the democratic surround

Multimedia & American
Liberalism from World War II
to the Psychedelic Sixties

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Where Did All the Fascists Come From?

On December 3, 1933, a reporter for the *New York Times Magazine* named Shepard Stone tried to answer a question that had begun to puzzle many of his readers: How was it that in a single year, the nation that had brought the world Goethe and Bach, Hegel and Beethoven, had fallen so completely under the sway of a short, mustachioed dictator named Adolf Hitler? To some analysts, the answer was fundamentally social, as Stone acknowledged. Starvation, political chaos, violence in the streets—all had plagued the Weimar Republic that Hitler's fascist state replaced. But neither Stone nor his editors thought such privations were enough to explain Hitler's rise. Rather, wrote Stone, "something intangible was necessary to coordinate the resentments and hatreds which these forces engendered."[1]

That something was propaganda. Above an enormous photograph of a Nazi rally, with floodlit swastika banners towering two stories high and row upon row of helmeted soldiers leaning toward the lights, the article's headline told its story: "Hitler's Showmen Weave a Magic Spell: By a Vast Propaganda Aimed at Emotions, Germany's Trance is Maintained." For Stone and his editors, fascism was a fundamentally psychological condition. Its victims swayed in time, linked by fellow feeling, unable to reason. In part, they responded to Hitler's charisma. But they also responded to the power of mass media. Hitler famously "hypnotized" the crowds at mass rallies until they roared with applause. His voice then traveled out from those arenas in radio waves, reaching Germans across the nation and inspiring in them the same hypnotic allegiance. As Stone suggested,

Hitler's personal appeal alone could not have transformed the mindset of the entire populace. Only mass media could have turned a nation famous for its philosophers into a land of unthinking automata: "With coordinated newspaper headlines overpowering him, with radio voices beseeching him, with news reels and feature pictures arousing him, and with politicians and professors philosophizing for him, the individual German has been unable to salvage his identity and has been engulfed in a brown wave. Today few Germans can separate the chaff from the wheat. They are living in a Nazi dream and not in the reality of the world."[2]

During and after World War II, this belief would drive many intellectuals and artists to imagine pro-democratic alternatives to authoritarian psyches and societies, and to the mass-mediated propaganda that seemed to produce them. But before we can explore those alternatives, we need to revisit the anxieties that made them so important to their makers. In the years leading up to the war, the fear of mass media and mass psychology that animated Stone's account became ubiquitous among American intellectuals, politicians, and artists. When they gazed across the Atlantic to Hitler's Germany and, to a lesser extent, Stalin's Soviet Union and Mussolini's Italy, American journalists and social scientists saw their long-standing anxieties about the power of mass media harden into a specific fear that newspapers, radio, and film were engines of fascist socialization.[3]

Since the late nineteenth century, writers in Europe and the United States had dreaded the rise of mass industrial society. Such a society fractured the psyches of its members and rendered them vulnerable to collective fits of irrational violence, many feared. Now analysts worried that mass media drew individual citizens into protofascistic relationships with the centers of political and commercial power and with one another. In the one-to-many communication pattern of mass media they saw a model of political dictatorship. In mass media audiences, they saw the shadows of the German masses turning their collective eyes toward a single podium and a single leader. To enter into such a relationship with media, many worried, was to rehearse the psychology of fascism. The rise of National Socialism in Germany demonstrated that such rehearsals could transform one of the most cultured of nations—and perhaps even America itself—into a bastion of authoritarianism.

COULD IT HAPPEN HERE?

In the early 1930s, popular writers tended to see Hitler as an ordinary man who had somehow risen to extraordinary heights. Journalist Dorothy Thompson, who interviewed Hitler in 1931, characteristically described him as "formless, almost faceless, a man whose countenance is a caricature, a man whose framework seems cartilaginous, without bones. He is inconsequent and voluble, ill poised, insecure. He is the very prototype of the Little Man."[4] How was it that such a man should have acquired such power? she wondered.

As Shepard Stone had pointed out, part of the answer was surely political. In the chaos of the Weimar years, Hitler and his National Socialists promised national rejuvenation. They also threatened violent ends for any who opposed them. Yet these explanations found a comparatively small place in the American popular press and scholarship of the time, where more cultural and characterological explanations often held sway. In 1941, for instance, William McGovern, a professor of political science at Northwestern University, published a representative if long-winded analysis of the origins of National Socialism entitled *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy.* The nearly seven-hundred-page tome argued that Hitler's program had deep roots in a German society that had long embraced authoritarian ideals.[5] Somehow Hitler had managed to harvest those ideals and so transform a German cultural trait into a principle of national unity. For McGovern and others, it was not only German politics that had produced National Socialism, but something in the German mindset.

This conclusion presented a problem: If German totalitarianism was rooted in German culture, how could Americans explain the apparent rise of fascism in the United States?

Though few remember the fact today, in the late 1930s, uniformed fascists marched down American streets and their voices echoed over the radio airwaves. The Catholic demagogue Father Coughlin, for example—founder of the "Radio League of the Little Flower"—was a ubiquitous presence on American radio for much of the decade. He formed a political party to oppose Roosevelt in 1936, endorsed and helped publish the

anti-Semitic tract known as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and by 1938 could be heard spewing anti-Semitic and pro-fascist propaganda on the radio to a regular audience of some 3,500,000 listeners. A Gallup poll taken in January 1939 reported that some 67 percent of these listeners agreed with his views.[6]

Alongside Father Coughlin, Americans could track the activities of William Dudley Pelley's Silver Legion of America—an anti-Semitic paramilitary group formed in 1933 and modeled after Hitler's brownshirts and Mussolini's blackshirts. Though Pelley claimed to hear the voices of distant spirits, his group still attracted fifteen thousand members at its peak.[7] Americans could also follow the Crusader White Shirts in Chattanooga, Tennessee; the American National-Socialist Party; and, of course, the Ku Klux Klan. For more than a few Americans in the 1930s, fascists were not merely threats from overseas. They lived next door.

