): V2V, V2I, V2G
 - Intra-Vehicle Communications: sensors, controllers
- Applications
 - Intelligent Transport System (ITS): vehicle tracking, collision avoidance, roadside safety, congestion control
 - Smart Grid: EV discharging and charging schedule
 - Vehicular Sensor Networks: Sensing, monitoring

Introduction (cont.)

- Security Concerns

- Sensitive information
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability




- PHY layer Security


- To boost up higher layer security mechanisms
- Creation of additional layer of security

Introduction (cont.)


- Our current area
 - V2V communications
 - Intra-vehicle communications



- Issues to be focused
 - V2V Authentication delay
 - V2V Eavesdropping
 - In-vehicle power line




System Overview (V2V)



- Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications
 - IEEE 802.11p interface
 - Licensed band of 5.9 GHz
 - OFDM at the PHY layer
 - Adaptive MIMO antenna systems

System Overview (V2V Cont.)




- Channel Estimation for V2V:

$$SNR_{adj,i} = (1 - \alpha)SNR_{est,i} + \alpha SNR_{adj,i-1}$$

$$\alpha = f(v_R)$$


$$f_D = \pm \frac{v_R f_c}{c}$$

System Overview (Intra-Vehicle)



- HomePlug Av Interface
 - Power line communication (PLC)
 - 2-28 MHz band
 - OFDM
 - Communications between electric control units (ECUs)

Proposed Techniques (Adaptive ARQ)



- Number of Retransmission \uparrow Authentication delay \uparrow
- Failed Authentication \rightarrow Interruption of communications


Proposed Techniques (Adaptive ARQ)

- Adaptive ARQ
 - Estimates SNR in each frame → Initial Selection
 - If the previous frame is lost → lower Rate

Else

Initial Selection is Final

Proposed Techniques (Adaptive MIMO)




- Eavesdropping can be active or passive
- Eavesdropping can initiate the MITM or replay attack

Proposed Techniques (Adaptive MIMO)

- Adaptive MIMO
 - Switches transmission mode between STBC and SM based on CSI
 - Mode switching occurs based on post-detection SNR instead of Demmel condition
 - Improves reliability between legitimate vehicles
 - Eavesdropper experiences very high BER


Proposed Techniques (In-Vehicle Power Line)

- Security of the Wired Networks
- Channel Capacity and Secrecy Capacity
- Design considerations: Signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR)

- Attenuation \uparrow Signal degradation \uparrow
 - Group delay \uparrow Inter-symbol interference (ISI) \uparrow
- 
- SNR \downarrow


Numerical Results: V2V Authentication

Decremental Distance



- Imperfect CSI
- Initial distance 50m
- Variable power settings


Incremental Distance



- Imperfect CSI
- Initial distance 150m
- Variable power settings


Numerical Results: V2V Security Against Eavesdroppers

BER for Legitimate Users



Improved reliability between legitimate vehicles

Secrecy Capacity



Enhanced secrecy capacity against eavesdropping

Numerical Results: Intra-Vehicle Cables

Manufacturer's Data

Cable Type	Nominal Cross Section (mm ²)	Nominal Diameter (mm)	Insulation Thickness (mm)
1	1	1.13	0.7
2	1.5	1.38	0.7
3	2.5	1.78	0.8

Approximate Expressions


Cable Type	Attenuation Constant (Nepers/meter) for (MHz)	Group Delay (ns/meter)
1	$0.0020f$	6.162
2	$0.0018f$	6.072
3	$0.0017f$	6.096

Conductor diameter ↑ Attenuation ↓ Group delay ↓

Insulation thickness ↑ Group delay ↑

Conclusion

- PHY layer techniques can boost up higher layer security mechanisms
- Mobility awareness is a key factor in designing V2V security protocols
- Hybrid network can be used for secure Intra-vehicle communications





Thank you!
And
Questions?

