

CI/CD/CDon't?

Deliberations on the threat model of continuous delivery systems


Jens Heinrich

Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg


2020-03-14/15

CYBER CiderSecCon


Concept-Pipeline




Attack Vectors-Impersonation




Attack Vectors-Evil Admin




Attack Vectors-Compromised Workstation




Attack Vectors-Compromised Repository




Attack Vectors-Compromised Management Host



Attack Vectors-Compromised Prod




Mitigations-Impersonation



Mitigations-Evil Admin

- Privilege Separation:


- 2-man-rule
- Enforced tests



Mitigations-Compromised Workstation


- Hardening measures:

- Using dedicated hardware
- Using hardware security modules for storage




Mitigations-Compromised Repository

- Privilege Separation:
 - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
- Signing of commits and checking the signatures




Mitigations-Compromised Management Host

- Privilege Separation:
 - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
 - Splitting the infrastructure in groups
 - Regular self checks/ deploys



Mitigations-Compromised Prod

- Privilege Separation:
 - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
- Reproducible builds
 - **JUST REDEPLOY AND RESTORE**



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- via Twitter [@JensHeinrichFFM](https://twitter.com/JensHeinrichFFM)

Sources I