The group that attracted the greatest notice of the American press in this period was the Amerikadeutscher Volksbund. The Bund had been created in 1936, when self-styled "American Führer" Fritz Kuhn, a German-born American citizen, was elected head of a German-American organization known as the Friends of New Germany.[8] At its largest, the Bund probably had no more than twenty-five thousand members, most of them Americans of German extraction.[9] Even so, on the night of February 20, 1939, they managed to bring twenty thousand people to Madison Square Garden for a pro-fascist rally. Though the event ostensibly celebrated George Washington's birthday, the Garden was hung with anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi banners. Speakers wore uniforms clearly modeled on the military regalia of Nazi Germany. Three thousand uniformed men from the Bund's pseudo–police force, the Ordnungsdienst, moved among the crowd, spotting and removing hecklers and soliciting donations. Throughout the rally, speakers and audience carefully proclaimed their pro-Americanism. They sang the "Star-Spangled Banner" and pledged "undivided" allegiance to the American flag. But speakers also launched a steady attack on Jews and the Roosevelt administration. One drew out the word "Roosevelt" in such a way that it sounded like "Rosenfeld." Another tried to convince the audience that Judaism and communism were essentially the same social movement.[10]

FIGURE 1.1.
Twenty-two thousand Americans rally to support fascism in Madison Square Garden, February 20, 1939. Among the banners was one that read "Stop Jewish Domination of Christian America." Photograph by FPG. © Getty Images. Used by permission.

Outside the Garden, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia stationed 1,700 policemen to keep order. City leaders feared large and violent counterdemonstrations, but the mayor had refused to prevent the rally, arguing that permitting free speech was precisely what distinguished democratic America from fascist Germany. In the end, police counted approximately ten thousand mostly peaceful demonstrators and observers, some holding signs reading "Smash Anti-Semitism" and "Drive the Nazis Out of New York." Journalists on the scene believed police estimates to be heavily exaggerated.[11] Even if they were correct, pro-fascist rally-goers outnumbered protesters two to one. To reporters at the time, it seemed entirely plausible that the Bund enjoyed substantial support, at the very least among Americans of German origin, and perhaps among other communities as well.

Even before this rally, the Bund loomed large as an emblem of the threat fascism posed to the United States. On March 27, 1937, for instance,

Life magazine published a two-page spread under the headline "The 'American Nazis' Claim 200,000 Members."[12] One photograph depicted American fascist families picnicking at "Camp Siegfried," a Bund-owned recreation and training camp on Long Island. Another image featured American men in white shirts giving the Nazi salute. Yet another depicted the German consul speaking to an audience of Bund members. Over the next two years, *Life* published a dozen photo features on American fascists and on the threat of foreign propaganda. On March 6, 1939, two weeks after the Bund staged its rally in Madison Square Garden, *Life* published a seven-page spread under the headline, "Like Communism It Masquerades as Americanism." There on the first page of the piece, Americans could see a Bundist color guard at the Garden wearing imitations of Nazi brownshirt uniforms and standing in front of a massive portrait of George Washington. Another headline in the same feature underlined the visual point: "It Can Happen Here."[13]

The actual number of fascists in the United States never came anywhere near to becoming a sufficiently critical mass to challenge, let alone overthrow, the state. Yet in the late 1930s analysts across much of the political spectrum feared that it soon might.[14] If it did, they reasoned, it would be because of one or both of two social forces. The first was a fascist fifth column inside the United States. In the 1930s, American journalists and politicians believed that Hitler's Germany was engaging in a massive propaganda campaign inside the United States. Reporters noted that Germany had established active propaganda networks in European nations such as France, Norway, and the Netherlands, and suggested that they were exporting those tactics to American shores.[15] In June of 1940, *Life* magazine announced, "These Are Signs of Fifth Columns Everywhere," and published pictures of fascists congregating in South America, Asia, and Long Island.[16] And despite the fact that Hitler's regime had tried to distance itself from Fritz Kuhn, many Americans assumed that the Bund was as much as anything a front for Nazi interests in the United States.[17]

The presence of Nazi agitators was only one part of the problem, though. The other was the power of language and of mass communication. Consider the national popularity of two groups that sought to challenge that power: the Institute for Propaganda Analysis and the General Semantics movement. Each presented a view of the individual psyche as vulnerable to irrational impulses and false beliefs. Each also suggested not only that communication could be manipulated by unscrupulous leaders, but that the media of communication—pictures, verbal language, symbols—were themselves naturally deceptive. Both agreed that the technologies of one-to-many communication amplified this power enormously. The individual American mind had become a battleground, and it was their mission to defend individual reason from the predations of fascism, of communication, and, potentially, of the individual's own unconscious desires.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis emerged in 1937 out of a class in "Education and Public Opinion" taught by Dr. Clyde Miller at Columbia's Teacher's College.[18] Thanks to a $50,000 grant from Boston businessman Edward A. Filene, Miller, a number of New York-area colleagues, and a

FIGURE 1.2.
German-American Bundists parade swastikas and American flags down East 86th Street, New York, October 30, 1939. Photograph from the *New York World-Telegram*. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, NYWT&S Collection, LC-USZ62-117148.

board of advisors that included leading sociologists Hadley Cantril, Leonard Doob, and Robert Lynd began creating study materials for a group of high schools in Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts. They also began publishing a monthly newsletter aimed primarily at teachers; it soon had almost six thousand subscribers.[19]

The newsletter offered its readers a detailed training regime designed to help Americans achieve a heightened state of rational alertness. In the Institute's materials the words and pictures of the mass media were scrims that obscured the motives and actions of distant powers. The source of their power to persuade lay primarily in their ability to stir up the emotions. The Institute implied that Americans could build up a psychological barrier to such manipulation by wrestling with newspaper stories and radio news accounts. An Institute-sponsored guide for discussion group leaders published in 1938 noted that propaganda analysis should proceed in four stages: "1) survey the contents 2) search for evidence of the statements or claims 3) study the propagandist's motive [and] 4) estimate the content's persuasive force."[20] This work could be done alone or in groups, and it was a species of intellectual calisthenics. Much as members might exercise their bodies to ward off disease, so might they also exercise their reason so as to ward off the inflammation of their unconscious desires and its potentially authoritarian consequences.

