

# CI/CD/CDon't?

Deliberations on the threat model of continuous delivery systems


Jens Heinrich

Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg


2020-03-14/15

**CYBER** CiderSecCon


# Concept-Pipeline




# Attack Vectors-Impersonation




# Attack Vectors-Evil Admin




# Attack Vectors-Compromised Workstation




# Attack Vectors-Compromised Repository



# Attack Vectors-Compromised Managment Host




# Attack Vectors-Compromised Prod






# Mitigations-Impersonation



# Mitigations-Evil Admin

- Privilege Separation:


- 2-man-rule
- Enforced tests



# Mitigations-Compromised Workstation


- Hardening measures:

- Using dedicated hardware
- Using hardware security modules for storage




# Mitigations-Compromised Repository

- Privilege Separation:
  - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
- Signing of commits and checking the signatures




# Mitigations-Compromised Management Host

- Privilege Separation:
  - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
  - Splitting the infrastructure in groups
  - Regular self checks/ deploys



# Mitigations-Compromised Prod

- Privilege Separation:
  - Enforced offsite/ offline backups
- Reproducible builds
  - JUST REDEPLOY AND RESTORE



You may contact me

- via eMail [J.Heinrich@ub.uni-frankfurt.de](mailto:J.Heinrich@ub.uni-frankfurt.de)



- via GitHub [github.com/ubffm/cicdcdont-lightning](https://github.com/ubffm/cicdcdont-lightning)



- via Twitter @JensHeinrichFFM