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[SECURITY] Releases are built/executed/released in the context of insecure/untrusted code #2

JLLeitschuh opened this issue May 23, 2019 · 0 comments


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commented May 23, 2019

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

The build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.

This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 Base Score of 8.1/10

This isn't just theoretical

POC code has existed since 2014 to maliciously compromise a JAR file inflight.

MITM Attacks Increasingly Common


Source Locations

  • uberscriptquery/pom.xml

    Lines 23 to 27 in 90a8a94

    <name>Scala-Tools Maven2 Repository</name>
  • uberscriptquery/pom.xml

    Lines 32 to 35 in 90a8a94

  • uberscriptquery/pom.xml

    Lines 39 to 43 in 90a8a94

    <name>Scala-Tools Maven2 Repository</name>

Original Report to Uber Security Team

When originally reported, this issue was closed as 'Informative'

Public Disclosure

Option 1: File for a CVE

A project maintainer for this project should probably file for a CVE number to inform the public about this vulnerability in the build for this project. The goal is to inform the public that there was a potential for published build artifacts to have been maliciously compromised in earlier releases.

If a maintainer on this project works for or is associated with a CNA, please have them file it with them:

Otherwise, an open source CVE should be filed for here:

Option 2: Manually validate the release artifacts

If this project's build is fully reproducible. An alternative to filing for a CVE is to go back and build the earlier releases (with the HTTPS patch applied) to confirm the artifacts were not tampered when they were built. This can be done by comparing the hashes of the artifacts built locally with the ones published. If the hashes of all previous artifacts match those that are published, you can safely assume that the releases were not tampered with.

Again, this assumes that the build if fully reproducible and will require significantly more work.

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