For the members of the General Semantics movement, the fight against propaganda depended on decoupling symbols and words from their objects of reference. If "semantics" referred to the study of meaning, "general semantics" referred to the more specific and, in the minds of its practitioners, scientific study of language and reference. The term "general semantics" was coined by Polish philosopher and mathematician Alfred Korzybski in the early 1920s. Korzybski had published a series of articles and books in which he argued that human beings' ability to pass knowledge down through time via language was what made them unique as a species. In 1933 he published an exceptionally influential extension of his early theories, entitled *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics*. At its core, the book argued that much human unhappiness in both the psychological and social realms could be traced to our inability to separate the pictures in our heads and the communicative processes that put them there from material reality itself. To solve this problem, Korzybski offered a course in close scientific reasoning and linguistic analysis. To alleviate the power that symbols and their makers have over us, he argued, human beings needed to parse the terms in which language presented the world to them. Having done so, they could begin to recognize the world as it was and thus to experience some degree of mental health.

General Semantics enjoyed a three-decade vogue among American intellectuals and the general public. In the years immediately before World War II, it seemed to offer new tools with which to confront not only the psychological threats posed by propaganda but a whole panoply of social and psychological ills. In his popular 1938 volume *The Tyranny of Words*, economist Stuart Chase summed up the historical importance of semantic analysis thus: "First a war that killed thirty million human beings. Then a speculative boom which, after producing more bad language to sell more fantastic propositions than in the entire previous history of finance, exploded like the airship *Hindenburg*. Finally, when a little headway has been made against economic disaster, the peoples of Europe, more civilized than any other living group, prepare solemnly and deliberately to blow one another to molecules. . . . Confusions persist because we have no true picture of the world outside, and so cannot talk to one another about how to stop them." [21]

To be able to understand the world and change it, Chase argued, Americans needed to break down language itself, to dissolve its terms from their material-world referents, and so distinguish the pictures in their heads from reality. And nothing made the importance of that work clearer than the omnipresence of mass communication, propaganda, and the threat of a second world war. In 1941, linguist and future Senator S. I. Hayakawa's volume *Language in Action* brought Chase's argument and Korzybski's theories into the public eye. Like Chase, Hayakawa argued that "we live in an environment shaped and partially created by hitherto unparalleled semantic influences: commercialized newspapers, commercialized radio programs, 'public relations counsels,' and the propaganda technique of nationalistic madmen."[22] To survive this onslaught, citizens needed scientific techniques for interpreting and resisting semantic assaults.

They especially needed techniques for disabling their immediate emotional responses to individual symbols. Hayakawa argued that human nervous systems tended to translate flows of experience into static pictures. Without training in General Semantics, it did so automatically. This in turn led quite literally to individual and collective madness. That is, words like "Nazi" and "Jew" conjured instant emotional responses; individuals lost track of the fact that the terms lacked immediate referents and were in fact so general as to be practically meaningless. Moreover, in their rush to emotional judgment, Hayakawa feared that citizens would rush to war as well. The only solution was a deep study of language and, with it, of our own roles in the communication process. As Hayakawa put it, "Men react to meaningless noises, maps of non-existent territories, as if they stood for actualities, and never suspect that there is anything wrong with the process. . . . To cure these evils, we must first go to work on ourselves. . . . [We must] understand how language works, what we are doing when we open these irresponsible mouths of ours, and what it is that happens, or should happen, when we listen or read."[23]

MODERNITY AND MASS MEDIA

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis and the General Semantics movement focused on making visible the mechanics of representation and interpretation. But for many analysts, the fear of communication that drove their work extended well beyond the individual encounter with language to encompass mass media technologies, capitalism, and modernity itself. In the decades leading up to World War II, Americans had witnessed enormous social and technological change. Between 1900 and 1940 the population of the United States had nearly doubled, from approximately 76 million to 132 million. Wave after wave of immigration, coupled with ever-increasing industrialization, had made America a much more urban society as well. In 1900 almost two out of three American citizens lived in rural areas; in 1940 more than half lived in cities.[24] America had undergone a technological transformation too. In the single lifetime between the end of the Civil War and the start of World War II, Americans had seen the arrival of the telephone, the electric light, air conditioning, the automobile,

the snapshot camera, silent film, sound film, and radio. In the mid-1920s movie houses saw an average of 50 million visits a week—in a country of just over 100 million citizens.[25] Radio, too, had become ubiquitous. In 1924, just four years after the first commercial radio broadcast, Americans had some 3 million radio sets in their homes; by 1937 that number stood nearer to 30 million.[26]

The 1920s in particular saw a dramatic acceleration in industrial capitalism and its attendant hype. America's first self-styled "public relations counsel" and Sigmund Freud's nephew Edward Bernays recalled the 1920s thus:

> Hordes of publicity agents served products and causes. And causes, worthy and unworthy, rushed to take advantage of the new techniques. Any idea could be built up if dealt with skillfully.
>
> Mahjongg, crossword puzzles, Valentino, and Lindbergh's flight were some of the focal points of the era's interest.
>
> Intense attention was given to wooing the public and bringing about adjustment between people and causes. People, tired of war issues, became interested in ballyhoo. Waves of contagious excitement spread over the land in fashions and public issues.[27]

To a number of commentators, and particularly to those on the left, the political propaganda of the 1930s extended the manipulative tactics of commercial advertising into a new and dangerous realm. "Capitalism has developed to the full the techniques of advertising and high-pressure salesmanship in order to get unwanted products into the hands of buyers," wrote popular left-leaning columnist Max Lerner in 1939. "Is it any wonder that those techniques have been taken over by the fascists? Is it any wonder that Hitler should have done us the honor of borrowing our most highly prized manipulative techniques in order to turn them to purposes we never dreamt up? In terms of the swaying of mass emotions Nazism may be summarized as the application of American capitalist techniques to German and middle-class docility."[28]

Lerner and Bernays had lived through the commercial frenzy of the 1920s and the depression that followed. But their writings also embod-

ied a deep fear of a more broadly modern crowd. In the 1920s and 1930s, American intellectuals read a great deal of Freud, but for explanations of collective psychology, many turned back to the writings of French physician Gustave Le Bon. In 1870 and 1871, Le Bon had lived through the defeat of Napoleon's armies, the siege of Paris, and the mob violence of the Paris Commune. In the chaotic decades of the Third Republic that followed, Le Bon came to see crowds as an increasingly common social phenomenon and as emblems of a new mass society. He also saw them as a threat—to collective social order and to individual reason.

In his 1895 volume *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, Le Bon linked their rise to the coming of modernity itself. The rise of industry and science had challenged the religious and political structures of the premodern world, he explained. Cut loose from these institutions, the modern individual found himself swept up into a sea of people who had left their villages, moved into the jammed tenements of the city, and labored in its innumerable factories. Le Bon feared these masses would soon drag France down into barbarism by becoming crowds. By a crowd, Le Bon meant not a simple gathering of people, but what he called "a psychological crowd."[29] Such a gathering had a "mental unity" and was characterized by two distinct features. First, the individuals in such groups had suffered "the disappearance of conscious personality"; and second, they had seen "the turning of their feelings and thoughts in a definite direction."[30]

Both of these features would become important elements of the dominant critique of mass media in America in the years leading up to World War II. In Le Bon's view, a leader could analyze the hidden desires of the individuals in a group and speak to them in a way that would undermine their ability to reason—that is, their "conscious personality." Once exposed to the leader's messages and to the contagious enthusiasm of the group, the individual would enter "a special state" like that of "the hypnotized individual . . . in the hands of the hypnotizer." In hypnosis, he explained, and by analogy, under the sway of the leader and his communicative technique, the individual would become "the slave of all the unconscious activities of his spinal cord, which the hypnotizer directs at will. The conscious personality has entirely vanished; will and discernment are lost. All feelings and thoughts are bent in the direction determined by the hypnotizer."[31]

While Le Bon noted the power of a leader's charisma, he ultimately located the capacity to bind a crowd together in the process of communication and in mass media. The leader, he explained, could be "replaced, though very inefficiently, by the periodical publications which manufacture opinions for their readers and supply them with ready-made phrases which dispense them of the trouble of reasoning."[32] In Le Bon's view, either a live speaker or a paper-and-ink magazine could shut down the individual's reason. The media need only "affirm" and "repeat" a particular message. Over time, the individual would simply forget the origins of the message and would melt into the crowd.[33] Le Bon also harbored a grander, darker notion: "Given the power possessed at present by crowds," he wrote, "were a single opinion to acquire sufficient prestige to enforce its general acceptance, it would soon be endowed with so tyrannical a strength that everything would have to bend before it, and the era of free discussion would be closed for a long time."[34]

WHEN MASS MEDIA MADE MASS MEN

This was in fact Hitler's plan. As Shepard Stone and others noted, Hitler's 1925 memoir *Mein Kampf* argued that the German masses lacked the ability to comprehend complex messages and forgot them almost soon as they did. Thus, propaganda should present simple, single messages over and over again. Above all, it should appeal to the emotions of individual citizens and so enlist their feelings in support of the state. Mass media should be used to centralize the distribution of opinions, to help them flow from the top of the national pyramid down to its wide popular base. They should guarantee that every member of the radio audience should hear the same voice that others heard in person at mass rallies, and that they should feel the same irrational bond to one another and to the Führer.

In part, then, the power of mass media derived from its ability to centralize and distribute the ideas and emotions of a single person or institution. If Hitler and his circle were insane, Nazi-controlled newspapers and radio threatened to pass their madness to their audiences. But for a number of critics, mass media mattered not only for their ability to deliver infectious messages, but also for the patterns of interaction they demanded

of their audiences. To those who believed that Hitler's vision of mass media simply took up where American commercial media left off, the one-to-many dynamic of broadcasting and publishing and moviemaking modeled the top-down, one-to-many power structure of mass society—whether that society was fascist, as in Germany and Italy; communist, as in the Soviet Union; or capitalist, as in the United States. Simply by engaging with mass media, individuals entered into a temporary psychological contract with the forces of mass society. As they watched or read or listened, they couldn't help but turn their minds and feelings in the direction of their society's central powers. At a psychological level, mass media asked them to practice the sort of unreasoning fealty to a single source of illumination demanded of citizens in totalitarian states. Moreover, despite the clear differences in their philosophies, authoritarian regimes were themselves representatives of deeper social forces such as industrialization, modernization, and bureaucracy. For these critics, modernity itself had spawned both the fascist state and mass media, and interaction with each promoted allegiance to the other.

In the 1930s, few critics expressed this view more articulately than Theodor Adorno. Like many of his colleagues at Frankfurt's Institute for Social Research, Adorno had fled Nazi Germany in the early 1930s. In 1938, he made his way to the United States, where the Institute's director, Max Horkheimer, found him a research position at the Princeton Radio Research Project in Princeton, New Jersey, alongside Austrian refugee Paul Lazarsfeld, American sociologist Hadley Cantril, and CBS Research Director Frank Stanton. After his arrival, Adorno penned a series of essays on music and radio, some published and others not, in which he limned the power of the mass media to indoctrinate audiences in the ways of authoritarian society. In the process, he transformed the critique of mass society articulated by Le Bon into a critique of mass *culture* and, specifically, mass *media*. Though his writing in this period would remain largely out of the public eye, much of it would be read by sociologists, social psychologists, and other intellectuals gathering in New York just before the war. Its terms would frame the American debate on mass culture well into the 1960s. And when they were finally translated into English in the early 1970s, several of the essays would help set off a new wave of critical media analysis.

FIGURE 1.3.
As early as the 1930s, theorists on the left and right imagined mass media as a force that could penetrate the home and the mind alike, bringing with it state propaganda. Poster by Lester Beall, 1937. © Dumbarton Arts, LLC / Licensed by VAGA, New York.

Adorno began reading Freud at least as early as 1926.[35] Yet his first essay for the Institute's *Zeitschrift*, "On the Social Situation of Music," published in 1932, took a strictly Marxist line. The social situation of music was the social situation of capitalism in miniature, he explained. Music had become commodified, and mass media had become mechanisms of industrial distribution. "The islands of pre-capitalistic 'music making'—such as the nineteenth century could still tolerate—have been washed away," he argued. "The techniques of radio and sound film, in the hands of powerful monopolies and in unlimited control over the total capitalistic propaganda machine, have taken possession of even the innermost cell of musical practices of domestic music making."[36] Even from a distance of many decades we can almost hear Hitler's soldiers knocking on the door, breaking down cells of musical resistance, flattening German society. But for all its emphasis on the cultural violence wrought by mass media, Adorno's essay left out issues of individual psychology.[37]

In 1936, however, Adorno began to integrate Freud into his essays on music. In his essay "On Jazz," published that year in the *Zeitschrift*, Adorno described jazz as the musical equivalent of a detective novel: generic, hyperstylized, commodified. Jazz was also very much about sex, he thought. Jazz played on the listener's unconscious libidinal desires—so much so, wrote Adorno, that "one would like to designate the symbolic representation of sexual union as the manifest dream content of jazz." Behind that dream content lurked another, more sinister reality: the transformation of the seemingly pleasant experience of listening into the work of aligning one's psyche with the social order. For Adorno, the conventional structure of the jazz tune modeled both the structure and the affective content of interpersonal relations in industrial society. The verse of a traditional jazz tune, he explained, spoke in the voice of "the individual . . . as if in isolation"; the chorus, by contrast, spoke of the pleasures of joining the social whole. During the course of listening, Adorno theorized, the individual experienced himself as a "couplet-ego"—that is, as a follower of the emotional lead taken by the song itself. According to Adorno, the individual listener first identified with the solitary voice of the verse, then melted into the crowd. He "feels himself transformed in the refrain," wrote Adorno. "He identifies himself with

the collective of the refrain, merges with it in the dance, and thus finds sexual fulfillment."[38]

In short, like the children of authoritarian parents, listeners to jazz found their individual desires bound to the will of the social collective through their participation in communication. Yet music did not simply manipulate their unconscious minds. It also restructured them. As Adorno put it, "The person of the amateur [listener] is the subjective correlative of an objective formal structure [in the music]."[39] That is, through its conventional structuring of sound, the jazz tune brought to life a conventional structure of feeling in the listener—one that mirrored the structure of the individual mind in mainstream society, and one that helped shape and maintain that mind's likeness to the mainstream ideal. By playing on the unconscious emotions of a listener, jazz helped turn his feelings in the direction of allegiance to the dominant structures and ideologies of the listener's society. In other words, it helped make a listener a certain kind of *citizen*.

During the three years that Adorno worked on the Princeton project, he applied his critique of the psychological power of media with a ferocious rhetorical bite.[40] He steadily attacked both popular music and the radio as if they were themselves the Nazi forces that had driven him from Europe. "The liquidation of the individual is the real signature of the new musical situation," he exclaimed in a 1938 essay for the reconstituted Institute for Social Research's *Zeitschrift*, "On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening."[41] Written in the same year that saw the anti-Jewish pogrom of Kristallnacht and the German annexation of Austria, Adorno's essay echoed with despair:

> It can be asked whom music for entertainment still entertains. Rather, it seems to complement the reduction of people to silence, the dying out of speech as expression, the inability to communicate at all. It inhabits the pockets of silence that develop between people molded by anxiety, work and undemanding docility. Everywhere it takes over, unnoticed, the deadly sad role that fell to it in the time and the specific situation of the silent films. It is perceived purely as background. If nobody can any longer speak, then certainly nobody can any longer listen.[42]

According to Adorno, the power of music to silence the individual grew out of its power to undermine the individual reason—a power that itself grew out of the industrial structure of the music industry. Building on his Marxist critique of 1932, Adorno suggested that industrial music production had managed to produce the illusion of "impulse" and "subjectivity" that characterized true art, but only that.[43] In the process it had brought out the most infantile impulses in its listeners. Tucked comfortably into beds of popular sound, Adorno's listeners became children and, at the same time, the sorts of unconscious denizens of the crowd described by Gustave Le Bon:

> Not only do the listening subjects lose, along with the freedom of choice and responsibility, the capacity for conscious perception of music, but they stubbornly reject the possibility of such perception. They fluctuate between comprehensive forgetting and sudden dives into recognition. They listen atomistically and dissociate what they hear, but precisely in this dissociation they develop certain capacities which accord less with the concepts of traditional esthetics than with those of football and motoring.[44]

In Adorno's essay, popular music not only speaks for the larger social order but—in its generic, mass-produced structures—actually *models* that order. When it engages listeners, it forces them to *imitate* its own dissociation from authentic feeling and authentic art. Listeners become unaware of their own predicament even as they become ever more standardized parts in a mechanistic social order. And if they start to come to adult awareness, the entertainment industry will quickly put them back in the nursery: "Together with sport and film, mass music and the new listening help to make escape from the whole infantile milieu impossible," declared Adorno.[45]

In 1938 the political consequences of infantilization were clear: in a sense, all of Germany seemed to be playing a horrible game of follow-the-leader. Adorno drove the point home in a 1941 article for the English-language edition of the *Zeitschrift, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, entitled "On Popular Music." As he and his coauthor, George Simpson, pointed out, Americans had endowed popular music "with the halo of free choice" even as the music industry had limited and standardized the

choices available.[46] With its glamour and banality, popular music sparked "child-behavior."[47] It also gave rise to particular character types. According to Adorno and Simpson, music facilitated "adjustment" to mainstream society in two ways, each "corresponding to two major socio-psychological types of mass behavior toward music in general and popular music in particular, the 'rhythmically obedient' type and the 'emotional' type."[48] By the first group, Adorno meant young radio listeners and especially those who danced the jitterbug. For Adorno, dance was a mode of accommodation. To dance to popular music was to rehearse one's alienation and at the same time, by attaching oneself emotionally to the pleasure system of the existing society, to increase that alienation. In the frantic footwork of the jitterbugs, Adorno seemed to hear the mechanical drumbeat of goose-stepping soldiers. The "rhythmically obedient" types, he wrote, were the "most susceptible to a process of masochistic adjustment to authoritarian collectivism."[49] They were not the only ones, however. Adorno's "emotional type" also put himself under the sway of the social order. In the jazz hall as well as the movie theater, Adorno explained, emotional individuals could experience the possibility of happiness denied in real life. Having thus had their wishes satisfied, albeit by an illusion, citizens would retreat from the barricades of political change to the safety of their fantasies.

Adorno's essay offered an early model of how communication could shape individual character and be shaped by it. It substantially extended the range of forces that Freudian psychiatrists had described as shaping the libidinal structure of the individual. In Adorno's theory of popular music, Le Bon's theory of mass media as thought leader returned as well: affirmed and repeated, the emotional messages of pop music had undermined the reason of listeners and opened them up to the pleasures of masochistic obedience. Moreover, the listener had become always and everywhere a citizen. In his late 1930s writings on popular music, Adorno politicized the psychological process of listening. To hear, to dance, to drift off to sleep while the radio played—at the edge of World War II, Adorno depicted these bits of everyday life as political acts. In his writing, as in that of many of his American contemporaries, the psyche itself had become a battleground in the struggle against fascism. And for Adorno at least, mass culture and mass media were on the wrong side.

FIGURE 1.4.
Hermann Goering at the microphone, 1935. American press reports in the late 1930s often suggested that Hitler and his colleagues were perverse, mentally unstable, or insane. Many Americans feared that mass media might provide conduits through which such leaders could infect an entire population with their madness. Photograph by Three Lions. © Getty Images. Used by permission.

THE WAR OF THE WORLDS

In the late 1930s, no event brought Adorno's point home to more Americans than the CBS radio network's broadcast of *The War of the Worlds*. At eight o'clock in the evening on the night before Halloween, 1938, Orson Welles's Mercury Theatre on the Air set loose a nationwide panic by broadcasting its adaptation of H. G. Wells's famous novel. Across the

country, listeners could hear what purported to be eyewitness accounts of Martian landings in and around New Jersey. The ferocious aliens shot off heat rays, launched gas attacks, and marched across the landscape in hideous spider-like machines. American bomber pilots dove to their deaths as they tried to destroy the invaders. Local police and military forces were completely overwhelmed. Only after the aliens succumbed to a massive bacterial infection did the assault come to an end.

According to what remains the most authoritative study of events that evening, Hadley Cantril's *The Invasion from Mars*, somewhere between four and twelve million people heard the broadcast.[50] At the start of the show, an announcer clearly stated that it was a radio drama and not a news account. CBS also interrupted the hour-long broadcast four times for station announcements and other business. Some 60 percent of local stations carrying the show also interrupted it on their own initiative to remind listeners that it was a play.[51] Despite these reminders, though, citizens from Newark to Omaha mistook the play for news, and panicked. The next day, the *New York Times* reported that during the broadcast, weeping citizens had flooded the switchboard of the *Providence Journal* in Rhode Island; hundreds of doctors and nurses volunteered for hospital service in Newark, New Jersey; and in that same town some twenty families on a single block had fled their homes, wet towels over their faces, believing that a gas raid was underway.[52]

In the wake of the broadcast, Cantril and his colleagues interviewed many who had panicked. Their interview with Sylvia Holmes, a housewife in Newark, gives some feel for the fears they uncovered:

> We listened, getting more and more excited. We all felt the world was coming to an end. Then we heard "Get gas masks!" That was the part that got me. I thought I was going crazy. . . . I guess I didn't know what I was doing. I stood on the corner waiting for a bus and I thought every car that came along was a bus and I ran out to get it. People saw how excited I was and tried to quiet me, but I kept saying over and over again to everybody I met: "Don't you know New Jersey is destroyed by the Germans—it's on the radio." I was all excited and I knew that Hitler didn't appreciate President Roosevelt's telegram a couple of weeks ago. While the U.S. thought every-

thing was settled, they came down unexpected. The Germans are so wise they were in something like a balloon and when the balloon landed—that's when they announced the explosion—the Germans landed.

When Holmes finally turned the radio to another station, she remembered, "It was eleven o'clock and we heard it announced that it was only a play. It sure felt good—just like a burden was lifted off me."[53]

Holmes's response was somewhat extreme, but her illogic was common among those who thought the broadcast had been news. In the wake of the panic, newspaper columnists, government officials, and media analysts such as Cantril all struggled to make sense of what had happened. Many commentators pointed to the international political situation as a key source of the confusion. In the weeks leading up to the broadcast, Neville Chamberlain had visited Hitler in Berlin on his infamous mission of appeasement. The Nazis had occupied Austria some months before; then, on October 15, they had occupied Czechoslovakia. In America these events had been accompanied by a series of news flashes—the same format in which Welles had couched his radio play. The editorial committee of the *New York Times* made the connection explicitly. In a column entitled "Terror by Radio," they opined: "Common sense might have warned the projectors of this broadcast that our people are just recovering from a psychosis brought on by fear of war. But the trouble goes much deeper than that. It is inherent in the method of radio broadcasting as maintained at present in this country."[54]

The editorialists of the *Times* went on to argue that by blurring entertainment and news, Welles and company had made it all too easy for listeners to mistake one for the other. Yet their use of the word "psychosis" is revealing as well. For journalists as for social psychologists in this period, the primary terms in which to interpret the power of mass media and particularly radio were psychological. In perhaps the most widely circulated contemporary response to the panic, nationally syndicated columnist Dorothy Thompson argued that the *War of the Worlds* broadcast had proven "how easy it is to start a mass delusion."[55] Its producers, she explained, "have uncovered the primeval fears lying under the thinnest surface of the so-called civilized man." According to Thompson, the radio

broadcast had circumvented and thus subverted the reason of listeners. It had triggered their deepest fears. And it had left them crazed for some sort of salvation by those in authority. By revealing this process, she argued, "Mr. Orson Welles and his theater have made a greater contribution to an understanding of Hitlerism, Mussolinism, Stalinism, anti-Semitism and all the other terrorisms of our times than all the words about them that have been written by reasonable men."

In Thompson's view, the broadcast had revealed a key mechanism of fascist formation in action, and one that threatened American democracy from within as well as without. Thompson explained that "the technique of modern mass politics calling itself democracy is to create a fear—a fear of economic royalists, or of Reds, or of Jews, or of starvation, or of an outside enemy—and exploit that fear into obtaining subservience in return for protection." And as the broadcast of *War of the Worlds* had demonstrated, the radio could be an ideal instrument for the transmission of terror. "The power of mass suggestion is the most potent force today," Thompson explained. It had brought the dictators of Europe to power, and it kept them there too. What's more, Thompson feared that it could easily turn Americans not simply into hysterics, but into political fanatics. "If people can be frightened out of their wits by mythical men from Mars, they can be frightened into fanaticism by the fear of Reds."

In Adorno's view, fanaticism was a feature of the listening situation itself. Radio and popular music bypassed reason, reached down into the unconscious emotions of listeners, and bound them to the distant rhythms of the jitterbug and the dictator's speech. For Thompson, the atomizing tendencies of modern industrial society and the terrific political and economic upheavals of the 1930s had created a vulnerable individual. Modern social conditions had untethered individuals from the local social worlds that sustained their identities. And in both Nazi Germany and the panic-stricken, demagogue-fearing United States of 1938, mass media amplified the individual's fear of his or her own vulnerability. At the same time, in the sorts of listening situations analyzed by Adorno, mass media presented individuals with opportunities to escape their isolation, to submit themselves to a higher authority, and to join other sufferers in a single mass. In these ways, to these and many other critics, radio and

other mass communication media threatened to turn American citizens into fascists. Adorno, Thompson, and their fellow journalists and scholars varied in their accounts of how the transformation would occur, but by 1938, virtually all agreed: Mass communication could turn the individual personality and, with it, the structure of society as a whole in a totalitarian direction.

2

World War II and the Question of National Character

As America edged closer to World War II, the fear that mass media could make mass men forced intellectuals and policy makers to confront two questions: First, how could they convince democratic Americans to go to war without turning them into the sort of unthinking authoritarians they would be trying to defeat? And second, what kinds of media could they use to do it? These questions in turn raised the question of national character. In Germany—which remained the touchstone case for American intellectuals, despite Japanese predations in Asia and Italian advances in Africa—Hitler's astute use of mass communication seemed to have amplified authoritarian tendencies already alive in German society. Analysts began to wonder what psychological tendencies might be native to American society. Was there such a thing as a "democratic personality?" And if so, what were its characteristics? And what forms of communication might strengthen it sufficiently to confront its increasingly battle-hardened totalitarian counterpart?

In the first years of World War II, two groups of social scientists began to develop answers to these questions. One group, consisting of psychologists and psychiatrists, had already turned away from Freudian orthodoxy toward developmental models of the self and, with them, visions of a flexible, collaborative personality. The other group, consisting of cultural anthropologists, had ventured into the Native American West and the wilds of Polynesia in search of alternatives to modern industrial societies and had begun to rethink the whole of American culture. Together these communities began to imagine an American society that would acknowledge

tions of the project, they've pushed me very hard and in the nicest possible ways to reach farther with this book, to sharpen its arguments, and to make them more explicitly relevant to the media cultures of today. I'm deeply grateful to every one of them.

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Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. McLuhan, *Understanding Media,* 48.
2. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality.*
3. As starting points into this literature, see Belgrad, *The Culture of Spontaneity;* Classen, *Watching Jim Crow,* Joselit, *Feedback;* Kuznick and Gilbert, *Rethinking Cold War Culture;* Monson, *Freedom Sounds;* Spigel, *TV by Design.*
4. See Doherty, *Projections of War* and *Cold War, Cool Medium;* McCarthy, *The Citizen Machine;* Spigel, *Welcome to the Dreamhouse.*
5. This book thus builds on the growing body of literature on the politics of attention. See, for instance, Crary, *Suspensions of Perception;* Mirzoeff, *The Right to Look;* Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics.*

CHAPTER ONE

1. Stone, "Hitler's Showmen Weave a Magic Spell." *New York Times,* December 3,1933, SM8–9, 8.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. Some Americans saw Hitler as the latest iteration of a totalitarianism that had emerged earlier in Stalin's Soviet Union and Mussolini's Italy. Especially in the early 1930s, analysts often considered Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism as three variations of the same phenomenon. As the decade wore on, however, the German case began to exert a primary hold on the American intellectual imagination. For an astute and comprehensive analysis of American attitudes toward totalitarianism in this period, see Alpers, *Dictators, Democracy, and American*

Public Culture, 1–156. See also Thomas R. Maddux, "Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism."

4. Thompson, *I Saw Hitler!,* quoted in Alpers, *Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture,* 40.
5. McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler,* 624.
6. Gary, *Nervous Liberals,* 392.
7. Scott Beekman, "Pelley, William Dudley," *American National Biography Online* Dec. 2009. http://www.anb.org/articles/15/15-01310.html?a=1&n=pelley%2C%20william%20dudley&d=10&ss=0&q=1. Accessed May 1, 2012.
8. Diamond, *The Nazi Movement in the United States,* 217–22.
9. Ibid., 222.
10. "22,000 Rally in Garden; Police Check Foes," *New York Times,* February 21, 1939; 1,5; 5.
11. Ibid.
12. "The 'American Nazis' Claim 200,000 Members." *Life,* March 27 1937, 20–21. For an analysis of *Life*'s coverage of American fascists in the years leading up to the war, see Gary, "The Pitiless Spotlight of Publicity" in Doss, *Looking at Life Magazine,* 77–102.
13. "Fascism in America." *Life,* March 6,1939, 57–63. The *Life* story was only one of many of this kind. See also Johan J. Smertenko, "Hitlerism Comes to America," *Harper's Magazine,* November 1933, 660–70; Ludwig Lore, "Nazi Politics in America," *Nation,* November 29 1933, 615–17; Raymond Gram Swing, "Patriotism Dons the Black Shirt," *Nation,* April 10, 1935, 409–11; Charles Angoff, "Nazi Jew-Baiting in America, Part 1," *Nation,* May 1, 1935, 501–3; Charles Angoff, "Nazi Jew-Baiting in America, Part 2," *Nation,* May 8, 1935, 531–35; Stanley High, "Star-Spangled Fascists," *Saturday Evening Post,* May 27, 1939, 5–7, 70–73; Dale Kramer, "The American Fascists," *Harper's Magazine,* September 1940, 380–93.
14. Leo Ribuffo, "Review: Fascists, Nazis and American Minds: Perceptions and Preconceptions"; Gary, *Nervous Liberals,* 9, 79–80; Alpers, *Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture,* 77–80.
15. Kramer, "The American Fascists," 391.
16. "These Are Signs of Nazi Fifth Columns Everywhere." *Life,* June 17, 1940, 10–13.
17. Gary, *Nervous Liberals,* 79–80.
18. Marks, "The Idea of Propaganda in America," 232.
19. Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy,* 132.
20. Marks, "The Idea of Propaganda in America," 235–36.
21. Chase, *The Tyranny of Words,* 351–52.
22. Hayakawa, introduction to *Language in Action,* xii.
23. Hayakawa, *Language in Action,* 37.

24. Carter, *Historical Statistics of the United States,* online edition: http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/6313765. Accessed May 5, 2012.
25. Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy,* 35.
26. "3 million" from Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy,* 33; "nearer to 30 million" from Cantril, "Propaganda and Radio," 87. In 1937, Cantril noted that approximately 26,869,000 homes had radios, allowing 75 percent of the population to listen at the same time (ibid.).
27. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion,* 1961 preface, xxxvi.
28. Lerner, *It's Later Than You Think,* 35.
29. Le Bon, *The Crowd,* 2.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.,7.
32. Ibid.,74.
33. Ibid., 78.
34. Ibid., 99.
35. Müller-Dohm, *Adorno,* 98.
36. Adorno, "On the Social Situation of Music," 391.
37. This is true of other essays he wrote on music and mass culture in these years as well, essays such as "Kitsch" (1932), "Farewell to Jazz" (1933), and "Music in the Background" (1934), all reprinted in Adorno et al., *Essays on Music.*
38. Adorno, "On Jazz" in Adorno et al., *Essays on Music,* 470–495; 487.
39. Ibid., 483.
40. It is tempting to read the outrage in Adorno's essays in this period as evidence of his resistance to the pro-industrial orientation of the project. But the situation was undoubtedly more complicated. He and Lazarsfeld shared many friends at the institute, most notably Horkheimer, and many of whom also shared Adorno's Marxist-Freudian orientation. Moreover, the sorts of questions he asked of media, if not the leftist idiom in which he asked them, would have been congenial to Hadley Cantril, a social psychologist trained by one of the foremost American theorists of personality in that era, Gordon Allport. Adorno has often and rightly been depicted as an outsider to the project's core mission, and his status there has been offered up as evidence of the fundamental contradictions between critical and administrative research. Yet the focus on Adorno's differences with his colleagues has also made it harder to see how he fused the character theory first explored by Erich Fromm in his 1920s research into authoritarianism in the German family with the analysis of mass media, and how he brought that fusion into American intellectual life. See Fromm, "Sozopsychologischer Teil" (English abstract), in Institut für Sozialforschung, *Studien über Autoritat und Familie,* 916, and Fromm, *The Working Class in Weimar Germany,* 208–10, for more on Fromm's work in this area.

41. Adorno, "On the Fetish-Character in Music," 276.
42. Ibid., 271.
43. Ibid., 273.
44. Ibid., 286.
45. Ibid., 287.
46. Adorno, "On Popular Music," in Adorno et al., *Essays on Music*, 445.
47. Ibid., 450.
48. Ibid., 460.
49. Ibid.
50. Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars*, 56. See also Sconce, *Haunted Media*, 110–18.
51. Ibid., 44.
52. "Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact," *New York Times*, October 31, 1938, 1.
53. Holmes, quoted in Cantril, *Invasion from Mars*, 53–54.
54. "Terror by Radio," unsigned editorial, *New York Times*, November 1, 1938, 22.
55. Thompson, "On the Record," November 2, 1938, New York Tribune Inc.; rpt. Koch, Howard, *The Panic Broadcast*, 92–93; 92. All subsequent quotations are from this column.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Taylor, *Strategy of Terror*, 2–3.
2. Ibid., 41–42.
3. Ibid., 63.
4. Ibid., 168.
5. Laurie, *Propaganda Warriors*, 15–28.
6. For a list, see Angell, "The Civilian Morale Agency."
7. The William Allen White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, for instance, sought to counter the efforts of the America First Committee to keep the United States out of the war; the Federal Union, founded by *New York Times* journalist Clarence Streit, advocated linking the Western democracies into a single antifascist front.
8. Pope, "The Importance of Morale," 203.
9. Ibid., 205.
10. Steele, *Propaganda in an Open Society*, 88–93.
11. Arthur Upham Pope, letter to Kenneth W. Hechler, July 7, 1942, "CNM 'H' Misc." folder, carton 3, Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. Records, 1923–1948, call no.: 87-M111. Repository: Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute.
12. Arthur Upham Pope, letter to C. J. Friedrich, February 27, 1941. Arthur Upham Pope papers, "Committee for National Morale, 1940–1941" folder, carton 3, Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. Records, 1923–1948, call no. 87-M111. Repository: Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute.
13. Allport, "Morale, American Style," 2, 5, HUG 4118.50, box 1, folder 2, Gordon Allport papers; quoted in Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 52.
14. Farago et al., *German Psychological Warfare*, 51.
15. Ibid., 86.
16. Allport, "The Nature of Democratic Morale," in Watson, ed., *Civilian Morale*, 18; quoted in Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 48.
17. Frank, "Freedom for the Personality," quoted in Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 121.
18. Brennecke et al., *Nazi Primer*, 5.
19. Ibid., 31.
20. Ibid., 28.
21. Ibid., 33.
22. Ibid., 20.
23. See Meyerowitz, "How Common Culture Shapes the Separate Lives: Sexuality, Race, and Mid-Twentieth-Century Social Constructionist Thought," 1057–84.
24. Brennecke et al., *Nazi Primer*, 59.
25. See Norwood, *The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*.
26. Emerson, quoted in Nicholson, *Inventing Personality*, 5.
27. For a history of this shift, see Lears, *No Place of Grace*.
28. Ian A. M. Nicholson, *Inventing Personality*, 5–6.
29. Ibid., 13; see also Pandora, *Rebels within the Ranks*, 25.
30. Allport, "Gordon W. Allport," in Lindzey et al., *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, 10.
31. Allport, *Personality*, 48; quoted in Hall and Lindzey, *Theories of Personality*, 262.
32. Lewin, "Krieglandschaft (War Landscape)."
33. Marrow, *The Practical Theorist*, 11; Heider, "On Lewin's Methods and Theory," 7.
34. Lewin et al., "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" 271.
35. Reported ibid., 271–99.
36. McLaughlin, "How to Become a Forgotten Intellectual," 116.
37. These were "Politics and Psychoanalysis" (1931), "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Relevance for Social Psychology" (1932), and "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology" (1932).
38. Fromm, "Analytic Social Psychology," 160, fn. 32 (fn. written in 1970).
39. Fromm, "Analytic Social Psychology," 160.